

WOMEN AS PERIPHERAL WORKERS:  
BARRIERS TO MONOPOLY SECTOR PARTICIPATION

by

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## Chapter I.

### INTRODUCTION

The sexual division of labor is one of the most pervasive and effective basis for maintaining inequality (Kessler-Harris, 1975). Various research traditions have tried to explain this phenomenon. Human capital theory ignores structural discrimination in the labor force (Becker, 1975). However, many political economists have posited that the structure of capitalist economies effectively segments certain groups into particular labor markets (Edwards, 1979; Braverman, 1974). Inequality is endemic to capitalist economic structure.

### STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The major explanations of women's labor force participation, benefits from such activity, the particular occupations women hold, and the effects of discrimination can be divided into two traditions. On the one hand, normative and human capital theorists assume an open, non-structured market-economy in which women sell their skills to the highest bidder. Radical political economists, however, assume a structured economy which segments the working population into different labor markets, confronting women with different work rules than men and lower returns from labor activity (Edwards, 1979; Piore, 1971).

Investigators working with the structured market-economy model have been successful in demonstrating the utility of monopoly and competitive industrial sector conceptualizations (Bibb and Form, 1977; Edwards, 1979). Monopoly sector jobs are those in which there are high rates of return on education, unionization, stability, and vertical organization (careers). Competitive sector jobs have low return rates to education and training, little or no unionization, instability, and characteristically are dead-end jobs.

Various findings resulting from the use of the structured market-economy model suggest that: the location in a particular industrial sector accounts for about one-third of the income discrepancy between men and women (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert, 1978); particular types of jobs are associated with particular sectors; the amount of control the worker possesses varies (Edwards, 1979); and that women and minorities are more apt to be found in the competitive sector (Morse, 1969; Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 1975; Edwards, 1979). However, other than Edwards' historical analysis of capitalism in which he posits that the form of control, technical or bureaucratic, is associated with and helps to maintain the labor market sectors, there is little evidence about how the sectors are maintained.

Edwards claims that the maintenance of the labor markets occurs because the labor markets are embedded into the economic structure of society (1979: 163). Contributions by the exogenous (racial and sexual) divisions may help to maintain the labor markets. Edwards concentrates on the division and maintenance of labor markets through job descriptions, career tracks, division of labor, form of control, unionization, minimum wage laws, and right to work laws. He does not extensively address other mechanisms which may perpetuate discrimination (sex roles, marriage and family obligations, etc.). Edwards dismisses the importance of sex roles and marriage and family obligations by citing an "impressive and growing research on the roles of women ... [suggesting that] change in their situations has occurred mostly in response to the interaction of the dialectics of ... sex with that of capitalist development" (1979: 196). The dialectics of which Edwards speaks are manifested in part by the ideology or norms surrounding marriage and childbirth.

Orthodox dual economy theorists invoke norms to explain the employment of women in the competitive sector. They suggest that women are socialized to devote their energy to the family and, therefore, to seek jobs that are part-time or allow for intermittent participation. These jobs are located primarily in the competitive sector. Political

economists, such as Edwards (1979) and Braverman (1974), argue that through job descriptions, management, and promotions, women are barred from entry into or from remaining in monopoly sector markets. I will, regardless of specific mechanisms, examine the effects of marriage and childbirth on the maintenance of labor market segmentation.

No empirical studies have been conducted on the effects of these important life events -- marriage and childbearing. Only a few studies of women, based on cross-sectional samples, demonstrate that married women and women with children are more apt to be found in the competitive labor market (Morse, 1969). However, these studies are flawed in that it is not possible to demonstrate if those women presently in the competitive labor market were ever in the monopoly sector, and what their participation was before and after marriage and/or childbirth. The intent of this thesis is to examine how marriage and childbirth, in terms of age cohorts, contribute to the maintenance of the monopoly and competitive labor markets, and thus help to explain the different employment patterns of men and women. Through a longitudinal analysis, I will examine if marriage and childbirth are, in fact, barriers to women's participation in the monopoly sector. In what follows, I will outline a history of women's participation in the labor force, and review literature purporting to explain women's position in

the labor force. Lastly, in a longitudinal analysis, I will examine the purported effects of marriage and childbirth in maintaining segmented labor markets.

## Chapter II.

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR

In the early stages of industrialization, women held productive work roles and family roles. But, according to Kessler-Harris, (1975) as industrialization continued and capitalism became more dominant, keeping women in their family roles became of the utmost importance. Women were used to socialize children to the appropriate values and ideologies necessary for a capitalist economy to grow. With industrialization, women's work roles were de-emphasized and assumed by men working in factories. But capitalists needed female labor to keep wages low, while at the same time women's allegiance to the home needed to be maintained. This, it could still be argued, is a problem today.

Thus, women who combined both family and production roles soon had to relinquish the production roles and be content with being the "good wife" and only working when they "had to" or, according to Kessler-Harris, when the labor market needed stabilization. Women were asked to give up an income for the "great-calling." They also were now to become "ladies": meek and passive, modest and silent, embodying the ideal of piety, purity, and submissiveness. The husband was to become the wife's master and she the grateful servant (Kessler-Harris, 1975). Kessler-Harris

claims working women's beliefs allowed employers to exploit women by treating working women as though their wages were "supplemental" income (Kessler-Harris, 1975). In determining women's "living wages," employers took into account the help and support they received from parents or a husband. This practice resulted in women earning only two-thirds of what men do. (Kessler-Harris, 1975). Women's subordinate position in the labor market contributed to their subordinate position in the home, which in turn fed back to their subordinate position in the labor market (Hartmann, 1976).

Women effectively constituted a reserve of labor (Simeral, 1978). Although men complained about women competing against them, men and women were rarely in competition for the same jobs. According to Kessler-Harris, women were, at various times however, trained as strikebreakers. Due to changing technology and job organization, women often replaced men and were hired for "new" jobs (Kessler-Harris, 1975).

Monopoly capitalism began at the end of the 19th century. Rather than small firms dependent on local labor supplies and local markets, giant corporations arose, utilizing national labor supplies and markets. It became unworkable to depend on local sanctions to keep women in their "place". Besides, the monopoly capital firm could use

women as operatives. In fact, they desired them because they worked for less.

Giant corporations implemented new technologies in their production processes. However, new technologies cannot always be implemented due to exogenous circumstances. "There is an interrelationship between the nature of technological advance in a production process and the sex of the available labor supply" (Stevenson, 1975: 246). Stevenson summarizes an example from the early textile industries. The early days of textile manufacture in the United States was characterized by a shortage of male labor. Women were thus used to produce wares. The procedure for spinning yarn was called frame spinning. Women had no problems in operating a frame spinner. England's textile mills used a procedure referred to as mule spinning. Men operated the mule spinners. Early attempts at introducing mule spinners into United States mills using predominately female workers were not successful. Women could not operate the mule spinners because their skirts became entangled in the machinery. Yet, mule spinners were more efficient and women came to be replaced by immigrant males during the middle 1880's. Spinning became a male job until the early 1920's when the textile mills moved south in search of cheaper labor and an improved frame spinner had been developed. Women were again hired and spinning again became a "female occupation" (Stevenson, 1975).

Women soon began increasing their numbers in the workforce. As women came into the workforce, there were many attempts to control them via legislation, regulation, and unionization. Immigrant women who were not properly Americanized were offered classes in the art of homemaking in hopes of Americanizing them. But the tension mounted as better educated women became bored at home (due in part to declining fertility) and began to enter "clean" office jobs. Office jobs were proliferating as the paper crush of corporate capitalism began (Kessler-Harris, 1975). In sum, employers created a new labor market by hiring women who were relatively well educated and under-paid (Kessler-Harris, 1975).

