

Philosophical Zombies Don't Share Our Epistemic Situation

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## ABSTRACT

Chalmers (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies *do* share our epistemic situation. In the following paper I aim to show that philosophical-zombies do *not* share our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness. I will begin with some background material regarding the general dialectic I am addressing in section (I) before outlining the debate between Chalmers (2007) and Carruthers and Veillet (2007) in more detail and its relevance for mind-body considerations in section (II). Next, in section (III) I will suggest a worry related to Carruthers and Veillet's position: that phenomenal concepts fail to refer in zombie worlds in the first place. Finally, in section (IV) I will argue that even if a zombie's phenomenal concepts successfully refer, there is still good reason to think that zombies will fail to share our epistemic situation. I will defend this claim by explaining three asymmetries between me and my zombie twin's corresponding epistemic situations.

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## GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

In the following paper I defend the position that philosophical zombies don't share our epistemic situation. Philosophical zombies are hypothetical creatures that are identical to humans concerning all physical and functional properties, yet lack any phenomenal experiences. While zombies have identical brain states compared to non-zombies, they lack any felt, private, and subjective experiences. Next, I understand epistemic situation in this paper as the justificatory status of one's beliefs. So, I am arguing that the beliefs of a physical duplicate of me who lacked experiences would not be equally justified as mine. Specifically, I am responding to Carruthers and Veillet (2007) who argue that philosophical zombies do share our epistemic situation, so long as we allow the zombies' beliefs to differ in content. That is to say, if we understand zombie beliefs to be about different states (other than phenomenal states), then there is an available physical referent for the zombie belief that will ensure all his beliefs are as equally justified as their non-zombie twin. I suggest a difficulty for the existence of such a referent, and point to a collection of asymmetries in justificatory status between the beliefs of zombies and non-zombies to argue that the Carruthers and Veillet (2007) strategy is unavailable.

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## Introduction

Chalmers (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies *do* share our epistemic situation. In the following paper I aim to show that philosophical-zombies do *not* share our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness. I will begin with some background material regarding the general dialectic I am addressing in section (I) before outlining the debate between Chalmers (2007) and Carruthers and Veillet (2007) in more detail and its relevance for mind-body considerations in section (II). Next, in section (III) I will suggest a worry related to Carruthers and Veillet's position: that phenomenal concepts fail to refer in zombie worlds in the first place. Finally, in section (IV) I will argue that even if a zombie's phenomenal concepts successfully refer, there is still good reason to think that zombies will fail to share our epistemic situation. I will defend this claim by explaining three asymmetries between me and my zombie twin's corresponding epistemic situations.

## Section I

Between Nagel's bats (1974), Chalmers' zombies (1996, 2010), and Jackson's Mary (1982), some philosophers have noted the existence of an apparent "explanatory gap" (Levine 1983, 2001) between the physical and the phenomenal. From this explanatory gap, some philosophers make the inference to dualism. Others accept an epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal, but deny any sort of ontological gap. The latter position is known as "Type B physicalism" under Chalmers' taxonomy (2003). Type B physicalists believe the identity of phenomenal states and physical/functional states is knowable a posteriori. While our concepts of phenomenal states and physical/functional states may be dualistic, phenomenal states are still going to be reducible to brain states.

An important strategy for the Type B physicalist in recent literature is the "Phenomenal Concept Strategy<sup>1</sup>" (PCS). This strategy attempts to place the explanatory gap in the way we think about consciousness, not consciousness itself. PCS makes use of phenomenal concepts (PCs), which are understood in a few different ways. In this paper, I will understand PCs as concepts that take phenomenal states as their referents. By phenomenal states, I mean those mental states or properties of mental states that are typed by what-it-is-like to have them. I

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<sup>1</sup> This phrase was first used by Stoljar (2005)

will also adopt the analysis of phenomenality found in Kriegel (2009). Kriegel argues that phenomenality breaks down into two further components: subjective character (the fact that phenomenal states are had by an individual, or belong to a certain point of view) and qualitative character (what it is like to actually have the experience - the felt aspect of the phenomenal state). Subjectivity is what makes a mental state a phenomenal one in the first place, and qualitative character is what makes a phenomenal state the one it is. In other words, subjectivity is a sufficient condition for phenomenality, and qualitative features serve as the differentiation conditions for phenomenal states. Subjectivity is a determinable, while phenomenal experiences are determinants.

