Conceptualizing Regional International Societies: Examining the Post-Soviet Space

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ABSTRACT

This thesis contributes to the English school’s growing literature on regional level international societies. Thus far English school scholars have demonstrated the existence of a post-Soviet regional international society. However, what is lacking is a clear defining of the members and institutions of this society. This paper gives particular attention to three questions: who are the actors, what are the primary and secondary institutions, and what role do these institutions play within the post-Soviet regional international society? Doing so contributes to the growing literature on the post-Soviet sub-global international society. In addition, it may be the case that Russian dominion is reflected through the network of secondary institutions in the post-Soviet international society. This thesis further investigates how the creation of this diplomatic structure allows Russia to contest the global diplomatic structure and project its great power status.
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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

Using the theoretical framework of the English School of international relations, this thesis seeks to define the members and institutions of the post-Soviet regional international society. According to the English School theory, secondary institutions, like international organizations, may constitute the existence of a regional international society. This makes it a useful lens to analyze not only what secondary institutions exist, but also the role they play. As such, this paper gives particular attention to three questions: who are the actors, what are the primary and secondary institutions, and what role do these institutions play within the post-Soviet regional international society? This paper finds that Russian dominion is reflected through the network of regional organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Organization, and the Eurasian Union. This investigation of regional secondary institutions matter because this diplomatic structure may allow Russia to contest the global diplomatic structure and project its great power status.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APEC- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BRICS- Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CIS- Commonwealth of Independent States

CISFTA- Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area

CJEU- Court of Justice of the European Union

CoE- Council of Europe

CES- Common Economic Space

CSO- Collective Security Organization

CST- Collective Security Treaty

EACU- Eurasian Customs Union

EAEU- Eurasian Union

EAEU Court- Eurasian Economic Union Court

ES- English School

EU- European Union

EurAsEC- Eurasian Economic Community

GUAM- Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova

IR- International Relations

MERCOSUR- Common Market of the South

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO- Non-Governmental Organization

OAPEC- Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE-Organization for Security and Cooperation

SCO- Shanghai Cooperation Organization

UN- United Nations

UNASUR-Union of South American Nations

WTO-World Trade Organization
Introduction

More recently, English school (ES) scholars have given attention to the development of sub-global international societies. Barry Buzan has argued that within the contemporary heterogeneous global international society there exist much thicker homogeneous regional international societies. Since then, ES scholars have made the case that the post-Soviet space constitutes a regional international society.\(^1\) However, what is lacking is to clearly indicate; who are the members and what are the primary and secondary institutions of this society? The purpose of my thesis is to address this gap by investigating the members as well as what primary and secondary institutions exist and the role they play within the post-Soviet regional international society.

Before I get to this examination it is important to understand the utility and value of the English school theory in answering this and other questions in world affairs. According to the English school of International Relations, to speak of order in international relations (IR) is to suggest a particular pattern among social life.\(^2\) It is important here to explicate what Hedley Bull means by ‘social life’ as it relates to international order. In international society, social arrangements serve in a functional sense, which work to promote certain goals and values. Meaning, states in international society agree and consent to rules and norms and this interaction is what achieves order. This is distinct from other IR theories in a number of ways.

Starting in the post-Cold war era there have been a handful of competing theories that provide a conceptual framework to help analyze international relations with, realism, liberalism, and constructivism constituting three notable paradigms. For example, while realism can be

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\(^1\) See Aalto, 2007; Buzan and Weaver, 2003; Costa-Buranelli, 2013; Kaczmarska, 2013; Makarychev, 2011; and Stivachtis and Pourchot, 2014.

further broken down into ‘classical’ and ‘structural’ realism, it ultimately suggests that power and conflict are unavoidable aspects of international politics. At the core of classical realism is the notion that human nature, or good vs. bad, guides laws and behavior. In this way, the theory postulates that people are inherently greedy and act exclusively in self-interest. However, examining human nature’s effect on objective laws through this narrow lens is destined to regurgitate a one size fits all analysis to global issues that are rather complex.

Unlike classical realism, structural realism studies the “structure” in order to understand how this constitutes world order. Structural realism suggests that the properties and interconnectedness of variables, as well as how they are organized effect outcomes. In this way, the structure “limits” and “molds” the behavior of states and gears them toward the common goal of survival. Through this lens, states are asocial and act in their own self-interest driven by the primary goal of survival.

However, one of the ways in which structural realism falters is that too much emphasis is placed on system-level variables at the expense of unit-level variables. The result of this is that a state centric view omits social factors within the state like economy, ideology, and culture from analysis. The implication of this was greatly noticeable in its inability to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons for this was due to the developments at the domestic level in the Soviet Union, which structural realism could not assess by exclusively focusing on the structure. In this way, structural realism paints a partial picture of the world by neglecting domestic developments and actors.

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Another theoretical approach is liberalism. The thrust of liberalism is that institutions improve international cooperation, which then promote prosperity and limit conflict. Thus, liberalism suggests that humans are not inherently greedy or violent with one another, but instead suggest that they may be capable of existing without conflict. Here the emphasis is on how democratic practices, free trade, and the rule of law play a significant role in the maintenance of peace. That being said, democracy promotion has not always secured peace and stability, as the case of the U.S. invading Iraq demonstrates.

Lastly, constructivism is the theoretical approach that demonstrates the social construction of international relations. Alexander Wendt describes two tenets of constructivism that suggest, “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”\(^5\) In other words, social rather than material forces constitute the structure of the system.

Similarly, the English school contends that order in social life is the result of a pattern in the relations of humans or groups that lead to a particular result.\(^6\) To achieve order, in this sense, societies must recognize primary, elementary, or universal goals and adopt patterns of behavior that promote them.\(^7\) These goals include, ensuring that life will be secure against violence; sanctity of agreements; and that the possession of things will remain stable to some degree.\(^8\) That is not to say that these are the only goals societies seek to maintain. However, for a society to

\(^6\) Bull, 2002: 3.
\(^7\) Ibid, 4.
\(^8\) Ibid.
exist the maintenance of these goals promote order and thus allows for the achievement of other goals.

Thus far, the theory describes order in social life as a result of patterns of particular behavior that sustain primary goals in society. This suggests that order in social life may exist in the absence of rules, but that is not to say that rules of conduct are completely absent from social life. According to Bull, in most societies rules of property or breach of contract may actually help create patterns of conduct that conform to the goals of society. As a result, these patterns of behavior begin to become expected in society. Overtime, as the goals of social coexistence are continually upheld, patterns of behavior emerge. These patterns eventually become adopted as “general laws and afford a basis for expectations about future behavior.”

Unlike structural realism, where states live in constant uncertainty of others because there is no trust among them, the English school supposes that recurrent patterns of human behavior offer states a degree of predictability. Through this lens, maximizing power is not the end all be all to securing order because as a society each unit has a responsibility to one another and this then limits or restrains bad behavior. The reciprocated normativity of self-restraint by actors is what maintains order here. In essence, Buzan suggests “this social element has to be put alongside realism’s raw logic of anarchy if one is to get a meaningful picture of how a system of states operate.”

9 Ibid, 7
10 Ibid, 7
Additionally, some suggest that the ES theory constitutes a middle ground between realist conceptions of international relations and more cosmopolitan notions of international relations.\(^\text{12}\) This skill, Richard Little argues, “allows the school to act as an inoculator between opposing positions that otherwise lack the ability to effectively communicate with each other.”\(^\text{13}\) The pluralistic methodology of the ES is important to note because it aids in finding ways of ‘linking disparate bodies of knowledge and understanding.’\(^\text{14}\) In other words, what makes the ES so attractive is its ability to “combine traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other.”\(^\text{15}\) This combination of normative and structural approaches is what gives this framework a more holistic perspective.

Also, English school theory is a useful theoretical framework that understands the dynamics of the social structure. According to Barry Buzan, the theory is “a good solution to the problems of how to think both analytically and normatively.”\(^\text{16}\) Furthermore, the English school’s triad of concepts, which will be elaborated on in the next chapter, acknowledges the presence of both state and non-state actors in the system. Because of the attention to the ‘old’ system of states and the ‘new’ world society of non-state actors, Buzan further suggests that this framework is “well-suited to looking at the transition from Westphalian to post-Westphalian international politics, whether this be at the level of globalization, or in regional developments.


\(^\text{13}\) Ibid, 397.

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid, 397.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010836792027001004

such as the EU.” In this way, the English school serves as a useful framework to think about both historical and contemporary problems in international politics.

One of the ways the English school tries to understand the world today is by considering it “as the latest phase in the unfolding of world history.” Similarly, Bull and Wight hold that international politics is simply a history of “recurrence” and “repetition” and as a result historical narratives about the world are intertwined with theories about world politics. This relationship with history is useful to the extent that it helps to discern the development of world politics over time.

For example, in Bull and Watson’s book, *The Expansion of International Society*, the editors and contributing authors investigate the origins and nature of the global international society today. One puzzle they focus on questions whether the expansion of the dominant European international society has led to issues regarding consensus on the rules, common interests, and institutions of the global international society. The book suggests that, largely, states outside of Europe have accepted the standards of today’s global international society. They argue that these states do so because “they could not do without them even in their relations with one another.” States in Eurasia, for example, have formalized and agreed upon the creation,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{21}}\text{Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 95.}\]
adoption, and implementation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is based on a common interest of promoting the political, military, and economic prosperity of member states. Here, member states of the SCO utilize the institutional framework of the global international society in order to organize this regional group. In other words, when there is regular contact, states often accept the Western inspired tenets of international legal, diplomatic, and administrative institutions in order to coexist and co-operate in society.

In addition to historical accounts of international politics, the English school’s theoretical framework is equipped to grapple with contemporary issues. For example, the post 9/11 political landscape introduces new challenges, namely terrorist groups as non-state actors capable of disrupting the state-centric international order. Barak Mendelson examines this theme in his article, *Sovereignty Under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al-Qaeda Network*, where he examines the challenge terrorist organizations pose to the society of states, particularly in regards to sovereignty. In doing so, he acknowledges the English school’s ability to discuss the threat of ‘revolutionary’ actors to the system and the system’s response to that challenge.\(^{23}\)

Mendelson suggests that the institution of sovereignty acts both as ‘an attribute of an individual state,’ as well as ‘an organizing principle of the international system.’\(^{24}\) Meaning, on the one hand terrorist organizations attempt to violate the sovereignty of states by, for example, eroding the state-society relationship and subordinating international law to that of ‘God’s law.’ On the other hand, because of the threat terror organizations like Al-Qaeda pose to the international society, states should see these groups as a ‘collective problem’ and should address


\(^{24}\) Ibid, 66.
the problem collectively.\textsuperscript{25} In other words, terror groups both disrupt sovereignty, ‘in their quest for statehood,’ as well as reinforce sovereignty, by ‘forcing states to put their differences aside to cooperate against the threat.’\textsuperscript{26}

This study, that questions the states’ responses to systemic threats from religious terror groups, highlights the ability of the English school to address a broad spectrum of issues in international politics. Additionally, the English school’s historical account of the expansion of international society sheds light on the way the present day global international society functions even among culturally heterogeneous states. This is useful to the extent that it has opened new avenues of research within the English school, particularly regarding the existence and contours of regional international societies. Furthermore, utilizing the ES theoretical framework, this paper will be able to define the members and institutions of the post-Soviet international society and demonstrate the role they play in the region. Doing so provides a more comprehensive understanding of the post-Soviet space as a regional international society.

The thesis is divided into two parts and four chapters. Part I will discuss the theoretical approach of the English school in addressing regional international societies. The structure of part I is as follows. I dedicate two chapters to outlining the theoretical dimensions of the thesis. Chapter 1 sets out to define key concepts of the English school theory, such as the international system, international society, and world society triad as well as the distinctions between the tiers. In addition to defining what the concepts of the theory are, the chapter will also elucidate on how the concepts relate to one another, as well as how to distinguish them. Similarly, chapter 2 will offer a more in depth explanation of institutions. Specifically, I elaborate on the contribution ES scholars have made regarding the different forms of primary institutions. The section will then

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 68.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 66.
provide a detailed analysis of the debate between the pluralist and solidarist understanding of institutions. Chapter 2 will conclude by acknowledging institutions that are unique to the post-Soviet regional international society.

Part II compliments the theoretical discussion in the first part with an empirical examination of a post-Soviet regional international society. Chapter 3 provides a description of the regional international society framework followed by a detailing of regional international societies in English school theory. Finally, chapter 4 examines the members and institutions of the post-Soviet international society. Per Buzan’s conditions under which an international society may emerge, this chapter looks at dominion and authoritarianism as primary institutions of the post-Soviet space, which are distinct from the global international society. In addition, this chapter analyzes the relationship between primary and secondary institutions, particularly with regard to how the primary institutions of dominion and authoritarianism are displayed through the secondary institutions within the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, I argue that Russia’s use of diplomatic methods helps it to create a regional diplomatic structure of secondary institutions, which allows it to compete with the global diplomatic structure. Illustrating this notion will shed light on the region’s distinct relationship with primary and secondary institutions. Lastly, the conclusion provides a summary of the findings and suggestions for future research.
Chapter 1: Key Concepts

To examine the members and institutions of the post-Soviet regional international society, a foundational knowledge of the framework is necessary as it provides an outline of the structure as well as key definitions of the English school theory. The theoretical framework of the English school serves as a launch pad to the introduction of norms in international relations theoretical discourse. Unlike structural realism, which offers a systemic approach of the international system solely through the lens of state actors, the English school offers an all encompassing account of international relations through, “theory and history, morality and power, agency and structure.”27 Here, the emphasis is on, not only the formal structure of world politics, but the social complexities as well.28 The English school strikes this balance by combining elements of systems theory, apparent in the international system tier, with elements of revolutionism, visible in the world society tier. Arguably, doing so may prove more illuminating because it attempts to provide a more holistic account of world politics.

This chapter seeks to better understand the conceptual underpinnings of the English school theory. In doing so, the chapter addresses three questions to better clarify the scaffold of the theory. Those questions are simply: what are the key concepts of the English school, how are they related, and how are they distinguished? In more detail, how does the theory define the international system, international society, and world society triad? Also, where does one tier start and the other end?

To begin answering these questions, a discussion on the English school’s three key concepts is necessary. The central concept of the ES is international society, in which states are the main actors that collectively produce rules and practices to manage ties.\textsuperscript{29} International society is only one tier out of three, along with international system and world society, which make up the three traditions of thought and action that comprise world politics.\textsuperscript{30}

One of the objectives of this chapter is to set up the discussion in the next chapter about the primary and secondary institutions and their purpose in international society. The first part of this chapter outlines the English school’s key concepts and definitions of the international system, international society, and world society. Although the world society tier does not factor heavily into the discussion of regional international societies, in the interest of providing a comprehensive literature review it is included nonetheless. The next section focuses on how the three tiers relate to one another. Here, attention will be given to how the three separate concepts operate together. The final section analyzes the international system/society distinction. Again, because the world society tier does not play a significant role in this thesis the international society/world society distinction is not included here.


What are the concepts?