Thus, the history of women's labor force participation henceforth has been highly reactive to changes in the labor process. Women's marriage and family obligations have been accentuated to keep women committed to the home and not to the labor force. Women's participation in the labor market has often been in response to economic need and to depress wages, break strikes, and to operate new technology.

In 1972, women fourteen years and older made only 58 per cent of the income men the same ages did (Chiswick and O'Neil, 1977: 24). The most recent Employment and Earnings indicates men sixteen and over made a median weekly income of 335 dollars, while women of the same age group earn only

211 dollars, 63% of the male earnings (Department of Labor and Labor Statistics, 1981). Little progress has been made toward reducing income inequality for women since then.

#### A LITERATURE REVIEW: TWO RESEARCH TRADITIONS

What follows is a review of literature focusing on women's lower returns from their labor force activity. It is by no means comprehensive; the literature is too voluminous. The review is divided into two sections corresponding to the two major views taken in this type of research. The first section contains an overview of explanations of wage differences which assume an open, non-structured market-economy. The second section focuses on literature that assumes a structured market-economy.

#### OPEN, NON-STRUCTURED ECONOMY

Normative and human capital theories assume an open, non-structured market-economy. Normative theory suggests that women devote more energy to marriage and family obligations than to labor force commitments, thus explaining why they make less than two-thirds of what men do. Human capital theory suggests that women liquidate a portion of their human capital upon marriage and childbirth. Therefore, they have less human capital to offer and make a corresponding lower wage. The difference between men and women is in the amount of human capital they have to offer.

## NORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Normative explanations claim that the high value placed on family and child-rearing in our society leads to socializing women into marriage and family-oriented roles. These roles are so important that women's labor force participation is guided by them. In order not to interfere with the important wife-mother-homemaker role, women take jobs which are conducive to this role. The jobs that women do take are reflections of this ideal-typical role.

In an international study, Darling (1975) notes there has been an increase in the incidence of women working part-time over the past decade, and that women are more likely to move in and out of the labor force (intermittent participation). She invokes a normative explanation for this phenomenon, suggesting that normative constraints account for the income discrepancy between males and females. Because of different sex-role socialization, Darling suggests that women choose different school curricula, curricula which are not as conducive to earning high wages. This model of female income determination stresses that women experience intermittent labor force participation because of commitments to the home and the domestic arena. Because of this, their human capital is lowered (Coser, and Rokoff, 1971; Mincer and Polachek, 1974).

The factors leading to a women's initial occupational choice are closely related to her perceived future marriage and family role. Klemmack and Edwards (1973) studied factors related to women acquiring stereotyped occupational aspirations. The traditional female occupations are characterized as being "primarily socio-emotional, nurturant, and person-centered" (Klemmack and Edwards, 1973: 511). They view as crucial determinants of future marriage and family plans: anticipated age at marriage; present age; dating status; and the anticipated size of the future family of procreation. The lower the anticipated age of marriage (which is related to present age and dating status) and the larger the anticipated size of the future family, the more stereotypically-female are the women's occupational aspirations. Respondents desiring marriage at a later time and smaller families aspire to more traditionally masculine occupations (Klemmack and Edwards, 1973: 521). Related to these findings are those of Preston and Richards (1975), cited in Hofferth and Moore (1979). They found that those women with monopoly sector employment opportunities had not been married. They claim this supports the "employment as alternative to marriage" hypothesis (Hofferth and Moore, 1979: 106).

## HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY

Becker (1975) stands at the forefront of human capital theory. He maintains that there is a positive relationship between education, work experience, training, physical and emotional health, and income. He assumes that the same holds true for women, though he never actually tests the theory using a sample of women.

Human capital theory claims that earnings are based on the amount of human capital a person possesses, emphasizing that the quality of the worker is positively related to earnings. Workers come to view themselves as "mini-capitalists", investing in themselves in the form of education, work experience, training, physical and emotional health and, on this basis, demand a higher wage than those with lesser investments (Vietorisz and Harrison, 1973: 374). Human capital theorists argue that because women possess less skill (human capital), they suffer in the competitive market, earning amounts commensurate with their skills. In short, human capital theory concludes that women get what they deserve in the marketplace (Duncan, 1974: S110). However, human capital theory is unable to satisfactorily explain why there are more people with low income than with low human capital resources (Thurow, 1969). Also lacking is an explanation of why there is a different rate of return on human capital held by women than by men.

Mincer and Polachek (1975) test this theory using a sample of women. They include variables such as family size, race, and concentrate on continuity of participation in the labor force. Mincer and Polachek conclude that the human capital-income function is the same for women as for men, and that less than half the wage differences of men and women are due to sex differences and work continuity. However, they do not address the alluded to sex differences or reasons for women's intermittent labor force participation. Bridges (1980) offers a functionalist explanation of these sex differences, arguing that women gravitate toward marginal industries because they offer more part-time and lower wage jobs which are not as likely to interfere with their domestic commitments. Although he addresses marginal industries, he does not address them as an independent variable as dual economy theorists do.

Blending normative and human capital explanations, research often emphasizes individual level variables and variables related to marriage and family. For instance, in his study of female employment, Sweet (1973) ignores single, childless women. Of more interest to Sweet is why married women work. Emphasizing social psychological and family-oriented variables, he suggests several motivations and facilitators. Among others, these include economic pressure, which pertains to an insufficient level of income

earned by the husband to maintain the household. Personal satisfaction is considered to be a factor pertaining only to those childless wives and a few college educated women. Another variable is the willingness to perform tasks. If a woman is trained in one area and the training is non-marketable, she may take a lesser job or choose to remain unemployed. Sweet demonstrates that the interval between marriage and first birth has no effect on whether a woman is employed or not. He also reports the existence of a positive relationship between having a previous marriage and being employed. Finally, Sweet indicates that wives solely contribute 12 percent to household income, while men contribute 81 percent (Sweet, 1973). The remaining income is considered to be jointly contributed. Sweet thus concentrates on family composition, the presence of children, their numbers, and their ages in his analysis.

Sweet does briefly address, though does not include in his analysis, market characteristics. He does realize that labor markets vary geographically. Women living in heavily industrialized areas can find jobs as operatives, for example, whereas in other areas this is not so. Yet, he ignores the fact that these jobs are typically low paying. Bibb points out that men tend to "hegemonize" high paying jobs in the "progressive, concentrated industries", or what we term here "monopoly industries" (Bibb, 1979).

Bibb and Form offer a thorough criticism of human capital theory's ontological assumptions. They claim human capital theorists present an over-rationalized view of man. This theory claims that producers have choices among different factors, and consumers have choices among different products; that workers possess a high degree of mobility; and, finally, that information about alternative markets in which to sell their human capital is readily and quickly available. The facts dispute these assumptions, according to Bibb and Form (1977). Workers are not always rational, job opportunities are often limited, information about different markets may be unattainable, and workers are not always ready to move (Bibb and Form, 1977: 980).

Because normative explanations and human capital theory begin with the assumption of a unified market-economy they cannot account for the possibility that there may be different rules for different people (discrimination). Dual economy and labor market segmentation theory present an alternative view, assuming the existence of a split or dual market-economy .

#### STRUCTURED MARKET-ECONOMY

A structured market-economy explanation of working women cannot be proposed without some historical considerations. The following sections will sketch out the

rise of monopoly capital, the dual economy, and labor market segmentation.

#### MONOPOLY CAPITAL

Structured markets are generally thought to result from the rise of "monopoly capital" (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). Synonymous with the rise of monopoly capital was the rise of the giant corporation. The monopolization process involved rapid growth in the ratio of physical capital (machinery) to labor. Growth in these corporate firms today relies less on increased employment than on increased capital investment per employee. A monopoly capital firm's production is large scale, constituting a large share of the output of an industry, enabling the firm to control its prices and volume of output and to serve national markets (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). Firms which make up the monopoly sector are, for example, the steel, copper, aluminum, electrical products, and automobile companies. According to O'Connor, one-third of the workforce is employed in the monopoly sector, concentrated in manufacturing and mining (1973: 15).