Now, to further understand what I mean by “phenomenal concepts” requires a distinction to be made between concepts that pick out their objects rigidly vs. non-rigidly. Rigid concepts pick out the same object across modal space, and non-rigid concepts will not pick out the same objects in all worlds where that object exists - they pick out their objects contingently. One can pick out phenomenal properties using both rigid and non-rigid phenomenal concepts, as seen in Chalmers (2010). Some cases of non-rigid phenomenal concepts that refer to phenomenal redness (PR) include the concepts, “the phenomenal property typically experienced by members in my community when looking at paradigmatic

red objects” (Red[C]), or “the phenomenal property typically experienced by me when looking at paradigmatic red objects” (Red[I]). These are non-rigid concepts since they do not pick out their phenomenal states by any essential characteristic. Another non-rigid concept is the indexical concept “this state” (E) where “this” picks out whatever phenomenal state the speaker is currently experiencing. Since “this state” is not a rigid concept, it could possibly pick out a variety of different phenomenal states, including phenomenal redness.

Now, consider the concept that picks out a phenomenal state rigidly. Kripke (1972) argues that phenomenal properties pick out their referents by essential properties of their referents. That is, they pick out a phenomenal state in virtue of how it presented to a subject, or its “qualitative character” using the vocabulary of Kriegel. This concept is called a “pure phenomenal concept” (R) using Chalmers’ vocabulary (2010). When Mary learns that Red[C] has such-and-such quality, the “such-and-such quality” concept she employs is R. To see how these concepts relate to one another, consider a few cases. While most members of the community will believe that Red[C]=R, a red/green invert would form the belief that Red[C]=G (where “G” is the pure phenomenal concept of phenomenal greenness). If I was shown a pear at T1, followed by a strawberry at T2, I could form the belief E=G at T1, and E=R at T2.

Recall that my characterization of a PC was simply a concept that takes a phenomenal state as a referent. I discussed how this could be done rigidly and non-rigidly. I will call the phenomenal concepts that involve the pure phenomenal concept R, and thus pick out their referents essentially via qualitative features, “thick,” and those that involve contingent referents (Red[C], Red[I], and E) as “thin.” I believe philosophers like Sundstrom (2011) and Chalmers (2010) have in mind thick phenomenal concepts; Sundstrom argues that phenomenal concepts are ways of thinking about conscious states in “inner” and “direct” ways, and Chalmers argues that phenomenal concepts pick out phenomenal states “in terms of their intrinsic nature.” Yet, other philosophers like Lycan have in mind thin concepts. Lycan argues that phenomenal concepts function like indexical concepts (1996). Following Kaplan (1989), indexicals have a reference fixing character that cannot be completed until the speaker and time of the utterance are known. Thus, indexicals are not rigid concepts that involve R.

The phenomenal concept strategy is an attempt at reconciling the epistemic possibility of dualism within a physicalist friendly ontology by pointing to our phenomenal concepts as the culprit for conceivability arguments, and not some special feature of consciousness like the dualist proposes. Importantly, PCS does not try to give a reductive account of consciousness. Instead, the PCS advocate

attempts to demonstrate why there is an inferential disconnection between our phenomenal and physical concepts. For example, since first-person indexical knowledge is not entailed from a full third-person description of the world, Lycan argues that the indexical nature of phenomenal concepts explains why there is an epistemic gap without invoking any sort of dualism, nor giving a reductive account of consciousness.

Chalmers (2007) argues that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail by succumbing to one of two horns: Either 1) a subject's possession of phenomenal concepts is not entailed from the complete microphysical truth of the universe, and thus PCs will not themselves be physically explicable, or 2) the possession of phenomenal concepts is necessary given the complete microphysical truth of the universe, in which case PCs will fail to explain our epistemic situation concerning consciousness. I anticipate that versions of PCS that make use of thick phenomenal concepts are vulnerable to the first horn, and versions of PCS that involve thin phenomenal concepts are vulnerable to the second horn. In this paper I will focus on the second horn, and will thus address thin versions of PCS.

## **Section II**

Unpacking the second horn involves a discussion of what is meant by "epistemic situation." Under Chalmers' notion, A and B share the same epistemic

situation when A and B's corresponding beliefs<sup>2</sup> (i) share the same truth value, (ii) share the same status as justified or unjustified, and (iii) share the same status as substantive or insubstantive. Some philosophers find this characterization too robust. For example, the truth-value of one's beliefs are in some sense external to a subject, and might not be considered relevant when determining epistemic situation on more internalist accounts. For example, Diaz-Leon (2010) argues that phenomenal concepts need only explain the inferential disconnection between the physical and phenomenal, nothing more. PCs only need to explain our epistemic gap, not our robust epistemic situation.

