

# Algorithms and Frameworks for Accelerating Security Applications on HPC Platforms

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(ABSTRACT)

Typical cybersecurity solutions emphasize on achieving defense functionalities. However, execution efficiency and scalability are equally important, especially for real-world deployment. Straightforward mappings of cybersecurity applications onto HPC platforms may significantly underutilize the HPC devices' capacities. On the other hand, the sophisticated implementations are quite difficult: they require both in-depth understandings of cybersecurity domain-specific characteristics and HPC architecture and system model.

In our work, we investigate three sub-areas in cybersecurity, including mobile software security, network security, and system security. They have the following performance issues, respectively: 1) The flow- and context-sensitive static analysis for the large and complex Android APKs are incredibly time-consuming. Existing CPU-only frameworks/tools have to set a timeout threshold to cease the program analysis to trade the precision for performance. 2) Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) use automata processing as its searching core and requires line-speed processing. However, achieving high-speed automata processing is exceptionally difficult in both algorithm and implementation aspects. 3) It is unclear how the cache configurations impact time-driven cache side-channel attacks' performance. This question remains open because it is difficult to conduct comparative measurement to study the impacts.

In this dissertation, we demonstrate how application-specific characteristics can be leveraged to optimize implementations on various types of HPC for faster and more scalable cybersecurity executions. For example, we present a new GPU-assisted framework and a collection of optimization strategies for fast Android static data-flow analysis that achieve up to 128X speedups against the plain GPU implementation. For network intrusion detection systems (IDS), we design and im-

plement an algorithm capable of eliminating the state explosion in out-of-order packet situations, which reduces up to 400X of the memory overhead. We also present tools for improving the usability of Micron's Automata Processor. To study the cache configurations' impact on time-driven cache side-channel attacks' performance, we design an approach to conducting comparative measurement. We propose a quantifiable success rate metric to measure the performance of time-driven cache attacks and utilize the GEM5 platform to emulate the configurable cache.

# Algorithms and Frameworks for Accelerating Security Applications on HPC Platforms

Xiaodong Yu

(GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT)

Typical cybersecurity solutions emphasize on achieving defense functionalities. However, execution efficiency and scalability are equally important, especially for the real-world deployment. Straightforward mappings of applications onto High-Performance Computing (HPC) platforms may significantly underutilize the HPC devices' capacities. In this dissertation, we demonstrate how application-specific characteristics can be leveraged to optimize various types of HPC executions for cybersecurity. We investigate several sub-areas, including mobile software security, network security, and system security. For example, we present a new GPU-assisted framework and a collection of optimization strategies for fast Android static data-flow analysis that achieve up to 128X speedups against the unoptimized GPU implementation. For network intrusion detection systems (IDS), we design and implement an algorithm capable of eliminating the state explosion in out-of-order packet situations, which reduces up to 400X of the memory overhead. We also present tools for improving the usability of HPC programming. To study the cache configurations' impact on time-driven cache side-channel attacks' performance, we design an approach to conducting comparative measurement. We propose a quantifiable success rate metric to measure the performance of time-driven cache attacks and utilize the GEM5 platform to emulate the configurable cache.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Most traditional cybersecurity solutions emphasize on achieving defense functionalities. The cybersecurity community largely overlooks the importance of execution efficiency and scalability, especially for real-world deployment. On the other hand, High-Performance Computing (HPC) devices have been widely used to accelerate a variety of scientific applications. However, straightforwardly mapping the cybersecurity applications onto HPC platforms usually may significantly underutilize the HPC devices' capacities. Unfortunately, security applications have not drawn enough attention in HPC community, and sophisticatedly implementing them are quite tricky: they require both in-depth understandings of cybersecurity domain-specific characteristics and HPC architecture and system model.

In this dissertation, we bridge the gap between the cybersecurity and HPC communities from both algorithm and implementation aspects. We investigate three sub-areas in cybersecurity, including mobile software security, network security, and system security. We demonstrate how application-specific characteristics can be leveraged to optimize various types of HPC executions for cybersecurity. For example, For network intrusion detection systems (IDS), we design and implement an algorithm capable of eliminating the state explosion in out-of-order packet situations, which reduces up to 400X of the memory overhead. We also present tools for improving the usability of HPC programming. We present a new GPU-assisted framework and a collection of optimization

strategies for fast Android static data-flow analysis. To study the cache configurations' impact on time-driven cache side-channel attacks' performance, we design an approach to conducting comparative measurement.

## **1.1 Automata-based Algorithms for Security Applications**

In this section, we will introduce the regular expressions and their finite automata based representation first, and then explain how they can be used as the computational core of deep packet inspection.

### **1.1.1 Regular Expressions & Finite Automata**

A regular expression, usually abbreviated as regex, is a string of characters that can be used to create a search pattern. Regex is a powerful tool to parse and compactly store a large amount of data; it is also essential for efficiently searching given patterns against the input text. Regex's syntax complies with the formal language theory. There are two de facto syntax set standards: The POSIX and the Perl. Each regular expression must consist of literal characters and meta characters. The meta characters have special meanings and are the keys of regex's strong expressive power. Although meta characters are syntax standard specific, most common meta characters are actually universal. For example, the well-known metacharacter dot-star `".*"`, representing a random text with arbitrary length, is shared by all syntax standards.

To allow multi-regex search, current approaches implement the regex-set through finite automata (FA), either in their deterministic or in their non-deterministic form (DFA and NFA, respectively). In automata-based approaches, the matching operation is equivalent to a FA traversal guided by the content of the input stream. Worst-case guarantees on the input processing time can be met by bounding the amount of per character processing.

Being the basic data structure in the regular expression matching engine, the finite automaton must




Figure 1.1: (a) NFA and (b) DFA accepting regular expressions  $a.*bc$  and  $bcd$ .

be deployable on a reasonably provisioned hardware platform. As the size of pattern-sets and the expressiveness of individual patterns increase, limiting the size of the automaton becomes challenging. The exploration space is characterized by a trade-off between the size of the automaton and the worst-case bound on the amount of per-character processing. NFA and DFAs are at the two extremes in this exploration space. NFAs have a limited size but can require expensive per-character processing, whereas DFAs offer limited per-character processing at the cost of a possibly large automaton. As an example, in Figure 1.1 we show the NFA and DFA accepting regular expressions  $a.*bc$  and  $bcd$  (notice that the dot-star metacharacter “ $.*$ ” represents any segment with any length). In the figure, Accepting states are colored gray. The states active after processing input stream  $acbc$  are highlighted using diagonal filling. In the NFA, states 0 and 1 have a self-loop on any characters of the alphabet. In the DFA, state 1 has incoming transitions on character  $b$  from states 1 to 7, and incoming transitions from states 1 to 4 on any characters other than  $a$  and  $b$  (incoming transitions to states 0, 2 and 5 can be read in the same way). As can be seen, the NFA consists of fewer states (7 against 8), while the DFA leads to less per-character processing (1 versus 4 concurrently active states).

### 1.1.2 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)

Deep packet inspection (DPI) is a one of the fundamental networking operations. It inspects and manages the network traffics. A traditional form of DPI comprises searching the packet payload against a set of patterns. It then filters the packets by blocking, re-routing, or logging them according to the searching results. Compared to the conventional packet filtering examining only

packet headers, DPI is an advanced method that can detect the malicious or abnormal contents in the payloads.

### 1.1.2.1 Automata-based Matching Core

DPI is most notably known as the core of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). NIDS is an essential part of network security device. A NIDS receives and processes packets, and then reports the possible intrusions. In the signature-based NIDS, every pattern represents a signature of malicious traffic; the payload of incoming packets is inspected against all available signatures, then a match triggers pre-defined actions on the interested packets. A regular expression can cover a wide variety of pattern signatures [1, 2, 3]. Because of their expressive power, regular expressions have been increasingly adopted to express pattern sets in both industry and academia. Accordingly, many well-known open-source NIDS – such as Snort<sup>1</sup> and Bro<sup>2</sup> – employ automata-based matching engine as their core; moreover, most major networking companies offer their own NIDS solutions (e.g., security appliances from Cisco<sup>3</sup> and Juniper Networks<sup>4</sup>) and also use automata-based matching cores.

In addition to NIDS, emerging applications like content-based networking [4, 5] require inspecting packets at line rate. Their tasks involve regular expression matching hence also demand the automata-based matching cores.

### 1.1.2.2 Out-of-order Packets Issue

In real-world scenarios, a network data stream can span multiple packets. Those packets can arrive at network security devices out of order due to multiple routes, packet retransmission, or NIDS evasion. This is referred to as packet reordering. Previous work analyzing Internet traffic has reported that about 2%-5% of packets are affected by reordering [6, 7, 8]. However, these studies

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<sup>1</sup><http://www.snort.org>

<sup>2</sup><http://www.bro-ids.org>

<sup>3</sup><http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/index.html>

<sup>4</sup><http://www.juniper.net/us/en/products-services/security/idp-series>

have focused on benign traffic; while attackers may intentionally mis-order legitimate traffic to trigger denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [8]. NIDS face challenges [9] when processing data streams that span across out-of-order packets, especially when performing regular-expression matching against traffic containing malicious content located across packets boundaries. In such cases, the malicious patterns are split and carried by multiple packets; and NIDS cannot detect them by processing those packets individually.

Several solutions have been proposed to address the problem of processing out-of-order packets in NIDS. One approach that is widely adopted in current network devices is packet buffering and stream reassembling [8, 10, 11, 12]. In this case, incoming packets are buffered and packet streams are reassembled based on the information in the header fields. Regular expression matching is then performed on the reassembled data stream. This approach is intuitive and easy to implement, but can be very resource intensive and vulnerable to DoS attacks whereby attackers exhaust the packet buffer capacity by sending long sequences of out-of-order packets. Recently, researchers have proposed several new solutions [13, 14, 15] aimed to relieve packet-buffer pressure or even avoid packet buffering and reassembling. This is done by tracking all possible traversal paths or leveraging data structures such as suffix trees. While they alleviate the burden of handling out-of-order packets to some extent, these methods are either applicable only to simple patterns (exact-match strings or fixed-length patterns), or suffer from bad worst-case properties (and are therefore still vulnerable to DoS attacks).

In this thesis, we aim to provide a solution that (1) can process out-of-order packets without requiring packet buffering and stream reassembling, (2) relies only on finite automata, and (3) can handle regular expressions with complex sub-patterns [16]. One of the main challenges in this design comes from handling regular expressions that include unbounded repetitions of wildcards and large character sets. This is because these sub-patterns can represent unbounded sets of exact-match sub-strings which cannot be exhaustively enumerated. Our solution leverages the following observation: all exact-match strings that match a repetition sub-pattern are functionally equivalent from the point of view of the regular expression matching engine and interchanging them will not affect the final matching result. Our proposed solution consists of regular DFAs coupled with a

set of supporting FAs either in NFA or DFA form. The supporting FAs are used to detect and record – using only a few states (typically no more than five) – segments of packets that can potentially be part of a match across packet boundaries. While processing packets out-of-order, those segments can be dynamically retrieved from the recorded states, and can be then used to resolve matches across packet boundaries. To be efficient, any automata-based solution requires minimizing the number of automata, their size, and the number of states that can be active in parallel. Our proposal includes optimizations aimed to achieve these goals.

## 1.2 Security Application Accelerations on HPC Devices

Many security applications require the efficient implementations on the hardware in order to satisfy the scalability and timeliness requests in the real-life scenarios. Given the broad utilization of regex matching, there is a high demand of high-speed automata processing.

From an implementation perspective, automata-based regex matching engines can be classified into two categories: memory-based [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27] and logic-based [28, 29, 30, 31]. For the former, the FA is stored in memory; for the latter, it is stored in (combinatorial and sequential) logic. Memory-based implementations can be (and have been) deployed on various parallel platforms: general purpose multi-core processors, network processors, ASICs, FPGAs, and GPUs; logic-based implementations typically target FPGAs. Of course, for the logic-based approaches, updates in the pattern-set require the underlying platform to be reprogrammed. In a memory-based implementation, design goals are the minimization of the memory size needed to store the automaton and of the memory bandwidth needed to operate it. Similarly, in a logic-based implementation the design should aim at minimizing the logic utilization while allowing fast operation (that is, a high clock frequency).



## 1.2.1 General-purpose Devices

Modern general-purpose HPCs, including CPUs [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37], GPUs [38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43] and Intel's Xeon Phi [44, 45, 46, 47, 48], have been widely used to accelerate a variety of scientific applications. In recent years, GPUs gain the popularity due to their massive parallelisms [49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 44, 55, ?]. Most proposals have target NVIDIA GPUs, whose programmability has greatly improved since the advent of CUDA [56]. The main architectural traits of these devices can be summarized as follows. NVIDIA GPUs comprise a set of Streaming Multiprocessors (SMs), each of them containing a set of simple in-order cores. These in-order cores execute the instructions in a SIMD manner. GPUs have a heterogeneous memory organization consisting of high latency global memory, low latency read-only constant memory, low-latency read-write shared memory, and texture memory. GPUs adopting the Fermi architecture, such as those used in this work, are also equipped with a two-level cache hierarchy. Judicious use of the memory hierarchy and of the available memory bandwidth is essential to achieve good performance. With CUDA, the computation is organized in a hierarchical fashion, wherein threads are grouped into thread blocks. Each thread-block is mapped onto a different SM, while different threads in that block are mapped to simple cores and executed in SIMD units, called warps. Threads within the same block can communicate using shared memory, whereas threads from different thread blocks are fully independent. Therefore, CUDA exposes to the programmer two degrees of parallelism: fine-grained parallelism within a thread block and coarse-grained parallelism across multiple thread blocks. Branches are allowed on GPU through the use of hardware masking. In the presence of branch divergence within a warp, both paths of the control flow operation are in principle executed by all CUDA cores. Therefore, the presence of branch divergence within a warps leads to core under-utilization and must be minimized to achieve good performance.

### 1.2.2 Automata Processor

Recently, Automata Processor (AP) [57] is introduced by Micron for the non-deterministic FA (NFA) simulations. Micron AP can perform parallel automata processing within memory arrays on SDRAM dies by leveraging memory cells to store trigger symbols and simulate NFA state transitions. The AP includes three kinds of programmable elements : State Transition Elements (STE), Counter Elements (CE) and Boolean Elements (BE), which implement states/transitions, counters and logical operators between states, respectively. Each STE includes a 256-bit mask (one bit per ASCII symbol), and symbols triggering state transitions are associated to states (and encoded into STEs) rather than to transitions. Transitions between states are then implemented through a routing matrix consisting of programmable switches, buffers, routing lines, and cross-point connections. Micron's current generation of AP board (AP-D480) includes 16 or 32 chips organized into two to four ranks (8 chips per rank), and its design can scale up to 48 chips. Each AP chip consists of two half-cores. There are no routes either between half-cores or inter-chips, which implies that NFA transitions across half-cores and chips are not possible. Programmable elements are organized in blocks: each block consists of 16 rows, where a row includes eight groups of two STEs and one special purpose element (CE or BE). Each chip contains a total of 49,152 STEs, 768 CE and 2,304 BE, organized in 192 blocks and equally residing in both half-cores. Current boards allow up to 6,144 elements per chip to be set as report elements.

AP automata can be described in Automata Network Markup Language (ANML) – an XML-based language. The ANML is low-level that requires programmers to manipulate STEs and inter-connections between them. AP SDK provides some high-level APIs e.g., regular expression [58] and string matching [59] to ease the programming for some applications; however, the lack of flexibility and customization ability of them would force users to resort to ANML for their own applications. Programming on AP is still a cumbersome task, requiring considerable developer expertise on both automata theory and AP architecture.

A more severe problem is the scalability. For reconfigurable devices like AP, a series of costly processes are needed to generate load-ready binary images. These processes include synthesis,

map, place-&route, post-route physical optimizations, etc., leading to non-negligible configuration time. For a large-scale problem, the situation becomes worse because multi-round reconfiguration might be involved. Most previous research on AP [60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67] excludes the configuration cost and only focuses on the computation. Although these studies reported hundreds or even thousands of fold speedups against the CPU counterparts, the end-to-end time comparison, including configuration and computation, is not well understood.

We believe a fair comparison has to involve the configuration time, especially when the problem size is extremely large to exceed the capacity of a single AP board. For example, the claimed speedups of AP-based DNA string search [68] and motif search [61] can reach up to 3978x and 201x speedup over their CPU counterparts, respectively. In contrast, if their pattern sets are scaling out and the reconfiguration overhead is included, the speedups will plummet to only 3.8x and 24.7x [69]. In these cases, the configuration time could be very high for three reasons: (1) The large-scale problem size needs multiple rounds of binary image load and flush. (2) In each round, once a new binary image is generated, it will use a full compilation process, which time is as high as several hours. (3) During these processes, the AP device is forced to stall and wait for new images in an idle status.

In this thesis, we highlight the importance of counting the reconfiguration time towards the overall AP performance, which would provide a better angle for researchers and developers to identify essential hardware architecture features. To this end, we propose a framework allowing users to fully and easily explore AP device capacity and conduct fair comparison to counterpart hardware [70, 71]. It includes a hierarchical approach to automatically generate AP automata and cascadeable macros to ultimately minimize the reconfiguration cost. Though this framework is general, in this thesis we focus on Approximate Pattern Matching (APM) for a better demonstration. Specifically, it takes the types of paradigms, pattern length, and allowed errors as input, and quickly and automatically generates corresponding optimized ANML APM automata for users to test the AP performance. During the generation, enabling our cascadeable macros can maximize the reuse of pre-compiled information and significantly reduce the time on reconfiguration, hence allows users to conduct performance comparison that is fair to both sides. We evaluate this frame-

work using both synthesis and real-world datasets, and conduct end-to-end performance comparison between AP and CPU. We show, even including the multi-round reconfiguration costs, AP with our framework can achieve up to 461x speedup against CPU counterpart. We also show using our cascadeable macros can save 39.6x and 17.5x configuration time compared to using non-macro and conventional macros respectively.

## 1.3 Android Program Analysis for Security Vetting

In this section, we first introduce how existing tools use the static program analysis to realize the Android security vetting, and then explain why it is difficult to achieve fast and scalable Android static analysis on HPC platforms.

### 1.3.1 Android Program Analysis Tools

Android operating system so far holds 86% smartphone OS market share [72]. End users frequently install and utilize the Android apps for their daily life including many security critical activities like online bank login, email communication and so on. It has been widely reported the security problems, for example, the data leaks, the intent injections, and the API misconfigurations, exist in the Android devices due to malicious and vulnerable apps [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81]. An efficient vetting system for the new and updated Android apps is desired to keep the app store clean and safe. On the other hand, the Google play store currently has more than 3.5 million<sup>5</sup> Android apps available, and around 7K<sup>6</sup> new apps are released through play store each day. Moreover, most popular existing apps provide updates weekly or even daily. These huge scales and high frequencies make the prior entering market app vetting extremely challenging. Bosu et al. [82] experimentally show that analyzing 110K real-world APPs costs more than 6340 hours, even using the optimized analysis approaches. Apparently, a fast and scalable implementation is the key to

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<sup>5</sup><https://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/number-of-available-applications-in-the-google-play-store/>

<sup>6</sup><https://www.statista.com/statistics/276703/android-app-releases-worldwide/>

make app vetting practical.

In recent years, plenty of Android program analysis tools including FlowDroid [83], IccTA [84], DialDroid [82], and AmanDroid [85] have been proposed. Most of them conduct static analysis on the Dalvik bytecodes to discover the security problems of Android apps. Static analysis can provide a comprehensive picture of the APP's possible behaviors, whereas the dynamic analysis can only screen the behaviors during the dry run. However, static analysis suffers from the inherent undecidability of code behaviors; any static analysis method must make a trade-off between the run-time and the analysis precision. Typically, a 10MB app could take around 30 minutes to be statically analyzed and is defined as a large-size app. We use one of the state-of-art Android Static Analysis tools – Amandroid [85] to analyze 1000 random chosen Android APKs. The blue line in Fig. 5.1 shows the execution time: Amandroid takes up to 38min to analyze a single APK. Accordingly, many existing analysis tools set the cut-off threshold at 30min for a single app. However, Google raised the app size limit in the play store to 100MB in 2015, and a majority of modern commodity apps has dozens of MegaBytes. It is manifest that current Android static analysis implementations must be accelerated to accommodate the app size growth.

### 1.3.2 High-Performance Android Program Analysis

Over the past decade, parallel devices become very popular computing platforms and successfully accelerate a verity of domain applications. More recently, due to the massive parallelism and computational power, Graphic Processing Unit (GPU) stands out and is trendy hardware in general-purpose parallel computing. It has been broadly adopted in Bioinformatics [49], Biomedical [52], Natural Language Processing [86] and so on. However, this trend doesn't draw enough attention in security community. Only a handful of previous work [87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96] implement the program analysis on modern parallel hardware; only three work [87, 90, 95] out of them leverage the GPU, and all discuss the acceleration of the common pointer analysis algorithm; none of them consider the Android program analysis. On the other hand, straightforward mapping of an application onto GPU usually is sub-optimal or even under-performs its serial coun-

terpart. The additional application-specific tuning is required to achieve optimal performance. For example, the industrial standard generic GPU sparse matrix-vector multiplication (SpMV) library cuSPARSE [97] can achieve up to 15X speedups against the CPU version. The CT image reconstruction uses SpMV as its computational core. However, mapping the reconstruction to GPU by directly calling cuSPARSE achieves only 3X speedups. On the contrary, a fine-grained design leveraging this application’s domain characteristics can increase the performance to 21-fold against CPU [52].