As industrialization began in the United States, the typical firm was homeowned and small. It serviced a specific area and, most importantly, was subject to the pressures of a free market. Managerial control <1> and

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<1> Control is the ability to obtain desired work behavior from workers.

ownership rested with families or the founding partners (Edwards, 1979). However, this pattern began to change in certain industries. Railroads, a few textile companies, and soon the steel companies began to grow. Management and ownership took on a new look. Rather than being owned and managed by a single person or family, the family owned a controlling share of the company and the public owned (financed) the rest. This marked the beginning of the large corporation which today dominates the United States economy (Edwards, 1979).

The rise of the giant corporation created certain "problems"<2> with which businessmen had to deal. Because of the nature of the new technology and degradation of skills, the labor force was undergoing a process of homogenization (Reich et al., 1973). The homogenization, along with increased proletarianization, resulted in more conflict and union activity (Reich et al., 1973). Labor movement activity indicated class resistance to capitalist hegemony. Monopoly capitalists, faced with this problem of loss of control, organized and fostered a segmentation of the labor market in order to "divide and conquer" the labor movement (Reich et al., 1973). "Thus labor market segmentation arose both from conscious strategies and systemic forces" (Reich et al., 1973: 361). In order to

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<2> Problems may be read as dialectical contradictions.

consciously exploit segmentation, employers exacerbated already existing racial and sexual antagonisms between workers and made certain jobs available only to certain segments of the labor force (Reich et al., 1973).

The second problem encountered dealt with running the giant firm with a "personal" touch (Edwards, 1979). It became impossible. As firms became larger, and had more employees, entrepreneurs could not interact and be involved with all employees (Edwards, 1979). Therefore, owners began to institute and use a hierarchical form of control (Edwards, 1979; Baran and Sweezy, 1966). No longer did the owner/manager oversee the labor process. There was now a hired foreman, a manager of limited power, answerable to the owner and, in later years, responsible to another manager hired to oversee hired managers.<3> In its most efficient form this new arrangement resembled an "army" (Edwards, 1979). A strict chain of command existed and a there was protocol for moving through it. This chain of command encouraged vertical lines and discouraged lateral lines of communication. In this way, some firms came to monopolize specific industrial sectors. Today, they are known as the monopoly sector.

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<3> There is a drastic difference between owners and managers. Owners stand outside the corporate organization and dominate it; the manager is inside the organization and dominated by it (Baran and Sweezy, 1966).

## DUAL ECONOMY

The idea of a non-unified market-economy is contained in various theories but, in particular, it is embodied by dual economy theory and dual labor market theory. The latter is more commonly referred to as labor market segmentation theory (Averitt, 1968; Piore, 1975; Bibb and Form, 1977; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert, 1978; Tolbert, Horan, and Beck, 1980). Although these theories differ in certain respects, their commonality is relected by:

... providing a nonindividualistic alternative for the analysis of earnings, theories of the dual economy provide structural explanations for economic differences between racial and sexual groups. Rather than interpreting group differences in earnings or poverty as due to different rates of individual "failure" in a competitive market, the theory suggests that such group differences may be the outcome of differential assignments of group members within the sectoral structure of the economic order (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert, 1978: 707).

While some industries comprise the monopoly sector, other industries constitute the competitive economy. Characteristics of firms in the competitive sector include

low physical capital (machinery) to labor ratios and correspondingly low output per worker (O'Connor, 1973: 13). Growth of production depends on the growth of employment within the firm. Production is usually small scale, serving local or, at best, regional markets. Restaurants, retail stores (grocery and drug stores especially), service stations, and repair shops are typical firms in the competitive sector (O'Connor, 1973: 13). The competitive sector employs roughly two-thirds of the workforce (O'Connor, 1973).

Jobs available in the competitive sector resemble the following typology: simple control, boss capriciousness in hiring and firing, high turnover (Piore, 1975), "dead-end jobs" (Edwards, 1979), low wages (Edwards, 1979; O'Connor, 1973), low rates of return to education and training/experience (Edwards, 1979), few fringe benefits, often part-time and/or seasonal employment, poor working conditions, high unemployment, and incomes that are often supplemented by federal, state, or local assistance programs (O'Connor, 1973).

A person seeking employment in the monopoly sector find that jobs have the following characteristics: they are careers (Edwards, 1979), they are bureaucratically controlled, they have due process in hiring and firing, good working conditions, unionization, employment stability

(Piore, 1975) high wages (O'Connor, 1973), high rates of return to education and training/experience, and fringe benefits.

Bluestone et al. summarize the characteristics of the monopoly and competitive sectors as follows:

The core [monopoly] economy [sector] includes those industries that comprise the muscle of American economic and political power.... Entrenched in durable manufacturing, the construction trades and to a lesser extent, the extraction industries, the firms in the core [monopoly] economy are noted for high productivity, high profits, intensive utilization of capital, high incidence of monopoly elements, and a high degree of unionization. What follows normally from such characteristics are high wages. ... Workers who are able to secure employment in these industries are, in most cases assured of relatively high wages and better than average working conditions and fringe benefits....

Beyond the fringes of the core [monopoly] economy [sector] lies a set of industries that lack almost all of the advantages normally found in center firms. ... peripheral [competitive] industries are noted for their small firm size,

labor intensity, low profits, low productivity, intensive product market competition, lack of unionization, and low wages. Unlike core [monopoly] sector industries, the periphery [competitive] lacks the assets, size, and political power to take advantage of economies of scale or to spend large sums on research and development (1975: 28-29).

#### LABOR MARKET SEGMENTS

Monopoly sector firms require a labor force which is stable and predictable. Owners and managers' hiring ideologies lead them to seek members of the population who have certain desired characteristics. White males overwhelmingly comprise the monopoly sector labor market. Women and other minorities make up the other major labor market referred to as the competitive sector. The following discussion reviews empirical studies employing the labor market segmentation approach.

Beck, Horan, and Tolbert (1978) utilize a dual labor market approach. However, they see labor market characteristics as a predictable result of the dual structure of the economy. Rather than researching the maintenance of the dual economy, they address income differences of workers and their characteristics as resulting from the dichotomization of the economy.

First, Beck et al. (1978) and Bibb (1979) demonstrate there is a difference in the overall quality of the monopoly and competitive labor forces. Monopoly sector workers are characterized by more schooling, better educated parents, higher occupational status, and higher pay. They are mostly male, white, unionized, and full-time workers. Beck et al. further indicate that the earnings discrepancy between the two sectors is not entirely a result of the different characteristics of the two labor markets.

Research has demonstrated an association between the dual labor markets and the earnings of workers. Beck et al.'s (1978) major finding is that the average annual earnings of a monopoly sector member is 3,057.97 dollars more than a peripheral worker's earnings. Parker's research supports Beck et al.'s claim, for he demonstrates that monopoly sector workers (especially union members) are protected from periodic economic fluctuations as measured by employment rates, whereas peripheral workers' wages and employment are greatly affected by short-term economic fluctuations (1981: 890). Beck et al. proceed to determine the cost/gain of the worker's sectoral location. They find that the cost of being located in the periphery for the average peripheral worker is 1,037.49 dollars, while the gain of being located in the monopoly sector for the average monopoly sector worker is 979.46 dollars. Thus, they

conclude that two-thirds of the 3,057.97 dollar difference is due to the labor force quality (human capital investment). One-third of the income difference is due to differing rates of return on worker characteristics based on sectoral location.