Chalmers argues that this characterization of epistemic situation leaves out crucial information. When Mary leaves her cell, we are not merely asserting that Mary gains a new inferential tool and can now form new beliefs, we argued that she gained substantive knowledge (which requires considering, at least, the truth value and justificatory status of her beliefs). Restricting the scope of epistemic situation to the inferential disconnection leaves out the fact that phenomenal concept advocates have already admitted that Mary gains propositional *knowledge* under a new mode of presentation.

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<sup>2</sup> Here, I am appealing to the well understood and intuitive notion of "correspondence." The beliefs will be sufficiently related in terms of representational content, and need not be identical.

To address this tension, I will proceed with a moderate claim concerning one's epistemic situation. All that is necessary for the following discussion is as follows: If A and B share the same epistemic situation, it is a necessary condition that the corresponding beliefs between A and B are equal concerning justification and cognitive significance.

It is also important to note that Chalmers does not require the content of corresponding beliefs to be the same in order for two subjects to share an epistemic situation. Consider the case of Oscar and Twin Oscar. Both subjects come to form the belief "Water is refreshing." Both beliefs are true and equally significant, yet an externalist account of content will make Oscar's belief about H<sub>2</sub>O and Twin Oscar's belief about XYZ. Nonetheless, Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation (Chalmers 2007).

So, why is it important that PCs explain one's epistemic situation in the first place? Consider my zombie twin (a microphysical duplicate of me that lacks conscious experience). If my zombie twin possesses PCs, yet is positioned in a different epistemic situation from me, then PCs cannot explain why there is a difference in epistemic situation between me and my zombie counterpart. Instead, we must look to consciousness to explain our epistemic situation, and the Type B physicalist is in trouble. But, if zombies *do* share our epistemic situation, then they

too have concepts about their mental states that are isolated from one another. This conceptual isolation will prevent zombies from making a connection between some mental states and others a priori (just as we struggle to find an a priori connection between the phenomenal and the physical descriptions of mental states) which can serve as the basis for conceivability arguments. Zombies will argue that a complete microphysical truth of the universe does not entail all the facts concerning their mental life, and some will make the inference to dualism from the conceivability of “zombies” (Carruthers and Veillet 2007). So, against the dualist, phenomenal concepts would explain why we think there is an epistemic gap.

So, do phenomenal concepts explain our epistemic situation? Chalmers argues that when I utter the phrase “I am phenomenally conscious,” I speak truly. Yet, when my zombie twin utters the same phrase, he speaks falsely. Since our beliefs differ in truth value, we must differ concerning epistemic situation, he argues. Unfortunately, given my earlier characterization of an epistemic situation, this argument is unavailable. I will have to identify a difference in justificatory status between corresponding beliefs, rather than a difference in truth value, to assert a difference in epistemic situation.

Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have argued so long as we allow a difference in the content of corresponding beliefs between me and my zombie twin (like in

the case of Oscar and Twin Oscar), then one can argue that zombies do in fact share our epistemic situation. That is to say, my zombie twin possesses just as much propositional knowledge as me, and all of their beliefs bear the same epistemic status and play identical epistemological roles as mine, but their knowledge is *about* something else - “schmonsiousness,” a physical/functional state deployed in certain perceptual contexts. This state plays the corresponding epistemic role to our own phenomenal states, but is simply not accompanied by any phenomenology. When a zombie forms the belief “I am phenomenally conscious,” their term “phenomenally” refers to shmenomenal states, and *their beliefs are true* - just like ours.

Chalmers (2007) responds to this line of argument by asserting Carruthers and Veillet’s characterization of a zombie is just not what we have in mind when we normally conceive of zombies. When we conceive of zombies, we aren’t thinking of some entity with a state “just as good” as consciousness, we are thinking of something that is importantly deficient. Something worth asking is, “Do non-zombies have shmenomenal states?” If we do not, it is not clear why they have been added into the thought-experiment. Zombie worlds are worlds in which *only* phenomenal states have been removed, all else is held fixed.

