Strange(r) Maps: the cosmopolitan geopolitics of Sri Lankan tourism

Shelby E. Ward

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Katrina Powell, Chair
Mauro Caraccioli
Bikrum Gill
Rohan Kalyan
Peter Schmitthenner

Blacksburg, VA

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Concerned with the ongoing coloniality within the form and interactions of international relations, this project examines the legacy of colonial mapping practices on contemporary geopolitics. Specifically, I investigate Sri Lankan tourist maps as subversive examples of the politics of vision implicated within the historical formation of island-space under colonial mapping practices (i.e. Portuguese, Dutch, and British), and the contemporary political implications of the island geography as the state, including exclusionary identity politics during the civil war (1983-2009). Using a mix-analysis approach, including interviews, participatory mapping, and autoethnography, as well as feminist, postcolonial, and critical theoretical lenses, I argue that Sri Lankan tourist maps serve as examples of the historically developed and continued right to space, mobility, representation, and resources between the Global North and South in what I term “cosmopolitan geopolitics.” As geopolitics can be identified as the relationship between territories and resources, cosmopolitan geopolitics is concerned with the power relations when such elements as culture, authenticity, history, and religion are marked in places, people, and experiences as valued resources within the international tourist economy, particularly in this project which connects the colonial histories of mapping, travel, and international relations. In order to address the imperial, masculine politics of vision this project is separated into two parts: the first is concerned with the ontology and colonial legacy the map (Chapters 1-3), the second with the politics of the map, including exclusionary politics of the nation state (Chapters 4-6). Chapter 1 investigates the politics of island space as represented on the tourist map, where the state serves as both a “treasure box” and “caged problem.” Chapter 2 argues that the cartoon images and icons serve as a resource map for contemporary geopolitics, and Chapter 3 indicates that this map simultaneously acts an invitation to the cosmopolitan, with assumed access and hospitality. Examining the various ways that the exclusionary politics of the Sinhala-Buddhist state are implicated in the representations on the tourist map, Chapters 4-6 look at cultural tourist sites, natural or wildlife sites, and former war zones, respectively. Overall, this is an interdisciplinary examination between postcolonial studies, critical tourism studies, critical geography, and Sri Lankan studies that examines the continued politics of vision and access to space with both international and domestic political-economic implications.
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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

This project takes a critical examination of tourist maps, as a cultural artifact in what has been called “coloniality,” or the ongoing colonial relations in contemporary relationships between nation states. I suggest that my taking into account the colonial history and development of mapping practices, tourism, and international relations that tourist maps serve as material intersection to examine such relations. The island state of Sri Lanka is an ideal case study for this project, as not only does it intersect colonial relations between the Portuguese, Dutch, and British, but because after ending nearly 30-year ethnic-religious civil war the country is looking to expand its tourism industry. Therefore, I argue that an understanding of what I term “cosmopolitan geopolitics” helps us to account for the ways in which culture and religious experiences become resources in contemporary geopolitics within the international tourist economy. Using a mix-analysis approach of interviews, participatory mapping, autoethnography, and theoretical perspectives, I organize the project into two main parts. The first questions “what a map is,” and the second questions “who gets to map.” Overall, this interdisciplinary investigation pulls from postcolonial studies, critical tourism studies, critical geography, and Sri Lankan studies in order to question the continued narratives and representations within cultural commodification and travel.
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“Today, in a supposedly postcolonial context, islands offer perhaps the most potent, distressing, and anomalous images of the neocolonial project, and can thus be seen to exemplify the complex afterlives of empire” (Anthony Soares, Islanded Identities: Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity xv).

Introduction:

1. Introduction: Tourism After Empire

In April 2017, the German airline, Lufthansa put out a story in their magazine on post-war travel in Sri Lanka. The travel story, entitled “Back to a future” began as follows:

First civil war, then a tsunami – until recently, only fearless travelers sought out Sri Lanka. That’s changed and people are flocking to the island again. Our author went in search of its magic and discovered an urban jungle with a soul, legendary beaches and a holy mountain.

Happiness, it seems, is here for the taking – the ocean so blue, the flowers such a blaze of color, the streets so clean. Glittering towers dreamed up by the world’s best architects reach for the sky. A tantalizing vision, but too good to be true. For now, at least, only a computer-generated idyll, this vision is plastered on construction site fences around Colombo. The reality is quite a different story: Sri Lanka’s city of millions stinks. It’s a sweaty, noisy, rattletrap of a place that stifles your breath. Its streets are dangerous and the weather makes you suffer – one minute the tropical sun is frying your brain, the next, a cloudburst knocks you off your feet. Tourist attractions, parks, beaches? Palaces or museums? Such things barely exist here – as yet (Borree 2017).

Accompanying the beginning paragraphs of “Back to a future” was an illustrated tourist map, including a tropical bird, a city, fruit, a surfer, a mountain, Galle (see Figure 1.1). Indicating all the sites and experiences that, perhaps, one could experience, but also, I would suggest what one should want or even desire to experience from this place. The concept of “desire” ought to be investigated alongside the narrative invoked by the map itself, because given the text that surrounds this image, it does not “yet” exist as a tourist’s paradise, but as the country continues to “develop” it could be. The paradoxes abound. There is the ‘urban jungle with a soul” vs. “Sri Lanka’s city of millions stinks;” “legendary beaches” and “a holy mountain” vs. tourist attractions that “barely exist.” Additionally, the piece is framed by “people are flocking to the
island again,” although from the narrative it is hard to discern if people ever really came to the island, as it is also not-yet ready for them.

Sri Lanka should be able to provide both beaches and a magic mountain, while at the same time providing the same level of urban landscape that is expected from a developed city. Even the authentication of the fearless traveler relies on the temporal of “once was.” Either way authenticity fails to actually exist in the present, accept for an imaginary referent.

These were also the kinds of paradoxical comments I often heard voiced by undergraduate students traveling to Sri Lanka, while working for a study abroad program during my Master’s. They would marvel at landscapes, for example, and then moments later complain that it was a “dirty” country. It was a buildup of these kinds of moments, moments that marked anticipation, desire, disgust, and value in an understanding of Sri Lankan spaces, as well as my own (perhaps, complicit) role in the promotion and tour of particular kinds of spaces (religious sites, village home stays, nature parks), which would eventually bring me to this study on the politics of vision, representation, access, and place in
international tourism as representative of larger patterns of colonial power relations between the Global North and South. This project follows my latest trip to Sri Lanka, in the winter of 2017-2018, this time asking Sri Lankans what stories or images they thought travelers had of the country, as well as what they wanted travelers and tourists to know, particularly as, the travel story indicates, the tourist industry is growing post-civil war. I followed a common itinerary for international visitors: Colombo (the capital city), Kandy (home of the “Temple of the Tooth”), Nuwara Eliya (“Little England” and the tea plantations), and the Beach (sun, sand, and sun). My own experiences, or at times re-experiences, of these places also trace the mobility, access, and privilege of the traveler and therefore I use self-reflection in this project not to undo this privilege, but as a creative way to dwell in potentially problematic and ugly moments. My own moments might be read critically and analytically. This project also asks more generally what the perceived relation to or from the traveler, the tourist, the stranger indicates about not only international travel, but contemporary international relations and geopolitics? In “Back to a Future,” the narrative presents paradoxes, while the map erases them. The notions of strangeness precede mapping. Maps are for strangers. Whether a map is made to show directions, resources, attractions, topographies, demographics, etc. it is made to show something that someone does not already know. Maps are also “the product of privileged and formalized knowledges and they also produce knowledge about the world;” they are products of and produce power (Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 332).

Tourist maps, as a particular form of promotional material, such as the one attached to this travelogue in Figure 1.1, I argue, mediate and facilitate both the perceived desires and values of the outside tourist and traveler on the one hand, and the promotion and marketing of those that
receive them, whether that is local tour companies or the Ministry of Tourism. During my research, I also asked participants to draw their own tourist maps. At times, the maps that these individuals drew were similar in terms of form and content as the promotional maps, again like Figure 1.1. At other times, the images and form that individuals mapped challenged the idea of the traditional tourist map. Part I (Chapters 1-3) of this project investigates the continued colonial legacy and geographic knowledge from mapping practices, but Part II (Chapters 4-6) follows these suggestions made by participants, which included such elements as Nature, Culture, and even former War Zones, but additionally the way in which these same elements are taken and promoted by the state. Many of these conversations and suggestions for tourists come from radically personal positions and beliefs, and this project does not presume to speak for or to such located positions, but instead I am interested in those moments when elements such as Buddhism and Sinhala history are promoted as a part of national identity to the outsider for consumption, and what that says about the perception of place and place-making on an international, or even intra-national, scale. The narratives, experiences, values, and mapping practices of these participants also complicate and even at times blur the imperial power relations critiqued in this project; power does not simply function top-down. In all their different forms tourist maps, whether personal or state-issued, are examples of various ways of relating and narrating encounters of modernity, as well as a material intersection and production between contemporary geopolitics and geoeconomics, in what this project refers to as *cosmopolitan geopolitics*. Geopolitics, including issues of exclusionary identity politics within the nation-state, the promotion of national identity, as well as the limitations of interactions between nation-states because of the historically developed power relations from empires to the present day. And
geoconomics, as Sri Lanka increasingly competes post-2009 within the international tourism industry, and the ways in which the promotion of national identity also functions alongside the legitimacy of the postcolonial state and the relationship to modernity vis-a-vis an established inter-national community as it is also an economic space for growth, investment, and profitability.

The experiences and values of participants also helps to locate these otherwise disembodied points of critiques, which follow as I expand below, the same position of the map itself. Alongside vision, scale is also a problem: a situated, oscillating, and located perspective is needed. Likewise, I also take on what I consider to be a feminist approach to autoethnography that seeks to go beyond just critical self-reflection, but presents my own experiences of Sri Lanka as moments of critique, placing myself in as the figure of the cosmopolitan tourist. Therefore my own experience of this place called Sri Lanka in this project might also be considered a kind of map and as such it should also be read as product of and producing power.

This project investigates the relationship between place-making and the promotion, consumption, advertising, and expectations in tourism, with critical attention to tourist maps of Sri Lanka. As noted, this considers first the continued colonial legacy and the historically developed ontological condition of the map, and second the contemporary political manifestations of these power relations by the nation-state. 1. Tourist maps of Sri Lanka implicate both continued colonial legacies on knowledge and desire, including reconfirming the island as state indicative of past imperial mapping practices as well as continued colonial and nationalist logics of power, acting as a resource map where the contents are opened to reveal a treasure box for mines of cultural capital, and extending an already-assumed and accepted
invitation to the cosmopolitan tourist, whose position of access and mobility parallels past colonial assumptions on place. 2. Simultaneously, coloniality operates in the tourist map to indicate the colonial power relations and logics at work by the Sri Lankan state, including particular forms of cartographic anxiety and postcolonial insecurity (Krishna 1994, 1999) that, through exclusionary identity politics (Mouffe 1994), places Sinhala-Buddhism and its cultural and religious sites as primary tourist sites displayed to the outsider, at the expense of other histories, identities, and knowledges of the island space such as Tamil and Muslim minorities. The narrative and status of Sinhala and Buddhist histories to the island and the promotion and display on tourist materials, including tourist maps additionally parallels larger patterns of exclusion and violence in the country’s recent history, including the ethnic-religious civil war between the majatorian Sinhala-Buddhist Government and the Tamil minority, primarily with the The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) between 1983 and 2009. Therefore, although I discuss at times how Sri Lanka has navigated their own relationship with international tourism including post-independence in 1948, to more open economic policies in the 1970s and 80s, and the limitations of tourism during the civil war, this work is particularly interested in with the post-civil war time frame since 2009 and the ways in which tourism itself is treated, at times, as a form of reconciliation and as a way to stabilize the post-war economy.

The paradoxes above as seen in either the travelogue or my own experiences reflects the continued politics and the logic of coloniality, a mark of modernity that binds many “post”colonial states between “what once was” and “what should be.” For example, Walter D. Mignolo (2011) describes the two sides of coloniality as “one constantly named and celebrated (progress, development, growth) and the other silenced or named as problems to be solved by the
former (poverty, misery, inequities, injustices, corruption, commodification, and dispensability of human life)” (xviii). This dual nature of coloniality, I argue, implicates much more than just the simultaneous enjoyment of Sri Lankan landscapes, mountains, and cultural sights and the disgust of poverty, industrial development, and pollution, but also indicates the ways which the mediation and maintenance of tourist spaces and geographies reflects the ongoing value of Nature, the Exotic, and Culture in more Authentic and Traditional societies, as well as the ongoing access, privilege and right to spaces of the Other.

2. The Historical and Contemporary Geopolitics of Travel in Sri Lanka

Rulers on the island have been involved in inter"national" trade since the 9th and 10th century from the geographies that would be known as the Far East, Europe, and the Middle East, and noted on the Portuguese map after Da Gama's travels in 1497 opened those sea routes (Gunaratna 2002). Colombo particularly would be an important port city for trade and travel in the Indian Ocean for the colonial powers, including the Portuguese, Dutch, and finally the British, in what was known as Ceylon at the time. Squarely positioned as a nation-state in history proper, Sri Lanka can now be discussed in terms of development and its status judged accordingly. As a region, South Asia is the third fastest growing economic region in the last decade (Webb & Wijewerra 2015), and, specifically for Sri Lanka, at $1.7 billion in 2016, tourism is the third largest foreign earner to the country (Gamage 2016). Additionally, from 2009-2015 Colombo saw the largest increase in international visitors at 21.1% (Myers 2015).¹ Further, In the intersections of development and geography, Greg O’Hare and Hazel Barrett (1993) observe that:

¹ Although it should be noted at this report assessed by MasterCard 2015 Global Destination Cities Index, does not include Europe and North America in this particular assessment (Hedrick-Wong & Choong 2015).
International tourism is an important and increasing source of revenue for many developing countries including Sri Lanka. The significance of tourism lies in its ability to earn scarce foreign exchange and help in the balance of payments, to create much needed employment and to stimulate other parts of the economy, both in the resorts and outlying regions. The growth of tourism in Sri Lanka, however, viewed in absolute terms has not been smooth or continuous (438).

The security of the country and its “development” status contribute to the associations and assumptions that a place is suitable for international tourism. Sri Lanka’s tourist industry did continue to attract international visitors throughout its civil war (nearly three decades), however, in selected areas (mainly in the Sinhala-Buddhist controlled South) and with various up and downs in tourist interest (such as related sporadic attacks and the 2004 tsunami). But the “development” of the state might also take into account the exploitative, extractive, and exclusionary colonial politics on the island. Matthew J. Webb and Albert Wijewerra (2015) observe, for example, that “[s]haring a common political heritage as former possessions, outposts or allies of the British Empire, the formation and development of South Asian states have been marked by numerous wars, rebellions and attempted secessions” (1-2). This includes the violent partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, as well as several cases of uprisings and insurgency, including Sri Lanka. What should be stressed here as the common thread of political violence in South Asia is a shared colonial heritage.

As of February 4th, 2018 Sri Lanka has been independent from British rule for 70 years. Of those 70 years, 26 of them were spent in civil war. While international tourism was limited during those years, China was already investing in infrastructure during the war. Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka lead Robert Kaplan (2011) to describe, in his book Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the future of American power, Sri Lanka as the “new geopolitics.” The recent Chinese developments additionally seem to echo this projection, including two major port
projects—one in the South, in Hambantota and one in the Capital, Colombo, which also connect Sri Lanka as a key component in their 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (see Winter 2016; Xinyuan et. al 2017).

As it is currently unclear whether or not, or how much, revenue from trade that Sri Lanka will get from the its position on the Silk Road (Safi 2018), what will it mean if tourism, along with their other major exports: tea and textiles, contributes even further to extractive power relations? As I will argue, the tourist map serves as a resource map for cultural extraction, the invitation of the cosmopolitan tourist extends to not only come, but to take. Then do sites of experience, temples, parks, beaches, etc., emerge alongside gems or natural resources, as tourist-dependent economies and create, what Jane Jacobs (1985) has referred to as, “supply regions?” As she notes, supply regions “are often said to have colonial economies. The term embodies this piece of truth: imperial powers have typically shaped conquered territories into supply regions” (68). A critical analysis of Sri Lankan tourist maps posits them as material evidence for and facilitator of an extractive hospitality and coloniality of geopolitics.

3. The Politics of the Geospatial Imaginary of the Island-State

Furthermore, I contend that the Sri Lankan post-civil war tourist industry is the ideal case with which to examine the role that the international tourist industry plays in perpetuating colonial, geopolitical power relations. Including the ways in which the exclusionary identity politics of nationalism continues to assert itself into the promotion of the experience of the state. This project most aligns with the work of Tariq Jazeel (2009) on cultural geography, postcolonial theory, and Sri Lankan studies who has similarly argued that “Sri Lankan island-ness is the prism through which all that pertains to the nation-state is refracted” (407). That is, Jazeel argues that
to assume or even take for granted the political entity of the state as the geography of an island
misses the particular historically developed geospatial imaginary of Western imperial mapping
practices that made it such (more on this below). By geospatial imaginary, I mean the assumed,
projected spatial knowledge and images that circulates in our understandings of geographies and
places, but which are also historically produced and as such are often implicated within
particular power relations. For example, the island-ness of Sri Lanka is a particular geospatial
imaginary. Before the colonial powers to the island, the geographic space was never under a
single political entity, although home to numerous kingdoms, as the seats of political rule of the
cities of Polonnaruwa (12th century), Anuradhapura (3rd century), and Sigiriya (5th century) can
attest to. Although the Portuguese did attempt to conquer the entire island, it would be the British
that would accomplish the task with the fall of the Kandyan Kingdom in 1815. However, the
desire to put the entire island under their political control already indicates a particular geospatial
imaginary that says just as much about power and a colonial relationship to space. Jazeel (2009)
进一步强调了“斯里兰卡岛的地理作为代表性和想象性术语，总是作为重复出现，限制了社会和空间的另一种组合和想象。斯里兰卡的岛屿形状……是 haunt the parameters on which a debate on ‘Sri Lanka’ can
necessarily take place” (400).

Questioning the politics of and approaches to mapping, I asked to participants to draw or
map the Sri Lanka that they were wanted tourists or strangers to know. I was careful in the way
that I phrased this, I did not want to infer “the island” of Sri Lanka, nor a contained and coherent
country, as traditional tourist maps of the country did. For example, alternative reference for Sri
Lankan space came from a father and daughter duo of artists in the hills of Kandy, Rahju and Rudrani. For his “map,” Rahju gifted me a print from his “Ancient Futures” collection. This image showed stone steps leading toward a stone gateway, set amongst a galactic background. This indicated for him a path towards a Sri Lankan future that did not leave behind those spiritual and cultural connections with nature and the self, but as a path towards, perhaps, alternative modernities.

Rudrani’s map was also, serendipitously, a path, which she drew for me that day. Her path was a river flowing between two sets of mountain, overlooked by a female form: a mother-nature type of goddess (the female form is also a common symbol in her own art) (see Figure 1.2). This was, as she described, to emphasize Sri Lankan nature, what she connected and valued most with her Sri Lankan heritage.

Similar themes emerged in both with the traditionally drawn maps and the non-traditional ones, in terms of the stories people wanted to tell the stranger. And those things were not,
necessarily, beaches or tea plantations. These included, *Culture* (focusing on Sri Lanka’s historical sites and ruins, including ancient cities and capitals); *Nature* (emphasizing the island’s spiritual relation to nature as well as the many national parks, landscapes, and overall biodiversity on the island), and *Former War Zones* (indicating the territories of the North and East where most of the fighting took place, people want both tourists and fellow Sri Lankans to go and know these stories).

However, these values towards the outsider follow larger discussions of the ways in which culture and nature most often signify specifically a Sinhala-Buddhist identity. The discussion of both nationalism and authenticity follow similar patterns, each points to an inclusive group, only as it simultaneously marks boundaries through exclusion. In this way, “authenticity demarcates the boundaries of what is allowed in and what is left out. In its nationalist articulation, authenticity becomes a punitive discourse” (Rambukwella 2018, 6). The inclusive/ exclusive performance of an authentic national identity is also found in the boundaries between these demarcations, that is to say, as it is performed towards the stranger, the Other, the visitor.

The ways in which Sinhala-Buddhism continues to work through exclusionary identity practices in the island-state, contribute to my extension of Jazeel’s own observations on the importance of Sri Lanka as a prism through which all that pertains to the nation-state is refracted, and maintain further that this is because nation building might also be aptly described in terms of *island building*. By the nation-state here I am primarily concerned with the collapse of polity, territory, and identity into an *imagined and practiced* geopolitical and geospatial entity.
Examining the ways in which politics and territory come together in the nation-state, Matthew Sparke (2005) looks at the hyphen itself as the representing,

a text-spanning symbol of space-spanning phenomena, the hyphen in nation-state came to represent two mutually reinforcing geographical processes. On the one side were the diverse state practices such as border policing, migration control, and planning that regulated territorial belonging. On the other side were the modern space-producing social and cultural dynamics that, in generating taken-for-granted national landscapes, national monuments, national maps, and so on, gave state regulation its space and place of legitimacy” (xii-xiii).

In the case of Sri Lanka, the nation-state indicates parallel geospatial imaginaries between the historically-developed colonial power relations of the state and islands. Helen Kapstein (2017) further states that “islands are the building blocks of nations, and nation-building relies on the formation of island spaces before, during, and after their establishment as spaces of pleasure, punishment, containment, exclusion, labor, and leisure” (xvii). I argue that the exclusionary identity politics and violence in nationalism and nation-building (e.g. Mouffe 1994; Shapiro 1997), the historical development of the state and cartography through colonial-imperial histories (Edney 2007; Harley 1988; Jazeel 2012; Sparke 1998), and the politics of representation, vision, knowledge, and power (e.g. Harley 2009; Kitchin & Dodge 2007; Starling 1988; Wood & Fels 1992) what Donna Haraway (1988) has critiqued as the “view from nowhere” in the privileged position of the cartographer and geographer that the ideal geospatial imaginary of the nation state is that of an island (more on the politics of vision and representation below). The history of the island geography that would become known as “Sri Lanka” indicates much about the relationship between colonialism, nationalism, and the perceived political-territory of the nation-state. The tourist imagination of the island-state is perhaps an ideal type for the self-representation of states in an era of hyper-competitive international capitalism. Thus, to
learn about the politics of tourism mapping in Sri Lanka is to learn something about the nature of postcolonial states in economic globalization. The conclusions that might be drawn from such an investigation might be numerous, but I suggest what economic relations within tourism present is the anxiety, insecurity, and limitations of the nation-state itself. That is, in this project, while acknowledging the historically developed power relations of empire that would eventually shape world politics as a world of nation-states, I put less emphasis on the postcolonial state and more on the postcolonial state. It is the container itself which appears to determine the limitations of interactions of states by fixing these past existing relations. The tourist map additionally appears to reconfirm these limitations as they fix, or appear to make permanent, the island-state as well as indicate what is valuable for the outsider. Therefore, this projects places together two existing literatures to examine the tourist map: the context imperial and colonial histories in the development of geography/cartography (e.g. Edney 2007; Harley 1988; Jazeel 2012), and how the histories of imperialism, colonialism, and “post”colonialism that have shaped contemporary international relations (e.g. Epstein 2017; Jabri 2017; Muppidi 2012).

4. The Political Silences of the Tourist Map

The sciences of cartography and geography developed alongside the state itself (Harley 1988), which parallels the time period of Western Expansion, meaning that the state, the map, and the colony were all produced along parallel power relations. The development of the nation-state, the world map, and the colonies were also tied to geoeconomic interests of imperial powers. J.B. Harley (1988), for example, has argued that strategic secrecy (as a mode of state and military intelligence, and as connected to colonial conquest) and commercial secrecy (looking at the rise of monopoly capitalism, and also as these were connected to the economic interests of
the empire) were an integral part in the development of the state’s cartographic borders. In what Harley dubs as “political silences” in mapping and the interactions and play between absence/presence and silence/utterance on the map, I am particularly interested in is the notion of strangeness in mapping, and the ways in which strangeness works within various power relations on the map. Maps make ignorance and strangeness known and familiar. They tell us things. They highlight features we ought to know. But in order to do so, they must also hide other things. They are simultaneously silent. Tourist maps are no less culpable for their own political silences with their cartoon and kitsch images.

Tim Edensor (1988), for example, notes the “Western visual convention, which stresses the value of looking at scenes in blissful solitude, epitomises a tourism which conceives the world as a place to be looked at; a visual consumption of cultures on display which edits out perceived unsavory aspects” (105-106). His work highlights the disappointment of tourists of having to deal with the number of people at the Taj Mahal, which “echo[es] the colonial convention that scenes were best depicted without ‘natives’ cluttering up the picture, many package tourists expressed surprise and disappointment, bemoaning the hordes that spoil the serenity of the scene and clutter the romantic vista” (1998, 105). Edensor also includes several antidotes from these Taj tourists, revealing that India itself was not the object, the site/sight of desire, but only the Taj Mahal itself. As he quotes from Bess, a retired teacher from the UK, on a two-week package with a friend, “I had no great desire to come to India at all, except to see the Taj and see another Wonder of the World” (Edensor 1998, 105). As the Taj Mahal is marked and inscribed as one of the Wonders of the World, so the rest of India is marked as excess. When the spaces and people outside of the site/sight of desire are unwanted, then the sites/sights of
destination become exactly that: resources. I would suggest not unlike the way a miner discards the excess rock and debris that surrounds a gem, the tourist navigates around the excess spaces in order to obtain the point of desire. The tourist map does not show the work to remove the unwanted, again it only indicates the points of desire.

There has been some work done on tourist mapping in cultural geography (see, Del Casino & Hanna 2000; Del Casino & Hanna 2003; Farias 2011), however, perhaps because, as “many geographers [may] simply dismiss tourism maps because of their blatant biases as advertisements and/or their flagrant disregard of the cartographic rules for accurately modeling reality,” tourist maps remain an underrepresented mode of inquiry in the field (Del Casino & Hanna 2000, 23). Additionally, although cultural cartographers Vincent J. Del Casino and Stephen P. Hanna have looked at the links between cartography and colonialism with the tourist map, I maintain that there is work still to be done here, specifically what might be gained from an interdisciplinary approach that more overtly links literatures that critique the imperial power relations in mapping as well as the history of colonialism and imperialism in international travel in discussions of the tourist map.

There are two different ways that one might approach the politics of tourist maps. The first, is similar to the work done in cultural cartography and tourist studies, which have highlighted the performative and embodied experience of tourist maps (della Dora 2009; Rossetto 2012), arguing that maps should not be read as “ontologically secure representations but as contingent, fleeting, fluid and relational entities” (Rossetto 29). Such an approach might indicate productive potential in the individual experience of the map-reader as “co-author” (della Dora 2009) and tourism “as a corporeal, vividly lived and active experience” (Rossetto 2012,
28). However, such studies, I suggest, might also do more to question the pre-assumed access to some areas on the map while simultaneously erasing other potential places. Therefore, in order to address the continued play between absence/presence, utterance/silence, strange/familiar that continue to play out on the map, my investigation questions the materiality of the map itself.

More research might be done to see how tourists use tourists maps to co-author or perform these spaces of Sri Lanka. But in a second possibility, I am interested in the narratives indicated on the map itself. Why do certain icons and images appear over others? What are the power relations that enable a Tamil tea picker to emerge for Nuwara Eliya, an elephant to indicate Yala (Ruhuna) National Park, or a palm tree for Jaffna? First, these maps help to question the politics in representation: what they hide, what they indicate, and how they are emblematic of extended ripples of representations and silences in the larger productions of the tourist economy. That is, they help to link representation and exploitative histories of the Tamil women plantation workers, the colonial imaginations of “The Hunt” to contemporary interest in National Parks, and the erasure of Tamil cultural sites. Even in the participatory mapping practices there was consistency between those maps and what was often seen in marketing materials. Unlike the work produced from infamous

historical cartographers, such as Claudius Ptolmey (see Figure 1.3), contemporary Sri Lankan tourist maps seemingly have no author. But considering that so many people in the participatory mapping practices so readily assumed that they needed to draw the island to indicate ‘their Sri Lanka” --which for many indicated that “Sri Lanka” equated with the island itself--I think indicates the ubiquitous form of the tourist map, the island, and the state. Even if we do not think of grabbing a tourist map, particularly one that doesn't have directions in preparation for a trip, does not mean that the form is not ever present. We instinctively understand how to display experiences in a two-dimensional space for the benefit of others, for a perceived stranger. I believe that this says something to the colonial project of space-making and nation building. Therefore, I do not see these particular studies, such as Rossetto and della Dora, as questioning enough the politics of vision and the historical and colonial relations of both tourism and mapping.

Furthermore, the development of the Western map became synonymous with the world map through increased objectification and scientific knowledge production, which homogenized what Nihal Perera (1999) has described as “world space” noting the hegemonic standardization of our geographical condition(s). Like other forms of objective, scientific knowledge production from European Enlightenment (Shiva 1997), mapping and geography indicate an imperial and masculine politics of vision (e.g. Massey 1994; Blaut 1969; Blaut 2009). James M. Blaut (1969) has observed that the “field, after all, was born and raised in the homelands of imperialism, and until recently there was little of it elsewhere; hence, no countervailing force from a non-white, non-Western, non-imperialistic geography (and from the West itself only a tiny and occasional dissent” (10). As already referenced, I suggest that this top-down politics of imperial, patricharal
vision has also contributed to what Sankaran Krishna (1994) has described as “cartographic anxiety,” which echoes again the double bind of coloniality. Speaking specifically of the position of India between the former and “post” colony Krishna states that:

> [u]ltimately, cartographic anxiety is a facet of a larger postcolonial anxiety: of a society suspended forever in the space between the "former colony" and "not-yet-nation." This suspended state can be seen in the discursive production of India as a bounded, sovereign entity and the deployment of this in everyday politics and in the country's violent borders. Quotidian life along the frontiers and its micropolitics renders transparent the arbitrariness and the violence of the discourse of nation-hood. Cartographic anxiety, from this perspective, becomes a prominent signifier of the post colony ("Cartographic Anxiety" 508-509).

Likewise the tourist map is no less complicit in its own production of cartographic anxiety. The tourist map serves as both a product of and for the international political economy as resource map for cultural extraction, but also through the use of iconography tourist maps also help to construct particular tourism spaces and identities (Hanna and Del Casino 2003). The tourist map also indicates the conditions of possibilities of how to interact within tourist space both in personal and international contexts through particular politics of vision. The geospatial imaginary of the tourist map that produces the island from above, confirms the boundaries of the internal and external boundaries of the state, but also invites the viewer into its space indicates the ways in which cosmopolitanism functions geographically.

5. The Privilege and Access of the Cosmopolitan Tourist and Researcher

I maintain that nationalism and cosmopolitanism both are historically situated within a Western, imperial consciousness, including a Western, geopolitical imagination. Tourist maps

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2 My reference here to the “condition of possibility” should not invoke a Kantian reading but a Foucaultian one. Foucault (1966) uses this phrase to bring awareness to the historically developed and progress of knowledge in what he defines as the *episteme*, which "manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. Such an enterprise is not so much a history, in the traditional meaning of that word, as an ‘archaeology’" (xxiii-xxiv).
indicate both of these spatial imaginaries, simultaneously. They confirm both a state in a particular mode of nation-building, identifying particular places, sites, and experiences which should be valued (a resource map), and an invitation to enter that space, giving the rights and access to boundaries beyond the state through cosmopolitan logic and spatial imaginaries within international tourism. This project’s conceptualization of cosmopolitanism follows Tariq Jazeel’s (2011) argument, as he stresses that we must think geographically of cosmopolitanism, that cosmopolitanism, even as it continues to pluralize and deconstruct within itself, cannot escape its historical shadow of western consciousness (78). Jazeel (2011) states:

the planet thought in particular kinds of ways also mobilizes a litany of stultifying ‘pre-critical geographical givens’. I stress the problematic textures of the planetary geographical imaginations so often embedded within avowedly cosmopolitan discourse, arguing that the ‘cosmos’ of cosmopolitanism is no geographically innocent signifier...such planetary yearnings normalize universality as an extension of Eurocentric modernity (78, emphasis added).

It is exactly this historically-contingent Western geographic imaginary, from imperialism through post-Cold War politics, which allows for the conditions of possibility for the global, cosmopolitan tourist. Situated within Jazeel’s critique of cosmopolitanism, I define the cosmopolitan tourist as a critique of the position of privileged displacement, and the pre-assumed access to borders, experiences, and places, who both precedes and benefits from universalizing assumptions, and gains social capital from the proximity to the particular (as also inspired by Chakrabarty 2011).

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3 By historically-contingent western geographic imaginary, I mean to align myself alongside works such as Denis Cosgrove (2003) (as Jazeel does as well), who uses “Apollo’s eye” as the lens to describe the “cultural history of imagining, seeing, and repressing the globe,” as it “stitches elements of a historically deep geographical imagination to practices of globalization that have helped define the West through connotes reworking of an expanding archive of global images, narratives, and myths” (3). Apollo’s eye, is the western gaze upon the earth, the view from nowhere.
I argue that the cosmopolitan position is one that has historically gained the right to mobility from the spatial-inscribed gaze of Western cartographic practices. This is only further reflected in Jacques Derrida’s (2001) work on hospitality, as he references the “cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality,” the cosmopolitan, thus, is not only an assumption of the invitation but of the hospitality that is to follow (69-71). Additionally, Jazeel (2013) is critical, through Derridean cosmo-politics, of the cosmopolitan state, specifically the Sinhala-Buddhist cosmopolitan state and nationalism:

A cosmopolitan mode of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism seeks neither explicitly physically nor politically to marginalize Tamils, Muslims, or any others with the national polity. Indeed, part of its very cosmopolitanism is its capacity to create space for difference; to welcome the stranger in here. Like any mode of cosmopolitanism, it is worldly in its outlook and articulations, even universalist in ambit. A cosmopolitan nationalism, however, retains its hegemony precisely through its self-perpetuating capacity to create space for difference within a pre-constituted majority. Not only does it welcome difference into its domain, it creates what it construes as difference through its own taxonomies of thought and rationality; through the ‘distributions of the sensible’ that it proscribes; through its capacity to do the including and excluding, the tolerating and policing (22-23).

The figure of the cosmopolitan tourist is the embodiment of the cosmopolitan paradox. For Derrida (2001), the promise of or for cosmopolitanism is always limited by the position of the state itself. Therefore, in my contribution of the figure of the cosmopolitan tourist to these ongoing discussion of cosmopolitanism(s), is a figure that is also marked by the historical Western spatial imaginary that collapses difference through universal values, and indicates an ongoing relationship between state boundaries. In this project it is the historically informed, contemporary play between the cosmopolitan tourist and the cosmopolitan state that also indicates a cosmopolitan geopolitics.

In order to subvert the collapsing and colonizing view from above from the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the tourist map, I further suggest requires situated knowledges and
partial perspectives, as a particular ethical research ethos, as inspired by Donna Haraway (1988). Haraway (1988) offers a feminist theory of objectivity, partial perspective and embodied knowledges, one that is not about transcendence, nor one with “innocent powers to represent the world, where language and bodies both fall into bliss of organic symbiosis,” but which has the “ability partially to translate knowledges among very different—and power-differentiated-communities” (579-580). Nikolas H. Huffman (1997) also suggests that feminist cartographers could utilize situated knowledges to “acknowledge the biology of human vision, the various visual technologies of mapping, the semiotic production of cartographic meaning, and the power to observer in our geographic and cartographic projects” (267). I suggest that these acknowledgements on the production and meanings can situate our cartographic practices not only in terms of masculine objective knowledge, but also as imperial objective knowledge. Charlotte Epstein (2017) also observes that a postcolonial perspective provides exactly what Haraway describes as partial perspectives within situated knowledges, “and from which the international system may begin to look rather different” (1).

What this means for me, and what form this takes on in this project, are narrative and poetic moments that attempt to go beyond just the merely critical self-reflection. Because while situated knowledges and partial perspectives acknowledge where one is and where one is not, finding the limits (even mapping) one’s position, I suggest that more might be done to articulate the power relations of the researcher. Not unlike the map or international travel, research itself has its own historically developed relations of imperial power and knowledge production. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) asserts in the beginning of her book, *Decolonizing Methodologies* that the word “‘research’ is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism;” that it is:
one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary…it stirs up silence, it conjures up bad memories, it raises a smile that is knowing and distrustful. It is so powerful that indigenous people even write poetry about research. The ways in which scientific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful remembered history for many of the world’s colonized peoples (1).

Given the top-down, disembodied subjects that this project critiques, the map, travel, the state, I suggest that the risk is too great for the form of this research to fall within the same traps of the imperial, even masculine, view from nowhere. Positionality becomes increasingly important when engaging in spaces, places not her own with unequal and contentious power relations, as are always present in the context of the postcolonial. Mohan J. Dutta and Ambar Basu have said of the relationships between the postcolonial and the authoethnography that:

[p]ostcolonial positionality, marginality, and autoethnography come to create this fractious ideology of imagining the possibilities of listening to the subaltern--her/his silences and interjections, her/his theories and struggles. Our positions in these fractious spaces are rife with contradictions, and the autoethnographic turn engages the politics of these contradictions with the materiality of structural violence, imagining therefore an incomplete and yet hopeful imaginary for the praxis of change” (2013: 160).

However, for my own feminist autoethnographic work, one must not imagine the possibilities of listening to or for the subaltern. For my research in the postcolonial world is an ever present threat of re-colonization, of domination in a field that already has to negotiate ongoing contradictory power structures as the subaltern is continually re-presented in Eurocentric academic discourse. Whose language are we speaking in, after all? I suggest that the researcher un-learn privilege, at her loss (Spivak 1990).

Therefore, I invoke what might be best described as a poetic autoenthography which I suggest attempts two things. First, in order to subvert the view from nowhere uses critical self-reflection as well as the narratives and maps from participants to locate the discussions of international and geopolitical power relations to the scale of everyday lives. Second, I use poetic
and narrative moments to not only locate my own point of view and privilege, but also as
days and narrative moments to not only locate my own point of view and privilege, but also as
moments to indicate the ugliness and even colonizing form and figure of the researcher and
cosmopolitan tourist. It is my goal in such moment to not smooth out, justify, or make
comfortable these moments of encounter, reflection, or observation. Because just as the
researcher runs the risk of speaking from the top-down, disembodied voice, so too does the
embodied, located, and even autoethnographic researcher run the risk of smoothing out or
making clean that which ought to be problematized. This is not unlike my observations from the
tourist map at the beginning which continues to erase contradictions. Therefore, I push these
moments of poetic autoethnography in order to make contradictions and paradoxes appear in the
text. This is at my own expense, at my loss. It might be for the reader to decide if these moments
are more truthful, or less.

Acknowledging such traces of the self and consciously positioning critique in our
experiences, in our situated knowledges can be awkward (Jazeel 2007). But vulnerability can
also be productive. As vulnerability invokes “self-exposure,” (Anderson & Glass-Coffin 2013) it
also has the possibility to expose power, social assumptions, political paradigms, cultural
inheritances, etc. those things that might become denaturalized through vulnerability. Objective
knowledge does not allow for any such affective research. Research should feel hot. You should
feel it warming your skin, your face. A gut punch. A pounding heart. Research requires
vulnerability and self-exposure. This affective approach to research and writing acknowledges
the “textual self is a performance” and is “responsive and oriented towards the evocation of
emotion and the opening of flows of affect. Such texts invite multiple points of connection and
recognize the movements of attraction, repulsion and compulsion between writers, readers and
texts” (Gannon 2013, 229). That is to say, an affective engagement of the textual self also assumes and imagines anOther, the perceived and imagined reader. As Keith Berry (2013) has said, “[t]he processes are too complex, the stakes are too high, to examine from a distance” (211). Moreover, what autoethnography, ideally, works against is ventriloquist research.

This project is also my own participatory map of geopolitical, historio-territory called “Sri Lanka.” The images, chapters, and conversations are my own nodes that both allow access and make some things visible, as they hide and erase others. You might think of the epigraphs (sometimes quotes, images, conversations, poems) as my own kitsch icons; they are a starting points. The mediums shift, but each one works as a representative node of in/visibility. This project is situated, located, and requires oscillation, as it also requires additional conversations and nuances outside of its own scope. It is both a node and a space between things.

Encountering has been and will continue to be destructive, but it also might provide ways to read those violences and destructive forces to make them a little less so. It is perhaps, and will at times, be jarring and awkward oscillate through my own encounters which is largely a critique of colonial geopolitical power relations and the ways in which they operate within and with international tourism. To move from the geopolitical to the personal to the ethnographic and back to the international scale, I oscillate between the view of the top-down, pervasive view cartographer, to the cosmopolitan tourist, to the researcher and interviewer. These oscillating positions at times do not fit neatly within one another, because each is already dis-placed, and each already trying to colonize the other. An interrogation of imperial desire and power, should also be a personal interrogation as well.

6. Overview of Project:
As noted this work is broken up into two parts. Following concerns from Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge (2007), in the post-representational turn in cartography and geography (see also Sletto 2009, 2014, 2015), this project is concerned with the politics of mapping and the ontology of mapping. The first questions “who” gets to map, and the second questions “what” is a map? In what follows, Part I (Chapters 1-3) might be placed under the “the ontology of mapping” - as it questions the map itself and interrogates the ontological condition of the map and its icons as a historico-political discursive production. Part II (Chapters 4-6), organized by analysis from the participatory mapping chapters, questions the contemporary politics of the tourist map’s production. Therefore, Part I also follows the colonial legacy of the map and Part II follows the exclusionary identity politics of the nation-state.

*Chapter 1* is an critical investigation into the historically Western spatial and narrative imaginary of island space and the resulting implications in the production of the island-nation. I argue here that the nation state works within a container metaphor, which in the contemporary tourist industry and the tourist map, operates as a “treasure box” displaying what should be experienced, seen, and valued. In order to also further highlight the cartographic violences (Shapiro 1997) and anxiety/ insecurity (Krishna 1994, 1999) of the nation state, I consider the container metaphor here as a “caged problem,” following Himadeep Muppidi’s (2012) look at the zoological metaphor in contemporary international relations, during the international community’s reactions to Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami and during the nearly 30-year civil war.

*Chapter 2 and Chapter 3* each consider different ontological conditions of the tourist map. Following my claim that the tourist map both confirms the state and what it is within the
state, Chapter 2 looks at how the tourist map works as a resource map, allowing for “cultural extraction” and paralleling the environmental and political effects of resource extraction. Chapter 3 takes this an additional step further and indicates that the resource map only works as the tourist map is an already-extended-and-accepted notion of hospitality.

The politics of vision of the researcher, the tourist, the state, and the map all potentially parallel one another: the top-down view from nowhere. Therefore, again, to “care” for these moments I incorporate autoethnographic elements, otherwise, this research runs the risk of perpetuating the very representations it critiques. These first three chapters are approached in a slightly different way, but they develop through my own politics of vision. First starting at the level of the map-reader in Chapter 1, I conduct what might be called a top-down analysis on the container that is the nation-state. Chapter 2, I insert myself slightly more, but using the example of the tea plantation worker to indicate that my vision of Sri Lanka often remains at the level of the tourist map where the figure of these workers remain in the abstract or as collapsed representations. This politics of vision indicates the level of the travel writer and the untranslatable differences within tourism geographies. Chapter 3, invokes my own embodied experiences of Sri Lanka as the conversation around the feminization of tourist spaces is framed around the over sexualization of white bodies in the sun as well as the promotion of the Native woman, and the ways in which both are represented in beach and spa tourism. Both the content and form of this chapter introduce the cosmopolitan tourist, a figure that I take up in this project, and which indicates the desires of the tourist and the researcher are not all that different.

I then follow the contemporary politics of tourist geographies and examine the participatory mapping exercises in Part II, oscillating between autoethnography, critical
reflection on mapping exercises, and theoretical inquiry. These chapters follow a similar approach and pattern, I acknowledge the radical personal associations of both Culture, Nature, and Former War zones by the participants, but also situate that each one of these suggestions within the continued identity politics of the country, which often favors Sinhala-Buddhism over all other identities on the island. Each one of these chapters additionally asks further questions of Sri Lanka’s tourist industry.

In Part II, the chapters follow these themes, respectively, but also ask and are interested in the following: *Ch. 4 Culture(s) of Sri Lankan Tourism*: how might the sites and experiences indicate a continued global consumption of the exotic and traditional cultures of the East through values of capitalist-cosmopolitanism, as well as, hide, not only overtly colonial narratives, but minority histories and culture? *Ch. 5 Nature(s) of Sri Lankan Tourism*: how do we integrate questions of sustainability into this context, both as a small island state susceptible to global climate change, and the attraction by international tourist and potential issues of thresholds for the environment, as well as consider the limitations of Buddhism as an alternative relationship to the Environment when utilized by the cosmopolitan state? *Ch. 6 Territories of Difference(s) in Sri Lankan Tourism*: is there a possible tension between the government’s reconciliation efforts in terms of infrastructure vs. the social needs of those most affected by the war, and how does the violent cartographies of the nation state and tourism intersect as a paradoxical external/internal geopolitical narrative that continues to marginalize minorities in the country?
Chapter 1: The Island State

I’ve never seen the island as I’ve landed,
never seen in from above
always hidden by 3am arrivals—
departure Doha—
to Colombo—
But I know the shape of her.
I’ve looked at her,
I knew her geography
before she ever let me in.
Diamond, tear-drop, mango.
I chose her shape in Kandy,
for a sapphire nose ring
out of a case of gems
laid out for me,
all cuts and colors,
and with silver tweezers
on a mirror
I chose her.
It’s a blue tear
sliding down my face,
Mom says,
and loves it.

1. The Island State: The Nation State as Container-Box

I’ve only seen Sri Lanka from a particular point of view, only been to particular places, had access to particular places. Indeed, my perspective here is limited and partial (Haraway 1988).
The analysis of these chapters is made less by expert eyes, and more from the eyes of the outsider, although historically these positions have often been conflated. Where I follow is a place of access and privilege, and therefore power. It is exactly this position, as privileged outsider that might afford, however, critique on the exact boundary between the self/Other, whose position that travel and the encounter continually provides. That is, privilege, my
privilege, ought to be critiqued. I see from above. I see the island, and the places I might go, like monuments rising before me, and in-between: nothing. I am largely ignorant of what changes between stable, mapped places as they give way to the space of lived practice (de Certeau 2013 [1984]). As they might reveal spaces or moments of encounter, self-consciousness, insecurity, even anxiety, however, can be helpful places to begin critique.

As noted in the Introduction, Part I of this project investigates the ontology of the tourist map, including the politics of vision that reconfirms the political geography of the island-state and an already-accepted invitation to extract experience and pleasure from the space. Each of these ontologies points to the privilege of vision and access of the outsider, both historically and contemporarily. Investigating my own privileged access and politics of vision critiques the historically developed and contemporarily active forms of coloniality from the privileged outsider, or the cosmopolitan tourist. In other chapters this form of critique will more overtly take on my own embodied experience, mobility, access, and privilege, however, for this chapter my critique of the island-state reflects that of its mapping, that is to say, a traditional, top-down point of view from above. This is also to say the parallel spatial imaginary of the cosmopolitan. Therefore, while it may appear that this chapter does not overtly indicate moments of autoethnography, the top-down analysis is no less apart of my own cosmopolitan politics of vision. As the poem alludes to, as researcher, as tourist, my point of view is from above: the map-reader.

From the view of the map reader, this chapter is concerned with the political and economic implications of the historically developed naturalization of the island as state. I will consider two implications of the island-as-state and the exclusionary and boundary forming
politics of nation-states, at times as a treasure box, as seen particularly in international tourism, and at times a caged problem. The goal of this chapter is to indicate the ways in which the mapped island-polity has been historically developed through outside colonial mapping and narrative practices, and the ways in which these political and social imaginaries are still at work within the international tourism industry. As a specific form of contemporary cartographic practice, I investigate tourist maps as an example of subversive state mapping. However, I suggest that when it comes to the reproduction of the island-state that both international tourism and international relations are implicated in its representation (or tourism as international relations). Although not questioning its geophysical characteristics as an “island,” the space of “Sri Lanka” was never also a singular political entity until the defeat of the Kandyan Kingdom by the British in 1815. Examining the Western, colonial relationship to islands, Dorothy Lane (1995) has observed that “[i]slands, unlike continents, can be considered successfully colonised only if inhabited by a single representative master who is able successfully to subdue, domesticate, and linguistically own any deviant elements” (3). Within a Western, spatial imaginary the island of Sri Lanka was never a space of plurality and difference, but a total geopolitical entity, with demarcated internal and external boundaries that ought to be maintained and controlled. The limitations and implications of such colonial geographies can be seen in the modern day state and its exclusionary identity politics (as explored in Chapters 4-6). Chantal Mouffe (1994) has investigated the exclusionary identity politics in Western liberalism, and we might additionally extend this observation to the territory of the nation state itself, but it would appear that the exclusionary politics required in nation building is only exacerbated within the “post”colonial experience.
As was alluded to in the Introduction, Sankaran Krishna (1994) writes of India that the anxiety over national identity and survival is seen in various political manifestations, but that “its cartographic manifestations are particularly interesting and revealing. Specifically, the ubiquity of cartographic metaphors, the production of *inside* and *outside* along the borders of the country, reveal both the epistemic and physical violence that accompanies the enterprise of nation-building” (508). But it is not only in India where the project of nation building and the subsequent productions of inside and outside of borders, territory, governance, and citizenship are produced and tested. For example, as Krishna (1994) observes that “quotidian realities can reveal how cartography produces borders, the arbitrariness involved in the creation of normality, and the fluid definitions of space and place that prevail in the midst of efforts to hegemonize territory,” we might also see how Sri Lankan tourist maps are but one form of normalizing cartographic borders (514). As such, I consider what the construction of inside and outside, or what we can think of a container metaphor, *does*, not only in the postcolonial state, but specifically in the island nation of Sri Lanka.\(^4\) The spatial violences of tourism (Devine 2017) also intersect with the spatial violences of the state itself. To carve the state as a contained entity, as a space to come, is not separate from relations to the state during times of violent unrest, violent natural disasters, or the violent cartographies of tourist spaces. Each of these relations is possible through the formation and production of the state itself.

It is additionally important to keep in mind that what emerges as the “inside” of the state includes the citizens as defined within articulations of borders. The production of the modern

\(^4\) In *Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial*, David Slater (2004) does describe the nation-states as the building blocks or the "containers" of the geopolitical (23). While Slater's description I believe helps to give validity to the observations of this chapter, it also was independent from Slater's references. But as Gearoid O. Tuathail (1996) indicates a critical geopolitics challenges these "pregiven containers for politics," which is also the purpose of this chapter at present (48).
nation state is the simultaneous production of the modern citizen, having an understanding of the scales of violences is important here. For example, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) asks for a history that “deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own repressive strategies and practices, the part it plays in collusion with the narratives of citizenship in assimilating to the projects of the modern state all other possibilities of human solidarity” (45). In this view of capital and even the state, these categories become sites “where both the universal history of capital and the politics of human belonging are allowed to interrupt each other’s narrative” (Chakrabarty 2000, 70). As it will become increasingly evident, when it comes to the Sri Lankan context of citizenship, “who” is understood as belonging within or the island itself vs. those deemed outside of island spaces is a continual mode of identity politics.

Therefore, we should also consider the positions of insider/outsider that simultaneously articulated within the production of inside/outside of the nation state. I follow Krishna (1999) definition of the “politics of identity” in this regard, particularly as he understands the politics of identity “as a discursive process by which societies produce categories such as insider and outsider, safety and danger, domestic and foreign, self and other, nation and ethnic group. From its very inception, the politics of identity is in a dialectic with a politics of difference” (xix). This politics of differences in Sri Lanka creates the insider, the domestic, and the nation as, often, Sinhala-Buddhist. Religious and ethnic minorities are then understood as Other, outsider, foreigner, and, at times, even dangerous. These identity politics carve boundaries around the identity of the island itself, even if those Other bodies remain “internal” and citizens. Tourism and tourist geographies do not negate these discursive violences, but are very often perpetuate re-presentations of the Sinhala-Buddhist island nation state.
Different maps indicate various politics of place. Rather than city space, or even a street view, the politics of place that this project is primarily concerned with is that of the state. Although there are many different forms of tourist maps, I am interested in the ones where the island-state is represented. Where the country becomes, as Ignacio Farias (2001) described the tourist maps of Berlin, “as extended matter, as a large physical extension” (402). What remains consistent between tourist maps is both the invitation with pre-assumed access to these places, as well as, its work as a resource map. But the rights to hospitality and extraction, I suggest, become more overtly obvious (and problematic) in cartographic representations of the state itself. That is, the tourist map as resource map and pre-accepted invitation help to mediate the island as state for the privileged outsider, as well as (as will be indicated in Part II) the exclusionary insider/outsider politics of the contemporary state. Similarly to the ways that Chakrabarty (2000) treats Europe and India, Sri Lanka should be thought of as a hyper term in that it refers to “certain figures of imagination whose geographical references remain somewhat indeterminate” (27).