International System

The international system, sometimes referred to as the Hobbesian tradition, includes units most often states, where some degree of interaction takes place.\textsuperscript{31} In the system, “two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions.”\textsuperscript{32} However, unlike international society, these states do not conceive themselves as being a part of a community. Bull explains that

\begin{quote}
   two or more states may be in contact with each other and interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other’s calculations without their being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves to be bound by a common set of rules, or co-operating in the working of common institutions.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

In other words, systems are formed when there is a degree of regular contact and interaction among states “sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other.”\textsuperscript{34} To further clarify, an example Bull gives is in his description of the relationship between Nepal and Bolivia as, “Neither are neighbors, nor competitors, nor partners in a common enterprise, but they affect each other through the chain of links among states in which both participate.”\textsuperscript{35}

Furthermore, the international system describes the nature of international politics as “a state of war.”\textsuperscript{36} This Hobbesian view suggests that states are in a constant struggle for power and survival is not guaranteed, thus the looming threat of insecurity is what imposes an obligation for

\begin{itemize}
   \item \textsuperscript{31} Buzan, 2004: 7
   \item \textsuperscript{32} Bull, 2002: 9
   \item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 13
   \item \textsuperscript{34} Bull, 2002: 10
   \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 10
   \item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 23
\end{itemize}
survival. If rules and principles are agreed upon they are done so out of “prudence” or “expediency.”37 Once these rules no longer prove expedient they may be broken.38 That is to say that there are no shared rules and institutions in the international system. Buzan sums up the international system well when he says this concept “is about power politics amongst states, and puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the center of IR theory.”39

International Society

The hallmark of the English school is its consideration of the social world. Here, norms socialize actors and influence outcomes; as opposed to the structure determining outcomes. The international society tier can thus be characterized by the social interaction of member states. According to Martin Wight, international society is a social contract among societies themselves each constituted by their own social contract.40 The social element of international society has provoked questions of how to maintain order in the relations between sovereign states under anarchy?41

Bull contends that, in an anarchic system, order in social life depends upon stability, but that without the sanctity of agreements and non-intervention there would be no society.42 From an English school perspective, maximizing power is not the end all be all to securing order because as a society each unit has a responsibility to one another and this then limits or restrains

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37 Ibid, 24  
38 Ibid, 24  
39 Buzan, 2004: 7  
42 Bull, 2002: 7
bad behavior. Bull suggests that anarchy succeeds in maintaining the minimum common goal of international order, but that this forms the basis on which to achieve other goals. He defines international society as

A group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

In international society, states share common interests, like security against violence, and values, like justice, that lead to achieving international order. To maintain these goals, and secure a degree of order, states adhere to rules. The rules states agree on vary historically. Examples include non-intervention, membership, and sanctity of agreements. What is important here are that the rules of international society work to condition the behavior and identity of members, while also defining the boundaries of the social system. In other words, there is an expectation that states in international society will abide by the rules. For example, states like Peru and Brazil have a reasonable expectation that neither will invade the other so long as they both accept that non-intervention is a standard rule for states in international society. The reciprocated normativity of self-restraint by actors is what maintains order here. When states do not accept the rules of society institutions, like international law, act in a way to gear states toward order. Chapter 2 will engage further on the subject of institutions in ES theory.

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Ibid, 7
Ibid, 5
Ibid, 13
Ibid, 13
Ibid, 40
When states accept the norms, practices, and rules of society they get to be members of that society. This is the basic premise of the concept known as the standard of civilization. Historically, the phrase originates from the practice of denoting states and people into a hierarchy of ‘civilized’, ‘barbarian’, and ‘savage’.

Today it is more commonly understood as a measure of inclusion and exclusion. As Christopher Hobson notes, the standard of civilization “shapes practices of inclusion and exclusion, determining which states are accorded full rights and recognition, and it is heavily implicated in the structures of power that constitute these hierarchical relationships.”

World Society

Bulls’ world society tier, sometimes referred to as Kantian/Revolutionism, suggests that other forms of “universal political organizations,” may achieve order and that such forms may better serve order. According to Buzan, world society takes individuals, non-state organizations, and the global population as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and puts transcendence of the states-system at the center of IR theory.

Another major distinction between international system and international society, on the one hand, and world society, on the other, is one of the units of analysis. Here, the units are “not states but individual human beings.”

Although there is disagreement among scholars about whether states can be considered to be members of world society, most agree that the major actors in this tier are non-state entities

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49 Ibid, 17
51 Bull, 2002: 20
52 Buzan, 2004: 7
53 Bull, 2002: 21
like NGOs, terrorist organizations, and individual human beings. As such, the lack of world society scholarship makes it a weaker framework than its international society counterpart. Researching the way non-state actors, human-to-human interactions, or how any combination of the two, influence international order should be explored so as to develop this framework and better gauge its potential. That being said, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine how world society underpins the post-Soviet international society.

How are they related?

So far the chapter provides the basis for understanding the ‘three traditions’ as individual parts. The first tier is the international system, sometimes known as Hobbesian or Realism tradition, which values national responsibilities. The second is the international society, sometimes referred to as the Grotian or Rationalism tradition, which gives priority to international responsibilities. Finally, the world society tier, which goes by the Kantian or Revolutionism tradition, emphasizes humanitarian responsibilities. The three concepts can be thought of individually, but that is not to say that they are mutually exclusive terms. This next section dedicates attention to the way in which the triad relates to one another.

While each of the three concepts is ‘conceptually and methodologically distinct,’ they often overlap and seep together. To be clear, the international system, international society, and world society are not opposing perspectives from which to consider international order, but rather they all co-exist and operate simultaneously in the world. Understanding how the concepts

54 Buzan, 2004: 86
55 See Martin Wight, 1991 for ‘three traditions’ of IR theory.
56 Buzan, 2014: 14
57 Ibid, 14
58 Ibid, 14
59 Ibid, 10
relate and interact with each other makes this clearer. The idea that the three traditions are interlinked to provide a holistic picture of international relations is evident in the classical ‘Three Traditions’ model of the English school Theory.

Figure 1. *The classical ‘Three Traditions’ Model of English school theory*60

In this model, Buzan draws attention to a number of points. First, all three elements co-exist and interact simultaneously. That being said, the question becomes, how strong are they in relation to one another?61 The model above is divided into the three traditions with dotted lines separating each tier that denote where boundaries begin to blend. In this way, the model suggests

60 See Barry Buzan, 2004: 9. *He notes that titles in () denote Wight’s labels, [] are the analytical focus, and titles along the border are where traditions blend together.

that while each tier is separate from one another they must be examined in conjunction in order to account for the diverse and complex intricacies of the world.

As such, in order to understand how one tier operates it is crucial to examine it in the context of the other two tiers. Meaning, to fully understand the function and utility of international society one must recognize its position between international system and world society. In other words, while the international system concerns the material distribution of power, it also presupposes the existence of an international society. Additionally, the relation between international society and world society is evident in the English school’s “presumption that an international society needs to be underpinned by a world society that embraces a common culture.”

While there is interaction among the three tiers, the central focus of the English school theory is international society. The basic idea of international society, Buzan suggests, is that, “just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by.” Again, states collectively agree to common rules and practices, which then conditions the behavior of member states and defines the boundaries of the social system.

Buzan further argues that this “social element has to be put alongside realism’s raw logic of anarchy if one is to get a meaningful picture of how systems of states operate.” In other words, the combination of the Hobbesian tradition with that of the Grotian Tradition may provide the

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63 Ibid, 12
64 Buzan, 2004: 8
65 Ibid, 8
best account of international politics. Further evidence of this is apparent in Bull and Watson’s definition of international society. The authors argue that international society can be defined as

A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.\textsuperscript{66}

This definition combines elements of the international system with that of international society to demonstrate that while states are the main actors in the system, the social system proposed by the ES requires an understanding of international relations beyond material capabilities. Here, states establish order through cooperating and communicating with one another.

\textbf{How are they distinguished?}

According to Bull, determining the distinguishing features of an international system and international society is not always straightforward, but argues

\ldots between an international system that is clearly also an international society, and a system that is clearly not a society, there exist cases where a sense of common interests is tentative and inchoate; where the common rules perceived are vague and ill-informed, and there is doubt as to whether they are worthy of the name of rules; or where common institutions are implicit or embryonic.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[66] Bull and Watson, 1984: 1
\item[67] Bull, 2002: 15
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
While Bull’s contribution laid the groundwork for this discussion, it has also been met with some suggestions for reconceptualization. Alan James challenges Bull’s distinction arguing that his is a ‘distinction without a difference.’\textsuperscript{68} James’ rejection of Bull’s definition stems from its ‘ambiguity of the boundary line between system and society.’\textsuperscript{69} Buzan takes a similar stance by questioning the need for a distinction at all between the two concepts. He argues that, “if all human interaction is in some sense social and rule-bound, then what results is not a distinction between international systems and international societies, but a spectrum of international societies…”\textsuperscript{70}

While this discussion highlights some tension within the ES, there are some who consider the distinctions to be functional. Watson argues that the distinctions are useful not because they have the effect of allowing the ‘complex reality of international relations to be simplified into this category or that but because it allows that reality to be illuminated by considering it from a particular point of view.”\textsuperscript{71} The following section will further elaborate the specifics of this distinction.

The dominant focus of the English school is in the international society tier where states agree to rules and norm, which govern relations. As a result, questions regarding the importance of the international system tier emerge. While it is true that the English school seeks a place for

\textsuperscript{68} Alan James, “System or Society?,” \textit{Review of International Studies} 19, no. 3 (1993): 276.
\textsuperscript{70} Buzan, 2004: 100
societal norms in world politics, according to Dunne and Little, there is also a “systemic logic.”

The ‘systemic logic’ underpinning the social aspects of the ES is what provides a more detailed and holistic account of world politics. That is to say that the international system underpins the existence of international society. In other words, the international system can stand alone without the existence of international society, however international society can not exists in the absence of the international system. What Bull is trying to do by distinguishing the power politics of international system from the social cooperation of international society is to illustrate the “mix of divergent and sometimes competitive practices that contribute to a complex and multidimensional reality.”

As previously mentioned, an international system comes into being when two or more states have sufficient interaction without rules or institutions. What makes this useful to ES scholars is that it provides a “normative benchmark” from which to discern how far international society extends. However, Bulls lack of clarity as to the criteria that outlines when an international society comes into existence has opened the door for others to fill this gap. For example, in *The Expansion of International Society: Culture Versus Anarchy and Greece’s Entry into International Society*, Stivachtis evaluates Bulls’ system/society distinction through communication, common rules, common interests, common institutions, and common culture. For example, when analyzing ‘common institutions’ he notes that it is not the institutions that distinguish between the international system and international society, but ‘rather it is the

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73 Ibid, 94
74 Dunne, 2011: 11
perspective from which states view them.” He supports this with an example of how the Ottoman Empire’s view of the balance of power was different than the European powers’ view, even though both were part of the European balance of power. In other words, what is crucial is the need for formal recognition that states participating in these institutions share the same understanding of the purpose and function of these institutions.

Richard Little has attempted to characterize the international system as one with a low degree of interstate interaction and an international society as one where interstate interaction reaches a significant degree, but what remained unclear from Little is the boundary line between the two. Buzan has offered an in-depth examination of this boundary line between system and society, by drawing upon the distinction between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft societies.

Buzan claims that gemeinschaft societies are built upon “bonds of common sentiment, experience, and identity.” Here, societies are considered to be “grown” rather than “made.” Alternatively, the gesellschaft society is one that is “contractual and constructed,” and this is what ties states together. In other words, gesellschaft societies are created through “acts of will.” According to Buzan, contemporary international society may be seen as a product of the gesellschaft understanding of society. Even in the absence of a common culture, “the regulating rules and institutions of a system develop to the point where members become conscious of common values and the system becomes an international society.” Here it is the formal

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75 Stivachtis, 1998: 44
76 Ibid
77 Stivachtis, 1998: 52
79 Ibid, 333
80 Watson, 1987: 151
acknowledgement by states of rules and institutions that distinguishes the system from the society.

Additionally, the debate regarding the balance between an order-based society of states and notions of justice in relation to human beings highlights another prominent distinction. In other words, this distinction illuminates not only the difference in actors but also the difference in identity. One side of the debate can be characterized by the quest for order among states at the expense of more humanitarian ventures. The belief is that efforts to promote justice, like intervention in defense of human rights, may cause disorder and this in turn is undesirable. The other side of this debate is associated with more cosmopolitan ideals of justice and the promotion of human rights. Here, the belief is that order may not be sustainable without justice. This distinction is further reminiscent of what is known as the pluralist-solidarist debate in the English school, which the next chapter will elaborate on in more detail.
Chapter 2: Institutions of English School Theory

Chapter 2 is a continuation of the ES framework discussion in chapter 1 and is the culmination of the theoretical portion of the paper. This section will elaborate on the institutions of the ES. The first part will look at Bull’s five classical institutions. Next will illustrate Buzan’s ‘nested hierarchy’ list followed by the way other ES scholars have formulated institutions. The purpose here is to set up the empirical portion of the paper in chapter’s 3 and 4. Examining what the ES theory says about institutions will help further distinguish it from other theoretical frameworks. Also, this clarification will be helpful to understand the following discussion of Buzan’s three conditions for the emergence of a regional international society in chapter 3. Lastly, examining these institutions helps inform the discussion in chapter 4 about the relationship between primary and secondary institutions and the role they play in the post-Soviet international society.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, to make sense of the later discussion on institutions, an understanding of the distinction between primary and secondary institutions is necessary. Next, an outline of Bull’s classical set of institutions, Buzan’s later conception of a ‘nested hierarchy’ of institutions, and others will help to make sense of the subsequent examination of the pluralist vs. solidarist debate. Finally, analyzing Watson’s independence to empire spectrum will round out the chapter.
Primary vs. Secondary Institutions

To reiterate, in international society, states share common interests, like security against violence, and values, like justice, that lead to achieving international order. To maintain these goals, and secure a degree of order, states adhere to rules like sanctity of agreements and non-intervention. When states do not abide by these rules, there are institutions that act as a way to gear states toward order and functionality of that society. However, without a succinct definition from Bull as to what constitutes an institution, ES scholars have since debated about what institutions do and do not represent. Others have since made attempts to fill this gap, with Martin Wight suggesting that institutions are, “recognized and established usages governing the relations between individuals or groups,” where, “an enduring complex, integrated, organized behavior pattern through which social control is exerted and by means of which the fundamental social desires are met.” That is to say that what the ES means by institutions is not the usual association with institutions as international organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (UN), but rather institutions here are mechanisms for maintaining order among the members of international society.

Worth mentioning is the distinction between primary and secondary institutions. The former reflect deep and durable social practices, which evolve and are shared by members of international society. An example of which includes Bull’s five institutions he introduced in *The Anarchical Society*. The latter describes ‘intergovernmental arrangements’ adapted by states

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81 Bull, 2002: 13
82 Buzan, 2004: 171
84 Wight, 1991: 140-141
85 Buzan, 2014: 17
to carry out specific functions. Examples of secondary institutions include the United Nations, the Red Cross, and the International Monetary Fund. This distinction is important in the sense that it is meant to avoid confusion because when ES scholars refer to institutions they are referring to the primary institutions as defined above. For this reason a more detailed look at primary institutions is in order.

Classical Institutions

One of the ways the English school distinguishes itself from other IR theories is through its conception of institutions. As previously mentioned in the section above, institutions considered by the English school are “constitutive of both states and international society in that they define the basic character and purpose of society.” While a succinct definition of institutions is lacking, scholars have identified a couple defining features within the English school literature. Particularly, institutions are thought to be ‘fundamental and durable practices’ that evolve. Tim Dunne further suggests that institutions are no more than “practices embedded in the fabric of international society.”

As a result, what can be considered an institution has evolved over time. That said, Bull is credited with ‘putting institutions on the map’ for the English with his set of five institutions: The balance of power, great power management, diplomacy, international law, and war. The first part of this section will introduce and elaborate on Bull’s classical institutions. Lastly, according to Buzan, what does and does not constitute a primary institution within the ES

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86 Ibid, 17
87 Buzan, 2004: 166
88 Ibid, 167
89 Dunne, 1995:141
90 Buzan, 2004: 169
framework lacks consistency and so a look at Buzan’s ‘Nested Hierarchy’ list of institutions will attempt to fill any gaps from Bull’s original contribution.