In this thesis, we propose a GPU-assisted Android static analysis framework. To our best knowledge, this is the first work attempting to accelerate the Android program analysis on HPC platform. We find that implementing the IDFG construction on GPU using the generic approaches (i.e., leveraging no application-specific characteristics) can largely underutilize the GPU computation capacity. We identify four performance bottlenecks existing in the plain GPU implementations: frequent dynamic memory allocations, a large number of branch divergences, workload imbalance, and irregular memory access patterns. Accordingly, we exploit the application-specific characteristics to propose three optimizations that refactor the algorithm to fit the GPU architecture and execution model. (i) *Matrix-based data structure for data-facts*. It uses the fixed-size matrix-based data structure to substitute the dynamic-size set-based data structure to store the data-facts. This optimization can efficiently avoid dynamic memory allocations. It also can reduce the memory consumption since it removes the copies of repetitive data-facts. (ii) *Memory access based node grouping*. It groups the ICFG nodes based on their memory access patterns. Compared to the original statement type based node grouping, this optimization can significantly reduce the branch divergences since it leads to only three groups (while the original grouping yields 17 groups). It can also maximize memory bandwidth usage. (iii) *Worklist merging*. This optimization postpones the processing of worklist’s tail subset to significantly mitigate the workload imbalance issue. It also can avoid the redundant processings by merging the repetitive nodes in the worklist. We evaluate the three proposed optimizations using 1000 Android APKs. We find the first and third optimizations can significantly improve the performance compared to the plain GPU implementation, while the second optimization can slightly improve the performance. The GPU implementation with all

three optimizations can achieve optimal performance; it can achieve up to 128X speedups compared to the optimal performance.

## 1.4 Cache Side-Channel Attacks

In this section, we will first introduce different types of cache side-channel attacks, and then explain why it remains unclear about the impact of cache configurations on the performance of time-driven cache side-channel attacks.

### 1.4.1 Categories of Cache Side-Channel Attacks

Timing-based cache side-channel attacks have been comprehensively studied since its debut in 1996 [98]. The time information of cache access leaks secret contents, specifically through the time difference of cache hits and misses. These attacks can be broadly categorized into three types based on the leakage observation method [99, 100]: (1) *access-driven* attacks, (2) *trace-driven* attacks, (3) and *time-driven* attacks. The access-driven attacks manipulate specific cache-lines and observe the access behaviors of cryptographic operations on these cache-lines. The trace-driven attacks observe the cache hit-miss traces during the encryption/decryption. Different from the former two, the time-driven attacks simply observe the total execution time of the cryptographic operations. All types derive the secret contents by analyzing the observation.

Time-driven attacks are the primary type in the early age of side-channel attacks. In the last decade, access-driven attacks, for example, the notorious meltdown attack [101], gain popularity. They have a higher resolution and lower noises, hence require fewer measurements than time-driven attacks. Fine-grained variants of access-driven attack have been proposed, including PRIME+PROBE [102], FLUSH+RELOAD [103], and FLUSH+FLUSH [104]. However, all access-driven attacks require that the attacker's process have access to specific cache addresses that shared by the victim's process.

Recently, some proposals leverage new hardware technologies to defend the access-driven attacks. For example, the CATalyst [105] exploits Intel’s Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) (CAT isolates shared cache space for victim’s process) to physically revoke the accessibility of attacker’s process. Given the attackers’ access privilege is not an assurance, studying time-driven attacks are still worthwhile since they demand no adversary’s intervention during the observations.

### 1.4.2 Cache Configurations’ Impact

Researchers have been speculating that cache configurations can impact the performances of time-driven side-channel attacks [106, 107, 108]. For example, intuitively, a bigger cache size would make the attacks on AES more difficult, as it can hold a larger portion of the precomputed S-box lookup table in the cache. However, we are not aware of any previous work that provides experimental data to demonstrate how cache configuration parameters influence time-driven attacks. It is extremely challenging to conduct performance comparisons under the same system with different cache configurations, as none of the existing CPU products provide configurable caches. This challenge prevents the experimental study about the impact of cache parameters on time-driven attacks.

In this dissertation, we overcome the aforementioned difficulty and conduct a comprehensive study on how cache configurations impact the success rates of time-driven attacks [109]. We leverage a modular platform – GEM5 [110] to measure the performances of time-driven attacks under various cache configurations. GEM5 is one of the most popular cycle-accurate full-system emulators in the computer-system architecture community [111, 112]. We leverage GEM5 to emulate the X86\_64 system with a configurable cache.

In our work, we measure the performance of Bernstein’s cache timing attack on AES [106]. Bernstein’s attack is one of the most classic time-driven attacks and still feasible on model processors [113, 114]. To make its performance comparable, we propose a new metric to quantify the its success rate. In the measurement, we run Bernstein’s attacks on GEM5 instances with different



cache configurations and provide systematic experimental data to describe the correlation of cache parameters and the attack's performance.

## 1.5 Dissertation Contributions

In this thesis, our scientific contributions can be summarized as the follows:

- We present O<sup>3</sup>FA, a new finite automata-based DPI engine to perform regular-expression matching on out-of-order packets in real-time, i.e., without requiring flow reassembly.
- We propose several optimizations to improve the average and worst-case behavior of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine, and we analyze how the packet ordering affects the buffer size.
- We evaluate our O<sup>3</sup>FA engine on various real-world and synthetic datasets. Our results show that our design is very efficient in practice. The O<sup>3</sup>FA engine requires 20x-4000x less buffer space than conventional buffering & reassembling-based solutions, with only 0.0007%-5% traversal overhead.
- We highlight the importance of counting the reconfiguration time towards the overall AP performance, especially the for large-scale and/or frequently updated datasets.
- We provide a framework for users to easily and fairly conduct performance comparison between AP and its counterparts. It uses a hierarchical approach to automatically generate AP automata and cascadeable macros to ultimately minimize reconfiguration costs.
- We evaluate our framework with AP using both synthesis and real-world datasets, and conduct end-to-end performance comparison (configuration+computation) between AP and CPU. Even including the configuration cost, AP can still achieves hundreds of times speedup against its counterparts.

- We propose a GPU-assisted framework for static program analysis based Android security vetting. It constructs Data-Flow Graphs using GPU and can support multiple vetting tasks by adding lightweight plugins onto the DFGs.
- We identify four performance bottlenecks in the plain GPU implementation: frequent dynamic memory allocations, large number of branch divergences, workload imbalance, and irregular memory access patterns. To breakthrough the bottlenecks, we leverage the application-specific characteristics to propose three fine-grained optimizations, including matrix-based data structure for data-facts, memory access based node grouping, and worklist merging.
- We evaluate the efficacy of proposed optimizations using 1000 Android APKs. The first and third optimizations can significantly improve the performance compared to the plain GPU implementation while the second one can slightly improve the performance. The optimal GPU implementation can achieve up to 128X speedups against the plain GPU implementation.
- We use the GEM5 platform to investigate the cache configurations' impacts on time-driven cache side-channel attacks. We configure the GEM5's cache through seven parameters: *Private Cache Sizes*, *Private Cache Associativity*, *Shared Cache Sizes*, *Shared Cache Associativity*, *Cacheline Sizes*, *Replacement Policy*, and *Clusivity*.
- We extend the traditional success-fail binary metric to make the cache timing side-channel attacks' performances comparable. We define the *equivalent key length (EKL)* to describe the success rates of the attacks under a certain cache configuration.
- We systematically measure and analyze each cache parameter's influence on the attacks' success rate. Based on the measurement results, we find the private cache is the key to the success rates; the 8KB, 16-way private cache can achieve the optimal balance between the security and the cost. Although the shared cache's impacts are trivial, running neighbor processes can significantly increase the success rates of the attacks. The replacement policies

and cacheclusivity also have impacts on the attacks' performances: Random replacement leads to the highest success rates while the LFU/LSU leads to the lowest; the exclusive policy makes the attacks harder to succeed compared to the inclusive policy. We then use these findings to enhance both the cache side-channel attacks and defenses and strengthen future systems.

## 1.6 Dissertation Organization

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present state-of-the-art existing works that relate to our targeted problems and some background knowledge required to understand the proposals in this dissertation. In Chapter 3 and 4, we present our work for high-performance network security. In Chapter 3, we introduce the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine, a new regular expression-based DPI architecture that can handle out-of-order packets on the fly without requiring packet buffering and stream reassembly. In Chapter 4, we address the programmability and scalability issues in the emerging Micron's Automata Processors, and accordingly propose the ROBOTOMATA framework that contains a hierarchical code auto-generating approach and the cascadeable macros. In Chapter 5, we present our contribution to high-performance mobile software security. We propose an Android security vetting framework that uses the highly optimized GPU-based DFG construction as the core. In Chapter 6, we present the work for high-performance system security. We design a comparative measurement to systematically study how cache configurations impact the success rates of time-driven cache attacks. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes my dissertation work.

# Chapter 2

## Literature Review

### 2.1 Algorithm Optimizations

In this section, we will present the existing work related to finite automata optimization and the out-of-order packet DPI respectively.

#### 2.1.1 Finite Automata Optimizations

NFAs have a limited size but can require expensive per-character processing, whereas DFAs offer limited per-character processing but suffer from the well-known state explosion problem. Each DFA state corresponds to a set of NFA states that can be simultaneously active [115]. Therefore, given an  $N$ -state NFA, the functionally equivalent DFA may potentially have up to  $2^N$  states. This state explosion problem may limit the DFAs ability to handle large and complex sets of regular expressions (typically those that include bounded and unbounded repetitions of wildcards or large character sets). Existing proposals targeting DFA-based solutions have focused on two aspects: (i) designing compression schemes aimed at minimizing the DFA memory footprint; and (ii) devising new automata to alternate DFAs in case of state explosion. Alphabet reduction [116, 21, 117, 118], run-length encoding [116], default transition compression [21, 17], state merging [20] and delta-

FAs [119] fall in the first category, while multiple-DFAs [116, 120], hybrid-FAs [20], history-based-FAs [19], XFAs [23], counting-FAs [22], and JFAs [26] fall in the second one. All these solutions, however, have been designed to operate on reassembled packet streams.

### 2.1.2 Algorithms for Out-of-Order Packets in DPI

The classic approach to tackle the packet reordering problem is to buffer the received data packets, reorder them, and finally reassemble the packet stream (or packet flow). Dharmapurikar et al., [8] proposed a system to buffer and reorder packets. Their system consists of a packet analyzer, an out-of-order packet processing unit and a buffer manager, and mitigates the risk of denial of service attacks by forcing attackers to use multiple attacking hosts. However, the system is still vulnerable to attacks exhausting the buffer capacity. Similar packet buffering and stream reassembly solutions have also been proposed and adopted in the industry (e.g. Cisco [10], Nortel Networks [11], and Netrake [12]).

Despite its widespread adoption, this buffering and reassembling approach is vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks whereby attackers exhaust the buffer capacity by sending long sequences of out-of-order packets. There have been a handful of proposals attempting to reduce these risks by avoiding packet buffering and stream reassembly. Varghese et al., [121] proposed Split-Detect. This system splits the signatures of malicious traffic into pieces, performs deep packet inspection on these sub-signatures, and diverts the TCP packets for reassembly from the fast path to the slow path upon detection of any of these sub-signatures. Split-Detect can achieve up to 90% storage requirement reduction compared to conventional NIDS. However, rather than avoiding stream reassembly, it offloads it to the slow path. In addition, Split-Detect is restricted to exact-match signatures and patterns with a fixed length. Our proposal works also on arbitrarily sized patterns. Johnson et al., [15] proposed a DFA-based solution that, for each packet, performs parallel traversals from each and all DFA states. This proposal is based on the observation that, since the initial DFA state is unknown when processing an out-of-order packet, any DFA state must be considered a potential initial state. A post-processing step will then be performed to reconstruct valid traver-

sals at packet boundaries. Although this scheme may be effective in the presence of non-malicious traffic (where the traversal is limited to a few DFA states), it does not provide a good worst-case bound, and it may involve a large amount of post-processing. More recently, Chen et al., [14] proposed AC-Suffix-Tree. This scheme avoids packet buffering and stream reassembly by combining an Aho-Corasick DFA with a suffix tree. Zhang et al., [13] proposed On-Line Reassembly (OLR), a scheme that stores patterns in a DAWG. Both these solutions, however, apply only to exact-match patterns and are unable to handle regular expressions, which are more common in real-world applications. Our scheme does not suffer from this limitation.

## 2.2 HPC devices Based Accelerations

Previous work has focused on accelerating regular expression matching on a variety of parallel architectures: general purpose multi-core processors [20, 21, 29, 19, 18, 120, 23, 26], network processors [122, 123, 124], FPGAs [28, 125, 126, 30], ASIC- [116, 17, 127] and TCAM- [128, 129, 130] based systems. In all these proposals, particular attention has been paid to providing efficient logic- and memory-based representations of the underlying automata (namely, DFAs, NFAs and equivalent abstractions).

### 2.2.1 GPU

Recent work [131] has considered exploiting the GPU's massive hardware parallelism and high-bandwidth memory system in order to implement high-throughput networking operations. In particular, a handful of proposals [132, 133, 134, 27, 25, 50, 51] have looked at accelerating regular expression matching on GPU platforms. Most of these proposals use the coarse-grained block-level parallelism offered by these devices to support packet- (or flow-) level parallelism intrinsic in networking applications.

Gnort [132, 133], proposed by Vasiliadis et al, represents an effort to port Snort IDS to GPUs.

To avoid dealing with the state explosion problem, the authors process on GPU only a portion of the dataset consisting of regular expressions that can be compiled into a DFA, leaving the rest in NFA form on CPU for separate processing. As a result, this proposal speeds up the average case, but does not address malicious and worst case traffic. Gnort represents the DFA on GPU memory uncompressed, and exploits parallelism only at the packet level (i.e., it does not leverage any kind of data structure parallelism to further speed up the operation).

Smith et al [134] ported their XFA proposed data structure [23] to GPUs, and compared the performance achieved by an XFA and a DFA-based solution on datasets consisting of 31-96 regular expressions. They showed that a G80 GPU can achieve a 10-11X speedup over a Pentium 4, and that, because of the more regular nature of the underlying computation, on GPU platforms DFAs are slightly preferable to XFAs. It must be noted that the XFA solution is suited to specific classes of regular expressions: those that can be broken into non-overlapping sub-patterns separated by `.*` terms. However, these automata cannot be directly applied to regular expressions containing overlapping sub-patterns or  $[^c_1..c_k]^*$  terms followed by sub-pattern containing any of the  $c_1, \dots, c_k$  characters.

More recently, Cascarano et al [27] proposed iNFAnt, a NFA-based regex matching engine on GPUs. Since state explosion occurs only when converting NFAs to DFAs, iNFAnt is the first solution that can be easily applied to rule-sets of arbitrary size and complexity. In fact, this work is, to our knowledge, the only GPU-oriented proposal which presents an evaluation on large, real-world datasets (from 120 to 543 regular expressions). The main disadvantage of iNFAnt is its unpredictable performance and its poor worst-case behavior.

### 2.2.2 Automata Processor

Recent studies have revealed Micron AP can improve performance for many applications from data mining [135, 60], machine learning [62], bioinformatics [61], intrusion detection [63, 136], graph analysis [64], and so on [137, 65, 138, 139, 67]. Among them, FU [140], SM APIs [59], and

RAPID [69] are highly related with this work.

Tracy et al. [140] propose a functional unit (FU) approach to accelerate APM problems. They decompose a Levenshtein automata to 8 FUs, then represent FUs in ANML and pre-compile&save them as macros. This approach can benefit all Levenshtein automata by reducing placement&routing overhead to some extent. However, it still requires significant inter-instance routing and compiling time for large-scale automata as shown in our experiments.

Programming on AP with ANML demands expertises of both automata structures and AP architecture. Therefore, String Matching (SM) APIs [59] are introduced recently to provide high-level abstracts for APM. Taking user-provided patterns and distances, SM APIs can generate binary images accordingly. However, if either the given distance or the pattern length doesn't fit any template in the library of SM APIs, it is necessary to construct automata and place-and-route them from scratch during the compilation. As shown in our experiments, SM APIs cannot support some large-scale problem sizes.

Angstadt et al. [69] propose RAPID, a high-level programming model for AP. RAPID bypasses the pre-compiled macros; instead, RAPID places and routes a small repetitive portion of the whole program, saves it as a small binary image, and loads this portion as many times as need on the AP board. However, this scheme may underperform pre-compiling strategy in the case that the desired pattern is large and its pattern lengths vary, because the repetitive portion of program is usually smaller than a macro. Another drawback of this method is losing the flexibility of cascable macros once the portion of program is saved as a binary image which can be only loaded and executed.

Wadden et al. [141] propose ANMLZoo, a benchmark suite for automata processors. It has a subset targeting on APM, and explores how different distance types, error numbers and pattern lengths affect fan-in/fan-out of each STE then further affect configuration complexity. However, it doesn't fully explore the AP's capacity since doesn't leverage any pre-compiled information. Moreover, users still need to manually manipulate the AP automata when extending the benchmarks.



## 2.3 Security Vettings for Android

In this section, we will introduce the existing Android static program analysis tools first, and then describe how the current solutions construct the Android programs' data-flow graphs.

### 2.3.1 Android Static Analysis Tools

Android security nowadays is one of the most crucial and popular subareas in software security [142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147]. A bunch of tools has been proposed for applying the static analysis on Android security problems. FlowDroid [83] first builds a call graph based on Spark/Soot [148] by performing a flow-insensitive points-to analysis. It then uses IFDS [149] to conduct the taint and on-demand alias analysis based on the call graph. IFDS is flow- and context-sensitive; however, the call graph building is flow-insensitive hence could degrade the precision of IFDS analysis. Moreover, FlowDroid does not text- and flow-sensitively calculate all objects' alias or points-to information due to computational cost concerns [150]. Epicc [151] adopts IDE framework to compute Android Intent call parameters. It models the intent data structure explicitly in the flow functions. Epicc only uses the results of Intent parameter analysis to resolve some specific cases of Intent call and does not perform the inter-component data-flow analysis. IccTA [84] extends FlowDroid by adopting IC3 [152] Intent resolution engine. IccTA can track data flows through regular Intent calls and returns but cannot through remote procedure call (RPC). On the contrary, DroidSafe [153] tracks both Intent and RPC calls but cannot track data flows through stateful ICC nor inter-app analysis. DialDroid [82] is a scalable and accurate tool designed for inter-app Inter-Component Communication (ICC) analyses. It makes a balance of the data-flow analysis accuracy and run-time cost.

Each of the above tools is built to perform one or several specific kinds of static analysis and is not flexible to extend the capability. On the other hand, Amandroid [85] provides generic support to multiple Android static analyses. It builds the DFG and DDG then adds low-cost plugins to realize various specific analyses. Amandroid calculates all objects' points-to information in a context-

and flow-sensitive way. Although this boosts the precision, it drastically increases the computation burdens [154].

### 2.3.2 Android Data-Flow Graph Constructions

The DFG is constructed through Inter-procedural Data-flow Analysis. Data-flow analysis is conducted using iterative algorithms. The conventional iterative search algorithm visits each ICFG node once in one iteration and keeps iterating until no further changes occur to the data-flow sets [155]. This approach has a regular computation pattern hence can leverage the well-studied depth-first and breadth-first search (BFS/DFS) [156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162] to efficiently visit the CFG in each iteration. However, it has large redundancy and slow convergence due to the fixed full workload in each iteration. Worklist algorithm is an alternative that dynamically updates the worklist after each node visiting. Inter-procedural, finite, distributive subset (IFDS) [149] and its extension inter-procedural distributed environment transformers (IDE) [163] are two well-known conceptual frameworks using the worklist algorithm as the core. Some optimizations [164, 165, 166] have been proposed to algorithmically improve the IFDS efficiency. Recently, two mature IFDS/IDE implementations gain massive popularity. IBM releases T.J. Watson Libraries for Analysis (WALA) implementing the IFDS [167]. Heros [168] provides IFDS/IDE solver on top of Soot [169]. Although the worklist algorithm algorithmically outperforms the conventional algorithm, it still potentially requires high computational cost due to a large number of iterations. Even worse, the dynamic update of worklist makes the computation pattern pretty irregular and extremely hard to be parallelized.

All works mentioned above target only on executing the analyses on sequential platforms. The literature on executing static analyses on modern parallel platforms is sparse. Among them, only several works use GPUs. Prabhu et al. [87] accelerate the 0-CFA, a higher-order control-flow analysis algorithm, with GPU. They leverage the sparse-matrix to optimize CFG data structures and achieves 72X speedups over CPU version. Mendez-Lojo et al. [90] accelerate the Andersen-style inclusion-based point-to analysis on GPU. They treat the analysis as a graph modification and

traversal problem and focus on providing general insights about implementing graph algorithms on GPU. Su et al. [95] also implement the Andersen’s inclusion-based pointer analysis. Their design has the similar idea to [90] and proposes several techniques to further optimize the implementation. They claim their work can achieve 46% speedup against [90]. Each of above three work targets only on one specific type of analysis and the design is generally not applicable to other static analyses. Moreover, none of them associates the algorithm with specific language or file type; significant application-specific tuning may be required when applying their algorithms to analyze real-world cases.

## 2.4 Cache Side-Channel Attacks & Countermeasures

In this section, we will introduce the related work with the time-driven and access-driven cache attacks respectively, and then present the work studying the implementations’ and system’s impacts on the cache attacks.

### 2.4.1 Time-Driven Attacks

Bernstein’s attack [106] is one of the most classical practical implementations of time-driven attacks. It is elaborated in Section 6.2.2. Bonneau and Mironov [107] proposed a finer-grained time attack. They observed the time variations caused by cache-collisions happened during table lookups of encryption. This attack requires less computational cost but is more difficult to measure. Tiri et al. [100] proposed an analytic model for time-driven attacks that can estimate the strengths of the symmetric key cryptosystems. Brumley and Hakala [108] proposed a timing template attack. They combined vector quantization and the hidden Markov model to build a tool to automatically analyze the cache-timing data. Brumley and Tuveri [113] described the timing attack vulnerability in OpenSSL implementation and approved that the time-driven attack on a remote server is feasible. Wang et al. [170] proposed CacheD, a software examining technique that leverages symbolic execution to identify potential cache time differences at each program point.

## 2.4.2 Access-Driven Attacks

Yarom et al. [103] presented FLUSH + RELOAD attack. This attack targets LLC and can recover the keys even if the processes are not co-located in the same core. Liu et al. [102] implemented the PRIME + PROBE attack also targeting on the LLC. This attack is cross-core, cross-VM, and works on multiple versions of GnuPG without relying on weaknesses of OS or VM. Irazoqui et al. [171] introduced another variation of PRIME+PROBE attack. Their attack is a fine-grain cross-core LLC attack. It needs no deduplication and OS configuration changes hence is quite viable. Gruss et al. [172] proposed the access-driven template attack on shared inclusive LLC. It automatically profiles and exploits cache leakage of any programs without requiring prior knowledge of specific software and system information. Gras et al. [173] proposed TLBleed that attacks the page-table caches (TLB) to bypass the hardware cache side-channel protections.

