A STRATEGY FOR INCREASED PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY
AND POWER IN THE MASS MEDIA AGE.

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(ABSTRACT)

The opportunity for substantively variable but spectacular and dramatic events to significantly and positively impact on presidential popularity was investigated.

The role of the mass media in establishing a charismatic and non-rational basis for authority in a modern mass democracy was studied. The policy-making process and the limitations on presidential power were observed in the crises management of the Kennedy Administration, the first 'television Presidency.'

Presidential popularity and political events data was analysed for the period 1965-1984, applying time series analytical techniques to an empirical study of the phenomenon.

A description of the data and the investigation is included, and the consequences of the obtained results for understanding the acts of Presidents and the institution of the Presidency are considered.
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Introduction.

This thesis hypothesises that the emphasis on mediated public popularity in determining presidential power in the modern era encourages presidents to pursue a strategy of spectacular, image oriented events, regardless of substantive content, in order to enhance their public standing.

As this rationale is based in the work of R.E. Neustadt, Special Adviser to President Kennedy, so this paper begins by looking at examples of the policy behaviour of the Kennedy administration. As Kennedy was influenced by Neustadt’s work, so his crisis oriented and media conscious administration’s policy became influential models for his successors who were drawn to his charismatic appeal.

The centrality of the idea of charismatic authority to a theory of presidential power based on mass public approval is an important element of this thesis. On the section on charisma and the media it is hoped to show how modern mass-communication techniques focus on non-substantive and spectacular events and therefore diminish the often assumed rational basis of authority in favour of charismatic appeal.

These ideas are subjected to empirical testing through an application of time-series analysis to presidential popularity, (a pre-requisite for Neustadt-type power), dependent on various types of political event. The subsequent results are analysed and applied to a review of the Reagan Presidency and particularly its foreign policy,
and the consequences for the institution of the presidency are noted.


There is obviously much that is worthy of study in the United States of America’s public policy, the subject of special interest in this paper however, is but one of the determinants for the course that U.S. policy takes. Recognising the President as just one of a number of players in policy decision-making, R. Neustadt proposed a dynamic pursuit of public prestige as a principal way to secure increased presidential power, (1). As Special Adviser to President Kennedy his work is reputed to have had great influence; it is in this Administration then that we first look for a new and developing strategy for presidential power.

Looking at the Kennedy Administration’s treatment of the Cuban crises for example, it is suggested that the eventual political success arising from this, and the image of vigourous and dynamic leadership which came to be associated with that administration, though not based in specific policy but rather in reaction to circumstances, has in many respects acted as a model for a Presidential institution increasingly attracted to symbolism and the projection of a posture of forceful power; never so clearly demonstrated since as under President Reagan. It will also
try to demonstrate that this is in fact a successful strategy for securing Presidential popularity.

The essential groundwork establishing the pivotal situations of the early 1960's Cuban crises, can be traced to what Arthur Schlesinger sees as a post world war two American approach to foreign policy, stemming from the Korean war experience and incorporating a philosophy of globalism,(2). He cites as characteristics of this; an obsession with crisis situations, an illusion of world leadership, and a sense of obligating Presidential duty, "cunningly intertwined with opportunities for power." After W.W.2., the U.S. had developed to the position of world leader, and the rise of the cold war and the definition of the widely perceived communist threat had become major elements of policy. This had important consequences for the Presidency, as Schlesinger says;

"Two things had happened: the belief that the world was greatly endangered by the spread of communism had generated a profound conviction of crisis in the U.S.; and the conviction of crisis had generated a foreign policy that placed the seperation of powers prescribed by the American Constitution under unprecedented, and at times unbearable, strain."(3).

The circumstances of the post-war period had therefore given rise to unprecedented opportunities for Presidential power, moreover this power was apparently especially
enhanced when dealing with the specific threat of communism which was viewed as pervasive and therefore required a strong and centralised counterforce. While it is not argued here that Presidents explicitly sought such areas of conflict and therefore the enhancement of their personal power, (as Schlesinger apparently implied), it can be suggested that the personal, ex officio benefits of such policy would colour the President's view and his evaluation of the importance of these crises as these were the areas over which he could exert the most influence, and therefore enjoy the powers of the office in greatest proportion to his responsibilities for maintaining legitimate and balanced government with all their inherent frustrations.

At the advent of the Kennedy Presidency then, there were established practices which encouraged exclusive Presidential involvement in foreign policy, and especially frequently in the areas defined by the perceived communist threat. Although it is important to question the legitimacy of this prevailing view, as Senator Robert Taft did, "...there is no principle of subjection to the Executive in foreign policy. Only Hitler or Stalin would assert that."(4), it is clear that Kennedy himself saw little difficulty with this, even as a Senator he said, "...it is the President alone who must make the major decisions of our foreign policy."(5). And later, as President following the "Bay of Pigs," it was clear that he believed that it was the President's responsibility to perform this role,(6).

For the purposes of the thesis presented here it
is important at this point to note how the scale of the power accumulated in the executive makes its transferrance especially complex; and how President Eisenhower used this increasing and little disputed power to create conditions which, in many ways, set the course of Kennedy's substantive Cuban policy, and which certainly restricted his options.

The Kennedy inheritance included, for the first time for an American President, a state defined as communist in the American continental area. On January 1st, 1959, President Batista resigned in Cuba and the next day Fidel Castro formed a provincial Cuban government, this was recognised by the United States on January 7th. Many of the reforms of the new government were apparently sympathetically received by the U.S. government, but as then vice-President Richard Nixon points out, from the beginning the official U.S. policy was subject to internal divisions; while noting the, "generally favourable press" which Castro had been receiving in the U.S. as the successful leader of a revolution against a right-wing dictator, he noted:

"Most of the State Department's Latin American experts advocated immediate recognition of Castro's government. But Allan Dulles and others in the C.I.A. and N.S.C. felt that we should delay such action until we had a better fix on Castro: was he an unwitting front man for the communists, or perhaps even a communist himself?"(7).

After meeting with Castro himself on April 17th, 1959,
Nixon noted in a memo to Eisenhower, Herter, Foster and A. Dulles that:

"He is either incredibly naive about communism or under communist discipline - my guess is the former...

...But because he has the power to lead..., we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction." (8).

Although at this point Castro is clearly viewed as a charismatic and not coercive leader, the administration became convinced of a communist threat and gave the go ahead for the support of anti-Castro forces early in 1960. Eisenhower's administration may have been drawn to the attractions, previously stated, of pursuing anti-communist foreign policy; in any event they did three things which severely constrained and directed Kennedy in the crucial early days of his administration: First, the definition of Cuba as a communist state and a foreign policy problem, which moved the issue squarely into the now conventional Presidential arena; second, the instigation of a policy involving substantial numbers of men dependent on U.S. support but not absolutely under U.S. control and therefore especially difficult to disband, the brigade of anti-Castro volunteers; third, and perhaps most importantly, the development throughout the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency to a level where it responded almost exclusively to a 'secret charter' developed by the National Security Council and virtually self-enforced, and not to the
original establishing congressional statutes. As it was put in "The Imperial Presidency,"

"In no way did the old whig, (Eisenhower), more effectively deprive Congress of a voice in foreign policy than by confiding so much power to an agency (C.I.A.), so securely out of congressional reach." (9).

