Power in Stalinist States: The Personality Cult of
Nicolae Ceausescu

by

John Oliver Kinder

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Political Science

APPROVED:

__________________________
Timothy W. Luke

__________________________
Lynette G. Rummel

__________________________
Ronald G. Shaiko

April 26, 1989
Blacksburg, Virginia
Power in Stalinist States: The Personality Cult of Nicolae Ceausescu

by

John Oliver Kinder

Timothy W. Luke

Political Science

(ABSTRACT)

This study examines the Socialist Republic of Romania as a Stalinist state which employs a personality cult. The leader of a state is the focus of a personality cult, but he does not enjoy the status it gives without consent from elsewhere within the government. In order to determine where this power comes from, three possible sources are discussed. These are: Nicolae Ceausescu, president of Romania; the state bureaucracy; and the people. The Soviet Union, during the time of Stalin, is used as a comparative element. When Nicolae Ceausescu came to power he did so with the consent of the elite. As the Romanian elite are less inclined to support his policies, Ceausescu has had to continually take steps to stay ahead of the opposition. The Romanian people also lent their support to Ceausescu earlier, and have since become discontented with the regime. This study concludes that a leader with a personality cult must have some form of consent to come into power, but his personal characteristics
will determine how he leads and whether or not he will be able to remain in power if that consent is withdrawn.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my committee, especially my chairman Timothy W. Luke for his guidance and for refusing to let me "buy the flim-flam". I would also like to thank the Political Science secretaries who have always been willing to help and who know what is going on when no one else seems to.

The friendship of the graduate students has helped me to enjoy my time here, in the midst of the work. I would especially like to thank Matthew Hall and Markus Brombacher for their support as well as for many good times, and Paul Taggart who, since I've known him, has helped me in my search for consistency.

To Teri Morrison, whom I have the privilege of calling my fiancee and soon my wife, I wish to express my love. Finally, I extend my appreciation and thanks to my parents who have supported me, not only in graduate school, but in every endeavor that I have undertaken. I am sure that I will never be aware of the full extent of their love and caring.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction ............................................. 1

2.0 The Elements of a Personality Cult in a Stalinist State ............................................. 4

2.1 Stalinism .................................................. 4

2.1.1 Nationalistic Socialism ................................. 4

2.1.2 Revolution From Above ................................. 5

2.2 Personality Cult ........................................... 6

2.2.1 Definitions ............................................ 6

2.2.2 The Leader .............................................. 8

2.2.3 The Elite ............................................... 11

2.2.4 The People ............................................. 11

2.2.5 Construction of the Cult .............................. 13

2.3 Conclusion ................................................ 14

3.0 Nicolae Ceausescu ....................................... 15

3.1 Introduction ............................................. 15

3.2 History .................................................... 15

3.3 Ceausescu in Charge ..................................... 17

3.3.1 Beginnings ............................................ 17

3.3.2 Accumulation of Power ............................... 18

3.3.3 Leadership Personified ............................... 22

3.4 Personal Characteristics ............................... 24

Table of Contents
7.0 Appendix A: Governmental Structure .......... 74
7.1 National Level .................................. 74
  7.1.1 Grand National Assembly .................... 74
  7.1.2 Council of State ............................. 74
  7.1.3 Council of Ministers ....................... 75
7.2 Local Level ..................................... 76

8.0 Bibliography ................................. 77

Vita .............................................. 89
1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ironically, throughout the history of twentieth century socialism, individuals have played a major role in the implementation of their new political machines. In some cases these individuals have risen to legendary status during and/or after their lifetime. The names Lenin, Mao and Stalin come readily to mind. In some cases this legendary status is not naturally occurring but is built around the leader (Tumarkin, 1983, pp.128-33). This creation of greatness and in some cases near deification is known as a personality cult (Lane, 1981, p.277). Personality cults have developed due to careful planning, artificially created events, and appeals to historical symbols and national emotions (Tumarkin, 1983, pp.207-8). Often the leader who is to be the focus of the cult takes an active role in its creation (Tumarkin, 1983, pp.3, 252-4).

The building of a cult does not imply that the leader does not have the qualities which his cult portrays. It does, however, magnify whatever qualities he has and often assigns new and better attributes to him. In this case the image projected by the leader and the people's perception of him are ultimately more important than his actions. Joseph Stalin is one who falls into this category (Tumarkin, 1983, pp.252-4); Nicolae Ceausescu, the current president of
Romania, is another (Fischer, 1982; Gilberg, 1974; Nelson, 1981; Shafir, 1985). In this paper I will discuss the personality cult basing my definition within the bounds of Stalinism. I have chosen Stalinism because Romania fits closely the Stalinist model (Fischer, 1982, p.49; Fischer, 1981, p.126; Shafir, 1985, pp.47-8). I then will explain the specifics involved in the Ceausescu cult and finally analyze the Ceausescu cult by comparing it to the cult of Stalin. Below I will outline more specifically how this discussion will proceed.

In chapter 2.0 I will discuss the personality cult in general and how it fits into Stalinism. This discussion will include the definition of a personality cult which will be used in this paper. The political utility of the cult will be discussed. In order to understand why such emphasis is put on one man it is necessary to know why the cult is desirable in some circumstances and to know who benefits from it. Finally, I will discuss how a personality cult is built. This analysis will include the necessary attributes of a leader, the conditions necessary in a society and the devices that ought to be utilized in order to build a successful cult.

After establishing the general rules and definitions of the personality cult a comparative analysis of Ceausescu and Stalin will comprise the rest of the paper. This analysis will be broken into three further chapters, the main bodies
of which will discuss Ceausescu and Romania. Each will conclude with a comparison of the two states. Chapter 3.0 will discuss Nicolae Ceausescu and Joseph Stalin, that is their personal characteristics. Chapter 4.0 will discuss the governments and bureaucracies of which they are a part, as well as the goals of the governments, that is what each government hopes to achieve through the implementation of a personality cult. Lastly, chapter 5.0 will discuss the people who are governed under the personality cult revealing what it is about these societies that makes them fertile ground for sowing a personality cult.

In the conclusion I will discuss the extent to which the label of Stalinist fits Ceausescu as well as discuss the power that his cult affords him. Finally, I will discuss the present implications that the cult has for Ceausescu and Romania.
THE ELEMENTS OF A PERSONALITY CULT IN A STALINIST STATE

STALINISM

As stated in the introduction one of the purposes of this chapter will be to define the personality cult with its basis in Stalinism. In order to do this the first task is to give a brief explanation of Stalinism. Based on a short review of Stalinist literature the following elements are necessary for a state to fit into the category of Stalinist. The state must operate under the auspices of socialism (Tucker, 1971, pp.20-46); and more specifically the socialism should be nationalistic or chauvinistic (Nove, 1975, p.68; Medvedev, 1971, p.492; Tucker, 1971, pp.110-11). It is the goal of Stalinist regimes to establish complete socialism within their country (Tucker, 1971, pp.135-6). There is a sharp distinction between the elite and the masses, with the elite leading a lifestyle far superior to the common man and also holding much control over him (Nove, 1975, p.48).

Nationalistic Socialism

Earlier it was mentioned that the concept of socialism in one country is an important element of Stalinism (McCauley, 1983, p.44; Medvedev, 1971, p.492; Nove, 1975, p.68; Tucker,
The notion of socialism in one country began as a tactical maneuver on Stalin's part so that he could establish an independent stance vis a vis his opponents and Lenin. Stalin used this concept in order to mobilize the "...thousands of party cadres who were working day in and out to transfer their country into a socialist reality. ... No longer were the cadres being asked to sacrifice for the chimera of a revolutionary dream thousands of miles away; they were being offered a revolutionary reality within their grasp." (Zwick, 1983, p.68). The notion of one state socialism helps make the efforts of the people more worthwhile and appeals to their sense of nationalism.

2.1.2 Revolution From Above

The concept of socialism in one country embodies the notion of the revolution from above. The basic premise of the revolution from above is that the course of development of a socialist state is not directed by the will of the people, but by the dictate of the state. This concept is put into practice by the implementation of mass agricultural collectivization (McNeal, 1988, pp.124-32) and industrialization (McNeal, 1988, pp.133-42; Medvedev, 1971, pp.71-109; Nove, 1975, pp.41-7). Normally the goal of agricultural collectivization is to achieve complete state control of the land (Nove, 1975, p.41) and to install socialism quickly by
removing the land from the land owners. Commonly collectivization has been achieved with the use of force (Nove, 1975, p.41). The goals of massive industrialization are to make the country self sufficient, to make it competitive on a world wide level (McNeal, 1988, p.140) and to put the means of production under state control (Nove, 1975, pp.46-7).

2.2 PERSONALITY CULT

The personality cult will be the final element of discussion in this chapter, because it is an important aspect of Stalin's USSR and Ceausescu's Romania. The discussion will include an explanation of what a cult of personality is; why a government would want to have one; the conditions necessary for the success of a cult; and finally how one is built.

2.2.1 Definitions

According to Webster a cult is defined as a "sect adhering to a common ideology or doctrine or leader; an instance of fixed almost religious veneration for a person or thing." The personality cult requires that the leader be held in high regard, at least superficially, by the entire population. According to Lane there are two different types of personal-
ity cults. Lenin may be used to illustrate both of them. The first cult existed while Lenin lived. The second was created after his death. "During his lifetime Lenin was already loved and revered..." (Lane, 1981, p.215). But Lane goes on to say that "although Lenin was worshipped during his lifetime he was still being judged as a historical person and a political leader who was not above criticism" (Lane, 1981, P.215). After Lenin died his cult took on a new form. According to Lane:

In the days and weeks following his death a powerful movement arose to endow Lenin with extraordinary qualities. It sprang from two distinct, though related sources. The leadership Lenin had given in those decisive early years of the new Soviet State had earned him the affection and respect of a very large number of Soviet citizens. His early death threatened to leave a great vacuum which the Soviet people tried to fill by artificially prolonging Lenin's presence in Soviet society. ...

The other source of a Lenin cult in those weeks following his death was the necessity to consolidate Lenin's image as a charismatic leader and to institutionalize his charisma in the Party in order to secure political continuity... This was clearly the first attempt to build up Lenin as a superhuman being whose charisma could be institutionalized by attaching it to the organization of his followers, in this case the Communist Party (1981, pp.215-17).

The second of Lenin's cults will be the type discussed in this paper.

A personality cult is the elevation of the leader of a state to the status of supreme leader, who possesses abilities and powers beyond what is possible for any one person. The cult is the foundation upon which the elite and the leader legitimize the regime and a basis of unity for the
masses. In order for the cult to be implemented there are particular conditions which must exist. First, the people must recognize a central authority. Second, there needs to be a point of identification for the majority of the nation. This point cannot be arbitrary, because the people must believe that the cult has its basis in reality. Next, the bureaucracy of the state is centralized and has the ability to control the information which is presented to the people. The elite and the leader pursue the same goals. The above criteria are necessary for a cult of personality to exist, but they do not make one imminent. The final factor in determining whether or not a state will have a cult is the leader himself. It is the leader's prerogative whether he presents himself and allows himself to be presented as the object of a personality cult. The leader, the elite and the people will each be discussed in detail below.