In this chapter, I first look at the nation state as container-box in terms of a “treasure box” — that is a container that contains cultural artifacts and experiences that are “exotic,” Other, and available. I consider tourist maps as displaying and confirming this particular container-metaphor. Second, I look at the nation state as container-box as noting a “caged” problem. This follows from Himadeep Muppidi’s (2012) concept of the zoological metaphor as one of the colonial signs in international relations, and follows the approaches to Sri Lanka as state in both the civil war and 2004 Tsunami. I argue that it is both the nation as a treasure box and caged problem that arise simultaneously in the process and project of nation building, and
we can see this overtly in the postcolonial, island state. The point of this chapter is not to indicate how the state is mapped differently within different contexts, i.e. tourist maps vs. international politics, but how the already understood island-state, through colonial mapping practices, has set limitations for the conditions of possibility within these different contexts. In other words, I am interested in how international tourism and international relations are similar in terms of the development of our international relations through shared colonial histories. Tourism and the international community’s involvement in Sri Lanka are examples of both epistemic and overt re-confirmations of the island state’s geographic polity. Moreover, using Sri Lanka as geopolitical lens gives us an opportunity to question and denaturalize this collapse between identity, geography, and politics within colonial “pasts” and presents.

2. The State as Treasure Box- Icons of Desire in Tourist Maps

Within the scientific and political projects of the 16th century, the European, Christian empires were committed to mapping, cataloging, and collecting the forms of exotic nature of the New World. This was done by both geography and natural history (Olarte 2016). Mauricio Nieto Olarte (2016), notes that:

[c]ollections of objects from distant lands became symbols of dominion and power over the alien. The creation of ‘cabinets of curiosities’—collections of natural objects and artifacts brought from remote places—grew fashionable amongst the powerful merchants and princes of Renaissance Europe. The exotic, then, was a symbol of the power of mankind over nature—and the natural world formed a part of the world of property, a fact that was translated into private collections of strange objects and into spectacular, beautifully illustrated, publications that functioned as great catalogs of the unknown (123).

We can trace the lines between imperial affinities for collecting objects, power over nature, and for the labeling and lusting after the exotic to the modern-day tourist industry. One example is
the success and popularity of the world’s fairs at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Alongside the world’s fairs was the human zoo.

Carl Hagenbeck, the man perhaps most associated with the development of the human zoo, would showcase his first Sinhalese exhibition in 1883 with over 100,000 vistors (Phillips 2018). The first exhibition was a "blockbuster" success at the Berlin Zoo, and along with mesmerizing elephants, there were also 21 Sinhalese individuals among the displays (Phillips 2018). Between 1883 and 1890, the Ceylonese shows and caravans that traveled to Europe not only provided entertainment and awe to onlookers at the "exotic" and "wild" island, but also gave anthropologists a chance to study the Sinhalese up close. This included Rudolf Virchow a German physical anthropologist who examined skin color, lip measurements, skull shape, whites of their eyes, hair thickness, and feet and hand casts (a painful process) in 7 Sinhalese a part of one of the zoos in 1886 (Phillips 2018). One of the interest of the Sinhalese body was the potential connection to the Aryan race. For example, Heinrich Becker, another German anthropologist wrote two years previous in his article, "Cinghala and the Sinhalese, the Land and the People of Ancient Paradise (1884)" that, "[a]ll told – we recognize here a people of paradise, not in a vulgar sense of living care-free among the animals. Rather a people of culture, who even if not travelling at the same pace as ourselves, has started down the path, so much so we need not be ashamed that our races are related" (as quoted from Phillips 2018, from Gary Bruce’s 2017 translation). Therefore, these contemporary German anthropologists were dealing with their own ethnic anxieties of classifying these displayed peoples as both Othered, but primitive versions of themselves. What Deborah Phillips (2018) argues is that "[t]he Sinhlaese as a living sign of themselves were expected to ‘represent’ and convey an authenticity through their body as
representative for an entire community" (9). I suggest that a similar process of authenticity and exoticism is at work within the contemporary tourist industry. Although the cosmopolitan now must travel from home to see the "wonders of the East," I suggest that the zoological cage, what Muppidi’s also suggests is still operative in international relations, remains in the form of the postcolonial nation-state, as developed through systems of surveillance and control (as seen in the next section). Additionally, as this section explores, the post-colonial island nation as represented on a tourist map displays these figures, collapsed and representative of themselves, as exotic gems to the contemporary cosmopolitan tourist.

At the center of the world’s fairs and the human zoos was the idea of progress. This narrative was aided by collecting and curating exhibits with exotic people from different parts of the “uncivilized world,” which, of course, meant that the Western states, such as America, Britain, France, or Germany which were marked as the furthest points on the fairs’ global scale of progress (Enloe 2014 [1990], 26). Cynthia H. Enloe (2014 [1990]) states that “[t]he world’s fair expressed an elaborate international political cosmology,” and it is one, that we can still see today within the global tourist industry (26). On the individual level alone, the increase of more affordable airfare, lodging, and (pending) peaceful travel destinations has opened the world itself to the exotic collections of the world’s fair. Olarte (2016) also observes that “[i]t is very important to pay attention to the appropriation, mobilization and translation not only of nature, but also the knowledge of others,” and I can only further emphasize the importance of this for the display and promotion of international tourism, including the ways in which the country itself, via the tourist map, is drawn as an elaborate collection of strange, authentic, and ethnic objects (126).
Cosmopolitanism works two-fold here. It allows access through universalization, but also sets limitations through its values of difference. First, through its politics of vision and materiality, the tourist map operates as both resource map and invitation (as explored in the following two chapters) and as its own cabinet of curiosities. That is, the map is operative as a self-contained entity full of exotic wonders. Second, as a discursive production, it also operates at the level of state narrative to reproduce the island as primarily Sinhala-Buddhist. That is, at the expense of alternative histories, politics, and identities the island becomes synonymous for a container of Sinhala-Buddhist history, politics and identity. In chapters that follow, I will explore further how this split between external value and internal value constitutes a dialectic of anti/colonial articulations within cosmopolitan logics.

Tariq Jazeel (2009) argues that “the topologies of Sri Lanka’s island-ness [can] be understood precisely as textual and imaginative repetition” (400). Tourist maps and their iconic symbols of the map are both textual and imaginative repetitions that inscribe and re-confirm Sri Lanka’s island-ness, and additionally what can and should be valued and experienced within the island itself. The island is therefore also indicated as “treasure box,” in regards to simultaneous boundary formations of the island and the internal availabilities of what lies “within” the boundaries. It is part of my argument here that the production of a cultural, “exotic” island as a coherent space, with a cohesive history within the boundaries of its “island-ness,” is only made possible by its mapping and territorial-political emergence as a nation-state. The idea of an “island” was, for the Western expansionist imaginary, connected to the idea of the far away, or even exotic. As David Paxman (2003) observes that “[i]lands did not necessarily mean small lands surrounded by water. The term could simply mean far places” (25). Therefore, the notion
of islands themselves are consistent with Himadeep Muppidi’s (2012) critique of the “wonder and awe” of the “rare and exotic” Otherness for those peoples and places were distant from “us” (the West,) within various ontological and geographical distances and proximities (104-105). This is part of the “Zoological Relations” as one of the continued colonial signs of international relations that he critiques.

Although the date is given above, the colonial spatial imaginary of Sri Lanka as coherent geographical, island polity did not begin in 1815, with the defeat of the Kandyan Kingdom, but was already operational in relation to the would-be-island-before this. For the British desire to take Kandy already indicates the would be island-state. These spatial relations also confirm the formations of the inside/ outside container-box that we now see in the nation state. For example, Jazeel gives the example of Samuel Newell, a young American Protestant missionary who secured passage to Galle via a Portuguese vessel in 1813. As Jazeel’s (2009) analyzes of Newell’s travel narratives:

Newell’s collection of travelogues reveal a way of seeing a space in which he spent ten months. Ceylon is written as an island shaped container for this brief period of his life, even if his own physical access and mobility across island space is anything but smooth and easy. As he narrates this period of his life, he also unwittingly narrates a geography, specifically the cohesive object, the territorial island integrity named as Ceylon, insulated from activity beyond its coastal borders and unperturbed by what was at the time a large cartographic blind spot in the middle of this not-yet island-colony: the Kandyan Kingdom. Because in 1813, when Newell was writing, the British had yet to forcibly conquer the interior Kandyan Kingdom and depose king Sri Vikrama Rajasinghe. Iteratively, discursively and textually though, an insular Ceylonese island-ness already existed and Newell was a part of such geographical inscription, repetition and performance (407).

I maintain that such historical travel narratives delineating a clear island body with internal experiences and cultural oddities, serves the foundational model for how we still approach travel and experience, of not just postcolonial states or island states, but how we understand travel
within the collapsed boundary of territory and polity. However, it is important to also note, that through the historical process of “de”colonization, particularly after World War II, that our world is generally ordered through nation-states. Therefore, the exclusionary internal and external boundaries of nation-states is also how international politics is understood and assumed. The connection here of the colonial spatial imaginary of the polity and the would-be nation state brings to light the fact that spatial imaginary of the nation-state is that of a coherent island. Nation building is island building. In order to make the coherent-ness of an island, and therefore the state, seem strange and not taken for granted, we ought to question its different mappings and interactions which have pre-assumptions and pre-given realities of geographical assemblages and politics. Moreover, within neocolonial global formations, this also includes the aesthetic pleasure of the island as invoked by icons and symbols, which, has historical precedent both in Western mapping practices and travel narratives.

For example, Antoine Eche (2011) looks at the island of Cyprus and its narrative production on maps as indicative of European travel memory from the 1600 to 1700. Keeping in mind that maps often included the mythological and artistic during this time, Eche (2011) notes that “the map of Cyprus, while offering average instruction, compensates with explicit assertion of aesthetic pleasure looking at the whole image and also with the reassertion of the island’s sensually pleasurable character, mixed with abundance (with the icon)” (100-101). We see the continued connection to the offerings of the island’s sensual pleasure in our example of Sri Lanka, with the continued use of icons and images to denote what is most valuable and available (abundance) to the modern traveler. Therefore, in connection to our own island of interest, the
icons on the Sri Lankan tourist maps also serve to display (even advertise) the aesthetic pleasure to come from the island itself.

Additionally, the map presents, re-presents the island-nation as a place that is already present and available for hospitality. It is an aesthetically-exotic place that should be experienced, as the icons and symbols of the map are ordered and framed displaying the ‘truthfulness’ and ‘history’ of the island, not unlike the collections and displays in a museum. The zoological international relations witnesses the history of research, classification, and objective scientific knowledge applied on distant places around the world, and Muppidi asks:

[i]s this perennial need to optimize, to optimize the relationship between the animals on display as well as the perceptions of the visitors, to structure and restructure the displays, to organize and re-organize the descriptions, arrange and re-arrange, renew and make anew the camps, the zoos and the museums on seemingly ever more systematic and evolving grounds, ever more modern ways, only another way of blinding oneself to the more basic questions of violence and justice regarding the Other, to the always already present but framed and contained—? (2012: 101).

I contend that the spatial icons themselves on the tourist map additionally become collectable entities within a Western spatial imagination. This follows the metaphor of the Colonial Museum, the Zoo, and the Camp, which Muppidi (2012) critiques “institutionalize[d] a shared desire, almost a need: the need to make visible, exhibit, maintain the specimens collected…But this need to display, to make visible, runs alongside the need to contain, to frame, that which is displayed, frame it in a way that that which is displayed does not escape the boundaries of that frame: run away, kill itself, spill over, move beyond the range of measure and surveillance” (98). The tourist map represents the frame of the nation state, or island state, as the frame or cage to which the Other is bound and safely secured for observation and experience. This is also a fetishistic desire for the experience of otherness to be appropriated, framed, and
collapsed onto a graphed icon in space. Henri Lefebvre refers to the fetishism of abstract economies, where “[c]apitalism does not consolidate itself solely by consolidating its hold on the land, or solely by incorporating history’s pre-capitalist formations. It also makes use of all the available abstractions, all available forms, and even the juridical and legal fiction of ownership of things apparently inaccessible to private appropriation (private property): nature, the earth, life energies, desires and needs” (350). In the context of Sri Lankan tourism, capitalism makes diverse icons such as a palm tree, a whale, a man surfing, a temple, and an airport as collapsed symbolic icons which are made to represent potential economies of experiences, places, and things that can be either be observed, consumed, or “had.” The imagined spaces on the island are like jewels that can likewise be collected (see next chapter). This is the fetishism of abstract economies being transformed “into the fetishism of an abstract economic space. Space-become-commodity develops the traits of commodities in space to the maximum” (Lefebvre 2011 [1974]: 351). Here, capitalism creates value through the fetishization of abstract space. We can see what this looks like in what would otherwise be blank or abstract space emerge as icons and emblems, as valued subjects, on the tourist map.

Moreover, we might also describe the ability to imaginatively collect and extract cultural capital from these iconic symbols of the map, as a place for “ravenous consumption.” Pierre Bourdieu (1986) indicates that cultural capital comes in three forms the embodied state, the objectified state and the institutionalized state. Through his own working definitions, this project speaks the most to the embodied, that is "in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body" and in the objectified, that is "in the form of cultural goods," including "material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc." (Bourdieu 1986, 17-20).
Through consumption the cosmopolitan tourist might gain cultural capital through the experiences or purchases made while traveling. As a material object, I would suggest, that the tourist map itself is less a form cultural capital, but instead indicates where cultural capital is located and obtainable. The extraction of cultural capital through the ontological condition of the tourist map as a resource map will be the focus of the next chapter, but here I am interested in the ways in which these forms of cultural capital are displayed internally to and as a contained within the state. Lefebvre (2011 [1974]) describes these kinds of ‘beauty spots’ on maps like historical sites and monuments and the like, as “designating places where a ravenous consumption picks over the last remnants of nature and of the past in search of whatever nourishment may be obtained from the signs of anything historical or original” (84). Not dissimilar to the spatial and temporal imaginary of the Edenic past as terrorized within Ceylon, tourist maps continue to promise and display the nostalgia of things that have imaginatively past. The ghosts of colonial dreams.

Of course tourism is not only about nostalgia, not all of tourism in Sri Lanka, for example, deals with historical or cultural sites. The experience of travel also adds to the “worth” of the individual, again accruing cultural capital. Or, as with beach tourism, “leisure time” is deserved and earned from the rewards of work “in the real world” (more on this temporal split in Chapter 3). Additionally, Western culture has increasingly produced itself as objective and neutrally scientific, it can no longer see itself as culture. “Culture” and “nature” have now become located as icons on a map of another place, textualized elsewhere (and will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4-5). As the “West” is no longer a place for culture it has outsourced its cultural productions to spaces of the Global South, where discursive formations such
“nature,” “exotic,” “traditional,” and, perhaps, most importantly “authentic,” still exist. The tourist map is able to promise all of these things within the Western spatial imagination. Lefebvre (2011 [1974]) additional states that “[i]f thumps and guides are to be believed, a veritable feast of authenticity awaits the tourist,” and that the “[c]onventional signs used on these documents constitute a code even more deceptive than the things themselves, for they are at once more revue from reality” (84). Which is exactly why Lefebvre’s assertion that “[t]he space of a (social) order is hidden in the order of space,” should be connected to mapping practices (2011 [1974]: 289). Lefebvre’s (2011 [1974]) discussion only further reiterates the notion of these symbolic icons as being extractable on similar terms, and with similar environmental and political repercussions as mined resources, because these spaces are “produced,” and the “‘raw material’ from which they are produced is in nature” (84). The tourist map is then at the same time a resource map.

Therefore, the production of iconic space as graphed on the tourist map not only re-affirms the internal/ external boundaries of the nation state. It indicates that what awaits inside the postcolonial island state is not dissimilar to the contents of a treasure box. The tourist map is the simultaneous re-production of both directions to the location of the treasure and the representation of the treasure itself. Also, as these icons are spatial productions extracted from raw material of “nature,” we can also consider the pirating of these icons in similar terms as other natural resources. But the tourist map also presents a paradox of the nation state. As it is both a re-articulation of the Sri Lanka it confirms both its “island-ness” and its coherent spatial polity. But as it also invites others within its borders, it thereby seemingly introduces the notion of borders as porous, even malleable.
3. The State as Caged Problem: Containing the Problem in Response to or as Violence

Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino (2003) maintain that “the link between cartography and colonialism provides a path toward understanding the complex interrelationships between the tourism map and identity. After all, as a part of the colonial project cartography served to demarcate the Western, objective, rational, and modern (male) subject from the inferior, Oriental or African, traditional other...modern tourists’ experiences and gazes reproduce this demarcation as well” (xvi). As suggested above these colonial geographies are only further exasperated by the colonial geography of the island, an ideally contained state space. For example, Dorothy F. Lane (1995) states that, “[i]n imperialist narratives, the coloniser appropriates the island by repeating these paradigms of discovery and settlement. The coloniser must, however, first establish the space as island. That application of the linguistic sign of island is often achieved through the mapping of territory” (14). This section further considers what the contemporary articulations of the island territory is within the representations and interactions of the international community.

I argued above that, following Muppidi’s zoological metaphor in international relations, that the tourist map re-produced the border, frame, or cage around the nation-state to imaginatively contain the exoticism internal within the island state, which could be consumed and experienced by the map user. In this section, I contend that through discursive productions, such as mapping, the nation-state’s territory and sovereignty is imagined exactly as Muppidi described in terms of the colonial zoo. In addition to displaying the “extoic and awe” of the island, the Ceylonese human zoo also indicated particular racial and ethnic anxieties. Phillips (2018) argues that ““the impact of the Aryan theory on Sri Lankan culture and society remains as a stark reminder to the deeply saturated ways in which colonialism leaves its mark, including,
"[t]he connection between Virchow’s anthropological study of Sinhalese at the Berlin Zoo and its participation in the shaping of an Aryan myth in Sinhalese nationalist ideology" (10-11). The Sinhalese’s connection to a “superior race,” even as it might have been the “less developed” version played apart in the exclusionary identity politics and ethnic antagonisms post-independence (the Aryan myth will be brought up again in Chapter 6). Therefore, the zoological cage indicates a paradox as a container seemingly “placed on” the exotic for display and observation, but also a contested space that perpetuates “internal” antagonisms.

A such, I wish to quote again Muppidi’s (2012) passage that this boundary ensures that the collected “does not escape the boundaries of that frame: run away, kill itself, spill over, move beyond the range of measure and surveillance” (98). It appears from Muppidi’s observation the relation of power of postcolonial states and former might be described by observation and surveillance as they continue to develop (post-independence of course) and mature into nation-states. Such a relationship between the former metropoles and colonies was not a self-determined nor inevitable outcome for independence, but it was one that was “swiftly fixed by the core states” (Perera 1999, 123). That is, as Nihal Perera (1999) describes, “[i] Instead of post-colonial states participating in the production of a system of states, or an alternative to the modern state, they were recruited into preconstructed positions. Independence was, therefore, a controlled process” (124). It is this hierarchy of nation-states that was established, or reestablished, from colony to independence which helped to determine that the nation-state as container serve as a cage for continual observation. However, as might be argued, the nationalist movements, as seen especially in the 1930s and 40s, were mobilized against the colonial regime. The nation-state was anti-colonial as it was simultaneously arranged from colonial logics.
More will be discussed in Chapter 4 on the anti/colonial position of the nation-state, but it can also be seen here in relation to its form as a container-box. Just as the treasure box is desired through imperial imaginaries, it is also now promoted by the state. Likewise, the “cage” might have been established through colonial logics of control and surveillance, but at other times it seems shut from the inside in what would appear to be an act of sovereign control. The 1972 constitution rejected dominion status from the United Kingdom, and established itself as the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Given the Cold War political environment this might also be read as a rejection of the Western liberal model of statehood as it positioned Sri Lanka with closer ties to Russia and China. Additionally, with the rise of Asian markets, Sri Lanka, along with other countries, began looking away from the traditional Western development model. "Developing" states were starting to question “development” in general as most had accumulated mostly debt instead of capital (Perera 1999, 157). Although, Sri Lanka would start to adopt more open, capitalist economic policies by the 1980s. What remains consistent in all of these political and economic changes, however, is the state itself. The nation-state determines and limits the conditions of possibilities with which states interact both externally and internally. Frantz Fanon (1963) described nationalism as "an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been," and that, “[t]his traditional weakness, which is almost congenital to the national consciousness of underdeveloped countries, is not solely the result of the mutilation of the colonized people by the colonial regime. It is also the result of the intellectual laziness of the national middle class, of its spiritual penury, and of the profoundly cosmopolitan mold that its mind is set in” (148-149). The mold, the container of the nation-state is both exclusionary and cosmopolitan (as cosmopolitanism is also exclusionary). The relations
between the international community and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) during the civil war indicates the paradoxes of the cage in terms of not only cosmopolitanism but of sovereignty. The conditions and limitations of possibility for the sovereign state are also indicating by the hierarchy of the international community, as well as the historical development of the nation-state as container. I investigate the cage in the following ways, as contributing to ongoing issues of cartographic anxiety and exclusionary identity politics leading up to the war, the justification of force by the GoSL particularly post-9/11 politics and the sovereign state vs. a “non-state” actor, and the contradictory reactions of the international community between the civil war and 2004 tsunami. This last point asks of international politics, when do dead bodies matter?

There is no simple place to start investigating the identity politics of the nearly thirty-year civil war in terms of a “caged problem.” As noted previously, the concept of the modern nation-state requires co-identification with citizenship, and becomes weary of the notion of identities as referents of additional formations, including religion. Krishna (1994), for example, even suggests that “the equation of religion with Indian highlights the fact that terms like nationalism, sovereignty, and citizenship are themselves implicated in practices that are, in their own way, the rituals of a modern faith” (507). In Sri Lanka there has been overt political instances of attempting to deal with the notion of “religion” and “national identity” by collapsing the concepts, so that in Sri Lanka the notion of Buddhism is inextricably linked to the idea of nationalism.

In the emergence of a religious-ethnic idealized national citizen in Sri Lanka, there is the on-going practice of combining the idealized and co-produced identity of the island-as-nation-state with a Sinhala-Buddhist identity. But, as one identity becomes the
imagined, idealized citizen it simultaneously marginalizes other would-be-national identities within the territorial borders of the nation state. Krishna (1999) argues that “most Sinhala political leaders since 1948 have articulated a narrative that accords the majority community (the Sinhala Buddhists) a special place in the national hierarchy even as they push others (Tamils, Burghers, Moors) into their proper place” (xxxiv). This is only further confirmed by Jazeel (2013) as he critiques a “state-endorsed Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony” in national Sri Lankan polity, which has historically and continues to “minoritize non-Sinhala and non-Buddhist otherness,” even after 2009 (64). Which makes a notion of “reconciliation,” rather difficult in the Sri Lankan context (or, perhaps such a difficulty only continues to confirm the non-coherent-ness of the island). Jazeel (2013) specifically address issues of “ethnonationalism” to make “visible a strain of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that passes for the ordinary and, as such, is rarely recognized as ‘nationalism’ per se” (65). For example, he looks at the ways that architect, Geoffrey Bawa is narrated within a particular discursive ethnonationalism of Sinhala-Buddhism, even though he was “neither ethnically Sinhala, nor religiously Buddhist,” and as his landscapes are enlivened “through particular Euro-American theoretical tongues” within three concept metaphors of “nature,” “religion,” and “subjectivity” (Jazeel 2013 65, 66). Jazeel’s reading of Bawa is just another example of the ways in which cultural productions and practices are implicated in exclusionary identity politics of antagonistic nationalisms. This also indicates the importance of looking at the social and cultural productions and practices of nationalism, which this largely takes on the form of the tourist industry for this project.

The Sri Lankan civil war was about the territories connected to two competing ideas of nationalism and how the island-space was to be imagined: Sri Lanka, the whole-venerable island
intact and Eelam, a Tamil-majority state within the island space. I suggest that it was the power of the spatial imaginary of the island-as-coherent-nation-state that contributed to the Sri Lankan government’s response to Tamil factions, like the LTTE, that is, they would do everything within their power to not allow the island be split into Sri Lanka and Eelam. The split of the island-state would delegitimize the state itself. What the GoSL needed was to delegitimize the claim of the Tamil insurgent forces both as their own state actors and their vision for island space, which they were arguably able to do as the discourse around the global war on terror increased. Particularly following 9/11 the GoSL further labeled the LTTE as a terrorist organization and placed itself as the legitimate sovereign state.

For example, from a military and strategic affairs perspective, Shlomi Yass (2014) overviews:

The last Sri Lankan president to face the LTTE, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was able to adopt a drastic policy of all-out war against the organization due to an atmosphere of ongoing violence, failed rounds of negotiations, and a heavy toll on the economy. This atmosphere, along with the general sentiment of a global war on terror created in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, facilitated extreme action such as imposing censorship on Tamil media and utilizing pro-government media in delegitimizing the LTTE, and towards the end of the conflict the government denied the UN, foreign media, and human rights organizations access to the battle zones (66). Not only does Yass (2014) indicate that the global war on terror helped to justify the final stage of the war, which was considered to be the bloodiest, but also suggests that this “can serve as a valuable source of information and lessons for the international community in its fight against terror” (66). Yass specifically identifies Israel as benefitting from such lessons, a point that both deserves more time to unpack and analyze between the games of legitimacy, sovereignty, and violence of “non-state” actors. In the context of Sri Lanka, 9/11 politics additionally emboldened the sovereign state, criminalized “non-state” entities, and justified any force necessary. In this
iteration of island space, internal violence seems justified by the sovereign’s own cage. However, and paradoxically, in order to justify “internal” violence, the internal must be made external.

For example, Jazeel (2009) cites a speech from former president, Mahinda Rajapakse:

We are a country with a long history where we saw the reign of 182 kings who ruled with pride and honour that extended more than 2,500 years. This is a country where kings such Dutugemenu, Valagamba, Dhatusena and Vijayabahu defeated enemy invasions and ensured our freedom. As such Mother Lanka fought against invaders such as Datiya, Pitiya, Palayamara, Silva and Elara in the past, we have the experience of having fought the Portuguese, Dutch and British who established empires in the world (Rajapakse 2009, 400, as quoted by Jazeel).

What is obvious from this statement is delineation of the inside/ outside within the formation (and I would even suggest mapping) of the island-as-political entity. The island as conceived space has dealt with outsiders and invaders attempting to penetrate the conceived boundaries of the island for thousands of years. This rhetoric implies that the “internal” civil war was the same as the “outside” invaders, such as the colonialists. It seems, that the narrative of the nation state must remain as a coherent entity so much so that it cannot articulate an internal fracture, it must “re-map” the invasion as an aggressive external force.

A similar narrative around the internal/external paradox of the internal invaders circulated around one of Sri Lanka’s most popular tourist destinations, Rahuna (Yala) National Park, which almost literally invokes notions of a cage. Jazeel (2013) overviews several newspaper headings and political statements that identified the figure of the Tiger as an invasive species in the park when the LTTE had taken control of parts of it. But he might have also articulated more the Sinhalese own emblem and symbol of the Lion. Sinhalese refers literally to “of lion,” or “lion-blooded.” The political rhetoric that represented the Tiger as the invasive species in, what we might call,” “Lion-Territory” further relies on the internal/external boundaries of the nation-state and national identity. Only with the exclusionary identity politics
of the nation-state could an identity be “external” or “invasive” while already present “within” the boundaries of the state itself. The caged-problem-as-nation-state, therefore, indicates norms of the international community, as well as norms for domestic exclusionary politics.

However, such associations also run the risk of becoming increasingly problematic. For example, overviewing the background of the civil war we can see how Yass collapses the animals for the ethnic groups in the country:

Originally known as Ceylon (“the Holy Island”), Sri Lanka is located near the southeastern coast of the Indian subcontinent, in the Indian Ocean. Its population of 21 million resides in an area of about 65,600 square kilometers. The Sinhalese (“lions”) are the largest ethnic group, constituting 73.8 percent of the population, while the Tamils (“tigers”) constitute 12 percent, and the descendants of the Arab traders (“Moors”) constitute 9 percent. The main religions are Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam, respectively (66).

First, I would like to briefly note that the “origin” for the name of the island only goes back to the colonial era, as before it has been called many things, i.e. Tambapanni, Taprobana, Sarandib. But second, while Sinhalese may mean “lion-blooded,” Tamil does not refer to tigers. These uncritical and overt animal associations, I suggest, indicate Muppidi’s (2012) analysis of the zoological:

This desired structure of visibility and containment, best exemplified in the institutions of the zoo (when the other is alive) and in museums (when the other is dead), requires a distinctive approach to signs: a need to hide, to keep invisible the ‘founding’ violence involved in making the specimen available for our grasp. So even as a surplus of signs is generate about the evolving nature of the arrangements (from size to distribution, from cages to pastures, cells to facilities) or about the riches, the treasures and the virtues of the institution itself, the signs remain quiet about this this was possible at all in the first place (2012: 98).

“The encounters between the state and the people along frontiers is suggestive of the contested and tortured production of sovereign identity;” and in the Sri Lankan context it was/ is the violence against the emergence of internal frontiers that not only signaled the tortured production
of sovereign identity but also the point to which the Sri Lankan government was willing to go to remain a coherent sovereign island nation (Krishna 1994, 508).

Moreover, the relationship between space and violence is consistent with Henri Lefebvre’s (2011) understanding of sovereignty. Lefebvre observes that the “state legitimates the recourse to force and lays claim to a monopoly on violence. Sovereignty implies ‘space,’ and what is more it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed—a space established and constituted by violence” (280). Thus, the Sri Lankan government’s reaction and scale of force used against the Tamil fractions only further constituted themselves in line with spatial imaginary and violence necessary to be understood as a sovereign state. However, I contend that it was the threat of a splintered island state, which threatened to unravel the very narrative of the island-as-state, which is to say the very notion of a territorial nation-state. Here, the nation-state continues to reflect the cartographic imaginary of modern Western political thought for governance and polity.

Vivienne Jabri (2017) observes that “[t]he colonial rationality is unlike other governing rationalities in liberal societies: it is predominantly based on the view that the target population is somehow lesser in capacity to self-govern (agency) and worth (having a right equal to the invader in terms of life and respect). Both in turn are informed by an underpinning racism” (39). From such a description we might also describe the international community as prepared zoo keepers. The analysis of the cage does not only indicate internal politics of postcolonial sovereignty, but through Muddipi’s descriptions the cage is also placed over the former colony, perpetuating colonial power relations. When looking at the international community and their role, or non-roles, in the civil war I do not mean to suggest that involvement or interference
should or should not have happened. In other words I question why and when do we mourn, not why did we not intervene? Following what Jabri calls colonial rationality or even logic of international relations, I suggest that we can examine further the zoological cage in international relations by the paradoxical reasonings for involvement, which I suggest is illustrated in the difference between the civil war and the tsunami. I suggest that the paradox of when to intervene further indicates or implicates the paradox or even hypocrisy of the cage itself.

Ramya Chamalie Jirasinghe (2016) indicates several actors of the international community which would eventually be associated with the civil war, from regional state actors, primary Western states, international organizations, and international human rights groups.² Jirasinghe ultimately argues, however, that despite the involvement of several actors within the international community that the overall response for most of the war was “ambivalence.” Framing her discussion of ambivalence with Homi K. Bhabha, “as a space of hegemonic possibility in unequal power relations,” she argues that the initial ambivalence of the international community, particularly as the security discourse post-9/11 produced the LTTE as a terrorist organization against a sovereign nation state, ultimately allowed and opened the space for the Government of Sri Lanka to disrupt the authority of the international community (2016, 293-301). The tension here that Jirasinghe points out reflects the hypocrisy of the international community, one that is rathered dominated by the US and their own discursive justifications for the use of lethal force against non-state actors and the increasing awareness of the amount of force and tactics that the GoSL was using against the LTTE. One was justified in their use of death, the other was identified as human rights abusers. Jirasinghe writes that “the hegemonic battle between the GoSL [Government of Sri Lanka] and the IC [International Community]
became an implicit battle between moral indignation and political will. The GoSL viewed the IC's moral stance as an example of its double standards, while the IC considered the GoSL's defiance an unpardonable precedent that had been set by a small state” (302).

Jirasinghe analyzes the civil war as revealing the hypocrisy in terms of the use of violence by nation-states, but I suggest that it also identifies a paradox or hypocrisy of zookeepers. Through unequal power relations established through shared colonial histories, the postcolonial states are placed under surveillance, but at times the zookeeper finds it necessary to step-in, and other times not. This apparent paradox of when to intervene and the apparent ambivalence for most of the Sri Lankan civil war, also gets at a question inferred by both Muppidi (2012) and Sharon Bell (2009), which is, *when do dead bodies matter?* This is the problem that Muppidi (2012) introduces at the beginning of his investigation of the colonial signs of international relations, stating that “[i]nternational relations is a field littered with dead and dying bodies. But the dead never seem to rot or stick, whether portrayed discreetly or starkly, sketched crudely or stylistically…I see them everyday. Trained primarily to conceptualize some piles of corpses as a sign of ‘power’ and others as ‘crimes against humanity,’ other languages of the body pass me by silently” (203). We see dead bodies, we see images of them, we see them displayed on screens, we read their numbers (40,000-100,000 deaths), but we do not smell them. They do not rot or stink or decay. They do not have time, for we have already moved past them. Our eyes gloss over them, but they do not remain in our memories (the sense most tied to memory is after all smell). This is, as Muppidi (2012) suggests, “my/ our international relations;” “[t]hese are relations not just of power and interest but also of shame and rage, of a scandalous numbness to

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5 These numbers indicate the potential death count for the war, depending on what media reports one followed (e.g. Mahr 2013; The Associated Press 2013).
mass death, of outrageous proprieties in the face of atrocities and of cognitive complicities in the zoological production of fellow other” (7). Perhaps it is the container that we place them in that masks the stench.

The 2004 tsunami which hit Sri Lanka killed over 35,000 people and left half a million homeless (Bell 2009, 89). There was a mass response from the international community, which produced an on-going joke in Sri Lanka, as Bell (2009) relates (from Colombo’s “intelligentsia”): “did you know there were three equally devastating tsunami wave? The first was the sea. The second, the invasion of ‘relief’ forces. The third, the numerous foreign NGOs who are effectively removing what remains of community sustainability, resilience, and capacity building” (89). There was also what we might refer to as “a geographical tension in aid,” since the disruption of aid was largely done along lines reflective of the war-torn geographical state. This included a disproportionate amount of assistance to the Sinhalese-dominated south (Jazeel and Brun 2009, 12), as well as the “tsunami tourist” that also emerged from the international community (Bell 2009, 89). All of which is behind Bell’s (2009) question: “[w]hy is it that 20 years and over 65,000 deaths as a result of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka failed to be worth of our, the ‘other’s’ collective attention, yet when half that number of the same people, in the same place are killed or ‘disappeared’ by a big wave, we very publicly grieve and our response is generous? Are the victims of the tsunami less implicated than those of war?” (92).

So again the question: when do dead bodies matter? When do they smell? When do they take up our imagined spaces and memories? When do we mourn? And when might international mourning (or absence of) signal the ongoing paradox of postcolonial cage?
Antony Anghie (2016) states that "[t]he ultimate purpose of the nationalist struggle is for the nation to establish itself as a sovereign entity in the community of nations. Nationalism and international relations are in this way intimately connected" (34). This relationship is, as he describes, oscillating and ambivalent. Anghie (2016) poses the questions: how does international law manage, attempt to engage with, shape, and even create the nation, or how does the character of the nation affect the character of international relations? These questions also implicate those questions of mourning. The nation-state-as-cage I suggest allows for the conditions of possibility of exclusionary and even violent identity politics in all states, or what Krishna describes as cartographic anxiety. However, through a historically developed international relations, the postcolonial adds particular "anxiety" to the question of national sovereignty.

Anghie (2016) looks at the time period between the two world wars, during the League of Nations, as the time that international law gave legal status to the "nation" and at the same time created the 'the other' or 'minority' nation (35). Since then, as Anghie argues, international law has sought to manage the 'other' nation. The League of Nations originally only conceived of nationalism in Europe, however, through multiple processes of decolonization throughout the world these "core" states would also have to consider nationalism in the "post"colonial, which was both non-state and pre-state (Anghie 2016). But unlike the nationalism that developed in Europe that was seen as the self-determination of "the people," the international community largely indicated the ways in which colonies could become states, and as such, "[t]he territory defined the people, rather than a situation where the people defined a territory" (Anghie 2016, 43). The paradox that Anghie (2016) identifies "is a prominent feature of the whole
process of decolonization and indeed its aftermath, was that indigenous authenticity had to express itself in accordance with a script written by the West in order to achieve a political form that was created by the West and that was the only means by which an entity could assert itself in the international realm as a full, sovereign state" (44). For Sri Lanka the mapping of the state as island space in the 17th century would be the precursor for state territory in the 20th. It is exactly this paradox that the cage of the nation state, particularly the "post"colonial state helps to shed light on. The cage is also the script with which sovereignty might be legitimized through particular identity politics, but also at times indicates the historically developed unequal power relations between these containers that persists from the "core" states and the "peripheries." The cartographic anxiety of the postcolonial cage indicates the conditions of potential violence along majoritarian/ minority lines as well as conditions of possible relations of how the international community relates to the observed state. Therefore, the paradox of the cage in terms of both the internal anxiety, as well as the ongoing surveillance by the international community is perhaps best summed up by Anghie. He states that:

> [t]hus, even as Third World nationalism succeeded in winning sovereignty for the formerly colonized countries, its furtherance contained within itself the possibility of future division because the very form of the nation-state inevitably created its ‘other’, the minority which would experience itself as subordinated because it was denied the status of sovereignty that the international system presented as the ultimate power. And international human rights often failed to provide the protection it promised (44, emphasis added).

Therefore, the nation-state, as contained within itself, indicated the possibility of further division internally, as well as the punishment externally for these structural failings. Both the “seemingly” internal identity politics as well as the “supposed” external of they system of states in the international community are implicated here.
The mapping of the nation state, or island state, as container metaphor, as seen in the seemingly “benevolent” economic relations of tourism or the interference, or lack of, in regional concerns all get to the production of international norms within geopolitics, from the colony to the postcolonial. I again suggest that it is the production of the geospatial imaginary of the island state which makes the production of this container metaphor as state overtly obvious, as well as, aides in highlighting the historically produced norms and their subsequently produced articulation of power. Jabri (2017) adds to this critique stating, on discursive international norms, that:

[d]iscourses on norms are with us on a daily basis, mobilized in legitimizing strategies related to a multitude of issues, from climate change to human rights to interventions in conflict. Nowhere are norms more readily called upon, or more implicated, than in contexts of war and responses to conflict. That there is contestation around interventionist practices, especially when these are militarized responses, reveals much beyond the immediacy of the situation at hand and points us to the epistemological and ontological foundations of the normative structuring of the international. These are predominantly seen as having their genesis in Europe and spreading historically to encompass a world order where normative limits to decisions and actions derive from the realm of the international as a structured, rule-governed terrain of politics (38-39).

As Jabri indicates, norms are called more on in times of war and responses to conflicts, although in the context of Sri Lanka, it would appear that a lack of response constitutes the norm in this regional conflict. Additionally, as introduced by Jirasinghe, perhaps if the US, for example, had declared the war against this non-state actor and terrorist-labeled group a human rights violation earlier, what would that have said about their own involvements with non-state actors and terrorist-labeled groups? Perhaps, a natural disaster, within no apparent overt actor (the geopolitics of climate change not withstanding), is the safer way to mourn. Inconsistencies or even possible hypocrisy within policies continue in these unequal relations.
Moreover, what the treasure box and caged problem of the nation state and island nation reveal is the paradox of the spatial imaginary of the nation-state. Those, most often the Global North, that have the means and the already extended invitation of hospitality (set with their own rituals of acceptance), seemingly are the ones that get to determine when sovereignty should or should not be considered. Therefore, what appears as a paradox, actually is a consistent project within international geopolitics of continued coloniality. The issues embedded within authority and in/visibility as indicated, now in neocolonial formations, in mapping practices. Bjørn Ingmunn Sletto (2009) contends, for example that mapping is inextricably linked with questions of rights and authority, not simply in binary terms of local or indigenous versus nonlocal claims to land rights, resources, and so on but also in terms of the negotiations of what constitute authentic readings of histories and futures. Through these storytellings, authenticities and meanings of landscapes are (re)defined, relations of power are negotiated, and ultimately, structures and processes of neocolonial control are made visible (444). That is, the narrative of the nation state and the metaphoric conceptualization of the container-box-that-can-be-opened-as-needed and whose-invitation-to-come-is-already-extended nation state is consistent, as long as we understand it as a space that is continually re-articulated in terms of sovereignty, governance, borders within its very foundational conceptualizations.

4. The historical and contemporary geopolitical lessons from Sri Lanka, the island-state

“In 1999, when I was studying Kandyan dance, one of my dance teachers choreographed a few dance pieces for a tourist show in Sri Lanka. One of the pieces he choreographed was Gajaga vannama, the recital of the elephant. He had two choreographic choices: he could choreograph the piece using pure Kandyan dance movements or he could choreograph the dance in which we had to embody the characteristics of an elephant. He chose the latter and said that “api aliyo wage natanakota, suddo kaemati” (white people like to watch when we dance like elephants). He also instructed us “aliya wage adambaren natanna” (dance with pride, as if you are an elephant).”
The reflection above is from Sudesh Bandara Mantillake Madamperum Arachchilage (2018_, a professional Kandyan dancer and professor of Fine Arts at the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. Madamperum Arachchilage has also investigated Ceylonese human zoos, as they also included “displays” of Kandyan dancers. Madamperum Arachchilage (2018) suggests that “colonial choreographers defined and manipulated the bodies of Sri Lankan performers in order to entertain curious colonial audiences by displaying dancers alongside wild animals in colonial exhibitions,” and that “colonial exhibits that staged the intimacy between wild animals and people inspired Sri Lankan ves dancers to choreograph the dance repertoire called vannamas that embody the characteristics of certain animals” (38). Through human exhibitions, like the Sinhalese displayed at the Berlin zoo, Kandyan dance incorporated the movements and choreography that resembled animals in order to entertain. This kind of colonial choreography that Madamperum Arachchilage examines (more on this in Chapter 4) further represents the identity politics of the zoological cage. But through the international tourist industry, I further contend that this zoological cage is at times the nation-state itself within international relations. Madamperum Arachchilage’s performance when he was younger, and being told to dance like an elephant because white people enjoyed it, is not only a personal reflection, but I suggest ongoing identity politics that indicates the commodity of representations between the Global North and South.

Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996) has suggested that international relations should be concerned about the politics and practice(s) of (re)presentations by the North of the South, and suggests that thinking of “North-South relations in terms of representations reorients and complicates the way we understand this particular aspect of global politics,” which can call our
attention to “an economy of abstract binary oppositions that we routinely draw upon and that
frame our thinking” (2). These include, “developed/underdeveloped, ‘first world’/’third world,’
core/periphery, metropolis/satellite, advanced industrialized/ less developed, modern/traditional,
and real states/quasi states,” and I would add to this list as well, particularly as we look at
international tourism with global politics, the exotic/familiar, tourist/non-tourist, and self/Other
(Doty 1996, 2). The politics of nation-states is a politics of representation. The geospatial
imaginary and narratives produced from tourist maps, for both the traveler and the citizen, is yet
another way in which the state is reproduced and represented, whose boundaries and value are
established at the exact time they are offered. Devine (2017) further observes from the power
relations and identity politics of tourism that:

The power relations and political outcomes of tourism projects, however, are far from
predetermined. Rather, tourism’s violent spatial practices of colonization and
commodification articulate with pre-existing historical geographies defining places
around the world to politicize a whole host of issues that are at once familiar and at the
same time different. They are familiar because many of the territorial and identity
politics engendered by tourism development trigger similar concerns, but they are also
unique because these concerns are embedded in the geographic and historical specificity
of place (645-646).

Looking at the violence of the nation state and the contemporary re-productions of it in the Sri
Lankan context, I maintain that it is necessary to consider the overt and the epistemic. The
obvious and the subservience. To both see and smell what the discursive productions of the
nation-as-being and -becoming allow for us to do at any given instant to our relations and
approaches to the conceptualizations of the state, in our terms of understanding death and war,
and in terms of understanding the availabilities afforded to the tourist who obtains social and
cultural capital. It was discussed above the ways in which the cage placed on the postcolonial
state lends itself to surveillance and control from historically developed inter-national power relations. But tourism adds yet another layer to these power dynamics, for example, Helen Kapstein (2017) maintains that “[t]ourism reflects the value system of the colonial nation-state, particularly values of surveillance, control, and consumption, often through violent practices of visuality” (xvii). Within the cartographed postcolonial state, tourism and international sanctions are not two different, unique, nor unconnected implications of the nation state, but they reflect both its historical formation and its contemporary re-presentations.

On representations, Jazeel (2009) writes, that “[l]ike all geographical facts, however, the Sri Lankan island is also a mapping; a way of seeing and imagining space that itself has a representational history. This is not to deny the materiality of island form, but it is to stress that the common-sense reality of Sri Lanka as inviolable, self-contained and unified politico-cultural island space is a fact that has been enabled by particular ways of writing ‘Sri Lankan space’” (400). As the narrative of Sri Lanka is also a map, a map that allows the island to emerge as its signified territorial space, I contend that we consider the ways in which we have traditionally approached this “pre-given” notion of the island as both a coherent political reality, and as ahistorical geographical assemblage that has been coherently collapsed under the borders and narratives of the nation state.

Keeping in mind the discursive production of the state formed through articulations and circulations between repetition and difference, I suggest that as we consider our re-productions and re-presentations of nation states, the ways in which each inscription is also a chance for difference, for a re-mapping. For example, Jazeel (2009) further contends that “[e]ach time knowledge is produced about Sri Lanka, the place itself is reiterated, re-produced slightly
differently. As well as geopolitical object then, Sri Lanka is also subject existent in language, in knowledge, in our representations” (412). Then, every time that we engage with the subject that we refer to as “Sri Lanka” it is a chance to re-map, re-narrate such an inscription with subtle, alternative formations; that is, “each time we enter into its textual field we can intervene by repeating it slightly differently; as outward and relational perhaps, but irrespective, most urgently in ways that reorient and pluralize Sri Lanka’s binarized cartographical possibilities” (Jazel 2009, 412). And as Trinh T. Minh-ha (2011) also posits that traveling can be productive; “[t]raveling can thus turn out to be a process whereby the self loses its fixed boundaries—a disturbing yet potentially empowering practice of difference” (41, emphasize mine). There is potential to active engage within difference, even in our coarse encounters.

Understanding that maps and narratives both work as they simultaneously hide and erase social orders, “[h]ow many maps, in the descriptive or geographical sense, might be needed to deal exhaustively with a given space, to code and decode all its meanings and contends” (Lefebvre 2011 [1974]: 85). We could use Lefebvre’s question to ask more specifically how many different kinds of maps of Sri Lanka would we need to be able to completely understand its own production/ reproduction as a state, and the subsequent consumption that this allows for others? Although it would seem given the overt and epistemic violence embedded within mapping that more maps would only further inscribe and gather presence around conceptualization of the nation state or the island state. Perhaps, then for the sake of a more peaceful approach, the question is not about how many maps, but what kinds of maps, who is mapping, and from what ontological process do they depart? As well as what politics is strengthened by the representation? The nation state as container box as seen in both the context
of a cage problem and as a treasure box is more literal than metaphoric. Given how well these things align over the boundaries of the nation state, discussions of nation building and state formations might generally be better framed as island building.

Moving forward, the critique of the state as a geospatial articulation of continued coloniality, and the ways in which these boundaries are only made more apparent, and arguably problematic, will be crucial to the analysis of this project. The next chapter will critique further the island as treasure-box by comparing the resource map of the tourist industry to Sri Lanka’s gem industry. The parallels between the island and treasure box are made quite literal in this assessment. Chapter 3 critiques the invitation and the position of hospitality afforded by the tourist map and the ways in which the island map is an extension of the narratives of pleasure and desire which also circulate the travel narratives of the exotic East.
Chapter 2: The Resource Map

1. **Introduction: the tourist map as resource map**

The image of the Tamil women who work the tea plantations of Nuwara Eliya are a ubiquitous image on tourist materials, including, of course tourist maps. So much so, that they seem synonymous with tea itself on the island. Before this trip, I had only been to Nuwara Eliya, the tea plantation country, in 2012. At that time we had stopped on our way back up from Yala for a half-day’s stop, on a weekend excursion from work. But this time I was able to stay a little longer, see a little more. I hired a driver to take me to all the tourist sites: the tea plantations, the botanical garden, the lake, and the waterfall at Lover’s Leap. Driving up to the waterfall we
passed the women picking tea leaves on the side of the hillsides. As we got closer, my driver pulled over the side of the road. We would have been close enough to touch, but he did not say anything to the women, nor to me. We did not touch. We did not speak. My driver only pulled over for me to “get the shot.” But unlike all the promotional images and icons on maps, these women were not smiling. We looked at one another, in an awkward silence. Finally, my driver assuming that I had my shot or had my fill of the scenery moved on.

I did not get to interview any of these women. I did not get to see what their own maps of the Sri Lanka might have looked like. I did not see or hear of their own experiences. We stopped on the side of the road, because they were images to capture. The associated image of the tea plantations. The tea plantations, tour guides, and even the Ministry of Tourism promote their image in guides, billboards, packages, and of course tourist maps. Drivers stop by so their tourist passengers can get the picture of Nuwara Eliya to take back home, post online, and generally receive the associated cultural capital from having been there. But this was labor that they would not be compensated before. When we drove off down the road, they were left as another node, another icon on the itinerary for the day.

As noted from the Introduction, this project uses elements of autoethnography in order to subvert and hopefully resist the politics of vision from both the map and traditional research. But as was also indicated in Chapter 1, this also means at times placing the point of view in the exact position of power, in order to observe what is produced at these various nodes. Part I of this project follows my own descending politics of vision, from the map-reader to the mobile and contradictory cosmopolitan tourist. (Which is not say that one is any less potentially problematic than the others, but to acknowledge that all of these positions are at work simultaneously.)
However, while I insert myself slightly more into this chapter, I also attempt to find the circumference, the conditions of limitations on my own positionality (what I will refer to in the Conclusion as a “limits” methodology). Therefore, the scale of this chapter is parallel to that of the travel writer, one who has access to these sites and experiences, but whose space between, her and the tea workers for example, largely goes untranslated. Once more from the introduction, my own use of autoethnography is to indicate contradictory and even potentially ugly moments. This moment on the hillside was no different. Perhaps indicating that the desires of the tourists are not much different than that of the international researcher.

Continuing to develop my analysis on the ontological condition and continued coloniality of the tourist map, this chapter pushes further my observation that the tourist map reconfirms the island-state as a container or treasure box for cultural capital. Here, I argue that, in addition, the tourist maps acts as a resource map directing each node or icon as a potential mine for potential cultural capital. This point is only further stressed by paralleling this notion of “cultural mining” with the gem industry in Sri Lanka, which not unlike the tea industry, is also dependent on tourism and foreign capital.

Therefore, this chapter is about more than just the Tamil tea plantation workers, but it must include them as well. Alluding to the play between utterances and silences, presence and absence, that work within mapping practices (see Introduction), this chapter is about how certain images become *the* articulated presence on a tourist map. This also, therefore, includes what is left out which surrounds and “allows” these particular images to emerge over others. The continued promotion and use of the Tamil women as tea plantation worker also hides, for example, on-going exploitative policies and imaginaries which surround ethnic identities and
antagonisms in the country. Further investigation also indicates the continued romanticization of tea, and by extension of the the worker, from the colonial period. Asking every tour guide that I had in Nuwara Eliya, “why only women?,” I received several responses of “it is tradition.” The last tour I had provided slightly more context with, “that is the way the British did it, and we have continued to it.” I will discuss below the ways in which tea more generally was started and continued in Sri Lanka from the colonial period, but this chapter is, again, more generally about the ways in which images have historically developed under colonial relations and imaginaries to now be extractable resources for the cosmopolitan tourist.

Sitting in the back of the tuk tuk, I wanted a picture of the women, because that would have been “the” picture of Nuwara Eliya. But I also knew that there was no picture that I could take, in any circumstance, that would not be extracting. My desire to “have” this picture only further indicates that this was an image already associated with the place itself; it was a part of the expectation and invitation already mapped out for me. The tourist map becomes a resource map for sources of social and cultural capital. A resource map that is best investigated when placed within the temporal contexts of “post” coloniality, which must include larger religious and ethnic identity relations, including the civil war.

As noted in the pages before this, since 2009, the country’s tourist economy and “international visitation has increased rapidly encouraging the government to earmark tourism as a key sector for achieving post-conflict economic recovery” (Buultjens et al. 2016, 355-356). Stabilizing a post-war economy ought to be a positive point in any context. But my concern is this: if tourism promotions continue to identify particular histories, cultures, and narratives of the island over others (e.g Sinhala-Buddhist over other minorities) or labor, narratives, and images
are exploited from certain populations (e.g. Tamil tea plantation workers or even those in former war zones), then is the tourist industry not complicit in contributing to potential violent identity politics? Are tourists not complicit in their consumption? Is the state not complicit in their promotion? How do we discuss agency within these contexts? Towards these questions I suggest we can at least consider the ways in which the conditions of possibility are based on the formation and mapping of the state itself, not only as a point of critique, but a productive lens.