An examination of Bull’s five institutions will start with the balance of power. To begin, a distinction must be made with regard to the term ‘balance of power’ as it is attached to other paradigms that relate to ‘power politics’. By the institution of the balance of power we mean the normative idea that great powers agree to a principle of balance as a way to maintain order, as opposed to the realist conception of powers competing for dominance and survival. Furthermore, Bull claims that the balance of power implies the potential for states to collaborate to promote the common objective of preserving the balance, which is evident in the ‘successive grand alliances’ against dominant powers. As such, the balance of power is said to fulfill three functions: the general balance of power throughout the system serves to prevent the international system from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire, local balances of power serve to protect the independence of states in particular areas from absorption or domination by a locally preponderant power, and also both general and local balances of power have provided the conditions for other institutions to operate. In other words, collaboration among states promotes self-restraint and the self-restraint of others. Doing so preserves the common goal of balance and contributes to the maintenance of order.

Similar to the balance of power, great power management serves to limit a state’s ‘hegemonic ambitions’, which would otherwise disrupt order in the system. First, Bull implies that there are two or more powers that are comparable in status and that there exists a ‘club’ with

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91 Bull, 2002: 102
a rule of membership.\textsuperscript{93} Great powers, thought to be the United States, Russia, China, England, and France\textsuperscript{94}, are powers recognized by others to have certain special rights and duties.\textsuperscript{95} Given their heightened status in international society, great powers contribute heavily to sustaining international order. According to Bull, great powers manage their relations with one another in the interest of international order by preserving the balance of power, avoiding or controlling crises in their relations with one another, as well as limiting or controlling wars among one another.\textsuperscript{96} Additionally, great powers exploit their preponderance as a way to control the direction of affairs in international society, which secures a degree of order.\textsuperscript{97}

As such, a defining facet of great power management as an institution of English school theory is that, “great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties.”\textsuperscript{98} In this way, great powers are beyond material capabilities. According to Reus-Smit, power is ‘also the product of legitimacy, of the perception, on the part of other social actors, that the exercise of power is rightful.’\textsuperscript{99}

The third institution is international law. According to Peter Wilson, international law provides a framework which guides states as far as what is to be expected of them and what will

\textsuperscript{93} Bull, 2002: 194
\textsuperscript{94} Clark, 2011: 35
\textsuperscript{95} Bull, 2002: 196
\textsuperscript{96} Bull, 2002: 200
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, 200
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid: 196
be tolerated with the intention of reducing unpredictability in international affairs. In this way, international law contributes to order in society because it reinforces the idea that states live in a society bound by common rules. International law thus establishes this notion as the “determining one for human thought and action, and so precludes the opening of questions without end and the eruption of conflict without limit.  

Next, diplomacy is the institution for the conduct of communication among states and other political entities, such as the UN. Parties negotiate, gather information, and build alliances with a guarantee of secrecy. The institution of diplomacy plays important roles in preserving order in international society. First, it facilitates communication between heads of state and other political entities. This is vital insofar as communication is crucial to the existence of an international society. In this regard, diplomacy may also symbolize the existence of a society of states. Diplomacy also allows for the negotiation of agreements, gathering of intelligence, and functions to minimalize friction in international relations. By fulfilling these functions diplomacy offers states the ability to recognize common interests in their relations with one another, as well as provide a tool for easing international tensions as they arise.

Finally, the institution of war will round out the list. According to Bull, war can take on a dual meaning where on the one hand it is a manifestation of disorder in international society, while on the other hand war can be considered an instrument of international society. On

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101 Bull, 2002: 135
102 Buzan, 2004: 168
103 Bull, 2002: 163
104 Ibid, 166
105 Ibid, 164-165
106 Ibid, 181
occasion the use of the institution of war can be considered to make a positive contribution to the maintenance of order. Bull notes several ways states use war in constructive ways, such as the enforcement of international law, to preserve the balance of power, and bring about just change. That being said, states generally work to restrict the use of this institution as a last and final resort.

Since Bull’s identification of five institutions, many ES scholars, like Buzan, Holsti, Jackson, James, Mayall, Wight and others have made attempts to develop the classification of primary institutions in a more systematic way. Many of these approaches are summarized in Buzan’s book, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*. The table below illustrates the contributions made to the literature on primary institutions and is organized by author.

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107 See Barry Buzan, 2004; Kalevi J. Holsti, 2002; Robert Jackson, 2000; Alan James, 1987; James Mayall, 2000; and Martin Wight, 1977.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wight</th>
<th>Bull</th>
<th>Mayall(^a)</th>
<th>Holst(^b)</th>
<th>James</th>
<th>Jackson</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious sites and festivals</td>
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<td>Trade (P)</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
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<td>Dynastic principles</td>
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<td>Diplomacy (I)</td>
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<td>Trade</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
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<td>Diplomacy (P)</td>
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<td>Alliances</td>
<td>War</td>
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<td>War (P)</td>
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<td>Guarantees</td>
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<td>War</td>
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<td>Neutrality</td>
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<td>Arbitration</td>
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<td>Balance of Power</td>
<td>Balance of Power, Great power management</td>
<td>Balance of Power (I)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Law</td>
<td>International Law (I)</td>
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<td>International Law (F)</td>
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<td>International Law</td>
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<td>The State</td>
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<td>The State (F)</td>
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<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Sovereignty (P)</td>
<td>Territoriality (F)</td>
<td>Sovereignty (F)</td>
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<td>Sovereignty</td>
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<td>Territorial Integrity (P)</td>
<td>Nonintervention (P)</td>
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<td>Political boundaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonintervention (P)</td>
<td>Self-Determination (P)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Discrimination (P)</td>
<td>Human Rights (P)</td>
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<td>Colonialism (P)</td>
<td>Colonialism</td>
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</table>

Notes:\(^a\) for Mayall (I) = institution and (P) = principle
\(^b\) for Holst (F) = foundational institution and (P) = procedural institution
\(^c\) words underlined are where the author identifies an institution as 'principal', or 'master' or 'bedrock'.
According to Martin Wight, ‘the institutions of international society are according to its nature’, which is to say that institutions will vary from one international society to another.\(^{109}\)

For example, Wight identifies: messengers, conferences and congresses, a diplomatic language, trade, religious sites, and festivals as institutions of “premodern international societies,” while considering: diplomacy, sovereignty, international law, and balance of power to be distinctive to the European international society.\(^{110}\) That said Wight does not categorize his lists into primary and secondary institutions.

James Mayall, on the other hand, categorizes his list into what he calls a ‘set of institutions and principles.’ He suggests that some of these institutions may be “law, diplomacy, balance of power, etc.,” while “sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention” represent principles.\(^{111}\) Mayall does single out ‘international law’ as, what he considers to be, “the bedrock institution on which the idea of international society stands or falls.”\(^{112}\) However, what is not clear in Mayall’s explanation is a complete list of ‘institutions’ and ‘principles’ as well as how the two categories are distinct from one another, if at all.

Stemming from Mayall’s ‘bedrock institution’ point, Alan James identifies sovereignty as ‘the constitutive principle of interstate relations.’\(^{113}\) Worth noting is that James highlights the ‘functional understanding’ of institutions by speaking of sovereignty in terms of rules about who


\(^{112}\) Ibid, 94

can be a member of international society. While he places primacy on sovereignty he also accounts for the way diplomacy and international law indicate the presence of an international society. Similarly, Robert Jackson emphasizes sovereignty as a key institution of international society. While Jackson does not attempt a direct discussion about institutions, he does consider the way in which diplomacy, colonialism, international law, and war may be “compatible with an institutional view.”

Kalevi Holsti’s contribution to this discussion is his “concern to develop primary institutions as benchmarks for monitoring significant changes in international society.” As a result, he thinks of primary institutions in either, ‘foundational’ or ‘procedural’ terms. In other words, “foundational institutions define and give privileged status to certain actors. They also define the fundamental principles, rules, and norms upon which their mutual relations are based.” Alternatively, procedural institutions are “repetitive practices, ideas, and norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors.”

To be clear, both foundational and procedural terms describe primary institutions. For example, Holsti suggests that sovereignty, territoriality, and international law constitute the foundational type, while diplomacy, war, trade, and colonialism constitute the procedural type. What is useful about this approach is that it considers the way institutions evolve over time. In

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116 Buzan, 2004: 171
117 Ibid, 172
119 Ibid, 26-28
this way, it recognizes new institutions like human equality and environmental stewardship the same way it acknowledges the decline of other institutions like colonialism and war.

Lastly, Buzan’s contribution proposes the idea of a ‘nested hierarchy’ as a way to categorize institutions. What this means is that some primary institutions “can be understood as containing, or generating others.” Buzan does this by constructing a list of what he calls ‘Master’ institutions. These are primary institutions that can ‘stand alone’. In this regard, he considers sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, equality of people, market, nationalism, and environmental stewardship to be ‘stand alone’ master institutions.

Further, he identifies a list of institutions that are derivatives of the master institutions. For example, Buzan establishes great power management as the master institution, and the institutions derived from this are alliances, balance of power, and war. It is important to note that both the ‘Master’ and the ‘Derivative’ forms are considered primary institutions. Additionally, he attempts to line up the primary institutions, both master and derivative, with their secondary institution counterparts. He admits that his list of secondary institutions consists of only a fraction of all examples, but that it should begin to illustrate how primary and secondary institutions relate to each other. Below is the table he uses to depict nested hierarchy.

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120 See Edward Keene, 2002: 60-144
121 See James Mayall, 2000: 19
122 Ibid, 182
Table 2. *The nested hierarchy of contemporary international institutions*\(^{123}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Institutions</th>
<th>Secondary Institutions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Master</strong></td>
<td><strong>Derivative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Territoriality</td>
<td>Boundaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Bilateralism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Great power</td>
<td>Alliances</td>
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<tr>
<td>management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equality of people</td>
<td>War</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Balance of power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
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<td></td>
<td>intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Trade liberalisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Financial liberalisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hegemonism stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Self-determination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Popular sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Species survival</td>
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<tr>
<td>stewardship</td>
<td>Climate stability</td>
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One of the interesting aspects of Buzan’s taxonomy is that it explores where secondary institutions may link to primary institutions. While he suggests a more exhaustive list is required to “trace all of the cross-linkages” between primary and secondary institutions, he acknowledges that this interpretation is a way of opening further discussion.

\(^{123}\) Ibid, 187
Pluralist/ Solidarist Debate

Concerning issues of order and justice, an additional facet of international society emerges known as the pluralist/solidarist debate. As such, the two positions that relate to this discourse are known as pluralism and solidarism, and each term acts as a way to frame normative debates in the English school. What concerned Bull when he introduced these ideas was, to what extent is order and justice compatible or conflicting and where do the two fit overall in world politics? This section will proceed with a brief overview of the debate. A look at the relation between institutions and where they fit within the debate will follow the overview. Lastly, the question of what side, order vs. justice, should take priority will be assessed.

Bull defines pluralism where, “states do not exhibit solidarity of this kind, but are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforcement of the law.” Alternatively, he defines solidarism as, “the solidarity, or potential solidarity of the states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement of the law.” More simply, pluralism is more concerned with the maintenance of order and that order is a necessary condition for justice, whereas solidarism tends to emphasize a more cosmopolitan worldview in which “order without justice is undesirable.” While the two terms may seem oppositional, their purpose is to provide a framework with which to define “the best balance between order and justice in international society.”

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124 Bull, 2002: 74-75
125 Ibid, 52
127 Buzan, 2014: 16
128 Ibid, 16
Pluralism’s primary concern is international order and its view of international society is one that is ‘limited to norms of coexistence.’\textsuperscript{129} Through this pluralist lens the rules and institutions of international society do not develop much beyond ‘shared concerns for the desired degree of international order under anarchy.’\textsuperscript{130} As a result, pluralism prefers institutions like diplomacy, international law, and sovereignty, which actively gear states toward orderly coexistence. In fact, this pluralistic character is evident in a number of other institutions as well including, territoriality, sovereignty/non-intervention, diplomacy, international law, great power management, the balance of power, war, imperialism/colonialism, human inequality, dynasticism, and nationalism.\textsuperscript{131} The first seven constitute a mix of Bull and Buzan’s classical/master institutions, while the final four are considered to be unique to pluralism.

What makes these institutions distinctly pluralist is that they tend to emphasize order over justice. To make this point clear, this next section will analyze the pluralist institutions as outlined by Buzan. To begin, in tandem with territoriality, sovereignty/non-intervention laid the foundation for the Westphalian order of a states-system.\textsuperscript{132} This is evident, Mayall points out, in the removal of religion by Westphalia and the subsequent adoption of non-intervention as a modern practice.\textsuperscript{133}

Similarly, diplomacy is the primary institution that evolved from a practice based on dynastic interests to one based on the interests and concerns of the sovereign state. The formation of states with the help of sovereignty/non-intervention created the need for a way to conduct orderly communication among states and thus the institution of diplomacy adapted to reflect the

\textsuperscript{129} Buzan, 2014: 89
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 90
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, 101
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, 102
\textsuperscript{133} Mayall, 2000: 11
concerns of the people versus those of the prince. Additionally, the introduction of sovereign nation states prompted the need for international law. The pluralist character of international law is evident in the way it functions to regulate the orderly coexistence of states in international society.

Another feature of pluralist institutions is that they may challenge notions of justice. Particularly, the institution of the balance of power is at odds with justice because it can sanction war against states that threaten the balance in the system, even if no legal or moral violation occurs. This institution’s objective is to maintain order, but this sometimes comes at the expense of lesser states. Similarly, great powers have managerial responsibility for international order, so long as others recognize them. This practice continues in the UN Security Council with the ‘legalized hegemony’ of the Permanent 5 members: United States, England, France, Russia, and China. Additionally, the removal of religion as a legitimate reason for war has paved the way for war to become an institution of international society. Since Westphalia, the formalization and legalization of war has solidified its place among the other pluralist institutions.

Imperialism/colonialism is incompatible with notions of justice due to its emphasis on ‘divided sovereignty.’ Keene suggests that, “imperialism/colonialism is ‘emblematic’ of divided sovereignty in which the core develops a Westphalian principle of sovereign equality and tolerance within itself, but practices divided sovereignty and the ‘standard of civilization’

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134 Buzan, 2014: 102  
135 Bull, 2002: 88  
137 See Keene, 2002
against the periphery.”\textsuperscript{138} As a result, the standard of civilization, promoted by imperialism/colonialism, opposed notions of justice like human rights from those who did not meet the standard. On this note, Buzan recognizes human inequality as a pluralist institution, which underpinned many practices throughout history (i.e. slavery). That being said, while human inequality supported imperialism/colonialism it “goes against the pluralist acknowledgment of the great society of humankind.”\textsuperscript{139}

Dynasticism can be considered a pluralist institution as it once was the dominant form of legitimate government. Membership, ‘moral purpose’, and diplomatic endeavors were informed by dynastic practices and influence. Finally, nationalism, as a primary pluralist institution, works as a ‘political tool’. Buzan notes the ‘transformative effect’ of nationalism in the way that it has “transformed people from being subjects of their ruler to being citizens of their state, in the process relocating sovereignty from the ruler to the people.”\textsuperscript{140}

Alternatively, solidarism’s approach to international order claims that some underpinning of justice, in which states take account of the needs and right of its citizens, is necessary for international society to be stable.\textsuperscript{141} Unlike pluralism’s narrow lens, solidarism considers the scope of international society to be much wider. Thus, solidarism acknowledges the potential for ‘functional cooperation’ with regard to issues like human rights and limitations on the use of force. Like pluralism, institutions have emerged with a uniquely solidarist bent. These are: human equality/human rights, environmental stewardship, the market, and democracy.