2.2.2 The Leader

When discussing the personality cult and the leader of a state, how great a role the leader plays and how much power the leader actually has in the government is an important issue. Some suggest that the leader is completely in charge, and that every operation is conducted only with his approval, that every decision great or small is addressed by him personally and that every person in the country is under his
complete control. Others have established models that claim that the leader has no real power but is merely a bureaucratic necessity. According to Arendt he would be seen "not as a person but as a function" (Tucker, 1971, p.28). In this case the leader can be almost anyone and his personal characteristics are not particularly important. I believe that is very important to realize the function of the leader, and at the same time it is also of great importance to take into account his personal qualities. It may be possible to establish a personality cult with any leader but it would not be possible to establish one at a great level of intensity or of long duration if the leader himself is not well suited to bear the burden of a personality cult.

Because it is the position of this paper that the leader does more than fill a necessary part in a political machine, it is necessary to examine the personality traits and attributes of a leader that will allow him to have a successful cult. According to Tumarkin, Lenin's cult came about partially because Lenin was a good leader who was able to keep many of the promises which he made to the people. Even though during his lifetime Lenin discouraged (Lane, 1981, p.215) or at least failed to encourage his own exultation, he was none the less highly esteemed by most of the population and held in awe by many of them. During Lenin's long illness and the time just after his death, the party he left behind was able to easily manipulate the feelings of the population because

The Elements of a Personality Cult in a Stalinist State 9
Lenin had already reached the level of hero in the minds of the people (Tumarkin, 1983, p.92). The extent to which a leader is able to successfully project his attributes to the people plays a direct role in the success of the cult. These qualities include policies that demonstrate a nationalistic attitude and identification with historical heroes. It is necessary for the leader to identify with the struggles of the people, to understand and share their plight and to demonstrate basic qualities that are historically respected in leaders by the people. In a cult such as the one created following Lenin's death, the leader becomes the one to look to for the proper demonstration of these attributes. Because the leader has become this great example it could be nothing but an act of aggression toward him and the state to cast him in a negative light. It also would be wrong to call the policies of the leader a failure because he knows what is best. If there is a problem it is because the people are not working hard enough and are in general not committed to the country or, even worse, there are some who desire to sabotage the efforts of the leader. During Stalin's purge some were arrested for "suspicion of intending to betray the Native Land" (Medvedev, 1971, p.352), so even improper thoughts toward the regime can be a crime.
2.2.3 The Elite

The governmental elites, of course, play a major role in the acceptance and success of the Stalinist leader. In a system where oppression occurs in significant amounts there must exist some consent from sources other than the leader himself. The elite are the vehicle of the cult. As far as the ruling elite are concerned, the main purpose of the cult is control. The cult allows the many to be controlled by the few and allows the purposes of the few to be fulfilled. They help institute the policies of the leader and in turn their positions should remain secure.

2.2.4 The People

One final element that must be considered when discussing the personality cult is the people of the Stalinist state. Are there particular elements that make a people or a society able to accept a personality cult? Although two recurring characteristics of a Stalinist regime are a rather strict legal code and repressive police force, the people often subscribe to the notion of their deified leader and his policies for reasons other than fear. Tumarkin points out that even when a leader is particularly oppressive the people are still willing to accept what has happened and blame those under the leader for their lot. They believe that if the
leader were aware of their troubles he would put them to an end. Tumarkin traces this attitude back to the tsars and the concept of naive monarchism (1981, PP.7-8) which the people extended to Lenin (1981, pp.108-9). Medvedev claims that people also felt that Stalin was unaware of the situation either—"Many people felt that wreckers... had wormed their way into the NKVD, and were destroying the Party's best cadres without Stalin's knowledge" (Medvedev, 1971, pp.289-90).

Normally the leader and the elite which share the fruits of the cult are considered the beneficiaries of the cult. They receive the privileges and perks not afforded the everyday citizen. There are, however, benefits for the masses as well. According to Lane it would be wrong to view ritual only "as a strategy, adopted by the political elites, to maintain the social and political status quo..." (1983, p.33). While Lane is referring to the broader category of all rituals it is not difficult to see that this concept is transferable to the ritual of the personality cult. It seems that the personality cult gains acceptance because the people have a need to believe in it. In a poor society with little hope for the present, a leader who promises great things for the future is someone to cling to. Again according to Tumarkin on the reemergence of the Lenin cult in the 1960's: "The cult of Lenin aimed to inspire the populace by glorifying a legendary past that would assure the realization of a legendary
future-- and to cover the disappointments of present day life in the USSR" (1981, p.261).

2.2.5 Construction of the Cult

One of the final concerns of the personality cult is the actual building of it. It is rather obvious that propaganda and the media are important tools in the building of the cult. However, it is the propaganda methods used that are of real importance. It is important that the people can see elements in their current leader which are directly related to the past. Examples are a military leader who led the country to victory against an invading foe; or a ruler who was able to unify the country in a time of great unrest. Tumarkin comments that when attempting to gain the people's favor the Soviet government has resorted to utilizing the methods of the church, which she states is counter intuitive to the purpose of the government (1981, pp.230-1). In retrospect it is ironic to see Lenin portrayed in the style of religious icons, which he and his government would have even the memory of destroyed. By adding to the effective propaganda an element of fear, the personality cult in a Stalinist society may be efficiently held into place.
2.3 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to lay out the general elements of Stalinism and specifically to explain the concept of the personality cult. The remainder of the paper will be a comparative analysis of Stalin and Ceausescu of Romania. I will examine the extent to which Ceausescu fits the label of Stalinist leader who enjoys a personality cult and the success of his cult.
3.0 NICOLAE CeAUSeSCU

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will discuss the personal characteristics of Nicolae Ceausescu and how they relate to his personality cult. This analysis will include a short description of his rise to power as well as a survey of his time in office. The discussion will address particular elements of Ceausescu's personality and leadership style. I will explain the ways in which Ceausescu is involved in the propagation of the cult and how active a role he plays in it. I will also examine the image that is said to be portrayed by Ceausescu in his cult and to what extent he meets or fails to meet this image. In the conclusion of this chapter I will point out the significant differences and similarities in the persons of Ceausescu and Stalin as well as some conclusions that may be drawn from these results.

3.2 HISTORY

Nicolae Ceausescu has been the leader of Romania since 1965 when he took the reins from Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej upon his death in office. Ceausescu currently holds the following positions in the Romanian government: President of the Re-

Nicolae Ceausescu 15
public; President, Council of State; Chairman, Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development; President, National Council of Working People; Chairman, Front of Socialist Unity and Democracy (Shafir, 1985, p.99). If official titles are an indication, Ceausescu has his hand in all aspects of Romanian society.

Joining the Politburo in 1955 Nicolae Ceausescu was its youngest member. Ceausescu's role in the Dej government gave him great amounts of control over party appointments so that at the time of Dej's death he was not well known publicly but within the party itself he had already begun to build a power base (Fischer, 1982, p.10; Shafir, 1985, p.73). During the early sixties it became obvious to those in the government that Dej intended for either Ceausescu or Alexandru Draghici to replace him (Shafir, 1985, p.68). However, using a style that Ceausescu has learned to imitate, Dej kept every one guessing as to which it should be. In Dej's government Draghici was in charge of Romania's security forces while Ceausescu was given control of the party apparatus (Shafir, 1985, p.68). Ironically, it is speculated that after Dej's death the party backed Ceausescu over Draghici because they feared that Draghici's control of the security forces might give him too much power, more than they were willing that he should have (Shafir, 1985, pp.68,70).
3.3 _CEAUSESCU IN CHARGE_

3.3.1 Beginnings

The notion of an elite purge is an accepted aspect of a Stalinist regime, and Ceausescu is not an exception. When compared to Stalin, however, one might attribute to Ceausescu a kinder, gentler purge, because the assassination and imprisonment of rivals was not his main method. It was expected that Ceausescu's policies and plans would follow the course set by Gheorge-Dej; however, Ceausescu took gradual but specific steps to rid himself and Romania of "Dejism" and to establish his own power (Shafir, 1985, p.70). Above it is mentioned that Ceausescu began his rule in Romania in 1965, this is not exactly the case. In 1965 when Dej died the rule of the country was taken over by a party triumvirate, of which Ceausescu quickly emerged as the first among equals (Fischer, 1983, p.11). During the time of the triumvirate all of the power and consequent decisions were said to be of a collective nature; no one person was to wield great amounts of power. Although the power was shared within this triumvirate, Ceausescu's bid for power can be traced at least as far as the ninth party congress which was held in July of 1965 (Shafir, 1985, p.69). During this congress a committee was established to investigate the status of certain political activists arrested during the Dej regime. The
purpose of the investigation was to determine whether or not those who were arrested and imprisoned or executed by Dej had been treated in a legal manner. The real purpose was to discredit Dej as well as eliminate Ceausescu's opponents in the new government. The results of the investigation were not announced until 1967, when Ceausescu became the official leader of the country and had accumulated enough power to secure his position.

3.3.2 Accumulation of Power

The years 1965 to 1970 can be considered the foundational years of Ceausescu's regime, both in establishing his position firmly as head of Romania among the elite and giving his claim to power a basis in reality among the people (Fischer, 1983, pp.11-25). It was during this time that Ceausescu began and completed his purge of the Dej "old guard" along with any whom he felt were a threat to his establishment of power. This purge was accomplished through carefully stacking the political hierarchy with his supporters and was completed by making public the findings of the investigation mentioned above. Because of his age (Ceausescu was the youngest member of the Politburo in 1955) and somewhat unsure position as the emerging leader of Romania, Ceausescu found it more politically prudent to expand the existing bureaus and to promote his supporters into these positions, rather than to demote

Nicolae Ceausescu 18
his potential opponents already in positions of power. Ceausescu was able to weaken the power of some rivals by employing the rhetoric of collective leadership (Shafir, 1985, p.70). For example it was decided that if collective leadership was to be properly utilized then it would be wrong for any one person to hold both party and state level positions. This policy seemed to be reasonable and was not met with objections. The political utility of it was great for Ceausescu. Because he and his supporters were new they did not hold multiple positions of power, only his opponents, the Dejists. Foremost among these was Draghici who was weakened by this move, and when he was later denounced for illegal activity during Dej's reign he was unable to resist (Shafir, 1985, p.71). Once there was no longer a need to lean on the rhetoric of collectivized leadership these policies were dispensed with (Shafir, 1985, p.71) and Ceausescu as well as his supporters could begin to hold multiple positions. Ultimately through this purge Ceausescu was able to claim that Dej's rule had been contrary to the interests of socialism and of Romania. By declaring Dej's rule to be basically invalid Ceausescu was able to clear for himself a new slate to begin his own plans and policies, securing for himself the role of making Romania into a true socialist state.

