Civic Culture: Scotland’s Struggle for its Political Interests

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ABSTRACT

Politics today is facing a troubling trend towards the empowerment of nationalist movements. With strong historical traditions and a powerful Scottish National Party, Scotland would appear to be a prime candidate for such movements. However, this thesis argues that Scotland represents a nation with a unique civic culture. This thesis seeks to determine which elements of Scottish political and cultural history have led to its modern day civic culture, in the form of a civic nationalism, or patriotism. It asks: why is Scottish nationalism unique, and why does it matter?

To answer, I have broken down the thesis into three main chapters that consider the theories of nationalism that are significant to the study of Scottish nationalism, the foundations of Scottish nationalism, and how Scottish nationalism manifests itself in civic contexts. The results reflect that Scottish civic culture deeply permeates the nation’s politics. Even when given the opportunity for independence, Scotland chose to remain a part of the United Kingdom in order to maintain its interests with the European Union. And, while political cultures are subject to rapid change, the current state of Scottish culture reflects a civic manifestation.
This thesis looks at how Scotland represents a political nation that resists instinctive, exclusive political decisions, despite its history as a strong and proud nation. This paper is organized in a way to give an overview of what national identity is, and what nationalism means, as well as what Scottish national identity means and how it influences Scottish politics. The question I asked was: How is Scottish nationalism unique, and why does it matter? I determined that in Scottish politics, both the Scottish people and the Scottish government act in a way that is very open to interconnected, international interactions, such as those found in the European Union. Scottish nationalism, or patriotism, embodies a love for their own nation, while keeping an open mind to other nations and countries. In addition, the Scottish nation is willing to put aside its drive for independence for the greater good of what they want to accomplish politically.
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# Table of Contents

## Introduction

- National Identity and Nationalism ................................................................. 7
  - Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7
  - Theories of the Nation ....................................................................................... 8
    - Ethnic Communities and the Nation ............................................................... 10
  - Nationalism ....................................................................................................... 13
    - Ethnic and Civic Nationalism ........................................................................ 13
    - National Autonomy and State Sovereignty .................................................... 17
    - Theories of Nationalism .................................................................................. 18
    - Nationalist Violence ....................................................................................... 21
  - National Identity ................................................................................................ 21
    - National Identity and Legitimacy .................................................................... 26
  - Neo-Nationalism ................................................................................................ 27
  - Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 28

## The Scottish Nation

- History of Scottish Nationalism .......................................................................... 29
- Governing Scotland .............................................................................................. 32
  - Scotland’s Objectives ....................................................................................... 34
- Nationalism in Scotland ......................................................................................... 37
  - Scottish Nationalism under the United Kingdom ............................................ 38
  - Scottish Nationalism as Civic Nationalism ..................................................... 41
  - Contemporary Scottish Nationalism ................................................................. 42
  - Significance of Scottish Nationalism ................................................................. 44
- National Identity in Scotland ............................................................................... 45
  - Heterogenous Scottish National Culture .......................................................... 47
  - Contemporary Scottish and British identities .................................................... 48
  - Layering of Identities ....................................................................................... 50
Introduction

In the midst of nationalist and populist movements across the world, Scotland stands out as a model for a different kind of nationalism. It also represents a reimagining of nationalism that emerged after a revived Scottish nation began to take shape. The result was a Scottish nationalism driven in political contexts by political interests, rather than a nationalism driven by historical identities or cultural interests. In fact, the civic nature of the Scottish nation could be said to demonstrate a civic culture or civic patriotism, distinct from the typical understandings of nationalism.

Scotland has long been seen as fiercely proud nation. Despite its political connection to the United Kingdom (UK), it remains distinct in many ways, and fights to maintain some degree of political control. Given the opportunity to vote for its sovereign freedom from the UK in the Scottish Independence Referendum, however, Scotland did not vote for independence. Instead, it voted 55.30% “No” to the question of whether Scotland should be an independent country in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Leading up to this vote, there was apprehension, as the fervently proud Scots were predicted to vote for independence. Yet, as we saw, the vote did not conclude as projected. Among the many nationalist and isolationist policies arising across Europe, why did the Scottish people not choose to assert their independence as a state? What is it that makes Scottish nationalism different from the nationalisms we see across Europe? And, why does it seek change through democratic means?

More recently, Scotland, and the rest of the UK, voted in the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (Brexit), where they voted to either Leave or Remain.

in the European Union. The turnout of this vote was an overall majority to Leave the EU. However, the component part of Scotland voted to remain. This difference in interests and priorities has marked the beginning of a discussion between the two countries, as well as a dialogue amongst the Scots, as to what this means for Scotland going forward. In the aftermath, Scotland has asserted its own interests and its alignment with Europe, and has made clear to Westminster its priorities. Given this, we must ask: What does Brexit mean for Scottish nationalism? What impact did Scottish nationalism have on the Brexit outcome? And how could Scottish nationalist sentiments respond to the UK moving forward with Brexit against the popular will of Scotland?

Ultimately, the primary research question driving this thesis is: What makes Scottish nationalism unique and why does it matter? In answer, I argue that Scottish nationalism is a form of nationalism, driven by the goal of maintaining and preserving Scottish interests and a sense of Scottishness. It can also be argued to be a form of civic patriotism or civic culture emerging from its old nationalism. It is motivated from within, but it is a more open form of nationalism than we see in many other cases. It matters because in the midst of isolationist and nationalist movements across Europe, Scotland voted ‘no’ to its independence, and voted ‘yes’ to be a part of an arguably weakening European Union. I also argue that Scotland exhibits a form of neo-nationalism in political contexts. And while Scottish people may fall back on culturally, historically driven nationalist sentiments in cultural contexts, political contexts allow for a Scottish nationalism that seeks outcomes to maintain Scottish interests.

Nationalism has a difficult, brutal past and has left many nations politically and culturally uncertain when facing national changes. As outlined by Margaret Scott in “Ulil’s Icon”, Benedict Anderson emphasizes that “how, over our bitter century, the idea of nationalism has lost its
optimism: yet the need to believe in the nation lingers.” During the 20th century, nationalism became difficult to support and difficult to see as a positive force. Yet, Anderson sets out that there is still a hopeful element attached to the nation. In addition, he suggests that “every document of civilization is also a document of barbarism. Yet, despite this, ‘don’t most of us want, against the odds, to give our nations another chance?’ This he calls a persistent wish among most of us to see some goodness in nations… And, as Anderson ends these essays, ‘In these strained millennial times, can such Goodness by profitably discarded?’ Nationalism has a complicated past and has many terrible elements attached to it, but Anderson recognizes that there is still a need to see some goodness; there is still a need to find some positive element in the future of the nation and nationalism. This thesis suggests such an element of goodness in the past, present and future of the Scottish nation, and what could be understood as Scottish nationalism, or its civic culture, in general.

The following chapters attempt to explain nationalism as it is understood through a primarily constructivist framework, the specifics of a modernist view of Scottish nationalism, the origins of Scottish nationalism and Scottish national identity, as well as how we see Scottish neo-nationalism manifesting itself in recent constitutional votes.

The first chapter will focus on theories of national identity and nationalism, and act as an introduction to the concepts that underlie our understanding of international relations. It will cover theories of the nation, theories of nationalism and theories of national identity. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how these ideas relate to one another as well as to explain

3 Ibid.
their potential implication in international politics. Furthermore, the following chapters will be based on the theoretical foundations established in this chapter.

The second chapter will address the specifics of Scottish nationalism and national identity in an attempt to explain how Scottish nationalism differs from other forms of nationalism. The chapter will also outline some of the basic elements of the Scottish government, as well as the government’s responses to the Brexit vote. It will act as a starting point to illustrate how non-violent nationalist sentiments can have significant impacts on not only the nations themselves, but the state within which they are contained. Furthermore, it will serve to highlight how nationalisms can have impacts outside of the state and how they represent broader nationalist tides. In the case of Scotland, there are immediate and direct implications of its identities, sentiments, and politics on Britain as a whole. There are also relevant interactions between national, state and supranational identities.

The third chapter will cover Scottish neo-nationalism, and illustrate how it is evident in current political debates, where it often eluded to, but does not necessarily drive desires for independence or desires for autonomy from the EU. The chapter will explain the roots of Scottish neo-nationalism (sometimes referred to synonymously with Scottish civic nationalism) and how it can impact Scottish voters, given a political, or civic, context. It will also set out the case for a civic patriotism or civic culture as emerging from its transforming nationalism. Because it is a form of nationalism that coincides with civic contexts, the results are not always what one might expect from a people and a government often driven by nationalist sentiments. Instead, the results reflect a nationalism concerned with Scottish interests as well as a more open, flexible and adaptable conception of what those interests entail. This unique form of nationalism represents a unique difficulty in predicting or understanding political outcomes or constitutional
voters as simply being a proponent of Scottish nationalism is not enough to ensure a drive for independence.

Non-violent nationalisms are often overlooked. It can be said that, in many cases, the urgent crowds out the important. However, it is not in the immediate actions of the nation, or state, that the dangers lie. Scottish nationalism represents a form of nationalism that is often overlooked, wherein political interests outweigh cultural or historical interests, given a political context. Although the delineation of civic and ethnic nationalisms is often criticized, this thesis seeks to explore Scottish nationalism as civic, in civic contexts, while not suggesting that ethnic forms are somehow illiberal. Instead, Scottish neo-nationalism highlights a tendency for Scottish voters and the Scottish government to emphasize political issues, as an entire nation, rather than cultural ones.

This thesis will engage in qualitative and theoretical methods, following a primarily constructivist framework of nationalism, as well as a modernist framework of Scottish nationalism in particular. Using Scotland as a case study of civic nationalism, or civic culture, this thesis will expand on the previously discussed topics of nationalism, Scottish nationalism, civic nationalism, civic culture, civic patriotism, as well as examine how they manifest themselves in constitutional votes and the discourse surrounding the issues.

This thesis will also engage in some discourse analysis in Chapter Three that highlights the role of the Scottish Government in disseminating nationalist sentiments to the Scottish people, and the tone that that sentiment takes.

The constructivist approach is not one that was predetermined at the outset of this thesis. However, as research progressed, it became clear that constructivism not only provides a suitable framework for the study of nationalism, but allowed for a more flexible interpretation of actors
and concepts in international relations. With that said, the complex nature of nationalism considered in relation to concepts such as legitimacy and sovereignty requires the contribution of perspectives outside of constructivism.

Constructivism can be thought of “as an approach to, rather than a theory of, international relations” when used to rethink ideas of identity. Due to constructivism’s willingness to link identity to nationhood and statehood it “may be in certain instances better equipped to deal with newly arising questions in contemporary international politics than other theories.”

Ultimately, constructivism focuses on “the meanings actors give to their actions and with the identities of these actors. Hence, the defining maxim of the constructivist approach is that ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. In other words, “constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life.” However, the third chapter turns to the order in that anarchy and the ways in which it shifts and responds to pressures from various actors.

National identities are what gives meaning to the actions of nations and are essentially, “the basis of interests.” In the case of Scottish neo-nationalism, national identities cannot be seen as the same today as they were several hundred years ago. Therefore, the national identity that forms the basis of Scottish interests which then dictates the form of its nationalism has a relatively new, and largely political foundation.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Chapter One

National Identity and Nationalism

“Having a national identity is a bit like having an old insurance policy. You know you’ve
got one somewhere but you’re not entirely sure where it is. And if you’re honest, you
would have to admit you’re pretty vague about what the small print means.”

Introduction

Nationalism and identity studies are often seen as broad, unspecified, and underwhelming. However, once we begin to uncover the nuance of the field, and apply those generalities to
specific situations, we can understand issues of substance. To start, it must be understood that
nationalism and national identities are catch-all concepts for a wide range of theories. While it
could be argued that one should take a single-theory approach, relying on one perspective’s
definitions, this thesis instead suggests we use a more inclusive approach. Rather than remaining
within the parameters of one theory, it is beneficial to have an understanding of the broader
narrative and narrow in on the elements that matter in each case.

Understanding the foundations of nationalisms and national identities is invaluable for
further discussion of its effects on sovereignty and legitimacy in the United Kingdom and in
Europe. Nationalism is frequently overlooked because of its banal nature. Therefore, “We
should approach nationalism, then, with critical attention to its limits, illusions and potential for
abuse but we should not dismiss it. Even where we are deeply critical of the nationalism and
nationalist sentiments we see around us, we should recognize the continued importance of
national solidarities and take on the task of remaking them, and of reshaping the culture of our

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nations.”\textsuperscript{10} This is even more true of civic forms of nationalism. Not only is it easier to overlook, it is in many ways easier to abuse, and its abuse is hidden by the benign face of its seemingly democratic, political characteristics.

Theories of the Nation

Before moving on to theories of national identity and theories of nationalism, I must first cover what exactly the nation is, for the purposes of this analysis. There are many understandings of the nation. This thesis emphasizes the importance of delineating the nation, state, and nation state, especially given the interactions of those entities on an international scale.

Nations are “‘illusory or spurious communities,’ and act as an ‘ideological smoke-screen’.”\textsuperscript{11} They are the products of what Benedict Anderson named ‘imagined communities’. Nations are not predetermined by the universe, nor are its constituent individuals inherently tied to one another. The reality is a community that comes to feel a connection to certain elements, as well as a connection to the other members of the community that emerges from a continued understanding of that nation, rather than its objective existence.

Anderson describes the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”\textsuperscript{12} Firstly, he claims it is imagined because “the embers of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”\textsuperscript{13} It is a sense or sentiment of a community in which members have no tangible ties to one another, yet they feel

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
an intense sense of connection. Secondly, Anderson argues nations are a community, in that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”\textsuperscript{14} Thirdly, the nation is limited. Even in their largest size, there are “finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind.”\textsuperscript{15} This is significant because it suggests that boundaries are a nonnegotiable, if flexible, characteristic of the nation. Following this conception, there are limits upon the cultural and sentimental connections between human beings. The international system as we know it would therefore always have multiple nations. Finally, the nation is “imagined as \textit{sovereign} because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.”\textsuperscript{16} While this distinction has its roots in the past, the requirement of sovereignty in the imagination of nations is not lost today.