Not only was the C.I.A. out of congressional reach, but the nature of its legitimacy gave rise to an independence from conventional authority which can be seen as having a very significant and determining effect on early Kennedy policy towards Cuba.

It is now possible to draw the picture of events which led up to the "Bay of Pigs" and on to the missile crisis of 1962, and to see the consequences of each situation for the political and policy goals of subsequent, and especially the current, administrations.

Before John Kennedy was elected, the C.I.A. under Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell had formulated a plan to overthrow the Castro government. On November 29th, 1960, after his election but still two months before his inauguration and with Eisenhower still President, Kennedy was briefed on the invasion idea and gave Dulles no reason to stop his planning. (10). It must be noted however, that at this time Kennedy's principal concern would almost certainly have been the establishment of his executive organisation; and his views on Cuba were clearly in flux. Schlesinger
maintains, "...his concern was with an affirmative program for Latin America rather than with Cuba,"(11), and on November 14th, 1960, he asked an aide, John Sharon, for estimates of the effectiveness of the trade embargo against Cuba and of the possibilities for a rapprochement.

Once installed the new administration did pick up the Cuban issue itself; the policy white paper on Cuba which it prepared defined the U.S. problem principally, and conventionally at that time, as Cuba's attachment to the international communist movement; but the effective policy was still clearly confused and seemingly virtually out of control. There were apparent differences between the C.I.A. and the administration on the understanding of how the invasion plan should work, (especially concerning the level of internal Cuban support that could be expected, and on the use of U.S. military support, (12)), and from the earliest administration involvement Schlesinger outlines a mushrooming and mistaken project over which Kennedy and his Cabinet exercised little or no control, (13).

Following the debacle Kennedy himself, no doubt feeling the weight of responsibility and acknowledging and resenting his lack of control, said with reference to Senator Fullbright's non-compliance in the project;

"There's only one person in the clear and that's Bill Fullbright. And he probably would have been converted if he had attended more of the meetings. If he had received the same treatment we received - discontent in Cuba, morale of the free Cubans,
rainy season, Russian MIG's and destroyers, impregnable beachhead, easy escape into the Escambray, what else to do with these people - it might have moved him down the road too,"(14).

The apparent sense of felt inevitability about events is clear, the lack of direct policy input by the administration can be seen. Yet the "Bay of Pigs" over which the administration exercised so little effective control set the agenda of subsequent events which contributed to an image for which the administration is positively remembered. And, central to this thesis, even at the immediate conclusion of the abortive invasion, Kennedy found himself with increasing popular support,(15), leading him to conclude, "The worse I do, the more popular I get." The "Bay of Pigs," a project which grew from option to necessity through organisational and structural demands and not from administration policy, was therefore politically, no bad thing.

The missile crisis of 1962 has commonly been viewed as one of the great triumphs of the Kennedy administration. Like most aspects of this period however, it has been the subject of revisionist analysis but these, I would suggest, have not undermined the general perception that this was a fine example of statesmanship and the responsible exercise of American power, and it is perceptions that are important here.

Yet regardless of its outcome the missile crisis was hardly the result of U.S. policy but rather the child of
external policy and, again, circumstances to which Kennedy contributed but over which he did not exercise control.

The missile crisis was in several respects related to the "Bay of Pigs" which was clearly not an executive initiative. While Kennedy was certainly deeply affected by the problems he faced during those early days of his administration, while Cuba was widely perceived as a special and personal concern, and there appears to be some concern that a vendetta mentality might exist, (e.g. Schlesinger relates British Prime Minister Macmillan’s attitude on being told of the missile crisis;

"The President, no doubt detecting an element of Rerserve in Macmillan’s tone, tried to reassure him that the Cuban decision was not merely a response to aroused public opinion or to private passion against Cuba; he had no interest in a squabble with Castro," (16),

and to an extent this might have been reasonable, but it was not evidenced in the restrained response to the unfolding crisis which the administration displayed, and seems unlikely to have significantly contributed to U.S. policy in the missile crisis. More so, the national embarrassment and sense of impotence surrounding the "Bay of Pigs" perhaps emboldened the Soviet Union to try to gain a similar position of leverage on the U.S. which the proximity of the western European allies provided against the U.S.S.R., consequences of a much larger, uncontroversial and international policy.
Kennedy may have been perceived as weak; his flexibility and admission of error at the Vienna summit with Kruschev in 1961 adding to the equivocal early response to Cuba, and creating conditions which encouraged the missile plan. In any event, I think it is clear that the missile crisis did not arise from explicit U.S. administration policy goals, and its handling was again largely a response to circumstance.

As illustrated, the Kennedy administration's experiences in dealing with Cuba were extensive. They were also, in many respects, pioneering in their treatment of this type of 'communist problem'. As has been noted, the first encounter was based on a virtually inherited and unmanaged policy dynamic, and it is hard to see the "Bay of Pigs" as creating a policy model. Indeed it is a main argument of this thesis that it is the failure to note the role of this administrative fiasco, among other things, in the later, exemplary handling of the missile crisis, and the therefore unusual and largely circumstantial nature of this crisis too that undermines later policies which seek to emulate it. The dynamic and forceful imagery of this period are attractive to many, and the expected domestic political success which flows from this gratifying; but it is unsound to move from an eventually successful response to the weight of circumstances, which is what Kennedy did, to a manipulative policy which must first create equivalent circumstances in order to react to them, and then claim the
substantive results to be the same. The objective and the results often appear to be the enhancement of image and the development of a new and charismatic, rather than rational, basis for authority and leadership.

A Theory of Charismatic Authority in the Television Age.

To look at the application of charismatic authority to the present American political system may seem odd. The notion of charisma is normally restricted to discourses on primitive or pre-modern societies, but I suggest that in today's modern and mass-communication society the opportunity exists for charismatic appeals to be effective again, especially in the area of electoral politics. We should note the special nature of this mediated charisma as compared to traditional concepts of charisma, and the limits of the framework within which charismatic authority now operates.

With reference to the democratic system and electoral politics, Max Weber defined representative authority as that which is, "conferred with particular criteria....for a limited term,"(17). Conventionally, as S.N. Eisenstadt suggests, there is an assumption of the existence of a large, "gap between charismatic aspects and the more ordinary routine aspects of social organisation,"(18), such as the representational authority to which Weber refers. It will be argued here that this distinction as it is currently drawn, is not so relevant in application to systems such as
exist in the United States, and which are increasingly prevalent in other modern mass democracies.