As I will indicate in Chapter 6, these issues of violence and identity are far from over in Sri Lanka. J.W. Buultjens et al. (2016) suggest of Sri Lanka’s post-conflict tourist industry that “[i]n order to create a resilient and therefore sustainable industry, it is important that the sector contributes to the economic well-being of the whole population, socio-political equality as well as an improvement in human rights. It is also important to ensure environmental assets are not degraded and preferably enhanced” (355-356). First, while I am not directly engaging the ongoing critiques of resilience scholarship, there are of course potential parallels in what I will critique of neocolonial power relations and, in particular, the neoliberal threads of resilience discourse in sustainable development work. Second, what I do wish to overtly highlight, however, is that the post-conflict tourist industry of Sri Lanka implicates much more than just economic profits, but as J.W. Buultjens et al’s statements indicate, in order to be a “successful” industry that this sector must contribute to the well-being of the entire population (this seems to imply and not just a selected few), must be able to contribute to ongoing socio-political reconciliation, including strengthening human rights within the country, and finally must not

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only be concerned about the potential environmental threats associated with tourism, but should also improve them. The question is again, who benefits from this tourist economy?

As also noted from the Introduction, Sri Lanka is not alone in putting their hope in the international tourist economy. Cynthia H. Enloe (2014 [1990]) observes that “tourism continues to be promoted by bankers and development planners as a means of making the international system less unequal, more financially sound and more politically stable. A lot is riding on sun, surf and souvenirs” (40). And in Sri Lanka’s case this must also include tea. But what this suggests, of course, is that the “Economy” does not nor cannot happen in a vacuum, and that even economic activity that may appear, at least on the surface, to improve the general standard living of a population, including the tourism’s connection to the Real Gross Domestic Product of Sri Lanka (Nisthar and Vijayakumar 2016), should be questioned, and not only just in terms of post-development critiques on the inability for global economic organizations (like the UN and IMF) to read economic success and stability in terms not written in GDP numbers (e.g. Ferguson 1997). But also in how the tourist industry is viewed as responsible, at least in part, in stabilizing a nearly 30 year, violent post-ethnic conflict, and, most importantly for my investigation here the ways in which this endeavor may only re-establish colonial geographic power relations. This chapter is primarily concerned about ontological coloniality of tourist map as a resource map, but other Part II especially will explore the ways in which tourism might contribute to the exclusionary identity politics of the war as well as legitimate the narrative and actions of the state post-2009. This should be of particular of concern as critiques, notably those from Sankaran Krishna (1994, 1999), that the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka might be analyzed on the issues of
nation building within the postcolonial state, in what we might succinctly describe, overall, as the postcolonial insecurities within cartographic anxieties of the postcolonial condition.⁷

Towards these concerns, I suggest we question developing, or re-establishing, tourist industries within geo-discursive formations like the Global South and within the contexts of geopolitical concerns of post-coloniality. This understands, as Roger Lee (2011) has suggested that “the material relations of economic geographies are not god-given; they are socially constructed in the context of sets of relations (not the least of those colonialism and postcolonialism) which are themselves formed out of constant political struggle over the meaning, purposes and control of economic activity” (67). Specifically, this project, in addressing the socially constructed relations between geographies and economies, considers the productions of Sri Lankan tourist maps as

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⁷ For references on what Krishna means by “postcolonial insecurities” (1999), particularly looking at India and Sri Lanka, as well as “cartographic anxiety” (1994) and the concerns he raises with the delienating of internal and external borders, see both the Introduction, but particularly Ch. 1.
spatio-textual narratives of commodified culture and nationalism, which are already reflective of
the normative relations of the international as historically developed within the context of South
Asian postcolonialism. Looking at tourist maps, such as the one advertised by the
locally-operated Sri Lanka tour company, Athulasiri (Figure 2.2), can give us a tangible example
of how neocolonial practices and representations are embedded and active within practices of
everyday life.

Continuing my investigation of tourist maps in this chapter, I consider the geopolitical
imaginaries in the production of space within the capitalist world economy, in what are
neo-or-continued colonial power relations between the Global North and the Global South, I look
here as lines are drawn around culture-as-extractive resource. I maintain that cultural extraction
parallels the environmental and political effects of resource extraction, including the ways in
which the map itself is a resource map for “mines” of cultural capital. Sri Lanka’s tourist
industry particularly indicates forms of ‘cultural mining.” Not only because of its own colonial
past, but because of the parallel and intra-connected discourses which emerge between Sri
Lanka’s tourist industry and its gem industry. Both industries, I suggest, reflect a continued
discourse of deferment common among postcolonial states, that is, although Sri Lanka has a long
history as the “‘jewel box’ of the Indian Ocean,” that the country remains “underexplored and
underexploited” (Gunawarden and Rupasinghe 1986, 80; Dissanayake and Rupasinghe 1993,
180). Associated with the dual associations of coloniality, “deferment” further reflects the bind
of the postcolonial state where full nation-state status appears continually deferred, between the
former colony and the “not yet nation.” I will reference this later in the chapter as indicating a
dialectical temporality. I continue the investigation of the “treasure box” from Chapter 1 by
examining the politics of representation and authenticity as images, such as the Tamil tea plantation worker, are made into “gems” for the tourist to extract and mine.

Within the environmental and political concern of economies, I consider the ways in which the political economy produces tourist sites and experiences as value-laden marks of authenticity, which only continues to confirm a historically Western geopolitical imaginary particularly paralleling the discourse and historical extraction of Sri Lankan gems. First, I overview the international concerns of geopolitics in the question of tourism for postcolonial states, and then connect how the production of the tourist map only further articulates the power relations of “post”-colonial economies, as it extends the invitation and the rights-to-come to the cosmopolitan tourist as a neo-colonial, or continued-colonial enterprise. Second, I more overtly set these relations as a parallel to Sri Lanka’s own gem industry. This parallel helps to investigate capitalistic productions of “authenticity” and “culture” as extractable and obtainable, as it also simultaneously creates its own notion of “limited availability,” therefore making it feasible that, just as with other capitalistic resources, that tourism creates the demand for and, perhaps, the demise of its own supply line. Finally, I look at the temporal dialectics which are produced and layered within the tourist map, including the perceived continuums of authentic experiences / tourist experiences, culture/ economy, untouched paradise/ overexploited places, and of course, colony/ nation state. Overall, I argue that the tourist map re-presents Sri Lanka an imagined space which “culture” and “authenticity” await the already-welcomed cosmopolitan tourist to be both extracted and collected for cultural capital.

2. The Geo-political Textual Re-productions and Implications in Cultural Mining
William Mallinson and Zoran Ristic (2016) make the claim that the developed use of the term ‘geopolitics’ has coincided with the continued “obsession with the control of resources, which [they] believe to be one of the causes of war” (xiv). However, referencing from the Introduction, given the parallel historical and political development of geography and the state through imperial knowledge productions, I am interested in a geopolitics that considers the relationships between territory (most often state-territory) and resources as established through colonial power relations. Gearoid O. Tuathail (1996) notes that geopolitics is also “conditioned by the predicates ‘geography’ and ‘politics,’ which are themselves delimited and conditioned by other predicates in unstable and indeterminate ways” (51). Tuathail (1996) further suggests that in order to question the ways that global space is written and imagined that a critical geopolitics considers what he refers to as “geo-politics” (using a Derridean tactic that is also not unfamiliar to this project, in order to both call to and displace a concept; “communicates with geopolitics; it recalls its history yet destabilizes this history”) (52). “Geo-politics does not mark a fixed presence but an unstable and indeterminate problematic; it is not an ‘is’ but a question” (Tuathail 1996, 52). Instead as a critical mode of inquiry geo-politics questions the doing, production, the imaginaries of the geographic and the political. This analysis of the ontological condition of the tourist map as resource map further implicates the production of the geographic and the political through our imaginings and relations to globalized space, and access to it.

Further, more might be investigated along neocolonial lines than just the overt grabs for resources, oil being the most obvious one contemporarily. This argument further claims that tourist maps, with their use of iconography (that is, cartoonish images and icons), are not separate from the geopolitical or geoeconomic history of imperial influence, but that instead it is
a combination of the history of Western geography and the ability to narrate a place through spatial texts and a formulation of a map which indicates the most valuable ‘cultural’ experiences and places. That is, tourist mapping can indicate neocolonial practices and representations within continued global power relations, from colonial imaginaries of not only the ability and right to travel, but also the right to extract. Here, specifically culture becomes an extractable resource from the Global South, where culture is offshored and remains distinct and authentic for those that have the time and mobility to access it: the cosmopolitan tourists within the historically informed international tourist industry. Authenticity is deemed valuable as it become rare in the face “modernization;” it is made apart of the leisure industry by those that already have the means to obtain it. Authenticity is cosmopolitan.

Considering the parallels between the extractive policies of resources and capital in colonial states, as well as the development of geopolitics as understood through a strategic resource-gathering practice, tourism provides a lens through which to analyze the power relations as embedded in the production and consumption of cultural capital, including the most seemingly “benign” of these production, i.e. the tourist map. For example, Christopher Loperena (2017) looks at “the parallels between traditional extractive industries and tourism, both of which rely on state orchestrated natural resource expropriation, dispossession and enclosure, resulting in rampant environmental degradation and ecological insecurity…” (619). In Chapter 5, I will more overtly discuss environmental issues surrounding the enclosure of “nature” as tourist spaces, but I lay the foundation here by investigating the textual reproductions of “nature,” “culture,” “history,” and other nodes of authenticity as capable for Others to obtain. To question

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8 The same critical analysis might be done here with geo-economics as Tuathail (1996) suggests for geo-political, separating these two elements in order to open them for inquiry, but please note the overview in the beginning of the Introduction for how I relate both of these terms specifically to my investigations here on Sri Lanka.
the production of and the geospatial imaginary of the tourist map in cultural and social production also means we acknowledge the historically, contingent imaginary of global travel as consumption, particularly within its construction within a cosmopolitan geography.

Pulling from Tariq Jazeel’s reading of cosmopolitanism (see Introduction), understanding that a cosmopolitan spatial imaginary of the planet is neither innocent nor objective is the first step to un-tracing the spatial map of the cosmopolitan tourist that not only infers from the world the right to move between boundaries, as these already-welcomed stranger, but also how these movements obtain value. The tourist map not only re-produces the claim of invitation, but also indicate where value is located within the country, as they so “casually” put myth “into ordinary practice” (as Jazeel says of cosmopolitanism, 2011, 83). The tourist map only works as it transcends the contradictions and differences within a given population, and then re-assembles into static images those space that are deemed as valuable. Thus, already marking what is valuable within the country through the eyes of the already-invited cosmopolitan tourist (as will be further discussed in the next chapter). Similarly to the lack of human presence that Jazeel (2011) critiques of the ideal cosmopolitan imaginary, which “frees its imperial inclusiveness from all contingency” (83), the tourist map erases the individual populace, and what emerges in the place of human presence are strategic destinations which cannot be described in any other way, except as resources of cultural consumption. And, when individuals are represented it is done so as to make them standardized and ubiquitous images, such as the tea plantation worker.

In economic, political, and environmental terms the tourist map is a resource map for cultural extraction, as indicated by the presence and possibility of these very images. Investigating the political, economic, cultural, and environmental implications of Sri Lankan
tourist maps as neocolonial practices, means we should investigate these articulations in terms of both overt consequences of tourism and tourism’s production of extractable environments. While acknowledging the historical reverberations of coloniality and the (re)productions of the environment or nature, as well as, contemporary realities of climate change, including global air travel’s contribution to increased greenhouse gas emissions and decreased biodiversity, there should also be concern for the cosmopolitan tourist’s role in cultural extraction, or cultural mining. Cultural extraction parallels the environmental and political effects of resource extraction, including the ways in which the map itself is a resource map for “mines” of cultural capital. Tourist maps become resource maps for cultural extraction, as the invitation of the cosmopolitan tourist extends to not only come, but to take. Moreover, as Loperena (2017) observes, “the national tourist product is oriented almost exclusively toward foreign consumption, deepening the relationship of dependency” (620). The tourist map serves as a textual representation of this dependency, as well as instructional guide for how to even further deepen the relationships for foreign consumption, as it points towards and for the foreigner.

Of course, tourism is not Sri Lanka’s only industry, for example tea exports and the textile industry also contribute significantly to their economy. Not to mention that, as 2015, 24% of Sri Lanka’s labor force were migrant workers in Asia, particularly in the Gulf states (Siriwardhana et. al 2015, 885–94). All of which are just mere examples of the diverse currents

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and nodes which surround the global economic systems in Sri Lanka. As Roger Lee (2011) observes, for example, that “[e]conomic geographies are the geographies constituted in the struggles of peoples to continue to be able to make a living through the construction of, and participation in, such circuits of value sustainable across space and time” (75). These systems within Sri Lanka’s economic geographies are multiple and complex, and not reductive to tourism alone. However, this also means that systems are not in isolation, and tourism has ripple effects throughout other industries in Sri Lanka, including the gem industry (O’Hare and Barrett 1993), transportation, retail, recreational and sports activities, and to mention the tea industry itself (Nisthar and Vijayakumar 2016).

The exportation of tea and the connection of Ceylon tea to the country plays heavily into tourist expectations, as the tea plantations themselves are “iconic” tourist attractions within the country. For instance, we can see from the Athulasiri tourist map that the icon for Nuwara-Eliya, a more temperate mountain location, known as “Little England,” where many of the main tea plantations are located, is a seemingly ubiquitous image for the tea plantations, that of the (Tamil) female tea plantation laborer (Figure 2.3). Again, the women that make up these associated
images are rarely, if ever, compensated for the use of their likeness. Yet, their images are still extractable and exchangeable for cultural capital. It is not only Ceylon tea itself which is consumable and commodifiable, but is the entire historical narrative of the tea plantations, more generally. Perhaps, even described as a racialized colonial legacy that continues to indicate what is “valuable” and “extractable.” It also seems appropriate to note that tea was not grown on the island, at least not any large production, until the introduction of the crop in 1867 by a Scotsman, after the coffee plant died off from fungus (Fernando et. al 2017). But now, through global tourism, we can fulfill neo-orientalist pursuits and “go native,” perform the role of the tea pickers ourselves, as the photo from Trip Advisor promotes in Figure 2.5.

Furthermore, while we should acknowledge that tourism is not the only industry in Sri Lanka, it may still helpful to question the potential political, social, and environmental implications that may follow from economies which are dependent on the flow of capital from one source. As Sri Lanka continues to increase this sector of its economy, are we going to see a similar dependency develop as with Caribbean island states, which has been noted as the “most tourism-dependent region in the world” and as the “largest source of both foreign exchange and employment” is in travel and tourism?

Figure 2.5 Trip Advisor “Photo: “Helping out in tea plantation,” Screenshoot from: https://www.tripadvisor.co.za/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g612378-d6649187-i19582818-Sri_Lanka_Chamo_Tours-Ambalangoda_Galle_District_Southern_Province.html#119582818”<img alt="" src="https://media-cdn.tripadvisor.com/media/ Accessed: October 25, 2017.
(Clayton 2009, 212). Again, Jacobs (1985) critiques those economies that are too reliant on one particular natural resource (i.e. she uses the example of the coal economy of Appalachia in US to note that issues of stagflation, a condition of high prices and too little work and to indicate a non-diversified economy within America). Similar observations might be made between economic tipping points and environmental tipping points when yields are dependent not only on tourism, but specifically looking at the extraction of culture as resource. This includes more than just those tourist sectors that overtly rely on spaces of the environment (such as beaches, national parks, hiking, etc., as discussed in Chapter 5), but as David Harvey (1978) states, “we also have to consider the costs of reproduction of labour power at a standard of living which reflects a whole hosts of cultural, historical, moral and environmental considerations” (125).

The historical relations between the production and consumption by and for the outsider, and how this connects geographically to environmental and cultural extraction, also echoes, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s (2015) refusal to “reduce either economy or ecology to the other,” as well as the connection she observes between economy and environment, that is:

the history of the human concentration of wealth through making both humans and nonhumans into resources for investment. This history has inspired investors to imbue both people and things with alienation, that is, the ability to stand alone, as if the entanglements of living did not matter. Through alienation, people and things become mobile assets; they can be removed from their life worlds in distance-defying transport to be exchanged with other assets from other life worlds, elsewhere (4-5).

Acknowledging that alienation and abstraction are necessary for commodification, the same must, then, be true for cultural commodification, which can be seen even more overt by stressing the production of culture as resource. For example Bram Büscher and Robert Fletcher (2017) note that in abstraction, “the tourism product is further divorced from its supporting reality to

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10 I think it is beneficial to note that “Third World” economies exist in the “First,” which might allow us to critique the capitalist global economy more generally, and not just as indicated in the postcolonial states.
become part of a class of products in which one can stand in for another” (654-655). That is, it is not enough to critique cultural as commodity, that culture can be produced, in artifacts, performances, and experiences, for surplus profit, but that these critiques emerge in their immediacy when we imagine them in their tangibilities. Barry Curtis and Claire Pajaczkowska (1994) state that there are “three paradigmatic moments of tourism: eating, shopping, and sightseeing,” and that each of these transactions the tourist “negotiates a highly formalized relationship or participation in, and distance from, the environment” (207). What is necessary for moments of tourism to occur is a level of manipulation vis-a-vis the environment. Even when landscapes, parks, and beaches are made a part of the tourist landscape the negotiation between proximity and distance must be controlled and mediated. Again, while the plantation workers images are used for postcards, maps, advertisements, your tour guide may even stop so you too can get a quick picture yourself; these are controlled images that are able to hide the continued exploitation of these workers.

Starting with the British colonial period Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, has become one of the world's largest exporters of tea. The British brought down lower-caste, primarily Tamil-speaking laborers from South India to work the plantations, and "[f]or most of their history in Sri Lanka, the migrant plantation labourers lived and worked in deplorable conditions, responsible for much of the economic production of the nation yet largely excluded from the financial benefits of such productivity" (Infanti et. al 2015, 36). After colonial independence much of these conditions continued, and did not receive citizenship status until

Figure 2.6 Kataragama Icon, the cultural performer. Screen shot from: http://www.sri/search/TourMap.aspx
Accessed: October 23, 2017
2003, which meant that they could not "not vote; own land or property, access health services or education, or secure government employment outside the estates; procure identity cards or open bank accounts" (Infanti et. al 2015, 36). And today labor, land, and housing for plantation workers are controlled by the plantation estates themselves, which continue to place workers in precarious and exploitative positions. It is important to note here as well that my own experience, or non-experience, with these women was not less potentially precarious and exploitative. It was clear that such occurrences happen often: people or drivers stopping on the side to take pictures of them. Perhaps I could have closed the gap, or made the distance between our worlds less if I had attempted to speak to them, to say hello. But I, the cosmopolitan tourist has the luxury of both place and time. Talking to and asking questions to the tour guides at the tea plantations, I found out that the women often had quotas to fill. By simply talking I had might have interfered with this work, and only further divided the space between us. And for what, so that the tourist or researcher might leave feeling slightly justified that they made an effort? But for whose benefit? Talking to the cosmopolitan does not necessarily help the worker, unless compensation is added. The cosmopolitan does however benefit from having had the experience. This is not unconnected to the commodification of places, people, and experiences.

Following also Henri Lefebvre (2011 [1974]), there is a historical link between capitalism, development and space, in that their survival is dependent on “their being able to extend their reach to space in its entirety” (325). Specifically, in capitalistic space, the tourist map in this investigation, merges the imaginary of the “underground resources…energy, raw materials,” to the “above-ground sphere” (Lefebvre 2011 [1974], 325). That is, the political economy produces tourist sites, as indicated by the icons on the tourist map, as emblems
suggesting the available material and resources from a given space, as if they had been pulled from a source, mined, produced, and made ready for the availability and use of the cosmopolitan tourist.

This also implicates those individuals who also work within the Sri Lankan tourist industry, particularly when we consider cultural and/ or religious performances as a part of these experiences. Although the tourist industry relies on non-material forms of extraction, including the re-production of cultural practices such as dance, food, and local crafts, extraction still relies on the production of material logics, that “entail mostly outward-oriented production, market valorization of natural and cultural resources for external consumption, and processes of dispossession in areas with high economic potential” (Loperena 2017: 621). For example, the Athulasiri tourist map includes for the Kataragama Esala Festival a singular performer as the given icon or node (see Figure 2.6). The festival, as advertised by the Sri Lankan government’s own tourist site describes it as “is a multi-religious festival where devotes use fire walking and extreme self-penance to shows their piety to Lord Kataragama” (“Festive”). This brings into question the line between religion as devotion vs. cultural capital, or perhaps it is also a chance to consider how we come to question the “authentic” religious experiences apart from the performance? Or better still, this is also a moment to consider the ways in which those nodes of religion and economy, as seen in historical and contemporary contexts, continually intersect and only remain distinct when they are written imaginatively in the production of their ideological shells, “religion,” “capital,” “authentic.”

Furthermore, Lefebvre 2011 [1974] refers to the “reproduction of the relations of production,” he observes that capitalism has not only reached into preexisting spaces of the
Earth, but now also produces spaces of its own (102). This capitalist production of its own space is clearly seen in the spatial productions of the tourist map. It is exactly this mode of production that allows icons of palm trees and temples to appear on the spatial surface of a re-assumed and re-confirmed island state (as we understand the confirmation of the state in such discursive modes as discussed in Chapter 1). Jennifer Devine (2017) considers critical political economy and political ecology to “analyze the role tourism plays in expanding and maintaining capitalism as a conflict-ridden system” (638). Also pulling from Lefebvre, Devine (2017) notes that Lefebvre saw “tourism development as an ‘intermediary stage’ wrapped up with capitalism’s colonization of space,” and that therefore capitalism’s colonialization of space “unfolds dialectically alongside the production of ‘state space’” (638). As spaces, experiences, and even people are mediated as products for consumption, tourism itself works through colonizing ways. Tourism is a total colonization of space. But these lines are only further reiterated when “past” colonial spaces are what tourism colonizes, as colonial legacies are re-packaged and commodified. Icons such such a tea plantation worker exploited during the colonial period are now not only continually exploited in the present but are also made extractable, indeed are made into repetitive experiences, prepackaged and pre-confirmed of what-should-be-experienced-on-the-island-state.

However, a contradiction arise in this production, indeed “new contradictions generated by the extension of capitalism to space” giving rise to “quickly popularized representations” Lefebvre (2011 [1974] , 326). That is, these repeatable representations are clearly indicated by tourist icons as commodified resources, can only also be valuable as they are also limited, ‘rare’ gems of the island, and thus must at least appear eventually exhaustible. A degree of reification
(or rareification) is necessary between the nodes of repetition and difference in order to create various and innumerable experiences and narratives of the island into single icons. Or to put another way, a certain degree of fetishization is required in this production. It is with this process that Lefebvre (2011 [1974]) asks, “[i]s there not a danger that the economic sphere, fetishized as the world market, along with the space that it determines, and the political sphere made absolute, might destroy their own foundation—namely land, space, town and country—and thus in effect self-destruct?” (326). Similarly, Devine and Diana Ojeda (2017) consider the violence in tourist spatial fetishism, when developers and state supporters carve out tourist and non-tourist spaces. Chapters 4-6, will look at the ways in which this fetishization between tourist and non-tourist spaces specifically work through modes of state cosmopolitanism for the benefit and access of the cosmopolitan tourist in terms of places deemed as “culture,” “nature,” and “safe/adventurous” (in terms of the opening up the former war zones). But here we can start by acknowledging the role of scarcity and abundance that the tourist map must play between to indicate experience, people, places as valuable and obtainable but also rare and exotic. This seems accomplished by mapping and carving out those tourist vs. non tourist space. Indicating what the tourist should see, and what can be ignored.

The fetishization of the Sri Lankan island nation itself follows similar tourist discourse patterns and subsequent contradictions. First, that it is valuable because the exotic, far-away island is ‘unique,’ it is not a typical tourist location, therefore it is also valuable in its non-touristisms. Second, it is valuable because the island was home to ancient civilizations, but it is also ‘developing,’ pre-modern, therefore a ‘young’ (and perhaps troubled) nation, and therefore its authentic culture will eventually be lost to modernization (see related discussion in
Nandy 1983). But this modernization is also represented by and demanded by the tourist, as much as the experience of authenticity. Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to suggest that authenticity is only present within the ideology of modernization and the idea of progress (e.g. Shanin 1997). By which I mean, the idea of “authentic” or “original” indicates linear temporality of “development” within the idea of “progress.” It is the double-bind of the demand of authenticity and development, can be further critiqued with Sri Lanka’s parallel of its gem industry and its tourist industry.

3. Parallels between Sri Lanka’s gem and tourist industry

The “metaphor” of gem mining is particularly appropriate for looking at cultural extraction, or cultural (com)modification - literally modifying culture for packaging, for the tourist industry of Sri Lanka for a few different reasons. Again, there is the, somewhat, literal connection to Sri Lankan’s long history (perhaps 2,000 years) as the “jewel box” of the Indian Ocean,” and “one of the meccas of gemology” (Gunawarden and Rupasinghe 1986, 80). For an island that is relative to the size of the US state of West Virginia, if not just slightly larger (see Figure 2.7), “Sri Lanka may have the greatest

Figure 2.7: “Country size comparison.” The sizes of West Virginia and Sri Lanka is a comparisons that I have often heard from people I knew from Sri Lanka and traveling within Sri Lanka, as well. It may also have to do with the shape of the geographical formations, as well. Screenshot accessed from website: March 2,2017
proportion of land surface underlain by gem deposits, as well as the widest variety of gem minerals, of any country in the world” (Dissanayake & Rupasinghe 1993, 173). In Chapter 4, the amount of “gems” or tourist experiences available in a small area is also related in how Sri Lanka becomes a “good deal” or “bargain” for the tourists. The challenge is to leverage this for greater foreign exchange. In their 1993 article, “A Prospector's Guide Map to the Gem Deposits of Sri Lanka,” C.B. Dissanayake and M.S. Rupasinghe (1993) concluded that “[a]lthough government figures indicate that gem exports account for more than 80% of Sri Lanka's mineral export industry, they represent only 4% of the total foreign exchange earnings…Present gem mining and prospecting are based largely on chance discoveries and subsequent ‘word-of-mouth’ exploration” (180). Although clearly this report is dated, I contend that we can still discuss the potential of Sri Lanka’s tourist industry within similar discursive relations. That is, although foreign traffic to the country has increased since 2009, the sites and cultural experience of Sri Lanka may also be described as underexplored and underexploited, a kind of “raw potential” passed through “word-of-mouth” networks that promises “true” cultural experiences instead of the overly “touristy” and “over-produced” Caribbean islands, for example.

Which, brings me to my second connection to this very useful metaphor, the overt environmental concerns of the tourist industry. Not unlike the repercussions of mining, particularly gem mining in Sri Lanka, tourism will also have increased environmental concerns for the country (Dissanayake and Rupasinghe 1996; Yapabandara and Curtis 2004). There is of course, again, the overall, global concern of tourism as air travel contributes to increased

11 Although the reference to this article may be dated, Lucas et. al’s 2014 study, “Sri Lanka: Expedition to the Island of Jewels” ended in much the same way, concluding, *again, for* the potential for grown in Sri Lanka’s gem economy, writing that “[t]he island’s gem and jewelry industry displays remarkable vitality and ambition for growth.” However, it is the specific discourse of the 1993 article that I would like to connect to the tourist industry and cultural extraction.
“greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss resulting from habitat loss, consumption of resources, and degradation of various types of environments, such as coastal areas, mountains and wilderness areas, rural areas, and small islands” (Wong 2004, 450). Sri Lanka, a tropical, mountainous island in the Indian Ocean, still containing mostly rural areas, intersects many of these precarious environmental positions, and, therefore, serves as a particularly useful case study to look at the environmental effects of the stranger. Moreover, since I am suggesting that what the tourist map invites the cosmopolitan to extract culture, to buy culture, as if they were choosing from several gems laid out on the table in front of them to inspect with small tweezers, having already been cut and defined, the customers taste already attributed for, I think that we should consider specific locations, as if each were their own mine, rich for cultural extraction.12

Third, as might be ascertained from the “nature” of the business of gem mining, there is the propensity for unequal social stratifications of work and capital and the potential exploitation of individuals, particularly for small mines and quarries in South Asian, as Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt's (2008) work indicates.13 Connecting tourism and development, or tourism as development,

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12 For example, J. Buultjens et. al looks at the management of environmental impacts on the country’s most popular National Park, Ruhuna, or Yala. Buultjens et. al begins by framing the issue of tourism for Sri Lanka as a “developing” country, stating that protected national environments are often seen as a luxury, “since there are generally few opportunities to earn income from them,” and the developing economies of these countries seldom are able to provide sufficient funding for the maintenance of the park (2005, 733). Tourism to these national parks help to fund maintenance of the park, employment and increased funding, and conversation. However, we continue to connect environmental sustainability with sustainable tourism in Chapter 5, which the authors define from World Tourism Organization’s definition of sustainable tourism, “as one that improves the quality of life in host communities, provides high quality experience for guests and maintains the quality of the environment on which they both depend (WTO, 1993),” we might ask how “sustainable” are either one of these projects, really? (2005, 733).

13 Chandana Alawattage also critiques the social structures in Sri Lanka’s gem mines by using Bourdieu’s political economy of symbolic forms and symbolic power to show how “capital is socially structured around particular fields of reproduction, how the field-specific organisation of capital is implicated in the presence and absence of calculative and control practices, how calculative templates and procedures, as symbolic systems, simultaneously perform interrelated but distinct functions of cognition, communication and domination and, after all, how domination, subjugation and resistance are scripted into day-to-day work practices” (2011, 1). Although I do not use Bourdieu’s work to make my analyze of tourism, the cosmopolitan tourist, and/ or cultural extraction, I suggest there
Frances Brown and Derek Hall (2008) write that it “involves exploitation of the labour force because of its low wages, excessive hours or duties … on the one hand, and often seasonal, temporary nature, on the other, and because in many developing countries there is a lack of possibilities for advancement to senior positions” (841). The tourist industry also requires that the distance between earnings of those that work in the industry is far less than the tourists they serve (Büscher & Fletcher 2017). The lack of advancement opportunity can also contribute to foreign or outside control of the industry, “which sees a high proportion of the economic benefits repatriated rather than remaining in the destination” (Brown & Hall 2008, 841). There is also the potential to exploit culture, or bodies that are marked as cultured, as the experience of identity is sold. I will expand upon this in this in the next chapter, but potential exploitation of bodies might also involve a feminization of those bodies and of the labor they are engaged in, as also critiqued in the blurring of the hospitable lines of the cosmopolitan tourist. For example, Darcie Vandegrift (2008) observes that “[e]xperiences that provide leisure, low cost, and authenticity emerge from work coded as feminine, such as nurturing tourists through guided experiences or cooking authentic foods. The production of leisure requires someone to clean rooms, cook meals, and create comfort, even pleasure, for tourists” (779). But if the work is coded as “feminine” then it is also more likely to as less valuable. Which referring back to the tea plantation workers,

are productive overlaps between discussions of domination, subjugation, and resistance in the social stratification of labor between gem mining and tourism.

14 Tourism studies looking at locations in the Global North also notes relatively low wages for tourist employees (Church & Frost 2004; Thrane 2008), and while these observations might allow a general critique of the global tourist industry, at large, I contend that the inequalities produced from tourism in the Global South are specific and unique. Most Global North places, such as London looked at by Church and Frost, are not largely reliant on the revenues of tourism, like other smaller, island nations. In addition, tourism from the Global North to the South as a unique historical development within colonial power relations.
might also help maintain the distance between what these workers can earn and how much the tea costs, which the tourist can afford to purchase.

Moreover, in addition to the qualifications for a “resilient” tourist industry in post-conflict Sri Lanka by J.W. Buultjens et al., the right or access to leisure might also engage discourses of human rights, as Brown and Hall (2008) begin posit that “[t]he ‘right to rest and leisure including …periodic holidays with pay’ has been recognised as a human right by the UN since 1948, and has since found expression in the massive expansion of vacations taken away from home” (839). This “right to leisure” may also connect to the cosmopolitan tourist’s own “right to nature,” particularly as we critique the right to nature as an island paradise within western historical imaginaries. Lefebvre (2011 [1974]), for instance, considers how the right to leisure is also connected to the commodification of “nature,” writing that:

[o]ver the last few years and rather strangely, the right to nature entered into social practice thanks to leisure, having made its way through protestations becoming commonplace against noise, fatigue, the concentrationary universe of cities (as cities are rotting or exploding). A strange journey indeed! Nature enters into exchange value and commodities, to be bought and sold. This ‘naturality’ which is counterfeited and traded in, is destroyed by commercialized, industrialized and institutionally organized leisure pursuits. ‘Nature’, or what passes for it, and survives of it, becomes the ghetto of leisure pursuits, the separate place of pleasure and the retreat of ‘creativity’ (157-158).

The production of and access to “nature” comes into social practice by its own commodification, and we can see, spatially, the availability of mountains, beaches, and parks textually displayed like gems for the cosmopolitan tourist to choose among as an accessible right.

But as we take into account the unequal access to move between the Global North and Global South, and as the tourism industry can disrupt local ways of life ultimately affecting access to holidays and improvements of well-being (Brown and Hall 2008), then is the
availability to come to one and not the other for the right to leisure, a human rights violation?\textsuperscript{15} Or, in other words, I mean to question and acknowledge more than just the lack of leisure allowed by tourist worker, and of course with the exploitative enterprise of the tea plantations in mind, but I mean to also ask is the acceptance of the always, already extended invitation of the cosmopolitan tourist, knowing that they will not or cannot (if the difference matters) extend the invitation to their “hosts,” a human rights violation? Is hospitality a human right? And is cosmopolitanism proof, not of its extension, but of its violation? This question, of course, has been the question of the refugee, but is it also the question for the tourist? There is of course more here to discuss than what at the present moment I have to give. However, the right to hospitality that the cosmopolitan tourist seemingly, and the host does (necessarily) have, might serve as a point of comparison for future discussions.

Moreover, as we understand tourism’s relations to culture as extraction by the cosmopolitan tourist, I would like to highlight the tangibility inferred in this reference. Jazeel (2011) describes, in an overall understanding, that cosmopolitanism is a “universal community of human beings that should be cultivated” (76). But what is involved in a cosmopolitan cultivation? We can turn to the the etymological Latin root of culture, “to cultivate,” “to grow.” But again, just as Jazeel (2011) also argues that “the ‘cosmos’ of cosmopolitanism is no geographically innocent signifier,” so I also argue in extension of this, that culture, as well, is no

\textsuperscript{15} For example, James C. Scott (1990) notes in his work \textit{Domination and the Arts of Resistance}, that as he privileges the issues of “dignity and autonomy,” “[s]lavery, serfdom, the caste system, colonialism, and racism routinely generate the practices and rituals of denigration, insult, and assaults on the body that seem to occupy such a large part of the hidden transcripts of their victims. Such forms of oppression, as we shall see, deny subordinates the ordinary luxury of negative reciprocity: trading a slap for a slap, an insult for an insult” (xi-xii). I am suggesting that, perhaps, there is a similar discursive power relation operating as a hidden transcript in the denial of reciprocity. In this instance, the denial of a reciprocal invitation. Which, again, only further implicates the contingent basis of the tourist’s invitation. On questions of hospitality of refugees, see Derrida 2001.
spatially innocent signifier (78). The root of culture is exactly, that, what can be grown, extracted, held, and, ultimately, consumed. Culture implies the build-up and consumption of material space. Thus, culture is not only an abstract narrative around rituals and imaginaries of populations, it is also spatial. It includes those things that can be held, located, and even mapped. Jazeel (2011) maintains that cosmopolitanism cannot escape its own historically-contingent shadow of Western consciousness, so I suggest that the idea of “culture” itself cannot escape from its own Western-developed ideology which continues to perpetuate the idea that culture is something that is “grown,” “extracted.” Therefore, as we reference “culture” our own language betrays the motivation to consume. This is significant, particularly, as when we talk about, not just consumption of culture abstractly, the consumption of particular places and geographical locations, of strange environments and natures. For example, John Urry (1995) describes that, first:

places are increasingly being restructured as centres for consumption, as providing the context within which goods and services are compared, evaluated, purchased and used. Second, places themselves are in a sense consumed, particularly visually. Especially important in this is the provision of various kinds of consumer services for both visitors and locals. Third, places can be literally consumed; what people take to be significant about a place (industry, history, buildings, literature, environment) is over time depleted, devoured or exhausted by use. Fourth, it is possible for localities to consume one’s identity so that such places become almost literally all consuming places (1-2).

Briefly noting that Urry again indicates the exhaustibility of the environment as places are consumed, I would also like to add that places are consumable as they are spaces of cultivation. It matters *where* and by *whom* culture is cultivated. Thus, what is also cultivated is not just consumable culture, but authenticity (or it is consumable as it is already authentic). But what Jazeel’s quotation also suggests is that humans themselves should be cultivated, and perhaps, even at the point of exploitation, in order to achieve a universal community. Then, consumption
does not just involve culture, but those bodies that make its cultivation their practice (as seen in
the “iconic” display of the tea plantation laborer and the Kataragama cultural performer.) What
are the implications of this cultivation, what is gained or lost, for the sake of universality and
“co-existence?” And, perhaps, more importantly, is it possible to mine culture to the point of
depletion, as with other resources, like precious stones and fossil fuels?

First, as a resource map the tourist map displays culture-as-resource as an available icon, but we might ask, to what extent are we conscious when we are looking at a given resource map of the limitation of that available source? Does the resource map already imply a temporality, within a two-dimensional view, of the scarcity, the time limit, of the resource it already promises? If we assume yes, which I might suggest, then we can also understand how tourist maps contribute to the profitability by implying scarcity. Particularly for those icons that might associated with “nature” or “culture” or other “authentic” signifiers are made to seem scarce by the looming presence of globalization and modernity. As mentioned in the Introduction, things like “culture” and “nature” are seemingly offshored to places of the Global South. Of course this is a limited understanding of modernity, as well as misses that which allows the cosmopolitan to reach those elements of cultural capital are the very processes of capitalist modernity.

Chakrabarty (2000) has that “[t]he problem of capitalist modernity cannot any longer be seen simply as a sociological problem of historical transition (as in the famous ‘transition debates’ in European history) but as a problem of translation as well” (17). The tourist map’s role here in the creation of or marketing space, as a translation machine itself, “is a simple step; the map helps to reproduce the space as unique, exotic, exciting, leisurely or otherwise in contrast from the everyday spaces of work and home” (Del Casino & Hanna 2000, 24). The tourist map creates
spaces that are seen in opposition to everyday life of the cosmopolitan, they are made Outside and Other.

Second, we might additionally ask about the somewhat ambivalent status of culture-as-resource. I have described “culture” above as a kind of natural resource, but I do not mean that what we understand to be “culture” exists outside of human production. Natural, or coming from the “sensual world” as Karl Marx described, implies it is also tied to human work and social relations. For example, Marx (1932) uses the example of a cherry tree as a “not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changed needs” (4). Nature is not outside of industry, social systems, and needs. Needs follow patterns of abundance and scarcity. Therefore, “natural” in my discussion refers to the relationship of extraction that sees “something” as existing beyond human intention as valuable. To be clear, I am not suggesting that there are not rituals, practices, relationships, values, and silences that exist as everyday life. But when these things are translated, in the Western understanding of the word and an object-based relationship, as “cultural” or “authentic” they become valuable and then commodifiable. Practices, sites, and experiences of everyday life become commodities. Büscher & Fletcher (2017) further contend that:

it is crucial to further conceptualize tourism as capital. Based on the process of commodification, tourism becomes capital when the value generated through the commodification process starts circulating to become a dynamic (and uneven) process whereby money or resources are invested in order to generate more money or resources. Tourism capital, then, mobilizes tourism resources as part of a broader circulation of value that inheres in and at the same time supersedes those same resources (655-656).
It is this process of commodification and circulation that Büscher & Fletcher suggest produces perceived authenticity or inauthenticity in tourism as capital resources.

Finally, however, given the social production and commodification of the “natural” value of culture and authenticity, can we discuss tourism as capital in terms of a "resource curse" shared between tourist-dependent economies and extraction-dependent economies (like oil producing states). When compared to fossil fuels, culture has a resource may seem to be limitless? But is it? I contend that as long as culture can be translated into or as “difference,” then it will be continually reproduced and repackaged. However, in order to be desired it must at least appear to be “running out.”

What translates practices of everyday life to commodities is their appearance of difference, as if they are made outside the scope of the “modern” world. Put even more simply in the Western understanding to label something as cultural, is to label it as “different.” For example, Curtis and Pajaczkowska (1994) suggest that “[a]t home the present, in all its complexity and contradiction is oppressively indistinct. Ironically, the experience of ‘being inside’ obstructs processes of commodification while ‘being on the outside’ constitutes objective substance which is then available for consumption. The ‘foreign’, as well as the ‘past’, has the virtue of clarity and coherence a distance that renders it desirable and appropriable” (205).

Culture as a commodity requires the presence of the outside, the presence of difference. The tourist map indicates both of these things as articulating the exotic and pleasureable icons and difference from everyday life of the tourist, but also constitutes and defines the outside. Both in terms of the island (as state) from above through a cosmopolitan eye, but also those spaces which
are outside everyday life, tourist spaces vs. non tourist spaces. This locates the mines of extractable experience as difference from above. But this is not without contradictions.

The questions of limits require first that culture be scare (again, the imaginary of modernization and in articulations of differences), and second there needs to be an agreed upon, general consensus of what counts as “authentic” culture, this is both in contrast to and in relation to the “culture” available to the tourist. It is to this point that capitalism may promise the thing that it may eventually deplete. The mark of “culture” designates what the stranger should experience based on already-conceived availabilites. However, the increasingly commercial and mediated aspects of tourism has many “travelers” searching further for the “real” Sri Lanka, the "real" culture of Sri Lanka that exists outside of these already pre-determined spaces, but in order to experience the “authentic,” places and experiences must be available to the tourist, which will only be marked as such by pre-assumed imaginaries of cultural-ness, or, rather difference. Therefore, while there may be a continuum of intentionalities within global tourism, if capitalism must continually make “authenticity” available to the consumer, then it requires an ongoing reification of what is marked and available within cultural difference and translation. The question then is, at what point is there nothing outside the spaces or experiences defined by culture and difference? Can capitalism eventually exhaust its own supply? As long as “culture” or “authenticity” can be repackaged, and retranslated through difference as valuable, tourism may indeed have an inexhaustible supply.

It is at this point that I want to pose a question along the lines of, “but the issue is if there will be any spaces left uncommodified in the practices of everyday life?” But to even ask such a question already falls into the trap of searching for the spaces “outside” of capitalist modernity
which finds value in tourism capital. But I highlight my inclination to ask such a question in order to show how exactly pervasive the desire for authenticity is. The play between in/authenticity are both at work in our political modernities, whose temporality might be better placed in present tense than past.

4. The dialectical temporality of the postcolonial tourist map

The first time I went to Nuwara Eliya we only had time to stop by one tea plantation, on my day back in 2018 of exhausting touristing, I eventually made it back to the same one. A new company had taken over, and the name had changed. The first time I had gone it was summer, and the surrounding tea areas were surrounded and bursting with flowers. I remember being elated, mesmerized by the green of the hills and the sunshine, and ran through picking flowers. I had them in my hair, I was stuffing them into my journal, and they were spilling between my fingers. This trip was quite different. It was winter, cold and foggy, and I was alone. This time went I went down the stone steps to take a walk along the tea bushes, there were no flowers, and instead there was a group of 4 or 5 women. When I got down to the bottom they came over to me, and taking one of the buds off of the bush, plucked the leaves apart and had me taste it. Above on the lookout, a group of young men appeared, pointing their fingers at us they were talking to one another. I couldn’t really hear or make out what they were saying, but the women starting covering their faces and backing away. They asked for money before completely leaving among the seemingly endless bushes. I didn’t have much immediately without digging further into my bag. What I had was obviously not enough to make them satisfied to equal the knowledge they shared with me, and perhaps what equaled them allowing me to meet with \textit{them}. They were a part of the experience of tea itself, after all. Their image was the image of Nuwara
Eliya itself on the tourist map. But the tourist map promises the consumption of tea and their labor, not necessarily of getting to know them or the knowledge that they have about this place. Given their manner, it was also clear that they were not “supposed” to be there.

The first time I went to Nuwara Eliya I found it as one finds it on a map. It was located and experienced at my own pleasure and ecstasy. The second time the map was revealed in its excesses, the exploitation and extraction necessary for the images to emerge on the map to begin with. But neither experience can be discussed as more authentic or inauthentic than the other. The map is something that we are both repulsed by and seduced by. It indicates those things that we both want to experience about a place, but once they get placed as such kitsch toursty icons, then they also are seemingly less authentic. It is then the experience outside of the mapped space that the tourist may desire, but this also means understanding the production behind the articulations. That is to say, the mediated space behind the map.

Like the tangibility of “culture,” once you qualify a thing, place, or experience as “authentic” in an object-based value system then it becomes profitable, because of its implied rarity for authentic culture in modernity. There is no difference between “authentic” vs. “in-authentic” tourist experiences, outside of their mediated, discursive productions. When a tourist travels to anOther place in search of an “authentic” cultural experience, Devine (2017) stresses that it is not only the identity and history of a place that is commodified and consumed, but the hosts of a space are also “products that are bought, sold and consumed” (642-643). In this way we might also describe tourism as the “postcolonial afterlife of authenticity” (Rambukwella 2018, 23).
Within nodes of continued coloniality, authenticity is a production of capitalism that continues in the marketing of the postcolonial state. In tourism, the postcolonial state is often the ghost of the romanticized dreams of its past authentic self. On the tourist economies’ relationships to the global capitalist economy, Curtis and Pajaczkowska (1994) state that “[t]he complexity and fragility of the relationship may account for cynical dismay at the sight of ‘inauthentic’ souvenirs—mass-produced versions of regional artefacts. Tourists are frequently forced to confront the extent to which tourism is a part of an economy that conforms uncomfortably close to the one they left behind” (208). These are also examples of those things, those reified nodes within systems of repetition and difference that are marked and codified as valuable until they no longer seem distinguishable from the market productions the tourists are used to. These systems reconfirms the production of ‘authentic’ culture, and the question of the possible, subsequent exhaustibility of capitalism’s own production. Tourism implies predetermined spaces that are available for experience, but as maps both highlight and hide, this also produces, simultaneously, those things that are not valuable, that which should be ‘overlooked,’ which are erased entirely as the island becomes nothing but possible cultural capital, gems laid out on the table. The implication of this, as Curtis and Pajaczkowska (1994) further indicates, is that what tourist literature, guidebooks, and I am including maps, “fail to mention is all visual evidence of similarity between ‘abroad’ and ‘home’. Reference to hospitals, schools, non-historical civic buildings—all aspects of the social infrastructure of everyday life—is absent except for the phonetic translation of ‘useful’ phrases that indicate an instrumental use of whatever medical, banking, police, transport or administrative facilities are needed by the tourist to sustain his or her more validated experiences” (209).
It is here that I would like to finally conclude the parallel of the tourist map as a resource map of mined gems, not just metaphorically or systemically within issues of possible production and exploitation, but in the map’s literal textual production, where the tourist map of Sri Lanka is a map of jewels, which you can see from Figures 8-10, how Sri Lanka becomes more and more re-iterated as a place of gems, starting with a resources map for sapphires, and progressing until the island is quite literally nothing else but a collection of precious stones laid out and available for the cosmopolitan tourist’s already assume access. The geospatial imaginary of a tourist map shows experiences, places, sites, and even people as valuable gems, and we can extend this system of visibility until all other possibilities are visually and textually erased.

This simultaneous production of visible nodes and the erasures of potential others, I suggest signifies a dialectic temporality, that not only connects the economies of tourist states, but which also parallels that of the position of the postcolonial state. Looking
specifically at the violent dialectics in tourism, Büscher & Fletcher (2017) suggest that

“[t]ourism-as-capital, in turn, is part of this violent dialectic, as can be seen in many
contemporary attempts to try to harness this violence itself as a further source of value by turning
it into tourism attractions” (663). This includes being able to profit off of the scarcity that
modernization creates the desire for, that is, to see things before “it is too late” (Büscher &
Fletcher 2017, 663), whether that is through the seemingly inevitable standardization in
globalization or because of the effects of climate change (and as appropriate, both
simultaneously). If I may, to quote again from the Prospector’s Guide, “the vast gem potential of
the country has been underexplored and underexploited” (1993, 180). Progress, then, would
imply a period of time in which availabilities of the state will be appropriately explored and
exploited. However, in order for these availabilities to continue to produce value within a tourist
economy, in terms of scarcity, experiences and places must simultaneously be imaginatively
not-yet-discovered and about-to-disappear. Therefore, authentic-ness is most valuable when it
can be produced in this temporal liminality. That is, the discourse of “underexplored and
underexploited” as a point of between-ness in more profitable in its promise than the
actualization of the act. We can also see the production of this dialectic, in the in-betweenness

Furthermore, tourism is the ideal industry within the Western spatial imagination for the post colonial state, as tourism’s productive temporality is already assumed under and neatly echoes the conceptualization of the temporality of the post-colonial state. For Sri Lanka, it is both a former paradise, and a paradise already, almost lost. The paradise that existed imaginatively before the war (which puts it near about the time of its colonialism) and the paradise that is already, almost lost to the forces of modernity, and where conservation efforts can intersect between the environmental and cultural as resources that must be saved against progress, but a progress that is also required for any nation state. The tourist map of Sri Lanka is only another reiteration of the cartographic anxiety produced in textual and spatial narratives of the geographic space once defined as colony, and perceived nation.

These temporalities, inevitably, also connect to the issues revolving around what Dipesh Chakrabarty (2011) has described as the “culture/economy continuum” within development and capitalist discourses, that is, where “culture” and “economy” become exclusive points on a continuum of progress where a society moves away from “culture” towards “economy” (28). This is not dissimilar from the continuum of the “authentic” vs. kitsch tourist spaces, but also as I have already argued, “culture” as we conceptually understand this discursive formation, does not exist outside of its ability to hold value, so such continuums already exists on scales of value, which is of course to say, a scale of potential commodities. Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. (2003) observe of tourist maps that:

[the everyday/exotic, modern/traditional, and disciplinary/resistance dualisms are not merely signs of tourism, but of the individuals who perform within, reproduce, and destabilize these spaces and categories. Second, the tourism map represents the tensions]
among those supposed dichotomies through its depiction/creation of certain identities as parts of tourist sites, its imperfect concealment of other social actors (especially tourism workers), and its images themselves” (xxii).

The tourist map produces these potential commodities, however, as a visible articulation, where culture-economy are produced, not as a continuum, but again in a similar simultaneous dialectic, and it is the geographic simultaneous-ness of these various dichotomies in relation to the postcolonial state that I wish to stress. Roger Lee (2011) states that “[c]entral to the meaning of ‘postcolonial’ is, surely, space—and, therefore simultaneity. The colonial is about relations across and within spaces—both relational and territorial—rather than relations through time—and hence chronology. Indeed a chronological approach lays stress on the colonial as a defining moment and so defines post-colonial in terms of that moment” (65). The “post-colonial” is itself a dialectic, it points both ways simultaneously in Western, horizontal temporalities, an articulation of past-future, produced in the in-betweeness. Tourist economies, perhaps we might say everywhere, relay on dialectical articulations of commodification, but within cultural tourism of the postcolonial state, we can see how these positions only aide in reifying the temporality of the former colony within a spatial imaginary that the cosmopolitan tourist can still interact within formations for which she is already familiar. This of course should indicate particular power relations within global economies, as well as, in interactions of individuals.

Within the dialectical temporality of the tourist map, the availability of culture is its own enlightenment myth. Progress is always already regression. Huri Islamoglu (2016) observes and suggests that given:

the intense experience of globalization of interaction among people in different world regions through trade, immigration, travel is bound to render absolute binary visions of the world into the west and its ‘Other,’ notwithstanding the continuing grievances incurred earlier as well as certain archaic reflexes on the part of the West harking to former patterns of dominance. The binary vision had been central to Western world
supremacy; with that supremacy in doubt, its model of global market model questioned, we may begin thinking of a world of, shared histories, shared concerns, while solutions remained specific and political (60).

However, until this point of perhaps, almost shared world of histories, concerns, and solutions produces itself in some other unforeseen formation, I suggest that the tourist map remains as evidence for the perpetual articulation of in-betweenness of postcolonial states and economies.

The tourist map of the postcolonial state indicates a various palimpsests of dialectical temporalities of Western progress, authentic experiences / tourist experiences, culture/ economy, untouched paradise/ overexploited places, developing/ developed, and of course, colony/ nation state, the myths and promises of Enlightenment, laid out spatially on a single field.

Chapter 3: The Invitation

“*There is no foreign land; it is the traveller only that is foreign, and now and again, by a flash of recollection, lights up the contrasts of the earth.*” —Robert Louis Stevenson

1. The Invitation: the Sri Lankan tourist map as assumed hospitality

The first two chapters have provided the foundation of critique of this project. First, from Chapter 1, that the tourist map reconfirms the state, specifically the island-state. Second, from Chapter 2, that the tourist map also reconfirms what is within the state, as the “exotic” treasures of the East narrative continue to reproduce potentially exploitative and extractive power relations. In this third chapter, I suggest further that in addition to the role of resource map that the tourist map operates as invitation to both the state and its contents. As prefaced in the Introduction, my use of and investigation of “invitation” comes from the politics of Derridean hospitality/ hospitality, which will be further developed here. The investigation of the already assumed and accepted invitation to come and experience from the tourist map will require considerations of hospitality and cosmopolitanism. Additionally, I consider how this
pre-accepted and assumed access to “paradise” reveals the tourist’s expectations of experiences, including her hosts, which are often marked on gendered and racialized lines. In order to investigate these racialized and gendered tourist geographies, I further insert my own experiences of travel in Sri Lanka in this chapter. What this means for me is critiquing not only my own privilege and access to particular spaces in Sri Lanka, but also my desires, and the ways in which these self-observations on desire and access can speak to the accountability of Whiteness in international tourism.