The concept "labor market" refers to the mechanisms and institutions "through which the purchase and sale of labor power are arranged" (Edwards, 195: 86). Internal labor markets may be differentiated from external labor markets. An internal labor market is firm specific. Promotion to a higher level within a vertical organization comes from within itself. Stone (1975) refers to this sort of organization as "job ladders". She claims it creates careers for the emerging homogenous, unskilled machine operators. Vertical organization also fractionates workers by pitting them against each other for placement in the next rung on the job ladder (Edwards, 1979; Stone, 1975; Wachtel, 1975). By only promoting from within the job ladder, the amount of "acceptable" workers that can fill open positions is reduced. If the company recruited from outside, the effect may be to bring workers closer and unify them, in Marx's words, by developing a "class consciousness".

Hence, the rise of monopoly capital firms and the subsequent labor market segmentation resulted in closed, narrowly defined labor markets instead of an open

competitive labor market. To gain access to jobs in the monopoly sector, workers must appear to possess certain traits. Although monopoly control did not change the traits necessary for the job to be done, it changed the "manner" in which the job is to be done (Edwards, 1975). Three ways in which monopoly capital changed the manner in which work is done are:

1) Monopoly capital institutionalized its power over workers by directing their work tasks. They accomplished this by instituting rules specifically mapping out how the job is to be done. Compliance with the rules means good standing with the company. Thus, the trait of rule-orientation is demanded of the worker.

2) Monopoly capital encouraged workers to perform their jobs in a "reliable, predictable, and dependable manner". Hence, the second trait demanded of the worker is "habits of predictability and dependability" (Edwards, 1975: 93).

3) Finally, monopoly capital provides incentives so that the worker remains loyal, committed, and "self-directed or self-controlled". As a result, monopoly capital requires workers to internalize the enterprises' goals and values (Edwards, 1975: 93).

A typology cannot only be constructed for a typical monopoly sector job but for the typical monopoly sector

worker. Typical monopoly sector workers have careers; they follow a logical progression from job to job in which pay, responsibility, authority, and status increase with labor market experience (Edwards, 1975: 99). Competitive sector workers follow a more random series of jobs and are denied opportunities for advancement (Edwards, 1975: 99). Although, women are found in monopoly markets, they are for the most part single and childless and usually under 25 years of age (Edwards, 1979). Wolf and Fligstein (1979) and Roos (1981) find in multivariate regression analysis and a regression standardization procedure that a "nontrivial" portion of the earnings gap between men and women is due to a concentration of women in low-paying and heavily female jobs.

Various explanations of the emergence of labor market segments have been offered, ranging from it being a natural outgrowth of the dual economic sectors (Beck, Horan, Tolbert, 1978), to a need to rid firms of excess capital (Baran and Sweezy, 1966), to providing a ready reserve of labor in order to keep wages depressed (Edwards, 1979). Regardless of the specific explanation, the effect of labor market segments is, then, to fractionate workers (Edwards, 1979). Rather than all labor competing within a unified market/economy, the labor market and economy have been structurally divided along racial, sexual, and supposed

behavioral lines. For the present study, only two labor markets will be examined, the monopoly or core sector and the competitive or periphery sector. The focus of the present research concerns the maintenance of these labor market segments.

#### HYPOTHESES

The above literature suggests that there is a relationship between the economy and marriage/family ideology for women. Regardless of the theoretical assumptions, it appears that women are unable to break cleanly from the ideal of the wife-mother-homemaker role set. Even if women do not adopt the ideal for themselves, employers tend to do so themselves and, as a result, favor men for employment and promotion. Traditionally, women's jobs are extensions of their domestic socialization. Hence, prior research indicates that the boundaries of female employment are circumscribed by women's marriage and family obligations, even if they are not married and have no family. If marriage and motherhood are barriers to monopoly sector participation, then the following hypotheses should find support:

- 1) Single, childless women are more apt than married women or mothers to be found in the monopoly as opposed to the competitive sector.

2) After marriage, women's pattern of proportional mobility between industrial sectors is more likely to be from the monopoly to competitive sector instead of the reverse.

3) After childbirth, women's pattern of proportional mobility between industrial sectors is more likely to be from the monopoly to competitive sector instead of the reverse.

## Chapter III.

### DATA AND METHODS

The data used in this study are a subset of the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of Labor Market Experience, Young Women File, 1968-1975. The NLS, utilizing a national probability sample of the civilian noninstitutionalized population, surveyed (by mail) young women who were aged 14 to 24 years as of January 1, 1968, with overrepresentation of blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged whites. The women were surveyed annually and their life-events along with their employment histories were recorded. The original sample size was 5159 women. The age distribution of this sample is presented in Table 1.

The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research prepared a subset of variables relating to industry of labor force participation, motherhood, and marital status. The variables selected for this particular study are the Standard Industry Codes as used in 1960, marital status, and the age of youngest child for each year.

The first step was to prepare a subset of the young women from the original data set. Those women who were married or had children at the outset of the survey were not considered valid cases. Thus, the subset for analysis consisted of only those young women who were single and

TABLE 1

## AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN IN THE SAMPLE, 1968\*

---

AGE	
14	394 (7.6) *
15	551 (10.7)
16	542 (10.5)
17	542 (10.5)
18	521 (10.1)
19	490 (9.5)
20	523 (10.1)
21	464 (9.0)
22	392 (7.6)
23	356 (6.9)
24	384 (7.4)
	<hr/> 5159

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

childless in 1968. This skews the age profile of the women upward into the younger ages. Table 2 contains the revised age distribution for the subset to be analyzed. The subset consists of 3288 valid cases.

The variable marital status consisted of six categories: 1) married, spouse present; 2) married, spouse absent; 3) widowed; 4) divorced; 5) separated; and 6) never married. Marital status was recoded to form a dichotomous variable, married and single. Categories 1,2,3,4,5 are collapsed into the married category. Because of the short time span of the study, divorced women are considered as married because in such a short time period it is unlikely that many women will get married and then divorced. The period is in some cases too short for a marriage, divorce, and re-adjustment to take place. Although some women married in 1969 may have had time to divorce, those married in 1973 would not. Thus to maintain continuity, all divorced women are considered as married. The effects of marriage are assumed to be the same for them, although they may be able to, in fact, regain their pre-marital status.

The age of youngest child is used to ascertain a birth in the last year and the event of motherhood. Although, theoretically, motherhood for this study could be initiated through adoption or marrying a person that has children,

TABLE 2

## REVISED AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN IN THE SAMPLE, 1968\*

---

AGE	
14	37 (3.8)
15	79 (8.1)
16	77 (7.9)
17	121 (12.5)
18	158 (16.3)
19	128 (13.2)
20	135 (13.9)
21	98 (10.1)
22	72 (7.4)
23	43 (4.4)
24	23 (2.4)
	<hr/> 971

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

the only safe procedure of determining the onset of motherhood with the present data set is by using the category number of children less than one year of age. It is impossible to determine whether a child who appears to be 10 years old is a step-son or a child who was nine years old the previous year. Therefore, only infant children can be safely used. This limitation depressed the number of potential valid cases for this study, but it insures valid conclusions from the analysis.

The Standard Industry Codes were used for the survey. The survey specifically used the codes of the 1960 census. I recoded them into three categories: monopoly (core) industries, competitive (peripheral) industries, and unemployed. Chart A presents a breakdown of the monopoly-competitive sectoralization.