## 2.4.3 Implementations' and Systems' Impacts

To our best knowledge, our work is the first systematic and experimental study of the cache configurations' impacts on the cache attacks' performances. The most relevant existing work we are aware of was done by Mantel et al [174]. Although the crypto algorithms are strong, careless implementations and misuses can make the ciphers vulnerable [175, 176]. Mantel et al. systematically studied how different AES implementations influence the vulnerability to cache side-channel attacks. They leveraged the CacheAudit static analyzer [177] to check the leakage bounds of different AES implementations. In [174], only one cache parameter (PCS) was considered. Moreover, its results are still counted as the theoretical expectations since CacheAudit is a program-analysis-based tool that calculates the leakage bounds without any actual executions.

# Chapter 3

## Scalable Automata-based Pattern-Matching Algorithm for Out-of-Order DPI

### 3.1 Introduction

Regular expression matching is a core task in deep packet inspection (DPI), which is a fundamental networking operation. A traditional form of DPI comprises searching the packet payload against a set of patterns. Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are an essential part of network security devices. A NIDS receives and processes packets, and then reports the possible intrusions. Some well-known open-source NIDS - such as Snort<sup>1</sup> and Bro<sup>2</sup> - employ DPI as their core; most major networking companies offer their own NIDS solutions (e.g., security appliances from Cisco<sup>3</sup> and Juniper Networks<sup>4</sup>). In NIDS, every pattern represents a signature of malicious traffic; thus, the DPI engine of a NIDS inspects the incoming packets payloads against all available signatures, and triggers pre-defined actions if a match is detected. A regular expression can cover a wide variety of pattern signatures [1, 2, 3]. Because of their expressive power, regular expressions have

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<sup>1</sup><http://www.snort.org>

<sup>2</sup><http://www.bro-ids.org>

<sup>3</sup><http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/index.html>

<sup>4</sup><http://www.juniper.net/us/en/products-services/security/idp-series>

been increasingly adopted to express pattern sets in both industry and academia. To allow multi-pattern search, current NIDS mostly represent the pattern-set through finite automata (FA)[115], either in their deterministic or in their non-deterministic form (DFA and NFA, respectively).

A large body of research has focused on developing efficient regular expression matching engines. For memory-centric solutions, where the automaton is stored in memory, DFA-based approaches are more popular than NFA-based ones, because of their predictable memory bandwidth requirements. This is due to a simple fact: processing an input character involves only one DFA state traversal, which can be translated into a deterministic number of memory accesses. However, this attractive property comes at the cost of potentially large memory space requirements. As a matter of fact, DFAs constructed from large and complex sets of regular expressions may suffer from the state explosion problem, making the storage requirements prohibitively large. State explosion can take place during DFA generation when the corresponding regular expressions have repetitions of wildcards and/or large character sets. Several variants of DFA [116, 120, 20, 19, 23, 22, 26] have been proposed to address this problem, and limit the effects of state explosion with varying degree.

In real-world scenarios, a network data stream can span multiple packets. Those packets can arrive at network security devices out of order due to multiple routes, packet retransmission, or NIDS evasion. This is referred to as packet reordering. Previous work analyzing Internet traffic has reported that about 2%-5% of packets are affected by reordering [6, 7, 8]. However, these studies have focused on benign traffic; while attackers may intentionally mis-order legitimate traffic to trigger denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [8]. NIDS face challenges [9] when processing data streams that span across out-of-order packets, especially when performing regular-expression matching against traffic containing malicious content located across packets boundaries. In such cases, the malicious patterns are split and carried by multiple packets; and NIDS cannot detect them by processing those packets individually.

Several solutions have been proposed to address the problem of processing out-of-order packets in NIDS. One approach that is widely adopted in current network devices is packet buffering and stream reassembling [8, 10, 11, 12]. In this case, incoming packets are buffered and packet streams

are reassembled based on the information in the header fields. Regular expression matching is then performed on the reassembled data stream. This approach is intuitive and easy to implement, but can be very resource intensive and vulnerable to DoS attacks whereby attackers exhaust the packet buffer capacity by sending long sequences of out-of-order packets. Recently, researchers have proposed several new solutions [13, 14, 15] aimed to relieve packet-buffer pressure or even avoid packet buffering and reassembling. This is done by tracking all possible traversal paths or leveraging data structures such as suffix trees. While they alleviate the burden of handling out-of-order packets to some extent, these methods are either applicable only to simple patterns (exact-match strings or fixed-length patterns), or suffer from bad worst-case properties (and are therefore still vulnerable to DoS attacks).

In this work, we aim to provide a solution that (1) can process out-of-order packets without requiring packet buffering and stream reassembling, (2) relies only on finite automata, and (3) can handle regular expressions with complex sub-patterns. One of the main challenges in this design comes from handling regular expressions that include unbounded repetitions of wildcards and large character sets. This is because these sub-patterns can represent unbounded sets of exact-match sub-strings which cannot be exhaustively enumerated. Our solution leverages the following observation: all exact-match strings that match a repetition sub-pattern are functionally equivalent from the point of view of the regular expression matching engine and interchanging them will not affect the final matching result. Our proposed solution consists of regular DFAs coupled with a set of supporting FAs either in NFA or DFA form. The supporting FAs are used to detect and record – using only a few states (typically no more than five) – segments of packets that can potentially be part of a match across packet boundaries. While processing packets out-of-order, those segments can be dynamically retrieved from the recorded states, and can be then used to resolve matches across packet boundaries. To be efficient, any automata-based solution requires minimizing the number of automata, their size, and the number of states that can be active in parallel. Our proposal includes optimizations aimed to achieve these goals. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We present O<sup>3</sup>FA, a new finite automata-based DPI engine to perform regular-expression matching on out-of-order packets in real-time, i.e., without requiring flow reassembly.
- We propose several optimizations to improve the average and worst-case behavior of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine, and we analyze how the packet ordering affects the buffer size.
- We evaluate our O<sup>3</sup>FA engine on various real-world and synthetic datasets. Our results show that our design is very efficient in practice. The O<sup>3</sup>FA engine requires 20x-4000x less buffer space than conventional buffering & reassembling-based solutions, with only 0.0007%-5% traversal overhead.

## 3.2 O<sup>3</sup>FA Design

In this section, we present our solution for performing regular expression matching on out-of-order packets without requiring prior stream reassembly. The main challenge in this problem is the handling of matches across packet boundaries. At the high level, our proposed solution couples one or more DFAs with supporting-FAs. The DFAs allow us to find matches within a packet. The supporting-FAs are used to detect and record segments of packets that can potentially be part of a match across packet boundaries. While processing packets out-of-order, these segments can be dynamically retrieved from the state information collected on the supporting-FAs, and they can subsequently be concatenated to the incoming packet in order to handle cross-packet matches.

To have an intuition of this idea, consider matching input stream *cabcdeab* against pattern *b.\*cde*. Let us assume that this input stream spans across two packets:  $P_1=cabc$  and  $P_2=deab$ . We can observe that pattern *b.\*cde* is matched across packet boundaries (the match starts in  $P_1$  and ends in  $P_2$ ; the *segments* of  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  involved in the match are underlined). If we use a DFA, this match will be detected only if packets  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are processed in order. If the packets are processed out-of-order, we will need a way to detect that segment *de* of  $P_2$  and segment *bc* of  $P_1$  are partial matches (specifically, they match the suffix and the prefix of the considered patterns, respectively). We will then use this information to reconstruct the match. Our proposed supporting-FA will serve this



purpose. We note that, because  $b.*cde$  is neither an exact-match string nor a fixed-length pattern, it cannot be handled by previous approaches such as SplitDetect [121], AC-Suffix-Tree [14] and ORL [13].

Because we are concerned about patterns with variable length, we focus on regular expressions containing repetitions of characters (e.g.,  $c+$  and  $c^*$ ), character sets (e.g.,  $[c_i-c_j]^*$ ) and wildcards ( $.$ ). We note that regular expressions without these features can be handled by traditional methods. For example, a regular expression containing a non-repeated character set  $[c_i-c_j]$  can be transformed by exhaustive enumeration into a set of exact-match patterns. For readability and in the interest of space, the remaining description focuses on the more general case (wildcard repetitions); however, our solution is applicable to all kinds of repetitions.

A central question in the O<sup>3</sup>FA design is the following: how can we identify the *minimal* packet segments that must be recorded in order to handle cross-packet matches? We note that excessively long segments would pose pressure on the required packet buffer and on the amount of processing involved in the matching operation, thus leading to inefficiencies. Our design leverages the following observations.

**Observation 1:** If a regular expression  $R$  is matched across a set of packets  $P_1, \dots, P_N$ , then the suffix of  $P_1$  must match a prefix of  $R$  and the prefix of  $P_N$  must match a suffix of  $R$ .

**Observation 2:** Given a regular expression  $R$  in the form  $sp_1.*sp_2$  and an input stream  $l$  containing a matching segment of the form  $M_1M^*M_2$ , where  $M_1$  matches  $sp_1$  and  $M_2$  matches  $sp_2$ , any modifications to  $l$  that substitutes  $M^*$  with a shorter segment will not affect the match outcome.

According to Observation 1, O<sup>3</sup>FA must detect segments of incoming packets that match any suffixes/prefixes of the considered regular expressions. These segments are recorded by storing the corresponding matching states information, and they can be dynamically retrieved and properly concatenated with later-arrival packets to detect cross-boundary matching. For example, while matching regular expression  $b.*cde$  on packets  $P_1=caba$ ,  $P_2=dcac$  and  $P_3=dead$  that arrive in order  $P_3 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow P_2$ , we first detect that segment  $de$  in  $P_3$  matches suffix  $de$ , and then that segment  $ba$  in  $P_1$  matches prefix  $b.*$ . When  $P_2$  arrives, we retrieve those segments and concatenate them with  $P_2$ ,

then conduct regular expression matching on *badcacde* and detect the cross-boundary matching of *b.\*cde*. In general, prefix *b.\** can match arbitrarily long strings, which may span across any number of intermediate packets. However, according to Observation 2, in order to reconstruct the match it is sufficient to record the shortest segment of the input stream that matches the regular expression with the wildcard repetition. In the considered example, rather than recording segment *ba* of packet  $P_1$ , we can simply record segment *b*. In addition, if a regular expression *p.\*s* is matched across a set of packets  $P_1, \dots, P_N$  such that the suffix of  $P_1$  matches *p* and the prefix of  $P_N$  matches *s*, recording the intermediate packets  $P_2, \dots, P_{N-1}$  will not be necessary for matching purposes.

The design is complicated by the fact that multiple regular expressions would require recording multiple segments, possibly leading to inefficiencies. In section 3.3 we propose a mechanism (that we call Functionally Equivalent Packets) to combine segments related to different regular expressions. As we will discuss, this method leverages the overlap between different segments.

### 3.2.1 O<sup>3</sup>FA Data Structure

We now discuss the design of O<sup>3</sup>FA, a composite automata-based solution that implements the scheme described above. As mentioned, O<sup>3</sup>FA consists of two components:

- One or more regular **DFAs** used to perform regular expression matching and constructed based on the given regular expression set. Any automata optimization techniques [116, 120, 20, 19, 23, 22, 26, 21, 17, 119, 178] can be applied to these DFAs.
- **Supporting-FAs** used to detect and record significant segments of incoming packets. According to the above discussion, supporting-FAs should be constructed to detect segments matching regular expressions prefixes and suffixes, and can therefore be of two kinds: *prefix-FAs* and *suffix-FAs*. These automata can be in either NFA or in DFA form.

In order to build the prefix- and suffix-FAs, we split the regular expressions at the positions of the repetition sub-patterns. For example, regular expression *abc.\*def.\*ghk* will be broken down into

three sub-patterns:  $. *abc. *$ ,  $. *def. *$  and  $. *ghk. *$  (the  $. *$  before  $abc$  is due to the fact that the original regular expression is unanchored, that is, it can be matched at any position of the input stream). This breakdown is possible because the supporting-FAs are used to record packet segments, and not to perform pattern matching; the short packet segments recorded by breaking down the regular expressions into sub-patterns will be concatenated into larger segments during processing. This breakdown allows significantly simplifying the supporting automata: by allowing dot-star terms to appear only at the beginning or at the end of each pattern, it will avoid state explosion when representing the supporting-FAs in DFA form. The full prefix and suffix sets corresponding to the given sub-patterns are:  $\{. *abc. *, . *abc, . *ab, . *a, . *def. *, . *def, . *de, . *d, . *ghk, . *gh, . *g\}$  and  $\{. *abc. *, abc. *, bc. *, c. *, . *def. *, def. *, ef. *, f. *, . *ghk, ghk, hk, k\}$ , respectively. However, some simplifications are possible. First, since the suffixes must be matched at the beginning of packets (Observation 1) and can end anywhere within a packet, the  $. *$  at the end of each suffix is redundant. Second, patterns that are common to prefix and suffix sets (e.g.  $. *abc, . *def, . *ghk$ ) can be removed from the prefix set (these patterns would lead to the detection of the same segments<sup>5</sup>). Third, sub-patterns that are covered by more general patterns belonging to the same set (e.g.  $abc$  is a special case of  $. *abc$ ) can also be eliminated. After these simplifications, the prefix and suffix sets used to build the prefix- and suffix-FA will be  $\{. *abc. *, . *ab, . *a, . *def. *, . *de, . *d, . *gh, . *g\}$  and  $\{. *abc, bc, c, . *def, ef, f, . *ghk, hk, k\}$ , respectively. Note that the suffix set contains both anchored and unanchored patterns (the latter start by  $. *$ ). These two groups of patterns can be compiled in two different suffix-FAs (i.e., an *anchored* and an *unanchored suffix-FA*) to allow space optimizations when representing the automata in DFA form.

During processing, upon a match within a supporting-FA, the corresponding accepting state must be recorded, and it will then be used to retrieve the packet segments to be concatenated to the current input packet. This "extended" input packet will then be processed by the "regular" DFA. However, some matches that occur within the supporting-FAs can be discarded, thus diminishing the amount of information that must be recorded to reconstruct relevant packet segments. First,

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<sup>5</sup>The reason why these patterns are removed by the prefix set will become apparent later. Specifically, since all prefix matches in the middle of packets can be discarded, keeping these patterns in the suffix set ensures that they will be detected by the suffix-FA.

since prefixes need to be matched only at the end of packets (Observation 1), all prefix matches occurring in the middle of any packets can be discarded. Second, if multiple anchored suffixes of a regular expression are matched, only the longest one must be recorded (shorter suffixes will be subsumed by it).

Figure 3.1 shows an example on regular expression set  $\{abc.*def, ghk\}$ , both patterns are unanchored (that is, they can be matched at any position of the input stream). The prefix set, anchored suffix set and unanchored suffix set are  $\{.*abc.*, .*ab, .*a, .*de, .*d, .*gh, .*g\}$ ,  $\{bc, c, ef, f, hk, k\}$  and  $\{.*abc, .*def, .*ghk\}$ , respectively. Figure 3.1 (a)-(d) show the resulting regular DFA, prefix-FA, anchored suffix-FA and unanchored suffix-FA; all supporting-FAs are left in NFA form. We assume three input packets:  $P_1=bhab$ ,  $P_2=cegh$  and  $P_3=adef$ , with the arriving order being  $P_3 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow P_2$ . After  $P_3$  is processed, the matching state sets of regular DFA and anchored suffix-FA are empty; the unanchored suffix-FA matching states is 6; the prefix-FA matching states are  $\{8, 9\}$ ; since those matches do not happen at the tail of  $P_3$ , they will be discarded. Then, we process  $P_1$ ; the matching state sets of regular DFA, anchored suffix-FA and unanchored suffix-FA are empty; the prefix-FA matching states are  $\{5, 6\}$ ; since only matching state 5 is active at the end of  $P_1$  processing, this sole prefix-FA state will be recorded. When  $P_2$  arrives, we should first check the recorded information of its previously processed neighbor packets (i.e., predecessor  $P_1$  and successor  $P_3$ ):  $P_1$  has a recorded prefix-FA state 5; the retrieved segment is  $ab$  and should be concatenated to  $P_2$  as a prefix.  $P_3$  has a recorded unanchored suffix-FA state 6; the retrieved segment is  $def$  and should be concatenated to  $P_2$  as a suffix. Then, the modified  $P_2$  is  $abceghdef$ ; after it is processed with the regular DFA, the matching of the pattern  $abc.*def$  will be reported.

### 3.3 Optimizations

Our basic O<sup>3</sup>FA design has two limitations: it can lead to false positives (that is, it may report invalid matches) and it can suffer from inefficiencies during processing. In this section, we describe a mechanism - called Index Tags - to avoid false positives, and a suitable format for the supporting-




Figure 3.1: (a) DFA accepting pattern set  $\{abc.*def, ghk\}$ , (b) prefix-FA, (c) anchored suffix-FA and (d) unanchored suffix-FA built upon corresponding prefix set, anchored suffix set and unanchored suffix set. Accepting states are colored gray.

FAs and two auxiliary data structures to improve the matching speed.

### 3.3.1 Index Tags

Our initial  $O^3$ FA engine design may report false positives in the presence of multiple regular expressions. For example, consider a dataset with two regular expressions:  $\{bc.*d, acd\}$ . Two input packets  $P_1:caaba$  and  $P_2:cabdc$  are received out of order ( $P_2 \rightarrow P_1$ ). Obviously, no matches should be reported on the corresponding input stream  $caabacabdc$ . However, in our basic  $O^3$ FA design, the anchored suffix-FA will detect the segment  $cabd$  of  $P_2$  that matches suffix  $c.*d$  of the first pattern; when  $P_1$  arrives, segment  $cd$  will be retrieved and concatenated to  $P_1$  as a suffix, leading to the extended packet  $caabacd$ . Processing this packet with the regular DFA will lead to the false match  $acd$  to be reported.

To understand the root cause of this problem, we make the following observation.

**Observation 3:** Let  $R$  be a set of regular expressions,  $R'$  a proper subset of  $R$ , and  $r$  a regular

expression belonging to  $R$  but not to  $R'$ . Let  $S$  be the set of segments of the input packets that match any prefix or suffix of regular expressions in  $R'$ . If there exists at least a segment in  $S$  that also matches a prefix or suffix of regular expression  $r$ , then a false positive can be reported during processing.

In the example above, let  $R$  be  $\{bc.*d, acd\}$ , and  $R'$  be  $\{bc.*d\}$ . We observe that segment  $cd$  of  $P_2$  matches pattern  $bc.*d$  in  $R'$  as well as pattern  $acd$  that belongs to  $R$  but not to  $R'$ . This fact leads to the false positive indicated above.

Based on this observation, in order to eliminate false positives, we must correlate the matched suffixes and prefixes with the corresponding regular expressions. To this end, we assign an *index tag* to each regular expression, and associate these index tags to the corresponding accepting states within regular and supporting FAs. During processing, we store the index tags associated to all traversed supporting-FA accepting states in a *tag list*. When the regular DFA reports a match, if the index tag of the matched regular expression is in the tag list, then the match is valid; otherwise, it is a false positive. Consider the example above; let  $tag1$  and  $tag2$  be the index tags of patterns  $bc.*d$  and  $acd$ , correspondingly. When the prefix  $cabd$  of  $P_2$  is detected to match suffix  $c.*d$  of the first pattern,  $tag1$  is pushed in the tag list. After the extended packet  $caabacd$  is processed against the regular DFA, the match of pattern  $acd$  will be discarded as false positive, since the index tag  $tag2$  is not in the tag list.

### 3.3.2 Compressed Suffix-NFA

As mentioned above, the supporting-FAs may be represented either in NFA or in DFA form. We recall that NFAs are compact but may suffer from multiple concurrent state activations, which may negatively affect the processing time. On the other hand, DFAs have the benefit of a single state activation for each input character at the cost of a potentially large number of states, affecting the memory space required to encode the automaton. In this section, we point out the most effective representation for each of the supporting-FAs.

We recall that, in our  $O^3FA$  design, the anchored suffix set contains only exact-match patterns. An NFA containing only anchored exact-match patterns can have only one active state. Thus, the anchored suffix-FA can be left in NFA form without loss in processing efficiency. We denote this automaton as **anchored suffix-NFA (asNFA)**.

The anchored suffix set can have a large amount of redundancy due to the nature of suffixes. An  $n$ -character pattern can lead to  $n-1$  suffixes, with every two adjacent suffixes differing in only one character. This creates compression opportunities for asNFA. We propose a **compressed suffix-NFA (csNFA)** representation, which reduces both the asNFA size and bandwidth requirements. Specifically, given the nature of the suffixes of any given pattern, we merge the asNFA states and transitions starting from the tail states. Figure 3.2 shows an example. Figure 3.2(a) is the asNFA built upon anchor suffix set  $\{bcdca, cdca, dca, ca, a\}$ ; Figure 3.2(b) is the corresponding csNFA. In this example, the compression reduces the number of NFA states from sixteen to six and removes six transitions.




Figure 3.2: (a) asNFA and (b) csNFA built upon anchored suffix set  $\{bcdca, cdca, dca, ca, a\}$ . Accepting states are colored gray.

While more compact, csNFA requires a more elaborate segments retrieval procedure. In an asNFA, segments retrieval can be done by simply tracking back from the recorded matching states to the entry state. However, in the optimized csNFA, this straightforward approach does not work since the backtracking may lead to ambiguity at some states. To address this problem, during csNFA traversal we identify all states that are active after the processing of the first input character and assign state pair  $\langle start\_state, end\_state \rangle$  to each active state, where  $start\_states$  are these active

states and *end\_states* are last states of the traversed paths originating from them. Only state pairs  $\langle start\_state, end\_state \rangle$  such that *end\_states* are accepting states are significant; moreover, as we discussed in Section 3.2, only the state pair representing the longest matching path needs to be recorded. The matched segment can then be retrieved by tracing the csNFA matching path using the recorded state pair. Since the anchored suffix set includes only exact-match patterns, the *start\_states* set has a limited size and the active paths are expected to go dead after the processing of a small number of input characters, reducing the amount of processing. Our experiments in Section 3.5 confirm the efficiency of this proposed compression scheme.