Describing Sri Lanka’s travel industry Greg O'Hare and Hazel Barrett (1993) write that:

Labelled ‘Paradise on Earth’ by visitors and residents alike, Sri Lanka possesses spectacular indigenous resources. A rich cultural heritage with Buddhist festivals and ancient monuments, high-quality scenic landscapes, pleasant tropical lowland as well as temperate mountain climates, safe beaches, and significant wildlife endowment including a number of designated nature reserves, are some of the island’s chief attractions (438).

Travel promises certain things, we displace ourselves with already pre-inscribed ideas of what we will find there, at this Other place. Perhaps, it might be argued, that we even have a “clearer idea” of these expectations through increased social technologies and subsequent networks that go along with them, including Instagram photos, advertisements, and online reviews. However, I suggest that this witnessing and relating of Other places back “home” also has a very particular historical resonance through imperial and colonial modes of representation and narrating. For example, the promise, here by Sri Lanka as ‘Paradise on Earth’ did not develop neutrally nor innocently through years of tourists and travelers visiting the island, but is reflective of a much longer history of the narrative and mapping of the ‘exotic Other.’ Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012), for example, has said of travel writing more generally that:
Traveller’s tales had wide coverage. Their dissemination occurred through the popular press, from the pulpit, in travel brochures which advertised for immigrants, and through oral discourse. They appealed to the voyeur, the soldier, the romantic, the missionary, the crusader, the adventurer, the entrepreneur, the imperial public servant and the Enlightenment scholar. They also appealed to the downtrodden, the poor and those whose lives held no possibilities in their own imperial societies, and who chose to migrate as settlers. Others, also powerless, were shipped off to the colony as the ultimate prison. In the end they were all inheritors of imperialism who had learned well the discourses of race and gender, the rules of power, the politics of colonialism. They became the colonizers (8-9, emphasis added).

Smith particularly indicates in this passage that the desire for images and narratives of the Other had wide and popular appeal across socio-economic statuses and class relations. What remains consistent throughout all these different positions, the voyeur, the soldier, the romantic, the missionary, the crusader, the adventurer, the entrepreneur, etc. is the desire for knowledge about the exotic Other. Although, perhaps, not explicitly invaders, through the consumption of these images and narratives, everyday individuals were a part of the colonial project. In today’s world of social media, online reviews, and the internet, more generally, the dissemination and coverage of images and narratives of travel destinations remains wide and various. In the Sri Lankan contexts, thanks to images, stories, and maps the idea and expectation of the island paradise is already assumed before the tourist leaves home.

The association between islands and paradise is also indicative of a historically develop Western spatial imaginary (see Introduction and Chapter 1). Melanie A. Murray (2009) discusses the myth of the island paradise in both the context of the Caribbean islands and Sri Lanka, and traces how the notion of
“paradise” changed from a religious context to an economic one, where it eventually became a justification of many exploitative economic enterprises, including slavery (xv). It appears, given O’Hare and Barrett tourist description of Sri Lanka, that this economic context of paradise continues as a marketing tool, successful in that it still appeals to the Western imaginary and desire to experience the Exotic. In order to further critique and explore the continued desire of the exotic Other in Western spatial imaginaries in the notion of “island as paradise,” I consider the modalities and representations associated with the tourist map and the subsequent neocolonial position of the cosmopolitan tourist.

Figure 3.1 depicts a fairly standard tourist map, notice its similarities to Figure 2.2, but also compare it to Figure 3.2, a “Pleasure Map of Ceylon,” which is currently sold as a retro postcard in Colombo. This Pleasure Map is dated at 1948 (also the year of Sri Lankan independence), and labeled as part of the Government Tourist Bureau Ceylon. Although the styles of drawings are different, the representative icons are virtually the same across the 70 years. It is not merely the tourist maps themselves today that market Sri Lanka as an ahistorical paradise or pleasure island, but it is also the spatiotemporality as indicated over the decades of these imagined geographies. It remains a perpetual paradise, an “endless summer” (see Figure 3.3).

For the West, notions of paradise do not remain in the abstract, but they are intimately a part of our geospatial and social imaginaries of a place, as well as tied to historical, social, and cultural contexts, e.g. religious to economics. The spatial imaginaries of paradise also induce
particular temporalities, as well. Paradise promises a temporality of halted or stopped time, that the fast-paced “real world” exists away from paradise, away from this place. This of course comes with its own notions of power relations, particularly in terms of development. States, most often island states, labeled and marketed as “paradise,” again like the Caribbean and the exotic east island of Sri Lanka, are simultaneously made to be outside and not a part of the ‘real’ world. Additionally writing on travel narratives, Claire Pajaczkowska and Barry Curtis (1994) observe that “[t]he leisure of the visitor becomes the temporal register of the place. Rueful reflections on the unhurried, uncultivated pleasures of the exotic are also a celebration of the power relations that underpin the historically constituted privilege of visiting” (201). The assumed leisure and pleasure that awaits the visitor is a part of the production of paradise-as-commodity, which only further articulates issues involved in power relations in postcolonial states. Given Pajaczkowska and Curtis’ description of paradise as “unhurried” and “uncultivated,” paradise is synonymous with “undeveloped” and even “pre-modern.” Investigating the politics of tourist maps, Rob Shields (2003) reinforces this point by stressing the pre-conceived notions or narratives that tourists have on a given place/
space. He writes that “[t]he preexisting elements of the place-myth must be recast as pleasurable if they are not already deemed. In effect, this comes down to providing illustrations of possible pleasurable coordinations between tourists’ bodies and the site itself...In this process, tourism maps, tourist itineraries, and illustrations such as postcards and media images are central” (Shields 2003, 10). Tourist maps are an invitation to paradise. Tourism promises stability, both internally and externally. To the tourist it represents the state to the world as “modernized, benevolent, and hospitable,” all qualities, as Liza Keānuenuoekalani Williams and Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez (2017) note, of a matured colonial territory (675). 16 Tourist maps are a part of shaping such place-myths. The extended invitation of the tourist map helps to perform the hospitalities necessary for the pleasure of the cosmopolitan tourist, who requires the right balance between modern comfort and “exotic” experiences/pleasures. For example, Figures 2.2, 3.1, and 3.2 contain icons suggesting the “exotic:” temples, dancers, wildlife, but there are also images of trains, airplanes, and white bodies enjoying the sun.

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One tour company, aptly named *Invite to Paradise*, for Sri Lanka and the Maldives makes this invitation to paradise quite literally. On their page advertising their “Chaffeur-Guided Tours” they juxtapose images of the smiling, English-speaking (more on language below) Sri Lankan drivers next to and in their cars lines with another retro-style tourist map, with their brand “invite to paradise” in the corner (see Figure 3.4). Even while promoting modern comfort (and safety) there is still evidently a need to also play up the romanticized nostalgia of past travel. Again, see the dialectical temporality from Chapter 2. However, in either depiction the desire of paradise and the expectation of the friendly Native host, remains unchanged.

Moreover, it is exactly this historically constituted privilege of visiting and combined with the historically constituted privilege of narrating and voyeurism (as indicated by Smith) that is simultaneously indicated by the tourist map. Again, mapping comes from a very particular colonial and imperial history. In her book *Decolonizing methodologies: research and indigenous peoples*, Smith (2012) considers the connections between imperialism
and the right to knowledge production, including the relations established in the knowledge produced from maps. She writes that “[m]aps of the world reinforced our place on the periphery of the world, although we were still considered part of the Empire. This included having to learn new names for our own lands. Other symbols of our loyalty, such as the flag, were also integral part of the imperial curriculum. Our orientation to the world was already being redefined as were being excluded systematically from the writing of the history of our own lands” (Smith 2012, 34). The right to name and label places contribute to the production of place-myths. This right and justification to place was patriarchal and paternalistic as it was imperial, mapping and naming were also a part of the civilizing project. In mapping practices place-myths are not just for the stranger, but their would be “hosts” as well. The intersections of imperialism, mapping, and knowledge production can still be seen in the continued geospatial imaginaries of the island paradise and the right to access it.

It is the tourist map of Sri Lanka, even through kitsch icons and symbols, such as temples, palm trees, and surfers, that operates with already-given assumption as a place of paradise and the exotic Other. That is, I suggest that the tourist map operates as an *invitation* of the cosmopolitan tourist, an invitation that does not have to explain nor narrate itself as paradise, but that can offer itself as such through an embedded extended hospitality from the imagined exotic Other. I maintain that the cosmopolitan tourist is a neocolonial position in so much as we understand her as developing from the same modes of historical voyeurism and colonial power relations of those that have had the ability and privilege of traveling, seeing, and naming.

My focus in this chapter on conceptualizing the cosmopolitan tourist again follows the line of inquiry of Part I on the ontological and colonial legacy of tourist mapping practices. Such
a focus on this position, both as a figure and point of view (top-down) does risk erasing the agency of the Sri Lankans working in the tourist industry and the ways in which they profit, make livings, are exploited, negotiate, and navigate within their own careers. It might be generally stated that Part I of this project functions and critiques at the risks of erasure. But this is also the purpose of Part I as well, to see the ways in which coloniality continues to function in our imaginaries of other spaces, and the ways in which these associated narratives and images gain profit in the international tourist economy. Part II considered, while still concerned with ongoing coloniality, the ways in which Sri Lanka is promoted and valued by Sri Lankans.

Therefore, an appropriate investigation of the tourist map includes the position of the cosmopolitan tourist, as the figure that the invitation is extended to. There are many different reasons to travel, but I do not define this position by personal motivations (although I can and do reflect and critique on my own desires). What the position of the cosmopolitan tourist highlights, and what I define the position by, is the ability to travel by means of cultural and monetary capital. I argue that the ability afforded to travel indicates longer histories of access and privilege that also play into gendered and racialized understandings of one another. Using this position to critique the encounters of differences in the mapping of tourist spaces vs. non-tourist spaces offers a theoretical lens to designate different continuums of privilege and indicates a feminist position or critique within international politics.

Investigating the neocolonial practices and representations in Sri Lanka tourist maps, I examine the already-extended-invitation to come as afforded to the cosmopolitan tourist by the tourist map. The tourist-map-as-invitation reflects continued neocolonial power relations in the “new” political economy, as tourist maps have historically developed within imperial and
colonial histories, which includes world mapping as objective scientific productions of knowledge and the Western ‘right’ to label and claim spaces. In Chapter 1, I argued that conditions of possibility for how nation-states were able to interact was limited by the development, including the mapping, of the state through its imperial and colonial histories. In this discussion, the tourist map is very much the same. The ways in which places are presented to the outsider are also conditioned through Western mapping practices. The claim, or offer, of invitation is unique, in many ways, to the tourist map, as compared to the claim of citizenship and borders, which other national, regional, or state-level maps offer, indicating either internal or even denial of movement. Moreover, the tourist map actually resists these claims of citizenship and borders, as the invitation to travel shows these borders to be pervious. This Chapter is a theoretical investigation and critique of the politics of vision and access to place from the cosmopolitan tourist. However, as alluded to in the Introduction, as Part II develops participatory mapping exercises at times challenged the idea of what a tourist map might look like, but others, particularly those working directly with the tourism industry reproduced a version of the kind of maps seen so far in this project. In such moments, both the resources of and invitation to place remained the same.

Unlike other mapping practices, the narrative portrayed by tourist maps is less about state citizenship and/ or visa legislation, but more about citizenship of the global economy. The figure of the cosmopolitan tourist helps to question the power relations embedded in the already extended and accepted right to come and experience, as well as the means. This expected invitation of the tourist map follows the formation of hospitality more general in tourism. Using as their example Hawai’i, Williams and Gonzalez (2017) state that “tourism – with its
discourses of invitation and its stratified economies of extraction – has smoothed over colonial occupation and its legacy of a racialized and classed society” (669). Tourist maps are an example of how these discourses of invitation and extractive economics are still operating within imperial power relations within racialized, classed, and even gendered lines. They need only be read as such.

Therefore, this chapter is not only about the mapping of exotic space, but the subsequent narrative of the “exotic” body, as the “Native” woman. In the experience and extraction of pleasure, the notion of modern and contemporary paradise brings sunbathers to Sri Lankan’s beaches. Traditional Western bathing suits and the subsequent performance in the mass display of white skin appears to contribute to an oversexualization of these bodies. But there also appears to be an ahistorical figure of the exoticized “Native” woman, which may contribute to issues involving sex tourism (as it was indicated a problem by a member of the Ministry of Tourism). The contrast of the white woman’s body as the seeker of paradise and pleasure and the native woman as often the symbol of hospitality and service, parallels, I suggest, a historically, masculine and imperial right to invitation and pleasure and what those symbols of pleasure are. Karen Wilkes (2013) examines the promotional and racialized material of Sandals beaches, and suggests “that images may not be received in the way that the producer of the image intended, nevertheless, there is a specific (class, race, and cultural) position from which tourism images tend to be produced and such representations, if not critiqued, are in danger of being taken at face value and applied universally. Images are a signifying practice” (34). Maps and images are productions of power, and the “[m]apping [of] tourism space is concomitant with the mapping of bodies, performances, and various tourism practices” (Hanna and Del Casino 2003, xxvi).
Therefore, in order to highlight the historically hyper-masculine view from nowhere as produced by the map and the subsequent right to claim and enter space, I look at the right to bodies as they parallel the hospitality and pleasure in the already extended and accepted invitation of the tourist map, via Matthew H. Edney’s indication of the pornography of cartography (2007).

In order to critique the power relations within this invitation, and the subsequent effects/affects on positions of hospitality, I question the position of access and mobility of the cosmopolitan tourist. This must include, first, looking at how spaces are mapped as tourist and non-tourist through spatialization processes, such as tourist maps, but also the bodies that simultaneously move through and inhabit those spaces. Often times this will also include a racialized and sexualized mapping and reading of bodies in space. Second, I examine how the experiences of “authenticity” give way to the positions of guest and host in Jacques Derrida’s notion of hospitality and hostility, particularly the ways in which the tourism economy and the cosmopolitan tourist blur and reconfigure these positions. Third, framed within the story of the Mount Lavinia hotel, I consider the performance of these hospital power relations as they give way to the feminization of the host position, where the host emerges as a point of leisure and pleasure for the guest. Finally, I conclude by considering the ethics of both moving through and mapping spaces of

differences, and the role of accountability for the cosmopolitan tourist.

The figure of the cosmopolitan tourist is my contribution to ongoing discussions of cosmopolitanism, and specifically the ways in which the power relations of this position parallel those of the tourist map. In discussions of hospitality, the lines between host and guest continually are made suspect. This position reveals a secret, the stranger was always, already invited. The map was produced through the tourist's own narratives of assumed access from violent histories of colonial cravings and consumptions. The tourist map both bears witness to this secret and is manifestation of these violent geographies of proximity. The map is both a reminder of the secret, and is also a part of the forgetting. Because, indeed forgetting is required

2. The viscosity of Whiteness in mapping tourist and non-tourist places

Carla Guerron Montero (2011) further observes that "tourism and popular media images often reproduce simplified, culturally uniform images of paradise-like places, characterised by exoticism and exuberance," which are not unconnected to a European colonial history that sees, particularly the Caribbean islands "as lands of plenty, as never changing and timeless" (21). Most often in Western tourism, again as promoted with the Caribbean islands, paradise is also associated with beaches. As perceived paradise, Sri Lanka’s beaches are one of its main

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17 The “truth” of the cosmopolitan tourist requires forgetting of the construction of the invitation, of the relations that formed it to begin with in order to have a subject at all that can be called the cosmopolitan tourist. Nietzsche writes, “[o]nly by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live with any repose, security, and consistency” (4).
attractions. It is also where most people will spend their remaining days before heading back to Colombo and flying out. These are spaces desired by the cosmopolitan tourist, promising certain temporalities of leisure and halted time, itself being “timeless” as noted by Montero. As the cosmopolitan tourist myself, with pre-assumed invitation and access, it was always in my head that I would go to the beach. I would go down South, to Galle, to Unawatuna and spend some days. I would go to observe the tourists who partake in the most common and perhaps famous of Ceylon’s attractions, the beaches themselves. I would go and partake in these pleasures myself, which would also appear to be, at least one of, the most passive, indulgent, and consumptive of tourist locations. But as research, interviews, and site visits took priority, I was running out of time, and at the last moment I decided to forgo the South and do a day and a half on a beach at the Mount Lavinia hotel. I booked the hotel, because in trying to stay at a lot of different kinds of hotels, it was one of the oldest and “grandest” but not having been recently renovated like the Galle Face hotel, it also was not as expensive. My fellowship money was also running out. Even so, it matters little for the figure of the cosmopolitan tourist how she affords access to tourist spaces, the point is that she can. And that space is always opened to her, already waiting for acceptance of the invitation.

The “grandness” of the hotel is also associated with its colonial past, a past that is promoted, arguably to the point of nostalgia, and particularly for the discussion in this chapter, of the colonized, hospitable servant. Figure 3.5, for example, indicates a hotel worker in colonial-era dress opening the door for a presumably white, Western tourist. This is a picture of welcome and hospitality. But even as a traveling researcher, in a mode of critique, I was not personally immune to the desires of beach pleasures or the comforts of such a hotel. I too was
looking forward to the sun and the heat, and at least a couple of hours on a beach. Taking advice from my friend, Ranitri, a native Colombonese who was finishing up her Master’s of Architecture at Columbia University in New York, I also went there because there was a private beach. With a private beach the chance was greater that I could be there in swimsuit and would not draw too much unwanted attention. Sri Lanka’s beaches were all supposed to be public. But with the 1,000 rupees they were charging non-guests for towels, it seemed there was a loophole created in order to maintain this particular tourist space. That is, it seems to matter little if particular beaches are actually private or not if the tourist vs. non-tourist spaces are still maintained by pricing “unwanted” individuals out. Not unlike the tourist map itself as it promotes tourist vs. non-tourist space, this is another example of the ways in which tourism attempts to smooth-over imperial legacies of race and class, as noted by Williams and Gonzalez above.

The designation between tourist space and non-tourist space happens in various forms and mappings. If it is not “legal” to mark such spaces it can be achieved through the pricing out of unwanted individuals. Many tourist sites charge five times as much for foreigners than local Sri Lanka nationals (this is a price markup that is reflected in most things, including less formalized pricing such as tuk-tuk rides), which “ensures a healthy revenue stream from foreign tourism whilst not economically denying access to Sri Lankan citizens” (Jazeel 2013, 74). But even so, some places are economically denied to Sri Lankan citizens. Or, sometimes it is not even necessarily about the ability to purchase into these spaces, because when, as Ranitri’s father explained of his own experiences, Sri Lankans want to go to particular places including, hotels, restaurants, etc. the same affordance of hospitality is not always extended. Sri Lankans may
choose not to go to these places, because, as he stated, “why would we go where we are unwelcomed?”

There is also, of course, a racialized component to hospitality and the mapping of tourist vs. non-tourist spaces. Who is welcomed and who is not, and how it is determined is often determined by perceptions of race, and the associations of perceptions of paradise and those that have the pre-extended and accepted invitation to it. I have been in hotels and restaurants in my years of travel in Sri Lanka that I would have never have been allowed, given my own attire from travel and exhaustion, if I was perceived to be anything other than White and Foreign.

Whiteness and race more generally, as Arun Saldanha (2007) argues, are “viscous.” Saldanha’s ethnographic work investigated the beach and drug tourism of Goa, India, and how different bodies interacted (or not) with one another in these exceptional spaces. Saldanha (2007) suggests that “[v]iscosity enables a rigorous grasping of social spaces by putting the dynamic physicality of human bodies and their interactions at the forefront of analysis” and that in basic terms race, including Whiteness, work by “sticking together, and its relative impermeability” (5). It is the viscosity of race that helps to explain “why music, ways of dancing, clothing, architecture, the beach, stereotypes, the pschohistries of colonialism, the distribution of light and money power together make white bodies stick and exclude others” (Saldanha 2007, 50). The viscosity of race helps to account for why certain activities such as sunbathing become racialized, often as a White activity that additionally gathers associations of leisure and class. Like the cosmopolitan tourist, the sunbather can afford time. The viscosity of Whiteness also helps me to account for my own ease and security in wearing a swimsuit in places like Mount Lavinia, but the simultaneous uneasiness of other bodies in being in those same or similar spaces. Like the
cosmopolitan tourist, the sunbather can also afford space. For example, before heading down to Unawatuna for the first time, some years back, a Sri Lankan friend indicated their uneasiness of going down there because of how “White” it was. What Saldanha (2007) describes specifically to Goa in terms of dancing and use of psychedelics as “techniques of the self,” beach tourism is also a thing “whites do because it is potential to the historical-geographic construction of whiteness. If Indians, [or in this case, Sri Lankans,] or other darker-skinned bodies engage in these practices too, they risk looking awkwardly derivative” (56). The “beach is for sunbathing… it is a space for whites” (Saldanha 2007, 113). It is not only the viscosity of Whiteness in terms of its historically, colonial articulations that produce tourists spaces as spaces of exception, but it also allows them access to those spaces. Here, Whiteness and the pre-assumed invitation of the tourist map parallel one another as each indicates tourist space.

3. The parallel power relations between Whiteness and the tourist map

In the acceptance of those that are permitted to move through various spaces, the notion of hospitality and the invitation should be critiqued. The tourist map is representative of the power relations of the already pre-given assumption of hospitality and the already-accepted invitation extended to the cosmopolitan tourist, indicating those spaces and experiences that are mapped out for those potential bodies, over others. Navigating these places, as someone who is accepted, to whom the invitation is extended, requires, critical reflection. In the inclusion and exclusion of bodies in tourist spaces, identities are both claimed and produced just as much as the spaces that are marked. As Vincent J. Del Casino and Stephen P. Hanna (2000) observe, “tourism maps do not only play a role in the production of tourism spaces; they contribute to the reproduction of identities” (24). Tourism helps to determine what is “desirable, acceptable and
possible” from the Other or “host,” as its development includes, “particular relationalities, networks and particular forms of life and bodies – especially the ones that it depends on for labor and patrimony and privileges others in favor of commodification, sexualization and privatization dynamics” (Devine and Ojeda 2017, 614). It is further the mapping of these tourist spaces which can help to shape the expectations and desires for experiences, places, and people.

In terms of the cosmopolitan tourist and her relations to alternative temporalities as promised, travel also promises a departure from the normal, everyday time of home and work. Not only does the ‘trip’ constitutes a lapse in the regular rhythms of mundane existence, it leads to a place where time ‘stands still’ or is reversed into a utopian space of freedom, abundance and transparency. Like Carnival, this movement implies an inversion of everyday order and, for the traveller, offers a vicarious participation in the pleasures associated with higher status, symbolically marked by exalted points of view, exclusive spaces and privileged services (Curtis & Pajaczkowska 1994, 199).

The pleasures of paradise implies the ability to afford leisure and hospitality. Tourism, as a capitalist industry, “exploits gender and racial inequalities and uneven development in capitalism’s and the market’s quest for cheap labor and exploitable resources. Yet, in tourism, unlike most industries, the identity and practices of a place, its people and natures are objects of consumption” (Devine and Ojeda 2017, 610). Therefore, the promised time of the ‘paradise’ is collapsed, or, at the very least, intimately associated with the nostalgia for a past where the power relations between traveler and native were indicated by the spatial roles each one filled, that between the guest and serving host (if not servant all together). Hospitality from both places and people are also assumed in the right to access to a tourist space, indicated by tourist or “pleasure” maps.
The indication of the Guest and Native can also be depicted in racialized and sexualized terms in more overt promotional materials. For example, Wilkes (2013) examines the Sandal’s resort wedding promotions in the Caribbean, which she suggests constructs the “white female as the epitome of beauty which have been specifically positioned within the discursive formations of the Caribbean region as a luxury destination in which to host white weddings” (33). The mediation of the white female body in the Caribbean is made to ensure that her body “is not out-of-place” (Wilkes 2013, 42, emphasis added). And in many ways, she is very much in place, this is her space, particularly as colonial power constructions are re-articulated and re-performed in the mapping of tourist geographies. The performance of hospitable native begins in the expectation, the promise of what is to come from the trip itself. Wilkes considers the use of racialized images of black bodies serving and pampering the white guests, and I suggest that the act of hospitality is not just indicated by tourist brochures and online promotional stock photos, but that this performance also gets embodied in the promise and initiation of tourist experiences.
The tourist map works under the assumption that these are one of the many things available from the tourist experience; that is, it is about the agency of the (white) guest’s body on the visiting site. Often the only icons indicating Sri Lankans are icons such as a cultural performer or a tea plantation worker, an authentic host that, either way, is connected to the pleasure or entertainment of the guest.

In the case of tourism in South Asia, Nazrul Islam (2012) considers the marketing and branding of ayurveda, an ancient and holistic branch of Indian medicine, into spa and health tourism, in what he refers to as “New Age orientalism” (220). Islam (2012) concludes that the “commodified version of ayurveda, which has been developed in the West as part of ‘Wellness and spa culture’, has become popular among the affluent middle class in India and abroad today, and through this the West has claimed and justifies authority over Eastern medicine” (220). This New Age orientalism of spa culture reflect an ongoing trend in the global tourist economy in postcolonial states (from the Caribbean to South Asia) of the temporality promised to the cosmopolitan tourist of a non-temporality, a time outside of time, that reflects the relaxation, leisure, and pleasure afforded to the pampered guest, or more subversively as the position of the one who is pampered by the hospitality of the Native (in formations of colonial nostalgia). And similar to the promotional materials of the Caribbean, the white woman’s body is made to appear not-out-of-place, or might I say time, given the spatio-temporal context of “ancientness” in ayurveda. These “services” are afforded to her, and she becomes more “enlightened” for having indulged in the exotic, ancient wisdom of the East. She is invited, and is already expected.

Continuing my role as the cosmopolitan tourist, I made reservations for one night at the Siddhalepa ayurveda hotel in Mount Lavinia. I had booked the hotel on the advice from Rantiri’s
father, who indicated that he and his wife were frequent visitors of the one in Wadduwa (and were welcomed). (Following such a suggestion might also indicate the class, the who I have access to in Sri Lanka, reflective of my own position and relationship to travel in Sri Lanka.) With the promises of wellness and mindfulness from the website promoting yoga, meditation, and ayurvedic services I was surprised to find also, upon checking in, that more of the residents seemed to be engaging in the pleasure of the rooftop pool and full bar. The hotel was able to provide a totalizing tourist space, where the pleasure of the escape of time gave way to sunbathing, swimming, drinking, and the soothing massages and treatments of the East, which awaited downstairs. Parallel to the desire and lure of the beach, I wanted to participate with each of these things. I was disappointed when I had time enough just for an appointment with the doctor for a diagnosis, and left with some tea and instructions to not eat so many chilies.

As the cosmopolitan tourist, my position indicates particular invitations and desires within degrees of privilege. At times indulgent in these privileges and pleasures, at times Orientalist, and most of the time ignorant. My own relationship to mapped tourist space illuminates many of the structures of coloniality that I critique. Del Casino and Hanna (2000) state of mapped tourist space that:

> [t]he exotic icons are dependent on everyday images of leisure. This is necessary so that the tourist can read and act within a set of temporarily fixed identity markers. Similarly, the staged acts of the tourism workers highlight the performative nature of identity and demonstrate that these acts are neither authentic nor inauthentic. They are instead the result of the temporary suturing of particular performances to particular identity categories in a map space (40).

But I cannot also stand above this mapped space, my own identity and performances within designated tourist spaces are only possible, that is the critique itself is only possible, as it is a
critique of my own movement within these spaces. The ease of which individuals could indulge in swimming, sunbathing, drinking, and ayurveda indicates spaces that are afforded to the cosmopolitan tourist, as she is understood in viscously colonial racial ideologies as well. This does not indicate that the activities, both drinking and treatments, are inauthentic or authentic, but they indicate the right to and hospitality of both simultaneously. Moreover, the spaces between tourist and non-tourist space may be mapped as distinct through articulations of presence and absence, but as bodies move through them and interact they are also contradicted. This space appeared to me to be an overtly tourist location, but it was also recommended to me by a local who enjoys the one in Wadduwa (and perhaps this hotel location is “less touristy”). But even as locals and non-White tourists travel more frequently to Sri Lanka, including India and China (discussed in Conclusion), these bodies are not often the ones represented on tourism promotional materials. Contradictions are inevitable in lived space. But the viscosity of race also aides in our discussion of more general patterns of places, including how the viscosity of Whiteness gathers notions privilege and wealth. Entry is afforded because of capital’s viscous gathering of and connection to Whiteness, in this way even when “absent” Whiteness is both seen and sees.

4. The hospitality/ hostility of the Cosmopolitan Tourist

International travel from the Global North to the Global South implies the meeting, the encounter of different and viscous bodies. These encounters offer micro examinations of larger geopolitical relations. Cynthia H. Enloe (2014 [1990]), reflecting on the tourism formula for international development, states, “[f]rom its beginnings, tourism has been a powerful motor for global integration. Even more than other forms of investment, it has symbolized a country’s
entrance into the world community...Tourism entails a more politically potent kind of intimacy” (31). In general, the tourist is not expected to be the adventurer, learn the local language, or adapt to local customs, and that the most that is asked of them is to learn the “strange local currency” (Enloe 2014 [1990], 31). Enloe (2014 [1990]) suggests that this helps to explain when “international technocrats express such satisfaction when a government announces that it plans to promote tourism as one of its major industries. For such a policy implies a willingness to meet the expectations of those foreigners who want political stability, safety and congeniality when they travel” (Enloe 2014 [1990], 31). That is, a country’s investment into the global tourist industry indicates a willingness to agree to, comply with, and continue the expectations of the foreign tourist, but also more generally of the international community. For a small postcolonial state, it seems the script for how and what to promote to the international tourist are often images she has of the country: the hospitable native, pre-modern landscapes, beaches (away from locals), and a place to experience “culture.”

Questions of tourism and travel really are questions for the foreigner, questions “of the foreigner,” as Jacques Derrida (2000) rewrites as he draws “the contours of an impossible illicit geography of proximity” (2). Indeed as Derrida (2000) traces the lines between the liminal space of hospitality and hostility (“hostpitality”, 45), mapping the positions of host and guest, of nationalist and foreigner, I suggest that we can further complicate these geographies of proximities and interaction by including the cosmopolitan tourist in the “post” colonial state. Williams and Gonzalez (2017) also use Derrida’s critiques of hospitality/ hostility in their analysis of Hawai`ian tourism, noting that with Derrida’s conceptualization that sovereignty and hospitality are incompatible. Hospitality must limit sovereignty, this limitation “governs the
difference between colonialism’s absolute, abstract hospitality – one easily commodified and abused – and a just hospitality that preserves the rights of the host” (Williams and Gonzalez 2017, 680). Colonial relations, then “pervert” hospitality, “keeping intact fantasies of the welcoming native to entrench itself into the “host” society and encroach upon the host’s sovereignty. In other words, hospitality turns on an occluded dialectic of host and hostage in becoming a defense for domination” (Williams and Gonzalez 2017, 673). Derrida (2000) reminds us that the terrible secret that the foreigner bears, which she knows “threatens to place [her] outside the law, situates [her] outside the law in advance,” is that she knows this ritualized invitation and hospitality is of her own making\(^\text{18}\) (39). I suggest that it is the “post”colonial state, here seen as Sri Lanka, that is forced to bear the responsibility of the cosmopolitan’s secret. It is the state that is held responsible for its own positioning within the global economy, and is held in comparison to not only other postcolonial states but also by those forces that made the relations to begin with. Therefore, sustainable tourism should not only be a question for environmental or economic concerns, but there is also the question of socially or culturally sustainable tourism (Williams and Gonzalez 2017). The constructed invitation, the right to universal hospitality implicates the secrets of the foreigner. Thus, the positions between host and guest do not sit restfully into the same positions of foreigner and host.

My figure and position of the cosmopolitan tourist parallels the contradictory cosmo-politics of the state in two ways. The first, is as Derrida (2001) critiques of the unlimited hospitality that is promised by cosmopolitanism, but which is ultimately always controlled by the

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\(^{18}\) Derrida (2000) uses the figure of Oedipus to orchestrate this point, as his guilt of incest and patricide manifests in the blame of Thebes, and it is Thebes “the city-unconscious, the unconscious at the the heart of the town, the polis, the political unconscious (this is why the accusation incriminates without incriminating: how could you put on trial an unconscious or a city, where neither of the two could answer for their acts)—it is Thebes, then, which unawares, bears the responsibility for the crime” (39).
state. Similarly, the cosmopolitan tourist appears to promise unlimited access into the state, but is ultimately always controlled by the access of capital. Second, the cosmopolitan tourist indicates a contradiction in the relations between “hosts” and “guests.” For example, Darcie Vandegrift (2008) adds further critique to the positions of “host” and “guest,” as she observes women moving from “First to Third World” countries to work in tourist industries, and as women move “from less affluent to wealthier Third World countries,” that “[t]ourism workers do not fit neatly into a pattern of Third World ‘hosts’ and First World ‘guests’” (779). And while these liminal positions do indicate additional nuance between the stranger and host, it is my intention to focus primarily those individuals, as Sri Lankan nationals, are employed, both directly and indirectly, by the tourism of their own country. By indirectly, I mean those more “flexible, informalized, small-scale tourism” sites that Vandergrift (2008) observed in “women’s homes, on the beach, and in local lodging and restaurants” (781). For example, people living near or in tourist locations will rent rooms to tourists, and services like Airbnb are becoming increasingly popular.

The contradiction of “guest/host” is not unique to only the cosmopolitan tourist and visiting country, but a tension that arises with the idea of “host” itself. Derrida (2000) introduces the hostis as both the “as host or as enemy” and the “foreigner (hostis) welcomed as guest or as enemy” (43, 45). We could begin by asking which lines between guest, host, and enemy does the cosmopolitan intersect? Derrida (2000) on the issue of the stranger and language states that “[a]mong the serious problems we are dealing with here is that of the foreigner who, inept at speaking the language, always risks being without defense before the law of the country that welcomes or exiles him” (15). Therefore, the fact that the tourist does not, often, have to deal with this issue, automatically signals a different relation to hospitality. Tourists are often
shielded from issues of language, (e.g. vendors, merchants, service industry workers are often hired for their abilities to speak tourist-appropriate languages) the environment that they visit is always, already anticipating their arrival (hiding of course the historical power structures that brought languages, such as English to these places to begin with). This also indicates quite a degree of mediation that is required between the tourist and the spaces they visit. Often visitors do not speak the “hosts’” language. Curtis and Pajaczkowska (1994) state that the tourist’s interactions “with the ‘other’ culture and country are thereby limited to the non-verbal and are thus markedly different from their experiences in their own everyday lives, where language is the invisible medium of exchange, an element as ‘natural’ and necessary to identification as oxygen is to respiration” (206). As language serves as a mediation point between the host and guest, a point of discursive liminality, it also has the ability to blur the lines between host and guest. The “host” already knows the language of the “stranger,” which already impacts the dynamics of these power relations.

However, it is not only with language that we see the “traditional” positions of host/guest blurred. Derrida (2000) observes that “[n]owadays, a reflection on hospitality presupposes, among other things, the possibility of a rigorous delimitation of thresholds or frontiers: between familial and non-familial, between the foreign and the non-foreign, the citizen and the non-citizen, but first between the private and the public, private and public law, etc” (49). These positions are always being made suspect, as the lines between public and private, citizen and non-citizen, foreign and non-foreign are not “natural” but made through various discourses and procedures. Derrida uses various examples of circulations between states, including email, letters, phone calls, the internet. The cosmopolitan tourist is yet another entity that deforms and
retraces the “frontier between the public and the non-public, between public or political space and individual or family home. The frontier turns out to be caught in a juridic-political turbulence, in the process of destructuration-restructuration, challenging existing law and established norms” (Derrida 2000, 49-51).

Tourist maps parallel these power relations in stimulating desires of a place. The tourist map is also a specific textual representation of these desires of the cosmopolitan tourist. It serves as witness to the contradictory cosmo-politics of tourism. But the cosmo-politics of tourism is also situated with an imperial and masculine history, as we can see with the feminization of the host position.

5. Feminization of the host position:

“Tourism has depended on presumptions about masculinity and femininity. Often women have been set up as the quintessence of the exotic. To many men, women are something to be experienced” (Enloe 2014 [1990], 28).

I ended up only having an hour or so on the beach at the Mount Lavinia Hotel. On my way down, I found some frames which related the hotel’s history. It was established as a governor’s mansion in 1806, when General, Sir Thomas Maitland came to Ceylon and did not find his original occupancy suitable to his rank. “King Tom,” as was his nickname, fell in love with a (half) Sinhalese woman who would become the namesake of the new estate, Lovina. The hotel’s website relates the affair, which was of course not fully permitted by English society in Colombo, in the following manner:

It was in the year 1806 that King Tom built his new residence, a symbol of the power and authority vested in him, as His Majesty’s Governor of the island of Ceylon. Indeed King Tom built a house fit for a king, wherein he fulfilled his greatest desire of creating a pleasure-dome filled with excitement and entertainment to escape the inevitable pressures upon his freedom as Governor, within a rigidly circumscribed colonial English society.
Here within the portals of this house, King Tom first set eyes on a beautiful mestizo dancer, Lovina Aponsuwa, the half Portuguese and half Sinhalese lead dancer of her father’s dancing troupe. As she danced before him, enticing him with her long flowing jet black tresses and fixing his attention with her large, expressive, hazel brown eyes, King Tom was mesmerised. He fell instantly in love with Lovina, for nowhere had he seen such perfection, such beauty, and such grace. Lovina and her dance troupe became regular performers at the Governor’s house. Flattered by the attentions of this high-ranking official, Lovina, the lowly dancer was further elated when, as a token of his growing affection, she learned that he was to name his grand country mansion Mount Lavinia, after her (“HISTORY OF MOUNT LAVINIA HOTEL COLOMBO”).

There was also an underground tunnel built under the mansion to where she lived. Eventually he was “forced” to return to England because of health problems, but:

The Governor, an honourable man, who wanted to do the very best for Lovina within the social mores of the time, presented her with a parting gift: a large piece of land in Attidiya, a village some distance away from Galkissa. Although the departure of King Tom was to naturally seal the end of their love affair, Lovina’s name is remembered as providing the inspiration in naming the Governor’s house. Indeed, it is believed that her descendants still live in the vicinity of Mount Lavinia. The legend is the story of Lovina, how she fervently held the attention, and captured the heart of a distinguished British Governor of Ceylon. To this day, the secret tunnel remains, keeping alive the memory and spirit of the beautiful mestizo dancer, elevated in the popular imagination to ”Lady Lavinia” (“HISTORY OF MOUNT LAVINIA HOTEL COLOMBO”).

The story behind Mount Lavinia, particularly the way that it is narrated here, parallels many characteristics of international tourism today. First, the governor’s mansion, now hotel, is already framed as providing a particular temporality for leisure and pleasure. Second, Lovina represents many tropes and desires for the sexualized Native woman, who is also at the leisure of the guest. And finally, that the guest always has the ability to leave. The access and mobility afforded to the cosmopolitan tourist is not just the ability to visit, but to eventually return.

In this story, the narratives of global tourism only continue to reflect colonial assumptions from North-South relations: for those that are capable of indulging in excitement and entertainment, for those that are capable of both coming and leaving. This story serves as an
example of the intentions, desires, agencies, and potentialities with and between those that travel and those that are travel to. This also indicates when the hospitable native becomes a part of the desired experience of travel itself, while also, potentially hiding the position of access and mobility that many Sri Lankans also have in the international tourist economy. Although “historical,” given the romanticized narrative that surrounds the story of King Tom and Lovina, it seems that this story can tell us as much about the perceptions and ideologies surrounding contemporary travel as the colonial period. Such a narrative should be considered within Roxanne Lynn Doty’s (1996) conceptualization of imperial encounters, which “serve as windows onto more global systems of representation” (3). Even as we consider positions of the tourist and travelers, we should also be concerned with the continued “unquestioned presumptions regarding freedom, democracy, and self-determination as well as identities of the subjects who are entitled to enjoy those things,” as these are also the narratives, assumptions, and values which circulate in an economy of host/guest relations in international tourism within postcolonial states (Doty 1996, 3).

Framing such stories in this way, in what we might call “exotic” romance, seems to indicate a narrative of history that the guest already wants or desires from the place. A continual social contract, where the violences of encounters, including the rape of many native women in colonies across the world, are smoothed over once more by the narratives of hospitality and tourism. It also serves as a connection between the exploration of “exotic” places and “exotic” women. Connecting the right to both places and bodies, Matthew H. Edney’s (2007) looks at the “parallels between pornography and cartography – and especially imperial cartography – in terms of the objectification of ‘other’ landscapes and cultures and their subjugation to an
empowered imperial vision” (90). These observations are only heightened when we consider the colonial relationship with the idea of the Native Woman, as “[t]ourism is as much ideology as physical movement. It is a package of ideas about industrial, bureaucratic life. It is a set of assumptions about manhood, education, and pleasure” (Enloe 2014 [1990], 28).

Maps extend the invitation to a place. Tourist maps not only extend this same invitation to explore, but to also take and experience pleasure. The right to extract pleasure also parallels masculine, imperial vision on women’s bodies. Referring to the continued masculine, imperial gaze from nowhere already inherent within the sciences of geography and cartography (see Introduction), this gaze is capable of objectifying both a corporeal body and a territorial body. But the intersections between the patriarchal right to see, know, claim, penetrate, and take is only exasperated when put into the context of tourist mapping. Wilkes (2013) observes that “[t]ourism images continue to be important for their contributions to the construction of meaning around notions of identity and belonging to different social categories of, race, class, gender and sexuality” (33). Including tourist maps into this discussion of tourist images, we must additionally question the production of identity articulations within the positions of hospitality. For example, Vandegrift (2008) maintains in tourism “leisure, low cost, and authenticity emerge from work coded as feminine, such as nurturing tourists through guided experiences or cooking authentic foods. The production of leisure requires someone to clean rooms, cook meals, and create comfort, even pleasure, for tourists” (779). This is what we might refer to as the feminization of the host position. That is, not only are the lines between host and guests blurred and redefined in the colonial/tourist position, but the role of service that the now guest-host
provides also indicates a level of feminization, as the “host” is at the pleasure and service of the guest.

In addition to the examples above of bodies of color servicing white bodies in the new orientalizing spa culture, one of the first encounters that a tourist has with the “hospitable native” is with, an often, female flight attendant. For airlines it is the first chance to provide service, pleasure, and present “the feminine essence of their nation” (Enloe 2014 [1990], 33). Enloe (2014 [1990]) notes that the airline companies took their cues from the success and hospitality of ocean-liners, and “[i]t was they who first used a racial and gendered division of labor to maximize profits while constructing a notion of leisure” (2014: 33). And as a former Sri Lankan airline advertisement ran: “When your business is business...our business is pleasure” (Enloe 2014 [1990], 33). Advertisements and promotional material are all geared towards promoting a spatio-temporality of leisure, pleasure, and desire. Therefore, leisure and pleasure are promoted from the beginning to the end of the trip--from the point of anticipated departure.

The cosmopolitan tourist further re-defines, and re-traces perceived boundaries of hospitality through this feminization of the ‘host.’ Derrida describes the foreigner and host relations as a ritual between masculinities. For example, Derrida (2000) infers that part of the potential hostility between the two positions is tied to the foreigners potential threat of the masculine sphere of the host. As he writes, “[t]he Foreigner shakes up the threatening dogmatism of the paternal logos...As though the Foreigner had to begin by contesting the authority of the chief, the father, the master of the family, the ‘master of the house,’ of the power of hospitality of the hosti-pets” (5). In tourism hospitalities, however, where do we position the power of the “master of the house,” if the host is already positioned as the supplier of pleasure and desire? The
lines between host-guests are contested in the global tourist industry through the production of feminization of the host position.

Moreover, the feminization of the host position is not just about the effect of pleasure and service for the guest, but also is tied economic and political justifications. As Enloe (2014 [1990]) observes the international tourist industry is labor-intensive, “people who come as tourists need and expect a lot of service,” which means that the cost of wages and distribution of benefits must be considered if companies are going to keep costs down (34). She suggests that women in many societies, “are presumed to be naturally capable at cleaning, washing, cooking, serving,” and “[s]ince tourism companies need precisely these jobs done, they can keep their labor costs low if they can define those jobs as women’s work” (Enloe 2014[1990], 34). What is more, Enloe (2014[1990]) also observes that: “[s]ex tourism is not an anomaly; it is one strand of the gendered tourism industry. While economists in industrialized societies presume that the ‘service economy’, with its explosion of feminized job categories, follows a decline in manufacturing, policy-makers in many Third World countries have been encouraged by international advisers to develop service sectors before manufacturing industries mature. Bar hostesses before automobile workers, not after” (36). As will be discussed in the following chapters is the “good deal” of tourism in Sri Lanka, both in terms of the variety available in a small space and also the exchange rate and cost of tourist experiences. Feminizing the labor of service providers appears to be one way of ensuring the “good deal” is maintained.

Parallel to the issue of language and cultural translations that must always be in consideration in the contact and interactions of strangers, so too must the translations of hospitalities. Therefore, even as I follow the critiques of the titled “feminization” of the host
position, I also acknowledge that this simultaneously infers Western assumptions of the roles of host and guest, as well as an understanding of gendered roles of care and service. That being said, once again the conditions of possibility for how international guests are to be received by the host, can also be linked to the historical process of mapping and the right inferred to by place. This right to place is also reflective of a masculine, even pornographic politics of vision.

Edney contends that there is debate around the term “pornography,” but suggest that the following can be inferred:

- Pornography entails the construction of an unequal relationship between the viewer and the viewed through three mechanisms: the subjection of bodies to a dominating vision, both in creating and viewing pornographic materials; the objectification of the individual by reducing them to certain physical parts that are then taken to define the entire individual; and, the imposition of the viewer’s desire onto the viewed body. All three aspects are integral parts of the modern cartographic ideal (2007: 91).

I would like to add, or stress, another part, which is the notion of perceived pleasure. The pornographic does not have to be actualized pleasure, but it is the perception of wanted and experienced pleasure, which only further connects the lines between pleasure, imperial mapping practices, and global tourism, as circulating around the feminization of the host position. The assumed and already accepted invitation extended from the tourist map, as already mapped and claimed space parallels the right to a body that is viewed as claimed and whose hospitality is already assumed. It is the perception of pleasure that experiences and places are suggested and offered to the tourist.

Additionally, Enloe (2014 [1990]) notes that “[t]he idea that the world is out there for the taking by ordinary citizens as well as adventures emerged alongside the growth of tourism as an industry. World’s fairs, together with museums and travel lectures, nourished this idea” (2014: 25). The right to the world’s spaces and treasures, is parallel to the imperial and patriarchal right
to bodies, as “exotic” bodies have also been put on display with world’s fairs and museum spaces (Muppidi 2012). The woman’s body is another perceived treasure box afforded to the cosmopolitan tourist (see Chapter 1).

The figure, image, and narrative of the Native Woman is standardized and already translated, not dissimilar to the ways in which the tourist map itself is standardized across time periods. For example, consider the contemporary map and the pleasure map from 1948 again. This kind of standardization was also seen in the postcard business in the promotion of the “exotic” (Enloe 2014 [1990]). The “exotic,” the supposedly different from the “everyday,” turns out to be unsurprisingly standard. For example, in Figure 3.7, a 1935 winter cruise promotion, are the two women depicted meant to be South African, Javanese, Malaysian, Ceylonese, or Egyptian? And the answer to that question would seem most appropriately answered with: “does it really matter? ” Not really, because in the
assumed access and pre-given invitation
to the cosmopolitan tourist, there will be
beautiful, exotic women in all of these places. Figure 3.7 is also another
retro-style postcard that was taken from old tourism promotional materials. Again,
the nostalgia indicates the standardization and consistencies across the
spatio-temporalities of Sri Lanka tourism, that images, such as these, can still resonate and are desirable. Edney (2007) further stresses that “[t]he overtly sexualized equivalency drawn between the land and the female body permits the male reader to infuse the territory with desire, desire for control of the land, desire for its ‘treasures.’ The acts of crossing the terrain, of penetrating the interior, as the common phrase has it, and of claiming the treasure can become a sexual act” (95). Images like tourist maps and postcards, and other promotional materials, that depict the “exotic” as simultaneously the place and the female body grant the invitation to enter, to penetrate, or in someway obtain and experience both under a masculine, imperial gaze.

Likewise, in the Mount Lavinia narrative King Tom is given the allowances of a historical figure, while Lovina is reduced to a meer caricature. Their pictures as depicted both on the walls of the hotel and the website (see Figure 3.8) confirm this narrative. His is a
commissioned portrait, while she, perhaps, too lowly for a portrait during her lifetime is rendered clearly in more contemporary times as a sketch of “exotic” beauty (although with very seemingly more Anglo-features). And as she serves a continued and consistent narrative of the Native Woman, a standardized picture is all that is needed. Not unlike the ways in which the complexities and inconsistencies of histories, identities, narratives, beliefs, etc. are needed, nor even desirable, on the tourist map, a standardized and exoticized picture is all that needed in the presumption of pleasure.

In short, the politics surrounding the invitation to the figure of the cosmopolitan tourist by the tourist map continue to reflect and perpetuate the right to places of difference in imperial mapping practices. This includes the promotion of the hospitable host that is at the service of the guests’ desires and pleasures, and extends not only the right to penetrate through state borders, but the right to experience the pleasures of what awaits within the body of the state.

5. Conclusion: The Ethics of Mapping Corporeal Geographies in Paradise

The following three chapters will specifically look at the ways in which what Tariq Jazeel refers to as the “cosmopolitan mode of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism,” and how this specific articulation of cosmopolitan works in forming spaces such as “nature” and “culture” as simultaneous and extended geographies of the state. In these different chapters the geographies afforded to the cosmopolitan tourist and the geographies produced by/ as the state emerge. Each mode of cosmopolitanism can also be understood through Derridean cosmo-politics, indicating the contradiction inherent in the relationship in the promise of cosmopolitanism but the simultaneous limitations of the borders of the state. Jazeel (2013) describes this as “a classically Derridean hospitality narrative that curates space for difference to emerge, to be welcomed and
tolerated, but only consolidating and hegemonizing its own sovereign and majoritarian speaking position” (23).

Given the many different examples of places and countries with which the scholars alluded to this chapter, the discussions here may seem applicable to other tourist destinations around the world. Although each country will inevitably have their own particular articulations and even contradictions, the patterns surrounding the critiques of the cosmopolitan tourist and the pre-assumed access and accepted invitation of the tourist map are most likely found in other countries of the Global South. These earlier critiques depart on the basis of ongoing global coloniality, and these networks and histories are at least echoed or refracted in other spaces of the “post”colonial world. These histories can be read through the continued access, movement, and viscosity of these bodies through and within different spaces:

[s]patialization is thus not only a matter of sites and networks of space, but exists at all levels to tie the micro scale of the body to the macro scale of the region. Bodies are ‘spaced’: the performative carriage of the body, the gestures, actions and rhythms of everyday routines deemed socially appropriate to a particular site, are etched onto place and into the somatic memory of individual inhabitants..Spatialization is thus both written and read practically by bodies as much as metaphorically through the conceptual operations of discourse (Shields 2003, 9).

Tourist spaces vs. non-tourist spaces are read through and by the bodies that circulate between them. The spatialization of tourism is also not without its memory and power structures of past imperial encounters.

“The identity categories constructed through tourism practices are always partial” (Hanna and Del Casino 2003, xx). Like all identity constructions, the spatialization of tourism implies that lines are not often drawn evenly, and often are continually contradictory. Tourist spaces and non-tourist spaces are not always so clearly defined. As individuals move through these spaces they inhabit contradictory and complex performances of identities, histories, beliefs, and
understandings. While never claiming to be totalizing, the figure of the cosmopolitan tourist does help to account for the perceived desires and pleasures of different experiences. Hanna and Del Casino (2003) suggest that “[i]n the spaces of tourism and leisure, social and spatial identities collide and elide, creating moments of ‘uncertainty.’ The uncertainties expose the margins of categories, such as tourist and nontourist, and make present the struggles that arise as tourists and nontourists try to either reinforce or break down the tenuous social and spatial borders made possible through the practice of tourism” (xxi-xxii). That does not mean, however, as Saldanha indicates, that these corporeal geographies are also not viscous as they follow what is consistent to the tourists’ own comforts and identifications.