Tolbert, Horan, and Beck's (1980) sectoralization is used rather than any of the other available sectoralizations (see Chart B). There are two reasons for this decision. First, Tolbert et al.'s conceptualization is the only empirically derived sectoralization. Second, conceptually, it is not as polemic as are the others. It is not the purpose of this research to demonstrate the efficacy of different industrial sectoralizations. However, as a precaution I used three other sectoralizations; Hodson's; Bibb and Form's; and Beck, Horan, and Tolbert's (all of

## Chart A

## INDUSTRIAL SECTORALIZATION

Industry	Sector
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries:	
Agricultural production	Competitive
Agricultural services	Competitive
Mining:	
Metal mining	Monopoly
Coal mining	Monopoly
Crude petroleum and natural gas	Monopoly
Nonmetallic mining and quarrying	Monopoly
Construction:	
General building contractors	Monopoly
General contractors, except building	Monopoly
Special trade contractors	Monopoly
Not specified construction	Monopoly
Manufacturing - durable goods:	
Lumber and wood products	Competitive
Furniture and fixtures	Competitive
Stone, clay, and glass products	Monopoly
Primary metal	Monopoly
Fabricated metal products	Monopoly
Machinery, except electrical	Monopoly
Electrical machinery, equipment	Monopoly
Motor vehicles and equipment	Monopoly
Other transportation equipment	Monopoly
Professional, photographic, watches	Monopoly
Ordnance	Monopoly
Miscellaneous manufacturing	Competitive
Manufacturing - nondurable goods:	
Food and kindred products	Monopoly
Tobacco manufacturers	Monopoly
Textile - knitting mills	Competitive
Textile - dyeing and finishing	Monopoly
Textile - floor covering	Competitive
Textile - yarn, thread, fabric mills	Monopoly
Textile - miscellaneous products	Competitive
Apparel and other related products	Competitive
Paper and allied products	Monopoly
Printing, publishing	Monopoly
Chemicals and allied products	Monopoly
Petroleum and coal products	Monopoly
Rubber products	Monopoly
Miscellaneous plastic products	Competitive
Tanned, curried, and finished leather	Competitive
Footwear, except rubber	Monopoly
Leather products, except footwear	Competitive

## Chart A cont.

---

Transportation, communications, and other public utilities:	
Railroads and railway express	Monopoly
Street railways and buslines	Competitive
Taxicab service	Competitive
Trucking service	Monopoly
Warehousing and storage	Monopoly
Water transportation	Monopoly
Air transportation	Monopoly
Pipelines, except natural gas	Monopoly
Services incidental to transportation	Competitive
Communication	Monopoly
Electric, gas, and steam power	Monopoly
Water, sanitary, and other utilities	Competitive
Wholesale trade:	
Motor vehicles and equipment	Competitive
Drugs, chemicals, allied products	Monopoly
Dry goods and apparel	Competitive
Food and related products	Monopoly
Farm products - raw materials	Competitive
Electrical goods	Monopoly*
Hardware, plumbing, heating supplies	Competitive
Not specified electrical hardware	Competitive
Machinery, equipment and supplies	Monopoly
Metals and minerals, n.e.c.	Monopoly
Petroleum products	Competitive
Scrap and waste materials	Competitive
Alcoholic beverages	Monopoly
Paper and its products	Competitive
Lumber and construction materials	Competitive+
Wholesalers, not specified, n.e.c.	Competitive

---

\*Electrical goods was coded for the analysis as a competitive industry. It was necessary due to the codes used in the data.

+Scrap and waste materials, alcoholic beverages, paper and its products, lumber and construction materials were coded as Competitive industries due to the codes used in the data.

## Chart A cont.

---

<b>Retail trade:</b>	
Lumber, building materials, hardware	Competitive
Department, general merchandise stores	Competitive
Food stores	Competitive
Motor vehicles, gasoline, accessories	Competitive
Apparel and shoe stores	Competitive
Furniture, household appliances	Competitive
Eating and drinking places	Competitive
Other retail trade	Competitive
<b>Finance, insurance, and real estate:</b>	
Banking	Monopoly
Credit agencies	Monopoly
Security brokerage and investment	Monopoly
Insurance	Monopoly
Real estate	Competitive
<b>Business and repair services:</b>	
Advertising	Competitive
Automobile repair	Competitive
Other business services	Competitive
<b>Personal services:</b>	
Hotels and motels	Competitive
Other personal services	Competitive
Entertainment and recreation services	Competitive
<b>Professional and related services:</b>	
Offices of physicians, dentists, practioners, and health services	Monopoly
Hospitals, convalescent institutions	Competitive
Legal services	Monopoly
Educational services	Competitive
Museums and other nonprofit firms	Competitive
Engineering and architectural firms	Monopoly
Accounting and auditing services	Monopoly
Miscellaneous professional services	Monopoly
Public administration	Monopoly

---

(adapted from Tolbert, Horan, and Beck, 1980)

Chart B  
OTHER SECTORAL CLASSIFICATIONS

Industry	Beck, Horan, and Tolbert (1978)	Bibb-Form (1977)	Hodson (1977)
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries	Comp.*	Excluded	Comp.
Mining			
Metal mining	Monop.*	Monop.	Monop.
Coal mining	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Crude petroleum and natural gas	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Nonmetallic mining and quarrying	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Construction	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Durable manufacturing			
Lumber and wood products	Comp.	Monop.	Comp.
Furniture and fixtures	Comp.	Monop.	Comp.
Stone, clay, and glass products	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Metal industries	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Machinery, except electrical	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Electrical machinery, equipment, supplies	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Transportation equip.	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Prof. and photographic equipment	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Ordnance	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Miscellaneous	Comp.	Monop.	Monop.
Nondurable manufacturing			
Food and kindred products	Comp.	Comp.	Monop.
Tobacco manufactures	Comp.	Comp.	Monop.
Textile mill products	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
Apparel and other fabricated textiles	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
Paper and allied products	Monop.	Comp.	Monop.
Printing, publishing and allied industries	Monop.	Comp.	Comp.
Chemicals and allied products	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Petroleum and coal products	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.

Chart B cont.

Industry	Beck, Horan, and Tolbert (1978)	Bibb-Form (1977)	Hodson (1977)
Rubber and misc. plastic products	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Leather and leather products	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
Not specified non- durable manufact.	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
<b>Transportation</b>			
Railroads and railway express service	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Street railways and bus lines	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Taxicab service	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Trucking service	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Warehousing and storage	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Water transportation	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Air transportation	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Petroleum and gasoline pipelines	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Services incidental to transportation	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
<b>Communications</b>			
Radio broadcasting and television	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Telephone (wire and radio)	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
Telegraph (wire and radio)	Monop.	Monop.	Monop.
<b>Utilities and sanitary services</b>			
Electric light and power	Monop.	Monop.	State
Gas, steam and supply systems	Monop.	Monop.	State
Electric-gas utilites	Monop.	Monop.	State
Water supply	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Sanitation services	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Other not specified utilities	Monop.	Monop.	Comp.
Wholesale trade	Monop.	Comp.	Comp.
Retail trade	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
Finance, insurance, and real estate	Monop.	Comp.	Comp.

Chart B cont.

Industry	Beck, Horan, and Tolbert (1978)	Bibb-Form (1977)	Hodson (1977)
Business and repair services	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
Personal services	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
Entertainment and recreation services	Comp.	Comp.	Comp.
Professional and related services	Monop.	Comp.	Comp.
Public admin.	Monop.	Monop.	State

(adapted from Beck, Horan, and Tolbert, 1978)

these can be found in Tolbert et al. (1978)). No appreciable differences existed as far as patterns of employment are concerned.

Controlling for time is achieved by looking at patterns over different survey years. The years used are 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973. In sum, a five year span is considered.

Due to large variations in missing data for particular years, especially regarding the industry of employment, all missing data had to be eliminated from the analysis. It was not possible to determine whether women were exiting from the monopoly industries after marriage/childbirth and entering the competitive industries/unemployment because of large swells in missing data, especially in 1970 and 1972. Because of this, all missing data were removed from the analysis. By selecting only cases which were not missing for the year of marriage, I assured being able to determine whether cohorts of women were transferring to either a different industrial sector or unemployment.