Weber defined charisma as;

"a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional qualities,"(19).

And the nature of the authority which it imparted to the posessor of this characteristic over his subject population, i.e. those who recognise his charisma, in the following terms;

"this recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion arising out of enthusiasm, or despair and hope,"(20).

The, at least, potential power which this attribute delivers to the posessor can be seen in B.R. Wilson's concluding remarks;

"It must be evident from the foregoing cases, (his illustrative examples), that charisma may radically effect a social situation - not because of any inherent power in individual men, but primarily because such power is looked for in particular individuals,"(21).

This is in reference to essentially primitive societies, and its relevance is essentially dismissed for civilisations with, "computers, electronics, data retrieval systems, time
and motion studies, and cost-benefit analyses,"(22). But I would argue that the logic applies very well to just such societies. Wilson is clearly drawn to the supernatural elements of the Weberian model of charisma but he does not give sufficient value to the much more limited qualifying quality of specific exceptionality. This is of a nature which, it is hoped to show, can readily be attained in the television age.

A possible problem for the reconciliation of this thesis could be the commonly perceived problem of anti-institutionalism which attaches to charismatic theory through the apparent lack of an established procedure for succession. Because charismatic authority is so clearly based in the individual possessing it, his replacement could become problematic. However, it will be shown that this issue has been reconciled in the modern system, and that the other special conditions for the rise of charisma, like the mass appreciation of a person's special qualities in a context of felt needs, can also be accounted for.

In applying the simple theory of charisma to the United States today it is necessary to note the framework of values which define the perceptions of the citizens. G. Debord suggests that in modern societies "...all of life is an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into representation,"(23), and that, "reality rises up within the spectacle, and the spectacle is real,"(24). He is suggesting that capitalism and the requirements of consumerism have heightened the role
of imagery, shallow in this context, and by so doing has reduced the role of conventional rational thought that is based in an analysis of all the relevant facts. The relevant facts now are reduced to the imagery alone and its resulting spectacle.

This radical thesis need not be accepted in its entirety in order to retain its value in highlighting a tendancy in modern mass-participatory societies toward spectacular politics, and the dangers of such a course. Administrative authority, prevalent in modern societies, requires some degree of centralisation but has to be made compatible with currently attractive theories of representative democracy; the new technologies for information transfer,(not computers necessarily; television, radio and mass-circulation newspapers suffice), are bound to be applied in disseminataing information from the centre, but their content is not one-dimensional - they do not pursue the provision of information very vigourously. There are commercial and popular constraints in programming, selectivity in presentation is therefore important and probably influential. The opportunity for extensive exposition of the facts is limited and therefore the selection of the representatives of society who have to obtain power is not based on complete circumstantial knowledge. The population is certainly aware of some of the limitations on its ability to make a fully rational choice, but it is satisfied, and
faced with the knowledge that it is ill-equipped in the policy sphere it is perhaps reasonable to believe that it will delegate this criterion to psychological or emotional judgements of who is the best, most capable leader, i.e., it elects largely on the basis of charisma. The person in whom to place the power to solve intangible but sensed problems is judged in terms of faith: Just as Weber demands.

The election process then, can be seen not as a policy debate, but as a contest between personalities trying to illustrate the strongest or most applicable charisma. The mass communication demanded in a democracy in a country as extensive as the United States, (in the franchise and geographically), makes reliance on mass-media likely as a practical necessity; and the limitations of the media as an information tool, could explain the move towards the media election: Media oriented candidates, media interpreters of media events. Little substance but a series of personality contests.

The fear of a lack of succession in conventional charisma theory which can readily be understood in areas relating to traditional concerns, like religious deliverance by a prophet, can be accommodated in political society through the ostensibly rational procedure of elections. If these are viewed not in policy terms exclusively, but in fact primarily as contests to establish the most charismatic individual, then we can see how charisma can retain its relevance today. Choosing Kennedy over Nixon, Carter over Ford, Reagan over Carter; all these campaigns,
and equally interestingly, the subsequent analysis of them, stressed personality, personal qualities and a cumulative appeal or charisma as much as policies. None of the successful politicians in these examples achieved his success primarily through institutionalised party or political processes of selection, but instead won nomination and election 'on the road,' in West Virginia or on television. And as L.S. Sabato says,

"image probably becomes correspondingly more important as a voter's information level declines,"(25).

In his theory of charismatic power, Weber says, "The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life,"(26). Charismatic authority is not permanent, it must be reinforced. Carter's decline, due to a persistent failure to deliver the things for which the electorate had apparently invested their faith in him, can be understood in these terms. Weber says that charisma must be proven but it is; by his definition, based solely on the perceptions of the followers and therefore logically only needs to appear to be proven. In an age where perceptions are increasingly mediated from reality to the perceiver, the opportunity for the artificial attribution of charismatic properties is clearly increasing.

It might seem difficult to see an opportunity for charisma, as defined by Weber, in the apparently formal election structures of the modern democratic state. After
all, he felt that, "...charismatic structure knows nothing of a form or of an ordered procedure of appointment or dismissal,"(27). On first glance this seems difficult to incorporate with established norms, but in fact this seems to be increasingly the case in the practice of political campaigns at the electoral level and, as illustrated previously, candidates originally described as outsiders increasingly make successful bids for office. Moreover, they are increasingly assisted by a phalanx of professional political and media advisers during the process. Weber does see such an opportunity for charisma in the electoral process as part of the routinisation of charismatic authority. In fact he notes:

"It is characteristic of the democracy which makes room for leadership that there should in general be a highly emotional type of devotion to and trust in the leader. This accounts for the tendency to favour the type of individual who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership... It...indicates the limitations on the level of rationality which, in the modern world, this type of administration can attain,"(28).

Written in the first half of this century it applies even better in today's mass media age.

There is a large sociological and political science literature on electorate behaviour and media influence. It
has been a concern since the advent of a mass media which could reach and, at least potentially, effect the electoral mass who determine the fate of their elected representatives; and whose participation, free from constraints, physical or intellectual, legitimates the claim for democracy.

In spite of the volume of the literature, and perhaps the cause of it, there is no substantial agreement among researchers as to the nature or scale of the media role in political behaviour. It is not uncommon, especially in empirically based analyses, to find a conclusion such as is presented by Patterson and McClure in the "Unseeing Eye." They present the emotionally comforting conclusion that although the electorate is not always cognisant of all the necessary facts, they are a critical pool of potential voters not easily fooled by manipulative presentations. On the basis of this belief they can suggest as the ideal political strategy, and one which appeals to a sense of simple morality too, an honest exposition of the issues by politicians.