Therefore, how we move through and map spaces of differences is a question of ethics and responsibilities of our own complicity. There is politics in the production of tourist vs. non-tourist spaces, but there are just as much as the same spaces are blurred and contradicted by the very individuals that are either afforded access or made representatives of that space. These are spaces of encounters, and in viscous spaces such as beaches “[a] white body needs to decide how to take responsibility for being rich and foreign on a third-world beach” (Saldanha 2007, 117). Although, like paradise itself, rich and third-world might be political perceptions, they are perceptions that determine the conditions of interactions with one another. I wanted to go to the beach, I wanted my day of sun and fun and paradise, I wanted a “traditional” massage. But these desires are also not without their own histories. Saldanha (2007) suggest an ethical condition meeting one another face-to-face that is, that ethics should consist “in letting yourself be destabilized by the radical alterity of the other, in seeing his or her difference not as a threat but as a resource to question your own position in the world” (118).
Tourist maps are proof of the already given permission to travel, to displace oneself into territories of differences. They imply, permit, and invite dis-placement. Farías (2011) states that “[p]lace does not emerge through an edging but rather through a displacement, from the inside to the outside, the near to the far, the closed to the open, the there to the away. Place then involves not just a folded space, but above all a folded displacement. Tourist maps are central devices folding tourist displacements between here and there, one attraction and the next, and thereby constituting a tourist geography of contained movement” (409). The following chapters will consider what emerges between the place and displacement in the production and mapping of tourist spaces, as well as those spaces that individuals wished the tourist to see. It will consider the connections between the cosmopolitan tourist and the cosmopolitan state in the folded displacement of both the perceived experience and the state itself.
Shelby: This is a more general question, not necessarily directed at your art, but what do you think the story is that people have of Sri Lanka that makes them want to come?

Rahju: It used to be sun and fun in the 70s, the Germans coming with their beer. Sri Lanka itself, I dunno, I think to some extent it gets projected out there though that Sri Lanka is more than sun and fun though. There is an ancient culture thing here and there's something apart from, the exotic thing is there of course the beach, the jungle, that whole sense of Sri Lanka being a kind of paradise island thing, and the mentality from the ancient times, it has always been Serendib, Taprobana, it was this fantastic land, you know. It must have been more so those days. That is stuck in there to some extent, but it's also the fact that there is a Buddhist or ancient culture thing behind that which makes it different from any other, or a Caribbean island or something like that, which would have the same kind of beaches and all, but there's this other thing, so I think the whole package. Also it is a small island with so much variation, so when it's pitched at the foreign tourism market. They have a lot of stuff to throw out there. Whereas another place might just do the Swiss Alps for skiing or Caribbean beach and that's it, you know. There's a lot of stuff that can actually be put out there, and I think that gets across to people maybe subconsciously that if they go there, there's something to experience, there is a lot of stuff.

Rudrani: Something for everybody.

Rahju: Yeah, definitely.

Rudrani: And that it's so small you can actually do a lot within a two week holiday.

Because a lot of people in the West especially, and they have two weeks only for holidays and they have to fit everything in there. With Sri Lanka being small,

Rahju: It is doable.

Rudrani: It's doable.

Rahju: Like India for example, it's huge. Honestly, if you really wanted to get to get in there, you can only take a section at at time.

Rudrani: You know you can go from the city, the capital city, to the Cultural Triangle in three hours and after Kandy down to Yala maybe for some wildlife and then to the beaches and you can fit that in (Pereira & Devi Das 2018).

1. The Culture(s) of Sri Lankan Tourism: Back of Beyond the Icons
This small piece of conversation is with Rahju Pereira and Rudrani Devi Das, a father and daughter duo living in the hills of Kandy first mentioned in the Introduction. This conversation highlights the various topics surrounding the “culture” of Sri Lankan tourism, which is the focus of this chapter. First, as presented here in my talk with these two, is the idea that Sri Lanka is a better “bargain,” we might say, because it has more to offer in a small amount of space. Unlike India, as was their reference, it is a smaller “doable” space: an island. Second, towards this point, as it is an island with history, it is more than just “sun in the fun,” but also contains “culture.” Once again, the association with a treasure box-as-container-island-state emerges to display what is available and valuable to the cosmopolitan tourist. This point is in contrast to islands such as the Caribbean, which seemingly appear (by default) not to have “history” and are only “sun in the fun.” And although this point deserves more attention, I can only briefly reflect here how the differences in associations between the Caribbean islands and Sri Lanka as containing history, or not, are also dependent on what is associated and promoted by tourism itself, and the specific relationship of colonial histories and islands.

Finally, culture, as described here and in other conversations, is often described along temporal lines, and connected to sites and places that reflect forms of ancient culture. The culture of Sri Lanka is associated with Buddhist practices, and these practices are inseparable from the value of its ancientness. My point here in reflecting on the temporal value of culture is that “history” is understood in a universalized way. Grasping the history outside of a Western timeline has posed a problem for the West more generally. For example, Tariq Jazeel (2013) states that “[f]or a British empire of science obsessed with the Orient’s ancientness, Anuradhapura posed a political problem as far as colonial power was concerned: how to author...
pre-colonial Ceylonese antiquity whilst maintaining Ceylon as a British possession?” (50). This was also reflective of a general problem with the continued imperial encounter, “how could the imposition of European history, modernity, power be justified space that so evidently had its own pre-and co-existing social formations? In as much as this posed an anxiety, it was allayed, negotiated, even repressed, by the very mechanism of the colonial project in all its complexity” (Jazeel 2013, 50). We might assess that postcolonial anxiety is/ was experienced by the metropole as well, and, perhaps, one way to deal with the ancientness of an identified culture was to make it observable, experienceable, commodifiable.

Continuing to follow the importance and promotion of island space within the geospatial imaginary of the cosmopolitanism tourist, this chapter questions different articulations of “culture” as “culture” emerges as both a signifier of sites, places, and practices, but also the “culture” that is created around the promotion and packaging of the tourist industry itself. Artists, government organizations, and private citizens understand the importance of cultivating the expectations in terms of performance and advertising. This chapter includes the participatory mapping exercises and interviews of those individuals who identified Sri Lankan culture, both as historical and religious sites that the tourist should experience, or as practices that Sri Lanka could teach/ show to tourists. The examples of participants of this chapter, include Rahju and Rudrani (Pereira & Devi Das 2018), but also Yamuna (Balasooriya 2018), an employee at Sarvodaya, the local-NGO; Ranitri (Weerasuriya 2017), the Columbian architect student, whose family runs a homestay; Sudesh Bandara Mantillake Madamperum Arachchilage (Mantillake 2018), a professional Kandyan dancer and professor at Department of Fine Arts, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka; and a member of the Ministry of Tourism (Anonymous 1 2018). In their
own tourist maps, some veered away from the icons and sites already depicted on the maps, and some did not, but in either case, these individuals helped to indicate, in one way or another the importance of “Sri Lankan culture.” The notion of “ancient-ness” and “culture,” as an always, already temporal entity is still related to why people still come, and what is deemed as valuable about Sri Lanka. In many conversations that I had, both formally in interviews and informally in everyday conversations, places like the Cultural Triangle, including the ancient capital cities, Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa were indicated as places that I or tourists should go, that is, what the stranger should know or see about Sri Lanka.

Looking at the politics of representation and promotion of tourism by the state, each of the chapters in Part II will follow similar patterns of acknowledging the suggestions made by participants from their interviews and participatory mapping exercises what they wanted tourists to see, placing these conversations in larger contexts of ongoing identity politics, and framing these seemingly contradictory moments through particular autoethnographic moments. It is my goal to use autoethnography in these moments to not play down the complexities circulating around the value of culture, nature, and even the civil war for the individuals in terms of global consumption and personal beliefs to acknowledge how each is possible simultaneously.

The discussion of the culture(s) of Sri Lankan tourism once again brings up the question of “authenticity” and “representation,” as well as how the culture of Sri Lanka tourism itself intersects within those articulation. Tourist maps, as Rob Shields (2003) observes, “indicate the sites and itineraries of ritualized, spatial practices that bring the past into the present” (5). The tourist maps by both participants and the ones that have been critiqued so far are spatio-temporal reflections on the values of both past and present spatial practices and their assumed value now.
Therefore, tourist maps are an example of tourism promotion that highlights the places where “culture” can be experienced, where culture itself is the attraction. As developed in this chapter, I argue through Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2000) work on History 1 and 2, that “culture” becomes a commodity as it is already capitalized through cosmopolitan logic. The tourist map only further indicates and projects culture as a resource. The maps drawn and indicated by the individuals I talked to both confirm and challenge the tourist map as resource map. The previous chapters have focused around tourist maps with no obvious author, but the goal here is to indicate what culture looks like when valued in all of its various articulations by individuals, who presumably have some stake in its commodification and consumption by outsiders. Many people drew what would appear to be traditional tourist maps, and often emphasized the cultural sites of Sri Lanka. For them this seems be more than just passive consumption, but an opportunity for “cultural” exchange. Towards the notion of cultural experiences and interactions as hopeful moments of encounter, I think it is important to question that which often mediates these interactions, the culture of Sri Lanka tourism more generally. How is the “culture” of tourism changing in Sri Lanka? It seems in the investigation of cultural tourism, that the “culture” of tourism itself ought to be considered. It is not just cultural spaces that are marked through exclusionary identity practices, of tourist/ non-tourist or Sinhala-Buddhist vs. Tamil, Hindu, Muslim (and any other signifier outside of the majority ethnic-religious identifier). There is a lot of work done culturally, politically, and socially in creating these spaces and tourist geographies. Developing from the discussion of hospitality and the already-assumed and accepted invitation from the tourist map from Chapter 3, this looks at where the cosmopolitan tourist is hosted and what this might say about larger trends in the global relations of tourism. Inferred from my
interviews, there seems to be a simultaneous rise of both crass commercialization, casinos, shopping centers, restaurants, but also the increase in community and ecotourism, as well as smaller chain hotels like Jetwing and Back of Beyond.

Although it may be a stretch here to call Jetwing a small company. As a Sri Lankan-based tour and hotel company, it offers several kinds of accommodations, from the more traditional, resort style to the smaller boutique hotels, in nearly all potential tourist spots on the island. They were also one of the first companies to invest in Jaffna when the government lifted restrictions. The company appears to be aware of the different kinds of places various tourists are interested in and are providing the different levels of “cultural” exposure to the comfort level of various tourists, including more “adventurous” options. Back of Beyond has a similar idea, in that it is a chain of a couple of small hotels in different places on the island. Ranitri’s uncle is the owner of this particular small (but possibly growing business). The uncle was an engineer, and was brought up in a conversation I had with Ranitri’s mother, who is a lawyer by profession. Like herself, they are a part of a seemingly growing community that have quit their own professions to pursue a more lucrative venture in tourism. The name of this introduction is as an acknowledgement to this family and the time that they have given me.

This chapter also considers the ways that sites and experiences when labeled as “cultural” only further a particular narrative of the country, as well as, continued global consumption of the exotic and traditional cultures of the East, and asks how might these narratives only be perpetuated by representations, such as tourist maps? Ignacio Farías (2011) states “[t]ourist maps produced space, especially through the arrangement of tourist attractions,” which they can do by

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19 Jaffna and the former warzones as a kind of “adventure” tourism will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
representing destination space by indicating a small number of objects as potential options, or represent only a certain type of attraction (408). One of these potential kinds of tourist spaces are cultural or heritage sites, and the emphasize on these kinds of tourist experiences were only reiterated by the participatory mapping exercises.

As the first chapter of Part II, this chapter is the pivot from more overt discussions of the ontological condition and the colonial legacy (although these will not be left behind) of the tourist map to the investigation of the politics of the map, particularly as the nation-state is implicated in nation-building through tourism. Helen Kapstein (2017) has observed that “[b]oth postcolonial nation-states needing to interpellate new citizens and postcolonial subjects seeking national belonging have identified tourism as a potential practice of nation formation” (xix). However, these chapters will also explore the limitations in nation-building through the continued coloniality of the tourist industry within the postcolonial state. Aníbal Quijano (2007) contends that "coloniality of power" “has pervaded and modulated the basic instances of the Eurocentered capitalist colonial/modern world power" (171). Tourism and its geographies once again are ideal in investigating such power relations.

Jennifer Devine and Diana Ojeda (2017) “tourism’s spatial fetishism, a set of spatial practices in tourism that enclose, erase and re-imagine people, places and natures in violent ways. Dispossession is central to how the tourism spatial fetishism operates and produces multiple forms and expressions of violence in tourism” (610). In the Sri Lankan context this includes the ways in which “culture” in its promotion and packaging signifies a Sinhala-Buddhist history and practices on the island, at the exclusion of others. While keeping in mind these various interwoven intersections of productions, experiences, positions, I consider here how
potential discursive dispossessions and violences works specifically with the emphasize for cultural tourism.

Such considerations ought to also take into account my own position and desires as they also follow the same propensity and potential for violence and dispossession. In my discussion with Rahju and Rudrani, for example, it is difficult to not be taken in by them. The conversation above was at their own home tucked into the Hills of Kandy, a place not easily found on a map or by my Tuk Tuk driver. Perhaps, not any less exclusionary than a tourist map. They are captivating, and in many ways my value of their conversation and company additional reflects the same desires that are critiqued here: a need for a “cultural” connection to a place and individuals, a value of the spiritual histories on the island, and the acknowledgment that such interactions are “special,” “rare” even as they are supposed to be abundant in this place called “Sri Lanka.” My own experience here follows a point that I will make on the dialectic of cultural relations in Sri Lanka: it is both radically personal and at the same time commodifiable.

In what follows, I focus on two primary strands of “culture,” first, those places and sites that are deemed as containing “culture,” and the culture of tourism itself that Sri Lanka has attempted to manage and cultivate since the 1960s. Then, finally, how these two elements intersect within an analysis of cosmopolitanism, capital, history, and the state, which come together to form this island state as a destination within a cosmopolitan geopolitics, as I explain in the last part of this chapter. This considers culture as the social relations around the tourist industry, and then also the social relations which produce culture as a commodity for the tourist industry, again, as often specifically Sinhala-Buddhist. Both forms of “culture” indicate potential overt and epistemic violence in the delineation of tourist spaces, but I also hope to acknowledge
that the distinctions between various forms of violences and dispossession within tourism “often hinges on one’s socio-spatial positioning and embodiment, as well as on one’s location within the tourism industry’s direct or indirect activities – whether or not one is the tourist, the “host”, the developer, the hustler, the sex worker, hospitality staff or the fisherman” (Devine and Ojeda 2017, 605). In navigating my own socio-spatial positioning and embodiment of Sri Lankan tourist space is split between the tourist and the researcher, and in terms of privilege and access, there is not much distinction.

First, in relation to my field work, I acknowledge those places that individuals have recognized or mapped that the tourist should go to or experience as “cultural.” I also wish to complicate these designations, as often what gets depicted as “cultural” often is a deferred signifier for “Buddhism,” this inclusion and simultaneous exclusion of Buddhism as culture works on parallel lines as inclusion or absence on promotional materials, including, of course, tourist mapping practices. Second, to investigate additional layers of “culture,” I move from the discussion and consideration of both the tangible parts of culture and the intangible parts of culture, considering spiritual values and hospitality as examples, but also how these values are already intersected, displayed, and promoted by the tourist industry. In these sections I look at the site of culture and the practice of culture. As sites, practices, and embodiments of culture within the tourist industry, each follows a dialectic as anti/colonial, commodifiable/ radically personal, and in/authentic. Finally, I indicate that these dialectics confirm the value of culture through Chakraparty’s (2000) reading of capitalism and history, and contribute that this additionally follows a cosmopolitan logic. I argue that capital itself is cosmopolitan, or cosmopolitanism is exchanged and practiced as capital. This cosmopolitan-capital framework
enables us to discuss the universalization of value on cultural sites and practices, but as they are also understood as “particular.” I maintain that it is the intersections of capital, cultural, history, and the state which produces Sri Lanka as a destination.

2. Cultural Tourism: Figures of Inclusion/Exclusion

In order to understand a typical tourist trajectory in Sri Lanka, I planned the trip by following a traditional path that included: Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, and the beach (see Figure 4.1). I attempted to retrace the amount of time most Western tourists get for a “long,” 10-14 day vacation. A doable bargain. However, there also seemed to be a discrepancy between what most tourist see and experience, and those places that Sri Lankans think they ought to see. For example, spending my first few days at Rantiri’s historical, colonial-era home (which had started off as colonial horse stables) turned homestay, her grandmother was slightly stressed that I would be spending my time at the tea plantations instead of the Cultural Triangle. She was appeased once Ranitri and I were
able to get across that this was not my first time, and I had indeed spent time at those specific places, including the ancient capital sites and ruins. Not unlike the tourist maps themselves, my experience of Sri Lanka extends beyond just this trip or particular trajectory, but my time is still in many ways determined by those places locatable on the map. While it might not have been my first time, my time in Sri Lanka has largely centered around tourist spaces, either going there myself, or as a guide to show those places to others. To many Sri Lankans, my own legitimacy to the island is often measured by how many of those places I have been (as seen in my interaction with one member of the Ministry of Tourism, below). Rarely am I asked about personal experiences or places, people I might have seen between the spaces graphed on the tourist map. What should be on the tourist map, then? What gets included and what gets excluded? And how might these inclusions/ exclusions indicate more than just the personal, but also the personal as articulated within larger forces of modernity?

As part of the political modernity in South Asia, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) has stated that “[c]oncepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, so on all bear the burden of European thought and history” (4). That is, political modernity cannot be understood outside of European Enlightenment thought and values. Included within this political modernity must include our consumptions within global tourism as well. What does cultural value tell us about the state of our political modernities? For Sri Lanka, “modern” tourism can be marked in the 1960s, when the country began to promote itself within the international tourism market (Reeves and Sivanandamoorthy 2018, this was also indicated by my interviews with the Ministry of
Tourism). In 1962, what was then the Ceylonese government, began promoting five key areas of the country: Galle, Colombo, Hikkaduwa, Bentota, and Kandy. It is worth noting that in these early days of Sri Lankan tourism promotion four of five of these sites were beaches and coastal attractions (excluding Kandy) (Reeves and Sivanandamoorthy 2018). In 1967, the government also implemented their first 10-year master plan for national tourism strategy, resulting in a boom in visitors from 20,000 to 118,000 moving to the 1970s (Reeves and Sivanandamoorthy 2018). Keir Reeves and Sivesan Sivanandamoorthy (2018) suggest, and as several individuals from my own conversations, that this boom was also aided in the “attractive mix” of kinds of tourism sites and interests from cultural heritage sites, beach locations, and parks and wildlife sites.

Again this “attractive mix” is reflective of what many participants have reiterated in conversations, including Rahju and Rudrani above. It is a part of the “good deal” in a small, island space. Sireeranhan et. al (2017) review, for example, that tourist traffic is often linked to “real exchange rate [usually compared to how it weak a currency is to the US dollar] and income level of the tourists’ home country, tourism price, travel cost, foreign direct investment, warm weather and climate in the country, crimes against tourists, and political instability in the destination country” (2). The island is accessible and unlike some island vacations, you also get access to culture. It is exotic both in terms of its presence as an island paradise, but also container of the exotic histories of the East. As Devine (2017) notes, there is increasing concern of colonial relations within cultural tourism, and that “[m]ore often than not, many critics argue that cultural and eco-tourism replicate colonial and neocolonial relations through tourism development and everyday tourism encounters” (637). The liminal position of the cosmopolitan tourist between
the perceived, mapped experience and the physical, corporeal interactions of place is one way to investigate the continued colonial relations in both the narrative of the former colony and the former metropole.

As the cosmopolitan tourist, I find myself between my own desires for authenticity and a personal quest to find those places that might signify my experience of Sri Lanka. During an interview with one member of the Ministry of Tourism (will be indicated as Ministry of Tourism Personnel 1, MTP1) he reiterated the importance of the world heritage sites, including the ancient cities of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa and Sigiriya on his own mapping exercise. While he was mapping, the conversation turned from what Sri Lanka has to offer and what people should see to what I had seen or not of the 8 labeled UNESCO world heritage sites in the country.

MTP1: ...We have those two places are world heritage sites, declared by UNESCO. We have eight world heritage sites. So, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, then Sigiriya rock fortress. Have you climbed Sigiriya rock fortress?
Shelby: Yeah.
MTP1: Dambulla rock temple?
Shelby: Yep.
MTP1: Ah, have you gone to ancient city in Kandy?
Shelby: Yes. This is my fourth time here.
MTP1: Old Dutch Fort?
Shelby: Yes.
MTP1: Uh, so yes she has covered all these. One, two, three, four, five, six. Then the Sinharaja Forest, rain forest?
MTP1: No, I haven't been there yet.

The fact that this small island contains 8 UNESCO world heritage sites within its boundaries is both a sense of pride and a marketing strategy. Additionally, here and in other places in the interview, my own relationship to Sri Lanka was judged by how many places that I had been to in the country. It might even be said that my relationship to Sri
Lanka was determined by how many places I could circle or check off from a tourist map. What had I seen of value in Sri Lanka? Indicated as resources, how many of these places could I collect? Tourist maps mark out and define places that are excluded from the everyday, the mundane. They mark those places that should be valued in their rarity as places of exceptions.

I would also like to highlight that nearly all of the UNESCO world heritage sites and the places most often marked on tourist maps as cultural sites, here in both promotional materials and by individuals, are also Buddhist sites. Del Casino and Hanna (2000) observe that “[i]n one sense, therefore, we can think of tourism map spaces as disciplining tourists: defining particular actions as the tourist experience in opposition to a representation of the everyday. Yet, their imperfectly concealed absences, exclusions, margins and other ambiguities expose the multiple and changing identities present in any map space” (28). The inclusion of Buddhist sites in both the promotional tourist maps combined with their continued presence on the participatory maps, signals the absence of Hindu and Muslim religious sites, as examples. This is reflective of larger understandings of what is valued in terms of cultural identity, and even as identity becomes promoted by the state. Kapstein (2017) suggests that “the postcolonial nation’s promise of tourism as an emblem of its liberation of leisure, the gaze, and mobility tends to recapitulate not only the ideological underpinnings of colonial tourism but also its failures and crises” (xviii). It seems the ways in which ethnic groups and cultures are associated with particular experiences and sites additionally reflects colonial logics in tourism.
To be fair, however, some people did suggest that Jaffna offered the Tamil-Hindu Kovil temples, but no one that I interviewed also included these on their maps. In this particular interview, MTP1 also emphasized the multicultural and multiethnic experiences within the country, including Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Christian. He discussed the kinds of attractions, experiences, or, has he described them, “products” that are available to promote to tourists. The products that Sri Lanka specifically had included, “we are an island,” “we have the beaches: sea, sun, and sand,” “2,500 old history,” “Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka in the 3rd Century BC with that we started our own Buddhist civilization,” “then wildlife area, the flora fauna, high biodiversity,” and “We have a multiethnic, multicultural community.” The multiethnic and multicultural aspect of the island in this conversations adds to its “good deal.” Describing further the mix of populations he stated:

So uh, we have uh, Sinhalese people, Tamil, Muslims, and Burger, and we have Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and people who are following Islam. So our festivals, we have national and religious festivals throughout the year. On the 14th of this month, we have Thai Pongal that is a Tamil function and then somewhere in May we have Vesak festival, where the Prince Siddhartha's birth and obtaining enlightenment and the passing of away of the Buddha. And Poson, the Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka. Poson, that is June, full moon day. Then Hachi, and things like, Muslim. So you know multiethnic, multicultural, so the culture is also another, another attraction that we can project.

MTP1 emphasizes that the “cultural” experience of Sri Lanka are from a multicultural and multiethnic society, but in his attempts to indicate the vast or even radical pluralness of the island these things do not fit neatly into either category: they spill over and are made messier in an attempt to distinguish between “ethnic” and “cultural.” For example, here, Islam functions as
both. The “instinct” to categorize between ethnic and religious groups might also reflect colonial relations on the island. And while it might be rightly pointed out that the use of English in these interviews contributes to the awkward and messy ethnic and identity categories. I would argue that it is not English merely in this instance, but it is generally the introduction and influence of Englishness or colonial categories which have contributed to these identity politics (although that is not to stay that our use of English in this interview was not a mode and indicator of particular colonial relations).

Although Harshana Rambukwella (2018) notes although since the 1980s, scholars began questioning the given categories of Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim, these categories have been used by the British colonialists since the 1800s. The British 1871 census listed Sinhalese and Tamil as both nations and races (this census listed 78 nations and 24 races) (Rambukwella 2018, 33). The term “nation” seems to have been used in smaller groups, but as the years continued the notion of “race” became more prominent and in the 1881 census only 7 were listed: Europeans, Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Malays, Veddas and Others.20 In the postcolonial period there were minor revisions to this, but “race” was replaced with ethnicity, and as imperialist efforts gave way to including “natives” in governance their classifications became increasingly political and institutional (Rambukwella 2018, 34). Identity categories are clearly always influx, and this particular instance of colonial identity politics follows the trajectory from nation, to race, to ethnicity. Although it seems important to ask where and when “religion” also becomes a part of these politics, or was/ is it already meant to be assumed with the nation/race/ethnicity categories?

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Furthermore, although MTP1 indicates multi-cultural-ethnic festivals from Tamil and Muslim holidays, the history that the island is given is Sinhala-Buddhist: with the 2,500 year-old history, “Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka in the 3rd Century BC with that we started our own Buddhist civilization.” The other religions are framed as ahistorical and more as “products” for potential promotion, along with the wildlife and flora and fauna (more on the Sinhala-Buddhist connection of these “natural” products in the next chapter). The signifier “cultural” works for both historical sites and religious-cultural festivals. Each is possible within the container-treasure-box, the island itself.

From the investigation of the island-as-treasure-box from Chapter 2, religion like culture in Western thought is understood in its thing-ness, a noun. Things that can be located and contained, also include “something that could be called a ‘Buddhist religion’” (Jazeel 2013, 13). Jazeel (2013) posits that “each time we seek to understand the role that Buddhism plays in Sri Lanka’s political present we risk re-essentializing the existence of Buddhism as religion that sits in particular Sri Lankan spaces” (13). Jazeel (2013) suggests that once religion is located as a thing, then we can also follow its constitutive outside, that is, “the secular will not be far away” (13). To discuss Buddhist culture within Sri Lanka as locatable in space is to continue these dualistic and object-based value systems of religion and culture. Instead, Jazeel (2013) suggest that by focusing “on the aesthetic dimensions of dominant modes of non-dualistic — that is to say, neither sacred nor secular, and neither natural nor cultural — environmental knowledge and experience” is to think beyond the “conceptual incommensurabilities implicitly comparative research imagination and theory culture” (16). Even as other religious and cultural practices are indicated as additional products to the cosmopolitan tourist, the island’s history, which is
understood as the state, remains Sinhala-Buddhist. This creates a very specific form of aesthetic nationalism which allows these “cosmopolitan” products to remain within the confines of the borders of the island-state, itself. Once again, cosmopolitanism works with simultaneous articulations of inclusion and exclusion. Through Jazeel’s critique of the cosmopolitan state, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism establishes itself as synonymous with the island-state, but in its cosmopolitanism allows for spaces of differences to emerge, but only as it is understood as Sinhala-Buddhist national cosmopolitanism which permits the inclusion of “Others” (Jazeel 2013).

Tourism, as an extension of cosmopolitan practices and spatial imaginaries, also functions to promote a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism which ascribes value to those places as best representing the states’ history, but whose very inscription of “state,” “history,” and “culture” already also reflects Western understandings of each. Tourism can help to define and even re-write the history of a place, therefore, “[t]his practice as historical–geographical erasure works to clear the slate for national and global elites to articulate new place-based histories, land claims and notions of heritage out of malleable tourism landscapes in the making. Erasure here does not signify creating a blank slate, but the erasure of the complexity of place” (Devine 2017, 644). Likewise, it is both what is excluded and included on the map which functions to erase the complexities of place.

While still keeping in mind the articulations of inclusion/ exclusion and presence/ absence which accompany the tourist map in the promotion of Sinhala-Buddhist culture over the potential erasure, or perhaps even denial of Hindu-Tamil and Islam-Muslim (Muslim, again, is often depicted as an ethnic identity) cultural sites, I wish to additionally acknowledge the ways in
which tourism can define and rewrite history through the same articulations of presence/absence in terms of a place’s own colonial history. One of many examples of this is the city of Kandy.

3. The Cultural Site: Kandy, an anti-colonial heritage site through colonial values

As discussed in the Introduction, Kandy was the last Sri Lankan kingdom and the last place that the British conquered, finally taking full control of the island in 1815. It was also, as noted above, the only non-beach or coastal attractions when the country began to look into marketing tourism in the 1960s. Reeves and Sivanandamoorthy (2018) write of its promotion that:

At the outset of promoting Sri Lanka as a global travel destination, Kandy was depicted in promotion campaigns as a cultural heritage destination with a vibrant street culture and an historic, religious, and British colonial era built environment situated in an attractive natural setting. Emphasis was placed on Sri Lankan authentic culture, norms, beliefs, values and the artefacts embodied by Kandyan culture. This led to a boom in product offerings that vended mainly to tourists. Research with vendors in Kandy confirmed that a multiplicity of tourist experiences are constructed. For example cultural events including Kandy, Perehara, Christmas, and Vesak festivals) and sporting pursuits (particularly cricket, golf, and traditional sports) have expanded tourism offerings in the world heritage city (251).

More often than not, if someone is going to take the time to see a “cultural” site in Sri Lanka it will be Kandy. The primary attraction in Kandy is easily Sri Dalada Maligawa, or more commonly known (especially to tourists) as the Temple of the Tooth. As one of the first non-beach sites promoted in Ceylonese or Sri Lankan tourism, it should be no surprise that this is a Buddhist temple, whose replica is said to be Buddha’s tooth. The temple is both a site of religious pilgrimage and tourist attraction. Its history as one of the last isolated areas, has given it a reputation of being “authentically Sri Lankan.” For example, Rambukwella (2018) observes that “[f]rom the late nineteenth century onwards Kandyan Sinhala identity and culture are seen as
more authentic because of their perceived isolation from European contact” (28). The very isolation that originally prevented colonial rule, is also the reason that Kandyan identity becomes authentically Sinhala, which is to say authentically Sri Lankan. This is an association that is promoted for both nationals and tourists.

This was also the only “proper” culturally-designated place that I went to during my retracing of the tourist trail. In planning my trip to Kandy, I had gotten back in touch with Sudesh Mantillake, a professional Kandyan dancer, whom I met some years back in my work with the Center for 21st Century Studies. Although I will refer to him as the scholarly appropriate “Madamperum Arachchilage” in discussion of his research, as I relate my interview with him, I will refer to him as Sudesh, as this is the name that I know him by. This is a part of my own inclusionary/exclusionary mapping of my position.
As a professional dancer, Sudesh has a long history with cultural performance and performing for tourists, as representative of Kandyan culture and heritage. Unfortunately, I did not get to meet up with him during my time in Sri Lanka, as he was currently in the States finishing up his last semester of his doctorate in Performance Studies at the University of Maryland. Once we were both State-side and on the same time zone again we caught up via Skype. One of my questions was, why or how did Kandyan dance become the most famous dance form in Sri Lanka, nearly to the point of erasing all other forms?

Sudesh told me the story of the British in the Kandyan Kingdom, and that by the time British finally conquered it that the Kandyan Kingdom had drained itself of resources and capital (Mantillake 2018). In order to indicate the Kandyans’ own power back to the British, they put on a cultural performance, including Kandyan dance (Mantillake 2018). It was here that Kandyan dance first really sunk into the British
subconscious as representative of Ceylonese culture. It was promoted by the British after this, and only continued to gain value post-independence. The promotion of particular art forms, such as Kandyan dance, on the one hand indicates an anticolonial by establishing it against art forms of the West or the former colony. But it is simultaneously colonial in that its value is exactly established through colonial eyes, and through its own colonial history. Ironically, it was first performed for the British as a mode of power. Inline with Sudesh’s story, Rambukwella (2018) maintains that the “associations between Kandyan Sinhala identity and authenticity have continued into the post-independence period. Kandyan dance is the preferred dance form at state events and is often chosen to represent ‘Sri Lankan/Sinhala’ dance internationally. Many urban Sinhala couples getting married in upmarket hotels in Colombo and other urban areas of the country adopt ‘Kandyan customs’ and ‘Kandyan dress’” (28).

Now in present day Kandy, Reeves and Sivanandamoorthy (2018) investigate cultural tourism and community resilience in Kandy, arguing that “it is only through collaborative initiatives and partnerships between government and industry organizations with host communities that long-term cultural tourism policies can be developed to facilitate equitable social outcomes” (243). This argument includes four integrated approaches: social capital, socially inclusive governance models, economic development, and principles of environmental sustainability (Reeves & Sivanandamoorthy 2018, 243). I suggest, however, that the stress on resilient outcomes for cultural tourism, particularly as seen in Kandy, also reflects on going productions of modern power relations in tourism as modes of, what David Scott (1995) has referred to as, colonial governmentality. Scott (1995), pulling from Foucault, states, “[m]odern power seeks to arrange these conditions (conditions at once discursive and nondiscursive) oblige
subjects to transform themselves in a certain, that direction. And if this is so, if the government
of conduct strategic end of modern power, then the decisive (which is only) locus of its operation
is the new domain of ‘civil society’” (200). That is, the development of cultural tourism as a
form of development itself is reflective of a common story in what former colonies ought to do
with their “natural” resource of cultural history. The way that this resource is handled in terms of
efficiency and productivity will directly indicate the state’s relation to modernity itself. Colonial
governmentality, as Scott (1995) examines, indicates when “power comes to be directed at the
destruction and reconstruction of colonial space so as to produce not so much extractive-effects
on colonial bodies as governing-effects on colonial conduct” (1204). The value of Kandy,
including as the site of the temple and as the home of Kandyan dance, for both nationals and
tourists is an example of colonial governmentality not so much of bodies, but on the desires and
values surrounding them.

and Memories of an Island, “[r]endered impotent the once haughty kingdom of the mountain
highlands, Kandhe Uda Rata, dwindled to a laconic ‘Kandy’ on the tongues of the foreign rulers.
Thereby, the ancient name of the island’s last kingdom, was drained of its romance and meaning
by the English as efficiently as they emptied her coffers” (250). The very name “Kandy” written
on a tourist map with the emblem of Sri Dalada Maligawa beside of it, also indicates a blank or
absent space of that map. The word “Kandy” is made to signify a space of an “ancient cultural”
city, but what it actually indicates is a city that was under colonial occupation. In one tourist map
published on the site “They Draw & Travel,” which allows members to post and share their own
tourist maps, played heavily on the notion of “Kandy” and “Candy” and the “Sweet Tooth” with
“Buddha’s tooth” (see Figure 4.4). The member, “AW Illustrations,” from Japan captioned their map, “This candy store-like city is so alive and so colorful! You can enjoy wandering local markets, bird watching in Udawattekele Sanctuary, chilling out peacefully by Kandy Lake, and, of course, Ceylon tea! :))} The Temple of the Tooth is a must go. They have Buddha's SWEET tooth!” (AW Illustrations). Again, this map of Kandy marks it as colonized territory, as “Kandhe” refers to “hill or mountain,” whose name meant to signal the kingdom or palace on the hill or mountain, and obviously not in reference to sugary treats. Kandy is designated as space that should be known as it is simultaneously a mark of ignorance.

In his own dissertation work, “Colonial Choreography: Staging Sri Lankan Dancers Under British Colonial Rule from the 1870s – 1930s,” Mantillake Madamperum Arachchilage (2018) defines “‘colonial choreography’ as the process in which colonized bodies were dislocated, mobilized, manipulated, staged, and displayed for colonial audiences. The European colonial gaze set the parameters for colonial choreography” (28-29). In the critique of the European colonial gaze it seems there is much similarity in colonial choreography and colonial
geography. Both processes work through performance, staging, manipulation, and display through exclusionary and insusionary measures. Each also includes the process and movement of bodies through space, and the creation of that space, as well. But briefly reflecting on my own movement and relation to places and other bodies in the research process, including the changing spatio-temporalities in order for “research” to be done: the constant displacement between here and home. This project itself is a cartography, choreography, as it is also colonial. In the very form of writing, I colonize all that I write of, the people, places, and experiences. I stage and manipulate, I exclude and include. This project is my own colonial choreography-cartography. This is not an exercise that I choose to undertake, but my own acknowledgment of the history of imperialism and research, of the rights to write and map places.

Work from those like Madamperum Arachchilage and Rambukwella, indicate that while culture can be “locatable” and “mapped” in places like Kandy, the practices, such as dance and music, “within” these spaces also help to determine why and how they are understood as “cultural” to begin with. Practices and places of culture are not easily separated from one another. Both Madamperum Arachchilage and Rambukwella look at links between cultural expressions and their institutionalizations in the formation of authenticity and Sinhalese state post-independence. Rambukwella (2018) observes “[w]hat was more or less a ‘soft’ cultural nationalism in the early twentieth century gained a more institutionalised dynamic in post-independence Sri Lanka. Particularly from the late 1940s onwards, with the political institutionalisation of Sinhala nationalism, many avenues of cultural expression became aligned to different degrees with exclusivist Sinhala sentiments” (3). The next section takes further consideration of these cultural practices as forms of “soft” cultural nationalism, but also extend
the discussions to more overtly consider the colonial choreography-cartography of tourist geographies.

4. The Cultural Practice: practices of Buddhism as both radically personal and commodifiable

As indicated not all discussions of culture revolved around culture as historical sites, but the idea of “culture” as practice, particularly Buddhist culture was emphasized. Yamuna, who works as a head secretary with Sarvodaya, a Buddhist-based local NGO. Sarvodaya’s international division has been involved in “cultural tours” to foreign organizations and student groups for some time now, since leaving her family’s home. The organization has also recently started looking to more overt tourist activities to help supplement the loss of revenue from international aid organizations. From my discussions with Yamuna and Bandula (the director of the international unit) in Moratuwa, the focus was mainly around the development of more community-based tourism, but the organization also recently opened a hotel in Kandy (I stayed there a night in the few days I had in the city). Yamuna’s “map” for me was a sequence of several images that she associated with Sri Lanka that should be shared with the international visitor (see Figure 4.5). In not a

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Figure 4.5: Balasooriya, Yamuna Participatory Mapping Exercise January 3, 2018.
dissimilar list to the MTP1 above, she described the series of icons that she drew: “I drew a
“shake” hand, it is like people are welcome. A nice welcome…And also doing mediation. We
have many opportunities to do meditation, breathing in and out to keep our relaxation, and stress
reduction. And a lot of sacred places, and we have very nice history in Sri Lanka. And forests,
rivers, natural beauty. And here finally, everyone, every nations, human being can be relaxed in
Sri Lanka.” These are similar to the suggestions made MTP1 in terms of practices that become
productus, but her emphasize is slightly different, she stresses that these are potential teaching
moments.

To situate Buddhism is not necessarily to suggest that stories are dead and mere history,
as Chakrabarty (2000) implies the process of historicization does, but instead I mean to
provincialize, so to speak, the universalizing productions of religion in the European context and
the ways in which these modes enabled “practices” of the Buddha to become a religious
identity. Often these identities parallel with ethnic identities, that could then be categorized and
contrasted against the white God in the Judeo-Christian tradition. But to do so does not also
mean that I can critique the spiritual and religious beliefs and values of those individuals,
including Rahju and Rudrani to Yamuna, and others. Their emphasize on their religious or
spiritual identities are radically personal and intimate experiences, which I could never speak to.
These are blank spaces on the map that should remain. However, my point of interest comes in
with the suggestion that others, the tourist, the stranger, the cosmopolitan would or should also
value these things, places, and experiences. That is also not to say that the pre-colonial spaces of
Buddhism were also pre-political, but it is to acknowledge that the colonial did produce
particular political spheres for religious identity within the former colony, and we can see the
ways in which these identity practices along religious-ethnic lines as practices of nation building.

In tourism, which sites/sights get to count as re-presentations of the national as cultural and historical (which again also are themselves understood in object-based relations) are dependent on this pre-understood connection between cultural-religious-ethnic identity and the state. Although (as will be discussed in Chapter 6), it was suggested that Jaffna and Trincomalee, have much to offer the traveler in terms of “rich” culture and history, the tourist maps (both local and government promoted) appear to only indicate the Sinhala-Buddhist sites as cultural sites, including Kandy and other ancient capitals. Both Jaffna and Trincomalee, for example, appear de-historicized and de-cultured when their icons include a palm tree and a surfer, respectively, which is to say they are also de-politicized. To be sure the ancient capital and cultural centers of the country do have much to teach the West and other visitors to the country in the advancements and histories outside of the normative “world history,” but in doing so it seems equally beneficial to locate the politicalization of those places within the imperial encounters and their continued productions within the modern nation state. The example of Kandy in its places as a city and cultural practices, the relations to colonialism, and potential continued coloniality within governmentality of cultural tourism, is but one example of this.

That is, caution is also necessary to avoid historicism in situating these intersecting and plural histories. As Chakrabarty (2000) states, “[h]istoricism is what made modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather as something that became global over time, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside it. This ‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’ structure of global historical time was historicist; different non-Western nationalism would later produce local versions of the same narrative, replacing ‘Europe’ by some locally
constructed center” (7). In the context of the Sri Lankan nation state, this violent center became a Sinhala-Buddhist one, and as has been noted, tourism is also not separate from these political practices. This is indicative of not only how we understand religion as a colonial enterprise in South Asia, and whose sites can now be located on a tourist map, but is the same time beyond the map. These are also apart of individual everyday lived experience. The following section will look at the value of authenticity and culture, as I extend Chakrabarty’s reading of capital to include cosmopolitanism.

5. Cosmopolitan-Capitalism in the production of the Desti/nation

Having established that tourist mapping practices in Sri Lanka work through inclusive and exclusive articulations (as mapping practices more generally do), particularly alongside the promotion of a Sinhala-Buddhist cosmopolitan state, I have considered a continuum of dialects of sites and practices of Sri Lankan culture as simultaneously: anti/colonial; commodifiable/ radically personal, and in/authentic. These dialectics are only possible as they have development within particular historical narratives. Jayawardhana et. al observe in the opening on their analysis of the hotel industry in cultural tourist sites that “[t]he up-ward trend of reaching a tolerant level of political and economic stability of the country after ending the 30 years long war has flashed a strong green light for the tourism industry to grow at a very fast rate as never in the history” (228). The “history” referenced here arguably appears to be the history of the nation of state of Sri Lanka. Although if we take for a moment the histories of the island in trade and maritime routes, it may be difficult to definitively say this is the most travel of “foreigners” than at any moment in history. But what this statement reveals is the connection between “history” and the “state,” as they both emerge simultaneous as history does not count until it can be read in
reference to the universal idea of the state itself, that is to say an European understanding of history itself. This is what Chakrabarty suggestions in his seminal analysis of capital and history.

The universalization of the state and capital within history, but its simultaneous production of the particular follow what Chakrabarty (2000) describes as History 1 and 2. History 1 is the field of capital and the universal, where “[o]nly History 1 is the past ‘established by capital, because History 1 lends itself to the reproduction of capitalist relationships. Marx accepts in other words, that the total universe of pasts that capital encounters is larger than the sum of those elements in which are worked out the logical presuppositions of capital” (64). With the given examples of money and commodity, the elements of History 2 are also the antecedents of capital, but not antecedents that capital itself establishes (2000, 63-64). Here, in the scope of history, and indeed “History 2s are thus not pasts separate from capital they inhere in capital and yet interrupt and punctuate the run of capital’s own logic” (2000, 64). Therefore, referencing Marx, History 1 must “subjugate or destroy the multiple possibilities that belong to History 2. There is nothing, however, to guarantee that the subordination of History 2s to the logic of capital would ever be complete” (2000, 65). This constant play between the pre-supposed universality and the pre-assumed particularity of capital and its antecedents, I suggest is also at play in the commodification of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism also operates within assumed universal values, but also within the pre-given assumption of antecedents, difference, and particularities. In a constant articulation of “not yet” and “almost” that the dialectic of the postcolonial state (see Introduction and Chapter 1), cosmopolitanism moves between and translates the universal and the particular, gaining value as it does. This also relates back to the discussion in Chapter 2, through the play between History 1 and History 2, the universal does not
completely consume the particular and from this way capital does not exhaust its supply, but it must be continually translated to the universal.

The play of history and capital also follows the contradiction set up by the state and cosmopolitanism in Derridean cosmo-politics. Derrida (2001) critiques the limitations of cosmopolitanism - a pure declaration of hospitality that is always already bound by the state, an impossibility. Which is why we also see complications with Sinhala- Buddhist cosmopolitanism, as Jazeel puts forth. Cosmopolitanism is histori-capitalistic, and more than just the way that it is available in capitalist industries, such as tourism, and has been historically developed as such, but more specifically it favors universals but gains value in the particular. Or we might even say that capital is historico-cosmopolitan.

The cosmopolitan has largely been discussed as the figure with pre-assumed access and the right to mobility, and as the tourist map indicates this figure has already granted and accepted invitation. I would like to stress this point further that the mobility of the cosmopolitan is made simultaneously possible through a dialectical geospatial imaginary of the nation state and beyond the nation state. The dialectic of cosmopolitanism is in the universalization of the nation state and the citizen as an individual, “since nationalist thought was premised precisely on the assumed universality of the project of becoming individuals, on the assumption that individual rights and abstract equality were universals that could find home anywhere in the world,” that once could be “Indian,” “Sri Lanka,” “Pakistani” and “a citizen at the same time” (Chakrabarty 2000, 34). The universalization of the nation state also points towards the possibility of cosmopolitanism: one could be both a citizen of the state and “a citizen of the world.” But the citizen of the world is only possible if they are also a citizen of a state. This also presupposes the
hierarchy of states (see Chapter 1) as only some mobile bodies get to be cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan is also a position and mark of privileged displacement, including the access between states (see Chapter 3). In this way, the cosmopolitan also serves to elucidate the contradictions within these seemingly universal principles. This follows and is not separate from the contradictions of hospitality of cosmopolitanism when looking at the asylum seeker.

The cosmopolitan location, as Derrida looks as Sanctuary cities for example, implies universal acceptance of others to enter that space. But the cosmopolitan promise to receive those other citizens of the world is limited by the state. The cosmopolitan as an individual implies universal acceptance of that person to enter Other spaces. But the cosmopolitan promise to be received is limited by the means to travel between borders, and at times the borders of the nation state. That is, the perceived hospitality of the state to accept individuals in both privileged and precarious positions of displacement is a contradiction because of the very production of the state itself. From the discussions above on the issues of culture within tourism, I suggest that it gains value specifically as culture becomes valuable as it follows cosmopolitan-capital logic. That is, cosmopolitan or cosmopolitanism is able to circulate within and as spaces of the nation state, as production of simultaneous universalizations and the particular, by looking at its ties to capital. This more than just considers the ways in which the cosmopolitan is afforded mobility between the universalized notions of particular states, but the ways which other elements are afforded values of cosmopolitanism. Specifically, this is seen in the productions of a Sinhala-Buddhist cosmopolitanism, as described by Jazeel and the hegemonic practice of an ethnonationalist state, and the ways in which this particular form of cosmopolitanism is able to gain value in reference to “cultural” tourist sites.
With the cultivation of cultural sites as national heritage sites, culture also come under the optics of the state. But through organizations such as the UNWTO (United Nations World Tourism Organization) and UNESCO these sites are additionally given universal value as they are connected to cosmopolitan logic and history proper. What tourist maps help to do, I maintain, is project particular images of the state towards already perceived values and understandings of the state, culture, and history. Such cartographic violences are also a part of the lessons learned from nation building. Tourist maps work in parallel but inverted ways, where the citizen is made invisible for sake of the cosmopolitan tourist, who is allowed entry by the cosmopolitan government. However, in each instance cosmopolitanism only works in inclusion as it also excludes. These are a part of the many intersecting cosmopolitanism operative indicated by Sri Lankan tourism.

History 1 we can see as universal values of heritage, culture, and history, and History 2, as the emergence of the particular, a Sinhala-Buddhist culture and state identity. Each seeks to erase the other, but each only gains value by the other as well. The particular becomes universal, therefore any other particulars that emerge out of the universal also are only able to be seen from the viewpoint of the universal. Referencing the phrase from MTP1 earlier, and “then we started our own Buddhist civilization,” for example, this is a particular history, but as told through the frame of a universal understanding of history.

We can see the ways in which cosmopolitanism and capital work parallel, and when it comes to tourism in Sri Lanka (if not other places as well). This is not only indicated by the mapping of the country, but is also indicated by the various taglines put out by the Sri Lankan Tourism Promotional Bureau. MTP1 listed these as: “[s]tarting from “The Pearl of the Indian
Ocean,” then “Isle of Serendipity,” then “Land Like No Other,” “Sri Lanka: Small Miracle,” and now “Wonder of Asia” as the promotional tagline.” All of these imply a perceived value of rarity, a universal value, we might say, of the exotic. This indicates the culture of tourism itself that Sri Lanka has cultivated and continues to cultivate, perhaps not so much in contrast to the “sun and fun” paradise of the 1970s, but as a continuation of paradise, where culture still remains outside of the tentacles of modernity. What state of modern capitalism is not indicated by the ability and desire for culture to be extracted and mined as capital itself, as a commodity?

Following up from his list of taglines, I asked how often they change the tagline. The MTP1 responded: Very good question you asked, because if someone believing in marketing, I don’t see reason for changing it, quite often, like Malaysia they say “Tour of Asia” or something like that, for India they say “Incredible India,” or something like that. So for a long time they haven’t changed it, so of course there is a problem. So I’ll come out with a small story in regards to this, “Small Miracle” promotional, what do you call, video clip. In “Small Miracle,” one tourist he is taking, during the video clip, he is taking the Sri Lanka and putting it in the bag, and something like that. And then there was a big “ha-who” over how could you expect “small” miracle, this is not small. Sri Lanka is not small. Some people… I don’t see, and I don’t mean to mean to boast my own, I also have a marketing background… I don’t see any reason, they have said “small miracle,” a lot of “ha-who” so they changed it, “Wonder of Asia”… [they] came up with the theme “Wonder of Asia,” with having 8 themes, covering different main themes, maybe food, maybe wildlife, health and wealth, festivals, something like that. This country has so many things to offer, but there are some modifications, and what do you call, “fine tunings” has to be done. Uh, as you know, having a wonderful product, will not give you everything. So you have to maintain it, handle it, should be clean.”

I was unable to find the version that MTP1 referred to, but in the video published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ YouTube account (notably not the Ministry of Tourism), “Sri Lanka Small Miracle,” includes cultural performers and dancers, Buddhist temples and statues of the Buddha, wildlife and aerial views of landscapes, images of cars in the capital and shoppers in a mall in motion, as well as nightlife and spas, all put to lines like “Jules Verne saw the world in 80 days, if he had searched a little harder he would have found this amazing place” in a
catchy-up beat, almost American-country musical tone

(MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Sri Lanka 2009). All of these elements allude to the vast amount of products at the awaiting pleasure of the cosmopolitan tourist, “the good deal” of a modern island paradise where culture is still available. It also makes sense given these continued discussions that one version of this video would have a tourist taking the “small miracle” of Sri Lanka and putting it into their pocket. This is essentially what is promised by such discussion, where the island itself, no matter how plural its ethnic and religious cultures are assumed to be or how many attractions it contains inside, the island-state itself is the product. This version of the video, I would suggest, simply recreates this same idea, where at the end the camera zooms out to reveal a tourist map of the country with similar icons indicated Buddhist temples, the capital, the lighthouse of Galle, etc (see Figure 4.6). In comparing this image to a tourist map, consider the similarities between Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.

The universal, objectified view as seen in mapping, the view from nowhere, is produced as the cosmopolitan vantage point. This view or map of Sri Lanka is perhaps the ideal

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Figure 4.6: Screenshot from "Sri Lanka Small Miracle" YouTube Video from Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MT0e3Lw9Ic Accessed: September 11, 2018.
example of what Chakrabarty refers in his analysis of History 1 and 2. History 1 is the view which allows the universal, objective view from above. Following these same critiques it is then History 2 which allows the various images and icons to also emerge. These are images associated with the particular but they are valued universally. And once more, as indicated by MTP1, the product itself, that must be fine-tuned, maintained, and cleaned is the island itself. It is a continual re-working. This is possible because of the cosmo-capitalistic values enabled through History 1 and 2, through the universal value of the particular these things converge in the development of the value of the island as commodity. This is a continuation of the island state as a treasure box, as indicated in Chapter 1, but also one step further. In this articulation, the state does not only contain those things that tourist values, but the state, the island (collapsed inseparable from one another) is the product itself. Within what I have described as a cosmopolitan geopolitics, this creates the island-state-as-product, as

the *desti/nation*. The desti/nation alludes to the universality of the nation-state, but also signals those products, experiences, and sites which out to be traveled for.