What makes these institutions distinct to the solidarist approach is their promotion of cosmopolitan forms of justice, as well as the moving of international society beyond a logic of

\textsuperscript{138} Buzan, 2014: 106
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid, 108
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, 109
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, 114
coexistence into one of cooperation and convergence.\textsuperscript{142} To make this point clear, this next section will detail the solidarist institutions. The institution of sovereignty/non-intervention takes on a solidarist character when international society embraces human rights. Meaning, there can be “legitimate erosion of the right of non-intervention on those grounds, without such erosion affecting the institution of sovereignty itself.”\textsuperscript{143} That being said, the legitimacy of intervention on human rights grounds remains undecided in the global international society.

The linking of the global market to the balance of power introduces aspects of solidarism. This is evident in the willingness of great powers to open their economies and accept the risks of interdependence and collaborate with one another. In this way, the collaboration among great powers can be seen as changing the normative composition of international society from mere co-existence to convergence. However, Buzan does note that the management of international society is “diffusing downwards and outwards from the great powers.”\textsuperscript{144} In this way, lesser powers or non-state actors that take up specific managerial roles can be said to support solidarism.

While the institution of international law has for the most part remained state centric, it also takes account of non-state actors and individuals. In this way, it is not inherently pluralist. David Armstrong argues that while international law is still state based, it has taken on more solidarist characteristics as a result of the changing nature of the leading powers and their commercial and moral interests.\textsuperscript{145} Similarly, diplomacy remains a pluralist institution. That being said, it has evolved to incorporate non-state actors and more solidarist concerns,

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, 134
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 140
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, 147
particularly as a result of technological innovation. Technology has vastly improved diplomatic communication not only among states, but also among non-state actors and individuals. This has allowed groups like Wikileaks, Anonymous, and others, typically excluded from diplomatic proceedings, to advance their own solidarist concerns.

The decrease in war’s legitimacy since 1945 is a result of solidarist traits. For example, the rise of the market downgraded or removed economic motives for war.\textsuperscript{146} That being said, the rise of human rights as an institution has extended the right to war beyond self-defense.\textsuperscript{147} While war remains a pluralist institution, the increase in solidarist motives, like humanitarian intervention, has pushed war in a solidarist direction.

While, the market does not have roots in cosmopolitan values or human rights, it serves as a mainly solidarist institution in that the building and maintaining of the global market goes beyond a logic of coexistence.\textsuperscript{148} For example, in response to growing trade, secondary institutions were created via collaboration, such as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875) and the Universal Postal Union (1874).\textsuperscript{149}

Also, human equality/human rights is considered to be an emerging solidarist institution within international society. The addition of human rights into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other UN conventions gives it some legitimacy to appeal for international action when human rights violations occur. In this way, the promotion of human rights goes beyond a logic of coexistence by attaching the responsibility of human rights to sovereign states. Similarly, environmental stewardship is regarded as an emerging institution of solidarism. It is based on moral claims of the right to a livable environmental, as well as a ‘custodial

\begin{footnotes}{\footnotesize
\item[146] Buzan, 2014: 151
\item[147] Mayall, 2000: 95-96, 102-104
\item[148] Buzan, 2014: 139
\item[149] Ibid, 138
}\end{footnotes}
responsibility to protect.\textsuperscript{150} As a result, environmental stewardship moves beyond a logic of coexistence by imploring cooperation among states to solve issues in the interest of justice that protects the environment.

Lastly, democracy may be considered a solidarist institution to the extent that it plays a significant role in the promotion of human rights. Additionally, democracy as an institution has contributed to US foreign policy. For example, Buzan argues that democracy helped cultivate a coalition of Asian democracies as a part of its hedging strategy against China.\textsuperscript{151} He says, “As can be seen from China’s paranoid crackdown on its own civil society in response to the Arab Spring, democracy has enough clout as an international norm to make authoritarian regimes feel existentially challenged.”\textsuperscript{152}

Interestingly, it has been argued that authoritarianism, as the mirror image of democracy, may constitute an institution of international society. For example, the French presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, has expressed doubt about the democratic establishment in the EU, even going so far as to say, “democracy no longer exists in the EU.”\textsuperscript{154} In search of an alternative, her visit to Moscow in March of 2017 to speak about collaboration with Vladimir Putin may facilitate authoritarian promotion. Around the same time, Russia signed a co-operation agreement with Italy’s far-right Lega Nord party further creating formal ties with Europe’s far right groups ahead of elections. This collaboration works to deepen ties with Europe’s far-right parties and promote authoritarianism as a way to challenge the democratic establishment in

\textsuperscript{150} Jackson, 2000: 177
\textsuperscript{151} Buzan, 2014: 161
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, 161
\textsuperscript{153} See Filippo Costa-Buranelli’s discussion on authoritarianism as an institution in chapter 4.
Europe. The notion of authoritarianism as an institution will be further elaborated on in chapter 4.

One of the major obstacles standing in the way of realizing both order and justice in international society revolves around issues of compatibility. Bull suggests that, given international society’s preference for orderly coexistence, two questions arise: Can justice be achieved only by jeopardizing international order and if so, which one should take priority? He concludes that, “order in social life is desirable because it is the condition of the realization of other values.”¹⁵⁵ That is not to say that order does or should have priority, but rather it is valuable to the extent that it is prior to other goals. This makes achieving more advanced goals, such as justice, possible.

Watson’s Independence to Empire Spectrum

This next section seeks to analyze Watson’s independence-empire spectrum, as well as his theoretical pendulum model to help determine the organization of the system between that of independence and empire. This is useful in evaluating the system that exists in the post-Soviet regional international society. Additionally, Clark’s discussion on hegemony in international society is useful in that it offers a definition of hegemony that is not exclusively about material power, but rather the appeal power represents. This definition may help discern whether the post-Soviet international society is hegemonic or if Russian influence pushes it more toward that of a dominion. As Andrew Hurrell suggests, “The great virtue of English school writing is that it recognizes that power is a social quality. Power is not, and never can be, based solely on material

¹⁵⁵ Bull, 2002: 93
In *The Evolution of International Society*, Adam Watson presents a spectrum that ranges from absolute independence/anarchy on one end and absolute empire/hierarchy on the other end. It is important to note that while the international system is anarchic, elements of hierarchy can exist within it. This is particularly apparent in the post-Soviet regional international society where, since 1991, influence from the Soviet Union persists to some extent. Given Moscow’s role as the ‘center,’ and Russia’s relative economic and military strength makes them the most logical actor to be situated in a hierarchical position of leadership in the region.

Watson’s independent state-empire spectrum is concerned with the organization of the system, particularly where the system falls between what he calls, ‘absolute independence’ and ‘absolute empire.’ To do this, Watson divides the spectrum into four ‘categories of relationship: independence, hegemony, dominion, and empire.’

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157 Waltz, 1979: 115
158 Carmen A. G. Descalzi, *Russian Hegemony in the CIS Region: An Examination of Russian Influence and Variation in Consent and Dissent by CIS States to Regional Hierarchy*. The London School of Economics [Dissertation], 2011: 33.
160 Ibid, 14
Figure 2. *Watson’s independent state-empire spectrum*\textsuperscript{161}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent States</th>
<th>Hegemony</th>
<th>Suzerain</th>
<th>Dominion</th>
<th>Empire</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent/sovereign states</strong></td>
<td><strong>Imperialistic international system (anarchic)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Imperialistic international system (hierarchic)</strong></td>
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On the far right end of the spectrum lies empire. Here, an imperial center dictates the actions of communities.\textsuperscript{162} It is worth noting that empire, like independence, does not exist in absolute form. Accordingly, international systems will exist in one of the three forms toward the middle of the spectrum.

First, dominion represents a system where an imperial power determines much of the internal government of a community.\textsuperscript{163} What distinguishes dominion from empire is that in a dominion system states still maintain their identity as separate states with some control over their affairs.\textsuperscript{164} For example, separatist regions, like Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, etc., are illustrative of a dominion system. These regions identity independently from Russia, and their host state, however Russian influence determines most of the political maneuvering in these areas. Additionally, Russian involvement in the region is so crucial to their survival that contesting this imposed hierarchy is near impossible.\textsuperscript{165}

Next, a suzerain system implies that there is one dominant state that exercises political

\textsuperscript{161} Descalzi, 2011: 34
\textsuperscript{162} Watson, 1992: 16
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid, 15
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, 15
\textsuperscript{165} Descalzi, 2011: 35
control over another.\textsuperscript{166} What is important to note here is that the states in this system accept the dominant state as legitimate. Members in this system consent to a degree of subordination in exchange for the perceived perk of prosperity or security, such as Belarus and the Central Asian states. In exchange for prosperity and security, these states cede power to the central authority and consent to the relative loss of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{167}

Finally, the last point on Watson’s spectrum is hegemony. Hegemony lies toward the independence end of the spectrum, however there is a leader in the system that exerts a degree of authority over the external relations of states, while leaving them domestically independent.\textsuperscript{168} This system is characteristic of other states in the post-Soviet regional international society like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, where Russia meddles in external affairs like trade and energy to influence political outcomes. To this end, the hegemon does not dictate, but rather involves continual dialogue between the hegemonial authority and the other states.\textsuperscript{169}

Legitimacy, Watson argues, is a process that swings like a pendulum. He suggests that when states can govern with a degree of legitimacy it acts as “the oil that lubricates the operative machinery of the system.”\textsuperscript{170} The idea is that when the leading power gains influence via consent it creates a more durable relationship between states. This occurs when the exercise of hegemony is made acceptable to other members of society. Alternatively, when leading powers gain influence via force the relationship is based more on dominion. Watson illustrates this in his pendulum model.

\textsuperscript{166} Watson, 1992: 15
\textsuperscript{167} Descalzi, 2011: 36
\textsuperscript{168} Watson, 1992: 15
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid, 15
\textsuperscript{170} Watson, 1992: 131
What is important to mention here is that the level of legitimacy in the system determines the swing of the pendulum. Watson notes that there is a tendency for the leading power to establish ‘a degree of hegemonial order’ which pulls systems toward the hegemony ‘gravitational center.’ The idea here is that states generally swing away from the ‘absolute’ extremes of independence and empire.

Much of the attention given to hegemony in IR theory is focused on material capabilities. According to Waltz, given the understanding that the goal of states is security, their survival depends on the distribution of capabilities. Their rank in the system depends on how well they score across their latent and tangible capabilities. This definition reflects that of a neorealist

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171 Based on Watson, 1992: 14-16 and 122-125
172 Watson, 1992: 252
173 Waltz, 1979: 131
174 Ibid, 131
perspective based on primacy.

On the other hand, Clark presents a definition of hegemony where social recognition plays a key role. Additionally, regarding hegemony as a legitimate social arrangement might make a contribution to international order, rather than define the threat to it.\textsuperscript{175} Meaning, hegemony may act as an institution. According to Bull, institutions are based on shared habits, practices, and goals and as international societies develop so do these institutions.\textsuperscript{176} Institutions have emerged precisely because of the ‘consent of international society.’\textsuperscript{177} In accordance with the Watson pendulum, as international society develops over time institutions adapt to meet the needs of the changing society. In contrast with the common definition of hegemony as strictly material, Clark’s definition suggests that material power alone is not enough to determine hegemonial authority.\textsuperscript{178} What Clark is describing here is that hegemony operates as an institution because it exists separately from primacy.\textsuperscript{179}

The challenge, as Clark notes, is to reconcile the interests and needs of the leading power with those of international society at large, and specifically the post-Soviet regional international society.\textsuperscript{180} It may be the case that Russia gains influence via force, which would no longer constitute hegemony, but rather dominion. In the regional context of the post-Soviet space there are certain elements to take into consideration regarding hegemony, dominion, and legitimacy. Russia having great power status contributes to its ability to define what counts as a legitimate

\textsuperscript{176} Bull, 2002: 71
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid, 37
\textsuperscript{178} Clark, 2011
\textsuperscript{179} Ian Clark, “How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?” \textit{International Relations} 23, no. 3 (2010), 473.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid, 476
threat and whether or not that warrants intervention.\textsuperscript{181} What constitutes this authority is worth examining.

Donnelly claims great powers are a socially constituted type of actor playing a particular or even unequal\textsuperscript{182} role in international society. Meaning, they must be recognized by others as holding a high degree of power. With this “unequal” position great powers have wielded their privilege to manipulate international society to their specifications, even at the expense of the sovereignty of other states.\textsuperscript{183} This notion is further examined in chapter 3, which examines how regional international societies are conceptualized generally, and chapter 4, which further examines whether the organization of the post-Soviet international society is hegemonic or a dominion.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid, 153  
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid, 152
Chapter 3: Regional Societies in English School Theory

Chapter 3 serves as the introduction to the empirical portion of the thesis. This section will highlight Buzan’s three conditions for the emergence of a regional international society, as well as his idea that secondary institutions play a role in the formation of a regional international society. Additionally, this chapter mainly serves as a review of regional international societies in the ES literature. The purpose here is to set up the empirical case of the post-Soviet international society in chapter 4.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, in order to understand the subsequent examination of the literature, outlining the parameters of regional international societies is necessary. Following this will be the literature review. Several authors have made a significant contribution to the ES study of regional international societies. Particularly, Stivachtis, Habegger, Webber, Dietz, Whitman, and Schouenborg’s work in the West, Zhang’s work in East Asia, Merke’s work in South America, Costa-Buranelli’s notion of the ‘polysemy’ of institutions, Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez in the Middle East, and Stivachtis and Pourchot’s work in Central Asia. Examining the work of these authors illuminates the way norms and institutions take on alternative meanings within different regional contexts. Furthermore, this discussion will help shed light on the eventual investigation of the members and institutions of the post-Soviet regional international society.

Contours of Regional International Societies

Typically, the attention in international society literature gives focus to how states collectively maintain international order. More recently, greater interest has been given to the
“reassessment of the global international society framework from the perspective of regions.”

The motivation behind this may lie in the “greater role regions play in global politics.” Given the heightened status of several regional powers “it has now become legitimate to speak of several regional international societies with their own structural and normative frameworks.”

Understanding the ES conceptual framework from a regional perspective is required in order to evaluate the post-Soviet space.

According to Buzan, the global level is unevenly developed. He further suggests that, “although nearly all states in the system belong to a thin, pluralist interstate society, there are regional clusters that are much more thickly developed than the global.” For example, Europe is considered a regional international society, which embodies some of the thin, pluralist features of the global level with the addition of thicker, solidarist institutions like NATO and the EU. Particularly, the enlargement of NATO has extended the “thick” core of European international society as new member states become “enmeshed in the institutional, political, and social practices of the Alliance.”

Concerning the parameters of regional international societies, this paper relies on Buzan’s three conditions for the emergence of a regional international society. Here he claims that regional international societies lose their point if there are no significant differences between

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185 Ibid, 327


187 Buzan, 1993: 345

188 Buzan, 2009: 28

them and the global level. However, if the differences become too great then the global level disappears. For example, regions may adopt the ‘Western model,’ particularly sovereignty, but “resist elements of it with which they disagree.” Filippo Costa-Buranelli’s article below will shed more light on this notion. Furthermore, Buzan argues that a region is distinguishable from the global level in having distinct institutions absent from the global level, an absence of institutions present at the global level, or a different interpretation of institutions at the global level.