During this five year period Ceausescu adopted positions, especially in regard to foreign policy and toward Romanian
nationalism which greatly endeared him to the general masses. The most significant of these policies was Ceausescu's response to the Soviet and Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968. Not only did Ceausescu refuse to commit Romanian troops to the invasion he also publicly denounced the Soviet Union for its actions. Ceausescu capitalized on this display of independence and claimed it as his own, even though Dej had also claimed an independent line. In fact in the early 1960's Dej presented the Romanian "Declaration of Independence" which stated Romania's independent line toward the Soviet Union. By denouncing the Soviet Union, Ceausescu was able to achieve several things. The first was to assert Romanian nationality; the struggle for unity in Romanian is centuries old. Along with appealing to the nationalism of Romania's citizens, Ceausescu was able to put forth the argument that Romania is an autonomous state developing socialism in a way particular to Romania. Ceausescu's claim was that the Soviet Union did not have the right to interfere with Romania or any other state which is on this path. If they did they would be guilty of standing in the way of the furthering of socialism. Because of this strong independent stance there existed a persistent fear that the Soviet Union would chose Romania as the next state which needed to be reminded of its power—"At the time, there were rumors throughout Romania that a Soviet invasion was imminent, and that shots had actually been ex-
changed across the USSR-Romanian border" (Fischer, 1983, p.22). Ceausescu, with the sentiments and loyalty of the people behind him, claimed that Romania was prepared to defend its borders in the face of certain defeat at the hands of the Russians. Although it will never be known if the pledge made by Romania to fight deterred the Soviet Union or if an invasion of Romania was never planned, many credit Ceausescu with holding them off. According to Mary Ellen Fischer:

Whatever the truth about Soviet intentions, the Romanian population perceived danger, and Ceausescu received the credit for averting invasion. ...

The most important result of August 1968 for Romania, then, was the immediate (and long-term) increase in Ceausescu's popularity. His defiant stand gained him the personal stature which no amount of economic achievement or diplomatic success could have given him. In some ways, Ceausescu's emotional speech in Bucharest on August 21 can be regarded as a gamble; provocative and dangerous it left no alternative but to fight and be defeated if the Soviets should choose to enter his country. But, at the same time, such a public statement leaving no room for retreat established the credibility of Ceausescu's resolve vis à vis the Soviets. And Ceausescu really had nothing to lose; even without the public defiance, an invasion by Soviet troops in 1968 would have meant an end to Ceausescu's personal power as it had to Dubcek's (Fischer, 1981, p.125).

The impact of Ceausescu's stance on the people was so great that he was able to maintain public popularity as the defender of Romania even in light of his domestic policies which caused great hardship on the people.
After 1969 Ceausescu was firmly established as the leader, having removed any real opponents from the political arena and surrounding himself with supporters. Ceausescu was pursuing a policy that was supported largely by the population and the party elites were content with their position. It is at this point, according to Mary Ellen Fischer, that "Ceausescu had the chance to become an authentic leader, worthy of imitation, with whom the citizens felt a close bond.... Unfortunately, Ceausescu's popularity in 1968 was based as much on expectations as on reality" (1981, p.126). At this point, however, Ceausescu's goals began to change from those of the people to a more specific, personal agenda. His new main purpose was to achieve financial and material self-sufficiency through massive industrialization and productivity. The people would surely have been in favor the increased productivity had it been used to enhance their standard of living; but Ceausescu's plan involved major national investment and the people's living standard actually began to decrease. Ceausescu noted this plan--

Of course, the development of industry, the building of new aggregate works, industrial complexes, factories and power stations, their endowment with modern technics have required and continue to require sustained material efforts from the whole people, and the allocation of a big portion of the country's national income (Newens, 1972, p.119).
As Ceausescu continues to implement his unpopular domestic policies and continuing to make them more rigorous, his popularity as a leader has faded drastically. In order to compensate for the disapproval of his economic plans Ceausescu attempts to turn to other areas to gain the people's support. Naturally, Ceausescu attempts to fall back on positions that have gained him popularity in the past. These are an independent and even defiant foreign policy vis a vis the Soviet Union and focussing on Romania as a completely Romanian nation. In order to enhance his policy of independence from the Soviet Union, Ceausescu has manipulated crisis situations with the Soviet Union. Fischer states:

Then, in late November [1978], came a crisis within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a crisis evidently publicized first by the Romanians themselves as they rejected the Soviet demand for an increase in military spending. ...No public Soviet-Romanian confrontation occurred until the end of November, when Ceausescu left the Warsaw pact meetings early and publicly voiced his refusal to comply with Soviet demands. Then, on his return to Bucharest, he immediately took steps to create the image of a crisis situation (1983, pp.133-4).

Fischer goes on to say that Ceausescu met with party officials, workers, intellectuals, youth and military representatives. Each of these groups as well as the different government bodies hailed Ceausescu for his victory. "Throughout this period Scinteia printed dozens of letters from citizens and groups expressing their full support for Ceausescu and his decisions" (Fischer, 1983, p.134). By creating the impression at home that he is standing up to the

Nicolae Ceausescu 23
Soviet Union on Warsaw Pact and Comecon matters, Ceausescu attempts to bring back the sentiment of 1968. Fischer states that this stance will only gain temporary approval from the people as "individuals of varying backgrounds have obviously become disenchanted with the sacrifice of concrete economic support from the Soviet Union in favor of a national independence that does not pay off in ways which immediately benefit the citizens" (1983, p.135).

3.4 PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Although it is not possible nor even particularly desirable to discuss all of the aspects of Ceausescu's leadership it is important to note those which seem to have a direct influence on his cult. According to Fischer Ceausescu's cult began its real formation in 1969 when Ceausescu's official policies began to differ significantly from the people's. Fischer states that when a leader is faced with clear differences in the expectations of the masses and his own goals, then, if he is not willing to change himself, he must take it upon himself to change the expectations of the people. According to Fischer there lies here a distinction between a charismatic leader "'who can woo them by the force of his own personality'" (1981, p.127) and one who must make up for his inability to win the people by fooling (and forcing) the people into following. Fischer claims that Ceausescu is of Nicolae Ceausescu
the latter kind. According to Fischer it is Ceausescu's style of leadership that makes it necessary for him to create a personality cult. Ceausescu is able to work well with party leaders and citizens on a small group level. He is able to impress his colleagues in the party and is known for having impromptu question and answer sessions with citizens on the street. And he also handles crisis situations well—TV coverage shows Ceausescu as being in confident control as he directs his underlings in the handling of different national emergencies. Crisis situations are, however, not the norm and Ceausescu's appeal to the people in a mass, official capacity is low.

When Ceausescu faces a large crowd, he becomes awkward and retreats into formality, reading speeches in a monotone, and underlining crucial phrases by unrhythmic first-pounding [sic.] with the stress all too often falling on the wrong word. He may have faith in his own abilities, and his own decisions but he does not have the ease and confidence in his relationship with the masses that is a prerequisite for authentic mass leadership (Fischer, 1981, p. 127).

Because Ceausescu is unable to close the gap between the desires of the people and his own policy his personality cult was formed. "Ceausescu and his colleagues had to create an idol to be obeyed, an image which would mobilize the popular support which regime goals and Ceausescu's personality could not support" (Fischer, 1981, p. 127).

Ceausescu is very active in his personality cult. It is required of any official when he gives a speech to mention Ceausescu and his accomplishments. When Ceausescu has offi-
cial photographs taken he is pictured wearing a mantel and holding a scepter. Ceausescu often points to his humble peasant roots and his first experience with capitalistic exploitation at the age of eleven. Upon the death of his mother an article appeared in Scinteia (Romania's official newspaper) in which she was honored for an exemplary life as a Romanian citizen and especially for giving birth to the "great statesman" (Fischer, 1981, p.128). Ceausescu is presented to the people as unselfish, high in stamina and courageous. He is said to have a hatred of injustice (Fischer, 1981, p.128). Some of these qualities are borne out in Ceausescu's daily life. "His schedule of public activities is formidable, and well publicized in books, in newspapers and on television. The evening news usually carries ten minutes of video tape relating only to Ceausescu's activities" (Fischer, 1981, p.129). He is hard-working and in his office every morning before eight. He is on the spot during crisis situations and will meet citizens on the street and discuss their problems with them.¹ Ceausescu's image portrays him as adhering strictly to socialist values and having inscrutable morals. He is omniscient and omnipresent, and although people might hope to be like him,

¹ Although discourse is encouraged it behooves a citizen not to make his complaints too specific and especially not to blame Ceausescu for any problem which he might have.
it is impossible for any to imitate the person he presents. Fischer observes that

\[ n \]o one could be quite so brilliant, courageous, hard-working, unselfish and honest as Ceausescu is supposed to be. He has indeed become so perfect that he cannot be emulated; rather than an example to be imitated, Ceausescu has indeed become an idol to be obeyed (Fischer, 1981, p.130).

In contrast to the image as Romania's first citizen of socialism, Ceausescu is given an historic and in some ways royal part to play as well. Ceausescu frequently identifies himself with famous leaders as Michael the Brave and Stephen the Great who are seen as great unifiers and sustainers of Romania (Newens, 1972, pp.91,93). Ceausescu has been received by many states around the world and the people are proud of the way that they are represented by Ceausescu. It is interesting that the people perceive Ceausescu's highest honor as his visit with the queen of England. He was royalty being welcomed by royalty (Fischer, 1981, p.131). It is apparent that the different aspects of Ceausescu's cult have been established to appeal to particular sectors of society. However, by attempting to appeal to all he may end up alienating one sector as he reaches another.

Although it may not be easy question to answer, it will be interesting to discuss the image that Ceausescu has of himself. Ceausescu very much sees himself as a patriarchic figure of Romania. He views himself as their protector and as the example to be emulated. When speaking about Romania

Nicolae Ceausescu
Ceausescu gives credit to the RCP, of which he is the head, and high honor to leaders of the past, whose position he is now in (Newens, 1972, pp.91-3). It is not unreasonable to assert that he is putting himself on the level of these famous leaders, and taking credit for the achievements of the party. From all accounts he is a hard working overachiever who is willing to expend himself to meet his goals. He does not understand why it is that the average Romanian is not the same way. Ceausescu has written volumes expounding on his knowledge of all things political; these works are a sort of Romanian bible (Fischer, 1983, p.25). Ceausescu identifies with the image of royalty and greatness and sees himself as the man about whom Romania rotates. One indication of this might be Ceausescu's reaction to North Korea and its leader Kim Il-sung. According to Kenneth Jowitt:

In North Korea Ceausescu found a country and regime whose ethos and organization he could be expected to appreciate: a regime focused on and seemingly unified around one man; ...a regime that simultaneously emphasized economic self-reliance, national independence and the right to innovate in the realm of theory. ...Kim's regime is a model of hierarchical unification and organizational compression: precisely the direction in which Ceausescu has been moving the Romanian regime. ...During his visit there [Ceausescu] arrived at a "full unity of views" with his "beloved friend" Kim Il-sung... (Jowitt, 1974, p.134).