Expanding on Anderson’s conception of the nation, Edward Weisband and Courtney Thomas reaffirm that nations are “not naturally occurring and they are not born. They are created.”\textsuperscript{17} Thus, we have some consensus on the man-made, or rather, culturally-made concept of the nation. The nation can either form over many generations, or can have more modern foundations.

With a somewhat different understanding of the nation, Ernest Gellner suggests that two primary elements make up a nation. First, it requires that two people share a culture. Second, it

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
requires that the two people recognize that shared culture\textsuperscript{18}. While this may simplify a complex issue, it addresses the nation as a matter of identity by highlighting self-identification and identification by others, bringing it to the core of this thesis. Claiming a nation requires self-acknowledgement of a shared culture as well as the acceptance of others’ claims to that shared culture. In a similar definition to Anderson’s, Gellner recognizes the communal understanding of national culture. Gellner’s definition, however, does not highlight the ‘imagined’ characteristic of the nation. It lists the shared culture and the recognition of a shared culture as being givens and does not highlight their constructed, imagined nature.

In addition, Weisband and Thomas argue that nationality “is about governance”, in that Gellner’s theory of political legitimacy holds and “the notion of self-determination is central to nationality itself but as a doctrine of legitimacy grounded in popular consent.”\textsuperscript{19} This understanding ties the nation to the nation-state, and essentially suggests that the nation seeks governance in some form and does not exist only as a community of shared identities, but as a community with shared interests.

**Ethnic Community and the Nation**

There is a complex, but clear distinction between a nation and an ethnic community.

According to Weisband and Thomas,

The concept of the nation, therefore, differs from those of race, ethnicity, and religion. It refers to the dynamics of legitimacy and popular consent as the basis for state sovereignty, political governance, and nation-state congruence. A nation is a historical, political-cultural invention or creation that represents the collective identity of a group of people who believe that they hold a common destiny if not a common history\textsuperscript{20}.


\textsuperscript{19} Weisband and Thomas, 72-73.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 77.
This distinction highlights the political nature of the nation. It asserts that while it has its roots in a historical and cultural invention, or construction, that it is the politicization and implementation of those identities that represents the nation’s significance. Furthermore, this delineation of the nation preludes the importance of nations within the broader international system that is to be discussed in chapter three. Scotland exists as a nation without state sovereignty but that is a political and cultural creation that represents the collective identity of the Scottish people, born of a common history.

In discussing the nation, there is a tendency to focus on the cultural elements of that nation, but we must turn from the cultural elements to the political ones because of Scotland’s unique civic culture. It has a strong cultural and historical background but its political culture is important to how Scotland portrays itself globally and acts domestically. While, “culture and history are central to nationalist rhetoric”\(^\text{21}\), it still remains true that “no amount of cultural heritage could have ever given ‘the nation’ the authority were it not expressed in political terms, had this particular community not been invested with a legitimacy which rested on the premise of freedom of ‘the people’ themselves.”\(^\text{22}\) This concept of the nation possessing some authority to incite legitimacy was significant following the Second World War, and remains significant in modern day politics. Although it may not be feasible for every nation to have its own state, nations often nevertheless maintain some authority, and autonomy over themselves as well as having an impact on the trends in international norms and institutions. Or, at least, there is an attempt to assert their interests and goals.

\(^{21}\) Harris, 21-22.
\(^{22}\) Ibid.
Nations and states are distinct, and nations and ethnic communities are distinct. Often nations and states overlap in nation-states, or national states as some refer to it as. However, there are many instances of states forming over multiple nations and nations existing without a congruent state. Anthony Smith defines the nation as, “‘a named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members’.” However, according to Smith, “a nation is not a state and it is not an ethnic community. It is not a state because the concept of the state relates to institutional activity, while the nation denotes a type of community…it is not an ethnic community because, despite some overlap… the ethnic community usually has no political referent, and in many cases lacks a public culture and even a territorial dimension.” This distinction asserts that not only are states and nations different, but that nations and ethnic communities are different as well. The main difference that Smith notes between ethnic communities and nations is that ethnic communities do not have the public culture and often do not have a territorial dimension, and instead rely on the common laws and customs, as well as the myths and histories. Despite this fine distinction, nations and ethnic communities, and subsequently national and ethnic identities, should not be confused for one another.

Erika Harris argues that there are two distinguishing factors between nations and ethnic communities. Firstly, “ethnicity is strictly a cultural trait in which the binding issue is primarily a common ancestry and which is not necessarily attached to any particular legal structure of the state.” This does not mean that the nation is not also cultural, but that it has deeper connections to the state and is not inherently tied to common ancestry or history. Secondly, she argues that

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24 Ibid., 12.
25 Harris, 39.
“while ethnicity may be construed as a fact of one’s cultural heritage, the nation comes with certain values and norms that accompany a more political and territorial discourse.”26 Again, she stresses the political element of the nation, as well as making reference to the territorial element that accompanies national claims highlighting the differences between the nation and ethnicity. In both Harris’s and Smith’s distinctions between ethnic communities and the nation, both the politicization of the identity, as well as the territorial disputes are cited as significant factors.

Briefly, Scotland should be primarily recognized as a nation rather than an ethnic community. It enjoys a political referent dating back before the union and creation of the United Kingdom. In addition, it has a modern public culture which is distinct from the other members of the UK. And finally, it has territorial dimensions that have been upheld by its semi-autonomous nature within the UK.

Nationalism

**Ethnic and civic nationalism**

Much of the literature on Scottish nationalism emphasizes that Scotland is a case of primarily civic, rather than ethnic, nationalism. While this thesis stresses the difference between ethnic and civic nationalism in the political sphere, it is important to recognize that, “each nationalism [ethnic and civic] and nation has elements and dimensions that include both types of nationalism … ‘No nation, no nationalism, can be seen as purely the one or the other, even if at certain moments one or the other of these elements predominate in the ensemble of components

26 Ibid.
of national identity*,”27 In fact, Scottish nationalism is largely civic in political settings, but portrays elements of ethnic nationalism in cultural settings. These tendencies are complex, in that “ethnic and civic tendencies are often identifiable not just between nations, but within them. Nationalist actors within the same nationalist movement may deploy ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation, depending upon the individual and the context in which she is speaking.”28 Therefore, while it is common to identify different nationalisms across different nations, there are also distinctions to be made within those nations as well. Depending on the context, different nationalisms can manifest themselves and influence people and policies.

Having already discussed the difference between nations and ethnic communities, I must now distinguish between ethnic and civic nationalisms. According to Michael Keating, a nationalist theorist and expert on Scottish nationalism, “the literature on nationalism has often recognized two ideal types- the ethnic and the civic…one presents membership of the national community as given, or ascriptive; the other sees individuals voluntarily constituting themselves as a collectivity.”29 Essentially, ethnic identity is given and not chosen. Both nationalisms are “used as a basis for social relations and political mobilization.”30 In the case of civic nationalism, though membership is voluntary, there must also be collective acceptance of each individual into the group. There is some criticism that, “the comparatively civil, liberal discourse of commitment to law and the state’s institutions may in some instances be more reflective of a growing imperative to sanitise (sic.) exclusionary statements than of a newer, more inclusive


30 Ibid.
model of national belonging.” And while, in the case of Scotland, there is a recognized issue of racial exclusion, the global inclusion and the inclusion demonstrated by the Scottish nation is likely not used as a means of sanitizing exclusionary statements. On the contrary, the exclusionary elements of the Scottish nation are often directed at England and widely recognized, therefore lacking the need for sanitization.

Civic nationalism is distinct from ethnic nationalism. It is “a collective enterprise of its members but is rooted in individual assent rather than ascriptive identity. It is based upon common values and institutions, and patterns of social interaction.” Therefore, unlike ethnic nationalism, it is something individuals are capable of choosing. Its common values and institutions enable a connection between people, despite sometimes diverse backgrounds. Scottish nationalism is in some ways ethnic, but there are definite civic elements as well. The majority of Scottish people were born there and have a genealogical history tying themselves to the place. However, that is not always the case; Scottish identity is usually flexible. It allows entrance by people that do not share that inherent, ascriptive identity into the community.

Returning to Gellner’s two requirements for a nation, that two people share a culture and recognize that shared culture, as long as someone has recognized a shared Scottish culture and has been recognized by other people that identify with that culture, and are also accepted by the whole, he or she can claim membership in that community. In civic nationalism, “The bearers of national identity are institutions, customs, historical memories and rational/secular values. Anyone can join the nation irrespective of birth or ethnic origins, though the cost of adaption

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31 Farida Fozdar and Mitchell Low, "'They Have to Abide by Our Laws...And Stuff': Ethnonationalism Masquerading as Civic Nationalism," Nations and Nationalism 21, no. 3 (2015): 538.

32 Keating, 5.
varies.”\textsuperscript{33} Civic nationalism allows broader membership, in general. However, that membership must be approved of by the other members to take effect. Furthermore, a civic national identity must not be confused with citizenship or legal recognition in the group. Although civic nationalism often takes form through political institutions, a membership does not require citizenship. However, “the idea of the civic nation will be inferred from the very principles of constitutional democracy.”\textsuperscript{34} While citizenship is not required, constitutional democracy is fundamental in the creation of a civic nation. And while, “at first glance the two concepts do not seem to be compatible…This incompatibility is somewhat lessened in the case of the civic nation, which comprises its share of universalism from… ‘a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values’.”\textsuperscript{35}

However, it must also be conceded that this distinction itself may not be necessary or always appropriate. Nicholas Xenos argues that perhaps what is called civic nationalism may be better represented by the term patriotism, and that they are not equivalent terms. He begins this discussion with the clarification that, “Patriotism means love of the patria. The proponents of civic nationalism generally take for granted that the patria and the nation are one and the same; that the contemporary form of the patria is the nation.”\textsuperscript{36} He instead suggests that the patria is a constructed experience. Therefore, “The love of the patria, by contrast, is the love of something created and experienced in an immediate way.”\textsuperscript{37} As opposed to the nation which is seen as ascriptive and pre-existing, the patria is love of something not natural. It therefore requires a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{33} Ibid., 5-6.
\bibitem{34} Donald Ipperciel, "Constitutional Democracy and Civic Nationalism," \textit{Nations and Nationalism} 13, no. 3 (2007): 396.
\bibitem{35} Ibid., 395-96.
\bibitem{37} Ibid., 228.
\end{thebibliography}
conscious effort to maintain it and it represents something that transcends the ties of nationalism. It is therefore his conclusion that civic nationalism cannot exist because is an element without that constructed political element. He argues further that, “it is the city that is the embodiment of the patria, not the mythical national family ensconced on its magical bit of territory. The patria is to be loved precisely because it is not ‘natural’ but something created, and hence existing in time.” \(^{38}\) However, Xenos leaves us with the idea that “The concrete experience of the patria, however, is no longer available to most of us because we live in out-scaled, abstract nations. Instead, we have the myth of the national family.” \(^{39}\) From this, we might conclude that individuals identify with the myth of the national family. Nevertheless, that does not change the fact that this myth is treated as real. That being said, perhaps speaking of a civic culture or civic patriotism may be more appropriate. Rather than forcing Scotland to represent a contested form of nationalism, it may be more apt to discuss its civic culture at the root of its political culture and civic patriotism.

**National autonomy and state sovereignty**

Nationalism can refer to the “policies and actions of other national groups living in the territory of the state” \(^{40}\), and is not only limited to the actions of nation-state in power. However, it must be clarified that national autonomy and state sovereignty are not the same. Smith recognizes that these ideas are often conflated and he warns against such a mistake. He argues that autonomous nations can exist in federations, as long as the nation and its will are not

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\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 229.

\(^{40}\) Harris, 39.
hampered in too great a way by the overall state. In the case of Scotland, it has some degree of political autonomy, and may be content to leave it at that. The Scottish referendum vote, where there was an 84.59% turnout of voters, had 55.30% voting ‘no’, and 44.70% voting ‘yes’ to leave the UK. As indicated here, “how ordinary people construe and articulate their national identity does not easily predict their politics, neither which party they vote for, nor their constitutional preference.” It takes the right circumstances and the correct pressure for nationalism to motivate constitutional changes in Scotland.

Ultimately, all nationalisms seek nationhood, which does not inherently mean statehood. Smith outlines the ‘well-defined goals’ of nationalist ideologies which he considers to be “collective self-rule, territorial unification and cultural identity, and often a clear political and cultural programme for achieving these ends.” If a nation does not require statehood to meet those goals, it may be sufficient to remain an autonomous or partially autonomous nation within a state.

**Theories of Nationalism**

According to Smith, nationalism is, “an ideological movement that seeks to attain and maintain the autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.” However, he continues on to explain that while

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41 Smith, 29.
44 Smith, 24.
there is a goal for autonomy that goal does not need to be realized through a sovereign territorial state, or it can be achieved in a partial manner, through a communal or federal form of government. Scotland, while it may have recently voted to remain a part of the United Kingdom, has not relinquished its nationalism. Rather, Scottish nationalism perseveres in the continued pursuit of some semblance of autonomy. Under the United Kingdom, Scottish autonomy and the degree to which it has sovereign control over its institutions and governing has varied over the years. However, Scotland is frequently in conflict with the United Kingdom to either maintain or increase its autonomy, leaving the governing of Scotland to the Scottish. Smith ultimately concludes that some nationalisms settle for, and some are content with, partial autonomy. It is not any less a form of nationalism when the end goal is not complete autonomy, as long as there is some drive for partial autonomy, unity, and identity.

In tying national identity to nationalism, Smith argues nationalism does not require ‘objective’ uniformity but that it is instead built upon wills and sentiments of the people. He suggests that “the nationalist does not require that individual members should be alike, only that they should feel an intense bond of solidarity and therefore act in unison on all matters of national importance.” Nationalism can exist where individuals identify themselves as being a part of a unique nation, despite objective cultural bonds.