In addition to primary institutions, Buzan proposes that secondary institutions at the regional level may reflect the existence of a gesellschaft type of regional international society. This is evident in the way membership in regional international organizations promotes coordination among members and cooperation toward common regional goals. Several of the articles below will discuss this notion in greater detail.

**Regional Societies**

This next section will elaborate on several key English school works regarding regional international societies. I will start with Europe as a subglobal international society. Here it has been demonstrated that ‘the West’ constitutes a set of overlapping regional international societies with different degrees of thinness/thickness. As a result, a great deal of English school scholarship has contributed to the study of a European regional international society.

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190 Ibid, 34  
191 Buzan, 2009  
192 Buzan, 2009: 29  
Particularly, Thomas Dietz and Richard Whitman have utilized the ‘international society’ and ‘world society’ concepts in addressing the structure of the EU’s system of governance, and then compare it to other regional international societies. They find that in the EU international society, the EU core is able to impose its system of governance due to its ‘hegemonic power’ as the center of an empire, and applicant states’ self-identification in belonging to this society with its norms, values, and interests. Additionally, they consider the ‘EU empire’ gradated, so this power weakens towards the empire’s fringes. In this way, the EU constitutes a regional international society that is located within the broader European international society.

Channeling Buzan’s premise that regional international organizations may reflect the existence of a regional international society, Yannis Stivachtis and Mark Webber demonstrate the institutionalization of the European international society through NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They utilize the ES concepts of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ forms of integration to analyze the development of European organizational frameworks.

Similarly, Webber concentrates more on NATO. He argues that during the Cold War, NATO took on a thick, solidarist character that revolved around shared values, cooperation, and common community. This existed among the backdrop of a thinner, more pluralist European international society that emphasized state coexistence and limited cooperation. He suggests that the expansion of NATO in the post-Cold War era has extended the thick solidarist core as new members adopt the practices of the organization. That being said, the enlargement of NATO has

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195 Ibid, 60.
196 Stivachtis and Webber, 2011.
also unearthed differences in the organizations interests, and while this has not diminished the solidarist nature of the alliance it has weakened it.

Also, Yannis Stivachtis and Mike Habegger trace the historical development of the Council of Europe and its role in post-enlargement Europe. 198 They suggest that the evolving structures and functions of the organization demonstrate an ongoing commitment to a homogeneous European regional international society. The authors conclude that “the CoE’s liberal norm socialization process is incomplete and that this process is essential to the organization of legitimacy as well as for the deepening of European regional international society.” 199

While much of the ES literature involving international society in Europe focuses on the EU, there exist investigations on the development of subglobal European international societies. Particularly, Laust Schouenborg demonstrates the distinctions between the global international society and a regional international society within Scandinavia. 200 He provides a historical analysis of the emergence of a Scandinavian regional international society over a 200-year period. Furthermore, Schouenborg’s analysis contributes to the development of “primary institutions” and “binding forces” as it pertains to regional international societies.

Europe is not the only subglobal international society. Many ES scholars have taken to task the study of the emergence of regional international societies outside of ‘the West’.

To begin, author Yongjin Zhang offers a critical investigation of the development of a regional international society in East Asia.

Zhang’s paper, *Towards a Regional International Society: Making Sense of Regionalism(s) in East Asia*, explores the theoretical promise of international society in providing insight into the emergence of regionalism in Asia. What is interesting about this article is that it was first drafted in 2002 for a presentation at the International Studies Association convention, but has since been updated to reflect what he calls the “thriving discourse on regionalism within the past ten years or so.”

In Zhang’s original article he begins with a look at how three facets, economy, security, and law, contribute to regionalism in East Asia. Considering regionalism in Asia as divergent from that which has evolved in Europe, Zhang argues that states, peoples, and societies of Asia have been brought together “first and foremost by unprecedented regional economic integration and increasing economic interdependence between economies in the region and the global economy.”

He then highlights the ‘open regionalism’ of preferential trading arrangements, which eventually forms the trading bloc Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). He argues that this arrangement of ‘open regionalism’ suggests Asia’s collective response to logistical hurdles, swift international economic transactions, and economic globalization. A further example that exhibits the interwoven nature of Asian economies is “network power’. While Zhang acknowledges this represents a ‘comparatively thin’ part of the literature, he examines the way in which various social and commercial networks in Asia facilitate “economic integration

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202 Ibid, 46
An example he gives is the Chinese family and business network, also known as the ‘bamboo network’.

Additionally, issues related to security are capable of promoting regional cooperation in Asia. For example, Zhang suggests the regional organization; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) exemplifies the region’s distinctive approach to regional cooperation, particularly as it relates to security. He notes the organization’s ‘particular brand of institutionalism’ where it seeks to avoid formal political and legal processes and instead opts for ‘inclusiveness, consultation, and consensus in conflict resolution’. The ASEAN organization’s preference for consultation and consensus seems to pull directly from Bull and Watson’s definition of international society in that the organization prefers to establish common rules and institutions through ‘dialogue’ and ‘consent’. Zhang further reinforces this notion by highlighting Acharya’s argument that organizing ASEAN this way is a deliberate choice because, “ASEAN founders were largely inspired by the goal of developing a social community rather than an institutionally integrated economic or military bloc.”

The final facet of regionalization in Asia that Zhang examines is that of legalization, or lack thereof. Zhang argues that, in fact, one of the obvious characteristics of Asian regional institutions is their resistance to legalization. He notes the way APEC ‘resists legalization’ and how the “ASEAN way” is, in Kahler’s words, “collaboration without legalization.” While the aversion to a formal legal framework for institutions is potentially problematic for Asia, it does illustrate the way in which the region might distinguish itself from other regions.

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203 Ibid, 47
205 Ibid, 195
206 See Kahler, 2000
Zhang’s article offers a helpful way of looking at the formation of common values and norms in the region with the social process of, what Buzan calls, ‘soft regionalism’. In doing so, Zhang identifies the way in which these practices shape and generate a distinctive identity in the region. He argues that informality, inclusiveness, consultation, and consensus seeking of ASEAN, APEC, and other regional institutions are only achievable when there is socialization among member states. As a result, East Asia’s regionally distinctive attempts to achieve order, security, and prosperity has led to a more cohesive region.

The next article, written by Federico Merke, addresses the development of international society in South America. The main thrust of Merke’s article, *Unpacking South America’s International Society: A Historical Sketch*, is to uncover the nature and function of the South American international society, as well as sketch its history and development. Additionally, he examines the region’s primary institutions with the purpose of outlining the contours of the South American international society. He does this by relying predominantly on Buzan’s notion that regional international societies contain institutions absent at the global level, the addition of an institution not present at the global level, or a different interpretation of an institution present in the global level.

Before he elaborates on the institutions of the South American international society he first analyzes the distinction between a South American and Latin American international society. He argues that regions are not simply “clusters of states playing with unique rules of interaction,” and that examining a region like Latin America, with a wide-ranging geography,
limited interaction capabilities, and low economic and military interdependence diminishes the utility of thinking in terms of a region.\footnote{209}

Thus he distinguishes Latin America as more of a cultural region than a geographical one and therefore it constitutes a “tight interhuman society yet a loose interstate society.”\footnote{210} In this way, Merke suggests that the interhuman society of Latin America houses two interstate societies with that of Central America, which acts as a sub-complex within North America, and a South American interstate society.\footnote{211} Because South America as a region is seen as more self-contained it is separated from Central America, which shares its interstate dynamics more closely with that of North America. This distinction is useful to the extent that it highlights not only the role of geographical location, but also the role of culture and shared history to the development of institutions in the region.

Following this, Merke analyzes Bull’s list of primary institutions within South America. In doing so, he identifies the presence of other institutions in South America distinct from that of the global level, namely concertación and regionalism. In the interest of time, I will discuss Merke’s analysis of two of Bull’s primary institutions within South America, as well as the two distinct institutions of concertación and regionalism.

Starting with the institution of war, Merke notes the relatively peaceful nature of South America as a “no war zone.” This is in sharp contrast with the massive internal conflicts and civil war experienced by most South American states. In other words, he states that “violence

\footnote{210}{Ibid, 71}
\footnote{211}{Ibid, 71}
occurred within states, not between them.”212 However, due to an increase in state strength and coherence during the twentieth century South America is able to better resolve conflict and continues to be relatively peaceful.

Next, Merke’s examination of Obregon’s reading of international law sees a distinct reformulation of Europe’s law in the South American image. In other words, South America did not simply cut and paste from Europe, but rather they ‘transformed and produced a transnational legal consciousness with their regional interests in mind.’213 For example, during the 19th century ideas of freedom and justice and shared cultural heritage produced a ‘solidarist program based on a regional system of law and working principles’. In doing so, Merke argues that this pattern is far from being one of conflict formation and is closer to a convergence interstate society based on a common identity and a transnational solidarity.214

Distinct to South America is the institution of concertación, meaning concertation in English. Merke defines this as a loose form of international organization based on consensus seeking and peaceful settlement of disputes.215 He says concertación depicts South America as Gemeinschaft in that as a practice concertación is embedded in a “deep seated imaginary’ of South America as an interhuman society veiled over an interstate society.216 In this way, it has helped to limit war through peaceful settlement of disputes and thus is a key practice that forms the diplomatic culture in South America.217

212 Ibid, 73
214 Ibid, 75
215 Ibid, 78
216 Ibid, 78
217 Ibid, 79
Finally, Merke notes the institution of regionalism as distinct to South America. This is evident in the activity of South American states seeking membership in different regional projects revolving around a common goal of development, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) or the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR). Also, Merke argues that a unique aspect to the South American international society is the way South American regional integration projects strengthened sovereignty instead of diminishing it. As a result, regional integration is not an alternative to the existing state centered system, but rather its practice works to project national ambitions.

The next piece titled, *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, is an edited book by Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez. Here the editor’s main focus is to investigate the application of the English school’s international society concept to the Middle East. To accomplish this the book contains a mixture of theoretical and empirical chapters.

The first two chapters, by Fred Halliday and Barry Buzan, introduce the theoretical aspect of the book. Fred Halliday offers a discussion on the ‘conceptions of international society’ in the first chapter. This notion of international society he presents is not the same that is used throughout the rest of the book, but it is useful in that it illustrates the on going debate over the meaning of international society. Similarly, in chapter 2, Buzan, draws out his interpretation of international society as a ‘social structure’. His purpose here is to examine whether or not distinct, international social structures exist at the regional level represented by the Middle East in either a society of states, or a world society. This chapter in particular informs most of the

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218 Ibid, 81
219 Ibid, 81
220 Buzan, 2009: 24
other chapters in this book. Furthermore, Buzan’s framework serves as a useful guide when applied to other regions. This will become clearer in the empirical section of chapter 4.

In chapters 3 and 4, authors Amira Bennison and Nuri Yurdusev focus on the Ottoman Empire. Bennison’s chapter concerns the extent to which one can apply the theoretical concepts of the English school to the Ottoman Empire. What Bennison adds to the book is a discussion about a sub-global world society. Meaning, she explores the degree to which the Muslim umma (international Muslim community) of the Ottoman era existed as a world society. She argues that although the umma as a world society may not align with more contemporary conceptions of world society, it nonetheless functioned as a “conduit for ideas and attitudes” which helped to manage the relations among Muslim states. The focus on the Ottoman Empire concludes in the fourth chapter in which Yurdusev investigates the impact of the expanding European international society upon the Middle East.

In Chapters 5 and 6, authors Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez and Simon Murden deal with the primary and secondary institutions of international society. In chapter 5, Gonzalez-Pelaez continues Buzan’s discussion about the application of primary institutions at the sub-global level. Here the author hones in on distinct institutions to the Middle East, as well as different interpretations that may be present in the region. She does this with an examination of the primary institutions Buzan puts forth from his ‘nested hierarchy’ list. She finds that all of the ‘Master’ institutions exist in the region, but not all of the derivative institutions are present. Also, she notes the presence of derivative institutions in the Middle East that are not present at


the global level, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. Lastly, she finds differences in interpretation in most ‘Master’ institutions within the region. She concludes that the region is a regional international society based on the regional differences collected both in the interpretation of the ‘Master’ list of institutions, and in the specific presence or absence of some derivative institutions at the regional level.\footnote{Ibid, 114}

Similarly in chapter 6, Murden focuses on the secondary institutions of the Middle East. Here he covers a wide range of secondary institutions like the Arab League, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), as well as the ‘Islamic dimension’ in the region. He claims that while expressing Islamic ideals is one thing, carrying out the actions of these institutions in the region is another.\footnote{Simon Murden, “The Secondary Institutions of the Middle Eastern Regional Interstate Society,” in \textit{International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level}, ed. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (London: Palgrave, 2009), 136.} Thus these secondary institutions have not done much to manage the relations among the states in the region.

In chapter 7, author Morten Valbjorn is concerned with Arab nationalism in the transformation from international to world society. He argues that it makes sense to speak of an Arab regional international society, but that it is necessary to distinguish between a number of interstate societies sharing an Arab dimension.\footnote{Morten Valbjorn, “Arab Nationalism(s) in Transformation: From Arab Interstate Societies to an Arab-Islamic World Society,” in \textit{International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level}, ed. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (London: Palgrave, 2009), 142.} Interestingly, he suggests that the English school’s notion of the ‘anarchical society’ offers a valuable way of grasping how inter-Arab relations are marked by conflict as well as shared identities and norms about ‘appropriate’ Arab behavior. In chapter 8, Sohail Hashmi continues some of the discussion from chapter 5 and 6 by analyzing the role Islam plays in creating, sustaining, or undermining the primary and secondary
institutions of the region. Finally, chapter 9 offers a twist on regional international societies by providing a ‘Neo-Gramscian’ angle to the study of order and change in the Middle East.

In summation, the book offers a look at the Middle East region through the English school’s conceptual lens. Mainly, the book seeks to better understand the application of the international society concept to the regional level, in this instance the Middle East. At the very least, this book serves the purpose of advancing the English school’s theoretical discussion on regional international society.

Filippo Costa-Buranelli’s paper titled, ‘Do you know what I mean? ’ ‘Not exactly’: English school, global international society, and the polysemy of institutions, explores the way regional international societies adopt the same institutions present at the global level, but then are framed, interpreted, and adopted differently. Additionally, Costa-Buranelli argues that the “increasing regionalization of world politics and the consequent multiplication of interpretations of global institutions weakens the shared normative understanding underpinning global international society by challenging a set of imposed meanings imposed by the West.”