This conclusion does seem intuitively wrong though, the authors themselves present their thesis as deviant from the expected and the received wisdom. Other studies feel they have illustrated media influence and show concern for the pernicious effect this could have for the fabric of democracy itself. For example, Blumler and McQuail in "Television and Politics," see a clearly powerful role
for television in political affairs and are worried about Party political or other manipulative control of the established democratic process. The scope of such enquiries are large, for the consequences are potentially great.

In moving towards the substance of this paper it is important to illustrate the contradictory arguments of authors such as those already mentioned, and also a conceptual basis in the belief that the media in general, and television in particular, (as Lang and Lang suggest (31)), can structure events for the audience; and how commentary and reporting which transmit the facts and provide insights, are in fact based on interpretations of and selections from the mass of actual events and are therefore, though often honest, always contextually deficient, possibly false and certainly not the whole truth. Their effect on the electorate is potentially compounded by the psychological sense that visual media (i.e. television), emphasise reality and create a sense of actually "being there." The impossibility which Lang and Lang feels exists for the media and especially television, to merely transmit information and not influence an event, (32), is a view shared in this paper.

Although mass media techniques were employed by many Presidents, it is often postulated that the "television presidency" came into its own during the Kennedy years. Indeed his road to the White House is distinguished by the acknowledgement of a great influence for television, (the debates in particular), on the election outcome. Theodore
White, among others, has examined this question extensively, particularly in his election study, "The Making of the President: 1960," (33). Here, the differences between the perceived television and radio performances of the candidates and the consequences for image based politics, etc., has raised the so called great-debates almost to a position of folklore and political mythology,(34). Kennedy himself said at one point that it was television in general, and the debates in particular, that made the difference in his narrow victory,(35). The 1960 debates stand out as arguably the single most influential media event of modern presidential elections and many observers credit them with playing a fundamental role in the final outcome. Kennedy, (considered the challenger), was a relatively unknown Democrat while Nixon was considered an experienced and skilled politician with a proven history in national government. It was clearly expected that the televised debates would favour the more experienced Republican candidate, yet as Meyer noted, "the whole apparatus of [media] persuasion and manipulation [held] few secrets from the Senator’s staff,"(36).

The result of the first debate according to a poll carried out by the Gallup organisation showed that twice as many people thought that Kennedy had performed better than Nixon. "The single most important result of the debate lay in the destruction of the image, so widely held, of Richard Nixon as champion debater and television personality par
excellence,"(37). Nixon, who throughout the debate was in some pain from an infected knee and appeared uncomfortable in front of the hot lights, suffered in comparison to the healthy, youthful looking Kennedy who displayed a poise and maturity beyond his years.

Although the underlying effect of the debate was to reinforce previously held political preferences, Kennedy made a net political gain by establishing a more favourable personal image of himself. The main advantage to Kennedy was to dispel previously held fears over his maturity and experience among undecided voters,(38).

Television is effective on two levels, issues and images. The most important factor in 1960 was the image presented by Kennedy in comparison to Nixon. The more substantive elements of the campaign whereby the public were directly exposed to the issues and policies of the candidates were considered to be of much less importance. The overall effect of the two areas is to reinforce each other; a positive assessment of Kennedy's image led to a positive assessment of his policies, the reverse would work under different circumstances,(39).

Additionally, as well as this general connection between perceived image and exposure to the media, many go beyond Berelson, Lasarsfeld and McPhee's assertion that exposure to the media only creates greater interest in one's own candidate and solidifies already held opinions in the electorate,(40), and what Patterson and McClure identify as "selective perception,"(41). This concept of selective
perception is disputed by other writers; Roberta Sigal makes a distinction between the political and personal components of a candidate's image, "...perception is stimulus-determined when perceivers look at a candidate's personality, appearance, objectivity, verifiable circumstances, etc., but it is perceiver determined when respondents view the candidates political traits,"(42). The political component is determined largely by partisan feelings while the personal component is open to outside influences, particularly the mass media.

Effects for some can be even more general or pervasive, emphasising agenda setting functions and other technical media constraints on the political process. As the Glasgow Media Group notes in its theory of the socially defining role of the media, "...the overall climate of media values...[influence] citizen's views into convergent patterns of thinking,"(43).

While the weakness and randomness of many studies' empirical relationships may initially appear to support Patterson and McClure in their thesis against media influence, it can be suggested that often the results may be understood because of the very pervasiveness and power of the medium under test. It is not necessary to show that the electorate believes or are affected by every claim presented through the media as those authors, seem to imply. In fact it seems that it would be generally accepted as unsurprising to most observers that the more extreme or hyperbolic claims
of a campaign, (such as the cited example claiming that George McGovern, if elected, would put fifty percent of the population on welfare, (44)), should be treated with something approaching amusement. After all, there would be a much larger body of more moderate criticism presented by which a "media-balanced" judgement could be made. But the cumulative effect of long term exposure to a still restricted set of media interpretations which are almost monopolistic in their nature is, I would suggest, bound to influence.

It is not easy with conventional data to isolate control groups when testing a hypothesis which includes elements, like the media, so widely and commonly distributed among the sample. The distinctions drawn in the original questionnaires between levels of exposure may not be effectual; e.g. in the 1980 General Election Survey eighty percent of respondents said they watched television news often, only five percent said they never watched, (45); and contamination from other non-obvious sources of media information, especially with respect to such a spectacular event as a presidential election, will polarise the sense of these illustrative figures still further.

It is not necessarily so disappointing that a strong media influence has not been convincingly shown through empirical analysis, it may only indicate the greater level of influence that the media has. While President Carter's Press Secretary, Larry Speakes held that, "the ability to turn a sow's ear into silk purses is limited. You can make
it into a silkier sow's ear, that's all,"(46), President Ford's Press Secretary noted, "if it hasn't happened on television, it hasn't happened,"(47).

The importance of these individuals in their respective administrations illustrates the media's importance and its function as the purveyor of a new basis of presidential power and authority. Neustadt required public prestige for presidential power and it is through the television medium that that is established or denied. It is in the television age that popular charismatic authority becomes a reality.

As Sabato points out;

"The United States is more a video culture than a word culture, and television is a major cause. In 1950 under ten percent of all households had a television set, but by 1980 almost ninety-nine percent did; more than half of all homes have two or more sets."

He goes on;

"The average American now watches over three hours television a day,"

and,

"...two thirds of all Americans consider television their primary source of news and about half claim to rely on television whenever there are conflicting reports in the various media,"(48).

As Weber saw;

"In traditionally stereotyped periods, charisma
is the greatest revolutionary force. The equally revolutionary force of reason works from without by altering the situations of action, and hence its problems, finally in this way changing men's attitudes towards them; or it intellectualises the individual. Charisma, on the other hand, may involve a subjective reorientation born out of suffering, conflicts or enthusiasm' (49).

Given these two realities the applicability of the theory to modern situations becomes clearer.