Nationalisms can be said to uphold six main concepts, “authenticity, continuity, dignity, destiny, attachment (‘love’) and the homeland.” Scotland does not necessarily uphold the ascriptive elements of nationalism found in those concepts, but it does contain the others. The connection to the homeland binds people within the nationalism together, as well as providing a

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46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid., 29.  
48 Ibid., 31.
goal for either the maintenance or the acquisition of ‘historic’ territorial boundaries. In Scotland, the connection to homeland does not have to come from birth, but can be gained over extended time spent within its borders. A ‘love’ of the nation is required for the people to be willing to sacrifice for it, and deem it worthy of sometimes very futile efforts. Destiny emerges in nationalisms as the inherent forces that drive certain people together due to their shared nation and the ultimate success of that nation as being inevitable. Dignity describes the strength and positivity with which a nation upholds itself and its ideals. Continuity refers to the existence of the nation as well as the national sentiment through elapsing time. It is not something that exists for one or two generations; it is enduring. Finally, authenticity reflects the need for both nationalist movements and nations to have both a legitimacy as well as some kind of truth behind their claims. It is not enough to make the claim; the claim must be authentic and have authentic boundaries.

Nationalism is, according to Smith,

a form of public and politicized culture, based on ‘authenticity’, as well as a type of political religion seeking to promote the national identity, autonomy and unity of a sacred communion of citizens in their ancestral homeland. In other words, nationalism seeks to create nations in the ‘authentic’ spirit and image of earlier ethnic and religious communities, but transformed to meet modern geopolitical, economic and cultural considerations. 49

Smith highlights that nationalism is a combination of efforts that have adapted to fit the concerns of the world today. In addition to traditional nationalist concerns, nationalisms today must be distinctly aware of the pressures of an increasingly globalized world scene, in which interconnected states are forced to come to terms with changes to sovereign power. Nations are similarly required to accept this new global framework they find themselves in. As chapter two

49 Ibid., 143.
will discuss, there is an interplay between sovereignty (and autonomy), global institutions, and nations.

**Nationalist Violence**

Brief attention must be given to the concept of nationalist violence. As clarified above, nationalist movements are frequently paid more attention to when there is an imminent threat to state(s) or to the global order. However, it is equally important to consider non-violent nationalisms as they offer insight into trends in international politics.

Furthermore, nationalisms do not necessarily begin as violent movements. Instead the violent movements are “usually a function of state repression of oppositional groups, and is therefore carefully calibrated: ‘There is ample evidence that nationalist groups employ violence strategically as a means to produce their joint goods, among which sovereignty looms large’.”\(^{50}\) This leads to the conclusion that nationalisms do not require violence, it is instead used as a tool to achieve their desired ends. With this in mind, it can be argued that non-violent nationalisms are able to achieve their ends without employing the tool of violence. However, that does not mitigate the potential for violence, nor does it decrease the importance that those nationalisms pose on global order. Instead, the focus should be on the global implications of nationalisms manifesting themselves through political tools rather than violent ones.

**National Identity**

National identity is one form of self-identification. Identity, in general, “refers to projections of the self into the world in terms of the multiple public demands that together define

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 73.
the complex array of roles human beings assume throughout a lifetime.” These processes of identity construction are social in nature and largely influenced by culture. Collective identities bind diverse people together through their common traits and ideals. They are “constructed through shared beliefs, values, habits, customs, norms, and traditions associated with common heritage, background, and lineage.” Nations are a form of collective identity, and while they can have various foundations and contributing factors, typically the members of the nation are in some agreement over their commonalities.

The theories of national identity used in this paper stem from several schools of thought. However, some scholars of Scottish nationalism have provided a basic framework for understanding the construction and maintenance of national identity. Frank Bechhofer, Richard Kiely, and Robert Steward suggest a starting point for constructing national identity and several points to elaborate the characteristics of national identity. They suggest 5 elements:

1. Individuals’ sense of national identity is constructed in the processes of everyday life.
2. Identity claims, which may be verbal but can also take other symbolic or behavioral forms, are made, sustained and modified by individuals in the course of the processes of everyday social interactions.
3. National identity is then the result of a continually negotiated process which takes place at the individual level.
4. A person’s sense of national identity is not in a perpetual state of flux.
5. It is important to stress that any particular moment in time and in specific contexts an individual may well regard her or his national identity as fixed and immutable.

We can summarize from this that national identity is not constantly in flux and is often fixed, but may also be modified under the right circumstances and are consistently being added to, as new

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51 Weisband and Thomas, 18.
52 Ibid., 21.
53 Ibid.
information or influences arise. In addition, they are typically self-identified and confirmed by others.

National identities do not necessarily result in nationalisms. However, the importance of a unified sense of national identity with common goals is one of the primary aims of most nationalist movements. This is true to the extent that, “people seek to create, or preserve, or even to die for, a sense of national identity.” National identities motivate people to act in their nations’ best interest when the oppression is strong enough, the drive for autonomy is great enough, or for a number of other reasons.

National identity is not static. It is in constant movement and changes from generation to generation. It follows the reproduction of a community based on symbols, values, myths, memories and traditions, as well as a reinterpretation of those elements to fit modern concerns. National identity is based on the identification of the members of the community. On the one hand, it is frequently connected to a shared heritage. On the other hand, given the porous nature of modern borders, it is linked more to cultural identification that can stem from a single individuals’ sense of connection to a community and that communities’ acceptance of the individual as one of them.

Yet, despite the flexibility of national identity, there are some essential criteria to an enduring, legitimate nation. Nations must have a unified public culture along with a historic homeland. In addition, it must have common laws. Furthermore, “Political solidarity requires that some myths of origin, historical memories and collective symbols be cultivated.” These

55 Smith, 20.
57 Smith, 138.
requirements must lead to an understanding of a greater community of members, of which all members may be strangers. While this seemingly requires something more than civic or territorial nationalism, once a base national identity is formed, there is some room for expansion, as well as grounds on which those civic and territorial nationalisms can commence. Smith argues that a deeper sense of the historical roots of a nation may be necessary for a nationalism to form, and that it requires more than simply, “residence and republican loyalty”\textsuperscript{58} to form the main criteria of citizenship in the nation. Such a requirement may describe some of the movements we are seeing in Europe today. However, it is not clear that the “genealogical test of national solidarity” that he proposes, to illustrate a parental/familial connection, is necessary for the existence of a nation. In Scotland, while it is sometimes the case that a familial connection to the land/state is required for acceptance into the nation, that does not always hold true. In fact, a sense of “republican loyalty” and long-term residence is often enough to encourage admission. As demonstrated below, national identity is determined by those with membership in the nation, and is thus conceivable for people with less rigorous connections to the nation.

A basic understanding of national identity outlines three criteria for a coherent, common identity. These include: “internal cohesion or thickness; the principle of exclusion’ and the dynamics of identity in forms of the We-I balance.”\textsuperscript{59} The internal cohesion of a national identity requires non-tangible boundaries to exclude non-nationals that, in addition, hold together nationals. The principle of exclusion refers to ‘othering’ as a way to form national identities, wherein “nations tell ‘us’ who ‘we’ are by relating ‘us’ to ‘them’.”\textsuperscript{60} The identity of individuals

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 39.
is solidified by creating a sense of opposition and exclusion. The effect is a determination of who an individual is based on who he or she is not. Finally, the dynamics of identity refer to an individuals’ need for various levels of identity. Each person has several individual identities that stem from a need for differentiation, as well as many collective identities where individuals strive for assimilation with the hopes of belonging to some group or community. These criteria of identity complicate the creation of a national identity, both at the individual and community levels. It is not as simple as feeling a connection to a nation. Instead, there are many processes for creating and maintaining an identity. For national identities, this complexity is heightened by the interacting global factors that also play a role. People feel connections on increasingly global levels. Where one might have felt a connection to the self, the immediate family, the extended family, the town, the region, the state, we now must grapple with our place on a global scale, and how those global identities interact with each concentric identity. Furthermore, these identities play a role in individuals’ allegiances to regimes and institutions. If one identity is given primacy over another, the degree to which the most complementary institution or governing body is supported, increases.

In the case of Scotland, we may be seeing this phenomenon on a larger scale. Instead of the individual needing balance with the collective identity, we see the collective identity needing balance with the larger British identity, as well as with the European identity. Therefore, the conflict that arises is not between the individual and his or her Scottish identity, but instead the Scottish identity with both the British and the European ones.

\[61\] Ibid., 40.
National Identity and Legitimacy

Although nations are not always fully autonomous, nor do they always have a sovereign state aligned with their nation, there is a sense that national identities legitimize the political decisions of a national community. Legitimacy is a product of national identity and is measured in two ways, “On the one hand it is legitimacy by output, drawn from the quality of the results of the political process…On the other hand it is the participation of citizens in the process of political decision-making, which is expected to result from a common will of the citizenry (based on national identity).”

Does then the Scottish national identity have legitimacy? The Scottish referendum placed the Scottish nation in a position to claim significant results from the political process, but instead denied that change. What we see here is a misinterpretation of the nations’ goals. There was an attempt to gain political autonomy and some degree of sovereignty, but the will of the people, and perhaps what was in the best interest of Scotland, did not align with attaining complete sovereignty. Instead, we see a national aim of partial autonomy and relinquished sovereignty. A complete fracture with The UK was not necessary to attain those goals.

National identities are ultimately a starting point for nationalism, but solely on their own have significantly less power of persuasion. It can be argued that, “constitutional or political preferences cannot be read off from statements about such identities; and politicians seek to mobilize these at their peril. Such attempts are based on a failure to understand how people construe national and state identity.” This misunderstanding occurs when national identity is conflated with citizenship. Citizenship, on the one hand, involves, “having the right to vote, pay

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62 Ibid., 47.
taxes, have your children educated and generally participate fully in the ‘civic’ life of the country.”\textsuperscript{64} On the other hand, national identity “involves cultural markers, of birth, ancestry, language as well as residence and operates through complex processes of social interaction.”\textsuperscript{65} In addition, Scottish national identity includes accent, residence, dress, as well as other elements more common in civic nations.

Ultimately, national identity, while less significant on its own, gives potency to nationalism in that the strength and cohesion of the national identity lends to a stable nationalism with clear interests. Furthermore, it enables the legitimacy of nationalist politics when a clear and precise national identity can be distinguished.

\textbf{Neo-Nationalism}

Moving forward to a discussion of Scottish nationalism, it is first necessary to outline the concept of neo-nationalism, and how it will be used in this context. While calling a nationalism ‘neo-nationalism’ may, in some sense, be arbitrary, “‘Neo-nationalism’ implies that there is a new form of nationalism emerging in advanced industrial countries which is sufficiently distinct from other forms to warrant a new term.”\textsuperscript{66} Although nationalism itself is not a new concept, nationalisms that have emerged recently and exhibit certain characteristics are sufficiently distinct from the typically discussed nationalisms that they must be newly identified in order to successfully consider their implications. And while, “it is in a number of ways analogous to historical or mainstream nationalism… more careful consideration shows its different place in

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
history, and its different character and potential… it deserves to be called ‘neo-nationalism’ rather than nationalism.”

Briefly returning to Scotland, we see neo-nationalism linked to civic culture, where neo-nationalism tends to favour civic engagement with domestic and international political issues. And, given how it emerges from a nation “whose relationship with the central state has undergone significant economic [and] political readjustment”\(^{68}\), it is certainly fitting to refer to Scotland’s nationalism as both a neo-nationalism and a civic nationalism. However, keeping this in mind, it may be more prudent to refer to it as a civic culture or civic patriotism because of its love of country and political culture.

Conclusions

Nationalism and national identity, as they are constructed in the modern international system, provide the foundation of significant trends in nation construction, state legitimacy, and transnational interactions. These concepts are key to understanding both Scottish nationalism, as well as the role of nationalism in the international system. This thesis focuses on the unique characteristics of Scottish nationalism, as it relates to nationalism across Europe today.

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Chapter Two

The Scottish Nation

MACDUFF: Stands Scotland where it did?
ROSS: Alas, poor country! Almost afraid to know itself (The Tragedy of Macbeth: IV.III.164-165)\textsuperscript{69}

History of Scottish Nationalism

When thinking of Scotland, an image of ancient Scottish traditions and the Highlands is conjured. Arguably, “all societies, of course, have a tendency to reach for the culturally and historically exotic when trying to justify what makes their essentially different.”\textsuperscript{70} However, assuming that point of view with regards to Scottish nationalism is more contentious than it might initially seem. While Scotland does undoubtedly have a vibrant past when discussing modern Scottish nationalism, looking further than those ancient roots to the modern formation of the Scottish nation, and thus Scottish nationalism, is necessary because it illustrates how Scotland differs from more ethnic, historically-centered nationalisms.

In fact, in our discussion of Scottish nationalism, and the Scottish identity that drives it, there must be a separation between the past and the present. Although it is impossible to discuss nations and nationalism as temporally fixed, a distinction is certainly necessary between Scotland’s ancient roots and its modern civic culture in order to understand how it interacts with other nations and states. One way to view this according to Murray Leith and Daniel Soule, is

\textsuperscript{69} William Shakespeare, “The Tragedy of Macbeth,” (1606).
\textsuperscript{70} David McCrone, Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Nation (Taylor and Francis, 2002), 6.
that we have to be cautious about Scottishness being the same through space and time, and that national identity is something that takes place through the social discourse of and on the issue of Scotland. There are links that can be made between the past and the present but one cannot consider being Scottish today and being Scottish in the fourteenth century as the same thing.\textsuperscript{71}

Expanding from this, we must also consider that what it means to be Scottish today is different in different contexts. In cultural contexts, it has more ties to the past. Yet, in political contexts, what it means to be Scottish is mostly a new idea and is largely based on contemporary political discourses.