Presently in Romania it is safe to say that the control of Ceausescu is waning or at least that he is finding it necessary to expend greater amounts of energy to keep it intact (Fischer, 1983, p.48).
3.5 CONCLUSION

What significant similarities may be found in the lives and the cults of Nicolae Ceausescu and Joseph Stalin, and what conclusions may be drawn from such a comparison? Both leaders needed to overcome the shadow and the influence of their predecessor and both did so to varying degrees. This was achieved first taking advantage of anything left behind by the leader and then separating from him. Of course, in the midst of this similarity there are also great differences. Although Stalin was eventually able to put some distance between himself and Lenin, he needed to rely on the image of Lenin to legitimize his own cult. According to Lane:

Once the immediate crisis following Lenin's death was resolved and political continuity was assured, the pitch of the Lenin cult fell considerably for a few years. It was revived again only when Stalin had been in power for some time. Then Lenin's charisma became exploited to legitimize and exalt Stalin's position in Soviet society (1981, p.217).

Ceausescu, on the other hand, was basically able to dispense with Dej after five years of party rule. In order for Stalin to emerge as the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union, he needed Lenin's approval; that is the people needed to believe that Lenin wanted Stalin to be their leader. Ceausescu did not need to benefit from any legend of Dejism, but did need at least some support from the Dejist old guard to gain and maintain his power. Once Ceausescu was firmly in power he

Nicolae Ceausescu
could be done with Dej and any of Dej's senior members who were more likely to be opponents rather than supporters. For Stalin the need existed to show some independence from Lenin but at the same time to concur with him. It is interesting that Stalin needed Lenin's approval desperately, but Lenin more than likely would not have chosen Stalin as his successor (Medvedev, 1971, p.25; Nove, 1975, p.28). Ceausescu had Dej's approval at least as a front runner for Romania's top position yet he turned on his benefactor as soon as it was a politically prudent and advantageous move.

Previously the utilization of the purge was mentioned. Once again there exist some general similarities and specific differences in Ceausescu and Lenin. The Stalin purge lasted for years and extended itself from the elite and the military into every aspect of society. No one was safe from the terror of Stalin. To be singled out by the Stalin machine meant prison or death or both. The purge of Ceausescu is, however, of a two pronged nature. The purge takes place on the elite level for Ceausescu's personal political longevity. There also exists on the level of the masses a purge with nationalistic and ethnic motivations. The latter aspect of the purge will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. As mentioned earlier the main fear of Ceausescu's purge of the elite was not death but loss of power and also public denunciation and humiliation (Fischer, 1981, pp.129-30; Shafir, 1985, pp.82-3).
With regard to the personal characteristics and goals of the two leaders there exist some definite similarities. Ceausescu and Stalin both aspired to become the supreme leader of their respective countries and both were able to succeed in this quest. Both Stalin and Ceausescu desired to be the first to bring about complete socialism in their country. Both attempted to make their countries secure through massive internal production and high levels of national investment. The domestic policies and internal control of Ceausescu are said to mimic more closely those of Stalin than any other East European leader (Fischer, 1982, p.48). It is an interesting development that the foreign policy of Ceausescu is to steer clear of Soviet Union influence and his domestic policies are very similar to the Soviet Union's most notorious leader.

Of all the similarities that may be listed about the two leaders that have been considered, the intense personality cult is the greatest. Each leader has been portrayed in a state of greatness that neither they nor any other can actually achieve. Both have been elevated to a level of pseudo-deification and derive their power largely from the image they present. The next two chapters will discuss the people and the leadership/bureaucracy and how they relate, respond and react to the cult of Ceausescu.
4.0 BUREAUCRACY IN AN ANTI-BUREAUCRACY STATE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The government of Romania is the machine in which Ceausescu is the main cog-wheel. The purpose of this chapter is to study the machine in order to examine its role in the leadership of the country. One of the main points of the discussion will be the role played by the government in Ceausescu's cult, and to determine whether the cult is manipulated as a tool by the government or if the government is actually subject to the whim and dictate of the cult. In this chapter the top officials of both party and state will be examined. This part of the analysis will emphasize who holds these positions and what significance their choice by Ceausescu holds. The authority that they hold, their role in the cult, as well as their goals and their ability to realize these goals will also be examined. Lastly, the conclusion will sum up any relevant findings as well as make comparison's between the governments of Romania and Stalin's USSR.
4.2 DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

4.2.1 The Romanian Communist Party

When Nicolae Ceausescu took the reins of Romania one of his tactical maneuvers was to rename the Romanian Worker's Party the Communist Party of Romania. He then stated that the party was a continuation of the Communist Party which had been formed in 1921. By doing this Ceausescu was able to identify himself with the historic roots of the party as well as remove from Dej the title of founding father of the party. Dej's claim is invalidated because the party he founded technically no longer exists (Shafir, 1985, p.70).

Just as with the government, the prescribed function of the party is different than its actual operation. The supreme body of the party is the Party Congress which is elected at the regional level at least every five years. At these times the Congress adopts programs and most importantly elects the Central Committee (CC) and the Central Audit Commission. Once these are elected the Congress delegates its authority to the CC for the remainder of the time that it is in existence. It is the job of the CC to elect the Political Executive Committee (EC) and the Central Committee Secretariat. In reality the CC is given a list of pre-selected names which they are expected to approve. The EC and the Secretariat are two of the most important members of Bureaucracy in an Anti-Bureaucracy State.
the party; they are joined by a third, the nine member Permanent Bureau, which is chosen by the EC. The EC is considered the party policy maker, the Secretariat the policy enforcer and the Permanent Bureau a high level decision maker. The EC is probably the most important of the three as it chooses the Permanent Bureau and reviews the work of the Secretariat. It is not particularly important to determine which branch is the most important since there exists a great amount of overlap between the three groups.

When Ceausescu recreated the Communist Party in 1965, he was able to capitalize on some of the decisions and appointments that he made while a member of the Politburo. Prior to Ceausescu the party hierarchy included a Politburo as the top branch; the CC was next. Ceausescu replaced the Politburo with a standing presidium and the EC was added as an intermediary body between the standing presidium and the CC (Shafir, 1985, p.71). The standing presidium was composed of seven members which had all been part of the Politburo. The new EC, except for three new members, also took its membership from the Politburo. However, Ceausescu also created a ten member candidate branch of the EC into which he promoted his supporters. The Secretariat was split with four from the Dej camp and four new members. Earlier it was stated that Ceausescu's policy was to promote rather than demote in order to gain support. Shafir states, "Out of twenty-seven new members elected between 1965 and 1969 to the leading
party organs, not one was demoted until April 1972" (1985, p.72). By 1969 the EC had been expanded to twenty-one full members and eleven candidates, while only two were added from the Dej "old guard". The party Secretariat had no Dejists and the Standing Presidium only three, including Ceausescu. Through death, denunciation and retirement the Dejist influence was gradually stripped away and Ceausescu's supporters were infused into the party (Shafir, 1985, pp.71-2).

4.2.2 Party and State

In 1965 in an effort to promote democratic centralism and collective leadership, it was decided that no one should hold both a party and a state office. Ceausescu was designated party leader, Dej's position as Chairman of the Council of State was taken over by another of the elite. The position of Prime Minister remained unchanged. Some of the elite were effected by this change in rules. Draghici, for instance gave up the position of Minister of the Interior (Shafir, 1985, p.71). Shafir speculates that the main purpose of this policy change was to weaken the power of the "old guard" (Shafir, 1985, p.70). In 1967 these statutes were changed. At this point, with Ceausescu taking the lead, top party and state positions were filled by the same men, further consolidating the number who held power in Romania. According to Shafir the plan to reverse these statutes was cloaked in

Bureaucracy in an Anti-Bureaucracy State
rhetoric which suggested that collective leadership would be strengthened. "The 'innovation' was formulated in terms suggesting that the transition to de facto personal rule signified Central Committee (i.e., widely collective) control of social and state activity" (1985, p.71).

It is important now to see to what extent the party and state overlap as well as to see what has become of collective leadership.² The Grand National Assembly is referred to as the supreme body of the state; this is only a title as the real power of legislative initiative lies with the CC and the Council of Ministers. It should also be noted that approximately half of the CC's membership belong to the GNA. The Council of State as mentioned, is elected from within the GNA, so it also has the opportunity to be largely represented by the CC. Since 1974 when Ceausescu created and filled the position of President of the Republic, one of his duties has been to act as president of the Council of State. Basically Ceausescu is able to violate the jurisdiction of the Council of State by making decisions and issuing decrees that are supposed to be made by the collective body. The Council of Ministers are also not quite as they appear. Shafir breaks the Council into three parts and explains how much of the council's organization is set up to maintain the governmental...

² For a brief explanation of the governmental structure, see Appendix A.
rhetoric. The first level is comprised of the prime minister and his deputies, obviously positions of authority. According to Shafir:

The second category is made up of leaders of public and administrative organizations whom special legislation designates as members of the government. Finally, a third category comprises the chairpersons of a number of mass organizations who belong ex-officio to the forum.

Representation of the latter two categories in the Council of Ministers is supposed to constitute an example of democratization and participation. In reality, it is but one more example of both party domination and party familialization, for many of the organizations allegedly representing broad social interests are either joint party-state bodies or mass organizations, headed by prominent members of the party leadership and/or the Ceausescu family. The Romanian mechanism of simulated change thus legitimizes the holding of multiple positions in state and party structures. Not only is such "blending" no longer said to be a "deviation" from the principles of "collective leadership", but it supposedly epitomizes the party's constant consultation with the strata of society.

The structure of the government is therefore a clear illustration of the institutionalized discrepancy between form and content. [The councils] are instruments of party control over the production process (1985, p.98).

By 1969 the Secretariat was free from all Dejist, and dominated by Ceausescu's top party members.

4.2.3 Current Composition of Government

The mechanism for party supervision at all levels is to be ensured in the "Multilaterally developed socialist society" by "take-over from within", i.e. on one hand by the "blending" of party and state organs and on the other by the simulative device of "participation" through mass organizations or other structures which the party dominates (Shafir, 1985, p. 95).
Now that the structure and function of the Romanian govern-
ment has been established, it is important to see how this
party/state overlap has evolved, as well as who holds these
vital positions in the Romanian leadership. Today in the
Ceausescu government, the party and therefore the state is
stacked with supporters and family members.