As an example, we consider the csNFA of Figure 3.2(b) and input *cadc*. csNFA processes the first input as  $\{0\} - c \rightarrow \{2,4\}$ ; we assign state pairs to both active states and track the traversal:  $\{2\} - a \rightarrow \{\emptyset\}$ ,  $\{4\} - a \rightarrow \{5\}$ . Since the first path goes dead and the second path reaches the tail state of the csNFA, the traversal leads to two state pairs:  $\langle 2,2 \rangle$  and  $\langle 4,5 \rangle$ . Since only state 5 is an accepting state and  $\langle 4,5 \rangle$  matches the longest segment, only state pair  $\langle 4,5 \rangle$  needs to be recorded. State pair  $\langle 4,5 \rangle$  should then be back-traced as  $5 - a \rightarrow 4 - c \rightarrow 0$ , leading to the retrieval of segment *ca*.

### 3.3.3 Prefix- and Suffix-DFA with State Map

We recall that all patterns in the prefix set and unanchored suffix set are unanchored (that is, they may be matched at any position of the input stream). Since their entry state is always active (potentially leading to the concurrent activation of multiple NFA branches), NFAs accepting unanchored patterns tend to have multiple concurrent active states, which negatively affect the processing time. By requiring a single state activation for each input character processed, a DFA representation guarantees minimal processing time, potentially at the cost of a larger memory requirement. However, we recall that patterns in the prefix and suffix sets do not have wildcard repetitions, and thus do not lead to significant state explosion. Thus, the DFA format is suitable for both prefix- and unanchored suffix-FAs; we denote these automata as **prefix-DFA (pDFA)** and **suffix-DFA (sDFA)**.






Figure 3.3: (a) NFA format and (b) sDFA with states map for unanchored suffix set  $\{.*abc, .*bcd\}$ . Accepting states are colored gray.

The number of states in a DFA can be minimized through a well-known procedure [115]. In addition, as discussed in Section 3.2, all prefix matches occurring in the middle of packets can be ignored. This allows further optimizations to the prefix-DFA. Specifically, all accepting states that do not present a self-loop can be made non-accepting, and all self-loops can be removed from the remaining accepting states. This simplification can both reduce the size of the prefix-DFA and simplify the processing (by making a filtering step to remove non-terminal matches unnecessary).

The use of a DFA representation for these automata, however, has a drawback: it complicates the retrieval of the matching input segments. Since there may be multiple paths leading to the same DFA state, it is not possible to retrieve the input segment solely based on the recorded DFA state. To tackle this problem, we propose using a *state map*, which maps the pDFA/sDFA states to the corresponding NFA states; segment retrieval can then be done by back-tracing NFA paths. Since pDFA and sDFA do not suffer from state explosion, the size of this state map is contained. One DFA state may map to multiple NFA states; in those cases, however, only the NFA state that leads to the longest retrieved segment needs to be included in the state map, allowing a one-to-one mapping.

We illustrate this design through an example. Let us consider pattern  $.*abc.*bcd$ . The corresponding unanchored suffix and prefix sets are  $\{.*abc, .*bcd\}$  and  $\{.*abc.*, .*ab, .*a, .*bc, .*b\}$ , respectively. The corresponding automata are shown in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. Specifi-




Figure 3.4: (a) original NFA format, (b) optimized NFA, (c) pDFA with states map for prefix set  $\{.*abc.*, .*ab, .*a, .*bc, .*b\}$ . Accepting states are colored gray.

cally, Figure 3.3 (a) and (b) show the unanchored suffix-NFA and the sDFA and state map, respectively. Figure 3.4 (a), (b) and (c) show the prefix-NFA, the reduced prefix-NFA obtained by applying the optimizations discussed above, and the resulting pDFA and state map, respectively. Suppose that the input packet is *bcdababedcb*. The traversal of pDFA in Figure 3.4 (c) is:  $0 \rightarrow b \rightarrow 4 \rightarrow c \rightarrow 5 \rightarrow d \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow b \rightarrow 4 \rightarrow a \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow b \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow c \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow d \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow c \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow b \rightarrow 4$ . The traversed accepting state (state 3) and the final active state (state 4) must be recorded. To retrieve the input segments, we first map those states to NFA states 3 and 7 by looking up the state map, and then back-trace along the NFA. This operation leads to the retrieval of segments *abc* and *b*. Segment retrieval on the sDFA is performed using the same procedure.

### 3.3.4 Quick Retrieval Table

Retrieving input segments by back-tracing along NFA paths can be inefficient. To improve efficiency, we propose the use of a *quick retrieval table*, which maps the NFA states directly to portions of regular expressions. This table allows retrieving input segments without back-tracing. A quick retrieval table lookup returns an offset in the relevant regular expression; the input segment can then be extracted directly from the regular expression. This data structure is particularly beneficial




Figure 3.5: (a) csNFA and (b) quick retrieval table for anchored suffix set  $\{bcdca, cdca, dca, ca, a\}$ . Accepting states are colored gray. Each char. position is a pair of index tag and offset, i.e.,  $\langle tag, offset \rangle$

in the case of long segments.

As an example, consider regular expression *abcdca*. The anchored suffix set and corresponding csNFA are the same as for the example in Section 3.3.2. Figure 3.5 (a) shows the csNFA and Figure 3.5 (b) shows the quick retrieval table, which stores  $\langle index\ tag, offset \rangle$  pairs. We recall that index tags point to regular expressions. If the recorded state pair is  $\langle 4, 5 \rangle$ , for example, a lookup in the quick retrieval table will return index tag *tag1* corresponding to pattern *abcdca*, and start- and end- offsets 5 and 6, respectively. This will result in retrieving segment *ca*.

### 3.3.5 Functionally Equivalent Packets

Any incoming packet may contain multiple segments that match a prefix or a suffix. For example, the sample packet in Section 3.3.3 contains two segments that match two different prefixes. All these segments should be recorded and retrieved properly, and all retrieved segments should be processed with the current input packet. A simple approach is to sequentially concatenate the segments retrieved to the current packet and process all modified current packets. For example, supposing the current packet is *efgh*, using the same example of Section 3.3.3, then two retrieved segments are *abc* and *b*, and the two corresponding concatenated current packets *abcefgh* and *befgh* should be processed serially. This solution can be highly inefficient. However, concurrently concatenating all retrieved segments to the current packet is not straightforward, since many segments may have overlaps. Our proposed solution is the *Functionally Equivalent Packet* (FEP), which has the main idea that we construct an alternate packet based on all retrieved segments then




Figure 3.6: (a) NFA format and (b) pDFA with states map built upon prefix set  $\{.*ab.*, .*a, .*bc, .*b\}$ . (c) Construction of functionally equivalent packet to packet  $P_2=eabc$ .

deal with the alternate packet instead of segments. Such an alternate packet contains all effective information (i.e., all detected segments) of the original packet and thus is functionally equivalent to the original one.

Consider the example RegEx  $ab.*bcd$ ; the prefix set is  $\{.*ab.*, .*a, .*bc, .*b\}$ . Figure 3.6 (a) and (b) are the NFA format and pDFA with a states map for this prefix set. Supposing the input packets are  $P_1=afab$ ,  $P_2=eabc$  and  $P_3=defg$ , there is obviously only one matching of  $ab.*bcd$  across all three packets. Two pDFA states 2 and 4 are recorded after packet  $P_2$  is processed, representing two detected segments that match prefixes  $.*ab.*$  and  $.*bc$ . The retrieved alternate segments are  $ab$  and  $bc$ . Directly concatenating both segments to  $P_3$  as  $abbcdefg$  can cause a false-positive matching. Our FEP design needs only one change that recording  $\langle state, offset \rangle$  pairs instead of only matched states; the *offset* is the offset of matched segments last character in the packet. When retrieving segments, all retrieved alternate segments will be filled into an empty string, filling positions accord to their offsets; then, the filled string will be shrunk to get FEP. Figure 3.6 (c) shows the construction of FEP to  $P_2$ .  $\langle 2, 3 \rangle$  and  $\langle 4, 4 \rangle$  are two recorded  $\langle state, offset \rangle$  pairs. The alternate FEP of  $P_2$  is  $abc$ ; substituting  $P_2$  by FEP in the data stream as  $afababcdefg$  will not affect the matching results.

## 3.4 O<sup>3</sup>FA-based System

In this Section, we provide the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine, which is a completed system based upon the O<sup>3</sup>FA design and can perform regular expression matching on out-of-order packets. We also provide worst-case analysis in this section.

### 3.4.1 O<sup>3</sup>FA Engine Architecture

Our O<sup>3</sup>FA engine consists of four major components:

- Regular Expression Parser
- Finite-automata Kernel
- States Buffer
- Functionally Equivalent Packet Constructor

Regular Expression Parser (RegEx Parser) is for preprocessing the regular expression set as well as building the corresponding prefix set and anchored/unanchored suffix set. Finite-automata Kernel (FA Kernel) is the operational core of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine consisting of both regular DFA and supporting-FAs. States Buffer is the buffer to store automata states generated by FA Kernel. Functionally Equivalent Packet Constructor (FEP Constructor) is the component for constructing FEPs by properly querying stored information in States Buffer.

Figure 3.7 is the schematic diagram of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine architecture. The blue-colored components are components involved in the regular expression dataset processing; the yellow-colored components are components involved in the input packet processing. Notice that FA Kernel is involved in both processing, since it is built in dataset processing and should be used for packet processing. The blue arrows show the dataset processing flow, while the yellow dotted-line arrows show the packet processing flow.




Figure 3.7: Overview of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine. The blue parts are dataset processing components; the yellow parts are input packet processing components.

**RegEx Parser:** This component works offline. It breaks regular expressions as described in Section 3.2, and it generates a corresponding prefix set and anchored/unanchored suffix set for supporting-FA construction.

**FA Kernel:** FA Kernel is the operational core of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine. It takes outputs from RegEx Parser and builds regular DFA and supporting-FAs following the O<sup>3</sup>FA design. According to discussions in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, FA Kernel specifically consists of **regular DFA (rDFA)**, **compressed suffix-NFA (csNFA)**, **prefix-DFA (pDFA)** and **suffix-DFA (sDFA)**. This O<sup>3</sup>FA construction works offline.

Once the O<sup>3</sup>FA is built, FA Kernel keeps processing packets online. It interacts with States Buffer and FEP Constructor by getting FEPs from FEP Constructor and storing proper matching information to States Buffer. The matching procedures are discussed in previous sections.

**States Buffer:** The States Buffer is an auxiliary component to assist both FA Kernel and FEP Constructor. It stores the matching state information generated by FA Kernel and can be queried by FEP Constructor to provide information for FEP construction.

As discussed in Section 3.3, States Buffer will store final states of regular DFAs and state pairs  $\langle start\_state, end\_state \rangle$  generated by csNFA as well as  $\langle state, offset \rangle$  pairs generated by pDFA and sDFA. Specifically, States Buffer will create an entry with *packet ID* for each arriving packet; if the current packet has neither an arrived predecessor nor successor, it will be directly processed in FA Kernel, and its entry will store the generated matching state information; if the current packet has an arrived predecessor/successor, then FEP Constructor will query the predecessor/successors

entry in States Buffer, and it will construct FEPs of arrived predecessor/successor packets based upon stored information in the entry. The FEP will be concatenated with the current packet, and the modified packet will be processed in FA Kernel; then, the matching state information will be stored in the current packets entry, and the corresponding predecessor/successor entry can be empty since all of the predecessor/successors information is already contained in the current packets entry.

Intuitively, the States Buffer will have a much smaller size than the packet buffer in general, since several state pairs can represent a whole packet, and States Buffer entries may be dynamically clear during matching. Experimental data in the evaluation section will support this inference. Worst-case discussion will also be provided in a later section.

**FEP Constructor:** The FEP constructor uses state information provided by the State Buffer to reconstruct functionally equivalent packets, as described in Section 3.3.5.

### 3.4.2 O<sup>3</sup>FA Engine Work Flow

The O<sup>3</sup>FA engine can keep processing the incoming packets once the O<sup>3</sup>FA in FA Kernel is built. For each current packet, the processing procedure should follow the below steps:

- 1) For any current packet, first check States Buffer to look up its arrived predecessor/successor. If you find it, go to step 2; otherwise, go to step 3.
- 2) FEP Constructor queries States Buffer and constructs FEP based upon the predecessor/successor buffer entry; then, it concatenates FEP with the current packet and outputs the concatenated packet to FA Kernel.
- 3) FA Kernel processes the current packet (concatenated packet), generates *<start`state, end`state>/<state, offset>* state pairs and writes them to States Buffer.
- 4) States Buffer creates an entry for the current packet and stores state pairs generated by FA Kernel in it. If the current packet has an arrived predecessor/successor, then predecessor/successors entries can be empty, and pointers can be added from those empty entries to the

current packets entry for lookup purposes.

Figure 3.8 shows the flow chart of packet processing, following the same rule of the above steps.




Figure 3.8: Packet processing flow chart. Dotted arrows indicate alternative paths if there are no arrived successor/predecessor packets.

### 3.4.3 Worst-case Analysis

Two aspects can affect the capacity of our proposed  $O^3FA$  engine. One is States Buffers size: A larger buffer size means more vulnerability to a denial of service attack; the other is the traversal overhead, which is caused by FEP. A longer FEP means more overhead, since the concatenated packets will be longer than the actual current packet. In this section, we will provide worst-case analysis for these two aspects.

Each non-empty States Buffer entry will store one *packet ID*, several rDFA final states (equal to



rDFA number in multi-DFA case), one  $\langle start\ state, end\ state \rangle$  pair and multiple  $\langle state, offset \rangle$  pairs. The first three have firm and tiny sizes, while the last one has an indefinite size, since we cannot bind the numbers of segments in a packet that matches the prefix and unanchored suffix. Our evaluation shows, in practice, these two numbers are also very small. However, in theory, they could be large enough. To provide an upper-boundary, we set a threshold of buffer entry size: If the actual entry size is less than the threshold, then states will still be stored in the entry; otherwise, the whole data packet will be stored instead. This ensures our O<sup>3</sup>FA engine will never be worse than the regular packet buffering scheme in the memory requirement. Later, our evaluation shows, in practice, the numbers of  $\langle state, offset \rangle$  pairs are very small; thus, the entry sizes are always far less than the threshold.

Similarly, the FEP length is indefinite; however, it will not exceed the length of a regular packet. Thus, the upper-boundary of the traversal overhead for each current packet should be the length of the packet payload. The evaluation section will also show that the FEPs are very small compared to the current packets, in practice.

### 3.5 Evaluation

In this section, we provide experimental data to show the feasibility of our O<sup>3</sup>FA engine design. Specifically, our experiments are designed to analyze the following aspects: (i) O<sup>3</sup>FA memory footprint on reasonably large and complex regular expression sets; (ii) savings in buffer size requirements of O<sup>3</sup>FA engine compared to traditional flow reassembly schemes; (iii) memory bandwidth overhead of supporting-FAs; and (iv) O<sup>3</sup>FA traversal efficiency.

### 3.5.1 Datasets & Streams

In our experiments, we use two real world and six synthetic datasets. The real world datasets contain *backdoor* and *spyware* rules from the widely used Snort NIDS<sup>6</sup> (snapshot from December 2011), and they include 176 and 304 regular expressions, respectively. The synthetic datasets have been generated through the synthetic regular expression generator<sup>7</sup> [179] using tokens extracted from the *backdoor* rules. Each synthetic dataset contains 500 regular expressions. The synthetic *dot-star\** datasets contain a varying fraction of dot-star sub-patterns (5%, 10% and 20%); in the synthetic *range\** datasets 50% and 100% of the patterns include character sets; finally, the synthetic *exact-match* dataset contains only exact-matching strings.

For each dataset, we generate 16 synthetic traces using the traffic trace generator<sup>7</sup> [179]. This tool allows for generating traces that simulate various amount of malicious activity. This can be realized by tuning parameter  $p_M$ , which indicates the probability of malicious traffic. In addition, to allow randomization, a probabilistic seed parameter can be used to configure the trace generation. In our experiments, we use four probabilistic seeds and four  $p_M$  values: 0.35, 0.55, 0.75 and 0.95, i.e., 16 traces in total for each dataset. All traces have a 1 MB size. Each of the data points below has been obtained by averaging the results reported on four simulations, each using a different probabilistic seed.

### 3.5.2 Packet Reordering

To simulate out-of-order packet arrival, we break each synthetic stream down into multiple packets and reorder these packets. Packet reordering is driven by two parameters: the out-of-order degree  $k$  and the stride  $s$ . Parameter  $k$  indicates the minimum number of arrived packets that are needed for partial stream reconstruction; parameter  $s$  indicates the maximum stride between two consecutive packets within each group of  $k$  packets.

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<sup>6</sup><https://www.snort.org/>

<sup>7</sup><http://regex.wustl.edu/>

For example, let us assume a stream consisting of eight packets:  $P_1$  to  $P_8$ . If we set  $k=2$  and  $s=1$ , then packets are reordered as  $P_2 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow P_4 \rightarrow P_3 \rightarrow P_6 \rightarrow P_5 \rightarrow P_8 \rightarrow P_7$ ; if we set  $k=4$  and  $s=1$ , then packets are reordered as  $P_4 \rightarrow P_3 \rightarrow P_2 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow P_8 \rightarrow P_7 \rightarrow P_6 \rightarrow P_5$ ; if we set  $k=4$  and  $s=2$ , the packets order will be  $P_4 \rightarrow P_2 \rightarrow P_3 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow P_8 \rightarrow P_6 \rightarrow P_7 \rightarrow P_5$ . Obviously,  $k=1$  and  $s=1$  implies natural ordering, while  $k=(\text{number of packets})$  and  $s=1$  leads to reverse ordering (in the example, from  $P_8$  down to  $P_1$ ).

This packets reordering scheme allows us to characterize how the packet order affects the performance of the  $O^3FA$  engine, and to compare the  $O^3FA$  engine with the traditional input stream reassembly method. In our experiments, we break each 1MB stream into 16 packets, each having the 64KB standard TCP packet size. We reorder packets of each stream using three parameter settings:  $k=2/s=1$ ,  $k=4/s=1$  and  $k=4/s=2$ .

### 3.5.3 Experiment Results

We first present the experiment results regarding the finite automata kernel's and the state buffer's memory consumptions respectively, and then show the evaluation results about the overhead of memory bandwidth and state traversal in last two subsections.

#### 3.5.3.1 $O^3FA$ Memory Footprint

First, we evaluate the memory footprint of the  $O^3FA$  supporting each of the considered datasets. The *backdoor*, *spyware* and *dotstar\** datasets include sub-patterns (e.g. dot-stars) leading to state explosion. To limit state explosion, for these datasets we break the regular DFA into multiple DFAs [120] (the number of DFA ranges from 8 to 15). Due to their simplicity, the *exact-match* and *range\** datasets can be supported by a single regular DFA. The total number of regular DFA states ranges from 9k to 254k across the considered datasets. We recall that the supporting-FAs are of three kinds: compressed suffix-NFA (csNFA), prefix-DFA (pDFA) and suffix-DFA (sDFA). As discussed in Section 4, none of the supporting-FAs suffers from state explosion, leading to rela-

Table 3.1: Memory footprint of FA kernels (MB)

Dataset	FA Kernel	
	<i>Regular multi-DFAs</i>	<i>Supporting-FAs</i>
<i>Backdoor</i>	60	0.62
<i>Spyware</i>	56	1.35
<i>Dotstar.05</i>	26	3.58
<i>Dotstar.1</i>	60	3.12
<i>Dotstar.2</i>	100	2.76
<i>Range.5</i>	5.6	2.43
<i>Range1</i>	5.8	2.05
<i>Exact-match</i>	4.7	1.92

tively small automata. The number of csNFA, sDFA and pDFA states ranges from 2k to 13k, from 1k to 13k and from 1k to 9k, respectively. *Range\** datasets have larger supporting-FA sizes. This is because all character sets must be exhaustively enumerated before constructing the supporting-FAs, resulting in large prefix and suffix sets. The number of transitions of the csNFA ranges from 5k to 27k. To achieve memory space efficiency, we apply defaulttransition compression [21] to DFAs. Table 3.1 shows the estimated memory footprint of the resulting  $O^3FA$  (we assume 32-bit transitions). As can be seen,  $O^3FA$  requires about 100MB memory space in the worst case, which does not put pressure to commodity systems. In addition, because supporting-FAs do not suffer from state explosion, their size is in all cases limited, and their memory space overhead is negligible in case of complex datasets including dot-star terms.

### 3.5.3.2 Buffer Size Savings

Figure 3.9 shows the maximum buffer size requirement comparison between the  $O^3FA$  engine and a traditional flow reassembly scheme [12]. The  $O^3FA$  engine uses the state buffer described in Section 3.4, while the flow reassembly scheme uses a packet buffer. The optimized flow reassembly scheme reassembles a partial stream once the buffered packets allow it and then processes that partial stream and flushes the corresponding packet buffer entries. For each value of  $p_M$ , we average the results reported using four probabilistic seeds. In the charts, the six bars represent




Figure 3.9: Minimum buffer size requirements for optimized reassembly scheme and O<sup>3</sup>FA engine on eight datasets. Note that the vertical coordinate is in logarithmic scale.

combinations of the two considered packet processing schemes and the three reordered packet sequences ( $k=2/s=1$ ,  $k=4/s=1$ , and  $k=4/s=2$ ). In all cases, we report the logarithmic value of the buffer size.

Overall, the  $O^3FA$  engine with state buffer achieves 20x-4000x less buffer size requirement than does the optimized flow reassembly scheme with packet buffer. We can also see how the packet order and malicious traffic probability affect the buffer size: (i) as could be expected, the degree of packet reordering  $k$  affects the packet buffer size, while  $s$  does not, and the buffer size has a linear relationship with  $k$ ; (ii)  $k$  has a minor effect on the state buffer size, while  $s$  has a major effect on it; (iii)  $p_M$  has a major effect on the state buffer size: a higher  $p_M$  leads to a larger buffer requirement.