Anthony Breuilly explains the rise of Scottish neo-nationalism, beginning with the end of the nineteenth century through the start of the twentieth century, wherein Scottish and British politics shaped nationalist sentiments. He establishes that:

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Scottish nationalism is its very recent rise to significant. In the later nineteenth century and up to 1914 there were a variety of Home Rule movements and some small groups of cultural nationalists. But these were divided from one another, had not backing from important elites such as businessmen or landowners, and no popular support. Only in the 1920s did some of these groups come together to form a nationalist party which was the direct forerunner of the present Scottish National Party (SNP). Electoral support for the SNP was limited before 1939 and reached its ebb in the 1950s. There was popular support for the ‘Covenant’ in the late 1940s – a statement in favour of devolution which received over a million signatures – but the Covenant movement was unable to do anything with this support. The SNP remained a small, rather purist party dedicated to independence. SNP success began in the early 1960s with improved performance in a number of by-elections. The party did reasonably well in the general election of 1966. In 1967 came the victory in the by-election at Hamilton and in 1968 considerable gains in municipal elections. The general election of 1970 was disappointing in the light of these trends. However, the great breakthrough came in the two general elections of 1974. In October of that year the SNP returned eleven members to the House of Commons\textsuperscript{72}.


\textsuperscript{72} Anthony Breuilly, \textit{Nationalism and the State} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 280.
Since the mid-1970s, the SNP has continued to have a strong voice in Scottish politics. However, the SNP did face setbacks in the late 1970s, wherein:

In 1979, Scotland prepared itself for a devolution referendum. This was based on the Scotland Act of 1978 that made provision for a referendum on devolution. Also it was to decide whether there was enough support for independence of Scotland among the Scottish electorate. A referendum was held to establish a Scottish Assembly, but while a small majority voted in favour of the proposal it did not obtain the support of 40 percent of the electorate. A strong majority was required for the proposal to be implemented. The failure of the referendum was perceived as the decline of the SNP, which was in disarray owing to factionalism.73

Nevertheless, following this decline, the Scottish Constitutional Covenant was organized in 1988 to “to develop a framework for Scottish devolution.”74 In part through the efforts of the Covenant, “the Scottish Parliament were officially convened on July 1, 1999 after the first general election of the Scottish Parliament was held on May 6, 1999.”75 And while, “The first MP of the Scottish National Party was elected in 1945”76, “it was not until the 1960s that the SNP started making substantial headway in electoral politics.”77 The SNP, in current day Scottish politics, argues for independence but within a democratic framework, and since their most recent third win of the largest party in the Scottish parliament78, they claim to only want to pursue independence given a popular, democratic will to do so79.

Following the SNP’s increased roll in the Scottish Government, we see a new era of Scottish nationalism. Given a nationalism that is “barely fifty years old, its origins lie not in the

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 116.
77 Ibid.
medieval battles for Scottish statehood, the Scottish Reformation, the Act of Union, the Scottish Enlightenment, or any of the other familiar historical milestones that regularly crop up in debates about Scottish identity.”\textsuperscript{80} In addition to its novelty, this new era of Scottish nationalism was also unique in its interests and aspirations. When Scottish neo-nationalism began to take shape, it “did not primarily demand independence for Scotland in order to defend a threatened ancestral culture\textsuperscript{81}. Instead, Scottish nationalists emphasized that independence was the most effective way to promote the political agenda of the left in a neoliberal era.”\textsuperscript{82} Even now, when the SNP prioritizes Scottish independence, it remains within the constraints of democratic, political processes and prioritizes interests motivated by Scotland’s political agenda. Historically, “The rise of nationalism, or rather, neo-nationalism in Scotland owed little to the defence (\textit{sic.}) of traditional cultural emblems such as language. This was no reactionary social movement, dismayed by the onward march of time and progress.”\textsuperscript{83} Scottish neo-nationalism began as civic nationalism and, at least thus far, has continued to act in ways consistent with its origins.

Governing Scotland

Scotland has its own parliament, with 129 MSPs. It is located at Holyrood in Edinburgh and was restarted in 1999.\textsuperscript{84} Following the Treaty of Union in 1707, the Scottish Parliament was

\textsuperscript{80} Ben Jackson, "The Political Thought of Scottish Nationalism," \textit{The Political Quarterly} 85, no. 1 (2014): 50.

\textsuperscript{81} See Appendix for Table 6 on the relationship between strength of national identity to drive for independence.

\textsuperscript{82} Jackson, 50.


disbanded and governing power was given to the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{85} It should be noted that, the English often refer to that legislation as the Act of Union, whereas in Scotland it is commonly called the Treaty of Union. This difference marks a fundamentally different understanding of the relationship between England and Scotland, in fact, “For many Scots, it was a partnership between England and Scotland; for many of the English it was more akin to a union of the peoples.”\textsuperscript{86} For much of the history of the UK, there was a significantly different understanding of the Union from both sides. After a long history as a part of the United Kingdom, Scotland voted to devolve from the UK and regain some of the governing power it had previously lost.

Currently, the Scottish government has nine Cabinet positions: (1) First minister, (2) finance, employment and sustainable growth, (3) health, wellbeing and cities strategy, (4) Education and lifelong learning, (5) Justice, (6) Rural affairs and environment, (7) Culture and external affairs, (8) Parliamentary business and government strategy, and (9) Infrastructure and capital investment\textsuperscript{87}. The devolved matters left under the control of the Scottish Parliament are those that were not reserved to the UK Parliament by the Scotland Act of 1998; they include: health, education, justice, home affairs, rural affairs, economic development and transport\textsuperscript{88}.

In 2012, a joint agreement was signed by the former First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond and the former Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, wherein the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 was approved. Ultimately, the vote concluded with 45\% of the population voting ‘Yes’ to the Question ‘Should Scotland be an independent country’, and 55%...
voting ‘No’. While this speaks to the priorities of the Scottish people in 2014, it is important to note that 45% of those that voted believed that independence was the right direction for Scotland to take.

Furthermore, following the outcome of the referendum, the First Minister released a statement that spoke to the contested, and unfinished nature of this issue. At a couple of key points in his statement, Salmond noted that Scottish nationalism, and moves for Scottish independence may be more possible and more significant that was originally believed. He commented that, “sometimes it’s best to reflect where we are on a journey. 45 per cent, 1.6 million of our fellow citizens voting for independence, I don’t think that any of us whenever we entered politics would have thought such a thing to be either credible or possible.” In those words, Salmond recognizes both the possibility and the credibility of Scottish independence and the movement for such a change.

Scotland’s Objectives

The Scottish government has influence over its nation, not just in terms of governing power, but in mission as well. It has published sixteen National Outcomes that it hopes to achieve in the next ten years. The ones pertaining to this thesis are: “[The Scottish people] live in a Scotland that is the most attractive place for doing business in Europe” and “[The Scottish people] take pride in a strong, fair and inclusive national identity.” Of only sixteen goals, being

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89 Scotland: The Official Gateway to Scotland, "The Scottish Government."


an attractive business location in Europe, and maintaining a strong and inclusive national identity are considered significant enough to claim a spot.

Specifically, the agenda for taking pride in a strong, fair and inclusive national identity includes “[Scotland’s] heritage and diverse and vibrant cultural life” and “the influence that new Scots bring to [Scotland’s] communities”\(^92\). This first concern embodies the previously mentioned impact that culture has on the nation. The second concern highlights the flexibility of the Scottish nation and its willingness, and in fact eagerness, to invite new members into their well-defined nation. Included in implementing this National Outcome is “Representing Scotland in the European Union, ensuring [Scottish] interests are promoted and protected and [Scottish] reputation enhanced.”\(^93\) This is noteworthy. In the official goals of the nation, the government is set to be responsible for Scotland’s interaction with the European Union. This shows a relationship between promoting and maintaining a Scottish nation, and having strong, significant ties with the EU.

Scotland’s explicit reference to the EU and its national identity, shows its drive to uphold its sense of Scottishness, while simultaneously increasing involvement with the rest of Europe, especially when it comes to economic ties with the EU.

Following the EU referendum, Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon has outlined five key interest areas which must be protected following Scotland’s vote to Remain in the face of the UK’s vote to leave. These include:

1) [Scotland’s] democratic interests – the need to make sure Scotland’s voice is heard and our wishes respected.

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\(^93\) Ibid.
2) [Scotland’s] economic interests – safeguarding free movement of labour, access to a single market of 500 million people and the funding that our farmers and universities depend on.
3) [Scotland’s] interests in social protection – ensuring the continued protection of workers’ and wider human rights.
4) [Scotland’s] interest in solidarity – the ability of independent nations to come together for the common good of all our citizens, to tackle crime and terrorism and deal with global challenges like climate change.
5) [Scotland’s] interest in having influence – safeguarding our ability to shape the laws and policies that define our future economic and social development.

The mandate overall sought to stress Scotland’s priority of protecting its relationship with the EU. In addition to these five mandates, the Scottish government has also released a report on Scotland’s place within the EU, entitled “Scotland: A European Nation”. This document clearly explains several key aspects of Scotland’s embeddedness in Europe. It explains that, “while Scotland may be a nation on the geographical periphery of Europe, [the Scottish people] are a people who very much define [themselves] as European citizens.”

The document was designed to be an overview of Scotland’s voice following Brexit and its rights to be heard and have its government act in its best interest. Yet, despite the policy concerns, it is the clear distinction of the Scottish people as European, that stands out so starkly against a Brexit backdrop. The UK, and England specifically, have rejected not just their political and economic ties to Europe, via the EU, but they have rejected parts of the European identity that Scotland has come to identify so strongly with. The Scottish government goes further by insisting that “Scotland is a European nation” and that “Brexit poses a fundamental threat to [Scottish] rights and interests, not only in areas that are within the competence of the Scottish Parliament but also in areas where power in

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Scotland is still claimed by Westminster, such as employment law and migration rights. Through these words, Scotland is not only affirming its strong national ties to Europe but rejecting Britain’s interest as its own by suggesting that Brexit, which Britain voted for, is a threat to Scottish rights and interests.

**Nationalism in Scotland**

Scotland’s nationalism is often overlooked in contemporary discussions on significant nationalist issues. This makes it even more important to study. Scotland exhibits a distinct form of nationalism. It is understated, which frequently undermines its significance. Gellner argues that, “the clue to the understanding of nationalism is its weakness at least as much as its strength. It was the dog who failed to bark who provided the vital clue for Sherlock Holmes. The numbers of potential nationalisms which failed to bark is far, far larger than those which did, though *they* have captured all our attention.” Scotland is the dog that did not bark. There are strong nationalist undertones to the national identity of the Scottish people, but it was not enough to claim political sovereignty. In addition, it has not been loud enough in recent years to conjure an interest in its potential global influences. With the Scottish referendum vote resulting in a perceived lack of enthusiasm for independence (despite higher than expected support for it), Scottish nationalism has all but been dismissed. However, a disinterest in total sovereignty is not synonymous with a lack of nationalism. Given the right motivation, Scottish nationalism has the potential to enact constitutional change.

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96 Ibid.
97 Gellner, 42.
Scottish nationalism under the United Kingdom

Scottish nationalism does not require full political distinction from the United Kingdom as demonstrated by its coexistence since the Union of 1707 and Scotland’s vote against independence. As explained above, while the Scottish nation is unique in cultural and political priorities, it is not essential for the nationalist sentiment of the people for it to have complete political sovereignty. In fact, “Scottish nationalism is able to coexist with the United Kingdom. The UK acts to accommodate Scottish distinctiveness within the unitary state.”

Thus, not only does Scotland not require full sovereignty, but the UK, after a historical struggle, allows Scotland enough distinctiveness and autonomy that it appeases nationalist sentiments. This can be extended to where Scotland is content to allow the English the lead the British government, wherein, “as long as Scotland and England voted more or less the same way, the constitutional anomaly whereby the United Kingdom always got a government the English voted for did not matter.” This illustrates a trend in Scottish nationalism that only requires that Scottish interests be met, and in the case of the English having the same interests, it did not matter that Scotland historically placed itself in opposition to England. Instead, what mattered were Scotland’s civic interests.

Yet, in instances where Scottish and English interests diverge, “Scots have consistently placed more trust in Holyrood than Westminster when it comes to running Scotland’s affairs.” Because nationalism “is not the only or even dominant issue in Scottish politics, but a constant

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98 Keating, 167.
100 See Appendix for Table 5 on attitudes of Scottish people on division of political powers.
101 McCrone, "Scotland out the Union? The Rise and Rise of the Nationalist Agenda," 75.
presence”\textsuperscript{102}, the interactions between Scotland, England, and the UK are often in flux. Since the Union of 1707, Scotland has often struggled against Britain, and against the presence of English power and influence in the UK. In an attempt to maintain a distinct Scottish identity and nation, as well as an attempt to preserve what they determine to be ‘Scottishness’, Scotland has made clear the boundaries it is willing to accept. In cases where the UK has squashed Scottish distinctiveness, nationalism moves to the forefront of Scottish political concerns.

Scottish nationalist sentiment is frequently posed in opposition to Britain. There is a prominent anti-English sentiment within parts of Scottish culture. However, it is not against the English people. Rather, the negative sentiment is a response to the structures of the United Kingdom, as a state\textsuperscript{103}. Nevertheless, “Scots feel much greater attachment to Scotland than they do to Britain, a phenomenon that has no parallel in England…. The ‘glue’ holding Scots together seems to be much stronger than that holding the English together.”\textsuperscript{104} Therefore, the differences between Scottish, English and British identities remain strong, despite a Scottish willingness to work in parallel with them to achieve their interests, when those interests align.

Furthermore, the Scottish nationalist sentiment is adaptive. It responds to changes in the state and reprioritizes its goals. When the British state is cooperative and allows for semi-autonomy for Scotland, the nationalist sentiment of Scotland lessens its opposition to the British state and refocuses on more pressing issues.