Eliminating the missing data drastically reduced the number of valid cases for particular years. It may be the case, however, that eliminating the missing cases has altered the results to a degree. Those cases which are missing may not resemble the women who constitute the valid sample. Although the subset obtained from ICPSR does not

contain variables on background variables, such as education or race, it is possible to theorize general characteristics of the analyzed cohorts. Because of their stable employment they are most likely working class women. They are probably not college educated because college would have interrupted their work histories. A criteria for inclusion was a work history which did not contain any recorded unemployment. It is probably a valid guess that there is overrepresentation of working class blacks and underrepresentation of middle class whites. On the independent variables they were not different, since all women in the particular sub-sample were homogenous on the independent variable.

Not all years were acceptable for analysis. Most of the problems resulted from faulty data. For instance, the industrial sector of employment for 1971 is only a one-digit code rather than the three digit code needed to perform a sectoralization of the industries. In another case, the age of youngest child in 1971 is uninterpretable. It appears to be another variable that was mistakenly selected. Finally some questions were not asked in certain years or are not useful for this study. For instance, getting married in 1975 is not important since the industry variables do not exist for 1976.

Each year that was valid was used. By controlling for the year, I analyzed the industrial sector distributions for

cohorts of married and single women, and those with children. By selecting, for example, from a sub-sample of single women in 1969 those that got married in 1970 (they claim they are married in 1970), it is possible to trace the entire cohort through a particular part of the life cycle. As an example, it is possible to trace a cohort through two years of singlehood and then three years of spousehood and to record their change (if any) in labor market sector participation.

## Chapter IV.

### FINDINGS

Hypothesis one stating that single, childless women are more apt than married women or mothers to be found in the monopoly as opposed to the competitive sector is not supported. The data in Table 3 suggests no evidence for the hypothesis. Table 3 shows that single women make up 38.6 percent of women employed in the monopoly sector with married women and mothers constituting 40.1 percent and 38.5 percent of the monopoly sector respectively. Single women are found more often in the competitive sector (61.1 percent) than are married women and mothers (58.2 and 59.9 percent respectively). Women, regardless of their marital or parental status, are employed in approximately the same proportions in the monopoly and competitive sectors.

Hypothesis two states that after marriage, the women's pattern of mobility between industrial sectors is more likely to be from the monopoly to competitive sector instead of the reverse. Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 display the industrial sectors of employment patterns for women married in 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972. It is clear that proportionally very little mobility occurs. The percent employed in the two industrial sectors of the labor force is very stable. For instance, in Table 4, 35.8 percent of the women were

employed in the monopoly sector and 62.3 percent in the competitive sector in 1968. In 1969, the year of their marriage, they increase their percentage in the monopoly sector to 40.6 percent, and decrease their percentage employment in the competitive sector, by 3.8 percent, to 58.8 percent. In no year after that does employment in the monopoly sector fall below the 1968 percentage. The lowest, other than 1968, is 1975, with 36.8 percent employed in the monopoly sector and 63.2 percent in the competitive. This pattern holds for the later cohorts.

Examining the cohorts of single women for each year, the pattern is clear. In the early years, 1968 and 1969, their percentages in the monopoly sector are lower than married women (see Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11). This may be explained by their younger ages. But by 1972, 1973, and 1975 the same percentage of single women are found in the monopoly sector as are married women. For instance, Table 9 shows the employment patterns for women who were single in 1969. In 1968 and 1969, 23.2 percent and 27.7 percent, respectively, were employed in the monopoly sector. In 1968 and 1969, 75.5 percent and 71.7 percent were employed in the competitive sector. By 1970, 34.9 percent are employed in monopoly industries. In 1972, 38.7 percent of the women single in 1969 are employed in the monopoly sector and 61.0 percent in the competitive. In 1973, they increase slightly

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SECTORS  
1972\*

Industrial sector	Marital Status			
	Single	Married	Mothers	
Monopoly	995 (38.6)	195 (40.1)	72 (38.5)	1262
Competitive	1572 (61.1)	279 (58.2)	112 (59.9)	1963
Unemployed	5 (0.3)	6 (1.7)	3 (1.6)	14
	2573	479	187	3239

Chi-square = 17.674

p &lt; .05

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 4

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN MARRIED IN 1969\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	38 (35.8)	43 (40.6)	48 (45.3)	43 (40.6)	41 (38.7)	39 (36.8)
Competitive	66 (62.3)	62 (58.5)	57 (53.8)	61 (57.5)	63 (59.4)	67 (63.2)
Unemployed	2 (1.9)	1 (0.9)	1 (0.9)	2 (1.9)	2 (1.9)	0 (0.0)
	106	106	106	106	106	106

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 5

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN MARRIED IN 1970\*

Industrial sector	Year					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	25 (20.7)	44 (36.4)	45 (37.2)	48 (39.7)	53 (43.8)	48 (39.7)
Competitive	94 (77.7)	76 (62.8)	76 (62.8)	72 (59.5)	68 (56.2)	73 (60.3)
Unemployed	2 (1.7)	1 (0.8)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.8)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
	121	121	121	121	121	121

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 6

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN MARRIED IN 1971\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	28 (23.0)	34 (27.9)	49 (40.2)	49 (40.2)	51 (41.8)	47 (38.5)
Competitive	93 (76.2)	88 (72.1)	73 (59.8)	72 (59.0)	71 (58.2)	75 (61.5)
Unemployed	1 (0.8)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.8)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
	122	122	122	122	122	122

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 7

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN MARRIED IN 1972+

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	33 (25.4)	43 (33.1)	49 (37.7)	55 (42.3)	50 (38.5)	51 (39.2)
Competitive	96 (73.8)	85 (65.4)	80 (61.5)	74 (56.9)	78 (60.0)	78 (60.0)
Unemployed	1 (0.8)	2 (1.5)	1 (0.8)	1 (0.8)	2 (1.5)	1 (0.8)
	130	130	130	130	130	130

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

to 41.3 percent being employed in the monopoly sector. However, in 1975, they decrease a little to 40.2 percent and increase the percentage in the competitive sector to 59.7 percent. Although single women show increases in monopoly sector employment and corresponding decreases in competitive sector employment in the early years, after 1972 their location is very stable. There is little proportional mobility. This pattern holds for women single in 1970, 1971, 1973.

Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15 contain the distributions for women having children in 1969, 1970, 1972, and 1973. The pattern here, as in the previous case, is very clear. Contrary to the third hypothesis, stating that after childbirth the pattern of mobility between industrial sectors is more likely to be from the monopoly to competitive sector instead of the reverse, sectoral location is found to be very stable. In fact, Table 12 presents some evidence of a reverse trend. The percentage of mothers having children in 1969 increased in the monopoly sector and decreased in the competitive sector. Although it is an increase of a little less than seven percent in the monopoly sector (41.7 percent to 58.3 percent), it is numerically only an increase of four. Only 24 cases were valid for this test, so it may not be possible to draw valid conclusions from these data. Although there are minor fluctuations,

TABLE 8

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN SINGLE IN 1969\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	197 (23.2)	235 (27.7)	296 (34.9)	328 (38.7)	350 (41.3)	341 (40.2)
Competitive	642 (75.7)	608 (71.7)	547 (64.5)	517 (61.0)	495 (58.4)	506 (59.7)
Unemployed	9 (1.1)	5 (0.6)	5 (0.6)	3 (0.4)	3 (0.4)	1 (0.1)
	848	848	848	848	848	848

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 9

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN SINGLE IN 1970\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	170 (23.9)	188 (26.4)	246 (34.6)	275 (38.7)	293 (41.2)	288 (40.5)
Competitive	534 (75.1)	519 (73.0)	460 (64.7)	434 (61.0)	415 (58.4)	422 (59.4)
Unemployed	7 (1.0)	4 (0.6)	5 (0.7)	2 (0.3)	3 (0.4)	1 (0.1)
	711	711	711	711	711	711