These effects can be explained as follow. First, since the considered flow reassembly scheme flushes the packet buffer entries after partial stream reconstruction, the packet buffer size is affected only by the minimum number of packets required for partial reassembly, which is controlled by parameter  $k$ ; on the other hand, the size of the state buffer is affected by the number and size of non-empty buffer entries, which are related to the detected segments and the arrived predecessors/-successors. The former is affected by  $p_M$ , while the latter is affected by the stride parameter  $s$ . Specifically,  $k=2$  and  $k=4$  lead to two and four packets being buffered before partial reassembly, while  $s$  does not affect this number; thus,  $k=4/s=1$  and  $k=4/s=2$  lead to the same packet buffer size, and to twice the packet buffer size than the  $k=2/s=1$  case. However,  $s$  affects the arrival order of the predecessor/successor of the current packet, thus affecting the size of the state buffer.  $s=1$  and  $s=2$  lead to two and three entries required (one for previous groups of  $k$  packets, the others for packets out of current  $k$  packets having neither a predecessor nor a successor), respectively; thus,  $k=2/s=1$  and  $k=4/s=1$  lead approximately to the same state buffer size requirement, while  $k=4/s=2$  leads approximately to a 1.5x larger state buffer. Because a higher probability of malicious traffic leads to the possible detection of more packet segments by supporting-FAs, resulting in more matching state information being stored in buffer entries, a larger  $p_M$  can lead to an increased state buffer size requirement.

Table 3.2: Ratio between the number of csNFA states traversed and the number of input characters processed (%)

Dataset	k=2, s=1				k=4, s=1				k=4, s=2			
	$P_{M=0.35}$	$P_{M=0.55}$	$P_{M=0.75}$	$P_{M=0.95}$	$P_{M=0.35}$	$P_{M=0.55}$	$P_{M=0.75}$	$P_{M=0.95}$	$P_{M=0.35}$	$P_{M=0.55}$	$P_{M=0.75}$	$P_{M=0.95}$
<i>Backdoor</i>	151	212	292	367	364	354	462	1060	151	212	292	367
<i>Spyware</i>	619	1051	1220	1349	1215	2037	2295	1944	619	1051	1220	1349
<i>Dotstar.05</i>	844	879	1230	2722	1818	1462	1591	4118	844	879	1230	2722
<i>Dotstar.1</i>	552	750	1106	2737	1184	1242	1784	4168	552	750	1106	2737
<i>Dotstar.2</i>	381	641	1198	3122	557	1167	1894	3798	381	641	1198	3122
<i>Range.5</i>	1021	1065	2276	2347	1929	1956	3658	4018	1021	1065	2276	2347
<i>Range1</i>	669	1238	2287	4118	1780	2003	3481	7266	669	1238	2287	4118
<i>E-M</i>	410	658	1531	3293	1476	1463	2055	4587	410	658	1531	3293

### 3.5.3.3 Memory Bandwidth Overhead

While in traditional solutions the memory bandwidth requirement of the regular expression matching engine is dominated by the processing of the regular DFAs,  $O^3FA$  engines have a memory bandwidth overhead due to the processing of supporting-FAs. In particular, while DFA components add a single state traversal (or memory access) per input character, NFA components can potentially have a more significant effect on the memory bandwidth requirement. Table 3.2 shows the ratio between the number of csNFA states traversed and the number of input characters processed. As can be seen, this ratio is generally small (well below 1), leading to limited memory bandwidth overhead. This small number of NFA state activations can be explained as follows: since the csNFA is anchored, most state activations will die after processing a small number of input characters.

### 3.5.3.4 Traversal Overhead

Because of FEP processing, the  $O^3FA$  engine may process more characters than inputs. These additional characters processed bring traversal overhead over conventional stream reassembly methods. Table 3.3 shows the  $O^3FA$  traversal overhead, expressed as a percentage ratio between the number of extra characters processed and the size of the input stream. As can be seen, the traversal over-

Table 3.3: O<sup>3</sup>FA traversal overhead compared to conventional stream reassembly methods (%)

Dataset	k=2, s=1				k=4, s=1				k=4, s=2			
	$P_M=0.35$	$P_M=0.55$	$P_M=0.75$	$P_M=0.95$	$P_M=0.35$	$P_M=0.55$	$P_M=0.75$	$P_M=0.95$	$P_M=0.35$	$P_M=0.55$	$P_M=0.75$	$P_M=0.95$
<i>Backdoor</i>	120	107	363	3437	222	146	768	5390	125	80	302	3540
<i>Spyware</i>	62	61	1398	25546	106	95	2764	38484	60	52	790	25614
<i>Dotstar.05</i>	109	80	2774	10625	231	408	4711	15958	141	232	2810	10628
<i>Dotstar.1</i>	43	136	122	23773	126	319	192	35512	77	143	117	23556
<i>Dotstar.2</i>	88	97	168	36339	173	182	236	54807	103	106	118	36531
<i>Range.5</i>	8	12	34	144	18	21	57	225	10	13	35	135
<i>Range1</i>	7	12	35	129	15	21	54	161	9	13	35	107
<i>E-M</i>	7	12	35	177	15	24	57	225	9	13	35	167

head (0.0006%-5%) is small enough to be negligible in practice. In other words, O<sup>3</sup>FA traversal efficiency is comparable to that of conventional stream reassembly methods.

This traversal overhead is affected by both  $p_M$  and the number of packets with a previously processed predecessor/successor. In our experiments,  $k=4/s=1$  packet sequences have longer FEP lengths than do  $k=2/s=1$  and  $k=4/s=2$  sequences. In addition, a larger  $p_M$  leads to longer FEPs, since it results in more packet segments being detected by supporting-FAs.

In summary, our experiments have shown that: (i) on datasets consisting of a few hundreds regular expressions with varying complexity, the O<sup>3</sup>FA memory footprint is typically less than 100MB, and the supporting-FAs size is limited (3.5MB in the worst case); (ii) O<sup>3</sup>FA state buffers can be up to 20x-4000x smaller than conventional packet buffers; (iii) the O<sup>3</sup>FA bandwidth is linear in the number of incoming characters and not significantly affected by the NFA components of O<sup>3</sup>FA; and (iv) the O<sup>3</sup>FA traversal efficiency is comparable to that of conventional flow reassembly methods.

### 3.6 Conclusions and Future Work

In this chapter we have introduced the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine, a new regular expression-based DPI architecture that can handle out-of-order packets on the fly without requiring packet buffering and stream reassembly. The O<sup>3</sup>FA at the core of the proposal consists of regular DFA(s) and supporting-FAs,



the latter allowing the detection of matches across packet boundaries. We have proposed several optimizations aimed to improve both the matching accuracy and speed of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine. Our experimental evaluation shows the feasibility and efficiency of our proposed O<sup>3</sup>FA engine.

# Chapter 4

## Framework for Approximate Pattern Matching on the Automata Processor

### 4.1 Introduction

Finite Automata (FA) is the core of automata-based searching algorithms of many domain applications in intrusion detection, data mining, bioinformatics, etc. [180]. Compared to the deterministic FA (DFA), the non-deterministic FA (NFA) becomes a more practical and affordable technique due to its much less memory requirement. Recently, Automata Processor (AP) [57] is introduced by Micron for NFA simulations. Micron AP can perform parallel automata processing within memory arrays on SDRAM dies by leveraging memory cells to store trigger symbols and simulate NFA state transitions.

A batch of previous researches investigate accelerating various applications on AP devices [135, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 181] and report hundreds or even thousands of fold speedups against the CPU counterparts. These remarkable achievements are based on limited size datasets within single AP board capacity, hence treat the compilation and configuration overhead as a one-time cost and exclude it from performance comparison. However, we believe such computation-only comparison

becomes unfair when the datasets scale out of single AP board capacity and demand multi-round reconfigurations.

Similar to other reconfigurable devices, AP needs a series of costly processes to generate load-ready binary images. These processes include synthesis, map, place-&-route, post-route physical optimizations, etc., leading to non-negligible configuration time. For small and infrequently changed datasets, it is relatively reasonable to treat the configuration time as one-time preprocessing cost. However, it becomes non-excludeable and very high for the extremely large datasets especially those frequently updated ones, due to three reasons: (1) The large-scale problem size needs multiple rounds of binary image load and flush. (2) In each round, once a new binary image is generated, it will use a full compilation process, which time is as high as several hours. (3) During these processes, the AP device is forced to stall and wait for new images in an idle status. For example, the claimed speedups of AP-based DNA string search [68] and motif search [61] can reach up to 3978x and 201x speedup over their CPU counterparts, respectively. In contrast, if their pattern sets are scaling out and the reconfiguration overhead is included, the speedups will plummet to only 3.8x and 24.7x [69].

AP SDK provides pre-compiled macros to reduce the reconfiguration cost. However, each macro only works for a fixed shape automaton; any automaton structural change forces the construction starting from scratch. Moreover, constructing AP automata from scratch is a cumbersome task requiring considerable expertise on both automata theory and AP architecture, since programmers have to manipulate computational elements, called State Transition Elements (STEs), and inter-connections between them with a low-level Automata Network Markup Language (ANML). Although Software Development Kit (SDK) provides some high-level APIs for a set of but limited applications, e.g., regular expression [58] and string matching [59], users have to switch back to ANML for many specific applications due to their lacking of flexibility and customizability.

In this chapter, we highlight the importance of counting the reconfiguration time towards the overall AP performance, which would provide a better angle for researchers and developers to identify essential hardware architecture features. To this end, we propose a framework allowing users to

fully and easily explore AP device capacity and conduct fair comparison to counterpart hardware. It includes a hierarchical approach to automatically generate AP automata and cascadeable macros to ultimately minimize the reconfiguration cost. Though this framework is general, in this paper we focus on Approximate Pattern Matching (APM) for a better demonstration. Specifically, it takes the types of paradigms, pattern length, and allowed errors as input, and quickly and automatically generates corresponding optimized ANML APM automata for users to test the AP performance. During the generation, enabling our cascadeable macros can maximize the reuse of pre-compiled information and significantly reduce the time on reconfiguration, hence allows users to conduct performance comparison that is fair to both sides. We evaluate this framework using both synthesis and real-world datasets, and conduct end-to-end performance comparison between AP and CPU. We show, even including the multi-round reconfiguration costs, AP with our framework can achieve up to 461x speedup against CPU counterpart. We also show using our cascadeable macros can save 39.6x and 17.5x configuration time compared to using non-macro and conventional macros respectively. The major contributions of this paper include:

- We highlight the importance of counting the reconfiguration time towards the overall AP performance, especially the for large-scale and/or frequently updated datasets.
- We provide a framework for users to easily and fairly conduct performance comparison between AP and its counterparts. It uses a hierarchical approach to automatically generate AP automata and cascadeable macros to ultimately minimize reconfiguration costs.
- We evaluate our framework with AP using both synthesis and real-world datasets, and conduct end-to-end performance comparison (configuration+computation) between AP and CPU. Even including the configuration cost, AP can still achieves hundreds of times speedup against its counterparts.

## 4.2 Background and Motivations

In this section, we will provide the knowledge about the Automata Processors' architecture, execution model, and programming model first, and then describe the programmability and scalability issues existing in the current AP SDK.

### 4.2.1 Automata Processors

**AP Architecture Overview:** Micron's AP is a DRAM-based reconfigurable device dedicated for NFA traversal simulations. Its computational resources consist of three major programmable components: STEs, Counters, and Boolean gates. The STEs are the cores of AP architecture to provide massive parallelism. Each STE includes a memory cell and a next-state decoder to simulate a NFA state with trigger symbols, i.e., 256-bit masks for ASCII characters. Connections between STEs simulate NFA state transitions, implemented by a programmable routing matrix. In a cycle, all active STEs simultaneously compare their trigger symbols to the input character, and then those hit STEs activate all their destination STEs via activation signals emitted by next-state decoders. Counters and Boolean gated are special-purpose elements to extend the capacity of AP chips beyond classical NFAs.

The current generation of AP board (AP-D480) contains 32 chips organized into 4 ranks. Two half-cores reside in an AP chip, which includes a total 49,152 STEs, 768 Counters, and 2,304 Boolean gates. The organization of these programmable elements on each AP chip is organized as following: two STEs and one special-purpose element (a counter or Boolean gate) form a group; 8 groups form a row; 16 rows form a block; and eventually, 192 blocks are evenly distributed into the two half-cores.

**AP Programming and Pre-compiling:** Programming AP relies on ANML, which is a XML-based language. Developers can define their AP automata in ANML by describing the layout of programmable elements (STEs and transitions). Then, an AP toolchain can parse such an ANML automata design and compile it to binary images. At runtime, after the AP board loads a binary

image, it starts to search given patterns against input streams of 8-bit characters by nominally processing one character per clock cycle at 133 MHz frequency. AP reports the events to the host, e.g., CPU, if matches are detected.

Analogous to other reconfigurable devices, AP compilation is a time-consuming process due to the complex place-&-route calculations. To mitigate the overhead of compilation, the AP SDK supports the pre-compile of automata to be *macros* and reuse macros to build larger automata in the future. That way, any subsequent automata having existing macros can be built directly on them with a lightweight relabeling, i.e., changing trigger symbols as demand. This can avoid the recompilation from the ground up.

## 4.2.2 Motivations

**Performance Issues in Reconfiguration:** Although the pre-compiling technique becomes available to alleviate the overhead of reconfiguration, it is strictly restricted to handle an exactly same structure with a pre-compiled macro, including all STEs and transitions between them. If the structure changes, a full and time-consuming compilation process must be invoked, leaving the computing resources in a wait state. For a large-scale problem size, which exceeds the capacity of a single AP board, more costly reconfiguration and soaring execution time may occur. For example, the *alua* dataset from a real-world database used in Bioinformatics sequence search applications demands around 20-fold of STEs supported by a AP board to perform pattern matching against input streams, even if only one error, e.g., insertion or substitution, is allowed. It will lead to 20 rounds of reconfiguration. As shown in our evaluation in Sec. 4.5, a single-round configuration takes as high as 130 seconds, and around 2600 seconds are spent on the reconfiguration in such a case. The conventional pre-compiled macros unfortunately would fall short from reducing this cost, because the change of pattern lengths leads to variable structures of automata in each round. A full recompilation has to be performed each time. Hence, a new approach is of great necessity to extend the scope of pre-compiling by maximizing the reuse of existing macros, even if the structure of automata differs.




Figure 4.1: ANML codes for a simple APM AP automaton

**Programmability Issues:** Fig. 4.2 shows an example of Approximate Pattern Matching, which searches the pattern “abc” and allows one error at most. The STEs take characters “a”, “b”, “c”, and “\*” as input symbols. The symbol infinity means the STE is the starting STE, and the symbol  $R$  means the STE can report the result. We also label STEs with numbers as the STE IDs on AP. The code snippet in Fig. 4.1 shows how to configure this automata on AP with ANML. Developers need to create an element for each STE and define its attributes. An error of Approximate Pattern Matching can be transformed to an insertion, deletion, or substitution, which needs to be programmed as an edge between STEs. For example, there is an edge from the starting STE 0 (with the symbol “a”) to the reporting STE 5 (with the symbol “c”), meaning that the string “ac” will be reported as a valid string for the required pattern “abc” with a deletion. As shown in the example, developers have to carefully connect all possible STEs. The expertise of Approximate Pattern Matching and ANML programming model of AP is required. Furthermore, if the pre-compiling technique is used to optimize the configuration, the case will become more complicated and error-prone.

## 4.3 Paradigms and Building Blocks in APM

In this section, we start from the manual implementation and optimization of mapping APM on AP to further illustrate the complexity of using ANML. Then, we identify the paradigms in APM applications, organize paradigms to a building block, and then discuss the inter-block transition connecting mechanism to construct automata from blocks.

### 4.3.1 Approximate Pattern Matching on AP

APM is to find strings that match a pattern approximately. Different with the exact matching, APM has a more general goal: it searches given patterns in a text, allowing a limited number of various errors. Errors are usually in three types: insertion, deletion, and substitution. The number of errors between text and pattern is referred to as distance. There are four most common distances allowing






Figure 4.3: Levenshtein automaton for pattern “object”, allowing up to two errors. A gray colored state indicates a match with various numbers of errors.

various subsets of error types, including Levenshtein, Hamming, Episode, and Longest Common Subsequence [180]. Because the Levenshtein Distance allows all three kinds of APM errors, we use it to discuss the design and optimization of APM on AP.

Fig. 4.3 shows an automata of Levenshtein Distance that detects the pattern “object” allowing up to two errors between the pattern and the input text. The traverse starts from the starting state at bottom-left and goes horizontally if no error occurs. Once an error occurs, the traverse goes up or along a diagonal to an adjacent layer. Once an accepting state (tagged with the gray color) is reached, a match will be reported. The epsilon-transitions allow the traverse reaching destination states immediately without consuming any input character once a source state is activated. In an APM automata, an epsilon-transition represents an error of deletion. The asterisk-transitions allow the traverse to be triggered by any input characters. In this case, an asterisk-transition represents an insertion or substitution when the traverse goes vertically or diagonally.

We apply two optimizations [182] on the Levenshtein automata to reduce the usage of STEs. They are important for the implementation of mapping the Levenshtein automata on AP, considering the limited numbers of STEs in the hardware. First, we cut down the states above the first full diagonal.<sup>1</sup> The states within the dotted triangle A will be skipped. The reason why we can apply this optimization is that these states are used to deal with errors before the first character of pattern

<sup>1</sup>A full diagonal is a diagonal that connects all rows.

and not necessary to be counted. Second, we cut down the states below the last full diagonal. That is because when the APM automata reports a found position in the text for the pattern, it doesn't need to report the number of errors. For example, in this case, no matter a position corresponds to 0 error (of an exact match), 1 error (of insertion, deletion, or substitution), and 2 error (of combinations of three types of errors), it will be reported. Therefore, the states within the dotted triangle B will be also skipped.

After truncating the original automata, we manually map it on AP. The Levenshtein automata shown in Fig. 4.3 will be transformed to the AP recognizable format shown in Fig. 4.4. Two major problems have to be resolved in the mapping. First, the ANML programming model requires to move a NFA trigger character associated with a transition to a state, because it can't support multiple outgoing transitions with different character sets from a single state, e.g. the transitions  $s2 \rightarrow s3$ ,  $s2 \rightarrow s9$ , and  $s2 \rightarrow s10$  in Fig. 4.3. The solution is to split a state to multiple STEs. For example, the state  $s2$  in Fig. 4.3 is split to STE1 with the trigger character  $o$ , and the auxiliary STE2 with an asterisk. The second problem is that AP hardware can't reach destination states within the current clock cycle, leading to the lack of support to  $\epsilon$ -transitions. The alternative is to add a transition from a source STE to its upper-diagonal adjacent STE. For example, the  $\epsilon$ -transition from  $s2$  to  $s10$  in Fig. 4.3 is transformed to the transition from STE1 to STE8 in Fig. 4.4. With these two transformations, the Levenshtein automata shown in Fig. 4.4 can be described in ANML and mapped on AP.

### 4.3.2 Paradigms in Approximate Pattern Matching

The transformation of Levenshtein automata on AP illustrates programming with ANML requires advanced knowledge of both automata and AP architecture. Any parameter change, e.g., the pattern length, error type, max error number, etc., may lead to the code adjustment with tedious programming efforts. In our hierarchical approach, our first goal is to exploit the paradigms of applications to be a building block.




Figure 4.4: Optimized STE and transition layout for Levenshtein automata for the pattern “object” allowing up to two errors.




Figure 4.5: (a) Four paradigms in APM applications. (b) A building block for Levenshtein automata having all four paradigms.

APM has three types of errors: *insertion*, *deletion*, and *substitution* (denoted as  $I$ ,  $D$ , and  $S$ ). These three kinds of errors with the *match*, denoted as  $M$ , can be treated as the paradigms of any APM problem. They can be represented in an AP recognizable format as shown in Fig. 4.5a. An APM automata usually takes one or several errors as shown in Tab. 4.1. As a result, any two adjacent STEs in an APM automata have four possible transitions. For the Levenshtein automata that can take all three error types, a building block including two STEs and four types of transitions is shown in Fig. 4.5b. The STE with the asterisk is the design alternative to support multiple outgoing transitions with different character sets.

With the building block, once the length of desired pattern  $n$  and the maximum number of errors allowed  $m$  are also given as the parameters, building such an automata on AP can be implemented by duplicating the building blocks and organizing them into a  $(m + 1) * (n - m)$  matrix, called the

**block matrix** in the remaining sections of this paper. The row 0 corresponds to the exact match; and the other  $m$  rows correspond to the number of errors allowed; and the  $(n - m)$  columns correspond to the pattern length with the second optimization that cuts down  $m$  characters discussed in the previous subsection. A Levenshtein automata allowing up to two errors for the pattern “object” having 6 characters can be built by duplicating  $(2 + 1) * (6 - 2) = 12$  blocks, and organizing them to a  $3 * 4$  block matrix as shown in Fig. 4.4. Note that in Fig. 4.4, the automata doesn’t have the STEs with the asterisk at top row, because it doesn’t need to take more errors when reaching this row. The character associated with a STE can be automatically generated: the STE at row  $i$  and column  $j$  is associated with the  $(i + j)$ th character of the given pattern.<sup>2</sup> For example, the STE in the row 1 and the column 2 is configured with the 3rd character  $e$  of pattern “object”.

After going through above steps, we still need to add more transitions across building blocks at different rows. We design an inter-block transition connecting algorithm, which will be explained in the next paragraph. We also need to handle the transitions starting from the blocks at the last column, because they don’t have destination states. Furthermore, we will introduce the cascable macro design to maximize the reuse of pre-compiled macros. This method will be introduced in Sec. 4.4.

### 4.3.3 Inter-Block Transition Connecting Mechanism

Because the cross-row transitions are required to handle consecutive errors which cannot be handled by directly connecting building blocks, we propose the inter-block transition connection algo-

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<sup>2</sup>The row index increases from bottom to top.

Table 4.1: Paradigm sets for common distances

Distance	Paradigm
Levenshtein	M, S, I, D
Hamming	M, S
Episode	M, I
Longest Common Subsequence	M, I, D




Figure 4.6: Inter-block transition connection mechanism for two-consecutive errors: The right part shows five cases we consider. The left part shows a part of Levenshtein automata having six blocks and how the inter-block connections are applied on it.

rithm. We start from two consecutive errors and then discuss how to extend to multiple consecutive errors. Because there are three paradigms for errors: *insertion (I)*, *deletion (D)*, and *substitution (S)*, there are  $3 \times 3 = 9$  two-consecutive-error cases that can occur in a Levenshtein automata, including II, ID, IS, DD, DS, DI, SS, SI, and SD. We can simplify the design with two observations. Firstly, the order of errors actually doesn't affect the result of automata. For example, for the pattern "object", an input text "osect" can be detected either as a deletion D of *b* with a substitution S of *j* by *s*, or a substitution S of *b* by *s* with a deletion D of *j*. Secondly, the consecutive errors DI and ID are functionally equivalent to a single substitution S. As a result, we focus on five cases, including SS, II, DD, SI, and SD.