Overall, Scotland seeks constitutional change and aspires towards semi-autonomy, but only insofar as a sense of Scottishness is allowed to thrive. According to Michel Keating,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{102} Keating, 215.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 181.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} William Lockley Miller, Edinburgh Royal Society of, and Academy British, Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond, vol. 128 (Oxford;New York,: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2005), 6.
\end{itemize}
“Opinion polls have consistently shown a substantial majority of Scots in favour of constitutional change and the establishment of an elected Scottish assembly or parliament with broad powers over Scottish domestic affairs. They have equally consistently shown that most Scots do not want complete separation.”

Scottish independence, as demonstrated in the recent referendum, is not a priority for the Scottish people, as long as their Scottishness is not threatened. In fact, the Union provides Scotland with a barrier for the Scottish nation, which might otherwise succumb to the rest of Europe as a weaker power. As long as Britain accommodates Scotland, Scottish nationalist sentiment in some ways prefers a lack of sovereignty with semi-autonomy. Scotland is small and in many ways dependent on Britain. Therefore, complete sovereignty is not a priority.

An essential element of the existence of Scottish nationalism within a larger state is that the United Kingdom is what is known as a union state. A union state “has one centre (sic.) of authority, but recognizes historic rights and infrastructures in various places.” It is this unique form of state that accommodates Scottishness and makes possible the survival of the Scottish nation within a non-Scottish state.

In fact, for a long time following the Union of 1707, “Scots were…unionist-nationalists. In other words, they remained Scots in strictly national identity terms, while embracing Britishness as and when appropriate as their state identity.” This has changed more recently in Scottish history. Following its devolution from the UK, the Scottish identity has begun to take on

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105 Keating, 209.
107 McCrone, “Scotland out the Union? The Rise and Rise of the Nationalist Agenda,” 73.
starker national tones and distance itself from Britain\textsuperscript{108}. Throughout its development, however, Scottish identity “has been created and reproduced (often explicitly) within and against the norms and institutions of the British state and society, and as part of the British Imperial core”\textsuperscript{109}, due to its national development within the UK. Scotland has been forced to assert its identity in the face of cultural oppression, yet the coexistence created some overlap in identity as well.

However, the union state often faces precarious national balances. Since the second half of the twentieth century, nationalism in Scotland has been strengthening in waves. While it had been a quiet voice in Scottish politics, it made a reappearance in the late 1960s as support for the Scottish National Party increased. A couple of decades later, nationalist sentiment increased even more as a result of “changes in Scottish attitudes and a diminished effectiveness of territorial management as the British state is no longer able to deliver the goods as in the past.”\textsuperscript{110} Again, it can be concluded that as long as the Scottish people feel as if their needs are being met and that they aren’t being culturally overshadowed by Britain, nationalism remains a low priority. However, as those needs are neglected, nationalist sentiment rises to prominence.

**Scottish Nationalism as Civic Nationalism**

Nationalism in Scotland falls far more under civic, rather than ethnic, nationalism. This is largely based on the fact that the majority of people we refer to as Scottish can be found within the territorial boundaries of Scotland. There is therefore no real dispute about the territorial boundaries. Furthermore, there is “an awareness that attempts to differentiate Scots on ethnic

\textsuperscript{110} Keating, *Nations against the State*, 171.
grounds could prove divisive within Scotland and might stir up ancient hatreds.”\textsuperscript{111} Thus, the nationalism is left with issues of political and institutional identity. Scottish nationalism is not necessarily ascriptive, but once born into the British state, Scottish people come to identify with Scotland based on largely political and cultural elements.

Historically, in fact, Scottish nationalism has avoided cultural distinctions as its primary identifying factors. While there has been some reference to history and ancient ties, there is a weak connection to language or ritual. Instead of the cultural identifiers, “nationalist claims are based on rather practical arguments about institutions, accountability and policy.”\textsuperscript{112} Again, this highlights the civic elements of Scottish nationalism. Rather than inherent elements of culture that individuals may have been born into, the focus is instead on the political and institutional aspects of the Scottish nation under the United Kingdom.

**Contemporary Scottish Nationalism**

In addition to the differentiation between civic and ethnic nationalism in Scotland, it is also important to clarify between traditional and contemporary nationalism. Traditionally, Scottish nationalism was concerned with the past; it “tended to be nostalgic, defensive and somewhat parochial, looking to an idealized image of Scotland totally independent from corrupting external influences.”\textsuperscript{113} In contemporary terms, those ‘corrupting external influences’ can be interpreted as both the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as much of the rest of the world. Increasing globalization and globalism, and the rise of global governing institutions, brings outside influences to practically all states and nations. Thus, the Scottish

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 181.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 181-82.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 215.
nation and Scottish nationalism cannot exist away from those influences. In fact, “the Scottish nationalists are not passively supporting globalization.”\(^{114}\) They are instead actively seeking to integrate and involve themselves in the global economy. This can certainly be seen through the interests and ambitions of the SNP. In general, “Scottish nationalism today supports free trade and is outreaching”\(^{115}\) which is outside of the traditional interest of nationalists where, “Experts in nationalism have always considered there [to be a] close link between nationalism and protectionism.”\(^{116}\) This speaks to Scotland as a neo-nationalism that is equipped to tackle modern issues and seeks to embrace global changes and integration, rather than run from them. Overall, Scotland must also no longer deal with the single influence of the UK and its concentric nations, but with a much broader batch of external influences.

Therefore, contemporary Scottish nationalism has changed forms. It is, “more diffuse, spreading well beyond the limits of the SNP. It is more open, more European and progressive. It tends to the social democratic left, is more self-confident and less defensive.”\(^{117}\) As explained below, the Scottish people traditionally were identified as being lesser than the English and subsequently lacked confidence as a nation. However, through the UK’s position in the European Union, Scotland gained a self-confident identity based on its merits rather than as a defense mechanism to distinguish itself from England.

Scotland is often discussed alongside Catalonia. They are both described as “middle-sized stateless nations…in Western Europe with old identities, relatively recent regional autonomy, nationalist parties that grew up from the late 1960s onward, and many exponents of a

\(^{114}\) Paquin, 58.

\(^{115}\) Ibid.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) Keating, Nations against the State, 215.
‘civic nationalism’ that asks for autonomy and inclusiveness but neither secession or xenophobia.”118 This emphasizes its recentness, as well as its openness. Furthermore, it highlights that while Scotland asks for autonomy, there is no mention of sovereignty.

Two important conclusions emerge from the shift in Scottish nationalism. First, their nationalism is less dependent on the UK and stands firmly on its own. Second, it is open to European and perhaps global influences. It is not a steadfast, rigid sentiment, unable or unwilling to change. Instead, it is flexible and changes with the times. The nature of a civic nationalism that does not hand down identities, without question, to the next generation, allows for change and adaption because it does not pass on ascriptive identities from which the nationalism emerges. Rather than fighting globalization and globalism, Scottish nationalism is likely to align itself with the rest of the world in a way that seeks Scottish distinctiveness and positive political or institutional changes. The Scottish nationalist sentiment will not concede on issues of priority, but it is secure enough in those priorities to be dynamic and flexible in areas of lesser concern.

Significance of Scottish nationalism

Finally, it must be mentioned that Scottish nationalism is often taken for granted due to its quiet, non-violent nature. In fact, Scottish nationalism “is unlikely to be violent”119. This is due to the fact that it “is not based on tribal attachment, or ethnic exclusiveness but on a distinct civil society and shared values.”120 While individually some may be resistant to allowing ‘outsiders’ into the Scottish nation, overall the nationalist sentiment is an inclusive one. There is not a strong sense of ancient connections or a contemporary exclusivity and therefore there is

118 Greer, 15.
119 Keating, Nations against the State, 215.
120 Ibid.
less of a drive to violence. Much of the violence we see associated with violent nationalist movements today stems from ethnic conflict and a strong sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Scottish nationalism largely focuses on the ‘us’ aspect. There is a drive to know what makes an individual Scottish, and what the collective goals of the Scottish nation are. With the exception of England and the United Kingdom, Scottish nationalism is far less concerned with exclusivity and distinctions from other nations.

National Identity in Scotland

National identity is typically an understated concept. It is sometimes a matter of great importance, but more commonly, “people take their national identity for granted, as implicit and unproblematic”[121]. When faced with troubling political or security issues, as well as some cultural motivations, individuals may become more defensive of their national identity, however, this is not typical.

Scotland is a place of distinctly prominent national identities due to its history and Scotland’s relationship with the United Kingdom. It has been reported that “more than 88 per cent of those in Scotland declare themselves to be proud of being Scottish, with an extraordinary 71 per cent claiming to be very proud.”[122] It is therefore necessary to consider the specific elements that make up that national identity. Often when national identities are at the forefront of a community, there is a certain level of exclusion and exceptionalism. In Scotland, it seems that despite a strong adherence to their national identity, there is also a surprising amount of openness to outsiders.


David McCrone and Frank Bechhofer distinguish certain identity markers and identity rules. Identity markers are listed as, “such things as birthplace, ancestry, accent, appearance and dress, indeed, anything which might be read as an indicator of national identity.” While some of these elements may fall under ethnic identity, there is a distinction to be made when aligning national identity with nationalism wherein many elements are not ascriptive and instead determined by individuals and their community. These markers, however, must be distinguished from identity rules which are “probabilistic rules of thumb whereby… identity markers are ‘read’, interpreted, combined or given precedence over others. Identity rules are rough guidelines which are not necessarily definitive or unambiguous, but which offer rules of thumb in making judgements about others.”

In Scotland, place of birth is the primary marker people judge others’ national identity on. Yet, place of birth is not outwardly apparent. Therefore, accent is often used as a replacement marker. In addition, “residence over a fairly lengthy period, coupled with an expressed commitment to Scotland, can make for a strong claim to be ‘considered’ Scottish, to be an adopted Scot.” It is not uncommon for individuals to be accepted as Scottish despite characteristics that might have otherwise excluded them from a more ethnic community, rather than ones formed by dynamic elements deemed significant by other individuals with accepted Scottishness.

Scottish national identity, though strong, is not inherently linked with party politics or constitutional governance. In fact, “for them to begin to align, let alone become a basis for

124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 1261.
action, would require a process of mobilization and politicization in the widest sense.” For example, the Scottish referendum vote highlighted the weakness of national identity to motivate constitutional change in Scotland. At the time, because a status quo with Britain had more or less been established, the priority of the Scottish people was not to obtain their full sovereignty. National identity, while prevalent, was relatively impotent. Political mobilization of the Scottish national identity can result from interests or survival being threatened by external factors, but it does not have to result in political conflict. As increasing pressures are placed on Scotland, and as its voice in the UK feels more threatened, following the vote to leave the EU, there is more motivation for Scottish national identity to shift against the UK and England. Thus, there could be some potential for it to become dangerous.

**Heterogenous Scottish National Culture**

Returning to Weisband’s and Thomas’s examination of the nation, they argue that “although it is widely assumed that high degrees of homogeneity must exist among those who constitute a nation, the empirical or objective facts of nations around the world reveal heterogeneity, diversity, and difference.” Nations do not necessitate similarity. Nations can entail diverse groups of people, with diverse cultural inputs as well as different understandings of what it means to be a member of their nation.

It is significant that “there is not a single homogenous Scottish national culture; such would be the mark of ethnic exclusiveness rather than national maturity.” Instead what we observe is “a cultural dimension to national life and a national dimension to cultural issues which

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126 Ibid., 1263.
127 Weisband and Thomas, 77.
was absent in the past\textsuperscript{129}. This has resulted in an increase in Scottish self-confidence and an overall assuredness in the legitimacy of the Scottish identity. In fact, the flexibility of Scottish identity and the lack of ethnic exclusiveness are responsible for the perseverance of Scottish culture within a broader European picture. Whereas Britain and England present a combative stance towards Europe, the Scottish identity enables a coexistence within the European union. Perhaps the persistence of Scottish identity despite an oppressive English and British identity has allowed Scottishness to thrive in a diverse environment. Overall, the Scottish identity is willing to participate “as part of the broader European scene.”\textsuperscript{130}

**Contemporary Scottish and British identities**

Scottish national identity is surely changing and evolving with the times. Just as Scotland’s nationalism has changed, so has its national identity. Although Scottish national identity has moved away from its ancient myths and traditions into a more contemporary identity, it survived the creation of the United Kingdom and modernization and has emerged strengthened.

In the current political scene, we can observe an increasing tendency for the component parts of Britain to prefer their national identity rather than their state identity\textsuperscript{131}. In addition, we see the UK, as a whole, asserting its independence from Europe and the governing power of the European Union. This trend to claim freedoms from greater institutions is also seen in the trend to claim identities in smaller groups.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{131} Bechhofer and McCrone, 1-2.
In fact, it can be said that the strength of the British identity is weakening. With the fall of the British empire, the commonalities of the various parts of Britain have diminished. In addition, growing secularism within modern politics has weakened the bonds Protestantism placed on the British people. With the weakening of British identity, the component parts are stepping up with reinvigorated identities of their own, identities that are fit for modern times.\textsuperscript{132}

Scotland has always had an interesting relationship with England and the rest of the United Kingdom. Scotland is often seen, in modern contexts, as being fiercely independent and almost defiant of Britain and England. But, this has not always been the case. Historically, “there developed an inferiority complex about Scottish culture… that anything local must be second rate and that metropolitan culture was both superior and more universal in its content.”\textsuperscript{133} In addition to Scotland’s sense of inferiority, anything produced by Scotland that was determined to be more in line with the ‘metropolitan culture’ projected by Britain was attributed to being either English or British, despite its Scottish origins. It was uncommon, especially in the arts, for Scottish practitioners to receive the credit. Over the years this resulted in a sense of inferiority that Scotland has steadily been combatting in modern times.

Additionally, Scottish people identify themselves in contrast with the English. Bechhofer and McCrone argue that, “having a sense of who you are in national identity terms involves knowing who you are not. As Thomas Eriksen put it: ‘We are not only because we have something in common, but perhaps chiefly because we are not them’...And ‘them’ to the Scots is the English. Scots define themselves \textit{vis-a-vis} the English.”\textsuperscript{134} The historical struggle between

\textsuperscript{132} Keating, \textit{Nations against the State}, 172.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 189.