The desti/nation has been the product that we have seen up until now on the tourist map as promoted by the international tourist economy, and whose value as both a product and a nation state is ready through a dialectic of anti/colonialism. The narrative of the Sinhala-Buddhist cultural sites and practices indicate the state as a particular destination, but only as it is also able to be read and understood as a state, which continues along exclusionary identity politics. The promotion of culture is one form that these exclusionary identity politics takes in the development of the desti/nation, but I will also show in the next two chapters how this works in similar terms for the promotion of nature and war tourism. Again, my inclusion of cultural sites, nature tourism, and former war zones in my analysis of the cosmopolitanism of the state is because these were the suggestion made to me of where the stranger, the tourist, the Outsider should know about Sri Lanka.
Chapter 5: The Nature(s) of Sri Lankan Tourism

"Sri Lanka is a very beautiful country. There are a lot of beautiful countries all over the world. But Sri Lanka is most beautiful, because of a lot of natural resources like rivers, and trees, and animals. And people also. Very nice, they have respect, hospitality. Smiling always. If you go to a village, they are nicely welcomed. Like if children come, it is like they are their children. Also, if Sri Lanka just has natural beauty, then it is not good, we want famous for the world. About Sri Lanka, it is a very small country, but it is very beautiful....also government earn money from the international people, because of they want to develop and maintain the places. And we have very natural parks, elephant parks. Bird’s park. And Sri Lanka also getting more, what is it called, funding for some projects. That is what international people, the most important for Sri Lanka, not only Sarvodaya." - Yamuna, Secretary, Sarvodaya (Balasooriya 2018).

"Okay. My focus is more meditation, spiritual, um, and uh, natured focused, so that's one reason I'm working and living here, I mean my mother is Norwegian and I went to art school in Norway, and all that kind of thing, came back here when I was at the end of my teens. That just basically because I needed a physical presence of what I feel from the land and the area which is the eastern vision, which informs my paintings and sensibility to the ancient Hindu, Buddhist world not in the religious sense, but that's where the inspiration comes from through the meditation and also just to be in Sri Lankan nature, which to me is connected in that same worldview, you know, the kind of benign nature that's giving the whole Buddhist concept of confession, that kind of thing. So the paintings are inspired by that. But, uh, I don't really try to illustrate that kind of thing. I just recreate my own symbols.” -Rahju, Kandyan artist (Pereira & Devi Das 2018).

"And I think it, Sri Lanka, is defined by its nature more than anything else. At least for me. I mean, people come and go and cultures change and you know, civilizations rise and fall, but I think there's something in the nature because even when you travel out and you come back, it's almost like it's alive and it's rich and it's going last, but of course nothing lasts forever, but like it's been there for a long time. It's going to last for a long time...” -Rudrani, Kandyan artist (Pereira & Devi Das 2018).

1. The Nature(s) of Sri Lankan Tourism: promoting the state of nature

The quotes above, from several individuals that appeared in the last chapter, indicate different ways that the concept of Sri Lankan nature gets expressed. The first quote serves as an example for how “nature” is understood as a potential resource for the country, specifically for international visitors. This concept of resource, coupled with the ways in which there are particular spaces that nature can be found, i.e. parks, should echo the critique of the tourist map as resource map from Chapter 2. Further, the suggestion that it is just enough that Sri Lanka has
this “beauty,” but that it must be shared with the world, should additionally echo the extended invitation hospitality from Chapter 3. The second quote should share associations with the previous chapter, and parallel with the associations of “Sri Lankan culture.” “Sri Lankan nature” is often connected with spiritual or religious sentiments. Finally, the third quote indicates the many “taken-as-givens” around “nature” (as well as, culture), where it is understood as ahistorical and outside the dynamic political spaces around it, as if it were not those very political spaces which help to determine the relationship to and understanding of “nature.” For example, Tariq Jazeel (2013) indicates that the “taken-as-givens” of ‘nature’ and ‘religion’ “do not announce themselves” overtly as productions of ethno-nationalism in Sri Lanka, however, the relationship between nature and Sinhala-Buddhist nationhood in Sri Lanka should also be put into context with “the normalization of ethnicized social relations and identities” within projects of nation building in the country, which includes tourist sights, such as the production of national parks (as the example he investigates) (2). It also indicates, an ongoing and perpetuated notion of the culture-nature divide along development ideologies.

I do not attempt to define “nature” as a definitive concept, but instead I look at it as it is discursively articulated and contingently indicated by specific spatio-temporalities. For this project, that includes how it emerges alongside the concept of “Sri Lanka,” and I ask, along similar terms of “Sri Lankan culture,” how does the notion of “Sri Lankan nature” signal simultaneous associations of universal values around “nature” and formations of the particular around already-associated concept of “Sri Lanka?” Similar to the last chapter again, I use autoethnography to facilitate the complexity of these interactions. As such, it is necessary to indicate that nature in such discussions, and as with direct association with “Sri Lanka,” is tied to
the territory, the ideology, the discourse of the state itself. As indicated by the conversations above, as well as Jazeel’s argument, it is necessary to investigate the interconnected associations of the state, culture, religion, and nature.

Most of my conversations surrounding Sri Lankan nature, religion, and culture will follow a discussion of Buddhism. This is not meant at the expense of other associations of nature and religions, such as Hinduism, but reflects my own personal relationships and travels in the country, which are for the most part with individuals who practice Buddhism. But also in what is consistent with the investigations of Part II, I examine the ways in which nature is promoted in tourism as connected to Sinhala-Buddhist state and history, at the exclusion of other identities and beliefs on the island. Although, I would note that Rahju and Rudrani do not claim a specific religion necessarily, but seem to find their own personal values within an Asian-based spirituality and pull from practices of both Hinduism and Buddhism. In my limited experience, this pull of practices between what is now referred to as Hinduism and Buddhism might better reflect the practices or representations associated in Buddhist temples, for example, including the integration of images and carvings of gods and goddess that would seemingly belong to the Hindu faith, and in the case of the Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura, a white bindi. I make these points not to separate out those things that are “Hindu” and those things that are “Buddhist” but to suggest that in everyday life these practices can easily cross and include the other, but it is in the act of claiming an identity, particularly a state identity, as one or the other that they become radically separate, and to the point of even violence. The work in this chapter looks at the potential violences in the identification of nature and religious identities, particularly as tied to the state and promoted in tourism, as well as the potential environmental impacts tied to
tourism. Tourism, and here the example of the tourist map and tourist geographies, promotes “nature” as it merges into the violent cartographies of consumption by the cosmopolitan tourist.

There are unique environmental concerns for tourism when it comes to the Global South, as tourism “frequently causes degradation of the environment through unregulated construction, over-use of resources, pollution and diversion of often scarce water supplies”, as Frances Brown and Derek Hall have indicted (2008, 841). But also, as I suggest, the ways in which tourism may either contribute to or perpetuate our understandings and values of “nature” and the “natural” world. “Nature” is reason enough to travel to a place in the Global South, and in the case of Sri Lanka both locals and visitors have a shared understanding of the value of such landscapes.

As prefaced, one of the themes that emerged was the concept of “Sri Lankan nature.” Participants emphasized Sri Lanka’s spiritual and historical (in Buddhist and Hindu cosmologies) connection to nature and/or placed value on “virgin” forests, high biodiversity, and
national parks. At times, nature in Sri Lanka is deeply personal, connected to individual spiritual and religious practices, beliefs, and values. But as the culture of “nature” leads way to nature as environment, it also becomes a “natural” resource to the country, particularly in the face of tourism. “The Environment” becomes the promotion of beautiful landscapes and wildlife as it offers a variety of experiences to the potential visitor, as well as increases the number of possible visitors. For example, one member of the Ministry of Tourism indicated how the different climate zones of the country provided different opportunities for the tourist (dry, wet, arid), and another indicated how the cycle of monsoons that hits the island at different points of the year coincides with different holiday periods of different tourists (Australian, European, Gulf States) (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).

The goal of this chapter, however, is not to take the promotion of “nature” and the “natural” conditions of the island at face value. Rather, I suggest that these conversations on Sri Lankan nature and tourism should be placed within larger geopolitical contexts that surround questions of sustainability and the environment, and which situate Western colonial and imperial relations in the development of “nature” as concept, and the ways in which these concepts and values are now being implemented by the state. Tariq Jazeel (2013) begins his book *Sacred Modernity: Nature, Environment, and The Postcolonial Geographies of Sri Lankan Nationhood* by stating that:

nature is something of an obsession in Sri Lanka. Visitors to the island and residents alike never stop marveling at the abundance of flora, fauna, and the succession of staggering beautiful landscapes with which the country seems to have been blessed. But if Sri Lankan nature captivates, it has rarely ever been strictly ‘natural’. Commonplace understandings of the country’s nature are deeply entwined with narratives of history, culture, and religion (1).
Taking these deeply entwined articulations of history, culture, religion, and politics with the production and value of Sri Lankan nature, I further locate these space(s) of nature(s) within Sri Lankan tourism, and the ways in which “nature” can be located on different points of the tourist map for the experience of the cosmopolitan tourist, in the perceived universal value of nature itself. (As well as when it is not.) Vincent J. Del Casino and Stephen P. Hanna (2000) have stated that “[a] tourism map... is an attempt to fix or identify space as ‘tourist’ or ‘non-tourist’ through a deployment of symbols marking paths, boundaries and tourist sights/sites. People within that space are identified through their representation and interactions as tourists, locals, tourism workers or as those excluded from the map and space” (29). An elephant for Yala National Park, a waterfall for Ella, fish for Arugam Bay, a windsurfer for Unawatuna, etc. all indicate spaces that are marked for the tourist vs. the locals, those spaces that can either be passively or actively enjoyed by visitors. Here, I consider the invitation to nature, the erasure of non-tourist spaces through mapping practices, but also the ways in which culture and religion also intersect the formation of nature in the Sri Lankan
context, which does not exclude the promotion of nature to the cosmopolitan tourist. To reiterate, the ongoing critique of tourist maps for this project looks at two different modes of the tourist map: one is the outline and continued representation of the state as the island, another is the possibility of the specific icons that arise over others, and the often standardized use of these icons. Therefore, in this specific chapter, the emergence of these particular icons are connected to the larger historical and political spatio-temporal narratives that allow them to emerge in the first place, including, for example, the association of the elephant for a national park and the colonial history of the hunt.

These associations of such icons as simultaneously Sri Lankan and colonial, indicates the continued coloniality within the political modernity of Sri Lanka. Investigating the political modernity of Sri Lankan, Jazeel (2013) has also observed that “nature and religion have been key vehicles for articulating a Sri Lankan modernity whose nation-building trajectories are necessarily temporally hybrid, looking at once outward towards the internationalism of a postcolonial global stage, forward to Sri Lanka’s own national self-determination upon that stage, and backwards to its own historiographical sense of itself” (10). As also discussed elsewhere, Jazeel (2013) critiques a “cosmopolitan mode of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism,” in order to point to the “political closures in avowedly cosmopolitan hospitality narratives and performances” (22). Specifically, in his work, Jazeel (2013) examines Ruhuna (Yala) National Park and various examples of tropical modern architecture that both work spatially as a form of cosmopolitan Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. He considers these examples as ways in which both “participate in a classically Derridean hospitality narrative, and in which they curate space for
difference to emerge, to be welcomed and tolerated, but only by consolidating hegemonizing its own sovereign and majoritarian speaking position” (Jazeel 2013, 23).

The work in this chapter continues to use Jazeel’s critique of cosmopolitan Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, as seen in the previous chapter, but once again extends this discussion to intersect the politics of tourism geographies, including, here, the politics of representing nature as resource and the extended invitation of the specific extractive hospitality by the tourist map. Like the spatial politics of national parks and architecture that Jazeel (2013) examines, tourist maps additionally help to “instantiate the sovereignty of Buddhist and Sinhala thought, tradition, and aesthetics within the fabric of an everyday ordinariness that Sri Lankan nature anchors” (23). In themselves they make no political claims, “yet they help shape the parameters through which difference can be recognized and tolerated. That is their politics” (Jazeel 2013, 23). Furthermore, I continue to develop these observations by Jazeel on the Sri Lankan politics of nature and religion as modes of cosmopolitan Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, alongside my reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s History 1 and 2 and the capitalist relations to cosmopolitanism within formations of history and the state in order to connect how these politics are operative in the value of “Sri Lankan nature” within the global tourist economy. The juxtaposition as indicated by Derridean cosmo-politics, of cosmopolitanism and the nation state, as well as, the play between the particular and the universal plays out once again in conceptualizations of Sri Lankan nature through a cosmopolitan geopolitics.

Additionally, following my critique of the postcolonial island state, I argue that the dialectical temporality (both towards the former colony and a globalized nation state), are only
further sharpened by the productions of nature and the environment within tourist geographies, including the inclusionary and exclusionary destinations of “nature” in “tourist sites” vs. “non-tourist sites.” As seen with the tourist map as resource map, nature is produced as tourist icons and images indicates nature as an extractable-tourism resource. Nature as resource reflects both Western understanding of object-based value systems, as well as confirms the “obsession of the control of resources” within geopolitics, and as been discussed (Mallinson and Ristic 2016, xiv). However, I also suggest caution towards uncritical claims towards non-Western, spiritual connection to nature, in that they might offer a re-conceptualization of nature. While South Asian philosophies might allow for a more relationship-based orientation to nature, in contrast to the object-focused resource, values of “Eastern” and “alternative” ought to be into question within current political systems, as historically developed. Following Jazeel’s observations, any potential alternative to conceptualizations of nature should also take into account the political articulations that shape our historical, contemporary, and even religious (not that the religious is ahistorical) understandings of “nature.” I take Donna Haraway’s (2016) suggestion for a multi-perspective, multi-spatial, multi-temporal envisioning of relations between ourselves and the worlds we perceive to be both external and inclusive of ourselves. Such considerations might help in the stranger’s connections to those places she is already going, that is, the connections between tourism and place, as well as produce “alternative,” or even defractive, networks and potential scenarios within geopolitics and global climate change.

Given the exploitative and object-based relationship to nature that these complications seem to indicate (nature as both a profitable and extractable resource as well as an invaluable and priceless resource that is in threat of “running out”), one might be tempted to suggest moving
away from Western understandings of nature towards alternative forms, like those found in Buddhism. However, and finally, as Jazeel also suggests, Sri Lankan nature is rarely anything but natural, therefore, any suggestion that might look towards more “Eastern” cosmologies as alternatives to the seemingly sterile, imperial, and objectified nature produced through Western Enlightenment values, must also recognize the signifiers, like Buddhism is also not produced innocently, ahistorically, or apolitically, particularly as the notion of “Buddhism” itself is produced as a capital “R” religion alongside colonial and imperial categorizing, comparing, and claiming alongside with Ethnicity/ Race. Jazeel (2013) contends that Buddhism and the emphasize on Buddhist nature itself is an ongoing project of simultaneous anti-colonialism and nation building within a Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic state, and that “the very concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘religion’ are only partially able to make visible the political contours of environmental formations in the Sri Lankan context” (2). Therefore, following his work and the consideration of colonial, anti-colonial, and post-colonial states of Sri Lanka as an example of modern nation building around the context of nature, the outsider, and state, as a particular within the general concerns of international relations, as well as pending concerns of changing climates, natures, and environments that more decolonial methodologies of the state and the self in general may be necessary in order to account for potential and on-going and historical crises.

Developing from the arguments in the previous chapter, that like cultural articulation in Sri Lanka, that we understand the emergences of “Sri Lankan nature” operative in dialectics of in/authenticity and anti/colonial. I begin with a conversation that suggests Buddhist cosmologies as ethical alternatives to environmental concerns. My intervention in this debate is that we must first re-politicize (indeed religion or religious practices are never apolitical or ahistorical),
specifically as Buddhism as developed within colonial histories and within Enlightenment values, as well. Therefore, I also locate colonial histories in the development of “natural” spaces in Sri Lanka, including its most popular national park, Yala. The emergence of nature as icons within the continued representation of island space, indicates the promotion of the “state of nature.” Second, I follow how the values of “nature” as an ideal space works in the contemporary contexts of ecotourism, continuing to produce “it” within spaces of mediation and control. This will again note, consistent with mapping practices, tourist spaces vs. non-tourist spaces. And finally, I consider the end of nature. I argue in spiritual and religious understandings of nature that we ought to accept them as both radically personal and political. My hope is that by acknowledging the personal value and connection between religion and nature in Sri Lanka and the work that has been done to suggest Buddhist teachings for a more ethical relation to the environment in the face of development and modernity, and simultaneously combine the political and potential violence of a Buddhist nature within nation-building, that we might come full circle back to the need to be able to discuss and story “natures” and “environments” in the radical pluralness that they already operate. That is, to be able to discuss demons, spirits, energies as agentic forces between the fields of the human and nonhuman alongside the state and international community concerns. But first these discussions must be made apparent in their politicalness. And often in Sri Lanka the inclusion of a Buddhist temple or a national park on a tourist map indicate similar political projects, that is particular form of nation building.

2. Buddhist and Colonial Nature(s)

The Monday before I started work at Sarvoadaya in the summer of 2012, a group of us went down to the beach for the weekend in Unawatuna. My friend and I had made a wrong turn
going back to our hotel from the beach, and ended up meeting a German ex-pat who, from the few bits of conversation we had, had married a Sri Lankan woman and was currently living there as a painter. About his own beliefs he said this: “Buddhism is my philosophy, nature is my religion.” Talking with someone else about the encounter later, they said, “yeah, I would say most people in Sri Lanka would agree with that statement.” Nature is, again, somewhat of an obsession for both tourists, locals, and even immigrants in Sri Lanka. It is even difficult for myself, at times, to not romanticize the connection. Not unlike the ways in which I am continually taken in by conversations I have with individuals like Rahju and Rudrani (see previous chapter), it seems to follow that many Westerns look towards Sri Lanka as a place that is outside the forces of constructive modernity, something more connected with nature. These desires, right alongside the concept of nature itself, should, however, be put into their very political histories.

Not unconnected, there has already been work done on the ways that “Eastern” cosmologies might offer alternative relations to nature and the environment, particularly in the face of such forces as global climate change. Alternative cosmologies might help to disrupt a singular, monolithic view of the world, or even a map of the world itself. For example, how might our understandings of changing climates and the continual question of responsibility differ if we understood the “world map” or the world itself as a giant Buddhist corpse “comprised of individual corporeal relics” (Shaw 2016, 521). Julia Shaw (2016) indicates a couple different conversations that circulate around the discussion of environmental ethics, Buddhism, and

conceptions of nature. One discussion emphasizes and promotes Buddhism as ‘eco-dharma,’\textsuperscript{22} which followings teachings “on the basis of its preoccupation with non-violence (ahimsā), and the well-being and (alleviation of) suffering (dukkha) of non-humans” (518). The second discussion, as she relates, “attempts to discount the second drawing on philosophical-theological arguments aimed at discounting the environmentally-engaged model of Buddhism” (2016, 518).\textsuperscript{23} Perhaps, a part of this second debate also requires acknowledging the potential romanticism of Buddhism along lines of Western value systems. A part of the issue here is the ways in which “nature” is valued and discussed in Western knowledge. For example, Shaw (2016) states, “[a] key argument here is that the debate about the prominence, or not, of environmental ethics in early Buddhism has been skewed by a one-sided interpretation of environmentalism as being concerned with ‘nature’ as an entity removed from humans, rather than with human:non-human entanglement” (519).

My contribution to this discussion of either use of or critique of Buddhist nature within environmental concerns is not to suggest a middle road as Shaw does, but instead to bring attention (or intention) to their simultaneousness, that is, “Buddhist nature” simultaneous allows us to discuss relations to nature outside of Western concepts as it also, at times, gains value exactly because of Western conceptions and value of nature. There is a similar contested duality when Buddhism signifies “culture” and “nature” and works as forms of nation-building through systems of coloniality in contemporary international relations. Tourism and its productions, including maps, are one way that the state is able to perform these values in the face toward the

\textsuperscript{22} Shaw points out that “dharma” has multiple religio-cultural interpretations, but for its practices in her discussion, which also works for my own here, this can widely be conceived as teachings of the Buddha.

international/universal. A focus on tourist values also helps to position the discussion beyond Western environmental revisionists whose seemingly fall close to romanticization (which is dangerously close to objectification, reification, commodification), and those that critique such potential misinterpretation and misappropriation.

It is exactly Sri Lanka’s particular narratives of history, culture, and religion which helps to give nature additional value in terms of a cosmopolitan tourist. Nature is already valuable, as has been discussed in more overt terms with culture itself in Chapter 2, because it faces destruction from modernity and development. Capitalistic forces give value to the very thing they threaten. But even in writing about tourism promotion in the country, and not merely the materials themselves, the lean towards the spiritual is evident. For example, note the phrasing used by the article on “Business Strategy, Market Orientation and Sales Growth in Hotel Industry of Ancient Cities in Sri Lanka,” out of the Postgraduate Institute of Agriculture at the University of Peradeniya: “[b]lessed with seven UNESCO named world heritage sites and being a richly bio-diversified land in spite of the smallness of the country, Sri Lanka is considered as one of the most attractive cultural and natural hotspots of the world” (Jayawardhana et. al 2013, 228). Jayawardhana indicate that the country is simultaneously blessed for both its cultural heritage sites and its “natural” landscapes. And as was discussed in the previous chapter, the smallness of the island contributes to its “good deal” for such cultural and natural gems.

Not only are Enlightenment values and understandings of religion and nature “stickily with us” (Jazeel 2013, 12), but it is the additional history of Sri Lanka as an island which only adds to these layers. Perhaps, it should not be surprising that the development of the cartography and geography and Western expansion also happens as the same time as the European scientific
revolution in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, which also formed how Europe related to nature. Like colonialism itself, the relation to nature was patriarchal and paternalistic. Additionally, like the mapping of the state at this time (see Introduction) it was tied to economic practices, as Vandana Shiva (1995) relates that the scientific revolution and its relation to nature "closely related industrial revolution [and] laid the foundations of a patriarchal mode of economic development in industrial capitalism" (xiv). The patriarchal power over and the feminization of nature was also aligned to the colonial project, justifying the order and control necessary and over those that did not know how to properly manage it. Shiva states that "[t]his view of science as a social and political project of modern western man emerging from the responses of those who were defined into nature and made passive and powerless: Mother Earth, women and colonised cultures" (20). As both are now expected and valued by the cosmopolitan tourist, we might also connect the colonial right to access and place to both the feminization of hospitality and nature (see Chapter 3). But this patriarchal and paternalistic view over nature would also persist when the Western views of civilizing included conservation, as was the case with Yala. The move towards conservation of space also seems to align with the time frame of Romanticism in Europe, as well as the development of natural history, which we cannot assume was any less politically patriarchal than previous forms of scientific knowledge. Particularly as Alan Bewell notes that (2004) "natural history' and 'nature' came into being as a consequence of European colonial expansion, their discursive histories are not easily separable from it" (12). Bewell (2004) further contends that “[t]he identification "nature" with the colonial world was a powerful and enduring one. ..The focus of natural history on the colonial world meant that travel, or at least access to travellers' accounts, was a fundamental requirement” (12).
Gilbert Caluya (2014) additionally adds that “[c]olonial islands were central environments through which new conceptions of nature were developed,” particularly along the lines conservation and preservation of nature (37). Therefore, I suggest the values and creation of nature as both a mode of economic advancement and conservation through scientific knowledge production and travel narratives appear to continue in the value and promotion of nature as a tourist resource in our contemporary cosmopolitan geopolitics.


On traditional tourist maps of Sri Lankan one key location marked is Rahuna, most commonly referred to as Yala, National Park. As of the publication Jazeel’s book in 2013, the park received over 200,000 annual visitors, and in the early 2000s the income generated from the park accounted for more than half the revenue of Sri Lanka’s Department of Wildlife.
Conservation (4). The official website for the park notes from its “First comprehensive tourist map” the park is located on the southeast of the country and two of its five blocks touching the Indian ocean (see Figure 5.3) (“Tourist Map of Yala National Park”). As has been noted on more iconagraphic maps of the country, it is often marked with an elephant or leopard (see past Figures).

In addition to the overtly religious connotations, as noted above, the possibility of experiencing diverse, “exotic” wildlife and landscapes is another way that nature gains value in Sri Lanka. As the most popular of Sri Lanka’s national parks, it is how, for many visitors, wildlife and nature more generally are mediated for their enjoyment and pleasure. As might be assumed from the icons, the park remains a popular place as it promises large mammals, like the noted Sri Lankan Asian elephant (a subspecies), leopard, water buffalo, but also such exciting reptiles like crocodiles. The promises and potential pleasure of these experiences are anything but downplayed. For example, a blurb from the About page on Yala’s official website reads “It’s an experience of epic proportions that brings you up, close and personal with untamed world of wildlife. Whether you are an avid nature lover or visiting a wildlife park for the first time, if you come here with a mind that’s eager to explore and learn, you will go away with new-found meaning to life” (“About Yala”). These two promotional sentences together indicate the simultaneous articulation of anti/colonial around values of Sri Lankan nature.

First, the themes of untamed or untouched resonate again, but whose value is extended not just to the experience of the park itself but whose connection to, what we might call, “true” nature is life changing. I suggest that we can see echoes of colonial values of nature in a nature that is located “elsewhere” and “preserved” in this more “exotic” and “wild” place. But the
patricahal stewardship and conservation of these otherwise “unruly” places now fall under the state’s guidance. Such abstraction and reification of nature seems compatible with Western notions of nature, but the emphasize on “with a mind” or a perceived mindfulness to the experience of nature and wildlife might also allude to particular Buddhist principles. Jazeel (2013) argues, for example, that the park remains an extension of a cosmopolitan Sinhala-Buddhist state through what he refers to as “sacred modernity,” highlighting the productions of the aesthetics of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that do not address themselves overtly, as such. The promotional materials of Yala do not overtly assert their Buddhist relationship, but the emphasize of “mindfulness” and experience and learning through non-human nature is an example of how a Sinhala-Buddhist or scared modern aesthetic is achieved. This particular, Sinhala-Buddhist aesthetic indicates an anti-colonial position around the preservation and experience of nature.

However, in the very fact that it works through preservation of nature as a national park indicates simultaneous colonial modes of power. This includes not only the formation of the state itself as a park, but even more directly to the colonial history of conversation and preservation on the island, and the relation to “wildness” that symbolized not only “nature” or particular animals, but as directly tied to the place and people more generally. As noted above, the patriarchal and paternalistic relationship to nature in the colonies was justified through a civilizing mission. This civilizing mission included at times economic endeavors (like the establishment of the tea plantations, Chapter 2), gaming, or conservation. What remained the same in each iteration was the assumption the native populations did not know how to properly manage nature and the landscape.
The park itself was a former colonial game site under the British, officially established in 1898. The official website seems to reroute around this particular history, noting that it was a wildlife sanctuary in 1900 and opened as a state park in 1938 (which was interestingly 10 years before Ceylon would become officially an “independent” state). Hiding this particular history of the park erases the colonial and Western influence in the creation and perceived need for sanctuaries, conversation sites, and national parks. The politics of preserving space of, or for, nature, indicates Enlightenment baggage of the culture-nature divide, as well as the need to maintain, control, and manage the wildness of the island. The preservation of nature was a part of the civilizing mission. Jazeel observes, for example, that “[f]or British administration, the ‘jungle’ was unhealthy and threatening. Its unchecked and regressive wildness stood in the way of human progress, and therefore it signified both a backwardness and modernizing challenge that taken together ideologically justified the very effort of imperialism” (2013, 37). Rahuna is but one example that indicates the ways in which the claiming and promotion of nature parallels the control and access to the island more generally. By designating particular spaces of nature for sport ensured control and domination of nature itself, and “the hunt” became a part of the civilizing mission of the island that was more generally connected to same principles of nature that it sought to control: backward, unruly, threatening. But in the first half of the twentieth century Western relations and values of nature would also changed from sport to conservation (Jazeel 2013, 37). This move between viewing nature as a space for civilizing sport to potential preservation (presumably from the very forces that sought to develop the perceived spaces outside of these designated areas) was not particular to Sri Lanka, but a change more generally to the West’s view of nature and the white man’s role (burden) in it. One might even say in the
question of independence and the “post” colonial state that the establishment of state parks was one way to legitimize the soon-to-be Ceylonese government, as civilized and external from nature, indicating their ability to self-govern, appropriately (see again, the time frame of the state park). Jazeel (2013) states that “[n]ational emparkment is a worldwide protocol that effectively sets aside space for a nation state’s nature. Unsurprisingly, given its modern roots in British imperialism, national emparkment’s very internationalism universalizes one of enlightenment thought’s primary binaries, that of nature/culture, and in this sense as a process itself it participates in a violent effacement of non-binary worldings and ontologies” (33). As such, national parks assist in producing a nature that can be known and classified through increased abstraction and exoticism, classified as extension of state power, and reflective of national identity.

Moreover, it seems a logical question to consider how much the politics of nature actually changes between colonial hunting grounds, sanctuaries, and state parks? Pala Pothupitiye, a Sri Lankan artist, would seemingly suggest “not much” (Pothupitiye 2018). Pala’s own work in the past has used colonial-era maps to explore the connected themes of geopolitics and colonialism. In my interview with him, he suggested that there seemed little difference to him between the colonists who participated in the hunt and elephant games, and those that come now to buy an image of an elephant on a t-shirt (Pothupitiye 2018). It is now a symbolic hunt, and both will take home their appropriate trophies. The elephant remains, in either case, the mark for having been to the exotic island of Sri Lanka; it is the signifier for the place itself. A wild and exotic place. The image of an elephant for Yala on a map could have any point indicated colonial hunting grounds, just as easily as it does a tourist location now. Without specific context the
promotion blurb promoting “an experience of epic proportions that brings you up, close and personal with untamed world of wildlife,” could also just as easily be about the hunt as it is a state park.

After independence the state park was then promoted as a heritage site by the Ceylonese themselves in the 1950s and 1960s. It was, as Jazeel (2013) also observes, “a wildlife for the nation state, but of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation: a cosmopolitan mode of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism whose nationalism works precisely by claiming as universal its path more particular content” (73). These formations should echo Chakrabarty’s reading of the universal and the particular from History 1 and 2, and how they emerge in the discussion of the cosmopolitan and the state. Here, nature is the particular that the state stakes a claim to, but only as its value is already understood towards the international, in terms culture, nature, and nationalism. The territory of national parks and the animals themselves become an extension of this cosmopolitan state.

Additionally, mapping, claiming, or narrating these spaces as “preserved” parallels associations with “untouched” or “virgin” wildlife, reflecting a feminization of the landscape. Feminization of the landscape only further justifies the state’s involvement by once again playing towards patriarchal duties and the stewardship of progress and civilization over the unruly jungle. The play between the universal and the particular in the cosmopolitan, Buddhist state also parallels the simultaneous “adventurous” or even “mindful” tourist, who seeks alternative spaces to experience other than, perhaps, what a resort might offer, and wants to conquer the wilds of an exotic island. There is somewhere in this an emergence of the Enlightenment of human over nature and the enlightenment towards the non-human within/ as
nature. But in either context, these modes of cosmopolitanism indicate that the state of nature is not without the state itself.

3. Nature as Resource: ecotourism and the mediation of space

Dydia DeLyser (2003) states that “[b]ehind each tourism map lies a history of its development and production, a history linked to the landscape the map claims to represent” (81). But the discussion of the tourist map can also be connected to larger discourses of development more generally. It is difficult to discuss those places deemed as natural and worthy of tourism, as seen on traditional tourist maps, without also discussing those “cartographies of development” which threaten the “natural beauty” of the country, and thereby making them that much more valuable.

Another form with which to discuss the cartographies of development and the history and value of nature is the increase of ecotourism in the country. Nearly 10 years after the date marked as the end of the civil war, the country and the economy have become increasingly more stable. Because of this, NGOs, like Sarvodaya, are seeing a decrease in foreign aid from international donors. As noted from the previous chapter, having relied on this stream of revenue to help fund many of their social programs in rural villages in the country, the organization is starting to look towards tourism to help supplement the loss. One of the ways that they hope to enter into the competitive tourist market is through community tourism and ecotourism. Along with Yamuna (again see previous chapter) the director of the International Division, Bandula, emphasized the importance of introducing tourists to the local people and landscapes of Sri Lanka, and that each had much to learn from the other (Senadeera 2018).
Another reason for community and ecotourism, as Bandula suggests, is that most ordinary Sri Lankans do not directly benefit from the tourist industry. This includes even the most stereotypical of backpackers who might not actively seek out the major tourist attractions, as often promoted by tourist maps. However, that does not mean they are not following their own guides and maps, including *Lonely Planet*. The specific concern with *Lonely Planet*, as Bandula explains, is “if a tourists only has a guidebook then…that person is confined to the limited places, because then informations is... limited in a particular area” (Senadeera 2018). Once cheap accommodations, food, and transportation are located in particular areas then tourists tend to keep to those places, and any additional revenue from tourism is lost. In this way, *Lonely Planet* and other such guide materials act as their own tourist maps, indicating the tourist places and non-tourist places, and how to navigate the space in-between.

However, there are also additional concerns, both environmental and cultural, for tourists navigating beyond their own maps and guidebooks. Noel B. Salazar (2017) observes that “[p]hysical tourism bubbles, particularly resorts, have been rightly criticized for being unsustainable. However, tourists freely roaming outside such contained areas also cause environmental or cultural damage” (705). Therefore, which form, we might ask, is less-sustainable and even more problematic for the environment: the large infrastructure projects going on in Colombo, the over-visited national parks, such as Yala, or the local community and ecotourism market? But further, what will it mean in terms of cultural and environmental interactions for those places that are seemingly beyond the touristscapes? If “authenticity” of tourist experiences in community and ecotourism is already connected with their proximity to nature, or the production of it, that this might not be a negation of the tourist spaces, but an
extension of it. That is, the inter-connected articulations of “nature,” “community,” “environment,” and “authenticity” might work towards additional structural violence in creating tourist bubbles. Or, at least this seems to be one of many possibilities. For example, Jennifer Devine (2017) maintains that “eco-tourism development commodifies nature and expands capitalism’s spatial frontier into ‘underdeveloped’ and/or semi-proletarianized spaces” (635).

In contrast to work that sees eco-tourism as “responsible travel” which helps to conserve the environment while improving the socio-economic conditions of local populations, Devine (2017) sees ecotourism as “a capitalist industry defined by tourists’ travel and leisure practices that integrates people, places and resources into the global economy” (635). She even further states that “[t]he eco-tourism economy comes replete with normative ideas about what constitutes nature, who is an ideal tourist, and what types of activities are desirable or permissible in tourism spaces” (Devine 2017, 635). The discussion of the ideal tourist and who is permitted inside this mediated space of a given touristscape, also brings into question the territorial divisions between locals and tourists. Not unlike, perhaps, the ways in which hunting grounds helped to define “who” was to be apart of the civilizing mission, and who was to be civilized.

When I ask Bandula about the potential negative consequences of bringing visitors to these kinds of environments, he indicated that it should be the government’s job to protect these kinds of space, as the government of Bhutan does. From his interview, Bandula indicated that Sri Lanka needed to “protect our culture” in the same way that Bhutan government handles tourism, including stricter and more exclusionary criteria of who gets to come to the country. No one could come without prior government approval, and you would need to “show your money.”
Bandula consented that some private sector involvement is good, but “then they don't think about cultural values” (Senadeera 2018). The lens and view of government involvement in such remarks are from the same view of the state itself, from “above” exclusionary practices enables control, helps to maintain and ensure that the state is culturally and environmentally more “intact.”

It is here once more that we see the dialectic of anti/colonial sentiments. The desire for the state government to have stricter involvement and control over the entry of outsiders, on the one hand, indicates reaction against potential exploitative and damaging encounters. On the other hand, the perceived internal protection from external forces, in many ways only further inscribes “state” space under Western nation-state understanding. This also comes back full circle to the colonial geospatial imaginary which sought control over the entire island space. Can we conceive of a way that the nation state, could actually be used to resist ongoing modes of coloniality?

Notably, this was not the only instance that Bhutan, and their relationship to tourism was brought up on this most recent trip to Sri Lanka. Bhutan was also brought up into conversation at the Ministry of Tourism as well, for example. However, it was not until I was sitting back on my couch at home in the States when it dawned me why Sri Lanka would never be, could never be like Bhutan. Apart from the fact, of course, that it was not Bhutan, Bhutan was the exact opposite of Sri Lanka in two very key ways. First, it was a landlocked country. Second, it had never been directly colonized. That is, although never directly colonized Bhutan did become a British protectorate in 1910, and the British occupation of additional parts of South Asia helped to shape the territories of the region. For example, Sanghamitra Misra (2011) notes that "an ideology of a unified territorialised entity was being realized, to be later claimed selectively by local
collectivities, and stitched to an emerging entity called India. For administrative units within this entity, spaces such as Bhutan, Tibet, Nepal and all the other places in between were firmly external to the new topography" (12-13). However, the long history of influences, trades, exploitation because of “natural” and strategic location of an island in the Middle of the Indian Ocean once again comes very much into play. Combined with the its “island-ness” and its “post”colonial-ness: the country has already been “opened up.” The development discourse for many former colonies is that they need “help” to “catch up,” whether that is through aide, partnerships, or tourism. Additionally, while some may wish for stricter access to the country, the government, as noted from the port developments, is also signing 99-year lease agreements with China.

4. Mediating Nature: between localized and state levels; particularities and universals

When I talked with Bandula in January 2018, the international division of Sarvodaya had already completed a couple of test tours with community villages. The organization and vision of such tours were also reflected by Bandula’s own tourist map (see Figure 5.4) (Senadeera 2018). Which, instead drawing a traditional tourist map as many did, he drew the layout of a village tour itself. The map overviews what the tourist would see if they went on one of these community or eco-tours developed by Sarvodaya. This particular tour example revolved around the production of rice. Bandula’s map included the paddy fields, showing where the rice is grown, where and how the farmer cultivates the rice, and how and where the final product is stored. This combination of community and ecotourism, I suggest, serves as an example of how nature itself is cultivated and made consumable. What Marx (1859) once again described as the “sensuous world” is just as much produced as any commodity. Nature as a cultural production can be
experience and consumed in particular places. Places that are designated as the appropriate and legitimate spatio-temporalities of nature.

While the examples, so far, have indicated state-level spaces of nature, more localized promotions of nature and understandings of “The Environment” within tourism and tourist topographies ought not to be overlooked. These more localized examples are also reflective of continued violence and colonality within development practices. That is, even outside of overt state discussions in the promotion of nature, similar questions in regard to power relations remain. For example, we might ask how much difference is there between an NGO receiving foreign aid vs. revenue from tourists? Particularly, if both are coming from similar structures in terms of the reliance of foreign “investments”? Cynthia Enloe (2014 [1990]) states that:

[1]Tourism is promoted today as an industry that can turn poor countries’ very poverty into a magnet for sorely needed foreign currency. For to be a poor society in the [twenty-first] century is to be ‘unspoilt’. Tourism is being touted as an alternative to the one-commodity dependency inherited from colonial rule. Foreign sun-seekers replace

See Figure 5.4: Senadeera, Bandula G.L. Participatory Mapping Exercise. January 4, 2018.
bananas. Hiltons replace sugar mills. Multinational corporations...convert their large landholdings into resorts or sell them off to developers (31). The need and desire for foreign bodies and the currency attached to them appears potentially to be just another iteration of one-commodity based economies, where the commodity, this time, is the packaged Nation State, former Colony -albeit in different wrappings: culture, nature, beaches, tea, wildlife. As more and more local communities and individuals rely on tourist revenue, it seems this holds true for local eco and community-based tourism as much as it does for the resorts. The question that unites both the local, the international company, or the state-government site is: how to mediate nature for consumption?

Mediating the expectations of “nature” can sometimes come into conflict with the realities of countries often labeled as “developing.” That is, not unlike the idea of nature itself as a production, the consumption of nature by outsiders requires the actual, physical cultivation, maintenance, manipulation, and mediation of space, environments, and materials for pristine landscapes to exist, in whatever capacity. It is often forgotten in tourist spaces that locals also have to live with both the expectations and the realities of nature. When I asked Ranitri, the architecture graduate student, what story or image do tourists have of Sri Lanka, she answered:

*Ranitri: Probably the green, warm, probably more of a “naturey” thing. Because everyone is like “oh it is so beautiful.” Even my classmates will say, “oh I’ve been to Sri Lanka for something, it is so beautiful and so warm.” That kind of ...
Shelby: tropical?
Ranitri: yea, a tropical kind of thing
Shelby: What kinds of images or stories would like people to have of Sri Lanka?
Ranitri: Of course I like the beautiful nature part of things, but it’s not really the case. It is only in some places. If only like that was totally real (Weerasuriya 2017).

The mediation of nature to and for the tourists includes the physical presence of where they will be experiencing the “wild” spaces (parks, ecotourist locations, etc.), or how much of it must be
removed or “erased,” in order to be mediated in exactly the right balance. But it also includes the mediation of the “idea” of nature itself. Perhaps, arguably, the maintenance and mediation of the “idea” of nature takes just as much work, if not more (particularly if we are thinking of colonial relations across the centuries), than physical landscaping alone.

The perception and assumption of Sri Lanka is that it will provide untouched natural beauty, diverse wildlife, and a more authentic connection to nature more generally vis-a-vis an ancient (but ahistorical) Buddhist cosmology. These ideologies are promoted through branding and marketing materials, including the icons and symbols which are included on tourist maps, designating where nature is located and where it can be experienced. These kinds of promotional materials are a part of the branding and marketing that help to “normalize and naturalize the idea that tourism is outside of structural violence” (Büscher & Fletcher 2017, 663). But the very possibility that such narratives can be promoted and marketed within contemporary tourism material is also dependent on past narratives of nature, culture, and religion within the idea of the exotic island through histories of colonialism and imperialism. On his discussion of tourist maps, Rob Shields (2003) notes that “[s]patialization ties together the cultural conception of the environment with individual bodies to sediment, in a practical and physical manner, social reproduction in line with place-myths...It embraces not only spatial patterns but temporal rhythms. Place is a memory bank of societies” (9). What memories are archived in the promotion of the “place-myth” of Sri Lanka, ” as nature becomes a spatial designation to experience and value? To note the “nature(s)” of Sri Lankan tourism is to simultaneously bring into fruition ideals, perceptions, and spaces of “development.” Neither is implied without the other.
Spaces of nature are crafted in particular ways for tourism. Nature, as a space of mediation, must be maintained in order to meet the standards and aesthetic expectations of the tourist. While “nature” is a draw for many tourists to visit the island, it does not include “all” of nature, but those articulations of it which are already valuable for the tourist. For example, when I also asked Ranitri, what do you think people should see or know about Sri Lanka? She responded with, “…Bugs. Don’t get scared of them. They are just there, everywhere…I suppose that is also my experience living there [New York City], and not seeing a single ant, or fly. And I’m like “wow,” no wonder everybody is so surprised when they see an insect, and they’re like “ahhh.” And they think that it is a hygiene thing, but then they’re just uncontrollable. And they’re just there” (Weerasuriya 2017). This is the kind of sterile environment that is expected in “modern societies,” and also an erasure of nature, in order to be more appropriately curated and mediated. There is also here an echo of the colonial need to assert and maintain control over nature, as well as I would suggest colonial-racialized notions between the association of cleanliness and hygiene. This goes hand in hand with a discussion of “cleanliness” of the tourist space itself. In the absence/ presence practices of tourist geographies promotional materials mediate those undesirable parts of nature out. This includes bugs, insects, and even garbage. On this last one, discussion around trash or garbage also tends to exclude the geopolitics of historical accounts of why the Global North is able to “erase” their consumptions and waste productions, while the Global South is not, but still held to the same standard. This standard includes the incapability to do both the same level of environmental damage and the supposed “clean-up.”

As I begin in the Introduction, working as a study abroad representative, I often had students complain that Sri Lanka was “dirty,” and would constantly ask things like why there
were no trash cans. When tourists and visitors complain about the waste and the “dirtiness” of Sri Lanka, they do so without considering the larger histories of development, exploitation, and international systems in the processing and trading of goods, and what that means for “The Environment.” The waste production that is necessary to accumulate “development” status, and the resulting environmental impacts, is further stressed by not only tourist numbers, but also their perceptions.

This is the cartographic violence of the spaces between perception of pristine and untouched nature and the repulsion of naked development. Sri Lanka is untouched, which is again to say pre-or non-modern, “natural.” It is at the same time dirty and polluted, which is to say, perhaps, all-too-modern. This is the double bind of the postcolonial state and coloniality as seen through environmental perceptions. Such perceptions and expectations also do not consider the packaging (literally) and material production in Western development practices that are connected to the mass production, needs, and desires for goods, as connected to their own encounters, and then the simultaneous condemnation of Sri Lanka as a backwards place, that is not quite ready to be at the level needed to attract more Western tourists. Not unlike the colonial civilizing missions of the national parks, this civilizing mission is once again aimed at fixing the unruly and misguided steps of a society that has yet to develop properly.

The sanitized Western world as clean and civilized does not have to see their own trash piling up around them: we have the luxury to afford blindness. Many places around the world have not been afforded the same conditions. But for how long will the West remain exempt? On my first night in Kandy, staying at the new Sarvodaya hotel, I caught a news story flipping through the channels. China would stop accepting recycling from other countries, as it was
already up to capacity with its own productions. Catching this particular news story when and where I did represents a culmination of a lot of pieces that were starting to circulate around, all of which I was not able to completely appreciate at the time. Surrounding China’s decision this news story indicated larger geopolitical and environmental implications. I just happened to catch it on a night I was staying at the Sarvodaya hotel, supporting another facet of their tourism development, and in one of the most associated cities of Buddhism in the country. I mention all of this to overtly stress my own position of the tourist who is complicit in all of these various articulations. Many places, including in the US and UK, are still unsure of what to do with even their recycling (nevermind the massive amounts of trash) as it piles up after China’s decision on January 1, 2018. The New York Times article noted on the subject that China has been processing at least half of the world’s exports of many recyclable materials, including 7.3 million tons in 2016 (de Freytas-Tamura 2018).

The notion of untouched, that is to say, non-modern landscapes and the simultaneous connection to non-modern cultures is a part of the curation “place-myths” in Sri Lanka, as well as other tourist spaces of the Global South. The sheer increase in volume of images and access to them in the 21st century only seems to perpetuate many of these colonial associations, values, and expectations for “nature.” Such images help to erase the structural violence of tourism (Salazar 2017). Within cosmopolitan-capital logic, once again, a particular village experience is valued through the lens of a universal conception of “village,” “nature,” and “culture.” Shields (2003) further states that “[r]ather than a loss of the local, however, the importance of local

24 The hotel itself also had an open-floor plan with the inclusion of open air and green spaces, common in tropical modern architecture (which Jazeel also critiques for aesthetic Sinhala-Buddhist cosmopolitan nationalism).
place-images and myths as a counterpoint to the received images of other places and spaces is increased, along with the role of the physical environment as an anchor for the spatialization of the place as a certain kind of character of site” (22). But, it would seem that for the value of a particular local-based site to emerge within its particularities outside more generalized notions of the universal concepts of “village,” “nature,” and “culture” and it increasingly becomes distinct in its place-myths and sites of character, then it also becomes potentially locatable on the tourist map. Reified once more into gems for the particular pleasure of the universal subject of the cosmopolitan tourist. The spaces of value for the cosmopolitan tourist and the connection between place as commodity, seem always between various nodes of particularization and universalization.

As the value of nature, and here Sri Lankan nature, continually oscillates between the particular and the universal. “Sri Lankan nature” emerges as a simultaneous spatio-temporal articulation of each. Continued imperial power is also seen “as part of a global economy where rural areas are both a source of materials for consumption in the metropoles and, now, also increasingly a matter of tourist destinations where environments are turned into resorts, theme parks and ecotourist conservation areas, game parks, hunting concessions and forestry hiking areas” (Dalby 2007, 110). This implies here that “the environment” is a resource, even a resource running out in terms of globalization and development. It is also a resource that can be grafted onto continued imperial logics within the needs and desires of the global economy, as the geospatial imaginaries of the metropolis and the peripheries continue.

5. The End of Nature: The Return of Kali
Islands are always in a space-between. Islands are always changing, either geographically or culturally. Whether “natural” disaster or planned, events like 2004 Tsunami or ongoing development projects, including China’s Port City Project in Colombo (which will add 575 acres of reclaimed land to the capital, contributing to potential tourist revenue, as well) have and will change the island. Altering the coast line and surrounding ecosystems, the Chinese project will have potential negative environmental effects, while also literally changing the “natural” shape of the island. These instances bring into question the production of “nature” as “natural” in historical and contemporary cultural, social, and political productions. This includes just as importantly what we understand in terms of “natural” and “islands” (e.g. China’s creation of islands in their territorial disputes in the South China Sea), as geophysical forces, including extreme climate and weather conditions, and people move, alter, and create islands. To reiterate from the beginning of this chapter, Sri Lanka, as a small island is vulnerable to the effects of our globally changing environments, landscapes, and waterscapes (and is already seeing the effects of these, including issues with agricultural productions, having to import coconuts for the first time in memory), but as a small postcolonial island has experienced and continues to experience potential exploitative practices which only further contributes to altered and damaged environments.

But what does the end of progress and development really look like? If we followed its progress thus far, it seems only a line of destruction. According to many environmental experts we have already reached past the tipping point. If there is any chance of survival, there seems

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25 Although, Chakrabarty notes that in the concept of the Anthropocene (the age of the planet now defined by human influence) that the human is discussed as both an actor but also likened to a geophysical force, and notes that postcolonial theory might both be challenged by this notion of the human but also help in challenging this notion of the human (2012).
need to discuss futures that might be in the plural and which resists totalizing futures, for the environments within our political modernity. Jazeel (2013) adds that nature and religion are two “key vitals for articulating a Sri Lankan modernity whose nation-defining trajectories are necessarily temporally hybrid, looking at once outward towards the internationalism of a postcolonial global stage, forward to Sri Lanka’s own national self-determination upon that stage, and backwards to its own historiographical sense of itself” (10). It is important to stress this point further, that this dual trajectory, what I have called a dialectical temporality (see specifically Chapter 2), as Jazeel (2013) argues “is modern, and that modernity itself is a useful concept through which to explore human relationships with the natural world” (10).

Tourism helps to mediate dualities around nature and culture as forms of modern nation building. If we understand the nation state as state of nature, rethinking our assumed relations to nature, rethinks our relationship to the state, and vice versa. The critiques of tourism and their mappings are but one way to critique the encounters of each other in these spaces, and as a place to locate each other in response-abilities. Donna Haraway (2016) suggests on the potential violence and destruction that awaits us to stay with the trouble. Staying with the trouble, as she relates, means and requires “learning to be truly present, not as a vanishing pivot between awful and edenic pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures, but as moral critters entwined in myriad unfinished configurations of places, times, matters, and meanings” (Haraway 2016, 1). Staying with the trouble might be necessary to find balance between the dialectical temporalities of our postcolonial present. The future of “nature,” “The Environment,” of both the human and non-human is wholly tied up in these same crosshairs. The myriad of unfinished configurations of moral critters should include, then, all with which
the discursive formation of “nature” already entails, including both bugs and gods. However, to be clear, any suggestion for the spiritual or religious in nature is not meant in a totalizing or romanticized way, but an acknowledgement of those spaces of both the human and non-human which already operate within modernity.

Mabel Denzin Gergen (2015) makes the claim that geographical interests should also consider the notions of gods, spirits, and deities in forms of local and indigenous knowledges, particularly in regard to discussions of environments and natures. Chakrabarty (2000) has also echoed a similar sentiment, stating “[o]ne empirically knows no society in which humans have existed without gods and spirits accompanying them. Although the God of monotheism may have taken a few knocks—if not actually ‘died’—in the nineteenth-century European story of ‘the disenchantment of the world,’ the gods and other agents inhabiting practices of so-called ‘superstition’ have never died anywhere” (16). Following the ongoing parallel and critique of natural resource extraction and mining and tourism (again Chapter 2), the consideration of the sacred and even sentient articulations of nature, also means re-defining the relationship to natural resources. One example from Bolivia, as Gergan (2015) notes, includes indigenous groups that have been successful in even redefining the constitution within “The Law of Mother Earth” to note mineral deposits as “blessings,” and even granting equal rights to both human and nature. This indicates renegotiating the relationship between the human and non-human. However, even while, as Chakrabarty has argued (2012), the postcolonial gives us a lens through which to hold up the complexities of the human and non-human in all of their articulations within environmental concerns, the postcolonial also gives us the tools to question whose narrative of nature gets to be acknowledged and how. Even a spiritually-Buddhist nature
has the potential to continue exclusionary and reifying identity formations in Western logic systems. Alternative relationships, stories, mappings may be necessary to deal with our dialectical temporalities and our relationships with one another, what Haraway calls oddkin, between bugs, critters, gods, and goddesses (2016). But in this relationship Haraway also means to stress that given in our present environmental crises that we must learn to live and die well with one another.

Travel might provide opportunity to make such relations with one another and within different spatio-temporalities. But travel also both creates and destroys. As an act of movement, like the act of language, the act of mapping, travel itself is violent, it is a movement of desire and power and pleasure. The encounters historically themselves have only increased the violences of these transgressions. But balance must be found. Stressing the need for such balance and the potentially destructive ways of a consumptive modernity, Rahju brought up another figure of the divine: Kali.