Fig. 4.6 is a part of Levenshtein automata shown in Fig. 4.4 but inter-block transitions are added. We denote two STEs in a block with the exact character and the asterisk as  $B_{i,j}.c$  and  $B_{i,j}.a$ , respectively. The inter-block transition for consecutive errors have two attributes: *direction* and *STE-pair type*. The *direction* has three options: *upward*, *forward*, and *backward*; and the *STE-pair type* has four possible types: *character-asterisk*, *asterisk-character*, *character-character*, and

*asterisk-asterisk*. Some combinations of these two attributes are invalid or functionally duplicated. For example, *forward character-asterisk*, e.g.,  $B_{0,0}.c$  to  $B_{1,1}.a$ , can handle SD, e.g., path  $B_{0,0}.c \rightarrow B_{1,1}.a \rightarrow B_{2,1}.c$ , but it is duplicated of *forward asterisk-character*, e.g.  $B_{0,0}.a$  to  $B_{2,1}.c$ , which can also handle SD, e.g., path  $B_{0,0}.c \rightarrow B_{0,0}.a \rightarrow B_{2,1}.c$ . Hence, as shown in Fig. 4.6, only four types of inter-connections need to be considered: *forward asterisk-character*, *forward character-character*, *upward asterisk-asterisk*, and *backward asterisk-asterisk*; and they can cover all five cases of two-consecutive errors. Note that the inter-block transitions with asterisks as the destination STEs are always for two different cases, because the traverse cannot stop at an asterisk. For example, the transition  $B_{0,0}.a \rightarrow B_{1,0}.a$  is for the path  $B_{0,0}.a \rightarrow B_{1,0}.a \rightarrow B_{2,0}.c$  of case SI and path  $B_{0,0}.a \rightarrow B_{1,0}.a \rightarrow B_{2,1}.c$  of case SS. Tab. 4.2 summarizes the rules of adding inter-block transitions for two-consecutive errors.

Any case having more than two consecutive errors can be produced as a combination of two-consecutive errors. Assume we add one more row  $B_{3,0}$  and  $B_{3,1}$  to Fig. 4.6 to allow three errors. A three-consecutive error SSI can be produced as a combination of SS and SI with the overlapped middle S. The existing inter-block transition connecting mechanism can handle more errors and no extra inter-block transition is needed. For the SSI case, SS and SI can naturally generate the path  $B_{0,0}.c \rightarrow B_{0,0}.a \rightarrow B_{1,0}.a \rightarrow B_{2,0}.a \rightarrow B_{3,0}.c$  for SSI. If the multi-consecutive errors contain a D, additional *forward character/asterisk-character* transitions have to be added, because only the deletion can bypass the current row. For example, DDD requires a transition from  $B_{0,0}.c$  to  $B_{3,1}.c$ , with the existing  $B_{0,0}.c$  to  $B_{1,1}.c$  (added in a building block by default) and  $B_{0,0}.c$  to  $B_{2,1}.c$  (added by inter-block transition connection mechanism for a two-consecutive error). The rule for the deletion in a multi-consecutive error, e.g., SD and DD, can be stated as: a batch of the forward inter-block transitions with a character STE as the destination is needed from a row  $i$  to a row  $j$ , where  $j$  is from  $i+1$  to  $m$  (the allowed maxim number of errors). Note that in Tab. 4.2 we discuss the additional transitions are added for the case of two-consecutive errors. For DD and SD, the case  $k = 1$  has been covered by the direct connection of two building blocks and  $k$  starts from 2.

Table 4.2: Inter-block transitions connecting rules for two-consecutive errors

Paradigm	Transition Attributes	STE Connection
M		None
SS/SI	<i>upward</i> $a \rightarrow a$	$B_{i,j}.a \rightarrow B_{i+1,j}.a$
II	<i>backward</i> $a \rightarrow a$	$B_{i,j}.a \rightarrow B_{i+1,j-1}.a$
DD	<i>forward</i> $c \rightarrow c$	for $k=2$ to $m: B_{i,j}.c \rightarrow B_{i+k,j+1}.c$
SD	<i>forward</i> $a \rightarrow c$	for $k=2$ to $m: B_{i,j}.a \rightarrow B_{i+k,j+1}.c$

## 4.4 Framework Design

In this section, we first introduce how to build automata from building blocks in our framework, and then introduce how to extend building blocks to a macro that can be pre-compiled and reused. Finally, we present our optimized framework that can build automata from reusable macros to reduce the time on recompilation.

### 4.4.1 From Building Blocks to Automata

Alg. 1 presents how to build automata on AP from building blocks. This algorithm accepts the types of paradigms, desired pattern length, and maximum number of errors allowed. Then, this algorithm can automatically fabricate complex AP automata. Note that this process is independent with specific APM applications, in the sense that it can work for any given paradigms shown in Fig. 4.5a and types of distances shown in Tab. 4.1.

In Alg. 1, we use classes of `BuildingBlock` (ln. 4) and `Automation` (ln. 3) to represent building blocks and AP automata, respectively. First, we create the building blocks via ln. 5-6, where the member function `add()` in `BuildingBlock` places and connects STEs following the rules depicted in Fig. 4.5b. Second, we build up the automaton with the block matrix determined by maximum error ( $m$ ) and target pattern length ( $n$ ) (ln. 7-8). After duplicating the blocks to fill the dimensions in ln. 9, we weave them together through the `ADD_TRANSITIONS()` to add inter-block transitions defined in Tab. 4.2. Third, the starting and reporting STEs are set in ln. 13 and all STEs are labels in ln. 22-24. To this point, an AP automaton can be constructed and ready to

be compiled to a binary image. Note that the macro-based optimization in Ln. 14-21 is an optional process, which will be discussed in Sec. 4.4.2 and Sec. 4.4.3.

---

**Algorithm 1: Paradigm-based AP Automata Construction**


---

```

/* Alg 1 constructs the automaton from basic building blocks, based on the
   user-defined paradigm sets, target pattern, and max error number.      */
1 CasMacroLib lib ; // Cascadable macro library
2 Procedure PRDM_Atma_Con (ParadigmSet ps, Pattern pat, int err_num)
3   Automaton atma;
4   BuildingBlock block;
5   for Paradigm p in ps do
6     | block.add(p);
7   int m = err_num, n = pat.length;
8   atma.row_num = m + 1; atma.col_num = n - m;
9   atma ← block.duplicate(m×n);
10  for int i ← 0 to m + 1 do
11    | for int j ← 0 to n - m do
12      | ADD_TRANSITIONS(atma, i, j, ps);
13  atma.set_start(); atma.set_report();
14  #ifdef ENABLE_MACRO // Cascadable macro constr. */
15    | CasMacro cmacro;
16    | for Paradigm p in ps do
17      | ADD_PORTS(atma, p);
18    | MERGE_PORTS(atma);
19    | cmacro ← AP_CompileMacros(atma);
20    | lib.add(cmacro);
21  #endif
22  for int i ← 0 to m + 1 do
23    | for int j ← 0 to n - m do
24      | atma.re_label(i, j, pat.C(j+i));
25  return atma;

```

---

## 4.4.2 Design Cascadable Macros

The most time consuming parts of an application on AP include the execution time and the recompilation time which has the *place-&-route* process [69]. Although the pre-compiling technique can build macros to reduce the recompilation time, the restriction of using this technique hinders it widely used in manual programming. For example, we can assume the AP automaton in Fig. 4.4 (for the pattern “object”, allowing up to 2 errors) is pre-compiled as a macro  $M_1$  with all characters of STEs parameterized. We can reuse it for patterns with any 6 characters and up to two errors. If a



new pattern, e.g., “gadget” for two errors, is also needed to check, we can reuse it by relabeling STEs to “gadget”. However, this macro can only be reused for exactly same numbers of STEs and connections between them. Failing to comply with any of these requirements will cause an indispensable recompilation from scratch. Thus, the pattern “gadgets” and the pattern “gadget” but allowing up to three errors cannot directly take advantage of the macro  $M_1$ .

In our framework, we propose *cascadable macros* to support reuse of macros for larger-scale AP automata. In particular, we connect one or more macro instances to compose a larger and different AP automata through our carefully-designed interconnection algorithm. With the cascadable macros, the overhead of reconfiguration can be significantly reduced, since only the connections between instances need to be placed-&-routed. Our method is to generate the desired automata by connecting multiple macros if the result block matrix can be constructed by multiple building block matrices. For example, the AP automata in Fig. 4.4 is stored as a cascadable macro  $M_2$  having a  $(3 * 4)$  block matrix. Assume we will build an automata for a larger pattern “international” having 13 characters and allowing up to 5 errors. The result block matrix is a  $(5 + 1) * (13 - 5) = 6 * 8$  matrix. As a consequence, the AP automata can be built by connecting 4  $M_2$  macro instances. To create cascadable macros, we need to extend current macros, e.g.,  $M_2$ , by adding input/output ports and connecting these ports with appropriate STEs.

**Buildng Cascadable Macros:** The first step is to add input/output ports. The optimal design of adding ports should minimize (1) the number of total ports, and (2) the *in-degree* of each input port, because both the number of ports and the number of signals that go into an input port are limited in AP hardware [183]. We define the port struct that has three attributes:

- **Port role** identifies the port is used to either input or output signals (*in*=input, *out*=output).
- **Cascade direction** indicates the direction of allowed cascade, and the side of two paired macros (*h*=horizontal, *v*=vertical, *d*=diagonal, *ad*=anti-diagonal).
- **Transition scope** represents whether connections can cross edges of neighboring macro to link non-adjacent STEs (*e*=edge of neighbors, *ce*=cross-edge of neighbors, *e/ce*=both).

Table 4.3: Port design rules according to paradigm

Paradigm	Port Attribute			STE $\leftrightarrow$ port Connection
	Dir.	Scope	Role	
M	$h$	$e$	$out$	$B_{i,n-m}.c \rightarrow Ox$
	$h$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{i,0}.c$
S, SS/SI	$v$	$e$	$out$	$B_{m+1,j-1}.a \rightarrow Ox; B_{m+1,j}.a \rightarrow Ox$
	$v$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{0,j+1}.c; Iy \rightarrow B_{0,j}.a$
	$d$	$e$	$out$	$B_{m+1,n-m}.a \rightarrow Ox$
	$d$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{0,0}.c$
	$h$	$e$	$out$	$B_{i,n-m}.a \rightarrow Ox$
	$h$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{i,0}.c$
I, II	$v$	$e$	$out$	$B_{m+1,j}.a \rightarrow Ox; B_{m+1,j+1}.a \rightarrow Ox$
	$v$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{0,j}.c; Iy \rightarrow B_{0,j-1}.a$
	$ad$	$e$	$out$	$B_{m+1,0}.a \rightarrow Ox$
	$ad$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{0,n-m}.a$
	$h$	$e$	$out$	for $k=0$ to $i-1$ : $B_{k,0}.a \rightarrow or \rightarrow Ox$
	$h$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{i+1,n-m}.a$
D, DD	$v$	$e/ce$	$out$	for $k=0$ to $m+1$ : $B_{k,j-1}.c \rightarrow or \rightarrow Ox$
	$v$	$e/ce$	$in$	for $k=0$ to $m+1$ : $Iy \rightarrow B_{k,j+1}.c$
	$d$	$e/ce$	$out$	for $k=0$ to $m+1$ : $B_{k,n-m}.c \rightarrow or \rightarrow Ox$
	$d$	$e/ce$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{i,0}.c$
	$h$	$e$	$out$	for $k=0$ to $i-1$ : $B_{k,n-m}.c \rightarrow or \rightarrow Ox$
	$h$	$e$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{i+1,0}.c$
SD	$v$	$e/ce$	$out$	for $k=0$ to $m+1$ : $(B_{k,j-1}.c, B_{k,j-1}.a) \rightarrow or \rightarrow Ox$
	$v$	$e/ce$	$in$	for $k=0$ to $m+1$ : $Iy \rightarrow B_{k,j+1}.c$
	$d$	$e/ce$	$out$	for $k=0$ to $m+1$ : $(B_{k,n-m}.c, B_{k,n-m}.a) \rightarrow or \rightarrow Ox$
	$d$	$e/ce$	$in$	$Iy \rightarrow B_{i,0}.c$

As mentioned in the previous section, multiple consecutive errors can be generated from two-consecutive errors. Therefore, we use Tab. 4.3 to list out all possibilities of STE $\leftrightarrow$ port connection rules in an AP automata having  $(m + 1) * (n - m)$  block matrix (corresponding to  $m$  errors at most and  $n$  pattern length). A building block is represented by  $B_{i,j}$ . The input/output ports always appear in pairs, representing the two sides of each connection. The STE $\leftrightarrow$ port connections can be categorized in two forms. The first one is the *one-to-one* connection, which is relatively straightforward. For example, for the paradigm *Match*, the output of one macro can be the input of the following macro, and one character can only be connected to the following character in the given pattern. Therefore, the framework adds the input and output ports to the exact-character

STEs of blocks in the first column ( $B_{i,0}.c$ ) and last column ( $B_{i,n-1}.c$ ), respectively. The rule is shown in the table as  $Iy \rightarrow B_{i,0}.c$  and  $B_{i,n-1}.c \rightarrow Ox$ .

The second one is the *N-to-one* connection, whose design needs to meet the requirements of building ANML macros and optimize the usage of ports. Here, we introduce *or* Boolean gates to our design. For example, in the case of the fifth port design of paradigm *Insert*, rather than adding a new port as  $B_{k,0}.a \rightarrow Ox$  for each row  $k$ , we use an *or* Boolean gate to allow a combination of connections as  $B_{k,0}.a \rightarrow or \rightarrow Ox$ , so as to reduce the number of used port to be only one. This design also bypasses a restriction of AP routing, i.e., no more than one transition is allowed to directly go to a single output port [183].

In the final step of completing the port design of a macro, we search and merge the ports with inclusive STE $\leftrightarrow$ port connections. Then, the attribute sets of merged port equal to the union of all participant ports. This can help further optimize the port usage. The procedure of constructing cascable macros is integrated into Alg. 1 from ln. 14 to ln. 21. Two predefined functions are implemented: (1) `ADD_PORTS()` adds input/output ports to given automata based on each paradigm (ln. 16-17), followed by STE $\leftrightarrow$ port connections as described in Tab. 4.3; and (2) `MERGE_PORTS()` optimizes the ports layout by merging equivalent and inclusive ports (ln. 18).

Fig. 4.8 exhibits the completed ports layout for the cascable macro  $M_2$ .<sup>3</sup> Fig. 4.7, on the other hand, shows the connections of four cascable macros. Because the macro instances *I* and *II* are vertically aligned and adjacent to each other, we simply link the input-output port pairs that have port attributes of  $v$  and  $e$ . Note that with these four  $M_2$  macros, we can construct more complicated automata other than the case for the pattern “international” having a  $(6 * 8)$  block matrix: once the block matrix of a given pattern is times of the  $(3 * 4)$  matrix, we can construct it by duplicating and connecting these four  $M_2$  macros vertically, horizontally, diagonally, and anti-diagonally.

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<sup>3</sup>Transitions between STEs inside a macro are skipped to highlight the port connections.




Figure 4.7: There are four instances that from a three layers four columns cascading macro. They are vertically and horizontally cascaded to form a larger AP automaton that have six layers and eight columns.




Figure 4.8: Port design layout for a three layers four columns macro.

### 4.4.3 Cascadable Macro based Automata Construction Algorithm

After the pre-compilation, the cascadable macros are inserted into a macro library for reuse (ln. 19-20). In our current design, the library contains macros whose pattern lengths (column numbers) are in three groups of  $\{1, 2, \dots, 9\}$   $\{10, 20, \dots, 90\}$   $\{100, 200, \dots, 900\}$  with each one allowing up to 3 errors (layers). The reasons of choosing these  $27 \times 3 = 81$  macros in the library are two-fold: (1) It is inefficient and even impractical to save all possible situations for different combinations of pattern sizes and errors. (2) Many real-world cases focus on pattern sizes  $< 1000$  characters and errors  $\leq 3$  (in Sec. 4.5). Therefore, this scheme can efficiently find the appropriate instances from the three pattern groups to handle any pattern of  $\leq 1000$  characters. For the rare cases with longer patterns (e.g.,  $> 1000$  characters) or larger error allowance, we can handle them by using more macro instances. Although a dynamic macro management mechanism is promising to optimize which macros should be put into the macro library, we leave it to our future work.

Based on the cascadable macro library, we can effectively reduce the construction and compilation overhead and efficiently build AP automata. Alg. 2 shows our macro-based AP automata construction. In this algorithm, we search the library for a hit macro, which has the same structure with the desired automaton. If found, the macro can be directly instantiated (ln. 5-6). Otherwise, we use multiple macros to form the desired automaton. First, we select and instantiate proper macros according to the dimensions of the desired automaton (ln. 8-11). Second, these macro instances are organized to a lattice (ln. 12-16). Third, we link these instances to generate the complete AP automaton (ln. 17-27). The function `CONN_INST(ParadigmSet, src, dst, dir, scope)` is predefined to make cascade links of input-output port pairs from the source instance `src` to the destination instance `dst`. The arguments of `dir` and `scope` are used as a filter, meaning only the ports with provided attribute values are qualified for linking. Finally, the AP automaton can be constructed after the relabeling process (ln. 29-31).

**Algorithm 2:** Cascadable Macro-based AP Automata Construction

---

```

/* Alg. 2 constructs automata based on our cascadable macro library, whose
   macros are built by ln. 14-21 in Alg. 1. */
1 MacroLib lib;
2 Procedure CASM_Atma_Con(ParadigmSet ps, Pattern pat, int err_num)
3   Automaton atma;
4   int m = err_num, n = pat.length;
5   if lib.search(ps, m+1, n-m) = true then
6     | Instantiate(ps, atma, m+1, n-m, true, true);
7   else
8     | int digits[] = {(n-m) / 100, (n-m) % 100 / 10, (n-m) % 10};
9     | int quo = (m+1) / lib.max_err, rem = (m+1) % lib.max_err;
10    | int ins_col = (bool)digits[0] + (bool)digits[1] + (bool)digits[2];
11    | Automaton inst[quo+(bool)rem][ins_col];
12    | if quo then
13      |   for int i ← 0 to quo-1 do
14        |     | Gen_inst_row(ps, inst[i], lib.max_err, digits);
15    |   if rem then
16      |     | Gen_ins_row(ps, inst[quo], rem, digits);
17    |   for int i ← 0 to quo+(bool)rem-1 do
18      |     | for int j ← 0 to ins_col-1 do
19        |       | if j then CONN_INST(ps, inst[i][j-1], inst[i][j], h, e);
20        |       |   for int k ← 0 to i-1 do
21          |         |   TransitionRange scope;
22          |         |     if k=(i-1) then scope=e else scope=ce;
23          |         |     CONN_INST(ps, inst[k][j], inst[i][j], v, scope);
24          |         |     if j≠(ins_col-1) then
25            |           |       | CONN_INST(ps, inst[k][j], inst[i][j+1], d, scope);
26            |           |       | if j≠0 then
27              |             |         | CONN_INST(ps, inst[k][j-1], inst[i][j], ad, scope);
28          |         |   atma ← inst;
29    |   for int i ← 0 to m+1 do
30      |     | for int j ← 0 to n-m do
31        |       |   atma.re_label(i, j, pat.C(j+i-1));
32    |   return atma;
33 Function Instantiate(ParadigmSet ps, Automaton am, int row, int col, bool start, bool report)
34   CasMacro cmacro;
35   cmacro ← lib.pick(ps, row, col, start, report);
36   am ← cmacro.instantiate();
37 Function Gen_inst_row(ParadigmSet ps, Automaton ams[], int err, int digits[])
38   int j = 0;
39   for int i ← 0 to (ams.size-1) do
40     |   while j < digits.size do
41       |     | if digits[j] then
42         |       |   Instantiate(ps, ams[i], err, digits[j], !i, !(digits.size-1-j));
43         |       |   j++; break;
44     |   | j++;

```

---

## 4.5 Evaluation

We evaluate our APM framework by using the Levenshtein automata construction, since it includes a full paradigm set of M, S, I, D in Tab. 4.1. In contrast, the other APM distances (e.g., Hamming and Episode) only need to use a subset of the paradigms and simpler routing, so that the compilation overhead will be less accordingly. Thus, we focus on the Levenshtein distance to better serve our purpose for evaluating the construction of complex automata. We run our experiments on a platform equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2637 CPU @ 3.5 GHz and 256 GB main host memory. The installed AP SDK is in version 1.6.5. Currently, the Micron AP is not ready for production; thus, we use an emulator<sup>4</sup> to estimate the runtime performance. We enable the cascadable macro library in our framework and generate AP automata using Alg. 2. The size of the library follows the scheme in Sec. 4.4.3. We also set the macros in library to accept up to three errors. That way, the higher error number (e.g.,  $i_3$ ) will need not only horizontal instance cascading but also vertical cascading.

### 4.5.1 Synthetic Patterns

To evaluate our framework on processing different patterns and error allowances, we use a set of six synthetic patterns of lengths from 25 to 155 in steps of 25. The error allowances range from one to four. In Fig. 4.9, the construction and compilation time of our framework is compared with other three AP automata construction approaches: Functional Units (FU) [140], String Matching APIs (SM\_API) [59], and basic ANML APIs (ANML). These three use partially optimized macros, conventional macros and non-macros respectively. We choose up to 155 characters for the synthetic patterns to fit into the AP board and avoid reconfiguration. The AP runtime performance is not considered in this section, because all these approaches present similar performance in processing patterns with the same length. This is due to AP’s lock-step execution mode, which makes the performance linear to the length of input stream and independent of what automata construction is

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<sup>4</sup><http://www.micronautomata.com>

applied.