\textsuperscript{134} Bechhofer and McCrone, "Being Scottish," 65.
Scotland and England, wherein Scotland was perceived as inferior, has intensified the modern distinction between the two.

Layering of Identities

The United Kingdom is an interesting case. Not only do people in the UK have the potential to identify with their state, but they have the concentric national identities to choose from or identify with. In addition, “people may also combine ‘state’ and ‘national’ identities by saying they are English more than British, Scottish not British, equally British and Welsh, and so on.” This demonstrates that identities are not singular. There is no singular identity that can describe an individual. Instead, what we get are many layers of identity. In the case of Scottish national identities, we find the complicated matter of state versus national identity. Both institutions overlap and share many similar characteristics. It is therefore common for there to be some level of each identity in an individual. However, that does not eliminate the possibility for individuals to exclusively identify with one over the other.

This interaction between layers of identity is further influenced by the increasing establishment of a European identity, which is frequently tied to the European Union as it provides political, cultural and economic services to its member states. The interplay of identity layers in some ways mimics the interplay of global governance and state sovereignty. There can be a cooperative, multilayered identity, but this requires less fervent singular identities. Similarly, global governance is possible, but it requires less strict sovereignty limits from states.

In Scotland, the primary identity tends to align with Scotland, rather than Britain. Whereas, in England, the primary identity tends to align with Britain rather than England. However, in Scotland, we also see a greater tendency for its people to identify with Europe, or at least less of a resistance to Europe, than we see in England. This highlights historical tensions between Scotland and Britain, as well as illuminating the result of the effects the EU had on Scotland. The inferiority complex that Scotland suffered in the past has been alleviated by the EU, thus creating more alignment for the Scottish people with the European governing body than they have with their formerly oppressive kingdom.

The stronger the sense of Scottish national identity, with a decrease in a sense of being British, leads to less acceptance of Scottishness for people born in England. However, the opposite is also true. The weaker the sense of being nationally Scottish and the stronger the sense of being British leads to an increasing acceptance of Scottishness in people born in England.

How Likely Scottish National Identity is to Lead to Action

National identity, which when amplified and unified, can lead to nationalist sentiment, is often seen as unimportant or of little significance. However, as the starting pillar for nationalism, it is imperative that we understand national identities; we must understand where they come from historically, as well as where they could lead to in the future. It is dangerous to ignore national identity, or to label it as banal ‘talk’ because ultimately, “talk is a prelude to action, without automatically generating it.” The link between national identity and nationalism is frequently ignored because it does not always directly result in it. However, following the pathways there is

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136 Ibid., 928.
137 Ibid., 932.
often a connection between the two and the form that national identity takes is likely to impact the form of the subsequent nationalism.

Scottish nationalism, as explained, is largely classified as civic nationalism, or can be explained as civic patriotism. The preceding national identity formation in Scotland is relatively open and accepting. Although it does have some racial tensions and barriers to entry, it is accepting of outsiders that demonstrate enough identity markers, or the appropriate identity markers. This flexibility is what has allowed the Scottish national identity to remain intact in the face of England, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

However, it must be noted that this flexibility is now being tested. We have seen two votes in recent years that portray some of the tendencies of the Scottish people. In the Scottish referendum, we saw Scotland make a choice to remain a part of Britain. And, in the EU referendum we saw Scotland vote to remain in the EU while the UK as a whole voted to leave. Given the strong sense of what it means to be Scottish, the UK referendum could have been surprising. Yet, as mentioned above, what matters to the Scottish people is not their complete sovereignty. Instead, what is important is an ability to maintain some autonomy, to maintain a Scottish way of life, and to be uninhibited from exhibiting Scottishness. This is not surprising, since “Nationality claims have never simply been about getting one’s own state. Self-determination has never been simply a matter of secession, but has involved the assertion of rights within a specific context, often as a matter of negotiation.” In Scotland’s case, this holds true. Scotland is concerned with its interests, and its assertion of rights. In the EU referendum, Scotland voted in a way that is consistent with its openness to Europe and its commitment to economic globalization. In the context of the UK and EU referendum votes, Scotland, in the days

leading up to and following those votes, made clear its intentions to voice its role in the UK. Scotland has a long history within the UK, and has not necessarily sought its own state. Even given the opportunity to claim its independence, under the leadership of the nationalist party, Scotland voted to remain a part of the UK, provided its interests would be heard and met.

Conclusions

Nationalism, and, to a greater extent, national identity are taken for granted when the stakes are non-violent as well as when they do not threaten state or global order. However, given the right circumstances, Scottish national identity has the ability to prompt nationalist sentiment strong enough to enact constitutional change. That change would have the ability to impart broader effects on Britain as well as the European Union.

In addition to its underestimated impacts on European order, Scottish nationalism represents a noteworthy case for potentially flexible nationalist sentiments, even among nations with such strong national convictions. Scotland, despite its fiery, traditional international persona, is in fact surprisingly flexible in its national identity markers; its nationalism is also flexible in its primary goals. Scottish national identity is somewhat open to outsiders that portray the correct indicators. In addition, Scottish national identity is constantly evolving past its ancestral roots and becoming confident and dynamic, in part due to its place within the EU. Scottish nationalism is strong in its convictions, but it is not unrealistic nor does it have stringent requirements. If allowed to create and maintain a sense of Scottishness, as well as some level of autonomy, Scotland, and even Scottish nationalism, is content to remain a part of the UK. However, if the limited autonomy or sense of Scottishness is threatened too drastically, Scotland becomes much more likely to make changes to meet its nationalist goals.
The issue of concern is what the recent ‘Brexit’ vote means for Scottish nationalism. Although the choice was made to remain a part of Britain following the Scottish referendum, the Scottish people also voted to remain a part of the European Union during the EU referendum. Ultimately, it was deemed to be in their better interest to remain a part of the UK, and nationalist sentiment did not require sovereign distinction from Britain. However, as we have seen following Brexit, the greater United Kingdom voted to leave the EU while Scotland voted as a whole to remain. If talk is a prelude to action, the catalyst for action for the Scottish people may have been the Brexit vote. Constitutional change as the result of nationalism requires the right catalysts and motivations. Despite the fact that those motivations were absent during the initial Scottish referendum in 2014, the Brexit vote is likely to cause Scotland to again take stock of its goals as a nation.

What matters is whether Scotland and its people can achieve its goals under the United Kingdom. Following the recent referendum to leave the EU, Scotland has found itself in a position of questioning its goals. There has recently been a call to a new vote for Scottish independence. If the Scottish people feel as if they cannot uphold a Scottish lifestyle or a genuine sense of Scottishness under the UK and isolated from the EU, the drive for constitutional change encouraged by nationalist sentiments may become more prevalent. Although there are many elements that have an effect on constitutional change and national strategy, the impact of nationalism is one that cannot be overlooked.
Chapter Three

Scottish Nationalism after UK and EU Referendums

“Scotland small? Our multiform, our infinite Scotland small?”¹⁴⁰

This chapter explains how Scottish nationalism formulates itself in civic contexts as civic nationalism, or civic patriotism. Given the recent votes on Scottish independence and United Kingdom separation from the European Union, the motivations for Scottish voting behavior and the voice behind the Scottish Government have become significant issues of concern. While Scotland has long been considered a fiercely nationalist country, and has had its nationalism confused for an ethnic nationalism, it in fact exhibits the characteristics of a civic patriotism in civic, or political, contexts.

Scotland’s Nationalism

Scotland’s nationalism represents a separation of the civic from the ethnic. In institutional, political contexts, Scottish nationalism demonstrates a tendency towards civic nationalism. However, given informal contexts, Scottish nationalism demonstrates a tendency towards an informal, more exclusive ethnic nationalism. For example, “given a cultural context, such as an international football match, the non-civic, exclusive conceptions of the nation and nationalism are paramount.”¹⁴¹ In the case of Scotland, “Non-civic/civic and inclusive/exclusive conceptions exists side by side.”¹⁴² Specifically, “Exclusive and cultural conceptions appear,

¹⁴¹ Leith and Soule, 79.
¹⁴² Ibid.
often innocuously, to co-exist with other forms. A balance is struck between defining the national ‘in-group’ as bounded and different but also tolerant and pluralistic as a democracy requires.”¹⁴³ The civic form of Scottish nationalism, as well as the specific characteristics of Scottish national identity, make it a significant example of a democratic nationalisms in Europe and illustrate how it can both enact and inhibit political change.

To clarify, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is often framed as a discussion of liberal and illiberal nationalisms, respectively. In fact, “In recent years, many scholars of nationalism have grown uncomfortable with the unequivocal sorting of cases into ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ categories. From a detached, analytical point of view… it is often impossible, or at best problematic to characterize and entire state, or an entire national movement, simply as civic or ethnic.”¹⁴⁴ In Scottish nationalist studies, although there are some that do not characterize their nationalism into either category, it is common for scholars to distinguish that Scottish nationalism is civic. Additionally, as noted in the second and third chapter of this thesis, scholars of Scottish nationalism have made the distinction between Scottish nationalism in political and cultural contexts. This falls in line with recent efforts that “have been made to use the distinction in a more abstract manner. Instead of being used to characterize concrete cases, it is now most often used to characterize opposed analytical ‘elements’ or tendencies and to show how they are mixed in different manners and proportions in concrete cases.”¹⁴⁵ Various forms of Scottish nationalisms are differentiated in this manner. This thesis considers the political context to be the location of a political, civic, neo-nationalism, whereas other, more culturally involved,

¹⁴³ Ibid., 80.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
contexts may exhibit forms of ethnic, cultural nationalisms. That being said, Scotland still could be considered a civic patriotism rather than a civic nationalism. Due to its open, civic culture, Scottish patriotism may be a better term because of how it reflects their love of country. Nevertheless, Scottish civic nationalism remains an appropriate term due to its connection with the Scottish nation and the Scottish National Party.

Furthermore, the recent construction of Scottish nationalism adds to its flexibility and adaptability. Scottish nationalism, as we know it, while influenced by the nations’ past, is not the nationalism we know today. In fact, “these new nationalist movements are very different from those of the nineteenth century.”\textsuperscript{146} This is significant because even since the Union of 1707, Scotland has undergone significant national change. In fact, modern Scottish nationalism was formed without “significant nationalism in either rural or traditional industrial Scotland”\textsuperscript{147}, which therefore inhibited the creation of nationalism from old roots with its own agenda. Specifically, “the political incorporation of Wales and Scotland and the destruction of peasant society in those countries avoided nationalism…but the incorporation of Ireland took a much weaker form and did not encompass the same destruction of peasant society. Thus a basis for later peasant nationalist movement remained.”\textsuperscript{148} Without the peasant base, Scottish nationalism was forced to reinvent itself in a more modern context, and therefore in a more politically, and less culturally, motivated way. Following the Union, Scottish political actors could take from this base nationalism “a number of elements around which it could crystallise (\textit{sic.})”, including “the strong and increasing institutional identity of Scotland”\textsuperscript{149} and “on these elements the existing

\textsuperscript{146} Breuilly.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 290.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 288.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 290.
nationalist party could, by converting its appeal from traditional nationalism to a pragmatic and materialist programme, achieve a good deal of success.”\textsuperscript{150} This is what we see in Scotland today, the result of that increasing institutional identity and the success that the Scottish Government has had in appealing to the new, pragmatic form of nationalism. It is that pragmatic, institutional nationalism that produces Scotland’s civic nationalism, despite the lengthy and complicated history that its ethnic nationalism could have had.

By another name, Scottish nationalism is referred to as a neo-nationalism, wherein “it is different from nationalism in that it surfaces in states with well developed economies and from areas that, rather than being underdeveloped, are usually ‘relatively advantaged’.”\textsuperscript{151} In Scotland this refers to the period following the 1707 Union where the lower classes of Scotland were removed to leave Scotland as a ‘well-developed’ country. The newer form of Scottish nationalism emerged after Scotland had undergone significant social and economic shifts.

Scotland’s nationalism differs from more ethnic nationalisms through its adaptive civic engagement and political mechanisms for dissemination. Ultimately, “The essential difference from, for example, former communist and Balkan countries, is that Scottish neo-nationalism is a progressive movement that stresses civic rather than ethnic features. It has adaptable political ideology and built-in social democracy and neo-liberal aspects.”\textsuperscript{152} Therefore, where we see backward looking (in the sense that they have ties to the past) nationalisms, we find intense, rigid political ideologies that resist integration and external influence. Whereas, where we see the progressive, adaptable political ideologies we find openness to democratic change and a willingness to closely co-exist, within certain boundaries, with external nations.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Leith and Soule, 4.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
Often, civic nationalism is depicted as a positive, politically acceptable force, while ethnic nationalism is seen as a negative movement. In other words, “neo-nationalism, or civic nationalism, is both socially and politically acceptable, while ethnic, or non-civic, nationalism is exclusionary and unacceptable as either a social or political movement.”\textsuperscript{153} They are adaptive because “they [new nationalisms] accept both the concept of limited sovereignty and the existence of multiple identities.”\textsuperscript{154} They don’t require full sovereignty and are accepting of variations within the nation. However, ethnic nationalisms are not necessarily negative, nor are they unacceptable. Yet, they are typically exclusionary and involve closed identities with strict barriers to entry. Scotland’s civic nationalism in political contexts differs from those ethnic nationalisms, in that it is mostly non-exclusionary and seek change through democratic processes that are open to international input and convergence.