Since 1967, Ceausescu has been promoting family members
into the governmental hierarchy. He was able to promote his
family because the new leadership was willing to support his
decisions (Fischer, 1983, p.49; Shafir, 1985, pp.77-80).
These include first his wife Elena, his son Nicu, other of
his children in lesser roles and members of his extended
family. This policy of family and supporter promotion can
preclude the promotion of the best for the job.

To replace the coterie of advisors built up by Dej,
Ceausescu began a policy of promoting members of his
extended family, on whom he could place greater reli-
ance. Around two dozen individuals related to
Ceausescu by blood ties or by marriage occupied posts
of varying importance, among them his wife Elena. The
problem with this policy was that family reliability
was not a substitute for ability (Schoepflin, 1982,
p.150).

Apparently as Ceausescu's cult has grown so has his policy
of promoting his family and cadre rotation. Through the
sixties the policy emphasized promotion, while the seventies
ushered in the policy of leadership rotation. According to
Fischer:

*Personnel manipulation* changed from promotion to cir-
culation of Ceausescu's supporters. Individuals moved
back and forth between the Party Secretariat and the

Bureaucracy in an Anti-Bureaucracy State 38
Council of Ministers, and also from Bucharest to regional posts or the reverse. ...

Several factors about personnel manipulation during this period are important to note. (1) Changes often seem arbitrary. Individuals in the circulating elite tend to be generalists, party activists, who may focus on a particular sector such as agriculture, culture or foreign trade, but who are just as likely to shift from one sector to another. They are presumably valuable to Ceausescu for their personal loyalty, and also for their ability to mobilize and motivate others rather than for their technical expertise. (2) Changes are frequent. Two to four years seems to be the usual length of service in any one office. No one has time to build a power base from which to challenge Ceausescu. ... (1981, pp. 34-5).

Fischer also notes that while Ceausescu's manipulation of these posts continued and increased he continued to make provisions to keep the elite support—"He would allow the new political elite to maintain its privileges and not threaten them as Khrushchev mistakenly had done in the USSR with his educational and Bureaucratic reforms" (Fischer, 1983, p.38).

When dealing with the promotion of his family Ceausescu does not state it as such but normally begins a special program aimed at the sector of society to which the family member to be promoted belongs. Shafir gives examples involving Elena and Nicu.

Romania's first family appears to have a direct impact on the social structure of the party. At the CC plenum that elected Elena Ceausescu to membership on the EC her husband emphasized the role played by women in Romanian society and economy, adding that the structure of the party hitherto satisfactorily reflected the proportion of women...

Approximately at the same time as the party leader began to emphasize the need for better representation of women in the RCP, the issue of "party rejuvenation" began to be raised as well... Just as Elena Ceausescu's promotion coincided with the seemingly "affirmative
action" directed towards recruitment of women into the party, so the promotion of younger cadres appears to be linked with the rising star of the family, Nicu Ceausescu, one of the "steering couple's" three children (1985, pp.76-7).

In 1984 all thirteen of the members of the Permanent Bureau held at least one state or joint party/state position. Ceausescu led the way with five, while most held two or three positions. At least one of Ceausescu's brothers-in-law and three of his brothers play prominent roles in the government. According to Shafir:

It is almost impossible to provide a complete list of Ceausescu's kin promoted through the framework of family power consolidation. Among the more prominent figures, however, are Gheorge Petrescu, Elena Ceausescu's brother, who has been a deputy prime minister since 1982, as well as Chairman of the Section for Transportation and Communication of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development, a body apparently particularly fortunate to have so many members of the family in leading positions; Nicolae A. Ceausescu a brother of the party leader, who since 1983 has held the rank of Lieutenant General in the Ministry of the Interior; Ilie Ceausescu, yet another brother, appointed during the same year Deputy Minister of Defense and head of the Higher Political Council of the Romanian Army, after having previously risen in the field of official historiography, and better known in the west as Dr. Ilie Ceausescu, a specialist in military history; and Ioan Ceausescu, yet another brother, who is vice-chairman of the State planning commission, and since 1983 also Vice-Chairman of the Council of Forestry (Shafir, 1985, p.78).

It is important to realize that the inclusion of the Ceausescu family into the ruling network does not necessarily guarantee them political safety. Ceausescu's own political health comes before his family's especially those other than
his wife and perhaps his son, Nicu. Commenting on the de-
motion of some members of the Ceausescu family Shafir states:

Even so, the demotions of 1982 were a shrewd move, once
more demonstrating that Ceausescu's skills as a poli-
tical manoeuverer are quite remarkable. By taking
action against his own kin, the president wished to
demonstrate, as he put it in a speech delivered at the
conclusion of the CC plenum, that "no one can be al-
lowed to encroach upon the law", thereby reinforcing
his own righteous image as an impartial and Draconic
ruler, cast in a contemporary reincarnation of the na-
tional hero, Vlad the Impaler. By so doing, he was
shifting blame away, not only from himself, but also
from the party... (1985, pp.78-9).

In the 1980s, Romania has faced several crises which have
worked together to further deteriorate the country's economic
condition and to generally make things more difficult for
elite and worker alike. During the 1970s, Romania's industry
was largely centered around refined oil products which made
them heavily dependent on crude. In the late 1970s, Romania
went into serious debt as crude oil prices rose while the
price for refined products remained stable or dropped. This
placed Romania in heavy debt just as western banks were ex-
periencing a lack of confidence in East European countries' re-
liability; the banks were therefore uncooperative in loan
rescheduling. Several seasons of bad weather as well as ag-
ricultural mismanagement caused great food shortages.

Such a high emphasis had been placed on industrialization
that agricultural workers were few and lacked incentive
to increase production.
Fischer explains Ceausescu's response to the crises vis a vis the governmental elite:

In responding to the crisis, Ceausescu had not returned to the rhetoric of collective leadership so vehement in 1965. Instead the personality cult is stronger than ever. Ceausescu remains infallible and omniscient; mistakes are the fault of officials who have not followed his instructions. ...And he is taking some steps to back up his rhetoric: more top level officials have been removed in disgrace than in any other period of Ceausescu's rule except 1968-1969. There is no longer security for Ceausescu's appointees. In fact, the circulation of individuals has speeded up. ...The ministries which have suffered most have been in the sectors of mining and petroleum, agriculture, and foreign trade, but changes have been made in other areas and criticism has not always been followed by the removal of implicated officials. Demotions are therefore unpredictable, often arbitrary, and seem to depend on the personal whims of Ceausescu himself. Hence he has abandoned any pretense at institutionalizing the political process, but rather has increased its personalization. An individual's security and promotion depend on placating Ceausescu (1983, pp.41-2).

Because of the desirability of maintaining the status quo, it is a fair conclusion that at least publicly, the goals of Ceausescu and the ruling elite are basically the same. Ceausescu issues the decrees and the party carries them out through its hierarchy. Although it is not reasonable to expect that the elite act only out of devotion to Ceausescu, they do work to fulfill the goals which Ceausescu sets forth. As mentioned earlier, besides continuing to be the unquestioned leader of Romania, Ceausescu's main goal is to create an independent, autarkic, Socialist, Romanian nation. Ceausescu often speaks of these goals in various speeches, for example:
Life proves that for a long time to come cooperation among States will have to be based on the principle of independent development... By asserting here... the decision of our people to unflinchingly go along the road to socialist construction, to the steadily raising [of] the material and spiritual well-being of our Homeland, we swear that we shall do our utmost to make socialism and communism triumph in Romania. Nothing on earth will divert us from fulfilling this historic mission which the Romanian Communist Party—the leading force of our entire nation—has set for itself (Newens, 1972, pp.93, 130).

The elite give incredible lip service to the pre-eminence of Ceausescu (Fischer, 1981, p.126). In speeches and official writings he is constantly praised for his accomplishments; Ceausescu is given credit for the successful leadership of Romania. When failure occurs, although his position will not be guaranteed, if one has any desire to retain his position among the elite, he must be quick to accept the blame and to explain that if Ceausescu's directives had been followed correctly, the problems would not have occurred. Shafir cites an example where this line was deviated from by one of Ceausescu's deputies:

As with many other former Ceausescu proteges, he was eventually subjected to the "rotation of cadres" mechanism, occupying different positions, his last post being that of Minister of Mines, Oil and Geology, a portfolio to which he was appointed in December 1979. Following repeated manifestations of unrest among miners, as well as the non-fulfillment of energy targets, which were accompanied by the common practice of reporting more coal than actually extracted, the party leader attempted to shift the blame to his deputies. He therefore "reorganized" the ministry headed by Trofin, who was removed from office and appointed Chairman of the Central Council of Artisans' Cooperatives. Had he sagely followed the practice of taking the blame upon himself and paying some self-critical lip-service, it is safe to say that Trofin
would have suffered no further damage, for the September 1981 ministerial "reorganization" left his membership in the PEC untouched. ...Trofin apparently refused to comply with the practice and absolve Ceausescu himself of responsibility. Consequently, he was expelled from the Central Committee, losing his seat in the Grand National Assembly as well (1985, p.83).

In order to help achieve the goals of Ceausescu, efficient implementation of the policies must take place. In order for these plans to work, cooperation, no matter how it is motivated, must take place on all levels, both national and local. Implementation of policies on the local level take place through the initiative of party-run mass organizations, which communicate to the people the will of the party (Shafir, 1985, pp.100-2). The specific policies include the massive urbanization of the population for the purpose of unity and land reclamation as well as the streamlining of the educational system. Propagating the intense nationalism of Ceausescu is also of prime importance. Elites must do their jobs successfully but not show too much initiative or take too many decisions upon themselves.

4.3 CONCLUSION

4.3.1 Summary of Elite Structure

In this chapter the discussion has, not surprisingly, described a highly centralized bureaucracy, which in its official form is ultimately centered on one man. The government
gives lip service to the notion of the people having major input into their own governing. Instead what actually exists is that the so-called supreme Grand National Assembly is the weakest of all the governmental bodies, and the decision making is in the hands of only a few.

Ceausescu has taken advantage of his various positions in the government in order to create the current situation. This was accomplished first through the promotion of supporters and next through the, of late rapid, rotation of the political elite. Cooperation among the Romanian elite has been a characteristic of the government since the late 1950's when Dej began the initial push for independence (Shafir, 1985, p.67). Since Ceausescu has assumed the leadership of the party the relationship between Ceausescu and the elite has been one of mutualism—they need each other. The state is not able to function because of Ceausescu, nor is Ceausescu only in his position because of the state, but they each exist as a function of the other. The question of power and who is enabled to rule by whom has become more of an issue as the policies become more of a burden. Originally the Romanian elite placed the authority to lead in Ceausescu's hands, as it was to their advantage to do so. The question that only time will answer is whether Ceausescu has taken sufficient advantage of the power given him to retain his position as the elites have fewer and fewer reasons to grant their approval of his rule. Fischer argues that Ceausescu
has created a safe, if tentative position by keeping the possibility of an opposition power base to a minimum (1983, pp.44-5).