He investigates this by trying to understand the role language plays in English school theory generally, and in relation to how regions develop and practice institutions, specifically. He acknowledges many ES scholars who have used language, such as Charles Manning’s linguistic metaphor to explain how the ‘game’ of international society was conducted, akin to a game of

\[\text{\footnotesize 226}\quad \text{Sohail H. Hashmi, “Islam, the Middle East and the Pan-Islamic Movement,” in International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level, ed. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (London: Palgrave, 2009), 171.}\]

chess.\(^{228}\) Others, like Tim Dunne, suggest that in order to grasp the social complexities of the world ‘requires an understanding of language and meaning, and, critically, an appreciation of the persistence of multiple modernities.\(^{229}\) Similarly, Andrew Hurrell has claimed that the use of political language in international society ‘is central to the attainment and stabilisation of political power and to understanding the success or failure of different conceptions of regional and global political order.\(^{230}\)

His discussion above serves the purpose of introducing the reader to the term ‘polysemy’ to mean ‘the association of distinct (but related) meanings with one and the same lexeme.’\(^{231}\) Additionally, he argues that ‘context is crucial’ and ‘meaning is usage’, so the best way to understand the meaning and use of an expression “one must appreciate the wider point and purpose of so using it, the extra-linguistic ends to which it might be put and the human affairs and institutions into which its employment is woven.”\(^{232}\) Costa-Buranelli relates this term to the ES by examining the way institutions are interpreted, understood, and put into practice by actors.\(^{233}\) Furthermore, he argues that states may adopt institutions like sovereignty and international law, “but the way in which it understands and practices them are in line with the standards, the understandings, and the conventions that its system of reference imparts on it.”\(^{234}\)

\(^{228}\) Manning, 1975
\(^{233}\) Filippo Costa-Buranelli, 2014: 502
\(^{234}\) Ibid, 502
He offers several empirical examples to illustrate his argument. So, what sovereignty means in Europe is different from that of East Asia, South America, or the post-Soviet area. For example, in the European international society the idea of sovereignty is linked to the idea of solidarity underpinning many EU policies. What Costa-Buranelli suggests here is that to be sovereign in the EU means actually ‘to cede sovereignty’. Alternatively, sovereignty in the post-Soviet area, which the next article by Pourchot and Stivachtis examines, is not based on notions of solidarity or responsibility. Instead, due to the quasi-imperial domination of Russia and the return to independence for former Soviet states the region understands and practices sovereignty as more protectionist. Finally, South East Asia also relies on a ‘state-centric, Westphalian conception of sovereignty. However, Costa-Buranelli suggests that sovereignty in this region is more ‘flexible,’ which is a result of Western and Japanese colonialism and Great Power competition at the global and regional level. Costa-Buranelli points out that this notion of flexibility is evident in the ASEAN organization’s emphasis on consensus, which echoes much of what Zhang demonstrated in the first article.

In other words, what sovereignty means and how it is practiced varies among other international societies. Costa-Buranelli’s article highlights an interesting discussion within the English school’s regional international society literature. That is, a global international society still exists and that “despite the different ways sovereignty is practiced, there is still an understanding that the system of sovereign states has to be preserved.” He suggests that understanding the diversity of regions through language may allow theorists to better grasp these new meanings, interpretations, and practices.

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235 Ibid, 505
236 Ibid, 505
237 Ibid, 506
238 Ibid, 511
The final article is one by Georgeta Pourchot and Yannis Stivachtis titled, *International Society and Regional Integration in Central Asia*. This article examines the degree of integration in Central Asia by utilizing the international society approach of the English school.239 Additionally, the authors explore the way in which Russia re-establishes its primacy after the end of the Cold War through the establishment of international organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This follows Buzan’s argument that secondary institutions may reflect the existence of a regional international society.

Additionally, the authors utilize Bull and Watson’s 1984 definition of an international society, mentioned in chapter 1, to establish that a society of states is one where rules are established via dialogue and consent. This is evident where the authors detail the varying degrees of interaction between Russia and other states in the region.240 The number of regional international organizations in Central Asia is illustrative of this. Particularly, the authors argue that when one applies the gesellschaft conception of international society then the CIS exemplifies the existence of a regional international society because member states have established by dialogue and consent common rules of and policies for the conduct of their relations.

Similarly, drawing again from Bull and Watson’s definition the authors note that member states in the region share a common interest in maintaining agreements. These interests may vary, for example Russia has an interest in maintaining a position of dominance, or states like

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240 For the purpose of the study the authors consider Central Asia to include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia that prefer a path to independence. However, all states share a particular interest to agreements related to sovereignty. This is evident, they suggest, after Russia’s recognition of two Georgian separatist areas, which threatened the sovereignty of Georgia, thus resulting in the break-up of Georgian-Russian relations.

Lastly, the authors consider the range of relations in Central Asia within Watson independence/empire spectrum. Watson suggests that during the Cold War, Russia exercised a degree of influence over the independent states in its region, which is indicative of dominion. The authors argue that this analysis is still useful as it sheds lights on the current relations in the region where Russia exercises a level of influence over other states in the region. This leads us to chapter 4 where the concepts outlined thus far will be applied to the post-Soviet space.

241 Ibid, 74
242 Ibid, 74
Chapter 4: The Post-Soviet Regional International Society

The purpose of this chapter is to empirically demonstrate the development and function of the post-Soviet regional international society. In doing so, this chapter aims to first, define the members of the post-Soviet regional international society, and second, to flesh out its primary and secondary institutions. The network of secondary institutions will be analyzed to determine the extent to which they reflect either Russian dominance. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to shed light on how Russia acquires its dominance through its creation of a diplomatic structure of regional organizations. Given Putin’s desire to “shut down the liberal, Westernizing project,” it may be the case that Russia’s development of a regional diplomatic structure allows it to contest or compete with the global diplomatic structure. Finally, this chapter should illuminate the utility of the ES theory in helping to understand the dynamics of the post-Soviet international society.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section investigates the members, practices, and secondary institutions under the heading of the same name. The “Members” sub-heading will, unsurprisingly, identify the members of the post-Soviet international society. Next, the sub-heading, “Practices,” seeks to examine three things. First, it attempts to understand the way Bull’s notion of sovereignty, as an ordering principle, manifests in the region. Second, it will explore Russia’s use of diplomatic methods as a way to expand its diplomatic space and how this relates to its identity as a great power. Third, the section will revisit the organization of the system as hegemony or dominion in the post-Soviet international society. The last sub-heading, “Secondary Institutions,” will analyze the network of regional organizations and examines how

this network contributes to Russian dominance. Concluding this chapter will reintroduce the institution of authoritarianism. Here I look at how the diplomatic structure of regional organizations helps Russia contest the global diplomatic structure by supporting authoritarian regimes. This may shed light on the reasons why Russia meddles in the elections of post-Soviet states, and why its connections with right-wing parties in the rest of Europe have flourished.

Members, Practices, and Secondary Institutions

Members

This paper relies on Bull and Watson’s definition of international society, which states that

A group of states… which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and arrangements.\(^{244}\)

This definition highlights Buzan’s gessellschaft form of international society. This form views international society as being contractual whereby states with common interests established by dialogue common rules and consent institutions (including secondary) for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their interest in maintaining these agreements.

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of dialogue and consent among republics was largely unbalanced. States in the region were recognized as sovereign, but in practice Moscow, or ‘the Center’ controlled much of the domestic and foreign policy of these

\(^{244}\) Bull and Watson, 1984: 1
states, particularly when it came to Soviet values. These values were injected into the domestic policy of each republic and dissent was not tolerated. In this way, the highly centralized government had an elevated level of control in each republic. An example of this is in the first, of many, five-year plans, specifically in the enforcement of collectivization of its agriculture sector.

In Armenia starting in 1929, collectivization existed as the new form of agriculture inflicted on all peasants. According to Matossian, collectivization achieved this by reorganizing agriculture, implementing new industrial standards, and controlling all commerce by Soviet institutions. Collectivization occurred simultaneously throughout the Soviet Union whether or not it worked for each republic. The government employed an array of tactics to get the Armenians to comply. If not, they faced prosecution, “corrective” labor, fines, and other forms of punishment for resisting collectivization. There was an expectation from the Center that republics would implement the order of collectivization and if republics did not comply the Center had mechanisms for enforcement. What stands out is that the dialogue between the Center and republics was mostly driven by Moscow’s political agenda. In this way, the Soviet Union reflected an imperial arrangement toward empire on Watson’s spectrum.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, three former Soviet states have successfully navigated away from Moscow and integrated into the European international society. By 2004, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia became members of the EU and NATO thus solidifying their place in the European regional international society. This region lies close to the independence side of Watson’s spectrum given the emphasis on solidarist values of human rights, democracy, and the

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246 Ibid, 100.
247 Ibid, 100.
market. With this in mind the members of the post-Soviet international society include the former Soviet states with the exception of the Baltics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

These remaining former Soviet republics find themselves somewhat in a state of limbo. Meaning, they find themselves caught between maintaining relations with Russia while also forging relations with the EU that could lead to possible membership. Geographically speaking, some of the former Soviet republics constitute a dividing wall of states where they simultaneously lie on the boundary of both Europe and Russia. In this way, both Europe and Russia factor into the relations of these states. That being said, the post-Soviet space is much more crucial to Russia than it is to Europe.

Practices

Sovereignty

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia’s foreign policy aim has been to establish itself as a great power, or at least a great regional power.\(^\text{249}\) One of the ways Russia achieves this is by maintaining close relations with the former Soviet states. In Yeltsin’s 1995 Presidential decree, Russia set forth a comprehensive document to illustrate the importance of the CIS to Russian interests. With Presidential backing this document suggests that Russia recognizes that all of their “main vital interests are concentrated on the territory of the CIS.”\(^\text{250}\) Russia believes that an alliance with the CIS states will allow it a way to achieve a credible space, not only

\(^{249}\) Garnett & Trenin, 1999: 133
\(^{250}\) Ibid, 135
regionally, but in the global community as well.\textsuperscript{251} That is not to say the CIS members are always willing to cooperate with Russia in this endeavor. This is because Russia’s desire to achieve great power status often inspires the use of coercion to get what it wants from the CIS.\textsuperscript{252} In this way Russia does not see the CIS members as full states, but rather as a vehicle for establishing Russia’s great power status.\textsuperscript{253}

Accordingly, Russia’s concept of its region as a sphere of interest is useful with regard to controlling territory.\textsuperscript{254} That is because historically, and even today, this sphere acts as a buffer zone from outside threats, as well as a “staging ground” for advancing Russian power, influence, and security.\textsuperscript{255} In other words, Russia’s conception of the post-Soviet space subordinates the sovereignty of those states in its region, which allows for it to exploit these states to maintain its own interests. This action not only serves to legitimize Russia’s position in the region, but it is also in line with its privilege, as a great power, to manipulate the region to its own specifications.

Many definitions of sovereignty exist in the literature. Jackson defines the practice of sovereignty as an institution that determines the legal equality of the state with all other sovereign states.\textsuperscript{256} Buzan suggests that sovereignty is the designator of property rights and the basis for rules of recognition, and its corollary non-intervention sets the basic frame for political relations.\textsuperscript{257} However, according to Costa-Buranelli, “the different practices of sovereignty carried out in different regional contexts undermine the supposed universal understandings of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{251} Kathleen Mihalisko, “Yeltsin’s CIS Decree: An Instrument for Regaining Russia’s Superpower Status,” \textit{Prism} 1, no. 21 (1995).
  \item \textsuperscript{252} Garnett & Trenin, 1999: 135
  \item \textsuperscript{253} Mihalisko, 1995
  \item \textsuperscript{254} Trenin, 2009: 6
  \item \textsuperscript{255} Ibid
  \item \textsuperscript{257} Buzan, 2004: 143
\end{itemize}
sovereignty. Given the more recent understanding of regional international society as the ‘global international society framework from the perspective of regions’, rules, like sovereignty, must be reexamined in the context of a particular region. This is further supported by Buzan who suggests that in reality international society is ‘radically’ differentiated at the regional level and that definitions of sovereignty and others needs to reflect the notion that international society is not a ‘single, global scale phenomenon’. Simply put, the practice of sovereignty in the EU will look different than the practice of sovereignty within the post-Soviet international society.

Similarly, Buzan suggests that in particular, sovereignty means different things at the pluralist and solidarist ends of international society. In a thin, pluralist, Westphalian interstate society, all kinds of intervention, except against those attempting to disrupt order, is illegal. Alternatively, just as the European international society has a thick, solidarist conception of sovereignty where members ‘cede sovereignty’, Russia too has a solidarist conception of sovereignty. However, Russia’s solidarist conception of international society is limited to its region. In other words, Russia holds a pluralist vision of sovereignty on the global scale that promotes limited cooperation, non-intervention, and respect for sovereignty. Within the post-Soviet space Russia’s solidarist conception of sovereignty allows Russia to undermine the sovereignty of lesser states in the region to expand its influence.

In the regional context of Russia there are certain elements to take into consideration regarding sovereignty and non-intervention. Russia having great power status contributes to its ability to define what counts as a legitimate threat and whether or not that warrants

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258 Costa-Buranelli, 2015: 504
259 Stivachtis, 2015: 327
260 Buzan, 2004: 219
261 Ibid, 219
Donnelly claims great powers are a socially constituted type of actor playing a particular or even unequal [emphasis added] role in international society. With this “unequal” position great powers have wielded their privilege to manipulate international society to their specifications, even at the expense of the sovereignty of other states.

Similarly, Bull claims that

…international society in the perspective of the great powers, which sees themselves as the guardians, treats the independence of particular states as subordinate to the preservation of the system as a whole when it tolerates or encourages the limitation of the sovereignty or independence of small states.

In this way, Russia uses the ordering principle of sovereignty as a means to manage the post-Soviet space in a way that allows it to achieve its place as the regional leader. With Putin at the helm, Russia practices an ‘asymmetric sovereignty’ where post-Soviet states ‘surrender elements of their independence’ to Russia. This is evident in several events where Russia has impinged on the sovereignty of post-Soviet states in order to further its own interests.

Russia’s inability to let go of the past leaves it “suspicious” of the sovereignty and independence of its neighbors and therefore “cannot see their status as anything other than temporary.” Additionally, the great power status of Russia contributes to its understanding of sovereignty as ‘protection’ rather than capacity and basis for cooperation within the region.

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262 Donnelly, 2006: 153
263 Ibid, 153
264 Donnelly, 2006: 152
265 Bull, 2002: 17
266 Bugajski, 2004: 54-55
abroad. This definition is in line with Russia’s recent action in Ukraine and Crimea where it claims the “protection” of Russian nationals necessitated an intervention there. In 2014, the crisis in Ukraine reached its peak when then President Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign the association agreement with the EU. Upon this ruling, mass demonstrations flooded the streets, which led to the ousting of President Yanukovych.

The expulsion of Yanukovych only heightened tensions with Russia. Shortly after this Putin stationed 40,000 troops along the Ukrainian-Russian border to protect what he calls ‘compatriots’. According to Wanner, “when compatriots live in geographic concentration, the principle of protecting them introduces the possibility of converting regions of another country into zones of diminished sovereignty.” It is important to note that Russia’s challenge to Ukraine’s sovereignty stems from a solidarist conception of humanitarian intervention. Given Russia’s position in the region it is able to strip former republics of some of their power.

Additionally, Russia’s perception of this threat to Russian nationals in Ukraine saw Putin annexing Crimea by means of a referendum in March 2014. The BBC reported that 95.5% of the Crimean population, 58% of which identify as ethnic Russians, supported the referendum and

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271 Ibid, 427
272 Ibid, 427
273 Ibid, 403
274 Ibid, 428
the subsequent secession from Ukraine. According to Russia, the protection of Russian nationals abroad justifies state interference. As the dominant actor in the region, Russia is able to decide that protecting Russian nationals abroad constitutes a legitimate case for intervening on ‘humanitarian grounds’. This action not only serves to legitimize Russia’s great power status in the region, but it serves to ‘defend’ the populations against the policies of independent governments. In this way, Russia’s goal of being a regional great power is realized.

A similar example illustrates the practice of passportization in the region. One of the methods Russia utilizes to intervene in CIS states is through ‘passportization,’ which has come to mean the allocation of passports to individuals by Russia. By doing so, it ‘captures’ the territory and the population it contains. An example of this practice is evident in the republic of Georgia. Residents of the two separatist areas, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are considered Georgian nationals, practically and legally. That did not stop Russia from issuing passports en masse, thereby turning Georgian nationals into Russian nationals, and creating the ‘legitimation’ it needed to intervene in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a direct response to Georgia’s NATO aspirations in 2008.