Scottish nationalism manifests itself as civic nationalism in the modernist interpretation where Scottishness is “a territorial, civic-based form of identity, whereby an individual resident in Scotland can claim to be Scottish.”\textsuperscript{155} Furthermore, it can instead be interpreted through the same framework as Scottish patriotism. A civic patriotism is still concerned with the territorial, civic identity and manifests itself in love for one’s nation, rather than love of the nation and hatred of external communities. As explained in Chapter 2, Scottish national identity is open to foreign entry. Given the correct circumstances, and an acknowledgement of Scottishness by both the individual and preexisting members of the Scottish nation, an individual with a non-Scottish origin is capable of claiming legitimate membership in the Scottish nation and legitimate

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Claire Sutherland, \textit{Nationalism in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Responses} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 35.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Leith and Soule, 4.
\end{itemize}
identification as Scottish. This chapter argues that Scottish nationalism takes the form of civic nationalism in the political context. Therefore, despite acknowledgement of a national identity, nationalism takes its civic form when confronted with formal political institutions. Specifically, given foreigners wanting admission into the nation, they are given the opportunity to vote in elections. In fact, “any European Union citizen living in Scotland can also vote in elections for the Scottish Parliament – as well as stand as a candidate for that institution.”\footnote{156} Scottish political nationalism is so based on civic engagement that most of the voices of those living within the political purview of the nation, and demonstrating an interest in the political dialogue, are allowed participation.

In addition to Scottish interaction with European citizens in its nationalism, Scottish identity is very open. Scottish identity “is also said to be underlined by the comfort with which Scots negotiate a dual identity and remain British in significant numbers.”\footnote{157} On the Moreno identity scale, which indicates the extent to which citizens feel ‘Scottish not British’, ‘more Scottish than British’, ‘equally Scottish and British’, ‘more British than Scottish’, and ‘British not Scottish’, we find large amounts of respondents identifying with multiple identities. Although Scottish identity is constructed in opposition to an English identity, the British identity has been integrated into Scottish nationalism as it was part of the foundation of Scottish neo-nationalism. In addition, the Scottish nation is not politically distinct from Britain and thus requires political engagement with it.

Scottish neo-nationalism is driven by a sense of Scottish identity that must be examined politically. Ultimately, “A simple correlation between party preference, constitutional

\footnote{156} Ibid.
\footnote{157} Ibid., 5.
preference, ethnic identity and national identity is not possible, but the need to understand the nature of that national identity becomes even more important.”\(^{158}\) Scottish nationalism and Scottish national identity are complex. They have elements of ethnic as well as civic identities, and although they are driven by political, democratic, and constitutional institutions, it is not a simple matter whether they can in turn influence those institutions. However, “The understanding of that identity as a civic rather than ethnic form allows for a more benign understanding of the possible impact on the political and constitutional structure of Scotland and the UK.”\(^{159}\) Scottish identity, and thus Scottish nationalism, are complex and significant but there is a sense that they can sometimes be benign and avoid constitutional conflict. As discussed in Chapter Two, Scottish nationalism does not necessitate sovereignty or complete autonomy, but only semi-autonomy, with the caveat that its interests are voiced and maintained.

In fact, Scottish identity has begun to require a political, civic emphasis. Scottish neo-nationalism is based on an identity that began to emerge largely in the nineteenth century alongside England, and while it has since become more unique and distinctive, there is still a need to differentiate. In other words, “being Scottish has become a stronger, and yet more culturally diverse, feeling in recent years. At the same time, Scotland and England are very similar in overall, general cultural terms. This, therefore, means that the emphasis on identity has to be political rather than cultural, and civic rather than ethnic.”\(^{160}\) Despite Scotland and England’s distinct histories, since the Union of 1707, the similarities between the two motivate Scotland to claim its own identity. This is thus achieved through emphasizing a political, civic identity, rather than a cultural, ethnic one. Scottish identity construction, and therefore the priorities of Scottish nationalism, are

\(^{158}\) Ibid.
\(^{159}\) Ibid.
\(^{160}\) Ibid., 5-6.
formed in contrast with England both inherently through a divisive relationship, as well as intentionally through emphasis of civic identities.

Looking at how Scottish identities manifest themselves in political contexts, we can consider elections and political parties. Scottish nationalism is not always inherently civic. For example, in sporting contexts it can take on a highly ethnic tone. However,

Scots are said to pragmatically choose civic democratic solutions for Scotland at elections (or referenda), and these pragmatic decisions override any non-civic, more emotive conceptions of nationalism. Therefore, civic nationalism must be dominant conceptions of Scottish nationalism. However, at elections or referenda voters are asked to make a decision within the context of formal state institutions. Therefore, it is hardly unexpected that, given the civic context, voters make decisions which largely fulfil civic conceptions of national identity.\(^{161}\)

This highlights that in civic contexts, civic nationalism is given priority. However, this raises a difficult paradox. When civic nationalism is given priority, nationalist concerns, in general, lose some urgency. Instead, other civic concerns, and the general wellbeing of Scottishness takes priority. This pragmatism is unique to civic nationalisms, and therefore has demonstrated that it may be better to use the term civic patriotism because the term nationalism may not always apply. Rather than emotive responses to civic concerns in elections and other civic contexts, Scottish nationalism leads individuals to vote based on the issues and based on what would be the most pragmatic response for Scotland, rather than what would be the most nationalistic response.

In the Scottish National Party (SNP), it is often suggested that nationalist interests, and independence are its primary concern. While it may seek to obtain increasing autonomy and a greater voice in Britain, it has not historically always sought independence. In fact, “home rule,

\(^{161}\) Ibid., 79.
devolution and independence were not and are still not the sole preserve of the SNP.\textsuperscript{162}

Recently, following the Brexit vote, the SNP has voiced its support for Scottish independence, but even still, it only suggests independence in the context of popular, democratic support for it. Furthermore, it places independence not in opposition to the UK as much as in conjunction with the EU. In fact, Scotland’s interests in the EU require interconnectedness and cooperation. As the independence referendum in 2014 showed, the Scottish people with their strong nationalist voice, did not vote for independence when its interests with Europe were not at stake.

In addition, while the SNP is largely the voice of Scottish nationalism, and specifically Scottish nationalism in politics, there is also a general consensus among all of Scotland’s political parties “that Scotland is a nation”\textsuperscript{163}. Whether they then advocate for nationalist policies is a different matter, but the underlying premise of a Scottish nation is widely circulated.

2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

Scottish People

The Scottish Referendum of 2014, held for the people of Scotland to vote for whether they wanted independence from the United Kingdom clearly expresses how Scottish voting patterns do not necessarily represent ethnic Scottish nationalist sentiments, but instead reflects a form of civic nationalism, or patriotism, that tailors itself to the context of various civic issues.

Prior to the UK referendum, surveys in Scotland reflected a low interest in independence. In 2014, preference for independence was at only 33%. While this was up from 29% in 2013, it

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 18.

\textsuperscript{163} McCrone, \textit{Understanding Scoland: The Sociology of a Nation}, 179.
was significantly lower than the 50% in 2014 that supported devolution, which was down from 55% in 2013\textsuperscript{164}. The trend shows movement towards support for independence, but given the 45% that voted for independence, the surveys did not reflect the choice the Scottish people ultimately made.

In fact, since Scotland formed its parliament, there has been little change in its drive for independence. Currently, the Scottish people are “content to remain within the United Kingdom, but one which gives them greater autonomy and control over all matters short of defence (\textit{sic.}) and foreign affairs. There is nothing inevitable about Scotland leaving the United Kingdom any more than it is inevitable that it will not.”\textsuperscript{165} Instead, it is a matter of political interests and pressures and how the Scottish people vote. What concerns the Scottish people as well as much of the Scottish government is maintaining some level of autonomy and political control, rather than being able to claim their independence.

This represents an ability of Scottish voters to vote outside of their underlying preferences. While the UK represents a challenge to Scottish nationalism, so does the EU. It is therefore a situational determination regarding which outcome would best suit Scottish interests. Admittedly, campaigning for the independence referendum has had some impact on the results, but given a two year campaign the effects would not be apparent in the surveys. I therefore argue that despite preconceived views of Scottish independence, the Scottish voters, given this specific civic context, voted in a way that represented the political context of Scotland at the time.

Additionally, it should be noted that during the referendum, “Scots were told that if they voted to leave Britain, they would lose their place in the European Union. They may now lose it

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\textsuperscript{165} “Scotland out of the Union? The Rise and Rise of the Nationalist Agenda,” 76.
anyway.” This placed additional strain on the independence vote as it was perceived to be determining not just the status of the nation as independent or not, but also its position within the EU. Given that many Scottish interests lie in close ties to the EU, this added obstacle to independence may have in some cases outweighed the interests tied to independence.

Furthermore, when asked following the referendum how people would vote in the Scottish referendum if it was held again, responses have varied given political contexts and do not adhere to preconceived identities or an inherent ethnic nationalism. As shown in the table below, survey respondents had hovered between 45 and 65 percent between January of 2015 and April of 2016, just prior to the Brexit vote.

Table 1: What Scotland Thinks

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Scottish Government

When the Scottish National Party won majority in May of 2011, the SNP’s manifesto addressed its goals for independence, but stressed that “independence will only happen when people in Scotland vote for it…We think the people of Scotland should decide our nation’s future in a democratic referendum.”168 This illustrates the emphasis, even within the national party, on civic practices. Although it won the majority and advocated that independence would be good for Scotland, it did concede that what ideally represents the interests of the nation is best shown through democratic practices. The Scottish people should therefore not be forced in any political direction that they do not themselves decide upon.

Furthermore, in the months leading up to the referendum vote, the Scottish Government stressed the importance of independence, not as a form of liberation, but as a necessary civic change. In other words, “Scotland is not oppressed and we have no need to be liberated. Independence matters because we do not have the powers to reach our potential…We shouldn’t have a constitution which constrains us, but one which frees us to build a better society.”169 The Scottish Government’s emphasis on independence as a political matter, a civic matter, rather than an ethnic or cultural one is significant. As Scottish people absorb much of their nationalist sentiments from the Government, a government that stresses the political, civic importance of an issue will resonate with them. It also minimizes the potential for cultural, emotive national sentiments.

2016 United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum

Scottish People

The EU referendum is representative of Scottish civic patriotism, in that it highlights potential for an open nation connected with Europe. Furthermore, following the Brexit vote, Scotland and its people have voiced their support for close cooperation with Europe, a willingness to work with England given a commitment to Scottish interests, as well as a slight resistance to the overall UK vote outcome in light of the breakdown of Scottish voting.

The outcome of the Brexit vote was 48% Remain to 52% Leave. Within Scotland, the vote was 62% Remain to 38% leave\textsuperscript{170}. While this may seem to demonstrate an underlying discrepancy between the interests of the Scottish people and the interests of the United Kingdom as a whole, that may not be the whole picture.

On the one hand, the SNP believes the Scottish people will converge on a decision of independence given an opportunity for a second referendum, especially if Scottish interests are perceived to be at stake. The call for the second referendum following the start of Brexit negotiations shows that the Scottish Government believe “that the kind of Brexit that Theresa May hopes to achieve will prove an anathema to sufficient voters in Scotland that this time the majority will back independence.”\textsuperscript{171} The Government has been steadfastly arguing that the current trajectory of the Brexit negotiations will not be best for Scotland.

On the other hand, some are interpreting the EU referendum outcomes as being demonstrative of a similarity between the rest of the UK and Scotland. Issues of freedom of movement have been cited, in that “rather than endorsing freedom of movement, it seems that


most voters in Scotland…would like to maintain free trade but abandon freedom of movement.”172 Here we see a divergence between the Scottish government and the Scottish people’s nationalist sentiment. Yet, the existence of a Scottish sentiment of closed worker movement does not necessarily suggest a disagreement with ties to the EU. Taken individually, issues can evoke a more ethnic form of Scottish nationalist sentiment. However, given the correct contextualization in civic, political, constitutional changes, these sentiments take a neo-nationalist form and the interests of Scotland are likely to take primacy.

Furthermore, in a recent poll, Scottish citizens were asked whether Scotland should be expected to leave, given the UK vote and 47% answered that they believed it should, whereas 51% answered that they believe it should not.173 This illustrates an adherence to the Scottish democratic outcomes, as well as an adherence to Scottish interest. Despite external democratic outcomes, Scottish people still believe that Scottish interests were best expressed via its own political consensus.

It should be noted that given an option between a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ Brexit, both the Scottish people and the Scottish Government are more amicable towards a ‘soft’ Brexit, whereas there is much starker disagreement given the option of a ‘hard’ Brexit.174 This highlights the flexibility of Scottish nationalism. Given an option for results that are more aligned with Scottish interests there is more support, but there is much more backlash when Scottish interests are threatened. Civic patriotism is flexible to a point, but firm when the nation’s interests seem threatened.

172 Ibid.
174 See Appendix for tables 1 and 2 on hard versus soft Brexit opinions.
Scottish Government

The Brexit vote has left the Scottish government, led by an SNP majority, in a difficult position of balancing perceived Scottish popular support and Scottish national interests. To understand their position in the current political context, it is necessary to examine government reports and statements by their First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon.

The Scottish Government is taking a hard stance on the UK decision to leave. Scotland is seeking to vote again on independence from the UK, given that its interests are not being considered if a hard Brexit is to be the way forward. These issues are interconnected and “Nicola Sturgeon, made this point shortly after the Scottish referendum when she argued that any ‘Leave’ outcome in an EU referendum would need to be endorsed in each part of the UK, effectively claiming a Scottish veto over a UK decision to leave.”\(^\text{175}\) Essentially, because all 4 countries within the United Kingdom did not vote to leave the EU, the outcome does not democratically reflect the interests of the state as a whole. Furthermore, “Ms. Sturgeon argued that Scots should have the right to choose between Brexit ‘or becoming an independent country, able to chart our own course and create a true partnership of equals across these islands.’\(^\text{176}\) Again, we see the linkage between Scottish nationalism and political choice. It is also situated in a cooperative context with Europe, rather than in opposition to the UK.

Scotland’s commitment to Europe is further illustrated in Sturgeon’s insistence in a historic connection between Scotland and Europe. She argues, that “maintaining Scotland’s place in Europe has been, and will continue to be, beneficial for Scotland and the rest of Europe.”\(^\text{177}\)


\(^{176}\) Castle.