Nonetheless, it seems that a zombie's belief *must* differ under an externalist account of content, since a zombie's phenomenal concept won't pick out a phenomenal property like my phenomenal concept does. By definition, we eliminated phenomenal properties from zombie worlds. If a zombie's belief referred to a phenomenal property, then it would be referring to something that was not actual in their world. A zombie's belief concerning phenomenal states would be similar to any belief I may form about ectoplasm. That being said, the first worry I have for Carruthers and Veillet's position does not concern epistemic situation directly. Instead, I worry that "shmonsciousness" has no object it can possibly refer to while preserving the same truth-value<sup>3</sup> as corresponding beliefs about our phenomenal states.

### Section III

It is *conceptually* possible that phenomenal states are multiply realizable. That is to say, it is conceivable that two distinct physical/functional states can give rise to the very same phenomenal property. So, let's imagine I undergo two wholly distinct physical/functional states, F1 and F2, at two separate times, T1 and T2 respectively, that both give rise to the same phenomenal state, P1. Potential phenomenal concepts could include the non-rigid concepts: "the phenomenal

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<sup>3</sup> Here, truth-value considerations are not for the purpose of assessing epistemic situation. Instead, the truth-values are being used as a test for successful versus failed reference.

property experienced by me at T1" ( $P[T1]$ ) and, "the phenomenal property experienced by me at T2" ( $P[T2]$ ). The rigid concept involved here ( $P$ ) will pick out  $P1$  by its qualitative features. When I form the belief, "I had two of the same phenomenal experiences," ( $P[T1]=P \wedge P[T2]=P$ ) I speak truly and my term "phenomenal" non-contingently refers to  $P1$  in virtue of its qualitative character. How will a zombie's concept pick out a phenomenal state without using qualitative character? When my zombie twin undergoes  $F1$  at  $T1$  and  $F2$  at  $T2$ , and then forms the belief "I had two of the same phenomenal (schmenomenal) experiences," it is not clear that any referent available in the zombie world could make this statement true. Schmenomenal states are supposed to refer to physical/functional states, but by hypothesis,  $F1$  and  $F2$  are wholly distinct - there is nothing that is "the same" over time in the zombie world. All physical states are different from  $T1$  to  $T2$ . If the physicalist insists that some physical state stays the same from  $T1$  to  $T2$ , and their schmenomenal concept picks out this constant state, then the condition of multiple realizability has been violated. Earlier, we said that two *distinct* functional states could realize the very same phenomenal state.

The same argument can be mirrored in terms of qualia inversion: Qualia inversion is also conceptually possible. That is to say, it is conceivable that the same functional state can give rise to qualitatively distinct phenomenal properties.

So, let's imagine I undergo the same functional state, F1, at two separate times, T1 and T2. At T1, I experience some phenomenal state, P1, and at T2, I experience some qualitatively distinct phenomenal state, P2. My belief that "I experienced two distinct phenomenal states,"  $(P[T1]=P_1 \wedge P[T2]=P_2 \wedge P_1 \neq P_2)$  is true, and my sentence is referring to P1 and P2. When my zombie experiences F1 at T1 and T2 and forms the belief "I experienced two distinct phenomenal states," it is not clear what the truthmaker is for the zombie's sentence. By hypothesis, all physical states remained the same. There is no state available in the zombie world that differed from T1 to T2 that could serve as the referent for "phenomenal" that would make the sentence true.

Importantly, I have not said that these conceptually possible worlds where multiple realizability and qualia inversion scenarios are metaphysically possible worlds - that would be question begging. Instead, I am arguing that zombie beliefs about shmonsciousness fail to refer since they do not have a referent in all conceptually possible worlds.

#### **Section IV**

Nonetheless, let us imagine that there is some physical state that the term "shmenomenal" successfully refers to. In this section I will argue that there still

exist at least three asymmetries between my zombie twin and I's corresponding epistemic situations. The first case I will address is that of introspection.

I will understand introspection as the process by which we attempt to learn facts about our current and/or recent mental states internally through the first person. By "internally through the first person," I mean to exclude the processes of observing one's own behaviors and collecting the testimony of others about one's own mental states, for example, as instances of introspective processes.

In the epistemology of introspection, there is a historical notion established since at least Descartes that we have a privileged access to certain mental states that affords a special epistemic status to some of the beliefs formed about these mental states through introspection. For example, Descartes has famously argued for the indubitable nature of the proposition "I think." In other words, Descartes did not believe we could doubt the claim "I think," as the process of doubting was proof for the proposition that "I think."