Most people do not have the time or inclination to intellectualise about politics. Political campaigns based on this premise will necessarily appeal to charisma. Elections are necessarily appeals to the idea of a better future; they have to be to rationally justify the call for change. And successful campaigns increasingly focus on the personal over the technical. Today genuine charismatic authority can be manufactured from only apparently charismatic qualities which are perceived as real by the electorate, and are judged on the electoral support they achieve. Although there is little or no need for 'sermon on the mount' appearances the competition for leadership is high, and the criteria of judgement similar.

Authority in mass democracies comes from a large population; personal appearances of national and apparently charismatic figures are seen by a very small proportion of the whole, and as Patterson and McClure point out in their book, "Unseeing Eye," the effect on the screen can be quite
different from the perceptions gained from the face to face confrontation, (50), but within each context it is impossible to say that one has more credibility in establishing a basis for charismatic authority. We can note however, as Luke does, (51), the different nature of each type; traditional 'high' charisma tied to substantively real events or behaviour, and increasingly common 'telereal' charisma which depends on a mediated image and only requires truth at the media level. Telereal charisma can therefore be created or manufactured; the specific exceptional quality of this type of charismatic character is the ability to look good on television, he may possess the superhuman or supernatural characteristics too, but these are not necessarily required and, without telereal charisma, may not be enough.

Charisma, in some form at least, does seem to operate in modern politics; but why then do we not experience the full range of the consequences which the theory suggests flow from this type of authority. Charisma can be innovative, as Weber claims, or shallow, as would seem to be a danger with telereal charisma; but modern society, while it does not rationalise charisma away, wishes to maintain the benefits of innovation and stability which it has acquired and therefore places limits on the role of charismatic leaders, in short it institutionalises them.

Weber says, "It is the fate of charisma, whenever it comes into the permanent institutions of a community, to give way to powers of tradition or of rational
socialisation,"(52). The discipline of the orderly, rational society creates rational and methodical action, but this 'impersonal discipline,' normative in the truly rational society, is undermined in the democratic state which recognises and seeks to appeal to individualism in society. All men are created equal and this equality is clearest in the franchise, there is no rational 'stratification' in voting. This seems especially true in the American political system which lacks even the widespread Party discipline of many other countries, or any other structure on which to fully enforce more rational criteria in elections. The primary system and the election procedure itself is not controlled sufficiently to avoid the opportunity for direct, irrational and charismatic appeals to the electorate, and in fact appears to encourage them.

But the institution must have rational authority for its legitimacy as an impersonal entity in modern society. While the elected officials may have rational authority too, (traditional authority having been emotionally largely rejected in mass participatory systems), it is more likely that with the failure to find effective methods of illustrating rational policy in the the election campaign the emotional or psychological charismatic appeal is the principal attribute emphasised; especially in times of felt need, the need for emotional deliverance rather than material administration.

If in democracies like the United States larger and larger groups are to form the body of judges of charisma,
i.e., the electorate at elections, then for the maintainance of institutional stability the procedures of the state must accommodate the process of charismatic selection; even at the cost of functionally desireable institutional procedures understood solely in terms of policy goals and means. The institutions after all, operate to routinise the provision for or the management of the needs of the society, including the emotional need for charismatic leadership.

In the United States the potential information level is higher than ever, but it is structured in such a way as to preclude much of that potential from being realised. Furthermore the choices between the candidates in terms of their policy differences often appear to be so limited as to be almost pointless. Voters often seem to be faced with making a choice between individuals both of whom, if elected, will try to do exactly the same thing.

It almost seems to be the case that the task of voting is solely the task of legitimating a system auxiliary to largely uncontroversial policies. As Weber suggests;

"...where the bureaucratisation of the administration has been completely carried through, a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable,"(53).

In the United States this level of bureaucracy seems almost to have been achieved. The candidates are therefore perceived in terms of legitimizing this bureaucracy, the rational choice becomes the charismatic leader for charisma
is the only area of the state requiring substantiation. The President has to provide the figurehead, the hero for society, he has to earn respect for the state from the nation.

Here I have attempted to show the relevance of a charismatic theory of politics to understanding present political practice in the United States. Weber’s 'charismatic authority' is rarely used in a modern application but I have sought to suggest that today, perhaps more than ever, the role of charisma in electoral politics cannot be ignored and could be rising to become the pre-eminent concern in the field; this already appears to be the belief of the rapidly increasing body of professional political consultants.

The television age, by distancing the mass from the candidate, creates the opportunity to manipulate. Charisma is now interpreted through an intermediary which must be seen as affecting the process.

Weber noted that what is alone important in determining charisma is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his followers or disciples. In this light charisma can be modelled and manufactured, and is therefore much more produceable and readily available.

To illustrate the logic it can be suggested that the scope of the policy debate is becoming so narrow that rational authority has been effectively achieved within the framework of capitalism and is enshrined in the bureaucratic
structure; but rational authority is not necessarily fully legitimate to the psychologically individualistic citizen and the appeal to participation maintains elections at an essentially sub-issue level.

For sure, many issues are raised in political campaigns but most are not the great intrinsic issues which define society, most of these have long since been settled. Elections can therefore be understood simply as the transferance of personnel; detached from meaningful policy issues the personnel can be understood as personalities, and to be selected the personalities tend to be charismatic—at least superficially.

The charismatic authority achieved though, must be understood within its context. The people no longer select a king or a prophet, they select a personal leader for a rational, bureaucratic system. Presidents are increasingly elected on the basis of perceived charisma, but they are appendages, though important ones, to a large societal system based on rational bureaucratic organisation.

Charisma no longer needs a miracle to be maintained, its proving ground is now the battlefield of T.V. debates or Nielsen ratings. The devotion which follows charismatic appeals makes it important to understand; the manipulation of image for apparently false but effectively real charisma makes it important to explain.

Within such a theoretical base of charismatic authority it is believed that substantive policy options are variable
in their impact upon Presidential popularity and authority, especially in a television age, and that if Presidents appreciate the impact of charismatic appeal on their power based on popularity then they will tend to focus on policy which is most image enhancing and which secures the greatest public popularity.

A Mass-Level Analysis of Presidential Popularity and Political Events.

Most studies of presidential popularity have been undertaken at the mass level and have been applied to economic or political event explanations. Most researchers propose rational explanations but the notable exception is J.A. Stimson whose 'cyclical model' is a response to what he sees as a parabolic cycle of presidential support, "reflecting regular expectation/disillusionment cycles" among the public,(54). This pattern is tied to the presidential election calendar and, Stimson feels, is of such strength that he can suggest that popularity is principally determined by the mere passage of time and is essentially independent of policy acts or other presidential behaviour.