Güven and Ribbelink suggest that “nationality should not be conferred on individuals against their will, and/or when these individuals already are nationals of another state, as this constitutes an infringement of the sovereignty and interest of that other state.” However, this

276 Bugajski, 2003: 52
277 Güven and Ribbelink, 2015: 55
279 Ibid, 55
280 Ibid, 47
281 Ibid, 55
pluralist understanding of the institution of sovereignty, whereby states remain free from external interference, is at odds with Russia’s solidarist conception. Russia’s understanding of sovereignty through the practice of passportization illustrates Deyermond’s argument that in the post-Soviet space sovereignty means ‘protection’. Georgia’s attempt to join NATO signaled to Russia that a part of the region it holds influence over wishes to leave, but also that it would bring NATO closer to Russian territory. As a result, Russia believes its intervention in Georgia was necessary in order to protect its region from Western adversaries and from the potential loss of territory it influences.

**Diplomacy**

Although an institution of the global international society, Russia uses diplomatic methods to expand its diplomatic space, meaning, the setting within which diplomacy and foreign policy are carried out.\(^{282}\) Ronald Barston outlines several diplomatic strategies states use within what he calls the ‘grey area’ of diplomacy that borders on, supports, or is directly linked to the use of military, coercive, or clandestine behavior.\(^{283}\) One of the strategies he elaborates on is ‘expansion strategy’, where “states and other actors seek to expand their influence and diplomatic space through groupings, institutions, dialogue, and representation.”\(^{284}\) Expansion strategies have three elements: membership, media, and representation, which help extend diplomatic space.\(^{285}\) States may do so in ‘quieter’ ways through dialogue, and special relations, or through more aggressive means such as creating ‘rival regional organizations’.\(^{286}\)

\(^{283}\) Ibid, 36
\(^{284}\) Ibid, 34
\(^{285}\) Ibid, 34
\(^{286}\) Ibid, 34
In many ways, it can be said that Russia adopts an aggressive expansion strategy toward regional organizations as a way to demonstrate its power. This foreign policy strategy toward the post-Soviet states may be a result of the growth and expansion of the European Union and NATO toward Russia’s traditional sphere of interest.\(^{287}\) The result of this expansion required Russia to develop its own regional organizations to rival Europe’s. As a founding member, Russia played a significant role in creating and supporting the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Organizations, and the Eurasian Union. Particularly, the security emphasis of the CSO suggests that it is the counter organization to Europe’s NATO. Similarly, the purpose of the EAEU is to integrate the economies of post-Soviet states and create a powerful trading bloc, much like the European Union does in Europe. One of the reasons why the creation of these secondary institutions matters is because when states join Russian led organizations they then legitimate Russian power.

Further, this space allows Russia to better facilitate changes in direction and support foreign policy initiatives. This is evident in Russia’s push to ignite the BRICS bloc, which can be considered equivalent to the G7. It can be said that Russia took the initiative to organize the first ‘ministerial meeting’ of the BRICS countries in 2006, as well as its first summit in 2009.\(^{288}\) More than anything this meeting had an important propaganda effect as Russian relations with the West were low and thus showcased its relations with outside influential partners.\(^{289}\) The propaganda effect thus satisfies the media element of Barston’s expansion strategy. While BRICS is not considered a secondary institution of the post-Soviet space, it does demonstrate

\(^{287}\) Slobodchikoff, 2014: 90
\(^{289}\) Ibid
Russia’s use of secondary institutions to project its power, both regionally and globally. In this way, Russia plays a heightened role in the creation of many of these secondary institutions in the region, not only to demonstrate its power, but also to be perceived by others as a great power.

**From Hegemony to Dominion**

This paper addressed Watson’s spectrum earlier in chapter 2, however a brief rehashing will be beneficial. Adam Watson introduces his independent-state/empire spectrum in his book, *The Evolution of International Society*. He notes that, while the international system is anarchic, elements of hierarchy can exist within it.290 This is particularly the case in the post-Soviet regional international society where influence from the Soviet Union persists to some extent. Moscow’s former role as the ‘Center,’ and Russia’s relative economic and military strength makes it the most logical actor to be situated in a hierarchical position of leadership in the region.291 In other words, while the global international society is anarchical, the post-Soviet regional international society is hierarchical with Russia as the leading power.

That being said, this hierarchical arrangement at the regional level does not preclude it from constituting a regional international society. For example, Fred Halliday argues that

> Inter-state relations may constitute a society, not so much because of the shared values involved, but because it is a grouping established by the concern of some states by others and maintained with a variety of ideological and military mechanisms, by the more powerful members… thus socialization becomes not the inculcation and diffusion of shared values, but the imposition of a set of values.292

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290 Waltz, 1979: 115
291 Descalzi, 2011: 33
Russia, as the regional leader of the system, exerts a degree of authority over the external relations of other states in its region, and this works to manage the relations of states in this society.

Watson uses his spectrum to denote where the system falls between ‘absolute independence’ and ‘absolute empire’. He acknowledges that empire and independence do not exist in absolute form and that the system will likely fall somewhere in between as either, hegemony, suzerain, or dominion. As previously mentioned, separatist regions like Transnistria or South Ossetia, are characteristic of a dominion system where an imperial power (Russia) determines the internal government of these frozen conflicts. Similarly, states in a suzerain system tend to accept the dominance of one state. This subordination is often met with the possibility of greater prosperity or security.

Finally, hegemony, according to Watson, suggests that there is a leader in the system that exerts a degree of authority over the external relations of states, while leaving them domestically independent. Russia, as the regional leader of the system, exerts a degree of authority over the external relations of other states in its region. This is evident in the fact that Russia has the largest population, the majority of ex-Soviet military capabilities, the most robust economy (relative to the other states in the region), and the largest international presence (permanent seat on the UN Security Council).

To investigate where the post-Soviet international society falls on Watson’s spectrum, this next section examines the recent actions Russia has taken to manage the relations of states in

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294 See Figure 2.
295 Watson, 1992: 15
the region. Russia employs trade embargoes, mainly on agricultural products, as a way to punish states in its ‘near abroad.’ Most of these interactions take place in response to these states initiating talks with the EU. The first example will illustrate Russia’s embargo on Moldovan wine followed by Russian pressure toward Ukraine before its signing of an association agreement.

For example, between 2013 and 2014 Russia imposed a trade embargo on Moldovan wine in response to the impending Vilnius Summit in November 2013 and the subsequent signing of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement in mid-2014. The agreement acts as a precursor to Moldova’s future accession into the EU, which Russia is firmly opposed to. However, Moldova’s dependence on Russia for energy and trade gives Moscow some leverage when it comes to manipulating political outcomes. To an extent, Russia considers the former Soviet republics as “elements of its power center.” In this way, if Russia loses member states in its ‘near abroad’ they then lose the region they would exercise power over. Thus, weakening Moldova’s economy with an embargo is an attempt to gear Moldova away from the West and toward the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union. A system where Russia meddles in the external affairs of states is characteristic of the hegemony point on Watson’s spectrum. That being said, Moldova’s dependence on Russia for energy makes it difficult for Moldova to contest Russian dominance in its affairs. This suggests that point on the spectrum may be moving closer to dominion.

Another example is apparent in the pressure Russia put on Ukraine before it was set to sign its association agreement with the EU. In August of 2013, talks were held between Russia and Ukraine. At these talks, Russia laid out the potential consequences for Ukraine if they were to sign this agreement. A week prior to this meeting, Russia issued a blockade of freight from
Ukraine to Russia as a way to demonstrate to Ukraine what they risk by moving away from Russia’s Custom Union. When the two countries failed to reach a consensus Moscow stepped up its effort to oppose Ukrainian integration in the EU.

Ahead of the Vilnius Summit, where the signing of the association agreement was set to take place, the Eurasian Economic Commission, consisting of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, published a document on November 1, 2013 that would introduce measures designed “to protect the Customs Union market against goods from third countries that join other trade blocs,” with Ukraine falling right into that category.\textsuperscript{297} As a result, ‘enhanced customs scrutiny and duties’ on Ukrainian goods would make trade more difficult. This was further echoed by Vladimir Putin’s advisor, Sergei Glazev, who has described Ukraine’s plans to sign the EU agreement as ‘suicidal’. Glazev warned that if Kiev went ahead and signed the association agreement with the EU, “Moscow would be forced to exclude Ukraine from the CIS free trade agreement.”\textsuperscript{298} Additionally, Moscow threatened the customs tariffs Ukraine charged on Russian supplies for the Black Sea Fleet claiming the tariffs were illegal. It was further suggested by Moscow that the $200 million Ukraine collected from these tariffs should be added by Moscow to Ukraine’s ‘sovereign debt.’\textsuperscript{299}

Russia also exploited the approach of winter to add further pressure to Ukraine. The increase in tensions between Ukraine and Russia meant Ukraine would have to borrow around $2 billion in order to prepare the country for heating and ensure the trouble free transit of gas

\textsuperscript{298} Ibid
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid
through its pipelines.\textsuperscript{300} In addition to borrowing money to pay for the impending heating season, Ukraine would also be stuck with a gas bill issued by Russia for $7 billion in fees not collected by Russia in the previous year.\textsuperscript{301} Russia argues that debtors, like Ukraine, have a “moral and financial” responsibility to pay for gas and if they don’t Russia has a right to shut off the supply.\textsuperscript{302} This was considerably damaging to Ukraine’s dwindling economy, which already was suffering from a recession. On top of this, Russia made attempts to appeal to the Ukrainian public by threatening to restrict the free movement of people. This would effectively eliminate access to the Russian labor market, thus cutting off a significant source of income for Ukrainian people. Interestingly, in solidarity with Moscow, Kazakhstan also issued a ban, although to a limited extent, on poultry imports from 3 Ukrainian producers.\textsuperscript{303} In this way, the organization of the system plays a role in managing the relations in the region.

The possibility that Ukraine would sign the association agreement with the EU, thus formalizing closer ties to the West, is perceived by Russia as a loss of power. What is at stake for Russia, Deyermond suggests, is its sense of itself as one of the great powers.\textsuperscript{304} She argues Russia’s great power status rests on its permanent membership of the UN Security Council, its nuclear arsenal, and its position as the dominant state in its region.\textsuperscript{305} In other words, if Russia loses Ukraine to the West it loses a significant part of its region that it would otherwise have

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\textsuperscript{301} Ibid
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\textsuperscript{303} Tadeusz Iwański and Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, 2013
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\textsuperscript{305} Ibid
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control over. Also, Russia’s dream of organizing a Eurasian Economic Union, to rival that of the European Union, would be diminished without Ukraine due to its size and proximity to Europe.

Russia’s onslaught of offensive tactics leading up to the Vilnius Summit is a clear demonstration of Russian dominion. As a result, Ukraine backed out of signing the association agreement. Additionally, Russian installation of rebel fighters in Crimea and the subsequent annexation of Crimea go beyond meddling in external affairs of trade and energy. While Crimea retains its identity, Russia determines much of the internal governing and political maneuvering within the territory. Given the increased aggression, whereby Russia has moved beyond meddling in external affairs to meddling in internal affairs, this system is characteristic of Watson’s dominion point. Further evidence of this is apparent in the way Russia utilizes secondary institutions to maintain dominance in the region and project its prestigious status.

Secondary Institutions

The members of the post-Soviet international society have adopted an array of organizations as a way to manage region specific issues such as, security, the economy, and trade. That being said, Russian dominance of these regional organizations has tended to reflect more of the interests of the dominant power. This part seeks to outline several secondary institutions in the region. In doing so, this section attempts to demonstrate how the primary institutions of dominion and authoritarianism are reflected through these secondary institutions. Additionally, this section should convey the notion that Russia utilizes secondary institutions as a way to maintain a position of dominance in the region. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Organization (CSO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), including the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Eurasian Customs
Union (ECU) will be analyzed.

**Commonwealth of Independent States**

One of the largest regional organizations in the post-Soviet space is the Commonwealth of Independent States. Requiring a way to facilitate the break-up of the Soviet Union and to develop a regional governance structure to manage interaction amongst the newly independent states, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus established the CIS on December 8, 1991.\(^{306}\) This effort was led by Russian president Boris Yeltsin in an attempt to protect Russo-Ukrainian relations after the break-up. Additionally, proclaiming the end of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin requested diplomatic recognition of Russia as its legal successor.\(^{307}\) In this way, Russia continued the role as leader and would remain in a dominant position heading into the post-Soviet era.

According to Janusz Bugajski, the CIS was “conceived as a mechanism to bind smaller and weaker neighbors closer to Russia and prevent their drifting permanently away from Moscow’s orbit.”\(^{308}\) Similarly, Robert Donaldson and Joseph Nogee argue that “the CIS is an instrument of Russian foreign policy” and that particularly it is a “mechanism for asserting Russian hegemony over the other eleven states.”\(^{309}\) While the CIS has not fully lived up to its intended purpose, the most important role it plays today is that it remains a “vehicle for political

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dominance” and gives “Russia a sense of continuity as a global power.”310 In other words, it facilitates regional interaction in the post-Soviet international society.

All former Soviet states would join the CIS with the exception of the Baltic States. Additionally, Turkmenistan and Ukraine never officially ratified the treaty. Turkmenistan and Ukraine remain associate members311, while Georgia was the last member to join the CIS in 1993 and the first member to withdraw after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. It is important to note that while Turkmenistan and Ukraine never formally ratified the CIS charter they remain tied to the organization through bilateral relations. For example, in 1993 Ukraine’s associate status allowed them to participate in the drafting of the CIS Economic Union and even committed to signing specific agreements; in 2004 Ukraine signed and ratified the agreement on the Common Economic Space (CES); and by 2013 Ukraine signed and ratified its membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA). Similarly, Turkmenistan has formed trilateral relations with Ukraine and Russia in the energy sector and Turkmenistan is represented at CIS summits. Lastly, while Georgia has officially vacated its membership, it still maintains ties with other CIS states, such as the Intergovernmental Belarusian-Georgian Commission for Economic Cooperation and GUAM. While these three states play a lesser role in the CIS, they continue to factor into the maintenance of Russia’s great power status and the formal ties they maintain with full members integrates them within the society.

310 Bugajski, 2004: 54
311 The CIS Charter makes only a vague mention of observers and associate members. Article 8 says: “On the basis of the decision taken by the Council of Heads of States, a state willing to participate in certain kinds of activities of the Commonwealth may join it as an associate member on the conditions determined by the agreement on the associate membership; On the decision of the Council of the Heads of States, the representatives of the other states may attend the sittings of the Commonwealth organs as observers; Participation of the associate members and of the observers in the work of the Commonwealth organs shall be governed by their rules of procedure.”
The organization is set up much like the EU in the way of structure, and regional goals are reached through consensus.\footnote{Ibid, 73} However, the similarities between the CIS and the EU end there. According to Paul Kubicek, many of its ideals, such as respecting state sovereignty, renouncing the use of force or coercion, and coordinating economic policies, have been breached more than practiced.\footnote{Ibid, 242} This is evident in the way Russia urged states to join, as not all former Soviet states were eager to become members of the CIS.\footnote{Ibid, 242} For example, Georgia was the last member to join in 1993 as a result of Russian coercion; the Moldovan parliament refused to ratify CIS membership until 1994, and then only after imposition of punitive agricultural tariffs by Russia; and Azerbaijan pulled out of the CIS in 1992, only to re-join the following year after a coup installed a government more to Moscow’s liking.\footnote{Ibid, 242}

More recently, Russian dominance continues to be displayed through its efforts to establish a common CIS energy space. One of the ways Russia does this is through the practice of swapping the debts of CIS members for Russian equity in their energy and strategic sectors.\footnote{Ibid, 242} For example, in March 2003, the Russian energy company Gazprom prepared to reduce the price of gas to Moldova in return for allowing Russian business to buy up assets.\footnote{Bugajski, 2004: 101-102} At the time, Moldova’s debt for gas delivery was $121.1 million and Gazprom wanted to swap the debt for ownership of several Moldovan companies.\footnote{Ibid}

In November 2002, Gazprom claimed Belarus received a “gas overdraft” and threatened...
to halt its gas supply if they refused to pay a higher premium than the amount contracted.\textsuperscript{319} According to Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, the cut in energy supplies was a political decision by the Kremlin, because Gazprom wanted shares in Beltranshaz as repayment for the Belarus gas debt.\textsuperscript{320} Even though Lukashenko’s rhetoric was condemning, Minsk still succumbed to Russian pressure and signed an intergovernmental agreement in April 2002 to expand cooperation in the gas sector.\textsuperscript{321} Securing these transport lines ensures Russia’s energy and economic dominance in the region. The swaps for debt transactions only “mask hegemony behind the rhetoric of regional integration and cooperation.”\textsuperscript{322}

In addition to energy, Russia dominates other CIS projects. Given its unique position in the region as the former leader of the Soviet Union it is able to lead the majority of regional organizations. This allows it to strengthen Moscow’s role in the CIS security and economic spheres.