*Rahju:* also the trauma has to happen. I mean if you think a few generations back and we, our grandfathers, anyone told them that we are now putting poison into our paddy fields, they would get up and slap us left and right because you used to do the chants and connect with the divine gift or they do is maintain it, so they used to attune themselves into it every morning, and in your harvest times the dancers would come or just kind of thing...That says something but how far we can come on such short time. But my hope is that we can make the journey back in short time, as well, once once, you know the trauma hits and the realization comes...Or to our time, according to the Hindu cosmology. We call it Kali. She's the goddess of destruction, so it's now like God and the Devil who are like two opposites, but the positive, negative and it's cycle is one happening, one mechanism. So when people don't learn and they are not willing to shift, then she possess that energy that destroys everything, so it's like a deadline, 'now no more of that nonsense.' She clears everything out and then a new beginning is possible...The new cycle after defeat, so it's a compassionate happening. It's not to recognize, it's not an evil one, but it's compassionate. Out of necessity she comes, she's a symbol of that kind of energy.”
Kali is described here on similar terms as a volcano or fire, where everything is destroyed, but everything grows back stronger, everything returns to balance. Showing me different versions of Kali that he has painted, Raju stressed that destruction is not what she wants to do, it is what she has to do. It seems worth noting that volcanoes are the creators of islands. Shiva (1988) also asks, “[w]hy does the myth that modern science controls nature, persist, when it actually creates a nature that is completely out of control? Violence is not an indicator of control; its use is a sign that the system is becoming uncontrollable” (148-149).

But. Whatever balance may or may not be possible in our futures, as of now, our current trajectory seems like a blatant test of Kali’s patience. Following the next major suggestion of what the tourist should see, Chapter 6 looks at former war zones. This will include literal cartographic violences in the development of war tourism, the underlying condition of Sinhala-Tamil imagined territories, as well as the increase antagonisms and violence for additional minority groups on the island.
Chapter 6: Territories of Difference(s) in Sri Lankan Tourism

Figure 6.1: Chandraguptha Thenuwara: “Barrelism Tourist Map”, Mixed media, 1997
1. Territories of Reconciliation and Difference

The tourist map above was created by Sri Lankan artist and activist, Chandraguptha Thenuwara. Thenuwara’s work responds to the mass amounts of camouflage barrels that surrounded Colombo in the mid-1990s during the civil war. Describing the barrels and their relationship to the city, Thenuwara (2005) has said “in their numbers have debarred civil life of all flow and movement. They dominate many major intersections, disturbing the flowing life of the city” (15). Thenuwara (2005) states that he bought a tourist map from the survey department, but that something was missing:

There was no indication of barrel-installations. On that map, I started making marks, where approximately barrels are installed. It will be a document of my time. There are lots of barrels installed in many places in the city of Colombo by the state authorities which I have perceived as “contemporary masterpieces”. I see these barrels installed places as open air art corridors or galleries. While the real producers of these barrelistic works do not identify them as art, I on the contrary see them as “art objects” (15).

Consistent with the discussion of tourist maps in this project, in terms of the play between absence and presence, the barrels on the tourist map are absent, erased. Thenuwara’s artistic response in this mix-media piece indicates a need to make the everyday lived experience of the city consistent with the view that is portrayed to the outsider. Both the tourist map and the barrels are state instalations and examples of controlled cartographies which direct the movement and vision of the citizen and the stranger. This is the first time that I have not started with my own work, either in reference to field work or my own past reflections, because it is also important to emphasize that I am not the only one interested in the state cartographies of tourism in Sri Lanka. These overt violent processes and representations affect others on a daily basis. While I can oscillate between my own work there and a geopolitical, theoretical analysis of coloniality, my own position is ‘past’ tense, while for most others it remains in the present. Using Thenuwara’s
work as a starting point, a phase which he will go on to describe as “Barrelism,” this chapter investigates the directed and controlled tourist cartographies of the state in direct relation to war, violence, and identity politics.

One cannot talk of the development of tourism within Sri Lanka without including a discussion of the nearly 30-year ethnic civil war: they bookend one another. Indeed, the identity politics of Sri Lanka have shadowed nearly everything that has been discussed in this project up until this point. These identity politics are the continued articulations of coloniality in the current geopolitical world. Following the “post” colonial period, the first republic constitution was written in 1972. Declaring itself as a “Unitary State,” it was with this new constitution that “Ceylon” officially became “the Republic of Sri Lanka,” and formally renounced its status as a British colony (since independence in 1948) (“The Constitution of Sri Lanka” 1972; Yusoff et. al. 2016, 89). But in its establishment as a free and independent state, the constitution also set forth the groundwork for many anti-Tamil and minority policies, including the establishment of Buddhism as the primary religion in the country and Sinhala as the official language, including that “[a]ll laws shall be enacted or made in Sinhala” (“The Constitution of Sri Lanka” 1972, 5). Chapter II of the Constitution was devoted solely to Buddhism, declaring: “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism while assuring to all religions the rights granted by section 18 (1) (d)” (“The Constitution of Sri Lanka” 1972, 4). And while this constitution did in this chapter “assure” freedom of religion as well as indicate in Chapter III that all laws would be translated into Tamil, it also clearly established the primacy of both Buddhism and Sinhala and their relationship to the state. The constitution was redrafted in 1978 (and has amendments added
since), and the now the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (although it was set as
democratic socialist in 1972) made power sharing only further impossible with the “introduction
of a unitary republic and the executive presidency system,” which sought to centralize power
under a Sinhalese liberalist perspective (Yusoff et. al. 2016, 89). Chapter II remained the same.

It was also during this same decade of nation building that the state established open
economic policies. Starting in 1977 these economic policies allowed tourism to expand until
1982 (Fernando 2016, 1). In July, 1983 ethnic riots would signal the start of the separatist war,
led by the LTTE for a Tamil territorial state of Eelam. But since May 2009, with the end of the
violent defeat of the LTTE, “Sri Lanka has witnessed an unprecedented post-war tourism boom
beyond its expectation. The number of international tourist arrivals to Sri Lanka has sharply
increased breaking all previous historical annual and monthly tourist arrivals records” (Fernando
2016, 2). The rise and fall and rise again of Sri Lankan tourism is directly attached to its ethnic
relations, to separate "internal" identity politics and its promotion as a "safe" place for tourists is
impossible. But as the question that Chapter 2 first raised, who benefits from the tourism
industry? And what role might the narratives and images promoted in it have in contributing to
past and ongoing antagonisms?

The civil war signaled two conflicting nationalisms: a unitary state of Sinhala-Buddhist
Sri Lanka and the separatist Tamil Eelam, sharing space within the island’s borders (Hyndman
and Amarasingam 2014; Perera 2016; Yusuf et. al 2016). Given the collapse of the geographic
island as a coherent and unified political space, it seems the need to maintain the coherent
“Unitary State” as the whole island only reaffirms the state’s, in general, connection with
Western notions of statehood (as has been discussed, particularly in the Introduction and Chapter
1). However, one cannot only contribute a general cartographic imagination of the state without also considering the particulars that the foundations of the state were implemented (not unlike the ways the state’s own universal and particular discursive emergences). For example, Yusuf et al (2016) observes that “[t]hough Sri Lanka began its independence with a strong pluralistic orientation, ethnic thinking was developed through colonial experiments with ethnic representation in the early 1900s, and, with increasing state centralization, ethnicity became a dominant category in the post-colonial period” (88). This also includes the Western state’s affirmation of a coherent identity, a particular, within the universal history of the state. The nationalism of Tamil Eelam threatened this coherent state, whose boundaries were already synonymous with the geography of the island and whose history was already determined to be Sinhala-Buddhist.

Also observing Sri Lanka’s most current constitution and its continued protection of Buddhism and by extension the Sinhalese populations within the country, Tariq Jazeel (2013) suggests it is exactly its existence as a normative religion which brings into question its simultaneous existence in the political and public sphere (17). Hence, Jazeel suggests, “Buddhism thought this way can readily carry anti-colonial political ferment by staking a pure and simple claim to pre-coloniality and cultural authenticity (as indeed it has). However, the state can just as easily claim rational political modernity by claiming that it has excised religion and religious historiography from political and public space” (Jazeel 2013, 17). The state’s relationship to Buddhism is both anti-colonial and simultaneously colonial in its exclusionary measure of nationalism.
The previous two chapters have considered the ways that the state’s relationship to Buddhism in the discursive productions and promotions of culture and nature become exclusionary and subversively violent. These are spaces of violent tourist geographies in the delineation of these spaces as containing either “culture” or “nature.” This chapter is about more overt violence reflected in the identity politics of the civil war and the hegemonic Buddhist state, but also the layered violences that are a part of making these same former war zones into tourist destinations. In justifying the analysis of cartographic violence vs. geographic causes of violence Michael Shapiro (1997) means to emphasize the political imaginaries and violence within the process of mapping, that is to say, the very claiming and identifying of geographic spaces. Shapiro (1997) states, “[a]long with various ethnographic imaginaries—the ethnoscapes that are a part of geographic imaginations—it constitutes a fantasy structure implicated in how territorially elaborated collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they practice the meanings of self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for regarding others as threats or antagonists” (xi). Tourism, again, as noted by the specific articulations and relations of cultural and natural sites in the country, has been one way to trace the Sinhala-Buddhist ethnoscape in the geospatial imagination of the Sri Lankan state. But theses geographies of antagonisms become much more acute as the most obvious and violent of the effects of these, the civil war, becomes the backdrop for tourists. Jaffna, particularly, was indicated several times during my interviews, conversations, and mapping exercises as a place that the tourist should now see, even as there still remains a military presence in the North-East of the country, however downsized.
Swati Parashar (2018) uses Krishna’s “postcolonial anxiety” to consider how militarism is made operative at various levels of governance and the state in the everyday lives of citizens. This chapter also looks at how modes of nation building are given to the military within modes of postcolonial anxiety, specifically in the everyday function and mapping of tourist spaces. First, as was indicated to me by conversations, interviews, and mapping exercises, that war or former war zones are now tourist locations for both visitors and locals to explore. Second, the ways in which the state through military involvement seeks to control these war-zones-turned-tourist-spaces in order in order to control the narrative of the nation itself, including who historically has a right to the geography of the state, and who the now-cosmopolitan state now accepts (and how). This second section also looks at how these tourist geographies are being opened and how this may affect those individuals living there. And finally, I also consider ongoing modes of postcolonial anxiety in larger patterns of violence outside these specific designated tourist spaces: the welcoming of rising Gulf State tourism and simultaneous disavowal of Sri Lankan Muslims. Continuing with my analysis of Jazeel and Dipesh Chakrabarty from the last two chapters, I argue, vis-a-via Jazeel’s understanding of a cosmopolitan state that these are not juxtaposed or contradictory phenomenon, but each can be understood in the violence and relationship between cosmopolitanism and the state.

Along with the continued interrogation of mapped space in exclusionary politics indicating acceptance of the cosmopolitan tourist and the simultaneous use of these tourist spaces as articulations of nation building for the benevolent and accepting cosmopolitan state, I would additionally like to add Perera’s (2016) own questions on warzone tourism in Sri Lanka to help frame this chapter. That is:
[w]hat kind of stories do the geographies of these travels, the objects of curiosity, places where specific sites are located and travellers themselves narrate about ethnicity, identity, the state, the place, landscapes, borders, development, war, the absence of war and the cruelties and pain of war?...How do places and landscapes change according to political circumstances as well as due to tourism of this type?” (10).

As was quoted from Jazeel (2013) in Chapter 4, “[a] cosmopolitan mode of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism seek neither explicitly physically nor politically to marginalize Tamils, Muslims, or any others with the national polity. Indeed, part of its very cosmopolitanism is its capacity to create space for difference; to welcome the stranger in here” (23). Once again, the cosmopolitan state, the Sinhala-Buddhist nation that is seen as allowing spaces of differences, and the cosmopolitan tourist, the individual that has pre-accepted rights to spaces of differences, come together in the acceptance of the state’s narrative of cosmopolitan spaces, even as these are territories of differences. Each again indicates the contradictions of the state and cosmopolitanism in terms of Derridean cosmo-politics (see Introduction and Chapter 3). The cosmopolitan Sinhala-Buddhist state also indicates the geography of the state as both political and moral. For example, writing during the time of the civil war, Michael Shapiro (1997) has stated, “in the case of Sri Lanka, ethnic strife is read by the dominant Sinhalese Buddhist faction as an assault on the ‘nation,’ and thus on the moral integrity of persons and of the unity among persons embodied by the state. Ideological contention is moralized in this instance because it is drawn onto an ontological ground, derived from Buddhist moral geography” (21). Moreover, the ethnic civil war also indicated, in response to this particular moral and political geography of a state, the emergence of a competing geography of differences, simultaneously internal and external to the imaged state of Sri Lanka: that of the Tamil state of Eelam.
Arturo Escobar (2008) combines notions of “territory” and “difference” in his examination of social movements in the Pacific South American context in terms of cultural, economic, and environments within ongoing global systems of coloniality. Escobar (2008) indicates that “[a]ny territory is a territory of difference in that it entails unique place making and region making, ecologically, culturally, and socially” (25). I consider here in the following pages the making of territories within context of differences, specifically the historically competing nationalism of Sinhalese and Tamil as seen in tourist geographies and narratives. But I also consider the differences produced within territories of the state, that is, the nation state like Escobar’s suggestion, indicates a territory of difference. Or, what we might refer to as territories of differences, because despite the narratives produced, it is never unitary and never coherent. This implicates the tourist map itself. The map, and the tourist map included, indicates what Rob Shields (2003) indicates as a “geography of difference” which “is socially constructed over the long term and constitutes a spatialization of places and regions as ‘places for this’ and ‘places for that’; that is, each site or area is construed as appropriate for certain social activities and behaviors--and this is central to its identity. The places, are cast--or spatialized--as certain types of place: romantic, harsh, warm, polluted, foreign, and so on” (7). The map also indicates how one should understand different spaces, what feelings, affects, or interactions that different places should elicit. This particularly becomes important as the affect of tourist materials and maps is meant to mediate and perform the space as an extension of the state itself. What feelings are taken from tourists going to Jaffna? How are these feelings meant to differ between Sri Lankan Tamils, Sinhalese, and the international tourists?
To be clear, I do not mean to confuse the cartographic violences of tourist maps with the history of overt state violence in the country. Instead, the critique is on the ways in which the politics of nation-building within the capacities of tourism and tourist mapping in the continual reconfigurations of the state as a replied and locatable entity also contributes to the legitimation of state violence in its confirmation. Similarly (and for this we might also connect the violences attributed to the state of nature in the previous chapter and the ways in which these indicates conditions for actual violence by the state on the basis of exclusionary identity politics), Jazeel (2013) writes, for example, that “though we should be careful not to confuse the politics of nature with the nationalist political violence in Sri Lankan context, it is my claim that the politics of nature is what legitimates nationalist violence” (22). Then, what in the politics of tourism continues to legitimize nationalist violence? Does coloniality operate in the modern state’s relation to identity and polity?

Spaces, territories, geographies, particularly as we can see in the Sri Lankan context, are never singular nor without contradictions. They are always multiple. This project, up until now, has sought an “examination of place making and region making from multilevel economic, ecological and cultural, and cultural perspectives affords novel opportunities for understanding the politics of difference and sameness that accompanies enactments of globality” (Escobar 2008, 3). But I want to indicate, particularly in the last section, are the differences of spaces and territories made by individual bodies, specifically Muslim bodies as yet another contested minority within the seemingly cosmopolitan state. I consider the ways in which borders are carved out on the street as people walk past one another, and how imagined territories are decided in the decisions of dress (to cover one’s face, hair, or not) or the use of color (black,
white, red etc.) These discussions seem to circle most acutely around the Muslim woman’s body, and not unlike the tourist map with its use of icons, colors, and depictions, spaces and memories are read and claimed in terms of her decisions. These are once again geographies made that are radically personally, but are not unconnected to larger patterns and structures.

As with the chapters before this, I come to the cartographic violence of nationalism in tourist sites by following the patterns of suggestions by participants of what I or the tourist should see or know about Sri Lanka. And like the other chapters before this, I oscillate between these conversations and larger nationalist and geopolitical circumstances. This chapter does reflect on individual’s reactions and suggestions that tourists should see these former and recently reopened war zones, but I extend this discussion to underlying identity issues that caused these now tourist locations to be war zones in the first place, as well as reflect how the exclusionary politics of nationalism reflects continued postcolonial anxiety or insecurity (Krishna 1994; 1999), and how this intersects with tourism and the acceptance (or not) of Islamic identities within the country. This final reflection reveals some uncomfortable conversations that I found myself in, as other’s confided in me their own discomfort in the increase presence of Islam, as these individuals (particularly the presence of women), created their own territories of difference, claiming and making borders with the political geography of their feet. Perhaps, even more than the chapters before, I wish to stress here the “awkward geographies” of encounter (Jazeel 2007) between my own territories of difference(s).

2. Drawing and Locating Former War Zones in Post-2009 Tourist Spaces
Rob Shields (2003) states that “[t]he cartography of tourism is, beneath the surface, political and religious territory” (15). Likewise, icons on Sri Lankan tourist maps indicate territories carved out from particular religious and political histories. The Sinhala-Buddhist premier relationship to the state’s geography is, unsurprisingly, connected to its colonial “past.” The “discovery” of Pali language and texts, including the Mahavamsa (5th or 6th century, loosely translated as the “Greater Chronicle”), greatly contributed to the chronicling of the island’s history, and subsequently its imagined geographies. Particularly after George Tunour’s own “pioneering” translation of the Mahavamsa was used in William Knighton’s 1845’s *History of Ceylon* and Sir Emerson Tennent’s 1860’s, two-volume *Ceylon*, which became the standard reference books for Ceylon during the nineteenth century (Rambukwella 2018, 36, see also Coningham et. al 2015).

The acceptance of the Mahavamsa as the standard text of Ceylonese history, which detailed Sinhalese Buddhist kingship and the Sinhalese as the stewards of the Buddha after his passing, contributed to the perceived authority of the Sinhalese people to the island’s history. But it additionally has supplied “evidence” for ongoing antagonisms between the Tamil and Sinhalese with one chronicle particularly depicting King Dutugemunu, a second-century Sinhala king, and his defeat of King Elara of South India. Rambukwella notes that this story “is understood in populist nationalist discourse as symbolic deliverance of the nation from alien bondage” (2018, 37). The chronicles of the Mahavamsa have added to Sinhala pride in post-independence politics, but the Dutugenmunu-Elara story also helped to justify “a historical enmity between the Sinhala and Tamil communities and was also mobilised to serve a ‘just war’ ideology whereby Sinhala violence against the Tamil community was rationalised on the basis of
a just war waged to protect the Buddhist religion and the Sinhala nation” (Rambukwella 2018, 37-38). It seems worth emphasizing that the authority and authenticity of the Sinhalese history to the island was in part aided by a text which had become “the” text for the British “curators” of the island. Sinhalese authenticity was translated for English texts.

This of course was not the only way where Sinhalese nationalism was given authority. As noted by Rambukwella (2018) and Sudhesh Mantillake’s (2018) work (see Chapter 4), cultural works, such as theatre, dance, and music, were also forms of nationalism for a would-be Sinhalese state. Again, the preference for a Sinhalese-Buddhist state was not merely indicated in cultural articulations, but in the very foundations of the constitution itself. But the point I wish to make is that the politics of representation and performance is not unconnected to the politics of the state, indeed they inform (and preform) one another. Tourism, as both a reflection towards the outsider and internal narratives, provides an appropriate critique for both. The patterns of tourism reflect those of the nation state: the nation state is made towards the outside in the field of the inter-national as it is simultaneously intra-national. Tourists sites often become the performance of these oscillating scales of nationalism. For example, the “discovery” of Anuradhapura also helped to give physical evidence to the authority of the Mahvamsa, and also an additional “source of wonderment to the colonial gaze” (Rambukwella 2018, 41). The Sinhalese government, post-independence, also contributed to its restoration, supporting archeological scholarship that would help to make to develop it into a heritage or cultural tourist

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site (see further discussion of cultural sites in Chapter 4). But by aligning sites such as Anuradhapura so closely with the heritage and history of the Sinhalese-Buddhist state, it also linked them to the geography of the Sinhala-Buddhist state. Robin Coningham, Mark Manuel and Christopher Davis (2015) observe that “one of the unintended consequences of the increasing alignment of the state-sponsored promotion of Buddhist heritage with the Mahavamsa’s narrative was to focus the attention of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the symbolic importance of such monuments with an attack on the Bodhi tree at Anuradhapura in 1985 and bombing of the Temple of the Tooth at Kandy in 1998” (5). Therefore, in its alignment of the state’s territory both historical and religious sites, such as Anuradhapura and the Temple of the Tooth could be tourist sites (both nearly always depicted on tourists maps) and the target for “terrorist” attacks.

The establishment of a Sinhala-Buddhist state was, in one sense, an anti-colonial move, but as it remains a “state,” the articulations of exclusionary identity politics persists. Furthermore, while briefly noting the identity categories established during colonial rule (as in many places around the world) the perceived origins of the Sinhala people was not wholly disconnected from colonial values of race. Many Sinhala scholars, for example, have noted that the Sinhala people are descendants of the Aryan “race” of Northern India (this Sinhala narrative was also once reiterated to me at a museum at Anuradhapura, see also discussions from Chapter 1). Rambukwella speculates that this reflects colonial racial discourse and the perceived desire to appear closer to European origins (2018, 38-39). As it might be obvious at this point, the Sinhala identity and Buddhism were not always as synonymous as they are now, but such processes within the nineteenth and twentieth centuries helped them to emerge together, and “[t]he twinning of these two categories is reflective of a process through which an ethno-nationalist imaginary became established and a notion of Sinhala Buddhist authenticity gained

Figure 6.3. Sri Lanka Tourist Map, indicating Tovil Temple, Jaffna. Screenshot from www.edimaps.com:ella-sri-lanka-map: Accessed 10 November 2018
hegemonic influence” (Rambukwella 2018, 46). And perhaps more importantly they emerged within the process of nation-building, as a process of nationalism, they do not exist outside a nationalist imaginary (Rambukwella 2018, 46), which is to emphasize here also a territorial-geographic or geopolitical spatial imaginary. Such spaces are only further reiterated through spatial orderings of tourism and the marking of the places of and within the state that are worth going to. The geospatial imaginary of the state allows both Anuradhapura and Jaffna to emerge within its spatial narrative, as long as the spaces are marked appropriately. The former site should indicate the long and “ancient culture” of the island/state and that history’s connection to Buddhism. The latter while also indicating a multi-ethnic history of the island, should indicate a history that comes after and at the allowance of the previous history, specifically Sinhala-Buddhism. While Anuradhapura emerges as historical ruins on the tourist map, Jaffna is often an “ahistorical” palm tree (see Figure 6.2, although there are, occasionally, exceptions see Figure 6.3). The figure of a temple or a ruin indicates specific spatio-temporalities towards those sites, but what historical, political, or social memories are indicated by a palm tree?

While, “[m]emory is constructed through secular rituals of the systematic, often guided, tour in which the site is ‘framed’ by discourse,” we can also interrogate which memories are performed or not on the tourist maps (Shields 2003, 15). Tourist maps, I suggest, are a form of what Shapiro has described as “[i]dentity-related territorial commitments” and that as such their cartographic imaginaries “produce at the level of representation [and] are tied to ontological structures of self-recognition” (Shapiro 1997, 30). The tourist map represents a particular narrative to the Other, but only as it must be recognized by the self. But the “Other” in these
contexts is not just the international tourist, but is an internal/external split that indicates the paradox of exclusionary national identities. It is a performance of selected memories framed by selected icons, names, dates, drawings. Even the simply circling around the Jaffna peninsula is significant in that for so long, it was unthinkable for Sri Lankans in the South to travel but so far North, much less for the international visitor (see example Figure 5.1).

Sasanka Perera in his examination of, specifically, Sinhalese travel from the South to the North after the civil war (and during the ceasefires), defines “warzone” as a “place where war was once active in the recent past and has acutely touched, scarred and impacted the landscape and the populace. In this sense, the word does not connote an area identified as a kind of museum entity frozen in the recent past actively maintaining the remnants of war” (Perera 2016, 3). Perera’s understanding of “warzone” already places the violence of war in the past tense. It might, therefore, be tautological to discuss “former warzones” during the participatory mapping exercises. However, I maintain that it is important to emphasize that for these participants the fact that these temporalities of violence were in the past and not currently indicative of the status of the country, is important. I would go so far as to suggest that this was nearly a point of pride that this could now be a place to trace on a map and point to as a location that was open, was safe, and was available for both Sri Lankans and others to visit. While the signs of war itself or war memorials are not seen (as of yet) as specific icons for Jaffna in any tourist promotional map, the war was indicated in participatory mapping exercises and interviews. For example, one member of the Ministry of Tourism simply wrote the year “2009” off to the side across from where the Jaffna peninsula was drawn (Figure 5.2). Not unlike what “9/11” has become in the United States, 2009 signals its own discursive formation, and is able to signify the (estimated)
death toll, human rights accusations, relocation camps, separation of families, the involvement of other countries (including Norway and India), the ambivalence of others (see Chapter 1), the closing of nearly half of the country, and then, most importantly, the “reuniting” of the country back to a rightful and coherent whole.

Moreover, although a warzone is not exactly a museum, there have been efforts to make the locations, buildings, and icons of the war, particularly in and near Jaffna, if not outright war museums, then nearly the same status. For example, Jennifer Hyndman and Amarnath Amarasingam investigate how, now post-civil war, “the Tamil Tigers and their militarized operations are remembered and curated,” as a simultaneous project of tourism and Sinhala nationalism (2014, 561). The works of both Hyndman and Amarasingam and Sasanka Perera look at personal archival items, such as photographs and maps to see how individuals navigate both formal (e.g. victory monuments) and informal (e.g. the Jaffna Public library) war memorial sites.

In the production of a battlefield into a tourist site John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold (2003) suggest that representation matters. Representations, as has been discussed similarly in terms of tourist maps (and mapping more generally), identify only as they are selective signifiers. Gold and Gold (2003) also suggest that “[b]y supplying a recognizable focus, battlefields give tangible expression to alternative readings of the past, allowing visitors to assume the mantle of pilgrims paying their respects to the sacrifice of forebears and perhaps also express their allegiance to a common cause” (114). But the production of Jaffna as a tourist site, also provides an example to the ways in which battlefield tourism does not so much allow tourist to recreate
alternative readings of the past, but that the past as a recreation is already a political process.

Hyndman and Amarasingam (2014) maintain that:

[i]n the contemporary Sri Lankan context, any trace of Tamil Eelam maps or cemeteries has been erased. Official ways of remembering the war are shaped by the triumphalist Sinhala Nationalism of the victor. Contemporary sites of “war tourism” today do not mention legitimate Tamil grievances or aspirations, Tamil civilian casualties during the final stage of the war, or the internment of hundreds of thousands of Tamils immediately after the war ended. Sites that may have humanized the Tamil Tiger movement, such as Prabhakaran’s childhood home, the site of the LTTE’s Jaffna political-wing leader Thileepan’s 1987 fast-unto-death, or the dozens of Tiger cemeteries, have been razed to the ground (564).

The Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism, at the time, suggested that the violence by the LTTE should be forgotten, but Hyndman and Amarasingam note that the Government did keep LTTE weaponry, bunkers, training facilities, and even destroyed property, such as a water tower (2014 564, 568). Clearly then, the LTTE and the civil war should be remembered, but it seems through a narrative that demonizes the violence of the insurgents, while simultaneously praising the violence required and power displayed by the state in order to defeat those that would split the state. This is also a future-oriented narrative, serving as a warning for those that might threaten the state once more. Hyndman and Amarasingam (2014) note that this victory/defeat narrative continues to resurface through these memorializing project, indicating that “memories of the Tamil Tigers are still publicly present in Sri Lanka, but they are produced by the victor in particular ways: dehumanized and militarized, with the LTTE as a potential and lurking threat that sustains the Sinhala nationalist project of ongoing militarization” (565). They even note the dangers of stopping and taking a picture of a razed graveyard, that a “thousand eyes” would be on you as soon as you snap the photograph (Hyndman & Amarasingam 2014, 565).
Maps, similar to photographs, memorialize through visualization. Owen J. Dwyer (2003) considers tourist maps as “memorial texts,” and, along with monuments, they are records of space and time (29-30). But as such, do maps serve to remember or forget? (Dwyer 2003, 33). Or, perhaps both? Given Hyndman and Amarasingam’s experience as but another micro example, it should also be questioned who gets to visualize, memorialize, and textualize memories? What is included on the tourist map, just as what is included or not in the tourist sites themselves, indicates the political process of remembering and forgetting in nation building. For the individuals, during these conversations and mapping exercises to indicate Jaffna, or the North-East more generally, as a place that either I or tourists should see is not insignificant, but political.

It is also not insignificant to note that these suggestions and the politics behind them were not unconnected to my own political presence: the political geography of my own feet. There is always a gap, a space of abstraction between the researcher and her reflections on places "having been." However, unlike the other places, experiences, and sites discussed throughout this project, I have never been to Jaffna. Parallel to the continual play between presence and absence in mapping practices, my own absence only further implicates the politics of space here. This was my first time to Sri Lanka since the borders to Jaffna had been completely open (although that is not to say, again, that there is no longer a military presence). Though I was unable to travel to Jaffna, when I went to Trincomolee in 2012 as part of a Sarvodaya Shramadana mission, we were told we were the first outsiders to visit their district center since the before war. Another time, taking a group of undergraduate, study abroad students, we almost made it close to Jaffna, before the Sri Lankan State Department called and told our hosts to turn around, that we
did not have the appropriate paperwork and were not approved to continue. That was in 2013. It was never clarified by our hosts why we had to leave the area with such haste, was it for our own protection? In my own memorializing of Sri Lanka, Jaffna is a blank spot, an absence. This is not a place that I have memories of. But it is a place that people are told to go, now, in large part because of the memory of war itself.

Although the war is no longer active, one gets the sense that the desire to see Jaffna is because you now could. Indeed, I confess that I too wanted, desired, to go for the same reasons. I had never been, had been so close before, but never quite made it. The suggestions in conversations and hand-drawn maps only further indicated my absence from and in these places. My own experience or non-experience of the place, and the desires which surround that diactomy, I suggest serve as a micro example of the larger patterns which inform the development of tourism in Sri Lanka. Once again, tourism is intimately connected to the identity politics of the civil war. The fact that one could not go, because of former (or present) dangers, makes Jaffna and the North-East, perhaps more generally, as a form of “adventure travel.” As Perera (2016) observes that those individuals who looked to go to Jaffna when the road was briefly opened during ceasefires during 2002 and 2005, and then post-2009, “undertook these travels to experience a certain sense of ‘adventure’ albeit from a safe temporal and physical distance from possibilities of danger…but nevertheless allowing space for a feeling of adventure to manifest through the ability to gaze upon selective destructions and consequences of war and by being in an area that had been inaccessible for a very long period of time” (10). Adventure travel also implies experiences that are not overly “touristy,” to go “off the map.” But is the desire for these experiences to confirm a place, or to reconfirm the self in this place? I can say
that my own desires remain split. Seeing them would help to fill in my own map of Sri Lanka. The point here that I wish to stress that even, or especially, the researcher falls into the same trappings as travel writers. The experience of Jaffna would only further validate my experience of Sri Lanka. As per my conversation at the Ministry of Tourism in Chapter 4, my legitimacy to this place called Sri Lankan is tied to how many experiences I can “check off” from the map. Acknowledging my own desires here indicates one instance of my political presence of difference: the researcher, the travel writer, the desirer of Other spaces--are all connected here. The ties between the local and the universality of the state remain linked, even when articulated in personal values and desires.

3. Tourism in Reconciling Geographies and Economies over Social Welfare

Beyond self-validation, what larger expectations circulate around developing the tourist industry of the North and East of the country? This section looks at the hope for tourism in terms of economic and geographic reconciliation, but also questions the social welfare of minority population in how these spaces are being developed. As the war ended there was and is a lot of faith placed in tourism to help rebuild the country, to where it could have been. As other small Asian states were growing, Sri Lanka was seemingly put on pause. First, how do we understand tourism’s role in reconciliation, not only in terms of economic security, but in terms of state security more generally? This is, after all, an enterprise which is seemingly about bringing different kinds of people together, what happens between new and old territories of differences? And as Sri Lanka has seemingly been separated from “itself” for years, how will or how can the infrastructure of tourism (including the opening of the North and East and the investment in
trains, buses, and transportation to these places) facilitate interpersonal (and interreligious) reconciliation efforts?

As noted previously, many of the historical and cultural icons already on the tourist map are from a Sinhala-Buddhist history, not a Tamil history. The icons that are indicated from these tourist maps are the stories of Sri Lanka, these are not just mere kitsch icons but they are a part of the narrative of a nation. As was discussed in the Introduction, colonization was good for the postcard business. But surprisingly (or not), as Enloe (2014 [1990]) indicated, the images and icons produced were standard from colony to colony. This was one way, it would seem, to deal with the vast differences in humanity across the world. Standardization of narratives and imaginative geographies (with some allowance for particularities) in the gaze and consumption of others was what, well, made them consumable (see Chapter 3). I have already connected these standardizing practices of imagine making and consumption to a continued coloniality in tourist maps. Perera (2016) additionally suggests that “[w]ar and extreme articulations of nationalism are among the many factors that might create such conditions for standardization of both sight and gaze, and finally the resultant discourses as well” (6). In the competing nationalism of the Sinhalese and the Tamil, post-war Sri Lanka also indicates similar patterns of standardization that might make the narratives and images associated with it consumable for both Sri Lankans, as well as potential international visitors. But unlike the formations of cosmopolitan nationalism as seen in previous tourist spaces, there is still a great deal of military presence involved in this particular mediation. Connecting these elements together, both the standardization of war and extreme nationalism and coloniality, we can further critique the ways in which “tourism

Hyung yu Park (2016) argues that heritage tourism is actually reflexive as it creates “a safe area where political dissent and historical contestation can be expressed and communicated,” and therefore recognizes tourism as a potential peace-making activity (114-115). As a part of this argument, Park (2016) posits that little research has been done on how local tourists discursively construct and articulate their own colonial pasts, and instead often framed as “passive and victimised hosts” (115). Park (2016) also suggests that because tourism in former colonies reinforces prejudices and stereotypes, catering to the exotic narratives in colonial ideology, it is also viewed as prohibiting local populations from defining a national identity of their own. Given the arguments made throughout this project, I would contend the need or even desire to establish a national identity is itself produced from colonial and imperial histories. However, Park’s work also indicates the complexities of colonialisim(s) throughout varying historical contexts, as he looks at Japanese colonialism in South Korea. Some might argue that my own project continues to frame local and regional tourists as passive and exploited hosts, however, I maintain that in order to consider tourist spaces as safe spaces for individuals to reflect on the complexities of, even “shameful and difficult,” pasts, then we might also consider what allows those spaces to be safe to begin with. Devine (2017) contends, for example, that “[t]his profit-predicated-on-security equation puts armies, agencies and organizations into
motion, and justifies the enormous amount of resources being poured into secure tourism spaces and breathes new life into old practices of colonization” (639). Moreover, Perera who does look at specifically Sinhalese tourists from the South of the country to the North, explores, among other sites, how the Jaffna Public Library became a tourist site. The library had been burned by a Sinhalese group in 1981, and during the ceasefire in 2002 became one of many stops along the travels to the North. But views of empty shelves elicited responses from tourists indicating to look at what the “war” or the “LTTE” or “Indian army” had done (Perera 2016, 49). Perera (2016) explains that by “distancing the incident from their collective conscience and, in at least some instances, shifting blame allows visiting Sinhala tourists to go through this iconic building as ‘tourists’ without openly expressing any feelings of societal guilt. It was simply an interesting building that was damaged by war, which is now repaired by the government, a sign of ‘development’ and ‘reconciliation’” (50). As was seen in Chapter 1, the rhetoric of the war “reroutes” the violence as an external force as it is collectively comprehended, particularly for those in the South were removed geographically from the main battlefields. Through such reflections and processes, the state is normalized once more.

Again, there is hope in the reconciliation abilities of a booming tourist economy. Conflict is expensive. Matthew Webb and Albert Wijeweera (2015) investigate the relationship between conflict and economics in South Asia, and note that Sri Lanka spends about 15 percent on the military in their central government spending, which is compared to "to a relatively meagre 3.2 per cent in conflict-affected states worldwide," at least according to 2011 World Bank Report (3). Even as these numbers are slightly dated, the opening of Jaffna seems to signal a performance of a reconciled geography, even if again, the military presence continues. Swati
Parashar (2018) contends that the “the democratization of security concerns made it possible for the state to transform its reticent citizenry into enthusiastic supporters of militarism as a necessary precondition for development and governance” (124). This connection between the state, militarism, security, and development intersects the politics of the nation-state and neoliberal modes of development, as Parashar suggests. Such an intersection is even more overtly seen as these connections are enabled vis-a-vis tourism. By opening these spaces up as tourist locations, their security is implied, which more generally follows the narrative of Sri Lanka post-2009. But this security is both only necessary and possible by the current and past military presences. Military presence ensures both safety and consumption: the ability for the spaces to be opened towards development initiatives. Both the security and development paradigms intersect as they are “presented as a quid pro quo arrangement between the state and its citizens, where the latter are obliged to enable, approve and participate in the securing of the state as their primary duty, in return for development benefits” (Parashar 2018, 124). Both are necessary to help establish sovereignty in the postcolonial world, which is to say, the world of nation-states more generally. But still further, Parashar wishes to differentiate between the unevenness of militarism and the state in the postcolonial world and the anxiety that this entails, she states that “[t]his differentiation is necessary in order to understand the trajectory of militarism in postcolonial societies that are gripped by a certain anxiety about their existence in the nation-state mode. This ‘postcolonial anxiety’ is either kept in check by domestic factors (leadership, anti-colonial legacy, internal democracy, etc.) or exacerbated by global events (globalization, Cold War, 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, global financial crisis, etc.)” (Parashar 2018, 125). As Krishna (1999) indicated and as I follow in this chapter, it is important
to recognize the ways in which the narrative of identity is important as either the catalyst or product of the militarism as both a mode of state-power and a development model. But in this last sentence it is interesting that one could replace “militarism” all too easily with “tourism:” the trajectory of tourism in postcolonial societies that are gripped by a certain anxiety about their existence in the nation-state mode.

Susan Pitchford (2008), however, further observes that tourism is often overlooked as a form of nation building. Including “ethnic tourism” “with its emphasis on exoticism and suggestion of remoteness, it can miss the identity-building efforts of minority groups within core societies. Further, its emphasis on the performance of a living culture misses those attractions that focus on history, and the importance of how history is interpreted in determining how people see themselves and are seen by others” (2). Some participants, for example, indicated that the Tavil temples were a site to see Hindu culture on the island, but this was rarely indicated as “Sri Lankan” culture in same manner that the Buddhist temple sites were. Although framed as a part of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural “heritage” of the island, this cosmopolitan feature of the state only emerges, as Jazeel (2013) indicates, when the state is already understood to be Sinhala-Buddhist. It is only then that such plurality is allowed and afforded by the generous, benevolent and cosmopolitan state.

As has been indicated in different parts of this project, there is a discursive violence to the carving and claiming of identities, particularly as spaces, places, experiences, and people are marked as available and desirable, but the thread of violence should be critiqued to the fullest extent possible, in which state violence is a precursor to tourist spaces. Further, as Pitchford indicates the emphasize on history and the identity-building practices of minority groups, it is
also important to keep in mind that a large portion of the minority Tamil population in the country sought to develop their own state of Tamil Eelam. The marking of these spaces is as much about the history that was unable to be claimed, as it is the history that was “preserved.” Tourism works as a mode of renarrating the history of Tamil and Sinhalese relations both inward and outward towards the self and Other.

Nationalism itself requires forms of iconography, that is national identity is a form of “image-making” (Pitchford 2008). In the production of symbols, icons, and cartoons on tourist maps in an overview of state productions, is yet another form of nationalism. But as has also been discussed in various ways, it matters just as much on what gets left off the map: identity is as much about difference as coherence. Political power of the state and the narratives of nation building are at work as Jaffāna and Trinco move from icons to of palm trees and surfers to potential temples. On the one hand this indicates an acknowledgement of additional culture rites, practices, and histories, but it becomes acceptable to enjoy these places as consumptive, exotic pleasures.

Fernando (2016) states that with the Sri Lankan government’s launch of their Tourism Development Strategy, a five-year plan post-civil war, that the country is confident that these strategies will move Sri Lankan “as a most sought travel destination in Asia while all stakeholders of the industry reap its benefits” (1). One of the many things, along with increased rooms and hotels, improved transportation infrastructure, and tapping into sea tourism and cruise ships, that need to be addressed, in order to make the “reaping” successful, is to rebuild the North and East (Fernando 2016). However, research done directly with the communities in the North and East reveals continued issues of access and exploitation for these already marginalized and
war-weary groups, more so than top-down development strategies. In my interview with Kasun Pathiraja, a researcher from the International Center of Ethnic Studies in Colombo whose work has recently looked at inter and intra religious communities in the North and East, indicated it matters how the North and East of the country are going to be rebuilt (Pathiraja 2018). Currently, as Kasun stressed, the government’s plan has been to focus on the infrastructure, investing in train routes, bus stops, and roads to get the North-East opened to the rest of the country. Additionally, in terms of tourism, as Fernando and conversations that I had myself (see Chapter 4 & 5) indicate, there is need for improved infrastructure in order to accommodate the numbers and expectations of international tourists. And this is how it appears the government has focused on reopening its “other half.” But Kasun argues that this is at the expense of the social conditions of the individuals that are most vulnerable to this kind of “exposure,” as well as ignores funding that could be put towards the social welfare of minority populations that were affected before the war, and which have seen the worst of the war during and since.

Kasun’s observation on the government’s response to reconcile (or rather not) the conditions of marginalized individuals in these areas additionally reflects Hyndman and Amarasingam (2014) own argument that to the state government:

it is “terrorism” that was the problem in Sri Lanka, and its “annihilation” has led to a landscape in which “social disparities” no longer exist. In other words, the post-war stance of the government rarely acknowledges the non-violent political grievances of the Tamil community even before the onset of violence in the 1980s. This argument is repeatedly made and becomes quite evident when visiting these so-called “terrorist” sites: Sri Lanka – a peaceful paradise of an island – was punctured by the unjust political demands of a violent terrorist organization, which, once vanquished, can return to its resplendent state (568).

As has been discussed throughout this project, but specifically in Chapters 4 and 5, tourism is potentially exploitative in various ways, including cultural commodification and environmental
degradation. In continued conversation of the “good deal” that Sri Lanka possesses for potential tourists in terms of the varied experiences and places that are valuable in a short amount of time and geographical space, another element that contributes to the “bargain” of the island is the exchange rate. That is, there is a direct correlation between a depreciating currency and the competitiveness of Sri Lanka as a major tourist destination with other Asia countries (Fernando 2016). Indicating that a devalued Sri Lankan rupee is desired by tourists, it would seem, at the expense of the Sri Lankan citizens themselves. I suggest that there is a similar pattern of exploitation when it comes to the opening up of the North and East to tourism. Kasun indicates that the government has focused on the infrastructure, including the maintenance and rebuilding of roads, bus routes, and railways to open access to the North-East. Not dissimilar to the opening

Figure 6.4 A-9 Road. Screenshot from Google Maps. A-9 Road. Accessed 9 November 2018.
of the A-9 road during the ceasefire of 2002 of the A-9 road, the focus on pathways to the North is a way of indicating that the government has acquired and now maintains these areas as safe places. But through his own research and the Center’s, Kasun points out that the government has not and could/should put less of its attention to rebuilding access without first rebuilding the social conditions of the people that were most affected by the war (Pathiraja 2018). As of now, without the rebuilding or focus on the social welfare of these individuals, it would appear there is much the same exploitative factor in tourism to these places as the value of depreciated currency. People are traveling, but “locals” must end up “paying the price” for the other’s “good deal.” It additionally promotes the narrative of the reconciled geography of the state. Fernando (2016) indicates that “tourist arrivals to Sri Lanka would increase by 21.5 per cent per year if a peaceful environment can be maintained. It is a necessary condition that Sri Lanka is to maintain the political stability and to accelerate the reconciliation process in order to make a peaceful environment as a tourism driving force of post-war economic development” (6). A successful tourist industry requires political stability, it requires a “secured” state. We might ask then what is the drive for sustained peace in the country? Economic conditions or social welfare?

Moreover, what role does the tourist have or should have in critically reflecting on their own position between increased economic conditions and the relationship to social welfare of those around them in these spaces? Perera (2016) acknowledges in the Sri Lankan context “a specific site warzone curiosity or a ruin is not only about what it is supposed to represent but also about what it has excluded through underemphasize, exclusion or expulsion of people, narratives, and memories” (8). And not without contradiction, history will cast long shadows on these tourists spaces, and it seems doubtful to Perera if ordinary tourists, either international or
Sinhalese, will be able to “unravel what these shadows mean,” as most likely their gaze has already shifted to look at the next site.

4. Postcolonial Anxiety of Islam in Sri Lanka’s Territories of Differences

There are perceived benefits for Sri Lanka’s tourist economy to move from the low-costs tourists, like the backpackers (as discussed in Chapter 5) who come to Sri Lanka as a “cheap” destination, to more high-end, luxury tourists (Fernando 2016). Rantri indicated in her interview one of the factors that makes the tourism industry in Sri Lanka vulnerable is the demand for rooms as individuals filling them really only overlap in one part of the year, particular in the peak months of November and December (Jayawardhana et. al 2013, 229; Weerasuriya 2017). One way to rectify this difference between infrastructure and demand may be to increase the number of business travelers (currently at 17%) (Jayawardhana et. al 2013, 229). With the increased involvement of China in the political sphere there seems to be some hope of continued increase of business travelers, and there is also starting to be some “higher-end” tourism in that market, as well. I talked another tour guide who was starting his own business, in fact, that specifically targeted the high-end, luxury Chinese market. As was indicated by several associated workers in the tourist industry, the tourists from Western countries are often the “lower-end” sector. But in addition to the potential Chinese clientele, there is also the increased potential luxury-tourists from the Gulf States. These tourists are desired not only because of their obvious “value” over the cheap tourists from the Western states, but also because their holiday seasons tend to offset the Western tourists as well, which helps to diversify the tourist economy, as well as fill rooms in different times of the year.
However, the diversification of the tourist economy does not mean there is an end to the exclusionary identity politics. As Rambukwella (2018) has observed, “[t]hough the war is over, Sri Lanka is by no means a post-conflict society. Key political questions remain about the nature of the Sri Lankan nation state and its (in)ability to accommodate cultural, linguistic and political diversity” (20-21). As the Sinhala-Buddhist state remains multi-ethnic-religious-and-cultural, there are other minority populations in the country that must also be considered. Rambukwella contends that the strand of Tamil nationalism that confronted the hegemonic Sinhalese state, also became increasingly majoritarian, and that it claims to be the only rightful minority community at the expense of others, including Sri Lankan Muslims. In 1990 the LTTE violently displaced thousands of Muslims from the North, particularly in Jaffna, which has also been described as ethnic genocide (Haniffa 2016). Much perhaps could also be said about the postcolonial insecurity and cartographic anxiety for the state-that-almost-was. Once again violent exclusionary identity politics indicate modes of nation-building. In today’s island-state, Rambukwella further stresses that “[p]ost-war Sri Lanka remains a troubled place where Sinhala nationalism expresses itself in different forms – particularly through Islamophobia” (2018, 45). Therefore, there is a noticeable difference between the acceptance of luxury foreign tourists from majority Muslim countries, and Sri Lankan Muslims.

Connected to the hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist national narrative is an apparent resentment or at least uneasiness of what is described as increased visual Islamic presence, including an increase in more Arabic style dress. There is a very long Islamic history in Sri Lanka through various forms of trade and travel (Biedermann and Strathern 2017; Choksy 2013).

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For example, before “Ceylon” was located on European maps, Arab traders, working with Sinhalese kings, largely controlled the ports on the island (Perera 2009). And in her own reflections, Sunela Jayewardene (2017) has stated that “[t]he ancestors of Sri Lanka’s Muslims encompass almost the entire modern Islamic world. There have been Afghan moneylenders. Iraqi saints, Malay and Yemeni mercenaries, wandering Sufis, Moroccan ambassadors, pearl divers, camel traders, salt merchants, and the countless sailors on the dhows that visited the ports of Lanka” (221). The East of the country was also home to a very large portion of Sri Lankan Muslims, but thousands were displaced during the War, again, primarily by the LTTE. Sri Lankan Muslims are now making their own borders through an increased visual presence. This increased visual presence of Islam in Sri Lanka also corresponds with increasing tourist rates from the Gulf States and the Middle East. In true form of the geopolitics of exclusionary national identity politics, a member of the ministry of tourism I spoke with indicated that these numbers increased after America and Europe started implementing “travel bans” and the luxury tourists from the Middle East started to come more consistently to Sri Lanka. From that conversation there also seems to be a more relaxed discussion of the “traditional” Islamic dress from these luxury tourists than every-day Sri Lankans on the street. So as the West creates stronger borders of its own, this generates an interesting visual territorialization in Sri Lanka between a tolerance that is influx, and the borders of which appear to open with the flow of foreign currency within a cosmopolitan geopolitics. Simon Dalby (2007) contends that “[g]eopolitics has a long and bloody history of providing arguments for war and justifying the vilification of foreigners” (116). But increasing Islamophobia in Sri Lanka, along with ongoing antagonisms of Tamil populations, indicates that at times in the geopolitics of nation states what is deemed as “foreign”
is simultaneously “internal.” (Cosmopolitan) Geopolitics is also the history of violence of (intimate) strangers.

During my conversation with Kasun, who had also been working on research involving inter-religious dialogues within Muslim communities for the past year, also made a point to make sure in my own wording that I was indeed aware that there was not an actual increase (or at least so notable) of Muslim individuals in Sri Lanka, but that more and more their manner of dress marked Islamic bodies from others (Pathiraja 2018). However, this “increased visual presence” might also reflect the way in which Muslim bodies are seen, in terms of both an embolden Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism as well as increasing Islamophobia around the world. Some of the participants and individuals I talked with, however, did believe that the population of Muslims was increasing in the country. It was even insinuated by one individual that because they were not as “educated,” they had more children. The increase in “traditional” Islamic dress also appeared to be a point of anxiety. Not surprisingly, many of these conversations revolved around the discussion of Muslim women and the veil. One individual asked that how could they trust someone if they could not see them smile? Another made the point that Muslim women did not use to wear black and would still wear the “traditional” and brightly colored saris, and then, maybe, cover their head. The implication here was that to dress more “Islamic” was to be less “Sri Lankan.” A similar tension is expressed by Jayewardene (2017), who ironically reflects on the loss of Sufi presence in the country: perhaps, indicating particular intra-religious associations of “spiritual” and “peaceful” vs. “fanatic” and dark.” She writes that:

The forceful teachings of Wahhabism, along with its well-funded organization, has attracted a small section of Sri Lankan Muslims too. Saudi Arabian funded madrassas, often run by Pakistani educated Mullahs, have multiplied in Muslim neighbourhoods. Rooms full of young boys, white robed and turbaned, rocking feverishly as they memorize the Quran, is an indelible sight. The increased presence of the floating, dark
shapes of burqa-clad women signpost these Wahhabi enclaves. Vividly coloured saris, which are the hallmark of Sri Lankan Muslim women, are subject to fierce disapproval by these fanatics. Their intolerance is sharpest in the Eastern Province. Wahhabism slunk into large Muslim populations of the east coast during the years of ethnic conflict. The extreme Islamic communities in eastern towns such as Kattankudi, where they dominate, seem to have uncoupled from Sri Lanka. The streets of Kattankudi are lined with date palms and the busy signage is overwhelmed with Arabic font, which is completely alien to the rest of the island. The black burqas, somber as rain clouds, easily outnumber the vibrant saris for which the town was once famous” (Jayawardene 2017, 241). Again, “Sri Lankan” is identified by colorful saris, but is uncoupled from the signifier by dark and somber burqas.

What is important, I believe, to point out is that in conversations that I was apart of or the reflections here by Jayewardene do not indicate overt “hate” speech. Instead, these discussions indicate a subversive image of what it means to be “Sri Lankan” and the religious-ethnic identity that accompanies this image is defined in particular ways and made “authentic” by certain embodied practices, including the choice and color of dress.

As discussed in Chapter 3, it is once again the woman’s body that becomes the site of contention, her own territory of difference. The presence or absence of the veil becomes highly politicized. Its presence or absence has been talked about in terms of nationalization in many countries around the world: “should a Muslim woman demonstrate her commitment to the nationalist cause by wearing a veil--or throwing off the veil?” (Enloe 2014 [1990], 52). That the Muslim woman is a site controversy, is no different in Sri Lanka. The question around the veil is also associated with nationalism, but in this case its associated non-Sri Lankaness. This woman’s body becomes a place of nation building, the presence of a dark-veiled woman carves a fissure in the imagined cartographed space of national identity. The identity politics of the nation state again comes to an impasse at the presence of difference.
But there was a notable distinction in the discussion of the veil during my talks with the Ministry of Tourism. One member related, for example, during his discussion of luxury tourists from the Gulf States that, again, one benefit was that their holiday came during the off season of Western tourists. This meant, among other things, that the hotels that usually have very strict policies on proper “swimsuit” dress in the pools permitted these individuals to wear what they wished in the pools. The distinction between the response to the everyday Sri Lankan woman in a black veil and the woman in a black veil booking a trip at a luxury hotel is readily found in exclusive spaces in tourist geographies. Büscher & Fletcher (2017) note that “[a] final issue is that branding itself obviously makes strategic decisions to play into existing social-economic inequalities in that certain places brand themselves exclusively for certain classes or segments of society. Hence, certain experiences are “meant” to be exclusively for the super-rich, which in turn enables them to further distinguish them as a class” (659). The ability to dress as one wishes in spaces that would normally be excluded for the everyday Sri Lankan woman once again points to the access and privilege of tourism from the perceived cosmopolitan.