### 4.3.2 Stalinist Bureaucracy

When reviewing the careers of Ceausescu and Stalin they should be credited with both shrewdness and foresight. Both had obstacles to overcome in the form of political opponents who had at least as much claim to the position to which Ceausescu and Stalin aspired. Ceausescu's opponents were Draghici and the old Dejists, while Stalin had to deal with the likes of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev to name a few. The discussion that follows will show that Stalin and Ceausescu used very similar means to build their elite and that through this elite they were able to maintain their power.

When comparing the development of the elite in the governments of Stalin and Ceausescu some very close similarities may be noted. Just like Ceausescu⁴, Stalin's power came from within the party rather than the state; he therefore launched his attack from the party. In 1922 Lenin appointed Stalin to head the Party Secretariat (Nove, 1975, p.27). Stalin

---

⁴ Ceausescu's rise to and maintenance of power are discussed in chapter 3.0 as well as earlier in this chapter.
began building his power base at this time by taking advantage of his position. According to Nove: "The Secretariat's power to shift members around could be and was being used to pack key committees, to send off to remote provinces anyone who spoke out of turn or who threatened Stalin's grip on party organs" (1975, p.27). In this way both Ceausescu (Fischer, 1983, p.10) and Stalin (Nove, 1975, p.28) were able to appoint loyal followers into positions of power. It would be false to state that either Stalin or Ceausescu, at the death of their predecessors, held supreme power. But it is true that their power was significant, and that it was enhanced by their ability to form a base of supporters prior to their bid for power. After coming to power it was necessary for Stalin and Ceausescu to maintain the status they had achieved with or without the consent of the elite. Ceausescu used elite rotation, which began partially as a device for promotion and had the approval of the elite. As Ceausescu has become less sure of his position the rotation has sped up and demotions have become more frequent. Stalin maintained his power by removing any actual or potential threats to his power (Nove, 1975, pp.52-3). By the end of his life Stalin had "destroyed the party as an organism capable of thought and discussion" (Nove, 1975, p.112). Stalin had reduced the party to a group of supporters who obeyed him and told him only what he wanted to hear (Nove, 1975, p.112). In the regimes of Stalin and Ceausescu there ultimately ex-
isted an elite which gained their position by supporting the leaders. The leaders in turn retained their power partially through the elite's continued support, and partially by removing any threat of power from among the elite.
5.0 THE PEOPLE, THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE CULT

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Throughout this paper one of the major goals has been to strike an accurate balance between the power of Ceausescu and the other factors which allow him the power he wields. So far the discussion has included Ceausescu himself as well as the government through which he operates. In this final chapter about the mechanics and specifics of Romania, I will discuss the Romanian people. The goal of this chapter is to characterize the Romanians as a national personality in an attempt to discover the elements beyond force which make them compliant participants in the Ceausescu cult. Mainly through the discussion of Romanian history the attitude of Romanians toward their plight will be formulated. Once this attitude is defined it will be applied to the Ceausescu era. The concluding section will be, once again, a comparison of the relevant aspects of the worker of Stalin's Soviet Union and of Romania. Identification with past heroes and great leaders is an important part of the people's culture and therefore an important aspect of Ceausescu's personality cult. This section of the discussion will deal mainly with relevant leaders in order to make best use of this fact. By under-
standing the type of leader that Romanians identify with some clues as to their personality as a nation may be discovered.

5.1.1 Implications of History

One of the dominant appeals of Nicolae Ceausescu's personality cult is to the people's sense of national pride and to the pride they have in their historic leaders (Shafir, 1985, pp.51-2). When examining the heroes of Romanian history it is very interesting to note the characteristics of leadership that gain a figure notoriety and praise. It seems that, especially during medieval times, victory in battle would be the most important element of a leader's record. This, however, does not appear to be the case when examining Romania's historical heroes. On the contrary, the most outstanding characteristics for a Romanian leader are political shrewdness and pragmatism. According to Giurescu--

The prolonged wars waged by the Romanian countries against the Ottomans, with the great human sacrifices they entailed, finally resulted in the maintenance of their entity as states. For, although Mircea the Old had to recognize the sultan's suzerainty in the end, although Stephen the Great after twenty years of tremendous efforts had to come to the same conclusion, their struggle had not been in vain: Wallachia and Moldavia preserved their entire state organization and full autonomy as regards internal government.... The maintenance of state entity made it possible for the Romanian people to further develop, to have an administration of their own, a ruling section and an army, a lively trade and a many-sided culture... (1971, p.60).
Another quality of a leader which is of major importance is the leader's role in the unification of Romania. Any leader who was able to preserve the autonomy of one or more of the principalities or further their unification is highly regarded. It is important to realize that Ceausescu claims these characteristics for himself by identifying with these leaders. In a typical speech Ceausescu stated:

We honor Basarab and Bogdan, Mircea and Stephen the Great, Ioan and so many other ruling princes... who were all good organizers of armies, good organizers of our people in its struggle for independence. We honour them not as feudal lords but as men ahead of their times who sacrificed everything to drive away foreign oppressors from the ancestral land (Newens, 1972, p.91).

When reading descriptions of Ceausescu one finds that both his proponents and opponents consider him to be a very shrewd leader. Ceausescu has been able to gain favor and favors from many areas of the political spectrum. Romania has received benefits from the USSR, the US and the UN. Many feel that Ceausescu's knowledge of politics and his ability to analyze political situations has allowed him to push his political clout to the limit without experiencing significant backlash from it. Ceausescu has also embraced the Romanian unity/Romanian nation idea. His desire is to create a Romania that is one nationality and one united people. Appealing to the idea of unity on one occasion Ceausescu stated:

You well know that in the fighting forces of Stephen the Great the Moldavian peasants were always in the
forefront; they were those who helped both Stephen the Great and the other Moldavian ruling princes to defend our national identity, to carry through the national unity of our people (Newens, 1972, p.93).

Although many oppose the methods he uses to accomplish this desire, the idea still stirs the national pride of the people.

Finally, today's Romania has centuries of political trends to serve as reminders of its political position. Romania has come to the (perhaps correct) conclusion that it has no real allies in its neighbors but only varying degrees of enemies. Historically any state who has aided Romania has done it for the opportunity to exploit Romania. This lesson has been well learned by Romania and has helped to shape its policies of today. This realization also helps Ceausescu have more control over the people. The idea of a pure Romanian nation is more acceptable to them, no matter how difficult it might be to achieve, when they believe that they have no friends other than themselves.

5.1.2 Conditions Today

The above discussion has given an historical background for the purpose of examining the characteristics and attitudes of the Romanian people. The next step is to apply these attitudes to Romania today. This will be done by discussing

The People, the Beneficiaries of the Cult 52
the position of the citizen and the conditions under which he lives.

As is mentioned above the main economic emphasis of Romania is to invest high levels (up to one third) of the national production in order to prepare the country for future consumption. This economic policy dictates that at best the workers standard of living is stagnant and at worst declining to dismal levels. During the 1980's conditions have apparently continued to degenerate as the policies have become harsher. Faced with a large national debt it was decided that the people should pay the bill and Romania's economy became an almost complete export economy. Not only are household luxuries mostly unavailable but necessities such as bread and meat and milk are rationed and long lines must be endured to obtain them. Energy usage for private purposes is strictly rationed with limits on heat, electricity and gasoline. In some towns gas and electricity are on only during certain times of the day. Television programming is usually only available for two hours a day and it is not unusual for as much as half of that time to be devoted to Ceausescu. Trond Gilberg writes:

It is very serious; there are now shortages of bread, meat, fruits and vegetables. Thus, General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu has launched a campaign to "educate" the citizenry about a "scientific" diet with much lower calorie intake, in which the consumption of meat is reduced drastically.

These problems are compounded by the severe energy crisis that has hit Romania in the 1980's. The regime's dramatic measures to combat this problem include
the periodic shut-off of electrical power both to in-
dustrial and to residential quarters and the "sug-
gestion" that citizens turn off their refrigerators
entirely, especially during the winter months. These
"suggestions" have been enforced by vigilante squads
whose members arrogantly and threateningly enter pri-
vate apartments to enforce compliance (1984, p.375).

As it was mentioned in chapter 3.0, when Ceausescu de-
nounced the Soviet Union in 1968, he was hailed as a hero and
as the defender of Romania. However, today he clutches
somewhat at contrived circumstances as an attempt to maintain
this sentiment. Feelings of nationality still exist, but it
is doubtful that anyone continues to view Ceausescu in the
same light as in 1968. The people participate in the na-
tional holidays surrounding Ceausescu and his wife, not out
of enthusiasm but obedience. The presence of the Securitate
adds a fear and paranoia to the every day worker's life. This
fear and a desire for economic gain have turned citizen
against citizen; it is estimated that one in three citizens
report to the police. There is little positive effect that
is derived from the cult by the people.

Another point to examine is the existence of dissent. Any
type of organized dissent, cases of which are few, have been
dealt with promptly and sometimes brutally. Discontent in
Romania is usually grumbled away quietly rather than voiced
in an organized form. Fischer claims that there is little
likelihood of organized mass revolt for the future. She
considers the political style of Ceausescu to be one of the
reasons that attempts at organization may be stymied.

The People, the Beneficiaries of the Cult 54
Ceausescu mixes threats and promises. He manipulates citizens' fears, their selfish interest in economic rewards, and their altruistic nationalism, to neutralize any opposition and prevent the alliance of interests that has produced mass revolt elsewhere in Eastern Europe (1983, pp.47-8). Fischer also relates an instance to support her argument:

Ceausescu has preempted any trade union activity before it could start except for a strike of coal miners in the Jiu Valley during the summer of 1977. He then demonstrated his political skill by combining carrot and stick: he promised to accede to many demands, and did in fact raise living standards temporarily in the vicinity; but as soon as the miners went back to work, he arrested the major leaders and sent them to prison for long terms. This successfully discouraged further strikes by showing miners that it was disastrous to lead such an action (1983, p.46).

Along with the successful utilization of the above mentioned method there also seems to be a lack of cohesion between and within the classes. It is not hard to understand that there is little cooperation between the working classes as there is no real way to tell who one's friends are. There is little or no cooperation between intellectuals and workers either, an element which has existed in organized revolts in other Eastern European states: Fischer cites Hungary in 1956 and Poland in 1970 as examples (1983, p.46).