Although this view has been criticised by others, Monroe claiming that, "the evidence strongly suggests that cycles in presidential popularity are better explained by specific events than by the vagaries of public opinion,"(55), for example, it retains a certain validity
and alerts the time-series analyst to some of the complexities of his interpretive task. Stimson's explanations of his observations too, contain some useful insights for the present analysis. He explains the pattern of declining popularity as a result of a general public disillusionment with the inability of administrations to fulfill the public's unrealistic early expectations. He suggests that presidents in fact secure mandates only for policy ends and not policy means, policy implementation is therefore always a potential valley of tears. This easily conforms to Edwards' emphasis on the symbolism of the Presidential office, for example, the desire to package complex ideas in simple phrases like; the New Deal, the Fair Deal, New Frontier or Great Society, the aim being simplification for mass public appreciation and assimilation, (56).

Given the focus of this study however, the key works in the area are those of J. Mueller and K.R. Monroe, (whose data has been used here), (57). The focus in which Neustadt held personal prestige and reputation in securing a belief in presidential ability and therefore leading to the enhancement of the President's power, emphasises the importance of a generalised presidential popularity arising for whatever reason, (often, though not necessarily, an effective use of the powers of the office), over substantively important but publicly deficient presidential acts. For this reason the "Rally-Round-the-Flag" variable created by Mueller is especially relevant. A rally event,
"an event which 1., is international and 2., involves the United States and Particularly the President directly" and is, "3., specific, dramatic and sharply focused," incorporates that class of events which may or may not be substantive in character but which all reflect positively on general presidential popularity,(58). Mueller and Brody both found that the public reaction to good or bad international events, for example the Cuban missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs respectively, is very similar and generally positive,(59). While others dispute the generality of this situation the exceptions can be explained by the specific circumstances of the deviant events, and the proposition of Brody and Mueller largely holds true,(60).

Applying Monroe's data which extends the Mueller classification, and incorporating new data collected for the first Reagan term, it is hoped to show that presidents can indeed secure significant increases in Neustadt's presidential power as measured through levels of public popularity by focusing on such rally events regardless of the policy-substantive impact which these events might have. Methodology and Results.

Operationalising the data for this purpose is quite straightforward: Presidential popularity comes straight from Monroe and her analysis of Gallup polling data. Only the national total figures are used as the popularity shown must be general and not partisan or group-based to secure for the President his 'public prestige' and authority. The
"Key Political Events" data which expands Mueller’s ‘Rally’ variable and includes corruption and leadership events, is reanalysed for application to this study and is augmented by relevant supplementary data for the Reagan Presidency, (Appendix). The new data was collected by following Monroe’s procedures and using her sources as much as possible.

A major problem for both the Monroe and Mueller studies is methodological, the application of multivariate regression analysis to time-series data. The results of any regression analysis may be seriously disrupted if either autocorrelation or multicolinearity is present in a model; the existence of these problems casts serious doubts on the coefficients produced in an analysis, and as Stimson points out, "time-series regression, more than other forms, is particularly prone to such confusion," (61). The problem of systematically related residuals or highly correlated independent variables are real likelihoods in studies which necessarily are linked by a time variable. In time-series analysis then it is important to apply more rigorous analytical techniques to the data than the simple regression technique applied by Monroe allows. For this reason in this study Box-Jenkins time-series analysis techniques are applied to the existing and augmented data, (62).

The first element of the analysis is identification of the univariate model, attempting to ensure that underlying trends in the data are accounted for and will not perturb inferences made at later stages of the analysis. The first
testing was of a first order autoregressive modeling. Although the Ljung-Box Q statistic, an additive measure of autocorrelations over time, suggested that the information was significant the estimate of the residuals was very high,\((.993)\), and with a T-ratio of 1,485.9 the series appeared to approaching non-stationarity and therefore was becoming inappropriate for meaningful analysis. As the ‘AR(1)’ model failed on grounds of non-stationarity a first order moving average model, \((MA(1))\), was applied; the estimate now came within acceptable limits of stationarity but the T-ratio of 1.37 was insignificant and this model too had to be rejected. The model could then be best identified by a simple differencing of the time-series.

Because Monroe failed to apply rigourous statistical procedures in her analysis and risked the multicolinearity and autocorrelation problems noted above, the next step was a reanalysis of the relevant elements of her own data. Introducing the political event variables, \(EVENTR\), \(rally events\), \(EVENTL\), \(leadership events\), and \(CORRUPT\), \(events involving government corruption\), to the now identified differenced time-series it was found that only the ‘Rally’ variable was statistically significant and this accounted for an average rise in popularity of over three percent,\((Table.1.)\). This tended to confirm the hypothesised belief that presidential popularity might be well served by dramatic and often emotional events, as rally events tend to be, rather than by more exclusively substantive acts of
presidential competence which would be witnessed in the 'leadership' variable especially. Surprisingly Monroe's corruption variable has little impact on presidential popularity.

In order to incorporate the Reagan Presidency the new data collected for the 1980 to 1984 period was applied, but the focus now shifted to a more general but specifically rally oriented event definition. In order to be able to generalise from the theory as much as possible and to apply as much of the data as possible in the analysis, the three original Monroe variables were reanalysed and where appropriate combined into a grand rally variable. This procedure conformed to the process followed by Monroe, i.e., where more than one event occurred in any given time period the binary codings were combined cumulatively, (Appendix).

The resulting variable which was statistically significant with a T-ratio of 3.2, increased presidential popularity by an average of almost one and one half percent. This was, as expected, somewhat less than the original narrowly defined rally variable achieved and reflects the more comprehensive nature of the new variable which had selected all events which could be shown to affect the President or his men directly, and therefore included some less dramatic events. Still, these essentially non-substantive political events show real potential for enhancing presidential power.

It was felt however, that the Monroe cumulative process was not an optimal way of compiling the data; this process
treats all events as qualitatively equal, (as a binary coding operation must), but it compounds the insensitivity of this practical procedure by then combining highly dissimilar events in a simple additive process, treating each event as of equal importance and complimentary nature. It was felt that this process skewed results by giving undue weight to accumulations of less important events and tended to discriminate against solitary but qualitatively important events and against accumulations of conflicting events. The data was therefore recoded to eradicate the cumulative process, each observation period was coded on a binary basis indicating the presence or absence of an event or events. This new coding also clearly discriminates, emphasising the simple existence of an appropriate event over the number of events in any period, but this is felt to correspond better with the way in which people evaluate a changing political situation and is therefore held to be more legitimate. This procedure did indeed increase the observed percentage increase in popularity by a full percentage point and retained statistical significance, (Table.1.).