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 10

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN SINGLE IN 1971\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	141 (24.4)	153 (26.5)	196 (34.0)	224 (38.8)	239 (41.4)	237 (41.1)
Competitive	430 (74.5)	420 (72.8)	376 (65.2)	352 (61.0)	335 (58.1)	339 (58.8)
Unemployed	6 (1.0)	4 (0.7)	5 (0.9)	1 (0.2)	3 (0.5)	1 (0.2)
	577	577	577	577	577	577

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 11

## INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN SINGLE IN 1972\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	106 (24.3)	109 (24.9)	145 (33.2)	168 (38.4)	186 (42.6)	183 (41.9)
Competitive	326 (74.6)	326 (74.6)	288 (65.9)	269 (61.6)	250 (57.2)	254 (58.1)
Unemployed	5 (1.1)	2 (0.5)	4 (0.9)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.2)	0 (0.0)
	437	437	437	437	437	437

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 12

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN HAVING A CHILD  
IN 1969\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	7 (29.2)	10 (41.7)	11 (45.8)	11 (45.8)	14 (58.3)	14 (58.3)
Competitive	17 (70.8)	14 (58.3)	13 (54.2)	13 (54.2)	10 (41.7)	10 (41.7)
Unemployed	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
	24	24	24	24	24	24

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 13

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN HAVING A CHILD  
IN 1970\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	8 (18.6)	12 (27.9)	16 (37.2)	16 (37.2)	19 (44.7)	17 (39.2)
Competitive	34 (79.1)	31 (72.1)	26 (60.5)	25 (58.1)	23 (53.5)	26 (60.5)
Unemployed	1 (2.3)	0 (0.0)	1 (2.3)	2 (4.7)	1 (2.3)	0 (0.0)
	43	43	43	43	43	43

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 14

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN HAVING A CHILD  
IN 1972\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	28 (23.3)	40 (33.3)	50 (41.7)	45 (37.5)	45 (37.5)	45 (37.5)
Competitive	90 (75.0)	80 (66.7)	69 (57.5)	74 (61.7)	74 (61.7)	75 (62.5)
Unemployed	2 (1.7)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.8)	1 (0.8)	1 (0.8)	0 (0.0)
	120	120	120	120	120	120

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

TABLE 15

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN HAVING A CHILD  
IN 1973\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	25 (20.8)	34 (28.3)	41 (34.2)	44 (36.7)	50 (41.7)	44 (36.7)
Competitive	93 (77.5)	86 (71.7)	77 (64.1)	76 (63.3)	70 (58.3)	76 (63.3)
Unemployed	2 (1.7)	0 (0.0)	2 (1.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
	120	120	120	120	120	120

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

the percentage of mothers remaining in or entering the monopoly sector after childbirth tends to be stable. Except for women bearing children in 1973 (see Table 15), the percentage employed in the monopoly sector does not fall lower than the year of childbirth. Table 16 shows a little more than a four percent decrease in monopoly sector employment and a corresponding increase of employment in competitive industries after childbirth. Again only 120 cases are valid for the test, thus little generalizability is possible.

Table 16 shows the employment patterns of women who had not had a child by 1973. The distribution of these women between the monopoly and competitive sectors is very similar to the patterns of mothers, single, and married women. In 1968 and 1969, 25.8 percent and 28.2 percent, respectively, were employed in the monopoly sector and 73.4 percent and 70.8 percent, respectively, were in the competitive industries. Beginning in 1970, their employment in the monopoly sector increased to approximately 40 percent and their employment in the competitive sector decreased to approximately 60 percent, thereafter remaining relatively stable.

No hypothesis is supported. Single women are as apt to be employed in the competitive sector as are married women and mothers. There does not appear to be any mobility

between the two sectors after marriage and childbirth. Although numerically single women are found more often in the monopoly sector than either married women or mothers, approximately 40 percent of women, regardless of their marital or parental status, are employed in monopoly industries. After 1970 the lowest percentage employed in the monopoly sector is 33.2 percent (see Table 14, 1970), with the highest percentage of women employed in the competitive sector being 65.9 percent (see Table 11, 1970). The largest percentage ever employed in the monopoly sector is 58.3. (see Table 12, 1973 and 1975). However, Table 12 contains very few cases; the largest percentage of women employed using a reliable sample is 43.8 percent (see Table 5, 1973). The smallest percentage of women employed in the competitive sector is 56.2 (see Table 5, 1973).

TABLE 16

INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN WHO HAD NOT HAD A CHILD  
BY 1973\*

Industrial sector	Year:					
	1968	1969	1970	1972	1973	1975
Monopoly	169 (25.8)	185 (28.2)	230 (35.1)	259 (39.5)	268 (40.9)	262 (40.0)
Competitive	481 (73.4)	464 (70.8)	421 (64.3)	393 (60.0)	383 (58.5)	392 (59.8)
Unemployed	5 (0.8)	6 (0.9)	4 (0.6)	3 (0.5)	4 (0.6)	1 (0.2)
	655	655	655	655	655	655

\*Numbers in ( ) are percentages.

## Chapter V.

### DISCUSSION

This analysis indicates that regardless of marital or parental status, women are found in relatively the same proportions in the monopoly as well as the competitive sector. Marriage and childbirth seemingly have no effect on the maintenance of the respective labor markets. However, the analysis does demonstrate the remarkable stability of the labor markets. There was very little, if any, proportional mobility between the two labor markets regardless of marital or parental status.

Clearly, the results were unanticipated. The bulk of the labor market segmentation literature claims there is a relationship between women's marriage and family obligations and their industrial sector of employment. Labor market segmentation theory posits that women's family obligations constitute significant "barriers" to monopoly sector participation. After marriage and childbirth, the findings here show that for the cohorts considered, women's industrial sector location remains remarkably stable, a contradiction to theory.

It would be easy at this point to claim that faulty data resulted in these "aberrant" findings. However, given the nature of the study upon which they are based, other

questions may be raised. Among them are: Is there a problem in the research design?; What are the effects of marriage and childbirth on industrial sector location for women, if any?; How are labor market segments maintained, if in fact they do exist?

There are problems with the research design, and it will be the task of future research to solve them. First, the time span for this study is too short. The entire study covers a range of seven years, but only five years have valid data. Of those five years, only four were "test" years (1968 was my baseline year). As a consequence, the sample women may not have had enough time to encounter the "barriers". For example, a woman married in 1970 may work in a monopoly sector job, along with her husband. In five years she and her husband may still be at their jobs. However, if the husband is promoted and transferred to another locale, then the wife must decide whether to remain at her present job and job ladder or "voluntarily" change her job and demonstrate "intermittent labor force participation". She would probably follow her husband. Her next job may be in the competitive sector, however (Barret, 1979a, 1979b). These same cohorts, analyzed with stochastic models for example, would better reflect such possibilities than the present analysis can.

The research design suffers from another problem endemic to the data available. Edwards (1979) outlines different labor markets within the monopoly sector. There are "subordinate" and "independent" jobs. Subordinate monopoly jobs are routinized. They encourage personality characteristics of dependability, discipline, responsiveness to rules and authority, and acceptance of a firm's goals. Typical jobs of this sort are factory and office jobs (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 1973). Independent core jobs encourage and demand creative, problem-solving, self-initiating characteristics, and often have professional codes and standards for work.

Stevenson, citing Wilensky, claims that most women are concentrated in jobs that can be characterized by one or more of the following: they are extensions of tasks done as housework or child care; they are not physically demanding or hazardous; they require patience, manual dexterity, sex appeal, or concern for welfare or cultural matters (1975: 245). In 1977, more than two-thirds of the employed women held jobs in traditional female occupations: nurses; librarians; teachers; social workers; clerical workers; and service workers (Barret, 1979: 46). Braverman (1974) cites evidence to support this claim. These jobs would be subordinate monopoly sector jobs.

The data at hand do not allow for such a classification. Therefore, what is needed is some type of index for these jobs, so that a new occupational index (as opposed to the Duncan Occupational Index) can be utilized. It may well be that women are employed in independent monopoly jobs before marriage and childbirth and employed in subordinate monopoly jobs afterwards.