The compilation data of FU is not available when four errors are allowed, due to the in-degree limitation in the FU approach [140]. In Fig. 4.9, we first observe that the compilation costs of all approaches increase exponentially as the error number rises. This explains that even with small growth rates of error number, the AP construction and compilation will have a larger impact on total performance. The reason for this error-cost relationship is because more errors require higher STE usage and more complicated placement-&-routing. SM\_API is a “black-box” approach provided by Micron and its performance is insensitive to the pattern length, meaning high compilation time is needed even for small patterns. The FU and ANML approaches show positively correlated pattern length and compilation cost, for the similar reason with aforementioned error-cost relationship. In contrast, the compilation cost of our framework is more determined by the instance number than the pattern length. For example, if only one error is allowed, a 100-char pattern uses 1 instance, while a 75-char pattern needs 2 instances (One has 70 columns and another has 5 columns). Since additional cascade compilation is required for the 75-char pattern, we observe its cost is higher than that for the 100-char pattern. On the other hand, we can also notice that the instantiation of a larger pre-compiled macro usually causes higher cost, e.g., the 100-char pattern needs more time for compiling than the 50-char pattern, despite only one macro used in both cases.

Overall, the SM\_API approach provides higher abstraction and is easier for developers to use. However, it usually requires more expensive construction and compilation than the other approaches. FU approach can achieve up to 3.7x speedups against the ANML approach. As a contrast, our framework can achieve up to 33.9x, 34.2x, and 46.5x speedups over the ANML for the case of one, two, and three errors respectively. Note, the speedups are obtained in the scenario of only cascading horizontal instances, because the error numbers are less than our predefined maximum error allowance for the library macros. When the error number exceeds this threshold, the scenario changes to use both vertical and horizontal instance cascades, where our framework can still provide up to 16.3x speedups over the ANML baseline.






Figure 4.9: Construction and compilation time vs. pattern lengths. The highest speedups of our framework over FU, ANML APIs, SM APIs are highlighted.

Table 4.4: Dataset Characteristics

Pattern Sets	Pattern#	Length (min.)	Length (max.)	Diff_lengths#
Bio	85389	32	686	375
IR	100K	10	959	846

### 4.5.2 Real-world Dataset

We evaluate the framework with two real-world datasets “Bio” and “IR” from bioinformatics and information retrieval domains respectively. The “Bio” is the BLAST *igseqprot* dataset<sup>5</sup>, and “IR” is the NHTSA *Complaints* dataset<sup>6</sup>. Tab. 4.4 describes the characteristics of the two datasets. The “Bio” contains ~85K patterns ranging from 32 to 686 characters, while the “IR” has ~100K patterns from 10 to 959 characters. Apparently, the overall demand for STEs in processing either dataset exceeds the capacity of a single AP board. For example, the “Bio” dataset with one error allowance requires over 4M STEs; however, the AP board can supply only 1.5M STEs (=49,152 STEs×32 chips in Sec. 4.2.1). This supply-demand imbalance forces us to use multiple flush/load reconfigurations to completely process the dataset. Since the AP automata can be stored as a macro in a library, we can reuse it for all the patterns with the same length and errors by simply instantiating the macro and relabeling parameters. Therefore, we only need to cascade and compile the patterns with different lengths. The two datasets have 375 and 846 such patterns respectively.

**Compilation Profiling:** We compare our framework to two other AP construction approaches: FU and ANML-APIs. The SM-APIs method is not used because it hides the compiling profile (e.g., STE usage) so that the rounds of reconfiguration are uncomputable. Tab. 4.5 shows the profiles of the three approaches. We test the two datasets “Bio” and “IR” with up to 4 maximum error allowances. Since the FU supports up to three errors, the corresponding data is not available for 4 errors. In the table, the “STE usage” (in percentages) is used to estimate the number of reconfiguration rounds. Generally, in the case of same datasets and errors, higher STE usage indicates less reconfiguration rounds are needed. On the other hand, the STE usage is negatively

<sup>5</sup><https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/downloads/flatfiles.cfm>

<sup>6</sup><ftp://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/blast/db/FASTA/>

correlated to the placement-&-routing complexity, which is represented by “BR allocation” (in percentages). Obviously, longer patterns (e.g., “IR”) and more errors will result in more larger single automata, thereby giving rise to higher BR allocation and lower STE usage.

For reconfiguration rounds, we distinguish the “recompile” rounds from the light-weight “relabel” rounds, based on that the patterns with the same length and error number require at most one cascading and placement-&-routing processing. Relabeling the entire AP board costs 45 ms [60], while the recompiling time depends on AP automata complexity. The “total compile time” columns include the cost from both recompile and relabel rounds. ANML-APIs show the best STE usage and thus use the least reconfiguration rounds. This is because the ANML-APIs use the low-level interfaces to accurately manipulate AP computational resources, which can provide efficient STE usages. However, the ANML approach takes the longest overall compile time, since there are no optimizations applied onto its recompile rounds.

In contrast, the FU approach oftentimes presents the lowest STE usage with the highest reconfiguration rounds, due to its large number of functional unit copies and associated complex interconnections. Nevertheless, the functional units can also reduce the placement-&-routing costs and thus optimize recompile rounds. As a result, the total compile time of FU approach can be still shorter than ANML-APIs. On the other hand, our APM framework shows slightly lower STE usage with more reconfiguration rounds than ANML-APIs. However, our framework can achieve

Table 4.5: Compilation Profile

#Err	Approach	Bioinformatics (Bio)					Information Retrieval (IR)				
		Recompile round	Relabel round	Mean STE usage(%)	Mean BR alloc(%)	Total compile time (s)	Recompile round	Relabel round	Mean STE usage(%)	Mean BR alloc(%)	Total compile time (s)
1 err	ANML	1	34	71.2	73.5	103	2	79	70.3	75.8	329
	FU	1	56	44.7	80.1	53.8	3	131	42.4	80.7	162
	Ours	1	36	68.3	79.2	5.83	2	89	62.6	80.4	12.8
2 errs	ANML	1	61	61.2	80.9	665	3	148	56.3	81.4	3763
	FU	2	95	39.6	89.3	335	4	228	36.8	92.2	996
	Ours	1	71	52.8	82.7	48.1	3	174	48.3	86.4	110
3 errs	ANML	2	105	47.5	81.7	7585	4	242	46.2	84.2	42340
	FU	3	149	33.5	91.4	3634	6	323	34.6	95.1	18780
	Ours	2	119	42.2	85.9	381	5	281	39.5	89.4	1070
4 errs	ANML	3	141	44.2	86.3	43201	6	353	39.6	87.9	135437
	FU	Beyond the capacity									
	Ours	3	168	37.4	88.6	3607	8	460	30.4	90.5	12760

the fastest total compile time, thanks to our cascadable macro design. In particular, our framework can achieve up to 39.6x and 17.5x speedups against ANML-APIs and FU approaches respectively.

**Performance Comparison:** In Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11, we compare the performance of AP approaches to an automata-based CPU implementation *PatMaN* [184] over the two datasets. Different from other CPU-based APM tools (e.g., BLAST [185]), PatMaN allows both gaps (insertion and deletion) and mismatches (substitution) with no upper-bound error number. We first compare the pure computational time between AP and CPU. After loading the binary image to AP board, it executes in a lock-step style; thus, the runtime performance is linear to input stream length and rounds of reconfiguration. This process is independent of automata construction approach. Fig. 4.10 shows our APM codes on AP can achieve up to 4370x speedups, which are within the same order of magnitude with the other AP-related work [60, 63].

In Fig. 4.11, we conduct a more fair comparison using the overall execution time (i.e., runtime and compiling time) for AP. We can observe that these AP approaches can generally outperform the CPU implementation in the cases of large error number (e.g., in sub-figures of “Four Errors Bio” and “Four Error IR”). However, ANML-APIs based approach may be slower than its CPU counterpart for small error number (in “One Error Bio”). This performance deterioration becomes more salient in processing the larger pattern set of “IR” (in “One Error IR”). The FU approach can provide better performance than ANML-APIs, but still fails to outperform the PatMaN in some cases (e.g., in “One Error IR”). This overall view shows the significance of the reconfiguration overhead of processing large-scale datasets. In contrast to these AP approaches, our APM solution can outperform all AP approaches and CPU implementations. Specifically, our APM is able to give an improvement of 2x to 461x speedups over CPU PatMaN for the two datasets. In addition, the optimal speedups over ANML-APIs and FU are 33.1x and 14.8x respectively.




Figure 4.10: Computational time comparison between AP (with three different construction approaches) and the CPU counterpart. Notice that FU approach can't support more than three errors.




Figure 4.11: Overall time comparison between AP (with three different construction approaches) and CPU implementation. Notice that FU approach cant support more than three errors.

## 4.6 Conclusions

In this chapter, we provide a framework allowing users to easily conduct fair end-to-end performance comparison between Micron AP and its counterpart platforms, especially for large-scale problem sizes leading to high reconfiguration costs. In this framework, we use a hierarchical approach to automatically generate optimized low-level codes for Approximate Pattern Matching applications on AP, and we propose the cascadeable macros to ultimately minimize the reconfiguration overhead. We evaluate our framework by comparing to state-of-the-art research using non-macros or conventional macros. The experimental results illustrate the improved programming productivity and significantly reduced configuration time, hence fully explore the AP capacity.

# Chapter 5

## GPU-based Android Program Analysis Framework for Security Vetting

### 5.1 Introduction

The Android operating system so far holds 86% smartphone OS market share [72]. End-users frequently install and utilize Android apps for their daily life, including many security-critical activities like online bank login and email communication. It has been widely reported the security problems, for example, the data leaks, the intent injections, and the API misconfigurations, exist in the Android devices due to malicious and vulnerable apps [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81]. An efficient vetting system for the new and updated Android apps is desired to keep the app store clean and safe. On the other hand, the Google play store currently has more than 3.5 million<sup>1</sup> Android apps available, and around 7K<sup>2</sup> new apps are released through play store each day. Moreover, most popular existing apps provide updates weekly or even daily. These huge scales and high frequencies make the prior entering market app vetting extremely challenging. Bosu et al. [82] experimentally show that analyzing 110K real-world apps costs more than 6340 hours, even using

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/number-of-available-applications-in-the-google-play-store/>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.statista.com/statistics/276703/android-app-releases-worldwide/>






Figure 5.1: The execution time of Amandroid. We analyze 1000 Android APKs. The x-axis represents APK indices. The APKs are sorted according to the descending order of Amandroid run time. The y-axis shows the execution time. The blue line indicates overall run time while the orange line indicates the IDFG construction time.

the optimized analysis approaches. Apparently, a fast and scalable implementation is the key to make app vetting practical.

In recent years, plenty of Android program analysis tools including FlowDroid [83], IccTA [84], DialDroid [82], and AmanDroid [85] have been proposed. Most of them conduct static analysis on the Dalvik bytecodes to discover the security problems of Android apps. Static analysis can provide a comprehensive picture of the app’s possible behaviors, whereas the dynamic analysis can only screen the behaviors during the dry run. However, static analysis suffers from the inherent undecidability of code behaviors; any static analysis method must make a trade-off between the run-time and the analysis precision. Typically, a 10MB app could take around 30 minutes to be statically analyzed and is defined as a large-size app. We use one of the state-of-art Android Static Analysis tools – Amandroid [85] to analyze 1000 random chosen Android APKs. The blue line in Fig. 5.1 shows the execution time: Amandroid takes up to 38min to analyze a single APK. Accordingly, many existing analysis tools set the cut-off threshold at 30min for a single app. However, Google raised the app size limit in the play store to 100MB in 2015, and a majority of modern commodity apps has dozens of MegaBytes. It is manifest that current Android static analysis implementations must be accelerated to accommodate the app size growth.

Over the past decade, parallel devices become very popular computing platforms and successfully accelerate a verity of domain applications. More recently, due to the massive parallelism and computational power, Graphic Processing Unit (GPU) stands out and is trendy hardware in general-purpose parallel computing. It has been broadly adopted in Bioinformatics [49], Biomedical [52], Natural Language Processing [86] and so on. However, this trend does not draw enough attention in security community. Only a handful of previous work [87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96] implement the program analysis on modern parallel hardware; only three work [87, 90, 95] out of them leverage the GPU, and all discuss the acceleration of the common pointer analysis algorithm; none of them consider the Android program analysis. On the other hand, straightforward mapping of an application onto GPU usually is sub-optimal or even under-performs its serial counterpart. The additional application-specific tuning is required to achieve optimal performance. For example, the industrial standard generic GPU sparse matrix-vector multiplication (SpMV) library cuSPARSE [97] can achieve up to 15X speedups against the CPU version. The CT image reconstruction uses SpMV as its computational core. However, mapping the reconstruction to GPU by directly calling cuSPARSE achieves only 3X speedups. On the contrary, a fine-grained design leveraging this application’s domain characteristics can increase the performance to 21-fold against CPU [52].

In this chapter, we propose a GPU-assisted Android static analysis framework. To our best knowledge, this is the first work attempting to accelerate the Android program analysis on HPC platform. We find that implementing the IDFG construction on GPU using the generic approaches (i.e., leveraging no application-specific characteristics) can largely underutilize the GPU computation capacity. We identify four performance bottlenecks existing in the plain GPU implementations: frequent dynamic memory allocations, a large number of branch divergences, workload imbalance, and irregular memory access patterns. Accordingly, we exploit the application-specific characteristics to propose three optimizations that refactor the algorithm to fit the GPU architecture and execution model. (i) *Matrix-based data structure for data-facts*. It uses the fixed-size matrix-based data structure to substitute the dynamic-size set-based data structure to store the data-facts. This optimization can efficiently avoid dynamic memory allocations. It also can reduce memory consump-

tion since it removes the copies of repetitive data-facts. (ii) *Memory access based node grouping*. It groups the ICFG nodes based on their memory access patterns. Compared to the original statement type based node grouping, this optimization can significantly reduce the branch divergences since it leads to only three groups (while the original grouping yields 17 groups). It can also maximize memory bandwidth usage. (iii) *Worklist merging*. This optimization postpones the processing of worklist’s tail subset to significantly mitigate the workload imbalance issue. It also can avoid the redundant processings by merging the repetitive nodes in the worklist. We evaluate the three proposed optimizations using 1000 Android APKs. We find the first and third optimizations can significantly improve the performance compared to the plain GPU implementation, while the second optimization can slightly improve the performance. The GPU implementation with all three optimizations can achieve the optimal performance; it can achieve up to 128X speedups compared to optimal performance. Our contribution can be summarized as follows:

- We propose a GPU-assisted framework for static program analysis based Android security vetting. It constructs Data-Flow Graphs using GPU and can support multiple vetting tasks by adding lightweight plugins onto the DFGs.
- We identify four performance bottlenecks in the plain GPU implementation: frequent dynamic memory allocations, a large number of branch divergences, workload imbalance, and irregular memory access patterns. To break through the bottlenecks, we leverage the application-specific characteristics to propose three fine-grained optimizations, including matrix-based data structure for data-facts, memory access based node grouping, and worklist merging.
- We evaluate the efficacy of proposed optimizations using 1000 Android APKs. The first and third optimizations can significantly improve the performance compared to the plain GPU implementation while the second one can slightly improve the performance. The optimal GPU implementation can achieve up to 128X speedups against the plain GPU implementation.

## 5.2 Background Knowledge

In this section, we will provide the background knowledge regarding the Android program static analysis. We first explain what the android static analysis is, and then introduce the Worklist algorithm, which is one of the most popular DFG construction algorithms.

### 5.2.1 Static Analysis for Android Apps

The ultimate goal of the static analysis is achieving the minimum false positive rate while capturing all potentially dangerous app behaviors. Three Android-specific features make this goal particularly challenging: (i) The Android control flow is event-driven. (ii) The Android apps highly depend on a large size runtime library. (iii) The Android apps are component-based and intensively call the inter-component communication (ICC).

All the existing Android analysis tools including the well-known FlowDroid [83] have attempted to at least partially address the above challenges. FlowDroid builds a call graph based on Spark/Soot [148], and then conducts a taint and on-demand alias analysis using IFDS [149] based on the constructed call graph. However, FlowDroid does not compute all objects' alias or points-to information in both context- and flow-sensitive way. It trades this precision for the computational cost [150]. Recently, another highly-regarded tool – Amandroid[85] has been proved that it is practical and efficient. In contrast to FlowDroid, Amandroid calculates all objects points-to information in a context- and flow-sensitive way. This provides higher precision and enables building a generic framework that can support multiple security analyses. However, it slows down the performance around four-fold compared to FlowDroid [154]. Fortunately, with the help of GPU, we can preserve the high precision while satisfying the timeliness requirement.

Moreover, most previous work design specific tool to detect specific Android security problems. On the contrary, Amandroid observes the fact that abnormal data flow behavior is the common phenomenon of these security problems. Accordingly, Amandroid builds the Data Flow Graph (DFG) and the data dependence graph (DDG). Then any specific analysis can be realized by adding

a plugin on top of the DFG and DDG. It substantially improves the design and running efficiency due to the reuse of DFG. We leverage this Amandroid’s observation and design the GPU-based framework for different Android analyses. Fig 5.1 shows the breakdown of Amandroid execution time. The DFG construction consumes the majority of running time. It takes at least 58% and up to 96% of the total execution time. Plugins for any specific analyses bring in negligible overhead (usually in the order of tens of milliseconds). Hence the GPU-assist framework design is specified to efficiently mapping of DFG building to the GPU.

### 5.2.2 Worklist-based DFG Building Algorithm

A DFG consists of an Inter-procedural Control-Flow Graph (ICFG) and the point-to fact sets. Each ICFG node has one set, and the DFG is built by flowing the point-to facts along the ICFG paths into the corresponding node’s set. Formally, let  $C$  be a component, the DFG can be defined as the following:

$$DFG(E_C) \equiv ((N, E), \{fact(n) | n \in N\}) \quad (5.1)$$

where  $E_C$  is the environment method of  $C$ ,  $N$  and  $E$  are the nodes and edges of the ICFG starting from  $E_C$ , and  $fact(n)$  is the fact set of the statement associated with node  $n$ .

Fig. 5.2 shows a sample DFG. Each ICFG node is accompanied by a point-to fact set  $fact(i)\{\}$ . During the DFG building, the facts are generated after each node processing and propagated along the ICFG paths. Unlike the graph traversal, visiting all nodes is not the end of the process. For example, in Fig. 5.2, after visiting node L7, one flow goes back to L1 and the fact set  $fact(i)$  is updated to  $fact(i)'$ . Due to this update, its visited successor nodes L2 and L4 must be revisited, and fact sets  $fact(2)$  and  $fact(4)$  must be updated accordingly. Amandroid constructs the DFG using a fixed-point worklist-based algorithm. Alg. 3 reproduce this algorithm. The while loop (ln. 10-ln. 14) is the core that iteratively processes the nodes and propagates the point-to facts. In each iteration, the analyzer pops out a node from the *worklist* and processes it through the function **ProcessNode()** (ln. 11-ln. 13). **ProcessNode()** processes a node to generate the facts and




Figure 5.2: A sample DFG. Each box is an ICFG node. Blue arrow-lines indicate the ICFG paths. Each node has a fact set colored in red.

propagates the facts to current node’s successors. If any of the successors’ fact set gets a new fact, that successor will be collected into a set *nodes* (ln. 13). Then the *nodes* will be inserted into the *worklist* (ln. 14). The while loop keeps active until it converges to a fixed point that all fact sets are steady (i.e., *worklist* goes to empty). Apparently, the while loop could be significantly time-consuming due to the potentially huge number of iterations.

### 5.3 Our Plain GPU Implementation

In this section, we will present our plain GPU implementation. This implementation uses only generic approaches without leveraging any application-specific characteristics. We first introduce the basic implementation designs, and then analyze the performance bottlenecks.