This tension of access and mobility also serves to indicate the ways in which tourist topographies and their own exclusionary politics mark spaces, experiences, and bodies as desired and present, or undesired and absent. This is the movement and access also already afforded to the cosmopolitan tourist vs. the cosmopolitan state. These are territories of differences and contradictions, which can also be found in such artifacts as kitsch tourist maps.

5. Conclusions: 2018 ethnic conflicts
When asked what he wanted visitors to know about Sri Lanka, a member of the Ministry of Tourism indicated he wanted visitors to know about “the conflict.” But then he also immediately followed this reflection with: “but that was not an ethnic problem.” He noted that Sinhalese and Tamil and lived side by side for hundreds of years, so it was not about that, but a political group. Although I would posit that it is not an ethnic problem alone, as ethnicity can ever be articulated without particular political, social, and even moral, imagined geographies. But from these discussions and ongoing conversations it seems clear that these imagined geographies surrounding the nation state and ethnicity still have both overtly violent and subversive impacts on the lives of everyday individuals. These territories of differences are only made more apparent as the contradictory spaces of tourism and the cartographies of the cosmopolitan tourist are put into various operating relationships.

Hyndman and Amarasingam (2014) note that “[m]ilitary hostilities in Sri Lanka may have ended in May 2009, but war continues by other means. Sinhala nationalism, combined with ardent militarization of the North and East of the country, continues to infiltrate the everyday lives of those who survived the war. War tourism is but one expression of the triumphalist nationalism and memorialization that pervades the country” (573). Moreover, it is not only Sinhala-Buddhists that have promoted institutional or actual violence against Sri Lankan Tamils, but through the politicization of Buddhism and ethnic identity, Rambukwella also noted that some Sinhala Catholics have participated in anti-Tamil violence, perhaps as a way to indicate their “Sinhalaness.”

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Not unlike Arturo Escobar’s (2008) own *Territories of Difference*, this project has been about “the incredibly complex intersections of nature and culture, space and place, landscape and human action, culture and identity, knowledge and power, economy and politics, modernity and globalization, and difference and sameness associated with imperial globality and global coloniality in a particular corner of the world” (4-5). Sri Lanka is both a distinct and consistent piece in many of these patterns. The issues as seen in the constitutions of 1972 and 1978 do not remain in that decade, but in the continual state of nation building. In 2010, the ratification of 18th amendment “further helped to legalize the centralization of power and the control of the central government over the state machinery by ensuring that all top officers of the state were beholden to the President for having appointed them” (Yusoff et al. 2016, 89). As the constitution also still gives primacy to both Buddhism and Sinhala, further centrality of power seems it will only continue to marginalize other members of society. In 2015, with the regime shift from President Rajapaksa to Maithripala Sirisena there was hope again for democratic change, especially since the former and his family were increasingly seen as oligarch-ish. However, as Yusuf et al. (2016) relates “positioning minority concerns and demands, especially their political autonomy demands, is still a contested topic for debate among political elites and nationalist forces” (89). Additionally, in late October of 2018, Sirisena caused a “constitutional crises” by appointing Rajapaksa back to Prime Minister without the approval of parliament (Abi-Habib and Bastians 2018). Given the comments that I have related above, it should have been no surprise (although no less disheartening) that not long after I returned to the States that pockets of violence broke out against Muslims in the country.
In a suburb of Kandy the Sri Lankan government declared a state of emergency in early March 2018, after a 20-something man was burned alive inside of his family’s home as an angry mob of 200-400 Sinhala Buddhists attacked and burned several homes, business, and at least one mosque. The government feared that these attacks would spread to other parts of the country. And there were similar attacks in the Eastern part of the country, in the tea plantation area, against Muslims after a Sinhalese truck driver was beaten and killed by a group of Muslim men, which had been described as a “road rage incident” (Mashal and Bastians 2018; Rasheed and Cader 2018). These most recent attacks on minority population clearly indicate that Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has not declined after the civil war, but, perhaps, has even become more emboldened. Aljazeera (with the New York Times making similar statements) reporting that, “[a]nalysts say tensions flared up between the two communities because of the rise of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist groups following the end of the country's nearly three decade war” (Rasheed and Cader 2018). It is also noteworthy for me to add that these attacks also happened to occur around primary tourist places: Kandy a center for cultural or heritage tourism, as well as the tea plantations.

Most of this project considers tourism-as-violence as an internal part of the economic, political, and social intersections that make commodifying other people and places possible, but this project also, from the introduction, considers tourism after 2009. Therefore, the discussion of tourism is also situated and located in an overt intersection of state violence. Additionally, now that Jaffna and other areas are now open to Sri Lankans and tourists, many are going to see those places that were closed off for so long. This also considers, then, violence-as-tourism, and although I would contend that my work in this project investigates violence in tourism as both
internal and external, I have meant to more overtly highlight those lines in this chapter (Salazar 2017). But the territories of differences in Sri Lanka tourism does not implicate the Tamil population alone, but other minority groups within the country. The performance of the exclusionary politics of nation building can be seen in various discursive forms. Tourist maps are one example that indicates these conflicting topographies, but they are a form that overtly indicates these marked spaces in the absence and presence of icons, histories, and narratives.

In the following section, I provide a conclusion that does not just summarize or restate the historically contingent and contemporarily active strands of coloniality with the state, tourism, identity politics, culture, history, nature, etc. Instead, I attempt to examine what all of this might mean in the future for travel in Sri Lanka. Specifically, I revisit some conversations that did not fit so neatly in analysis of these main chapters, but which bring up some remaining questions left surrounding the relationships of the tourist. Drawing primarily from my interview with Rahju and Rudrani I ask, following an assertion made by them: can tourism actually preserve culture? A part of this question implicates the notion of “authentic culture” but not just from the tourist’s perspective, but from the local, as well. In addition, as I consider the relationship between the spaces of encounter between the tourist and host, I ask, how do we find comfort with one another within our political modernities? How does travel create both comfort and discomfort, and how might a liminal approach help us to navigate this dichotomy? (And to remain accountable?)
Conclusion

Heavy eyes
and a flight over the Atlantic.
Not sure how long
and I’ve already messed up
the time:

  a driver came for me in Colombo
  before I even left Atlanta.

Doha is always golden
  when you fly above.
My white sandcastle city:
a mouth open wide
inhaling the desert
like gold sand was air.

I turn my head.
The stewardess is already back to her seat
  (or, perhaps, that was later).
I do know,
toward the window again,
and everything was blue-gray,
  (or perhaps tan).

But there were witnesses, now,
to the phenomenon
of the blurring color-block:
the map’s erasure.
Two little boys
behind me,
  “I can’t see anything”
  “I only can see two colors,”
Unnamed.

There was nothing else
  no water nor sand nor city
  just these two colors.
The philosophers ask
whether the colors
are land and water.
We all agree
by orientation alone,
water must be
below,
but without reference,
we may be sailing
and somewhere, I think,
the city remains, above.

Below, above, between,
perhaps, there have only ever been
two colors without names,
that we spread with our fingers
over glass,
ever touching but moving
in cartographic abstractions.
-January 2018

1. A Cartography of Liminalites

Should you trust me? Have you trusted in my authority as a writer, a researcher? Have you followed the pieces that I have consciously placed in front of you? Perhaps, you should question me. Re-questioning is how we find the limits of things, the edges of things: a limit-attitude. “Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits;” this is what Michel Foucault (1984) suggests as a philosophical ethos “characterized as a limit-attitude” (45). But acknowledging these limitations allows me to begin to play, re-trace, to find the arc of knowing. As Foucault (1984) writes, “[t]he point… is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible
transgression” (45). Conclusions are not ends, but a re-return. They draw shaky circumferences at best. But lines that waver also transgress.

During the collection of participatory mapping and interviews, several people indicated that they wanted to know my “findings,” that I should share what I learned about the tourist industry in order to help them. One person even suggested that people would listen to me more, because I was an outsider. Therefore, I must be cautious with this conclusion. First, as the reader will have already noted that this project is not about making hospitality better, but instead to question the continued thread of coloniality within the assumption of hospitality both historically and contemporarily in what we might consider within a cosmopolitan geopolitics. Second, that the critique I wish to make is against expert knowledge. The contributions that I have laid claim to since the introduction are just the linking together, the threading and weaving conversations that already exist. By tracing these lines together, I hope that they map as much as they unmap. By creating lines, we also find limits. We find the borders, the spaces between things, and even the imaginative beyond, the play of absence in presence. This is a cartography of liminalities, which values questions over definitive conclusions.

I have asked throughout project what are the conditions of possibility in contemporary Sri Lankan tourist mapping practices? That is, I have looked at the identity politics in tourist geographies, and the ways in which we can use tourist maps as heuristics to investigate the larger politics of absence and presence will allow particular icons to emerge over others in the representation of space and national narratives. These tourist maps, as both resource map and pre-accepted invitations of hospitality, confirm both the state and what is within the state. The contents of either the “treasure box” or “caged problem” as the nation state (see Chapter 1) will
inevitably shift depending on is desired: cultural sites, beaches, architecture, national parks, former war zones, etc. But what remains consistent is the ability to map the state, establishing boundaries, while simultaneously extending the invitation for others to come inside the state, erasing boundaries. Again, these are elements that indicate a cosmopolitan geopolitics. I have already quoted Tariq Jazeel (2009) as stating that “Sri Lankan island-ness is the prism through which all that pertains to the nation-state is refracted” (407). But I suggest that the identity politics of post-2009 Sri Lanka only further emphasize this point. Although violence is often questioned in terms of the postcolonial or South Asian state, as well as other “developing” geographies (e.g. Ahmed 1998; Krishna 1994, 1999; Wijeweera & Webb 2015; Malreddy & Purakayastha 2017), I argue even further that the question of violence is within the issue of the state itself. Even the the subversive cartographies of tourism indicate violence. The nation-state is not the lens to question the violence in South Asia, the postcolonial, or even Sri Lanka, but Sri Lanka, the postcolonial, and the cartographic violences in South Asia are lenses to question the political geography of the state. Helen Kapstein (2017) suggests that “islands are appropriate for the national project not only because the nation projects itself into the seemingly convenient, capsulated island microcosm, but also because the island space itself--in nature, as a geographical feature--is never fully intact or encapsulated and so the choice of the island exposes a failure at the core of nationalism to have the center hold” (xv). I have also maintained that nation-building might be better understood as island-building, but in Kapstein’s suggestion, island-states might also help to question the form of the state as well. International tourism and the commodification of authenticity is one example among many that cartographic violences could be questioned, but an investigation into global tourism acknowledges that power is more
effective and efficient when it works through positive mechanism of power relations, as it is also an economic condition that continually welcomes and requires the figure of the outsider, here what I have considered as the cosmopolitan tourist.

In the discussion of authenticity this project has considered two major positions, the first is that of the outside cosmopolitan tourist and the pre-given assumptions and values of authentic sites and experiences that validate their position in the space(s) of otherness. The second, is the politics of authenticity of a particular national-and-religious identity which helps to justify a continued position of power within the country. The first also indicates the ontological and ongoing functions of coloniality in tourist geographies and mapping practices, as the second also followed the politics of mapping and promotion of the state, particularly along exclusionary identity politics. Authenticity works in cartographic oscillations between inside/ outside. Each of these are confirmed by the same icons as seen on traditional maps, as well as stressed by the maps drawn by individuals. The suggestions that the tourist should see and value, cultural sites, nature, and former war zones, parallel the identity politics that continued to perpetuate a Sinhala-Buddhist history and narrative of the political island-space.

I contend that in order to address these historical and contemporary cartographic anxieties of the tourist map that both parts of this study are necessary. What is at stake, for example, if the exclusionary politics of the Sinhalese-Buddhist state are explored without first acknowledging the colonial legacy and historical relations of the nation-state? Or if the top-down imperial legacy of Western mapping practices are critiqued without examining the ways which these representations are continued and promoted in contemporary tourism by the state, paralleling similar patterns of recent state violence?
Therefore, taking these two parts together, this project indicates the ways in which the Sri Lankan tourist map confirms a politico-territorial space of the island-state, as well as, the exotic, ancient histories of (largely) Sinhala-Buddhist sites and experiences to be enjoyed by the cosmopolitan tourist, the stranger, but also as what should be valued as national identity internal to the island. This argument has additional implications for what Sri Lanka might contribute to the field of international studies and geopolitics, including the ways in which Sri Lanka indicates parallel geospatial imaginaries between the historically-developed colonial power relations of the state and islands, as nation-building indicates island-building. Therefore, islands through their particular colonial histories can tell us much about the anxieties of the state itself. The identity politics of the nation-state are played out in more spaces than just the torn geographies of a civil war, but in more taken for granted forms, including tourism.

But as this also requires putting together several different literatures including international studies, tourist studies, Sri Lankan studies, postcolonial studies, as well as literatures of cultural geography, a transdisciplinary lens is not only helpful, but required. This project has taken a feminist and transdisciplinary approach to international relations and politics. I contend that this approach is necessary in order to account for and navigate the intersecting historically developed power relations and positionalities that are often marked on racialized and gendered lines, particularly as these imperial and colonial histories are additionally characterized by patricharal and masculine politics of vision and space. For my own feminist research ethos this additionally has required the integration of authoethnographic moments. While this is not a complete autoethnography, I am committed to using autoethnographic elements to account for the ways in which my own positionality and experience intersect these various power relations.
But this is more than just a personal commitment to research, but an approach I argue is necessary to critique these various elements that might otherwise remain taken for granted, including the state, the map, and tourism. Following our own experiences allows us to navigate not only our complicit roles as researchers, but also the intersecting layers between political violence, structural violence, and personal violence which are at work within our political colonialities and modernities. The project uses two different sections to account for both the ontological and political politics of tourist mapping practices, but this work is also my own procedural alternative map and chapters are nodes on that map. It should be read both critically and analytically while keeping in mind that someone else’s map of Sri Lanka’s tourist industry might be drastically different, particularly when taking into account the issue of language.

It was briefly discussed in Chapter 4, but this study might have taken a very different form, not only in terms of the interviews but even with different ontological and political implications, if this investigation was done in Sinhala, for example. But I would also suggest that this study is done in English, not only as the language of international research, but also that the interviews could be conducted in English says just as much about the historical presence of imperialism and colonialism within both Sri Lanka and international relations more generally. This history parallels the history of the world map. For this particular investigation it is perhaps appropriate that it is done in English. But also paralleling the same politics and ontological condition of mapping practices English and language practices work through oscillations of absences and presences: it reveals as it also hides. Therefore, English should also not be taken as given either, and should be read in the pages before this within its own very particular history and political presence. My use of English is just as complicit and follows the same modes of
power that I critique of cosmopolitan spaces. This is the language and point of view of the cosmopolitan.

In what follows, here, I nuance briefly (and not enough time that these conversations deserve) some additional and lingering questions around authenticity which have not been explicitly addressed, yet, in the mapping of the cosmopolitan tourist or state. The questions that I have here are largely brought up and surround the context of my interview with Rahju and Rudrani. First, I consider the performative aspect of authenticity as they relate to their new role as “hosts” for Kandyan travelers and tourists. This section acknowledges their own negotiations in these positions as performative hosts, reflecting that they are no longer just making art, but are art themselves to be seen by others. Here, Rahju also makes the suggestion that tourism actually helps to preserve culture. I return to this question in the second section, using their experiences as an example, and inquiry whether our assertions on what resistance looks like, or should look, like in discussions of homogenizing and hegemonic discussions of capitalist modernity? I suggest here instead to think of the encounters within international travel in terms of mis/translations. Finally, returning back to the questions posed to me by participants of this project, I give my own version of “suggestions” for travel. Against the hope of some, these suggestions will not be for the Sri Lankan tourism industry, that is not where my voice is located. My narrative is that of the outsider, and is really the only place from which I can return questions with claims. Here, for the traveler, the cartographer, and the researcher I argue for blanks spaces and ignorance.

2. The personal, performative politics of authenticity
Rahju and Rudrani have become, in a way, tourist attractions themselves. Recently they had started working with some of their friends, already in the tourism industry, to set up purchasable experiences of spending an evening with artists in Kandy. On the Sri Lankan In Style website, alongside such attractions as a hosted experience with an elephant expert, a traditional, Sri Lankan lunch, and a visit to the Temple of the Tooth, you can also find an option to “visit to an artist’s home” (“A visit to an artist’s home”). With a theme of available rarity consistent with cultural tourism, the caption below the image of Rahju and Rudrani in front of one of his paintings reads “The artistic and philosophical among you will love this wholesome visit to the home of a talented and reclusive artist and his daughter” (“A visit to an artist’s home”). Del Casino and Hanna (2000) have indicated, “[t]he tourist seeks out an ‘authentic’ other in an attempt to order and structure the world. Authenticity can never be fully realized, however, because it is constantly staged through the process of creating representations for tourists” (26). Many tourists, particularly those that are attracted to the stories of Sri Lanka are also looking for an authentic experience. Not just a ticket to a cultural site, where the ruins of culture are preserved and available to the tourist, but also an experience in places where culture is still deemed to exist. However, as Del Casino and Hanna have indicated, authenticity is never completely realized because it is always mediated. Authenticity is never realized because it is constantly being deferred.

But always seemingly reflective, the deferred performance of authenticity and their role in it, is not lost on Rahju and Rudrani. I asked them how they saw their work as connected to tourism, and discussing the the change from showing their art in a studio and showing their art at home for tourists, Rahju explained:
Rahju: Not, so I never exposed myself or even try to get exposed to the tourists in as such. And then also they were actually more local people interested at that time, but in recent times, say the last five years, like I said, the kind of people who are coming in, are having different concerns and they're looking, the travelers are looking outside of the tourist field. So uh, friends of ours in the field who got us interested in interacting with the tourists, that has been really interesting because I discovered that they have changed. So now I'm actually trying to get my audience more from that side, then from the local side. Also I've kind of saturated Colombo the last 35 years, you know, it's a very small outfit here, and the collectors are even smaller. So now looking at showing from home, which just so much more fun. You know that the art world is really hyped up and quite weird sometimes. So showing from home environment is also better for the clients as well because they get to see what the background is to the work as well and we can talk about all sorts of things and it's one on one meetings which I'm really enjoying because even when I first started in exhibition at '83 was the first time exhibited after art school…And I've managed get away from that and have much more of a real contact with the people who come to me now. So that's partly because the people have changed, the whole guests out of tourism in that area at least, just looking into something outfit the mainstream, which we are part of, outside of the mainstream. So there is a shift there, overtime. And also first time, I mean, I never thought I would be getting into that faction, but once I got into it I realized it's actually a good setup, setup because people book us for an evening, so they come with certain expectations, certain readiness to engage and be, you know. And so that actually the way it's set up is a kind of a stage, it is liked my performance art, right? It is a happening...

Shelby: Your home is the...
Rahju: installation. So it happens in a nicer way when it is prepared like that. So it clicks off. It sparks (Pereira & Devi Das 2018).

Their home is the art installation, and they, the performative pieces. With the increase of the tourist industry, authenticity is now not just something that tourists are looking for, but also for these artists is seemingly what they gain from potential experiences with people, which is more “real” than the Colombo art world, or from perceived typical tourists. But it is also with the understanding and acceptance that their home as an art installation, and in way they are no longer just the artists, but the art themselves. Particularly, as there is no pressure to buy art on these experiences, the tourists are paying for the experience of being welcomed into their homes, having refreshments, and just looking at their home studios and art pieces. That is to say, they are
paying for hospitality itself. Although they are occasionally able to sell a piece and get “pocket money” from the tour companies, this is not the focus for Rahju and Rudrani. This also means that they are comfortable enough being the attraction themselves. He told me, “I mean, part of our thing is that we don't want them to feel any pressure or uncomfortable, as a sale thing, because if they go to some boutique shop in town or whatever, somebody is hanging out, always trying to sell them something so they come here to relax after having done the whole town, temple, botanical garden, shopping, whatever. Just chill, you know, there's no pressure of that kind here” (Pereira & Devi Das 2018). Briefly noting the ways that the Temple of the Tooth can just as easily be listed as a tourist activity as shopping, just as it was listed alongside the website with a visit to an artist’s home. The availability to purchase a ticket to someone’s home also parallels the already-accepted invitation of the tourist map itself, each performs hospitality for capital for the cosmopolitan tourist. But the experience of hospitality in Rahju and Rudrani’s particular circumstances also promises something not experienced on the map, it’s authenticity or the appearance for the chance of an authentic experience is promoted by its rarity of the reclusive artists. Like the map, hospitality is once again mediated via the tourism industry and what is obtainable through a maintained presence.

Taking into account the purchase of hospitality, one of the questions that I asked Rahju and Rudrani was on how to create more responsible tourism? My question, as is the focus and critique of this project was on the that of the cosmopolitan tourist, the stranger, those that are coming to Sri Lanka. However, Rahju flipped my question on what does needs to be done for more responsible tourism, that it is not the tourist’s responsibility but those that receive them. He stated that:
“I understand the question, but I think we’d need to turn it around. It's not the people that are coming that need to be aware, it is the people who are receiving them who need to change. Our people are totally lost contact with their roots, including the Buddhist culture and the connection to the land, the spiritual connection to the land and therefore the behavior. The kids come out of school now not connected with the kind of social mannerism and behaviors, which we had which was benign gentle, open kind of thing and so I'm finding that people are coming to is no longer the Sri Lanka that I knew in the past. You know, which was just part of our people's understanding that we taught the modern of our people have been taken away from their own identity and also the status aspect. You know what it aspire to going to school and what you see on TV and all that. It makes them very foreign and it creates a different revered up, stressed out sort of generation as well, so I would think what's more important at this stage is to get our people to understand how to receive people and how to be able to embody what we are and then make that available. That is what's missing right now. And they're pushing a lot of advertising about Sri Lanka out there and they're bringing in the tourists, because of the situation as it is, but I feel on ground we need to change our attitude and can include that much more and especially if the people that were in the trade, we're given a kind of guidelines and training and knowing how to do it that way. Because I think the change from the people coming in is anyway happening. Like I said earlier, to a large extent. And if it also happen here as well, then it would start happening together. A kind of conscious about what they're coming into and how they're treated and how people treat them. That's the bit that worries me a lot” (Pereira & Devi Das 2018).

While noting again that the ways in which the island’s history is connected to a Buddhist history, and even potentially again erasing other identities to the island, what I would like to note primarily from this interaction is the flip that this does from the cosmopolitan tourist to the host. But does this imply a shift away from the coloniality of tourism as well? Rahju would go on later to describe the need and desire to make a “quick buck” in the tourist industry, and perhaps development more generally, as a ‘third world phenomenon,” which cannot have the “luxury of ….alternative awareness” (Pereira & Devi Das 2018). Therefore, for Rahju the culture of tourism itself of Sri Lanka should be one that “really create[s] the kind of culture on the receiving end,” as he stated (Pereira & Devi Das 2018). He indicated that the tourists that are
coming are already changing, more mindful or self-aware, and the focus should now be on how they are received.

In these conversations with Rahju and Rudrani what came out is the desire for “real-ness” or “authenticity” in cultural experiences and practices, particularly as culture is understood on a historical understanding of the past and present and the future of a place within a capitalist modernity. Rahju suggests that tourism might have developed differently within the country if it had developed on the local level. There is also a form of nostalgia in his discussion of tourists of the past in Sri Lanka, like the backpackers in the 70s, like the ones that would rent a room from his grandmother. But at the same time he would ideally see both the high and low end of tourism develop, it is the perceived crass, hoard of middle class tourists that seems to be the issue in terms of, again, the perceived disadvantages of “pure” commercialization. As he explained:

“The younger tend to be more exploring, of course adventures. But they used to be the one starting up in Hikkaduwa and the beaches and so on, like Arugam Bay, and all that. It's a little worrying when it gets to established because then only the wealthy can come in and do this number, you know? In fact, that's what I prefer. I don't like the middle, the midrange, tourism, those big hotels that pack all the buses full of tourists, you know. I think we should, we should keep on developing the high-end which gives us more money per tourist and all that, but they should also develop the more backpacking, low-end as well, because my grandma used to do this when she was struggling in the seventies that she'd take people in as a guest house, because she had a beautiful family home that was mostly people in the meditation circuit, because that's what she was in to. But we should have developed that more on a local level where people, guest homes, smaller hotels, all of that should been developed in a Sri Lankan style. So those kinds of people could have gone to those places, and experienced Sri Lanka proper more. Because those are the of kids who are into that kind of thing. But that it is getting a bit squashed out when the more commercial type of tourism in the midstream gathering and pushes out” (Pereira & Devi Das 2018).

The discussion overtly indicates the connection between capital and class in the cultivation of “what kind” of tourism is ideal, but Rudrani also interjects and suggests that “that's
changed slightly with the introduction of Airbnb though” (Pereira & Devi Das 2018). This also gets at where people stay is also connected to how “authentic” or “cultural” a tourist’s experience might be: resort vs. homestay, hotel vs. camping, etc. Which, once again, only seems to take it back to the discussion of capital, hospitality, and the cosmopolitan. The cultivation of tourism on the local level was one of the ways in which Rahju suggested that tourism may actually help to preserve culture. That is, exactly because the tourists who are seemingly coming now are looking for “authenticity,” looking for auravedic practices, Buddhist sites and practices, and nature, that once locals see that the tourists value these things, that they too will find them valuable and want to preserve them. This is a difficult question and proposition to definitively give an answer. But one way that we might look at it is what else might tourism preserve, or not, as connected to “culture,” and not just with the cultural sites as they are pointed and represented on tourists maps themselves.

Ranitri’s (see Chapter 4) historical, family home has also turned into a small home stay, which is mainly promoted on Tripadvisor (their mom found it easier to use than the Airbnb website). Returning back from my 9 or so hour train ride from Nuwara Eliya, I walked into their living room, her mom was lounging on the couch and father was the table on his computer. They were relaxing from the Sri Lankan evening heat. She said to me, as I sat down across from her on one of the chairs, “I’ve thought of something, that you need to know about tourism in Sri Lanka. It is really sad, because in Sri Lanka people are not doing their professions anymore they are going into tourism.” I was never able to fully interview either of Ranitri’s parents, they were both incredibly busy running their homestay. She was a lawyer, her husband was an environmentalist, and now both were primarily focused on running Highbury Colombo, which, is able to pull in
more money for the family than either of them could do in the professions they went to school for. But as I was constantly coming and going during my time in Sri Lanka, I was always eager to get some small piece of conversation about their experiences running this place, and often I was greeted this way. Something along the lines of “I have thought of something you must know,” “a guest said something today which will be helpful for your report.” In these moments I once again stepped into the role of the “expert,” I was a figure, in such a way, that might also help to authenticate the experiences of those were constantly negotiating the dynamic tourist industry. My own position, literally my presence in space is one that also trangresses as it is also limited. But limits, once again, might tell us something, as long as we understand in such circumstances that they are partial and untranslatable.

*Highbury Colombo* might be an example of a homestay that tourist could stay at on the “local” level but it is also not without its own complications and contradictions. For example, while Rahju nearly romanticizes the backpackers on the low level of tourism, Ranitri and her family had a slightly different experience trying to start off in the tourism industry on their own. Ranitri said:

> “we kind of had to learn on the go. Even from pricing, we had actually our first room and we thought ‘okay we are not a hotel, we just want to give out a room in short stays.’ And it was like $15 bucks a night, and it was actually getting a little sketchy, where we would get these really creepy, almost like this feeling of unsafety, was the first issue with like security, and having strangers in your house. But then as we increased the price to maybe like $60, we realized that the kind of clientele, the people that you get coming, were the kind of people that we felt comfortable around, and people who are more respectful of the property, and just in general” (Weerasuriya 2017).

The politics of authenticity not only indicates what tourists desire, but also how to cultivate a culture tourism, as well.
The power relations of authenticity indicate the politics of what “should be,” based on “what once was.” But the arguably romanticized what “should be”/“once was” are qualifiers that contribute to the cosmopolitan tourists pre-understood narratives of what to experience and value about a place, as it is also apart of “local” discourses in the ways that hosts should be welcoming and staging that encounter. The politics of authenticity enfolds itself into these temporalities “should be”/“once was,” pointing both forwards and backwards. The present in the politics of authenticity works as an empty signifier for this dialectic temporality. Authenticity is never present.

Describing what he calls the postcolonial afterlife of authenticity, Harshana Rambukwella (2018) references Frantz Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*, and observes that “[w]hat we confront in much of postcolonial nationalism is Fanon’s second stage, where authenticity haunts the postcolonial imagination – both as a culture of mourning about a lost past and as a political imaginary built on the recovery and modern-day reconstruction of this authenticity” (150). Like the other examples explored in Part II of personal values and mapped experiences of culture, nature, and former war zones, authenticity is a signifier that is radically personal for individuals around the tourist industry, but it also becomes increasingly problematic and violent when used in state geographies, including tourist geographies. “To uncover authenticity’s many nationalist genealogies requires an empathetic reading,” as Rambukwella (2018) suggests (152).

As might be inferred, I find notions of authenticity unsettling, it is a large vibrating box of a signifier, but following Rambukwella’s suggestion here, as well as my own observations, uncoupling the authenticity might also require an empathetic re-mapping, as well.

3. Mapping for the Paradoxical Temporalities of Authenticity and Mis/Translations
Del Casino and Hanna (2000) maintain that although tourist maps contribute to the production of identity and indicate relationships between identity, representation, and space, that tourist maps also do not fix meaning, “they contain uncertainties and traces of excluded others that introduce potential ambiguities in their relationships with space and identity” (24). As indicated in different ways in this project, the plays between absence/presence, or even the universal and particular should also indicate uncertainty and ambiguity. Del Casino and Hanna’s suggestion to think of tourist maps as inter-related processes between identity, space, and representations is part of the consideration of participatory tourist mapping. This indicates the issues of both the politics of mapping, but also the ontological process or status of the tourist map, or of maps themselves.

As noted in the introduction, Rahju was also one of the participants that did not give me a traditional map, what most would consider in the analysis of Western cartography as a map. Nor did Rahju draw for me that evening, instead he sent me home a print of one of his own paintings. The background of this print is space, as in outer space with innumerable stars, in the forefront is a Stonehenge like set of rocks forming an archway, leading up to the gateway are stone steps. He tells me that this is my map, it is a path. A path for Sri Lanka to follow to look toward and move toward the future, but to not forget about the past, to not forget itself. It is from his collection “Ancient Futures” (Figure 7.1). The temporality consciously depicted in this picture would seemingly be the same paradoxical temporality in authenticity, but if I might venture to suggest a not unproblematic interpretation. That is, while the temporality of his map indicated a path both forward and backward it did not appear to be to exhibit the same tension. This was not a paradoxical temporality but a “present” one.
But, again, I am brought to the question, does tourism preserve culture? Arguably capitalism preserves it, as it simultaneously reifies it in order to then sell it. It gains value and exchange through cosmos-capital logic. The question is then how do we travel outside of capitalism when authenticity is already capitalized (Authentic)? Rahju and Rudrani’s discussion is hopeful and I do not wish to simply and uncritically squash hope into cynicism, but to indicate both of these articulations simultaneously. Whose value and understanding of “value” is indicated in the preservation of culture?

Not unlike my own narrative and position as a researcher, this a point that needs to be continually re-questioned, to find the limits of things. A part of the mapping of authenticity involves, it would seem appropriately, my own physical return to Virginia. I had been back in Blacksburg for a couple of weeks, when I had met up with an old advisor, who was also friends with Rahju. We met a local coffee shop, catching him up on this latest trip to Sri Lanka, and how
everyone was doing. I told him about Rahju and Rudrani’s newest venture into tourism, and their performative role as their own art and their home as installation. He sat back in his chair, and stated, “Is that not a fabulous form of resistance?”

Perhaps this is yet another example of finding, tracing, and even living within the edge of things. Their consciousness awareness of their performative position appears a liminal trace between resistance and power, resistance and capital. Both of these tensions exists simultaneously. These tensions might also exist in those that are searching and traveling and those that would receive them. And not that either position does not also indicate privilege as well.

Rudrani describes the experience of letting people into their homes as intimate, nearly vulnerable terms, “making themselves available to each other” (Pereira & Devi Das 2018). Rahju indicates that this also a performance. A performed hospitality, but they also do not feel it is intrusive. It is a performed invitation that is simultaneously resistance and vulnerability. Perhaps this is an example of the host, within in purchase of hospitality, owning the means of production on their own terms? Or is it a neoliberal practice at work? Again, it is not my intention nor my agenda here to decide between these tensions, but to acknowledge them. A space between translations, an exchange of unequal parts. Which I do suggest is that between the questions of authenticity, culture, and resistances that there are questions and concerns of translations: of unequal parts and power relations.

Additionally, it is not only what tourist are looking for that we might also reflect on, but where are they coming from. As of 2015, it was reported that the top 7 tourist countries to Sri Lanka were: Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Maldives, and the UK (sourced from the
“Annual Statistical Report of the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority” by Sireeranhan et. al 2017, 3). But when I talked to the Ministry of Tourism in January the main countries were, in order of traffic: India, China, and the UK. Will this shift indicate alternative relations between hospitality and cosmopolitan-capital relations, or will it only continue to indicate the normative relations of the international as already established within the orders of history and states?

The historically relationship between tourism, travel, coloniality, and culture is not an essentially defined nor concluded piece of modernity. Salazar (2017) also notes that “the idea of de-growth in tourism may sound nice but is unattainable, for one because it is largely Western-centric, not considering the dynamics of tourist markets in emerging economies” (705). For example, in Sri Lanka the main tourists are coming from China and India, and although one might be hard pressed to describe either these as “emerging markets,” particularly China, it still indicates that global tourism, while we tend to think of Western tourism, neocolonial positions and networks, is much more complicated. Therefore, as “[t]he colonial legacy and its continuing impact on contemporary tourism remain important but should not make us lose sight of newer developments, emerging tourist-sending countries and novel forms of dominance and violence” (Salazar 2017, 707). To account for neocolonial forms of power, as suggested by Salazar, from non-Western spaces that the West be removed as a geography and indicated as an ideology. Or, geo-ideology, if we wish to highlight the developed ontologies to their particular historical geographies. This follows Imitaz Ahmed’s (1998) definition of modernity as “the wisdom of the West, conducive to the organization and reproduction of hegemony and the power of dominant social forces” (2).
Thus, when Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996) states that “[o]nce again the West must breathe life into a base and lifeless (though always potentially volatile) element of humanity, giving it an identity and beginning its history. The motive force remains outside of the ‘third world’ society and its indigenous culture, social structures, and inhabitants” (134). She could just as easily be talking about tourism, as she is foreign aid. History, culture, and social practices become reinvigorated when tourism starts valuing those things again, as commented, this seems not only to be the agentic force of value outside of the society as site of production, but only continues to follow the logic of value coming from Western imaginaries, capitalism’s ideological geography. While clearly individuals find this potentially helpful in actually protecting culture, I suggest what Devine does, that in order for tourism to reach is political and social potential that the means of production need to be in the hands of Sri Lankans themselves. However, as noted above with Rahju and I’s discussion of what or who makes tourism responsible is also not without contention and contradiction, particularly as we consider between how we end up valuing the spiritual and the hospitable and the non-modern, that is to say, what we understand “true” culture to be.

Peter Marden (1997) asks “what sort of politics is emerging if place and experience are no longer contiguous?,” and suggests that “[t]he diminishing distanciation of ‘otherness’ and the unavoidable presence of the stranger is not necessarily leading to what Meyrowitz (1985) calls ‘placeless cultures’ but rather to sites where imaginative and nostalgic yearning may well reveal highly distinctive place-bound politics and geographies of dissent” (61). This is one potential with the interactions of strangers within international tourism, that is to ask such questions- what
is Sri Lankan identity, that is to say a place-based identity tied to a narrative of statehood in on-going interactions of outsiders?

Curating historical and cultural sites for the tourist, what is “valuable” within the state (think treasure box once more), is also a pre-confirmed acknowledgement that “history” is the metanarrative of the nation state (Chakrabarty 2000, 41). The nation-state is always already an internal/external split, its borders face in either directions, and the production of the state for the outsider is already a production of the state for the citizen, as well. This is what, as Chakrabarty suggests, European imperialism and third-world nationalism have achieved together: “the universalization of the nation state as the most desirable form of political community” (2000, 41). As he notes, the universal legitimacy of the nation state also work through universal excites of both the “economy” and “history,” and we can see how these two elements articulate together in the production of the state.

What the play between History 1 and History 2 also indicates the impossibility of the truly universal, just as Derrida’s notion of cosmopolitanism, but also in this case the ways in which cosmopolitan values human or world heritage and history gives ways to Western values. As Chakrabarty (2000) states “[n]o historical form of capital, however global its reach, can ever be a universal. No global (or even local for that matter) capital can ever represent the universal logic of capital, for any historically available of capital is a provisional compromise made of History 1 modified by somebody’s History 2s. The universal, in that case, can only exist as a placeholder, its place always usurped by a historical particular seeking to present itself as the universal” (70). Both cosmopolitanism and the nation state (at times cosmopolitanism as the nation state) operates within the universal logic of capital only as it always already confronted
with the particular, and as I suggest, the particular that is commodified in order to bring into universal value. The commodification of the particular always, also requires the process of translation, but where translation always already implies difference, the impossibility of direct exchange. However, it is also the constant play between them that also allows for the “globalization of capital across diverse, porous, and conflicting histories of human belonging” (Chakrabarty 2000, 71). Or that it is to say, cosmopolitanism. Within the impossibility of translation Chakrabarty (2000) also suggests to think of Derridean trace, “which cannot be enclosed, an element that constantly challenges from within capital’s and commodity’s and by implication, history’s claims to unity and universality” (93).

Issues in mis/ translations might indicate another form of potential subversion to the traditional narratives of the global tourist industry. For example, in another interview Yamuna, the secretary with Sarvodaya discussed bringing international students and groups to villages. In her descriptions, culture was a part of daily practice that the tourist is ignorant of and must be taught. Yamuna states:

“Tourism is not only international people come here and visit many places. That is not tourism. Tourism is..we have to teach them a lot of things, if you go to visit some village there are a lot of patty fields, they are interested in very nice canals. If you go to patty field we have to teach them what is patty, how to become rice, how people grow them, and what are the fertilizers that we use, what are the poisons that we use, and what are the insects disturbing the patty fields, or in any other vegetable or something. And if you come the kitchen, we have to teach them how we make curries. Very tasty. What we are adding, then if I get the pepper, how to become a pepper, and how to prepare to prepare for the curry. There are many things we have to teach them. That’s why I learn about tourism” (Balasooriya 2018).

Tourism, for her, was more than just people coming, but an opportunity to teach them. It is in the acknowledgement of ignorances where the space of encounter is most productive. That
is, this reading of tourism places ignorance in the position of the cosmopolitan tourist. The resistances and hope as indicated by Rahju and Rudrani, and the encounters and translation work of ignorance as indicated by Yamuna, might be examples of ways to become comfortable in modernity. Chakrabarty (2000) states that “[b]ut the struggle to make a capitalist modernity comfortable for oneself, to find a sense of community in it, to be…at home in modernity, is an ongoing ceaseless process for all” (180). This struggle continues in our value for culture that is both universally valued and particularly experienced. How do we find homes in our consumptions that values yet is constantly the perceived threat of what is valued, that is to say, the consumptions of modernity, which inscribes value by its own seemingly lack? How do we find comfort in our ignorances and the spaces between translations?

4. Mapping for Blank Spaces and Ignorance
Hakim Bey (1985) writes in The Temporary Autonomous Zone:

The second generating force behind the TAZ springs from the historical development I call "the closure of the map." The last bit of Earth unclaimed by any nation-state was eaten up in 1899. Ours is the first century without terra incognita, without a frontier. Nationality is the highest principle of world governance--not one speck of rock in the South Seas can be left open, not one remote valley, not even the Moon and planets. This is the apotheosis of "territorial gangsterism." Not one square inch of Earth goes unpoliced or untaxed...in theory.

The "map" is a political abstract grid, a gigantic con enforced by the carrot/stick conditioning of the "Expert" State, until for most of us the map becomes the territory--no longer "Turtle Island," but "the USA." And yet because the map is an abstraction it cannot cover Earth with 1:1 accuracy. Within the fractal complexities of actual geography the map can see only dimensional grids. Hidden enfolded immensities escape the measuring rod. The map is not accurate; the map cannot be accurate (100-101).

But if the map cannot be accurate, it also cannot be closed.

As I have continually indicated, world mapping, drawing lines upon the earth has been historically developed, particularly as it has gained validity in its re-presentation, or even production, of territory. One does not exist without the other. But if the mapping of nation states
is contingent, collapsing (imperfectly) socio-political relations onto arbitrarily assigned geographic locales, then the nation state itself is suspect. The map continually unravels beneath its own writings, these two grids, of politics and geography. There are holes and blank spaces, still. There are silent and dark places on the map. The tourist map unravels beneath the tourist’s hands: already being unwritten, rewritten. As a textual narrative itself, (if I am capable, if I can), like the book and the world, the tourist map, “contrary to a deeply rooted belief, … is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the [map] and the world; the [map] assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the [map], which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (if it is capable, if it can). Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature” (Deleuze and Guattari 2003, 11).

There are still spaces of ignorance, there are still (always) spaces of becoming, and disappearance. If we are to hope for an alternative approach, or the production within the materiality of the map, then it is these blank spaces that we ought find as possible sites of resistance. For it will be these spaces that continually reveal the shadow of territory, that is, as it must, already shifting. Although as we dare to approach the ruptures in the map, the spaces of deterritorializations, we must careful that our heaving tracings do not reinscribe them into the same power relations. Ruptures, contradictions, deterritorializations are still connected, threaded, into the map, and its tears and breaks are already re-producing, un-producing in spaces beyond the tourist’s of vision.

Instead, these blanks spaces, I argue, are spaces of possible resistances. Similarly to Rahju and Rudrani’s own traces, Foucault (1980) suggests that power and resistances can operate
within the same global systems (142); global or micro, power and resistance are always bound to
the same space. Therefore, as the tourist map indicates operations of power, it must also indicate
resistances. This claim is, perhaps, not unlike James C. Scott’s (1990) description of hidden
transcripts, that as “[e]very subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a ‘hidden transcript’ that
represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant. The powerful, for their
part, also develop a hidden transcript representing the practices and claims of their rule that
cannot be openly avowed” (xii). Specifically, we might look towards those participatory
mapping exercises, even as they indicate patterns of larger identity politics, and often
reconfirming the state itself, these are also radically personal narratives that are at times often
against the values that they see from tourist and the larger tourist industry.

There were some participants who confirmed island space in their maps of Sri Lanka,
others challenged it. But there is also a politics and arguably even a decolonial move to refuse to
map, to not be part of the colonial project of research. That is, there were also hidden transcripts
in the refusal to map. Pala Pothupitiye, the artist whose comments paralleling the elephant hunt
and the contemporary tourist purchasing merchandise with elephant pictures appeared in Chapter
5, also has an interest in the potentially neo-colonial power relations in maps. One of his
collections, “An Atlas” was described by one Colombo art website as:

that Sri Lanka has seen the gradual establishing of a neo-colonial society. ‘An Atlas’
attempts to encapsulate all these different analyses by placing symbols representing the
dominant political forces in the country along with the neo-colonisers and powerful
companies on official government maps. It draws attention to the dynamics of
contemporary transient Sri Lanka – a transition that leads to an unclear future (“Pala
Pothupitiye – Colombo Art Biennale”).

Although Pala agreed to meet with me and let me interview him, my many follow-up requests to
use his own art in these pages or to submit his own map went unanswered. I would like to
suggest that such a refusal from the researcher is also a form of resistance within a decolonial imperative. The gathering of participatory maps might justifiably parallel the colonial impulse to gather data, to represent space, to claim experience of it. Situating knowledge for and from the researcher is once again crucial.

Moreover, in addition to Donna Haraway’s claim for the knowledge produced from situated knowledges, she also provides a formula that sees how subjective knowledges might yield more productive objective knowledges. Instead of a master theory we would value webbed accounts, as “[w]ebs can have the property of being systematic, even of being centrally structured global systems with deep filaments and tenacious tendrils into time, space, and consciousness, which are the dimensions of world history” (Haraway 1988, 588). We work towards objectivity as we weave these webbed accounts together, as each position is indicative of deep and heavy tendrils of capillary power structures. Moving these different threads, tendrils, filaments, capillary positions around on the map, as they emerge in constant state of un-becoming, might offer a potential resistance to these productions of power through play and playfulness. That is, this methodology values, and even, encourages the freeplay of the structure. Derrida (1978) claims that it is freeplay between positions of center and margins, origins and ends, that structure is always in the process of being (re)structured in repetitions, substitutions, transformations, and permutations. In freeplay, the rupture, or the disruption (as he reworks his previous statement), he states, “would presumably have come about when the structurally of structure has to be begin to be thought, that is to say repeated,” which is why he states that this “disruption was repetition in all sense of this word” (Derrida 1978, 2). Or perhaps, another way, structure is only able to form as it repeats (and/ or substitutes, transforms, permutates) and as
such any event which is an element that can be coordinates is only a disruption as it is already the system doubling on itself.

Derridean freeplay, within a rhizomatic methodology, not only provides possibilities of resistances within alternative positions, but is additionally productive when we couple freeplay with playfulness, as indicated by María Lugones. Playfulness, is the loving-perception, a transformed attitude that is necessary for a more productive world-traveller. Lugones (1987) suggests playful, ‘world’-travel Lugones contrasts playfulness from play, “[i]n agonistic play there is risk, there is uncertainty, but the uncertainty is about who is going to win and who is going to lose. There are rules that inspire hostility” (15). Following Derrida’s juncture of hospitality/ hostility (see Chapter 3), playfulness, then, might allow for hospitality, instead of perpetuating the “agonistic traveller” who is “a conqueror, an imperialist” (Lugones 1987, 15). As the agonistic traveller is always a possibility, world-traveling is risky, there are both positives and negatives to playfulness: “positively, the playful attitude involves openness to surprise, openness to being a fool, openness to self-construction or reconstruction and to construction or reconstruction of the "worlds" we inhabit playfully. Negatively, playfulness is characterized by uncertainty, lack of self-importance, absence of rules or a not taking rules as sacred, a not worrying about competence and a lack of abandonment to a particular construction of oneself, others and one's relation to them” (Lugones 1987, 17). There is again the problem of vision and perception, “to the extent that we learn to perceive others arrogantly or come to see them only as

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31 Lugones does not necessarily mean literal world traveling, as she recommends that women of color in the U.S. learn to love one another, by traveling to each other’s worlds. But I contend that this emphasis on loving-perception and playfulness is productive, no matter the distance. The white-western traveller, as the greatest distance to account for, no matter the geographies. To world-travel for the white-western traveler does not mean exclusively boarding an airplane, but nevertheless it is this world-traveler that I am concerned with for this project. As this is also my position.
products of arrogant perception and continue to perceive them that way, we fail to identify with
them— fail to love them— in this particularly deep way” (Lugones 1987, 4). The cosmopolitan
tourist is an arrogant perceiver. Work must be done to find something akin to a loving
perception. However, the hope is that it is not only the inscriptions, the re-presentations on the
map that are capable of being re-structured, but the relations that the map produces might also be
changed. That we might learn to love, yet. But “[l]ove has to be rethought, made anew”
(Lugones 1987, 7).

Similarly to Lugones, Haraway (1988) writes that “[t]he Western eye has fundamentally
been a wandering eye, a traveling lens. These peregrinations have often been violent and
insistent on having mirrors for a conquering self—but not always. Western feminists also inherit
some skill in learning to participate in revisualizing worlds turned upside down in
earth-transforming challenges to the views of the masters. All is not to be done from scratch”
(586). Although not explicitly stated, perhaps, this is why a kind of feminist methodology is
necessary for such a restructuring of the tourist map and the relations it produces. Mapping still
indicates science’s transcendence mode of operation that “[v]ision in this technological feast
becomes unregulated gluttony; all seems not just mythically about the god trick of seeing
everything from nowhere, but to have put myth into ordinary practice. And like the god trick,
this eye fucks the world to make techo-monsters” (Haraway 1988, 581). However, despite
Haraway’s assertion western feminists have, for some time now, tried to love one another.
Tried, with varying degrees of success, to avert our arrogant gazes. I cannot say, whether or not,
white western feminist have been capable, yet, of intimacy. To be intimate with the Other is not
the same as loving, “[i]ntimacy is constituted in part by a very deep knowledge of the other self
and ‘world’ travelling is only part of having this knowledge” (Lugones 1987, 17). But how are we to tell the difference between loving perception, perhaps even potential intimacy, and those views from nowhere that continue to fuck the world? How do we welcome those into our homes in a way that is both intimate and vulnerable? How do we travel to those places and be both intimate and vulnerable? Alluding to the question posed in Chapter 2 and whether or not hospitality is a human right, how do we open up our own spaces to also receive?

Epstein (2017) suggests that we do not necessarily need to “cast out a political tradition, liberalism, that is inseparable from modernity itself, with all the bad and the good it has wrought,” but does suggest that “constructivism’s unquestioned grounding in liberal thought needs to be a little more carefully thought through. The problem, rather, lies in a particular turn taken by the Enlightenment’s defining category, that which enabled the entire modern scientific enterprise, including in its critical dimension, which we subscribe to, namely, reason” (7). This suggestion that we do not necessarily need to throw out all the bad with the good, seems to me a response that is wanting to be “realistic.” Strange(r) Maps also writes against Enlightenment thought and the scientific enterprise of mapping, and thus, narrating the world. But it remains curious to me the fact that we even after Chakrabarty, Horkheimer, Adorno, Foucault, that we still seemingly have no language outside of Enlightenment thought. That is, as a part of this suggestion, Epstein (2017) also writes that, “[t]he problem, to put it differently, is how to use reason in order to denounce the tyranny of reason that postcolonial research has brought to light” (8). How does one use reason to fight reason? The postcolonial perspective has undoubtedly indicated the urgency and need to unthink our own Western normative structures, institutions, and ideologies, which invariably includes our own Enlightenment baggage and emphasizes our
continued lust for reason. But is there a way to out reason our way out of reason? Must reason
(still, always) prevail? I am weary of such suggestions, and wish to venture that a postcolonial,
situated, and autoethnographic perspective gives us more than just the ability to re-configure
empty ideological shells permitted to us by, or as, reason. Instead, I would like to suggest two
things. First, is, what I believe, to be an equally “realistic” response, that is, instead of asking
what is “good” or “bad” about western liberalism, is to ask what can we live with, and what can
we not live with? I mean this first as a response against reason, in what also seems to perpetuate
a Cartesian mind/ body dualism, but ask instead for a “gut” reaction, an empathetic jerk, a bodily
response from which we have long ago been educated out of recognizing, re-membering.
Additionally, by asking what we can and cannot live with, I also mean that literally, what are
those things in liberalism, through identity and exclusionary politics, that are killing us? Killing
others? (e.g. Mouffe 1994; Muppidi 2012). A look into postcolonial violence in South Asia
through the process of nation building is but one instance of this. Additionally, these questions
engage the processes of overt and subversive nation building. Understanding that nation building
is always in a process of being and becoming, then even those more ‘benign’ processes of
narrating and mapping the nation state such as tourism, still inscribe particular narratives and
re-inscribe the pre-given expectations of a coherent and geographic-political body. The
emergence of postcolonial violence in Sri Lankan and the tourist industry do not happen as
separate articulations, both are possible through the emergence and continual re-mapping of the
nation state, the highest order of western liberalism.

My second alternative suggestion, will most likely appear less “reasonable” than the
first. And indeed, it is meant to. I mean this in its most radical sense of breaking apart a
reason-able response. That is, I suggest we disengage reason from ability, and perhaps leave it behind all together. I suggest that the only way out of reason is ignorance. By claiming ignorance, we acknowledge what “we” should have long ago, that our knowledge on the world, is only that, “ours,” it is situated and partial, and everything else is shadowed in ignorance. It is reason and our own pre-ordained sight, an Apolloian gaze on both geography (the world map is our own making) and time (what does Enlightenment and progress truly look like at the end?) which perpetuates normative structures of both individuals and their governing bodies. It is blind ignorance which might provide a way out of reason’s ideological snares.

I have shown how the tourist map works through a cosmopolitan imaginary as the already extended invitation, on terms that the guest has already established, but as these systems appear through cartoon icons and symbols, these dominant power structures are hidden. The tourist map is, so to borrow language for a moment, a hidden transcript for the Global North. To re-trace the map in order to reveal the palimpsest of these discourses, to peel back the light film overtop the surface, exposing its heaviness. But also to re-trace the map in such away to reveal its blank and silent spaces, and the spaces of resistances already at work undermining the map’s gaze. But how do we tell the difference between fucking and intimacy, when, often, the former claims to be the latter? I suggest that we might begin to love one another through ignorance. (Intimacy, “true” intimacy seems to much to claim just yet, so let us start with love.) Claiming ignorance inverts, disrupts, diffracts the distorted mirror of the view from nowhere. Yet, still, caution must be made.

Curiosity does not negate ignorance. Appreciation does not negate Ignorance.
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