**Collective Security Organization**

Next, the evolution of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of 1992 into the Collective Security Organization (CSO) of 2002 is emblematic of regional cooperation through dialogue. Having recognized the scope of the CST as too limited, regional heads of state, including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, came together to update the organization to reflect new values. In particular, to “ensure collective protection of


\textsuperscript{320} Bugajski, 2004: 67

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid

\textsuperscript{322} Blank, 2003: 2
independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Member States.” The CSO has evolved since its inception and by 2007 the organization signed an agreement to cooperate on security, crime, and drug trafficking. Additionally, the CSO developed peacekeeping forces to be used in the post-Soviet space to promote peace and stability. The organizations efforts to develop regional coordination around the common goal of security reflect the qualities of a regional international society.

That being said, Kubicek argues that the majority of the security threat to CIS states comes from either within their own states or from within the CIS itself, which in most cases, meant Russia. For example, Russian military troops stationed in Moldova supported the Transnistrian separatist movement, as well as Russian pressure toward Ukraine to turn over the Black Sea Fleet to Russian control. These same kinds of security problems still persist today as evident in the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, which was instigated by Russia based on its practice of sovereignty as an ordering principle. Given the asymmetrical security structure in the region, Russia is able to exert a degree of dominance over the other members.

This notion is further reinforced by the structure of the CSO doctrine that “ensures the planning, procurement, and training would be controlled from Moscow and that Russian officers would dominate the collective staffs and joint forces.” In essence, this organization allows Moscow to exert its influence throughout the regional security structure by situating itself in positions of authority and leadership within the CSO. Not only does this integrate Russian forces

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324 Slobodchikoff, 2014: 86
325 Ibid, 86
326 Kubicek, 2009: 242
327 Ibid, 242
328 Bugajski, 2004: 61
with other states in the region, but it also provides legitimacy to Russian military operations.

While the CSO provides Russia with a way to infiltrate the security realm in the region, it also provides Russia with a counter collective to combat NATO encroachment. Because Russia regards itself as the ‘defender’ of the region, it claims the right to station troops and preserve military bases in the post-Soviet states. In this way, the CSO reflects the primary institution of dominion, while also acting as a counter force to NATO in the West. Arguably, this action helps to solidify Russia’s status as a great power by preserving ‘its region’ from what it considers to be external threats. As a result, any attempt by the West to ‘lure’ CIS states away from Russia’s orbit is perceived by Russia as a direct security threat.

**Eurasian Union**

Further, Russia has sought to breathe life into the CIS economic sphere through the creation of several regional organizations. As a result, the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) were developed with an emphasis on establishing the region as a coherent and viable economic bloc.

The three leading members of the EurAsEC, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan later joining, launched the EurAsEC in 2000 with the purpose of creating a single market where members worked collectively to establish free trade zones and lower barriers to trade. The organization achieved a modicum of success and began plans to create a Eurasian Development Bank with the support of Vladimir Putin. What is important to note here is the means with which this bank was able to develop, function, and support itself.

While the purpose of the bank was to promote further regional economic coordination, business

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329 Slobodchikoff, 2014: 76
associations in Russia dominate its list of sponsors, particularly, the Russian Chamber of Industry and Trade, the Russian Alliance of Manufacturers and Businesspeople, and the Association of the Financial and Industrial Groups of Russia. This self-centered tactic by Russia usurps the supposed cooperative nature of the organization in order to exert its influence. In other words, by installing its own sponsors Russia controls the operation of the organization.

An additional aspect of the EurAsEC is its internal governing structure. Specifically, the EurAsEC includes an ‘Integration Committee’ made up of the deputy heads of governments of member states who are responsible for “ensuring free trade among member states and identifying further possibilities for integration.” What is interesting here is that this committee does not require each decision to be unanimous and instead only needs a 2/3 vote to pass. Further, each state does not have an equal vote, thus highlighting the organization’s undemocratic nature. In essence, the votes are distributed based on which state pays more into the EurAsEC budget. In this case, Russia pays the most and therefore receives 40 votes. In other words, the EurAsEC as a secondary institution may reflect the primary institution of authoritarianism.

Following the relative success of the EurAsEC, the EACU came into existence in January 2010. Headed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia later joining, the purpose of the EACU is to “comprehensively upgrade, raise the competitiveness of and cooperation between the national economies, and to promote stable development in order to raise the living standards of …Member States.” Additionally, members share a common interest in maintaining this agreement as it provides for the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor.

330 Ibid, 76
331 Ibid, 76
Furthermore, establishment of the EACU may be Russia’s attempt to contest WTO membership. Meaning, if Russia creates an alternative regional trade organization it allows it to represent the CIS in relations with the WTO, thus projecting its great power status. In this way, Russia perceives its “claims to great power status will only be taken seriously if the CIS acts as one coordinated body…”

By January 1, 2015, the EurAsEC and the EACU was absorbed into the Eurasian Union (EAEU). Its model is based off of the European Union and its governing structure reflects some of the form of the European Commission. One interesting aspect of the governing structure of the Eurasian Union is in relation to the function of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU Court). While its primary purpose is to settle disputes emerging from the framework of the ECU and the EurAsEC, some have argued that the “rules governing the activities of the EAEU Court represent a significant setback.” In particular, “this setback reflects the lack of political will of the EAEU members to transform the EAEU Court into an effectively judicial body similar to the CJEU and their insufficient commitment to the rule of law.” Ultimately, the organizations lack of commitment to democratic forms of governance may speak to the regions tendency toward authoritarian practices.

In other words, Russian dominion and authoritarian practices are reflected in the CIS and its sub-organizational structures. Russia’s understanding of sovereignty as an ordering principle and its use of diplomatic methods contribute to its creation of a regional diplomatic structure, embodied by several regional secondary institutions. This structure allows Russia a way to

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333 Bugajski, 2003: 56
335 Ibid
compete with the global diplomatic structure and project its great power status. This ties into the next section, which highlights the practice of authoritarianism in the post-Soviet international society. This is useful; not only to highlight authoritarianism within the post-Soviet international society, but also to understand the way Russia may use it to contest Western democracy.

**Authoritarianism**

Recently, Filippo Costa-Buranelli has proposed an idea that authoritarianism, an antipodal to democracy, can also be considered as an institution of international society. He suggests that the actions and rhetoric that result from repetitive authoritarian policies, within Central Asia, may help to legitimize authoritarian regimes. These regimes may constitute an institution in that they are used to manage the relations of states within Central Asia. Buzan drew similar attention to the institution of democracy, outlined above, which manages the relations of states in the ‘West’. Further, Costa-Buranelli identifies three elements that contribute to the institutionalization of authoritarianism: learning, emulation, and praise. In other words, states learn authoritarian practices from other states in the region, adopt them as their own, and are involved in the custom of ‘praising’ others and thus legitimizing authoritarian behavior.

It is important to mention that authoritarianism is a name given by the West to describe the practices of these states. This is because these states have not found a term to legitimize what they do. Overtime, society has de-legitimized dictatorships and authoritarians and there has been a need to find a term they can use to market this form of governance. This may be why nationalism is so prolific in these regions, since it attracts the support, while masking authoritarian practices. That being said, the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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336 Summary is based on a panel presentation by Filippo Costa-Buranelli at the 2017 International Studies Association Conference in Baltimore, Maryland, USA.
may be an attempt to legitimize and sustain autocracy. The aim of the SCO is to ‘promote regime survival over democratization’\textsuperscript{337} and undermine the spread of liberal democracy within the organization and beyond. Thus, demonstrating that authoritarian states can come together and create a stable collective.

While Costa-Buranelli applied this framework solely to the Central Asian states, it may also be useful to describe similar practices by Russia and within the entirety of the post-Soviet international society. Kneuer and Demmelhuber argue that ‘against the background of the global momentum for democratization since 1989, autocratic regimes may rather be interested in the “pre-emption” of liberalization in autocratic regimes or democratic revolutions that would threaten their own domestic stability and alter the regime balance in their immediate regional realm.’\textsuperscript{338} Russia’s response to what it perceives as the ‘global momentum for democratization’ can be characterized by authoritarian practices.

For example, the electoral restructuring Vladimir Putin initiated in 2004 highlights the authoritarian tendencies of post-communist Russia. Many of Putin’s amendments acted to restrict competition and limit funds for opposition parties, which in turn benefitted the regime. With regard to the decision making process in Russia, challenging these changes to the electoral system proves futile as a pro-Kremlin ruling party dominates the Duma and thus there is little need to explain the merits of legislative changes or persuade a majority of deputies to adopt them.\textsuperscript{339} Additionally, the media in Russia is state owned and thus subordinated to the regime. In

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this way, Russia’s electoral system under Putin can be considered authoritarian.

That is not to say that Russia’s penchant for undemocratic elections began with Putin. During Stalin’s time, voting was considered a requirement even if there was only one candidate on the ballot. Not voting was prohibited and often “led to a midnight knock on the door and a one-way ticket to Siberia.”340 According to article 112 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet met infrequently and consisted of deputies chosen from a relatively small pool of Communist Party members.341 Also, the limited contestation and general acceptance of legislation implemented by party members suggests that the Supreme Soviet is “not a real legislature, but a rubber stamp.”342 While much has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians still feel that the system remains skewed toward the regime and many do not wholeheartedly believe in the electoral process.

Regionally speaking, Russia’s position as the dominant actor in the region has allowed it to employ similar tactics to manipulate elections within the post-Soviet. For example, to ensure the 2006 re-election of Belarusian dictator, Aleksandr Lukashenka, Russia’s ‘election bolstering’ comprised of several tactics. To boost Lukashenka’s standing with Belarusian voters he was widely praised in Russian media and endorsed by prominent Russian politicians; he was backed financially by Russian businesses; and the Russian FSB security service discredited and harassed the democratic opposition.343 Additionally, Putin promised not to raise gas prices beyond the “heavily subsidized 2005-level of US$48 per 1,000cbm” and as a result Lukashenka was able to

raise public wages shortly before the election.\footnote{Ibid} By providing cheap gas, Putin was able to ‘subsidize autocratic consolidation’ in Belarus. In essence, Russian dominion supports authoritarianism as a way to improve its position.

More recently, Russia’s recent attempt to influence the 2016 presidential elections in Moldova is evident in its bombardment of Moldovan media with pro-Igor Dodon coverage and its promise to cancel trade and labor market restrictions if Dodon wins.\footnote{Andrey Devyatkov, “Dynamics of Russian Power in Moldova,” \textit{Foreign Policy Research Institute}, March 22, 2017, \url{https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/dynamics-russian-power-moldova/}} The propaganda will expose the pro-Russian candidate in a favorable light while lifting trade restrictions will help Moldova’s weak economy with the hope that ordinary Moldovans will perceive this relationship with Russia as the best course of action as they approach the 2018 Parliamentary elections.

Russia’s response to Western democracy seemed to take off after the “colored revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). The Orange Revolution in particular was the key event that led Russian authorities to fear the spread of political unrest into Russian territory.\footnote{Antje Kästner, “Russia: Supporting Non-Democratic Tendencies in the Post-Soviet Space?,” \textit{German Development Institute} (2010): 2.} Russia perceived these revolutions to be inspired by the West and in return Russia adopted a critical stance toward Western democracy and began to develop its own image to counter as an ‘alternative donor to the region.’\footnote{Ibid} Arguably, Russia fulfills this position of ‘alternative donor’ through its regional diplomatic structure of secondary institutions. In other words, Russia, as the regional leader, uses this regional diplomatic structure as a way to shape the ideology of its international society to counter what it perceives as the threat of Western democracy.
Conclusion

English school scholars have already made the case that a regional international society exists within the post-Soviet space. However, what is lacking, and what I contribute, is an investigation of the members and the institutions of the post-Soviet regional international society. Employing an English school perspective, this thesis expands on the emergence and contours of the post-Soviet international society by defining, not only its members, but also the role primary and secondary institutions play in the region.

Requiring a way to facilitate the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, established the Commonwealth of Independent States. Originally intended to coordinate the political, economic, and security realm of the region, it has since been taken over by Russia as a way to establish dominance. Relying on Buzan’s premise that secondary institutions suggests the emergence of a regional international society, I assert that Russia utilizes the secondary institutions of the CIS as a way to exert the primary institution of dominion within the region. This is illustrated in several CIS organizations where Russia has used its political and/or economic strength to, for example, install Russian “peace keepers” in separatist territory, co-opt energy assets in Moldova and Belarus, and restrict trade. By developing secondary institutions across the political (CIS), economic (EAEU), and security (CSO) spheres, Russia establishes this regional diplomatic structure that, not only reflects its interests and its dominant status, but also allows it to contest the Western diplomatic structure. In this way, the authoritarian practices we see in regard to Russian meddling in the elections of post-Soviet states may actually be Russia’s way of contesting Western standards of democracy.

While this practice helps Russia maintain its primacy and manage the lesser states in its region, it might also usher in a new political struggle. It may be the case that since the global
international society is no longer divided between communism versus capitalism, there now exists a different ideological division between democracy and authoritarianism. For further research it may be useful to see whether what we see as the rise of nationalism in Europe is a particular type of extreme nationalism known as “dark nationalism,” which has been used by right-wing parties in order to obtain support and rise to power. There we should observe the connection between these parties and Moscow.

This form of nationalism has been exercised by far right leaders in Europe, such as Marine Le Pen from France or Heinz-Christian Strache from Austria, with the help of Russia to come into power. All have used an extreme form of nationalism to deal with disillusioned people by exploiting their fear to attract the masses and gain power. In other words, they are not nationalist they are autocrats. What has been observed as the rise of nationalism in Europe may be a façade that conceals authoritarianism. Russian dominance gives it the means to influence, but nationalism is what has opened the door to allow the spread of authoritarianism into Western Europe. To better understand the dynamics of this new political struggle, further investigation of Putin and the populists should be explored.

\[348\] In a lecture presented to Virginia Tech students on October 10, 2016, Dr. Edward Weisband considers the way in which, what he calls “dark nationalism” characterizes the advocacy of separate national status. It is an attempt to make existential the criteria for a nationality by subjugating different ethnicities within populations. As a result, it generates a division within states along racial and ethnic lines and may be contributing to the rise of xenophobia we see in Europe today.
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