5.2 ETHNICITY IN ROMANIA

One significant aspect of the Romanian personality is its very diverse ethnic culture. Among Romania's ethnic groups
are Germans, Gypsies and Hungarians. The Hungarian group is by far the largest and the most problematic. The discussion which follows will give a summary of Romania's ancient history in order to shed some light on Romania's ethnic situation. History is important because many of Romania's current ethnic problems find their roots in arguments concerning the ancient history of Transylvania. A discussion of the present ethnic situation will follow which will deal almost entirely with the Hungarians, rather than the other minorities. It is necessary to delve so far back into Romanian history, because many of the problems of today can be traced back to the historical claims of Romania and Hungary.

5.2.1 Ancient History

Due to a lack of documentation Romania's ancient history is subject to several different and conflicting ethnic interpretations. Arguing these interpretations is certainly not new to Ceausescu's government; however neither are these arguments foreign to Ceausescu. Ceausescu has taken great pains to see that history is presented in the correct manner—that is in a manner that supports Romania's nationalism as well as the current governmental policies. The two main interpretations of Romania's ancient history are
the Romanian and the Hungarian theories. Both of these will be discussed.

5.2.1.1 The Romanian Interpretation

One of the major points of controversy found in Romanian history is who today's Romanians have descended from. According to Romanian scholars they are descendants of the Daco-Romanians or Dacians. The presence of the Dacians, in the form of several separate tribes and groups, is placed in Romania sometime between 500 and 300 B.C. (Seton-Watson, 1963, p.1). The area that they settled in is now called Transylvania (Otetea, 1985, p.9). Most of the ethnic controversy in Romania is over this area. By arguing the Daco-Romanian theory, Romanians feel that their claim to the area is legitimate. When describing Romania's military tradition Ceausescu begins with praise for the Dacians—"The valiant army of the fearless Decebalus, the legendary leader of the Dacians... expressing the undying love of liberty of the people, heroically and valiantly defended the ancestral land..." (Newens, 1972, p.94). Early in the second century A.D. the Dacians lost their autonomy when the Romans crossed the Danube and defeated them. The Romans occupied Dacia for just over 150 years, abandoning their colony in A.D. 271 (Otetea, 1985, p.120). The Romanians trace most of their heritage to the Romans and to this period of Roman occupa-
tion. The belief also exists that the formation of the Romanian nation is a direct result of this occupation as well as the later close proximity of other Roman colonies to Dacia. The term Daco-Roman is used to describe the society left by the Romans, which was a combination of the Dacians and the Romans who remained in the colony.

There is some question about the next years following the Roman departure. This period in Romania's history is one in which the demonstration of continuity is crucial. According to Condurachi and Daicoviciu certain archaeological digs supply the needed proof. "The recent excavations at Alba Iulia, by demonstrating the persistence of the indigenous population until at least the early fifth century, have confirmed such historical evidence as we have about the continuity of Daco-Roman life after the withdrawal of the Roman administration in 271" (1971, p.179). The period in question is between A.D. 271 and the seventh century.

5.2.1.2 The Hungarian Interpretation

There are few points of agreement between the Romanian and Hungarian interpretations of Romania's origins. According to Hungarian historians today's Romanians cannot claim that they have ancient origins in Transylvania. The first Hungarians began to settle in the Carpathian basin around 895 A.D. and that the area was uninhabited except for a few
scattered Slavic villages (Genocide in Transylvania, 1985, p.13). The Vlachs (Romanians) are not to have appeared in Transylvania until 1234 when Pope Gregory IX sent a letter to the Transylvanian prince asking that asylum be granted to those "'poor Vlach refugees'" (Genocide in Transylvania, 1985, p.13). It is these refugees, who received the good will of the Transylvanian principality and became a privileged minority, who are the forefathers of Romanians today. Because of their historical interpretation Hungarians in Romania feel that they hold a true claim to Romania. They consider themselves to be a nation taken captive by a usurping Romania. Among those espousing this Hungarian interpretation today are groups such as the Transylvanian World Federation, the American Hungarian Federation and over forty other different groups who attempt to educate the West about the problems for ethnic Hungarians as well as petition the Romanian government for changes in their policies (Genocide In Transylvania, 1985, p.77). The Hungarian government also espouses this interpretation.

---

5 Although this part of the discussion is referring only to Transylvania it is no less valid because it is noted in the "Romanian Interpretation" that the Romanians trace their geographic beginnings to Transylvania.
5.2.2 Present Ethnic Conditions

In chapter 4.0 the educational and urbanization policies of Ceausescu were discussed in light of proposed gains for the advancement of socialism and agricultural improvement. As I conclude this section about ethnicity, I will discuss the predominant Hungarian explanation of the reasons for and results of these policies. Hungarians argue that the plans of Ceausescu are a direct assault against the distinct and unique Hungarian culture. There is a major difference in the official reasons given for the policies and in the people's perception of them. Because many of these policies deeply affect the Hungarians, it is necessary to know their view of the situation. Although Romanians are affected by the urbanization efforts it seems that Hungarians are most significantly affected. As they are relocated the reassignments are such that Hungarians are separated from one another and are forced to live as an even greater minorities with national Romanians. The villages that they leave behind are bulldozed and otherwise destroyed. This destruction includes all land marks or other physical signs of cultural distinction. It is important to note that a large portion of the villages slated for destruction are Hungarian. All Romanians who are relocated of course suffer the consequences, whether an ethnic minority or not. The consequences are mainly in the form of discomfort and inconvenience of the
so called apartments that the people are being moved into. The apartments are little more than inadequate dormitories with no private kitchen or bathroom facilities.

The plan, called sistematizare (systemisation), is the rural counterpart of the programme already under way for the devastation and reconstruction of Bucharest itself. It envisages the destruction of all these [eight thousand] villages by the year 2000 and the herding of the peasantry into 500 "advanced-type agro-industrial complexes". According to witnesses, these resemble half-finished "high-rise concrete rabbit hutches" (Ronay, 1988, p.A19).

The people are also unable to maintain personal garden plots which are a necessary supplement to the inadequate food rations supplied by the government.

The educational system has also been altered in ways which seem to discriminate against minorities. Among the plans of modernizing and stream lining the Romanian educational system has been to close down most of the Hungarian speaking schools especially at the secondary level. This, of course, necessitates that in order to pursue higher education Hungarians must further abandon their ethnicity further by attending Romanian speaking schools.

According to the law, 25 Hungarian pupils are needed to justify the maintenance of a Hungarian-language class. However, the presence of one Romanian child suffices to change the language of instruction from Hungarian to Rumanian. ...If you were lucky enough to enter one of the few remaining schools where the language of instruction is still Hungarian, you will pay a high price once you finish the sixth grade. Rumanian-language schools will not take you in... Since there are only a very few schools left in Hungarian- inhabited Transylvania still operating on the higher levels in the Hungarian language, your
chance for an education ends [at the grade school level] (Genocide in Transylvania, 1985, p.40).

Hungarians also report harassment for speaking Hungarian in public. There have been incidents of Romanians reporting Hungarians for speaking Hungarian while waiting in food queues. Romanians are willing to betray Hungarians in this manner because the potential for a shorter wait in line appeals to them more than supporting the abused Hungarians. A Hungarian woman reported an incident after visiting her daughter in Transylvania:

My daughter told me before we went there never to open my mouth because I can not (sic.) speak Rumanian. ...But then I whispered to my daughter... The woman behind us began to yell in Rumanian, then others were yelling, too, and the policeman at the door told us to get out of there... (Genocide In Transylvania, 1985, p.54).

In their zeal to show that Romania is a truly Romanian nation, Romanian officials take demographic surveys. Those giving the survey were instructed to code respondents as national Romanians unless they specifically request otherwise. From a testimony given about census taking at the beginning of the Ceausescu era: "Our orders were as follows... To register every household as Rumanian, unless otherwise demanded by the subject" (Genocide in Transylvania, 1985, p.65). Hungarians are often afraid to make this request. All Hungarian towns have been given Romanianized names and people are pressured to give their children Romanian names (Genocide in Transylvania, 1985, p.40).
Perhaps the worst element of the treatment of minorities is the ethnically motivated purge which was mentioned in chapter 2.0. Although all of the policies mentioned so far could be considered a type of purge, here I am referring specifically to the Danube-Black Sea canal project. It is widely believed that the construction of this canal had little practical value but was intended to punish minorities and other undesirables, by sentencing them to hard labor.

"During the last 30 years about a half million people were used as free slave laborers on the project, most of them Hungarians from Transylvania and Moldova. Amnesty International reported that in order to ensure a constant supply of free labor, new laws were passed ordering those who publicly criticized the political or economic situation in Romania or the treatment of the minorities, be sentenced to forced labor. Decree 153/1970 was often used by the Romanian authorities... There are thousands of cases on record where Hungarian factory workers were arrested for speaking in their mother tongue during their lunch breaks and sent to the death camps without any trial. ...Finally the Grand Canal is completed. The Ethnic Minorities of Romania have paid for it with their blood... Several hundred thousands have found their final resting place in the Danube Delta, buried in mass graves along the sides of [the canal]" (Genocide in Transylvania, 1985, p.24-5).

As is discussed at the beginning of this section there exists more than a thousand years difference between the Hungarian and Romanian theories explaining when the original Romanians began to occupy Romania. By adhering to the Daco-Roman theory, Romania is able to make several claims about itself that legitimize the national ideology, national claims

---

6 This project began under the rule of Dej.
and political alignment. Romania claims to have continually occupied Transylvania, beginning several centuries before Christ, and conclude from this that they have a historical right to Transylvania.

An example was given above, and it is not unusual for Romanians on all levels to participate in the discrimination against minorities. This fact adds to the lack of cohesion of the Romanian people. It seems that the Romanians are unwilling to admit that the Hungarians suffer more than they--Brutus Coste, a representative of the Truth About Romania committee writes: "To the best knowledge and belief of the Truth About Romania Committee, the fate of the ethnic... minorities in Romania--including the Hungarian majority in Transylvania--is in no way different from that of the Romanian majority" (Coste, 1977, p.38). At the same time the Hungarians are unwilling to accept that they are not the only ones who suffer at the hands of the government--"Rumanian State authorities increasingly discriminate against non-Romanian nationalities... terrorizing them on every field of their existence" (Genocide in Transylvania, 1985, p.83). The policies of the Romanian government toward minorities attempt to bring about a faster and forced assimilation of the Hungarian people so that Ceausescu can have his completely Romanian nation; they also allow and encourage brutal ethnic discrimination on an all inclusive level. The following is an adequate description of the ethnic situation in Romania:

The People, the Beneficiaries of the Cult
As a result, millions of Hungarians now live in Rumania, where they are treated by Ceausescu's regime as an alien body whose ethnic character must be destroyed. ... The ideal is a country of one race, one language, one faith, one class, one income level, one type of education, one ideology—all centralized under the rule of one party, one leader. ... The Hungarians in Rumania and the Rumanians themselves merely live in different circles of Hell. The Rumanian economy is the worst in the Soviet bloc... (von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, 1988, p.46).