Now, there is a potential difference between introspecting one's propositional attitudes and one's phenomenal experiences. Just in case, I will restrict all further discussion of introspection to the latter. Concerning phenomenal consciousness, some philosophers like Kriegel (2009), Tye (2009), and Chalmers (2010) among others have suggested that pure phenomenal beliefs enjoy a special

epistemic status. Phenomenal beliefs may be incorrigible, indubitable, or infallible among other properties. Incorrigible beliefs are ones that cannot be corrected by anyone else, indubitable beliefs are ones that cannot be doubted, and infallible beliefs are ones that cannot be false. So, for example, Chalmers (2010) argues that “direct phenomenal beliefs<sup>4</sup>” (E=R) are infallible in virtue of being true by definition.

Now, I do not need to make so strong of a claim. Even if all beliefs about phenomenal conscious are not certain, it seems clear that introspection confers at least *some* justificatory support for beliefs about phenomenal consciousness.

So, what about zombie introspection and shmonsciousness? Some might argue that zombies are unable to introspect, but I think this is too quick. Block (1995) has made the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, demonstrating that the former is more easily understood under a functional definition than the latter. Further, there are plenty of externalist accounts of introspection that characterize it as a quasi-perceptual process that is instantiable by zombies and compatible with the lack of phenomenality. Given that my zombie

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<sup>4</sup> Interestingly, the structure of a direct phenomenal belief is very similar to the structure of an atomic sentence in Bertrand Russell’s *Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. The only logically proper name in Russell’s language is “this” or “that,” whereas other “proper” names like “Jim” are disguised descriptions. And, the only perfectly logical object in Russell’s project is the most simple unit of sense data. Both systems use indexicals that pick out bits of experience as their objects to form the most certain propositions.

twin and I are functionally equivalent, some externalist accounts of justification, like reliabilism, might end up demonstrating that my zombie and I to have equally reliable functional mechanisms for detecting shmenomenal and phenomenal states respectively. An externalist may argue that this would show that my zombie and I do share the same epistemic situation. Yet, my argument fares better against the popular internalist accounts of justification endorsed by many Type B physicalists. Internalists will have to admit that I have more justification for my introspective beliefs about the contents of my phenomenal experience than my zombie twin does about shmenomenal states. If my zombie twin and I *only* differ in phenomenality, and our introspective beliefs were equally justified, then thick phenomenal concepts incur no extra justification than thin corresponding ones. Common sense reports of internal mental states, like pain, contradict this claim, since they are verbally justified via phenomenal feels.

A second asymmetry exists between my zombie and me in the justificatory status of our corresponding beliefs concerning other minds. The traditional “problem of other minds” is the puzzle of identifying what it is that justifies our beliefs that other entities have minds similar to our own. This question has received a few attempted solutions by describing our “mindreading” capacities.

“Mindreading” is a term that refers to the set of abilities we possess to observe

behaviors of other entities and then attribute mental states, including conscious ones, to the subject via some inferential process. The accuracy of mindreading skills seems to be an empirical issue. Nevertheless, I would like to provide a diagnosis for why the problem of other minds exists as a type of conceptual skepticism, albeit a seemingly non-threatening one (at least in the case of other humans).

One way to articulate a puzzle generated from the problem of other minds is as follows: It is possible that I attribute mentality to an entity that does not in fact have it. Further, it is possible that I do not attribute mentality to entities that do have it. Here, I understand the term “mentality” as picking out any subjective or phenomenally conscious mental property. While increased reliability of my “mindreading” skills may diminish the epistemic possibility that I have made this error, there is always a small chance that the skeptical scenario holds and I have misattributed mentality (either positively or negatively). This skepticism provides some level of negative justification for our mindreading judgements.

I propose that one possible diagnosis for this problem is that it is a consequence of the analytically true principle that no two subjects can adopt numerically identical points of view. Here, I understand “points of view” as picking out the complete unified phenomenal experience of a subject at a given

time. Two points of view can be qualitatively identical, but not numerically identical given that there are still *two* points of view - one to correspond to each subject of experience. Now, given the possible existence of points of view numerically distinct from oneself, skeptical scenarios can question our judgements about other points of view. Given that one point of view cannot definitively refute skeptical scenarios by adopting the other point of view, this problem of other minds persists. Solipsism is a logically coherent (yet empirically unlikely) worldview. It is the nature of subjectivity that make possible the skeptical scenarios about other minds.