Finally it was felt that there are some key events which have special significance for presidential popularity. In order to capture this phenomenon the new data was recoded to extract three classes of events which it was felt were of special character and importance. It was felt that instances of direct and personal threat to the President or the Presidency would illicit a positive popular response, for
this reason the attempted assassination of Presidents Reagan
and Ford, and the assassination of presidential candidate
R.F. Kennedy were selected as examples of this personal
threat phenomenon and coded into a new variable, "ATTACK". Likewise it was felt that instances of American power or
capacity which involved few short-term and only diffuse
long-term costs, would rally support. To capture this a
"POWER" variable was constructed using the 1969 moon landing
and the 1983 invasion of Grenada as appropriate examples. In
spite of the initial analysis of Monroe's corruption data it
was felt too that presidents could affect their popularity
in negative ways; operationalising this concern was very
easy, the Watergate period in the mid-'70's is an almost
perfect example of imprudent presidential action. It was
felt that Monroe's cumulative coding procedure had
especially impacted on this event by equating relatively
less important congressional hearings on corruption, for
example, with moves to impeach a President,

The results here were not entirely satisfying, perhaps
because of the relatively few cases under test, but they
were generally confirmatory. It was immediately clear that
'Watergate' had a very great impact, dropping presidential
popularity by almost five percent on average, and rendering
the other variables statistically insignificant. While the
significance figures demand caution the other variables did
nonetheless appear to move popularity in the expected
positive direction and by somewhat more than two percentage
points. (Table.1.). The current intervention model was then
substituted with a transfer modeling of the data, but this was not found to add significantly to the results.

In all these procedures have generally confirmed that the possibility exists for presidents to substantially enhance their popularity through the spectacular or dramatic event without regard to substance or policy considerations. The results would do little to dissuade an incumbent from pursuing such events as a realistic strategy for securing public prestige and consequently increasing presidential power; these events are certainly much more controllable, or in fact manufactureable, than more substantive popularity tools like economic policy for example.

President Reagan: The Pursuit of Popularity.

Ronald Reagan, the current President, seems to conform to the hypothesised pattern especially well and represents the apex of the new art of mass-media politics. Indeed it is his Presidency which inspires this study for it has so enmeshed image with reality and has, it is argued, been so popular as a result. Why this has happened is complex: partly it is because as Sclesinger suggests;

"Kennedy's action, (in the missile crisis), which should have been celebrated as an exception, was instead enshrined as a rule. This was in great part because it so beautifully fulfilled both the
romantic ideal of the strong President and the prophecy of split second Presidential decision in the nuclear age. The very brilliance of Kennedy's performance appeared to vindicate the idea that the President must take unto himself the final judgements of war and peace...One of its legacies was the imperial conception of the Presidency,"(63).

In addition, uniquely and importantly, our first television President, was assasinated; he died and was a hero. "The massive media coverage of Kennedy's death, the televised slaying of Lee Harvey Oswald, and the continuing controversy over Kennedy's assasination - as well as the murder of his brother Robert five years later - left an indelible impression on American political memories,"(64), undoubtedly including, and perhaps especially, on Ronald Reagan, a one time harsh critic who now quotes Kennedy in campaign speeches.

But as we have seen, while Kennedy sought responses to events with largely external origins, Reagan appears to seek to create similar policy areas by creating by definition, surrogate Cubas in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and even Grenada; and by alluding to a communist threat which must be seen with reference to the areas mentioned, as more rhetorical than substantive. This may in part be the result of personal character or also a response to narrow political imperatives.

As Tom Shales of 'The Washington Post' has suggested,
Ronald Reagan is, "the first true prop President, one whose real self is the image on the television screen and whose shadow self is the man in the White House." While this may overstate the case, it seems clear that President Reagan is more comfortable and more qualified in dealing with the imagery aspects of his position rather than with the substantive, executive policy decisions. There are many anecdotes of how little time he spends working including, for example, a tendency to fall asleep at Cabinet meetings, which is at least unusual behaviour. But he is fully aware of the power of the press to affect his influence, one of his closest advisers, Ed Meese noted that, "the press acts as intermediary between the public and the government and as national interpreter of events. Its effect can't be overstated since perception can be more important than reality,"(65).

It is true that much of Reagan's impressive rhetoric is not the result of careful analysis of personal experiences; he did not see military combat and, as Robert Dalleck says, he achieved his current wealth and status, "through the manipulation of an image rather than through traditional productive enterprise,"(66), which he proclaims as an ideal.

His personal character can be viewed as a product of a traditional background bedded in traditional values of effort and reward, and from experiences in a career based in imagery and not substance; war films with heroes and no casualties, where the visual effect has more worth than the
concrete result. It is not entirely surprising then that his politics may involve the utilisation of imagery, and that the success of this imagery, as in his professional career, is the benchmark by which his own success is personally judged. For example his re-election campaign moved further from policy, (though not politics), and closer to cinema than any previous effort. He is clearly comfortable making appeals to the emotions.

Reagan's views of the Soviet threat to his perceived democratic ideals, (as evidenced in his campaign speeches and literature), have remained unchanged from the fifties. His concern with communism unlike other, and especially more recent, Presidents is expressed in an unreasoned, emotional and vituperative manner with regular references to the Soviets of the type; "that evil empire," or that "bizarre chapter in human history." This could of course be political strategy tapping the latent fears and insecurities of his society; but he has a long history of antagonism towards communism, even leading to a voluntary appearance before the infamous House Un-American Activities Committee, (67). It was not unlikely therefore, that he should take up the anti-communist gauntlet. However, as noted by Dalleck, (68), for Reagan, "the world outside the U.S. is little more than an extension of the world within," this said, in reference to his 'anti-Soviet evangelism,' can also be understood as a rationale for appeals through foreign policy to the American people, his electorate.

I do not suggest that Reagan's activities in his anti-
communist foreign policy are necessarily cynical manipulations of electoral sympathies. Even such grand, if slightly ridiculous, flag waving extravaganzas as the invasion of Grenada can be interpreted as genuine responses to deep-rooted fears. The display elements of the large taskforce, and even in the pro-American, (and almost by definition anti-communist), Olympics ceremony in which the President took part, (69), naturally fit with Reagan's experiential expectations, and are not therefore in this respect contrived.

But his actions are often problematic on almost every criterion of judgement except his own personal popularity. In Central-American policy for example, he does not respond, as Kennedy in the early sixties did, to a serious and generally perceived threat. The level of response is not in proportion to the threat as it can be shown to exist, and even a cursory glance at contemporary periodicals can illustrate the general dissatisfaction with the administration's analysis and execution in this area. In Congress the President was at some points virtually achieving bi-partisan opposition to his policy for the region, which is fairly unique, (70), but again his immense public popularity can be seen to enhance his power and make him very difficult to effectively oppose and he has since won most of the concessions that he sought.

I think it is possible that Reagan is involved in Latin America because of the historical opportunity for
Presidential power that the action against communism that he has defined there allows. He is also experiencing the traditional personal success which seems to attach to such activity. The substance of his policy though seems weak and is controversial, but it may have become a central and almost necessary part of Presidential strategies for political success; an appeal to a time of greater virtue and certainty before Vietnam and Watergate, for example to cold war political imperatives, and Kennedy’s beleaguered dynamism.