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

What similarities exist between today's Romania and Stalin's Soviet Union? What difference, if any, do the people who are subject to the cult make to its path and its effectiveness? Just as earlier in the discussion, there exist both similarities and differences. Two of the most obvious similarities lie in the ethnic diversity of the states as well as the long history of oppression they both share. One of the strongest characteristics of Stalinism is internal control and it cannot be denied that Romanians are subjected to this control. Both Stalin and Ceausescu have used the lines of independence and nationality to stir the people. Appealing to the people's nationalism proved to be successful in gaining their support as well as mobilizing the population. In Romania the people gave their support to Ceausescu even though his domestic policies were harsh. In the Soviet Union people were willing to work for socialism when it was their own. In the USSR Stalin's nationalism fo-
cussed on the Russian people (Zwick, 1983, p. 68); Ceausescu has focussed, not surprisingly, on the Romanians. In both states the other nationalities have suffered due to these policies, especially if they are unwilling to support the regime. Minorities in support of the government's policies have fared better. According to Zwick--"One did not have to be a chauvinist to fall victim to the appeal of 'socialism in one country,' just a good Soviet Communist" (1983, p. 68). In Romania Hungarians willing to be assimilated into Romanian culture are normally afforded the same status of any Romanian citizen. Economic conditions have followed similar paths with the people bearing the burden of their countries' industrialization policies.
The purpose of this paper has been to discuss the personality cult of Romania's president Nicolae Ceausescu within the bounds of Stalinism. The question that I wish to answer has been--where in a Stalinist state does the power lie? One question that has emerged implicitly is--how well does Romania fit the Stalinist model? In light of the discussion of the first four chapters these two questions will be answered. The latter question will be discussed first.

6.1 STALINISM DEFINED: REPRISE

Whether or not Romania adequately fits the Stalinist model becomes a relevant question because there are extremes within Stalin's regime which are absent from the Romanian case. The most conspicuously absent point is the paranoid use of murder as a political tool. However, I do not believe that to be a Stalinist state means to mimic Stalin. Shafir states that Romania had to choose between the Soviet Union and the Soviet model. This means that if Romania wished to pursue its own policies and plans, it could not be completely aligned with the Soviet Union (Shafir, 1985, p.48). As has been shown there are significant differences and similarities between the leaders, between the governments and between the people
of the two states being discussed. The similarities allow the conclusion that Romania is a Stalinist state, while the differences show different methods to achieve the same ends. Ceausescu is no less a Stalinist leader because he chose promotion and rotation to control the elite rather than assassination. The goals of the state should include both economic and military independence as well as a nationalistic socialism to be achieved for the people under the direction of the state. Using these criteria there is no difficulty in labeling Romania a Stalinist state.

6.2 THE QUESTION OF POWER

After a brief detour it is important to come back to the central issue and that is determining where the power lies in a Stalinist state and more specifically, where it lies in Romania. By adding the regime of Stalin as a comparative element it has been shown that the paths to power assumption and retention may differ while the goals remain the same. At this point it is difficult for me not to give into my preconceived biases and give Ceausescu all of the collective credit and blame for Romania's present situation, and thereby place all of the power in his hands. This said, my final arguments will be based on the following conclusion: that a Stalinist leader is more than a figurehead and more than a necessary tool for the maintenance of the bureaucracy; the

Conclusions: The So-What Question

specific leader makes a significant difference in the path of the country as well as in his own political longevity. The importance of the individual can be seen in the regimes of both Stalin and Ceausescu.

First, I would like to reiterate Ceausescu's own handling of his political future. It would be foolish to assume that after Dej's death Ceausescu suddenly appeared and claimed the role of successor. On the contrary, as has been noted, Ceausescu was constantly operating within the bounds of power allowed him. Due to his position in the Politburo, Ceausescu had several years to promote and train political supporters. Dej's approval of Ceausescu and the expectation that Ceausescu was loyal to Dej, made it reasonable to expect that Ceausescu's moves were made in the attempt to increase the party unity (Shafir, 1985, pp.51-2). When Stalin came to power, he did not have Lenin's approval. He also had to deal with many contenders for his position putting his bid for and assumption of power on rather shaky ground. Stalin had the benefit of Lenin's infirmity to allow him preparation time, but Dej remained active in Romania almost up to the time that he died (Fischer-Galati, 1967, p.111). It was known that Dej was terminally ill but the government never had the opportunity to work in his name without his influence. Ceausescu had years to lay the political ground work for his assumption of power and as head of the Party Secretariat Stalin had at least two years to do the same. It is interesting that from

Conclusions: The So-What Question 69
his pool of leadership Dej chose Draghici and Ceausescu as possible successors rather than from his oldest supporters. When Dej first began his move toward independence his "old guard" was reluctant (Shafir, 1985, p.48), while the younger cadres had been more willing to follow his line of independence. Whatever the reason for the favor he found, Ceausescu had this advantage over Stalin in his bid for power.

In chapter 4.0 the methods that Stalin and Ceausescu used to build their elite power bases was discussed. It is easy to speak of a leader's ascension to power but it must be realized that he cannot get there without some form of consent. However, I also feel that once the position of leadership is firmly established it is possible to retain it even against the will of the elite. Stalin's power was retained through a continuous violent purge; Ceausescu has retained his by the, so far, successful use of elite rotation. Ceausescu has had, at differing levels, the elite's consent to rule for the duration of his time as leader. It is important to realize that once the initial crew of hard line Dej supporters were dispensed with, the elite have had no real reason for fear. In the USSR the ones who had the most to fear were Stalin's opponents, although there were arbitrary arrests and executions of some who were thought to be in Stalin's favor (Nove, 1975, p.189).

In a country that has known outside oppression and strict internal control for centuries it is difficult to imagine

Conclusions: The So-What Question 70
what impact and influence the people can have on the leader and the extent of his power. But the people of every country must be included as an influence on their government. There is no way of knowing what difference it would have made had the people opposed the ascension of Ceausescu. The fact is that the people were not opposed to Ceausescu's rule and in 1968 they heartily embraced his foreign policy. During the Watergate scandal of the 1970's, the Romanian people could not understand why Nixon's domestic improprieties were causing such a problem. Their reasoning was that they had to pay a much greater price for a sound foreign policy, and they felt Americans had nothing to complain about. Romanian rule has become more oppressive as this trust is quickly being outweighed by discontent. Talk of Romania is turning to the further closing of its borders as governmental control increases. Presently travel out of Romania as well as travel into the country is more restricted than ever; Romania has begun to shun US aid in order to preserve its independence and to keep the US from meddling in its affairs. Romania has often been reproached for its human rights policies by the US government and independent groups such as Amnesty International. According to Amnesty International prisoners of conscience in Romania are made up of those wishing to emigrate; religious groups, normally Protestant evangelicals, and ethnic Hungarians. In 1983 six men were sentenced to death for economic crimes because they caused "serious det-
riment to public property". These crimes normally involved the theft of meat as well as selling it illegally (Amnesty International, 1984, pp.298-300). At any rate any advantage that Ceausescu may have gained from the support of the people is being lost, and the result will probably depend on how long Ceausescu lives.

Ceausescu's position in Romania is not assured. He is not the omniscient, all powerful leader which his cult portrays, no one could be. He has not reached the goal of national independence, although at the forfeit of economic gain he is coming close. Romania is praised in the West for the independence it shows toward Moscow and chastised for its human rights policies. Because of the independent stance Romania has had to pay full price for goods, such as crude oil, which the USSR normally subsidizes for its satellites. Also because of the doctrine that no state should interfere in its internal matters Romania has forfeited its Most Favored Nation status rather than meet US demands for an improved human rights policies. Apparently Romania has shown that it does not need special concessions the US or the USSR as it has managed to pay off its national debt despite the policies of the two superpowers. Officially the government is approaching his goal of a single nationality but only by denying the existence of its ethnic minorities. Ceausescu is wise to qualify Romania as a developing Socialist state, rather than a state which has reached this goal, as the citizens of

Conclusions: The So-What Question
Romania share little other than each other's problems and poverty as they have benefitted little from fulfilling Ceausescu's plans. Despite the many shortcomings of Romania, Ceausescu holds great power, more than any other in the government. As time wears on he is finding necessary to devote more of his strength and cunning to retain his position (Fischer, 1983, p.46). Ceausescu's shrewdness and sense of timing aided his ascent to power (Fischer, 1982, pp.15-18). His understanding of the Romanian people enabled him to appeal to their specific personality and thereby pursue some of his goals at their expense. Finally, his ability to stay ahead of any potential opposition has helped to keep him in power and in all likelihood will continue to do so.
APPENDIX A: GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

7.0

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

7.1.1 Grand National Assembly

In 1965 Romania adopted a new constitution and the state was proclaimed as the authority of the country. The supreme body of the state is the Grand National Assembly (GNA). The GNA is considered the parliament of Romania and in 1965 had one representative for every 40,000 citizens and in 1975 every 60,000 people had a representative. The present membership of the GNA is approximately four hundred deputies. Deputies must be approved by the party before being added to the ballot. The assembly elects the State Council, the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General. The GNA meets twice a year, although special sessions may be called. Laws are passed by a simple majority and signed by both the president and the secretary to the Council of State.

7.1.2 Council of State

The Council of State is elected by and officially accountable to the GNA. The council is comprised of about two dozen members all of whom are elected from the GNA.
Council's official duties include setting the election date of the GNA and appointing and recalling officials of central organizations (except for the Council of Ministers). They are also in charge of ambassadors and diplomats as well as matters of citizenship. The Council of State also has the power to carry out most of the duties of the GNA between its sessions. Unofficially, the council acts in much more as a legislative body than the GNA, even though the constitution dictates otherwise.

7.1.3 Council of Ministers

The main executive body of the Romanian government is the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is responsible to the GNA and to the Council of State when the GNA is not in session. The administrative body is in charge of all the central government ministries including economic, defense and domestic policies. All Council decisions are treated as orders to be obeyed on a country wide level. The number of ministers fluctuates according to the perceived need. For example in 1976 there were thirty-eight ministers (Matley, 1970, pp.145-7; Staar, 1977, pp.156,7).  

7 This endnote serves as the citation for the entire "national level" section; the next endnote will also include the entire section that it follows.
7.2 LOCAL LEVEL

Local government in Romania is handled by People's Councils which operate at the county or judet, municipal district, town and commune levels. Within these councils, executive boards are elected and these implement the policies adopted by the councils. People's Councils are intended to mobilize citizen participation in public affairs. Based on the plans passed down from the national levels these councils administer local budgets, agricultural policies and other relevant domestic affairs such as road maintenance and local education (Matley, 1970, p.147; Staar, 1977, p.158).
8.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bibliography


The vita has been removed from the scanned document