\(^{177}\) “Scotland: A European Nation”, 2.
And while she recognizes that “Scotland may be a nation on the geographical periphery of Europe”, she argues that “we are a people who very much define ourselves as European citizens.”\textsuperscript{178} This embodies Scottish neo-nationalism. The nation is flexible, it is open, and Scottish people can define themselves both as Scottish and as European. Given their unique form of civic culture, Scottish identities can take many forms when civic engagement is made possible under those other identities. Sturgeon points to the Brexit vote in saying that, “As the referendum result show, this outward-looking, European heritage continues to this day in our cultural, economic, intellectual and political engagements.”\textsuperscript{179} Having an SNP majority party emphasizes the open characteristics of the Scottish nation. Thus, the Scottish national identity is influenced by the civic nationalism endorsed by the government, which in turn leads to a tendency for voting in civic contexts based on that civic form of nationalism, or patriotism.

In addition to calls for either a ‘soft’ Brexit or a new independence vote, there is a concern that “the stark divergence in the democratic will between the different nations of the United Kingdom (UK) demands a reappraisal of how political power in the UK is exercised.”\textsuperscript{180} Although the UK has been the political voice for its component countries for a long time, there has been increasing devolution for Scotland and increasing sentiments for independence\textsuperscript{181}. The Brexit vote draws attention to the discrepancies between the democratic will of the state as a whole, and the democratic will of Scotland as a part.

Moving forward from Brexit, Scotland must now decide how to best represent its interests and how to best have its interest heard. Scotland’s civic form of nationalism relies on

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{180} “Scotland’s Place in Europe,” (Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, 2016), v.
\textsuperscript{181} See Appendix for Table 4 on increasing Scottish interests in independence and decreasing contentment with just devolution.
government guidance regarding the country’s interests and requires civic contexts in which Scottish people can have their voices heard. As the UK plans to continue on with its Brexit negotiations it is “Constitutionally and politically…imperative that Scotland’s interests are heard and acted on.”\(^{182}\) And while, “the concerns of those who voted to leave must be listened to and addressed, there is clearly a strong desire in Scotland to be a full and active member of the European family of nations.”\(^ {183}\)

If the UK plans to move forward towards a ‘hard’ Brexit, as it seems to be, “The Scottish Government continues to believe that independence offers the best long-term future for Scotland. If we were an independent country we would not be facing the prospect of being taken out of the EU against our will”\(^ {184}\). In fact, “by opting for a ‘hard’ Brexit – meaning leaving both the EU customs Union and the single market – against the explicit wishes of the people of Scotland and Northern Ireland, British voters have put a dark cloud over the immediate future of the United Kingdom itself.”\(^ {185}\)

However, in a similar stance to what we saw prior to the referendum of 2014, the SNP believes “Scotland will only become independent when a majority of people in Scotland choose that future in a democratic referendum.”\(^ {186}\) Constitutional change in Scotland occurs when the interests of the majority of Scottish people align. Even the nationalist party recognizes that Scotland requires civic contexts in which to make change happen.

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\(^ {182}\) “Scotland: A European Nation”, 16.

\(^ {183}\) “Scotland's Place in Europe,” v.

\(^ {184}\) Ibid., 40.

\(^ {185}\) Matthias Matthijs, "Pulling the Trigger on Brexit," *Foreign Affairs* 2017.

\(^ {186}\) “Scotland's Place in Europe,” 40.
Second Independence Referendum

Scottish People

Recently, there has been much discussion of a second independence referendum for Scotland. This potential vote is significant in the discussion of Scottish neo-nationalism. Scotland voted No to its first chance at independence from the UK in 2014. It then voted to Remain in the EU against the overall vote to Leave by the UK. We now face the potential for an independence vote based not on traditional nationalist platforms, but one based on concerns for the overall political interests of Scotland. A vote of Yes would represent not a vote based only on desires to be independent from the UK, but to be connected with the EU.

What we are seeing now is support for a second referendum, but not support for that referendum to take place immediately. Percentages have risen since the Brexit vote to where 46% of respondents favoured independence and 42% support devolution, making independence “the single most popular constitutional option.”\(^{187}\) However, we have also seen rising levels of Euroscepticism. The outcome of the Brexit vote, as well as the civic debate surrounding the Brexit proceedings, have likely had an impact on what interests the Scottish voters are prioritizing and what outcomes seem to be in the best interest of their nation\(^ {188} \).

Following the Brexit vote, BMG research conducted polls in January 2017 regarding Scottish independence. Respondents were asked: Should Scotland be an independent country? And the responses were 43% Yes and 45% No. This is up 3 percentage points from the poll held in December 2016. However, there seems to be underwhelming support for holding a second independence referendum before Brexit is completed. It seems that support for independence is


\(^ {188} \) See Appendix for Graph 1 on increasing levels of EU skepticism.
stronger following the completion of Brexit. This opposition “may simply be tactical” rather than principled which is not uncommon in community that embodies a civic form of patriotism.

**Scottish Government**

Meanwhile, the Scottish government is quite adamant about a second referendum vote because the initial independence vote was partially argued against as it would risk Scotland’s place in the EU which, nevertheless, is now still in jeopardy. Nevertheless, it still underscores the importance of adhering to the political will. Politically, “The Scottish Parliament…voted to back the first minister’s call for talks to take place with the UK government over a second independence referendum…But the UK government has already declined Ms Sturgeon’s request to be given the powers to hold a legally-binding independence referendum before the Brexit process is complete.” This may show that the Scottish government recognizes the importance of this second vote. However, the UK is already on precarious ground and therefore does not want to risk further destabilization. Nevertheless, Sturgeon is moving forward with the request and has argued that although power over constitutional issues rests with the UK, the legislation “is quite a vague term’ and said the issues had never been tested in court.”

The Scottish Government has used the time following the Brexit vote, as the negotiations begin to take place, to frame the issue as one of national importance. Scottish neo-nationalist sentiments highlight open and flexible political interactions and in recent political discussions, 

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192 Ibid.
“Ms Sturgeon used her speech to highlight the global role an independent Scotland could have, stressing it would remain an ‘open, outward-looking and inclusive’ nation that would continue to welcome people from across the world.”\textsuperscript{193} Not only do Scottish people often vote in a way that reflects Scottish civic patriotism, but the Scottish Government seeks to project that image outwards to Europe, and inwards to its own people within the political dialogue.

Overall, it may be “possible to devise more effective bilateral intergovernmental processes and forums; however, the prospect of such forums leading to the Scottish and UK governments genuinely sharing executive authority and making decisions which would be mutually binding…seems unlikely.”\textsuperscript{194} What Scotland, especially the Scottish Government is looking for is more political power, more autonomy, and if possible democratically chosen independence. While more effective intergovernmental processes and forums may appease Scottish interests for a time, a continued relegation of Scottish interests to a second tier behind the interests of Britain as a whole, and often England as its largest component, it is unlikely that such a route will lead to lasting contentment. This is especially true if Scotland is to continually face outcomes similar to that of the Brexit vote, wherein Scotland’s democratic outcomes were overlooked due to the nature of the United Kingdom and its governing structure.

Conclusions

Scottish nationalism takes different forms in different contexts. Given a cultural, ethnic context, such as sporting events, it can take the form of ethnic nationalism. However, in political contexts, Scottish nationalism exhibits the characteristics of a civic patriotism. It is often referred

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.

to as a neo-nationalism, due to its relatively recent beginnings. As we have seen through the UK and EU referendums, and the push towards a second independence referendum, Scottish nationalism is complex and takes many forms. It is dependent on Scotland’s interests, the position of the Scottish government, as well as the interactive consequences of issues regarding multiple political actors. Scottish nationalism is by no means simple to decipher, and the impacts it has on the voting habits of the Scottish people are even more hidden to observers. Yet, the urgency of formulating a framework from which to understand it remains. There may be no clear formula to predicting future constitutional outcomes, but civic patriotism certainly plays a role and deserves concern and attention.
Conclusion

This thesis sought to understand what makes Scottish nationalism distinct and unique, and to explain why it matters despite its non-violent nature. In addition, Scottish nationalism has often been referred to as either civic or neo-nationalism and this thesis argues that both characterizations are true, to some degree. Scottish nationalism is the result of an open national identity, and a relatively new revival of its old nationalism. This thesis has also argued that in many ways, referring to Scottish nationalism as Scottish patriotism may in fact be more representative of the civic culture at play in Scottish politics.

Chapter One embarked on an outline of the nation, nationalism and national identity theories. This was necessary to emphasize the important elements of each concept in study of Scottish nationalism to follow.

Regarding the nation, it was concluded that the nation is an imagined community that is distinct from concepts of race, ethnicity and religion. Furthermore, nations can be culturally based, but can also have a political or civic foundation. Nevertheless, nations are distinct from states as well as ethnic communities. The distinction from states can be observed in the existence of multiple nations existing within a single state. The distinction from ethnic communities is the result of ethnic communities not having a public culture and often lacking territorial dimensions, where they alternately depend on on common laws, customs, myths, and histories.

The definition of nationalism suggested that nationalism is “an ideological movement that seeks to attain and maintain the autonomy, unity and identity of a human population.”\(^\text{195}\)

Given this definition, it was important to recognize the differences between ethnic and civic

\(^{195}\) Smith, 24.
nationalisms. Ethnic nationalisms tend to be given, not chosen, whereas civic nationalisms tend to be more voluntary (although they require collective acceptance). Although it can be problematic to distinguish between the two types of nationalism, when the liberal and illiberal components are emphasized, by deemphasizing those elements and instead considering the cultural versus political foundations of the two nationalisms we can have a productive discussion of various types of nationalism. This extends to their causes and their implications. The chapter also engaged in a discussion of how patriotism may be a more accurate way of naming what is often called civic nationalism. The argument is that civic nationalism is in fact not plausible, and that a civic patriotism better reflects the Scottish civic culture.

Chapter two seeks to outline the important characteristics of the Scottish nation, Scottish nationalism and Scottish national identity. I began with a discussion of the important issues regarding governing Scotland as well as the history of Scottish nationalism which emphasizes the civic nature of Scottish nationalism, or patriotism, as well as its recent formation. This is followed by an outline of the Scottish government’s objectives for the Scottish nation. These specifically highlight the flexible openness of Scotland, as well as its willingness and eagerness to have close ties to Europe.

The unique form of Scottish nationalism does not emphasize sovereignty or independence. Instead, it seeks constitutional change to meet Scottish goals and interests. These interests are obtainable through semi-autonomy. Specifically, because Scottish nationalism resulted from its position within a union-state, it is willing to align itself with England and the broader United Kingdom in order to achieve those goals.

Chapter Three goes on to consider the specifics regarding how Scottish nationalism forms itself as both civic nationalism, or patriotism and a Scotland-specific brand of neo-nationalism.
Scottish nationalism manifests itself in both civic and ethnic forms, depending on context. In more culturally driven contexts, ethnic nationalist tendencies prevail. However, in civic, political contexts, a civic form of nationalism, or patriotism, tends to emerge.

The third chapter considers three different scenarios: the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, and the potential for a second Scottish independence referendum. In each case, I have attempted to explain how the Scottish people and the Scottish Government have contributed and responded to these constitutional dilemmas. I have stressed the civic nature of Scottish voting behavior, as well as the tendency of the Scottish Government to concern itself with democratic, popularly driven constitutional outcomes. Nevertheless, the Scottish Government also seeks to uphold and maintain Scottish interests and seeks to lead the Scottish people in a direction that they suggest will most likely lead to those outcomes. Finally, as was mentioned, the Scottish people have trust in Holyrood to act in ways that most suit Scottish needs and interests and with a government led by the Scottish National Party, those needs are increasingly highlighted in nationalist tones.

Moving forward with future research, there is potential to look at the complex nature of nationalism in general, and Scottish nationalism, specifically. Nationalism is a complex issue and nationalist sentiments are driven by many factors, such as its history and its modern political interests. While this thesis sought to focus on the political elements of Scottish national identity and nationalism, there are other factors that can influence these sentiments. Ethnic, economic, and security concerns certainly play a role and it would be prudent to undertake a study of how the various issues impact both the Scottish government and the Scottish voters.
In addition, given the high-profile characteristic of the recent votes, some insight could be gained from a study of media, both domestically and internationally, and the possible impacts it had on Scottish, as well as English, Welsh, and Northern Irish, voters.

Furthermore, Scotland could be placed in a larger context for a discussion of shifts in international norms and potential legitimacy crises arising from those shifts. In the international system, it is common for states to exist through external legitimacy or acceptance, but a shift may be upon us, wherein the international community becomes more likely to substantiate legitimacy claims from internal, national pressures.

I would leave the reader with the idea that nationalism is of increasing concern on the international stage today. And, whether it is violent or democratic, ethnic or civic, closed or open, it often imparts subtle influences on people and governments. It is therefore important to pay close attention and give special notice to those forces which might otherwise be overlooked.
APPENDIX

Table 2196:

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Table 3197:

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Note: Up to and including 2015 SSA interviewed adults aged 18 and over. In 2016 those aged 16 or 17 were also interviewed for the first time. If these 16 and 17 year olds are excluded the proportion choosing independence falls to 45% while the remaining figures are unchanged.

Table 5$^{199}$:


$^{199}$ Ibid., 7.
Table 2 Attitudes towards Division of Powers between Scottish Parliament and UK Government, 2010-16

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<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All decisions</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All except defence and foreign affairs</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All except defence, foreign affairs, taxation and welfare</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No decisions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Up to and including 2015 SSA interviewed adults aged 18 and over. In 2016 those aged 16 or 17 were also interviewed for the first time. If these 16 and 17 year olds are excluded the proportion choosing all except defence, foreign affairs, taxation and welfare increases to 13%, while the remaining figures are unchanged.

Table 6\textsuperscript{200}:

Table 3 Support for Independence by Moreno National Identity, 2012-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish, not British</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>+33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Scottish and British</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More British than Scottish/ British not Scottish</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 1\textsuperscript{201}:

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 2.
Despite the 62% vote to Remain, Scotland has become more sceptical about the EU.


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