Kennedy, concerned about his popularity, used to complain with reference to his domestic policy aims that, compared to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first one hundred days, he was not dealing with the commonly perceived, black and white issues and the general expectation of radical action which existed in the thirties; his policy therefore had to move more pragmatically and incrementally. In foreign policy on the other hand, his policy was one of reaction to a rapidly changing world; perhaps flawed but dynamic, apparently effective and at least interesting. Reagan is faced with a foreign policy situation much like Kennedy’s domestic one, but he supplants frustration with alternative action. The rationale for the activity is activity itself. A media President reacts to a media age with media events; helicopters and blood are much more arresting than formulas for missile counts or budget analysis - to Reagan as well as the population.
Conclusion.

Here I have sought to illustrate, by looking at a number of specific examples, the ad hoc or illusory nature of pivotal events in American policy. In the first section it was shown that in some of its first foreign policy decisions the Kennedy administration was reacting to events initiated by others or based in prior and inertial events, that Kennedy was preoccupied with these circumstantial crises and was unable to effectively apply his own policy doctrines as a result. Despite this failure to apply explicit policies in these areas the reaction to, and eventual resolution of these crises were, as hypothesised, politically successful; and when combined with Kennedy's vigourous image and his assasination, which unified opinion and raised him above partisan squabbles and enhanced his presidency with noble and heroic attributes,(in the manner of a Greek tragedy, for example), this period set political and policy norms for later administrations.

It is suggested that President Reagan, who more than any other President in the intervening period is a man apparently drawn to image over substance, follows a policy of dramatic and spectacular action in pursuit of an imagery of the nature associated with the Kennedy years. He is not responding to a threat which is nationally perceived, (like the missile crisis), he is not responding to circumstances over which he has little control,(like the "Bay of Pigs"),
his concerns are self-defined and executed. By comparison the artificial nature of many Reagan actions can be observed, but his political success must be noted too.

The questions can now be raised; does the pursuit of heroic imagery offer greater political success than the development of specific, strategic policies, and is there no political mileage in acknowledging substantive policy problems?

Whether or not President Reagan pursues such imagery intentionally in the pursuit of political success, or is successful because it is in his character to operate within this framework, it is important in evaluating both the character of Presidents and the future of the presidency to understand the rationale behind this apparent reality. The attraction of Kennedyesque style and manner seems real but its pursuit is debasing; Kennedy was an individual reacting to the responsibilities of his office and applying his policies where he could. The special circumstances of his administration historically and personally were responsible for the substance of his major policies, his eventual popularity was in part circumstantial too.

To reduce the presidency to a vehicle for popularity at the expense of effective policy, neglecting the circumstances that are relevant, even if they are not so potentially dynamic, in the pursuit of opportunistic policy goals seems weak and pernicious; but no less likely for that. If this is the electoral reality of the television age then the system is under threat, if it is the easy option
and covert goal of the candidate then he should be exposed.
**TABLE 1.**

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<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>Presidential Support</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Increase in</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popularity, (%)</td>
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<td>T-Ratio</td>
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**Original Monroe Data**

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<td>CORRUPT</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
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</table>

**Augmented Monroe Data**

**Operation 1.**

| Generalised Rally Event, (GRE) (Cumulative) | 1.425 | 3.2 |

**Operation 2.**

| GRE, (Binary) | 2.426 | 2.56 |

**Operation 3.**

| GRE, (Binary) | 0.998 | 0.89 |
| ATTACK        | 2.667 | 0.66 |
| POWER         | 2.150 | 0.43 |
| WATERGATE     | -4.875 | -1.96 |
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(3) ibid. p.163.

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(7) ibid p.201.


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(41) op. cit. "The Unseeing Eye," p. 66.


(44) op. cit. "The Unseeing Eye," p. 131.


(49) op. cit. "Weber on Charisma" p.53.


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(60) See for example, Kernell S. Explaining Presidential Popularity American Political Science Review, 1977, 72.(2). p. 506-522

(61) op. cit. "A Cyclic Model."


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(65) Quoted in National Journal, April 24th 1982, p. 716.


(67) ibid. p.22.

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(70) Time magazine, 11th. April 1983.
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APPENDIX

Key political Events Affecting Presidential Popularity.

1965
April 27. Dominican Republic Intervention.
Aug. 11. Los Angeles Race Riots.

1966
July 12. Chicago Race Riots.

1968
March 31. Johnson Announces He Will Not Seek Re-election.
April. N. Vietnam Agrees to Preliminary Peace Talks.

1969
April. Paris Peace Talks.
Nov. 3. Withdrawal of Troops from N. Vietnam.
Nov. 16. My Lai Massacre Reported.

1970
April 30. Cambodian Invasion Ordered.

1971
July 1. Pentagon Papers Published.

1972
May. Nixon Visits Moscow.
June 17. Watergate Break-in.
1973

Sept. 2. Washington Post Disclosures on Watergate
Nov. 7. Nixon Wins Election.

Jan. 1973
Watergate Trials Begin.

April 27. Grey Resigns from F.B.I.

April 30. Key Nixon People Resign, are Fired.

May 17-Aug. 7. Ervin Committee Hearings.

May 22. Cover-up Conceded by Nixon.

June. Brezhnev Summit.

June. Dean Implicates President.

June 29. Bombing of Cambodia to Cease.


Aug. 29. Sirica Orders Tapes’ Release.


Oct. 20. Saturday night Massacre.


1974

Jan. 4. Nixon Refuses to Comply With Tape Subpeona.


March 1. White House Indictements for Watergate.

April 11. House Subpeona’s Nixon Tapes.


June. Nixon to Middle-East.

June 20. House Releases Transcript Discrepancies.
July 3. Moscow Summit.


1975


April 11. Embassy Closed, Americans Evacuated Phnom Penh.


May 12. Mayaguez Captured.

Sept. 5., 22. Attempts to Assassinate Ford.

Dec. China visit by Ford.

1976


Nov. 2. Carter Wins Election.

1978


July 12. Andrew Young Controversy.

Sept. Camp David Peace Talks.

Nov. 18. Murder of U.S. Congressman in Guyana Triggers Mass Suicide.


1979


May 9. Salt II.

Aug. 15. Andrew Young Resigns.

Nov. 4. U.S. Embassy in Iran Seized, Hostages Taken.

Nov. 11. U.S. Embassy in Beirut Seized.


Dec. 27. Soviet Backed Coup in Afghanistan.


1980

Jan. 4. Carter Curtails Grain Sales to U.S.S.R.

Jan. 8. More Retaliatory Measures Against Iran Announced.


April 28. Cyrus Vance Resigns.


Aug. 4. White House/Billy Carter/Libya Investigated by Senate.

Nov. 2. Iran Announces it Will Release Hostages.

Dec. 5. Aid to El Salvador.

1981


April 12. First Shuttle Flight.


1983

April 18. Beirut Embassy Destroyed.


Bimonthly Presidential Popularity and Political Events Coding.

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<th>Period</th>
<th>Popularity, (%)</th>
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