The problem of other minds functions quite differently in zombie worlds, since it deals with the possibility of misattributing shmonsciousness instead of phenomenal consciousness. And, shmonsciousness refers to an objectively observable state (unlike my usage of “consciousness” which refers to a subjective state). In fact, “schmonsciousness” cannot refer to a subjective state, since subjectivity is sufficient for phenomenality, and there is no phenomenality in zombie worlds. Because the zombie world lacks subjectivity, and subjectivity is the cause of generating other-minds skepticism, zombie worlds will lack the problem of other minds under my analysis. Even if we don’t take the problem of other minds seriously as non-zombies, the zombies do not have it in the first place.

This level of certainty in zombie beliefs concerning their fellow zombie's phenomenal states is not achievable by us phenomenal beings - the skeptical possibility of the problem of other minds degrades our epistemic confidence in a way that zombie's attributions of phenomenal states are immune. Consequently, since my zombie twin has a higher justificatory status for his beliefs about the phenomenal states of fellow zombies than I do for my beliefs about the phenomenal states of my fellow non-zombies, my zombie twin and I fail to share the same epistemic situation.

The third asymmetry I wish to explore is the discrepancy in the total number of beliefs capable of being formed by my zombie twin versus me. In this paper I have made frequent use of the term "corresponding" beliefs between me and my zombie without fully addressing what is meant by "corresponding."

Correspondence here will require a sufficient similarity between two beliefs, yet will not necessarily require the beliefs to be identical in content. That being said, before giving a full account of correspondence, PCS will run into an issue when attempting to put my beliefs in one-to-one correspondence with my zombie's beliefs.

Let us consider a test case: First, assume Lycan's (1996) version of PCS, where a zombie's "phenomenal" concept is an indexical. The zombie might come

to form the belief, at T1, that  $P[T1]=E$ . For PCS to succeed, the beliefs had by my zombie twin containing non-rigid concepts should correspond to my beliefs employing rigid concepts. Yet, it is certainly the case that I too can form the belief  $P[T1]=E$  at T1. In fact, any belief a zombie can come to know, I too can know. As I stated earlier, it would not make sense to suppose that I do not have phenomenal states. Plus, there are beliefs that I can form, like  $P[T1]=R$  that the zombie cannot in principle come to form. When put in one to one correspondence, it turns out that I can form more beliefs than my zombie twin. The set of possible beliefs for me is larger than the set of possible beliefs for my zombie. There will be beliefs that I have that will not correspond to any belief had by my zombie twin. Thus, my zombie twin and I cannot share the same epistemic situation, since there will be cases when my belief fails to correspond with any of my zombie's beliefs, and thus they will differ in justification.

One could respond that zombies have just as much propositional knowledge, and that all of my extra beliefs are redundant propositions under different modes of presentation. Even if this reply is true, beliefs with differing modes of presentation can differ internally concerning justificatory support. If Lois is certain of the proposition, "I will see superman today," her internal justification of believing "I will see Clark Kent today" will not be certain, despite the two sentences expressing

the same proposition. Given the discrepancy in their modes of presentation, each proposition provided different levels of justification.

Relatedly, I can in principle (given a complete 3rd person description of the world), know everything there is to know about my zombie twin. The scope of possibly formed beliefs for me is wide enough to fully describe the zombie world. There is nothing about consciousness that I could not know. Regarding *consciousness*, I even know what it's like for a zombie to experience red, namely that there is no experience. I have given a full description of my zombie twin once I have listed the complete microphysical truth of the universe. Yet, my zombie twin will not be able to give a full description of me and the phenomenal world - even if it is physical. My zombie twin will be unable to know any fact concerning the qualitative character of my experience. They could never come to know, for example, that "the phenomenal property experienced by JC when looking at paradigmatic red things" (Red[JC]) is of such-and-such character R, since they cannot employ R. Thus, my zombie twin and I do not share the same epistemic situation - my zombie twin is epistemically constrained concerning facts about me in a way that I am not about him. The scope of possibly formable beliefs for my zombie twin is narrower than is required to give a maximal description of a world with subjective phenomenality.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper, I aimed to show that philosophical zombies cannot share our epistemic situation concerning epistemic situation. I attempt to defend this claim by raising suspicions that zombie's phenomenal concepts could successfully refer, and that even if they did, there exist other epistemic inequalities between the justificatory statuses between my zombie and I's respective beliefs.

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