Another problem with such a short time span is that the particular years used may be part of, or synonymous with, a particular "moment" of capitalism (Aronowitz, 1981). This particular "moment" may be conducive to hiring 40 percent of the women in the monopoly sector and 60 percent in the competitive. For instance, it has been demonstrated that capitalists "chose" the type of production process utilized (Kessler-Harris, 1975; Stone, 1975). Therefore, the chosen production process in particular industries may allow for employment of married women in the monopoly sector. The history of technological change in the textile industry provides good evidence that there is an "interrelationship between the nature of technological advance in a production process and the sex of the available labor supply" (Stevenson, 1975: 246). Presently, the "moment" may be different, and a higher or lower proportion of women may be employed in the different sectors.

Although labor market segmentation theories claim to be historical theories, the sectoralizations used are not. They are ahistorical. Relying on data collected at one particular time, they effectively "institutionalize" the particular industries as monopoly or competitive, when, in fact, it is possible for industries and especially particular firms to lose their monopoly status or to gain it. It is even possible for firms and industries to become nonexistent (the railroads are almost at this point). The present study relied on a sectoralization published in 1980, based on data collected between 1966 and 1972. Although many of the analysis years are within this span, how well does that sectoralization fit present reality? I suggest maybe not very well. I do not mean to overemphasize process in the location of particular industries, for a characteristic of a monopoly industry is its stability and insulation from market fluctuations, but these industries are not completely immune to financial difficulties (witness Chrysler and Braniff) (Bibb, 1979). It would be a better strategy if it were possible to construct different sectoralizations for each two or three year period and then analyze the cohorts' industrial sector employment patterns. This would make the methodology isomorphic with the theory.

The second question concerns what the effects of marriage and childbirth have on industrial sector location,

if any. The literature dealing with the relationship between the economy and family structure indicate it is strong. Capitalism has effects on the particular structure and organization of the family, and the structure and organization of the family certainly impinges on the opportunities and employment patterns of women. Anthropological and sociological researchers have consistently documented how well integrated the female role is with marriage and childbirth (Holmstrom, 1981). Establishing relationships between the female role and marriage and childbirth are not a problem; the particular form the relationships take and how they affect women are problematic, however.

I caution against reifying these effects. The effects of capitalism on women's employment patterns or industrial sector location may vary at different times. Management initiatives, labor market fluctuations, current ideology about marriage and childbirth, availability of childcare, number of single parents, all affect employment patterns. Presently, there is an increase in female-headed households. Management may hire these women because female-heads are viewed as more stable than single or married women. They must work to support their family, much like the husband does to support his. They may be viewed as serious about their work, much like men are (Gates, 1976).

The changing organization of the office and the implementation of available technology has resulted in a proliferation of office jobs. Employers are faced with either hiring different categories of women (married and mothers) or hiring men who will demand higher wages (Kessler-Harris, 1975). Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between the nature (ideology) and composition of the labor market and the managers employing them.

The final question raised is how, then, are labor markets maintained, if they do exist. The most striking finding of the analysis is that 40 percent of women are employed in the monopoly sector and 60 percent are employed in the competitive sector, evidence for labor market segments. This holds true for women in general: married women, single women, and mothers. One may claim that the monopoly sector employs approximately one-third of the labor force (O'Connor, 1973) and the sample used here approximately reflects this tendency. It could be argued that women are hired randomly into the monopoly and competitive sectors. However, it is unreasonable to believe that the entire sample of women never changed jobs from their first one, even as early as 14 years of age. Some women surely changed jobs in 1975. But those jobs changes occurred within the barriers of their particular labor market, a feature that researchers such as Felmler (1982)

neglect. The fact is that no proportional mobility occurred between the industrial sectors. Marriage and childbirth apparently are not barriers to monopoly sector participation. But the women employed in the monopoly sector who got married did not leave it. This may not be surprising. However, the 60 percent of women employed in the competitive sector who got married did not leave that sector either.

Future research may find that the first job is the most important element in explaining industrial sector location. If the critical element in determining a woman's industrial sector location is the first job, particularly as an adult, full-time member of the labor force (age may be a critical variable), then the employer's investment in hiring women may explain a great deal.<1> This is not to say that marriage and childbirth may not affect the choice of first job and, hence, the entrance into a particular industrial sector, for as Klemmack and Edwards (1973) have demonstrated, perceived marriage and family plans, closely related to present dating status, can effect the occupation chosen. If a monopoly sector employer hires a single women, he may have hired her because he views her as being relatively stable compared to a married/mother's labor force

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<1> Career origins have been demonstrated to continually affect earnings level (Birnbaum, 1975).

participation. He makes a particular investment in hiring the single woman, but she later marries. Now it is to the employer's advantage to keep the woman, regardless of her marital or parental status (the monopoly sector labor force is characteristically stable). In fact, Baron posits there is a relatively low rate of mobility between sectors (1975: 204). The married woman may wish to take a lesser job but the monopoly sector requires a stable labor force. The industry may make concessions to married women to keep them employed, such as by providing daycare.

The competitive sector hires the unacceptables from the monopoly sector. To this sector, women are desirable employees because they work for less, they are not unionized, and demand less. Whether a woman is married or not is unimportant, except for employer capriciousness.

However, the data clearly demonstrate that after marriage, the proportional mobility between the two sectors is practically non-existent. In the early, single years, there is more mobility. But hiring a married woman for the first time presents a different problem for the monopoly sector employer. He must insure that the woman remain employed long enough to become useful to the company, as "experience on the job seems to be a critical element of

training in virtually every occupation" (Piore, 1975: 133).

#### CONCLUSION

Future research on the industrial sector location of women should include finer distinctions of this concept. This will involve collecting data including not only the industry of employment but a detailed job description. The job description will allow for finer distinctions to be made in conceptualizing the various sectors. Instead of a polemic conceptualization of the labor markets, it will be possible to make distinctions between not only different labor markets but among jobs and the internal labor markets comprising the sectors.

I urge the use of longitudinal data to insure the isomorphism of theory and methods. I suggest collecting a series of case studies of women to determine the effects of life-events as well as changes in production processes for their employment patterns. These case studies would allow for a more precise analysis than a cohort study.

This analysis has not supported the hypothesis that marriage and childbirth effectively bar women from participating in the monopoly sector. Instead, this analysis has shown there to be very little proportional mobility between the labor markets. The labor markets are remarkably stable in this regard. This finding points to an internal contradiction within labor market segmentation

theory. On the one hand, labor market segmentation theorists claim that marriage and childbirth ideologies bar women from monopoly sector participation. On the other hand, they claim that the monopoly sector industries require a stable labor force. If 40 percent of the single women are employed in the monopoly sector, they then would constitute a highly unstable work force, for as the married and had children they would then exit the monopoly sector. This analysis suggests however, that the marriage and childbirth ideologies do not bar women from monopoly sector participation. A more indepth analysis may yield different results.

But the specific means by which labor markets are maintained are not fully understood. Therefore, data must be collected that is amenable to refinements in the theory if the inequality that women experience in the labor force is to be recognized and understood.

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WOMEN AS PERIPHERAL WORKERS:  
BARRIERS TO MONOPOLY SECTOR PARTICIPATION

by

Thomas L. Steiger

(ABSTRACT)

This thesis examines the effects of marriage and childbirth on industrial sector location of women in a longitudinal analysis, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience, Young Women File for years 1968 to 1975. Contrary to theoretical assumptions, women, regardless of marital or parental status are found in the same proportions in the monopoly and competitive sectors. Although marriage and childbirth appear not to have any effects on the labor market segmentation of women, the labor markets are remarkably stable. Suggestions for future research and an assessment of labor market segmentation theory are given.