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**Algorithm 3:** Worklist-based Iterative DFG Building
 

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1 Require: entry point procedure  $EP$ ;
2 Ensure:  $DFG$ ;
3 Procedure  $DFGBuilding(EP)$ 
4    $icfg \equiv (N, E)$ ;
5   for  $n_i \in N$  do
6     new empty Set  $fact(i)\{\}$ ;
7      $n_i \leftarrow fact(i)\{\}$ ;
8   new empty List  $worklist$ ;
9    $worklist \leftarrow EntryNode_{EP}$ ;
10  while  $worklist \neq \emptyset$  do
11     $n \leftarrow worklist.front()$ ;
12     $worklist.pop\_front()$ ;
13     $nodes \leftarrow ProcessNode(icfg, n)$ ;
14     $worklist \leftarrow nodes$ ;
15  return ( $icfg, fact\{\}$ )

```

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### 5.3.1 Basic Design

In this section, we implement the worklist algorithm on GPU using the generic approaches. We call it the plain GPU implementation because it neither uses application-specific characteristics nor considers fine-grained GPU architectural features.

#### 5.3.1.1 Using Summary-based Analysis

In order to parallelize the Android method processing, we employ the Summary-based Bottom-up Data-flow Analysis (SBDA) algorithm introduced in [186]. SBDA generates a unified heap manipulation summary for each method. With SBDA, the interprocedural DFG construction can utilize the summaries instead of re-analyzing the visited methods. It makes the methods at the same layer independent hence makes the worklist algorithm more parallel-friendly. Though the SBDA is a more conservative approach, it still can preserve flow and context-sensitive data-flow analysis result [187].




Figure 5.3: The two-level parallelization. Different methods are processed on different SM. Each core processes one ICFG node in the current corresponding worklist.

### 5.3.1.2 Two-level Parallelization

GPU architecture supports two-level parallelism: a GPU board has multiple streaming multi-processing engines (SMs); each SM contains multiple CUDA cores. CUDA programming model groups the threads into thread-blocks. All SMs process the thread-blocks parallelly; in each SM, CUDA cores execute corresponding threads simultaneously. We map each Android *method* onto a thread-block to achieve the method-level parallelization. We then let each thread in the thread-block handles one ICFG node of the current worklist to achieve the finer node-level parallelization. This two-level parallelization design makes a maximized utilization of the GPU computational resources. Fig. 5.3 schematically shows such design.

### 5.3.1.3 Dual-Buffering Data Transfer

The memory consumption of the static analysis highly depends on the size of Android APK file. A large app could have hundreds of methods and take up tens of GB memory space. On the other hand, a commodity GPU usually has no more than 32GB global memory. For example the NVIDIA P40, one of NVIDIA's current high-end products, has only 24GB global memory. In the case memory consumption exceeding the GPU capacity, we have to divide the workload to sub-groups



**Algorithm 4:** GPU Worklit Kernel

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1 int *h_cfg, *h_nodeValue, *h_facts;
2 d_cfg ← h_cfg; d_nodeValue ← h_nodeValue; d_facts ← h_facts;      ▷ copy data from host to device;
3 Procedure WORKLIST(d_cfg, d_nodeValue, d_facts)
4   local int worklist;      ▷ allocate shared memory space for worklist;
5   int tid ← threadIdx.x;
6   int methodid ← blockIdx.x * blockDim.x;
7   worklist ← init_nodes[methodid];
8   while !worklist.empty() do
9     if tid < worklist.size() then
10      src_node ← worklist[tid];      ▷ each thread handles one node in current worklist;
11      new_facts ← Gen_Kill(d_nodeValue(methodid, src_node));
12      ▷ each thread processes corresponding node statement and generate facts; different blocks
13      handle different methods;
14      dest_nodes ← search_CFG(d_cfg(methodid, src_node));
15      ▷ each thread collects destination nodes of its current source node;
16      for n ∈ dest_nodes do
17        d_facts(methodid, n).union(new_facts);
18        if d_facts(methodid, n).update() then
19          worklist ← n;
20          ▷ update facts and worklist;
21      __syncthread;
22   h_facts ← d_facts;      ▷ copy the result back to host;

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and transfer the data in and out of the GPU multiple rounds. Even the latest hardware technologies – NVLink and unified memory provide faster transfer speed, the CPU-GPU data communication is still considered as one of the major overhead and can significantly degrade the performance.

In order to hide the CPU-GPU data transfer overhead, we propose a double buffering scheme. This scheme is a software solution based on the asynchronous execution of the CUDA kernel and data-transfer engine. Specifically, we create two buffer spaces in the GPU global memory and two CUDA execution streams. Buffer 1 stores the current data, and Stream 1 launches kernel execution accessing Buffer 1. Simultaneously, Stream 2 transfers next bulk of the workload to Buffer 2 for next round of kernel executions. The function of the two streams and two buffers is swapped from iteration to iteration. The CPU-GPU data communication overhead of  $(i+1)$ th round is hidden by overlapping the kernel execution of  $i$ th round.




Figure 5.4: The performance comparison between the plain GPU implementation and the CPU counterpart. The x-axis represents the APK indices, y-axis indicates the speedups compared to the CPU performances. the APKs are sorted according to the descending order of GPU implementation’s speedups.

## 5.3.2 Performance Analysis

To evaluate the efficiency of the plain GPU implementation, we examine the designs mentioned above with a dataset containing 1K Android APKs. We then analyze the experiment results to discover the performance bottlenecks.

### 5.3.2.1 Comparison with CPU Counterpart

We test our plain GPU implementation on a NVIDIA TESLA P40 GPU using 1000 Android APKs. Fig. 5.4 shows the performance comparison between the GPU implementation and the CPU counterpart. We re-implement the worklist algorithm in Amandroid using C language with multithreading to make the CPU version fairly comparable to the GPU implementation. The figure shows that GPU can only achieve 1.81X speedups on average against the CPU counterpart. It at most can achieve 3.39X speedups against CPU; for the majority (65.9%) of the APKs, GPU only achieve less than 2X speedups (the skyblue area); for 7.3% of the APKs, GPU even runs slower than the CPU (the red area). Apparently, the plain implementation largely underutilizes the GPU computation capacity.

### 5.3.2.2 Performance Bottlenecks

As Fig. 5.4 indicated, worklist algorithm is an irregular application; straightforwardly mapping the algorithm onto GPU largely underutilizes GPU's computation capacity. There are four performance bottlenecks in the plain implementation:

**Dynamic Memory Allocation** Although very recently, researchers notice and try to break through the GPU memory allocation bottleneck [188], dynamic memory allocation in GPU is still a significant challenge due to the hardware limitation. Worklist algorithm associates an *data fact set* with each node; the *data fact sets* keep updating during the node traversals. Hence the sizes of the *data fact sets* cannot be foreknown, and the GPU implementation requires frequent dynamic GPU allocations and reallocations.

**Branch Divergence** The GPU execution model is single instruction multiple threads (SIMT), means that to maximize the GPU resource usage, all threads in a thread-block should execute the same instructions with different data. In the occurrence of branches, GPU has to handle them one by one. When the threads with branch 1 are executing, all other threads get stuck until the branch 1 execution complete. Then GPU will execute branch 2 and all succeeding branches in the same manner. In the worst case that all threads execute different branches, it will deteriorate to sequential execution.

The worklist algorithm groups the ICFG nodes based on the types of their corresponding statements. There are nine categories of statements in Android apps: *AssignmentStatement*, *EmptyStatement*, *MonitorStatement*, *ThrowStatement*, *CallStatement*, *GoToStatement*, *IfStatement*, *ReturnStatement*, *SwitchStatement*. Furthermore, *AssignmentStatement* consists of expressions coming from 17 different groups: *AccessExpr*, *BinaryExpr*, *CallRhs*, *CastExpr*, *CmpExpr*, *ConstClassExpr*, *ExceptionExpr*, *IndexingExpr*, *InstanceOfExpr*, *LengthExpr*, *LiteralExpr*, *VariableNameExpr*, *StaticFieldAccessExpr*, *NewExpr*, *NullExpr*, *TupleExpr*, *UnaryExpr*. Apparently, this grouping scheme in original worklist algorithm could result in dozens of branches. It could be a disaster to the GPU execution.

**Load Imbalance** An ideal balanced workload should be that the number of ICFG nodes in a worklist matches or is an integral multiple of the number of CUDA cores in a SM. The balanced workload can ultimately utilize the resources since no cores will be idle during execution. However, the size of worklist on each iteration highly depends on the ICFG structure. Any two consecutive worklists' size could be quite different and unpredictable. It is pretty hard to make every worklist to be a balanced load.

**Irregular Memory Access Pattern** GPU has enormous memory bandwidth. Each memory access of a warp (32 threads) can read or write a 128B memory block. If this 128B block contains the requested data of all 32 threads, it is a full utilization of the bandwidth. However, if the block contains only the data requested by some of the threads, then multiple memory accesses are needed to feed the whole warp, and a proportion of the bandwidth is wasted. In the worst case, the request data of 32 threads reside at 32 random memory location, then 32 memory accesses should be performed and  $\frac{31}{32}$  bandwidth is wasted. Unfortunately, like other graph traversal problems, the accesses to the destination nodes are unstructured; hence it's extremely difficult to guarantee the efficient bandwidth utilization. Moreover, different statements and expressions have different memory access patterns, and the data-fact set of each node is dynamically changing; these make the memory access pattern of the worklist algorithm even more irregular.

## 5.4 The Optimization Designs

Aiming to break through the performance bottlenecks described above, in the section, we propose three optimizations. These optimizations leverage fine-grained application-specific characteristics to refactor the worklist algorithm to make it fit the GPU's architecture and execution model.




Figure 5.5: (a) is the straightforward data structure of point-to fact set. (b) is the unified compact point-to fact matrix.

### 5.4.1 Optimization 1: Matrix-based Data Structure for Data-Facts

Worklist algorithm stores the point-to data-facts using set data structure since it should dynamically insert newly-generated facts to the set. Set data structure causes no significant inefficiency in CPU-based execution, however, can sharply degrade the GPU-based execution's performance due to the frequent dynamic memory allocations. Moreover, we find that many repetitive data-facts exist among different data-fact sets. Fig. 5.5(a) shows sample data-fact sets of some ICFG nodes stored using original set data structure. We can see data-fact sets of node L2, L3, and L4 have exactly the same facts. These repetitions are caused by the data fact propagation.

A data-fact is a pair consisting of a *slot* and an *instance*. We observe that the pools of *slot* and *instance* can be pre-determined before the worklist iterations. During the data-fact generations and propagation, the algorithm combine the *slots* and *instances* chosen from the pools. Accordingly, in our optimization, we propose the matrix-based data-fact data structure as shown in Fig. 5.5(b) to substitute the original set-based data structure. One ICFG node associate with one matrix. Each row of the matrix represents one *slot* and each column represents one *instance*. Once a data-fact is generated and propagated to a node, the corresponding matrix cell will be marked. With this optimization, we replace the dynamic updating of fact sets by the entry accesses of fixed-size fact matrices. This optimization not only can make the memory access pattern more regular but also can reduce memory consumption due to avoiding storing repetitive data-facts. We can further reduce the memory usage by applying bit-masks to the matrices.




Figure 5.6: The scheme of node grouping. Three colors indicate three different types of nodes.

## 5.4.2 Optimization 2: Memory Access Pattern Based Node Grouping

The original worklist algorithm classifies the ICFG nodes based on the statement and expression types. This classifying scheme is insufficient for the GPU implementation due to the large number of divergences. We observe that if we pre-determine the pools of *slot* and *instance*, generating and propagating data-facts for every ICFG node are converted to looking up and combining entries from two pools. Hence, grouping the nodes based on the types of statements is no longer necessary. Instead, we propose a memory access pattern based grouping scheme for ICFG nodes. We identify that there are only three ICFG node memory access patterns existing: (i) The one-time fact-generation statements, e.g., *ConstClassExpression*, *NullExpression*, *LiteralExpression*. Each of them only generates new facts at the first time they are visited; then it will only propagates the facts when they are inserted to the worklist again. (ii) The single-layer statements, e.g., *VariableNameExpression*, *StaticFieldAccessExpression*. They may produce new facts every time they are visited; each visit only requires single de-reference. (iii) The double-layer statements, e.g., *AccessExpression*, *IndexingExpression*. They may produce new facts every time they are visited; each visit requires a double de-reference.

The nodes in the same group are stored consecutively in the global memory. We sort each current worklist based on the node group before we process it. This new grouping scheme apparently




Figure 5.7: An example shows a case that the worklist merging can eliminate redundant processing.

can significantly reduce the number of branches given that it has only three groups. Moreover, the new grouping scheme can maximize memory coalescing. For example, in Fig. 5.6's case, a warp will always process the nodes with the same memory access pattern, so it eliminates the branch divergence. Moreover, storing the nodes of the same group consecutively in the memory can maximize bandwidth utilization.

### 5.4.3 Optimization 3: Worklist Merging

We assume the current worklist has 36 ICFG nodes. Given a warp has only 32 threads, GPU needs two warps to handle the current worklist. The second warp processes only four nodes leads to a waste of 28 threads. Hence this 32-node worklist is an imbalanced load.

Aiming to solve the load imbalance issue, we propose the *worklist merging* optimization. In this optimization, we divide each current worklist to a *head list* and a *tail list*. The head list contains the subset of current worklist in which the number of nodes is the integral multiple of 32 while the

tail list contains the remaining nodes of the worklist. In the above example, the head list contains the first 32 nodes, and the tail list contains the last 4 nodes. The GPU implementation first uses one warp to process the head list; then, instead of processing the tail list, it collects the destination nodes of the head list to form the next worklist and merges the tail list into the next worklist. The implementation then handles the next worklist in the same manner and keeps iterating until reaching the fix-point. Since the worklist algorithm is insensitive to the orders of node processing, our worklist merging optimization can minimize the imbalanced workloads without affecting the final results. Moreover, the worklist merging can avoid some redundant node processings. For example, in Fig. 5.7, node L6 is processed twice in both the third and fifth worklists. Suppose the L6 is in the tail list, with our worklist merging, it will not be processed in the third worklist; when we merge the tail list into the fifth worklist, the duplicated L6 will be removed hence we avoid the redundant processing of node L6. Since the data-fact propagation in worklist algorithm is monotone, the L6's data-facts after the second processing is a superset of the data-facts after the first processing. Hence removing the first L6 processing will not affect the fact propagating from L6.

## 5.5 Framework Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of the proposed optimizations for our GPU-based Android program analysis framework. We run the experiments on the machines quipped with 10-cores Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 5115 CPU @ 2.40GHz, 64GB RAM system memory, and NVIDIA TESLA P40 GPU. This Pascal microarchitecture GPU has 24GB total global memory, the peak memory bandwidth is 346GB/s. It has 30 streaming-multiprocessors (SM); each SM has 128 CUDA cores. The total CUDA core number is 3840. Each SM has a 48KB L1 cache (shared memory), and the L2 cache size is 3MB. The CUDA version is 10.

We use the latest Amandroid<sup>3</sup> (coded using scala) as the CPU counterpart. To make it fair, we

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<sup>3</sup><https://github.com/arguslab/Argus-SAF.git>



Table 5.1: Dataset Characteristics

no. of CFG Nodes	no. of Methods	no. of Variable	max Worklist length
6217	268	116	74

re-implement the worklist algorithm in Amandroid using multithreading C. We evaluate our GPU implementation using a dataset containing 1000 APKs. The characteristics of these APKs are listed in the table 5.1.

We verify the output results of GPU implementations by comparing them to the DFG constructed by the original CPU implementation. The plain GPU implementation, as well as every optimizations, do not affect the correctness of DFG. In the following subsections, we first provide an overview of our GPU implementation. We then zoom in the performance and evaluate three optimizations: matrix-based data structure, node grouping, and worklist merging, respectively.

### 5.5.1 Overview of GPU Implementation’s Performance

Section 5.3.2.1 indicates our plain GPU implementation mostly can only achieve less than 2X speedups against the CPU counterpart. In order to evaluate our optimizations, we use the performance of plain GPU implementation as the baseline, then accumulate the optimizations to the GPU implementation and compare their performances with the baseline.

Fig. 5.8 shows the performance comparison of GPU implementations with different optimizations. The x-axis shows the app APK indices. Notice that we sort the APKs according to the descending order of the optimal performance. The y-axis shows the performance speedups against the baseline. The figure indicates that applying all three optimizations to the GPU implementation can achieve the optimal performance: it can achieve 128X peak speedups and 71.3X average speedups against the plain GPU implementation. The figure also shows that the matrix-based data structure (mat) and the worklist merging (mer) optimizations can largely improve the performance of GPU implementation. Though the memory access pattern based node grouping (grp) optimization can also improve the performance, it is not significant. We will provide detailed evaluations and discussions of each optimization in the following sections.




Figure 5.8: The GPU implementation’s performance overview. The x-axis indicates the app APK IDs while the y-axis indicates performance speedups against the plain GPU implementation.

## 5.5.2 Evaluation of Matrix Data Structure Optimization

In this subsection, we apply the first optimization – matrix-based data structure (*mat*) of the data-facts to the general GPU implementation. The optimization design is described in subsection 5.4.1.

Fig. 5.9a shows the performance comparison between the GPU implementation with and without the first optimization. The x-axis shows the APK IDs while the y-axis shows the performance speedups compared to GPU implementation without *mat*. Notice that we sort the data pairs based on the running time of CPU version in descending order.

The figure indicates that the matrix-based data structure optimization can significantly improve the GPU version’s performance. It can achieve at least 7.6X speedups and up to 92.4X speedups against the plain GPU implementation. For 59.4% of APKs, the *mat* optimization can improve 20X-40X performance (the skyblue area in Fig. 5.9a), and in average, it can achieve 26.7X speedups. The performance improvement is significant because the *mat* optimization can eliminate dynamic memory allocation, which is one of the major GPU performance bottlenecks.



(a) Matrix-based Data Structure (*mat*) optimization(b) Memory Access Pattern based Node Grouping (*grp*) optimization

Figure 5.9: Performance comparisons between the GPU implementation with and without (a) matrix data structure (*mat*) optimization; (b) memory access pattern based node grouping (*grp*) optimization; (c) work-list merging (*mer*) optimization. The x-axis indicates the app APK IDs while the y-axis indicates the speedups against the GPU implementation without (a) *mat*, (b) *grp*, and (c) *mer* respectively.


(c) Worklist Merging (*mer*) optimization

Figure 5.9: (cont.) Performance comparisons between the GPU implementation with and without (a) matrix data structure (*mat*) optimization; (b) memory access pattern based node grouping (*grp*) optimization; (c) worklist merging (*mer*) optimization. The x-axis indicates the app APK IDs while the y-axis indicates the speedups against the GPU implementation without (a) *mat*, (b) *grp*, and (c) *mer* respectively.




Figure 5.10: Memory footprint comparison between the matrix-based and set-based data structure for storing the data-facts. The x-axis indicates the app APK IDs while the y-axis indicates the memory footprint.

Since the matrix-based data structure is also designed to reduce the memory space consumption, we also compare its memory footprints to the memory footprint of the set-based data structure. Fig. 5.10 shows the memory footprint comparisons between the matrix-based and set-based data structure. It indicates the matrix-based data structure optimization can reduce 75% memory consumption on average. It at most needs 34% memory space compared to the set-based data structure. The matrix-based data structure can significantly reduce the memory footprint because it avoids storing the copies of repetitive data-facts.

### 5.5.3 Evaluation of Memory Access Pattern Based Node Grouping Optimization

In this subsection, we apply the second optimization – the memory access pattern based node grouping (*grp*) in addition to the GPU implementation with *mat*. The optimization design is described in subsection 5.4.2.

Table 5.2: Worklist Profiling

	Worklist sizes		
	$\leq 32$	$>32 \ \& \ \leq 64$	$>64$
before mer	87.6%	4.3%	8.1%
after mer	74.4%	11.9%	13.7%
	no. of Worklist iteration		
	average	max	min
before mer	5.6K	6.8K	4.3K
after mer	4.5K	5.8K	3.6K

Fig. 5.9b shows the performance comparison between the GPU implementation with and without the second optimization. The x-axis shows the APK IDs while the y-axis shows the performance speedups compared to GPU implementation without *grp*. Notice that we sort the data pairs based on the running time of CPU version in descending order.

The figure indicates that *grp* optimization can only slightly improve the performance. For 76.3% APKs, the *grp* can only achieve less than 1.5X speedups (the skyblue area in Fig. 5.9b) against the baseline; for 15.5% APKs, it even degrades the performance (the red area in Fig. 5.9b). The performance degradation is caused by that most worklists are small. Table 5.2 shows the results of worklist profiling. The third line of the Table indicates that on average, 87.6% of the worklists in a worklist algorithm instance have less than 32 ICFG nodes. It means that most of the worklists can fit into a single warp hence cannot take the merits of *grp* but will suffer the sorting overhead. However, since the *grp* can maximize the coalesced memory accesses, in some cases, it can still achieve slightly overall performance improvement.

#### 5.5.4 Evaluation of Worklist Merging Optimization

In this subsection, we apply the third optimization – the worklist merging (*mer*) in addition to the GPU implementation with both *mat* and *grp* optimizations. The optimization design is described in subsection 5.4.3.

Fig. 5.9c shows the performance comparison between the GPU implementation with and without

the third optimization. The x-axis shows the APK IDs while the y-axis shows the performance speedups compared to GPU implementation without *mer*. Notice that we sort the data pairs based on the running time of CPU version in descending order.

The figure indicates that *mer* optimization can significantly improve performance. For 67.4% APKs, the *mer* can achieve at least 1.5X speedups and up to 3X speedups against the baseline (the skyblue area in Fig. 5.9c). In average, it can achieve 1.94X speedups. The improvement is significant because *mer* can efficiently reduce the number of worklist algorithm iterations and enlarge the worklist sizes. The eighth line of Table 5.2 indicates that in average, the *mer* optimization can reduce 1.1K iterations in a worklist algorithm instance. This reduction apparently can improve performance. Moreover, merging the *tail list* with the predecessor worklists can enlarge the sizes of the worklists. The fourth line of the Table 5.2 indicates that 25.6% worklists require more than one warp to process. Hence the *mer* can boost the benefits of *grp* optimization.

## 5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we propose a GPU-based Android program analysis framework for the security vetting. Based on the profiling results, we find that the IDFG constructions take the most of the overall analyzing time (up to 96%); hence we accelerate the IDFG constructions on the GPUs.

In the GPU design, we first implement the IDFG construction algorithm on GPU using general approaches, including summary-based analysis, two-level parallelization, and optimized data transfer. However, we find this plain GPU implementation has four major performance bottlenecks: frequent dynamic memory allocation, the branch divergences, load imbalance, and the irregular memory access pattern. These issues can sharply degrade GPU implementation's efficiency. Accordingly, we leverage application-specific characteristics and propose three advanced optimizations, including matrix-based data structure for data-facts, memory access pattern based node grouping, and worklist merging. The matrix-based data structure is also designed to reduce memory consumption.

In our experiments, we evaluate the three proposed optimizations respectively on Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 5115 CPU and NVIDIA TESLA P40 GPU using 1000 Android APKs. The experiment results show that the matrix-based data structure for data-facts and worklist merging optimizations can significantly improve the performance compared to the plain GPU implementation, while the memory access pattern based node grouping optimization can slightly improve the performance. The optimal GPU implementation can achieve up to 128X speedups against plain GPU optimization. The matrix-based data structure optimization also can save 75% memory space on average compared to the original set-based data structure.



# Chapter 6

## Comparative Measurement of Cache Configurations' Impacts on the Performance of Cache Timing Side-Channel Attacks

### 6.1 Introduction

Timing-based cache side-channel attacks have been comprehensively studied since its debut in 1996 [98]. The time side-channel of cache leaks secret information, specifically through the time differences of cache hits and misses. Time-driven attacks are the primary type in the early age of the timing-based side-channel attacks. They observe the total execution time of the cryptographic operations and crack the keys by analyzing the observations.

In the last decade, access-driven attacks, for example, the notorious meltdown attack [101], have gained popularity. They manipulate specific cache-lines and observe the access behaviors of cryptographic operations on these cache-lines. They require fewer observations than the time-

driven attacks due to the higher resolutions and lower noises. Fine-grained variants of the access-driven attacks have been proposed, including PRIME+PROBE [102], FLUSH+RELOAD [103], and FLUSH+FLUSH [104]. However, all access-driven attacks require that the attacker’s process have access to specific cache addresses that shared by the victim’s process.

Recently, some proposals leverage new hardware technologies to defend the access-driven attacks. For example, the CATalyst [105] exploits Intel’s Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) (CAT isolates shared cache space for victim’s process) to physically revoke the accessibility of attacker’s process. Given the attacker’s access privilege is not an assurance, studying time-driven attacks are still worthwhile since they demand no adversary’s intervention during the observations.

Researchers have been speculating that cache configurations can impact the performances of time-driven side-channel attacks [106, 107, 108]. For example, intuitively, a bigger cache size would make the attacks on AES more difficult, as it can hold a larger portion of the precomputed S-box lookup table in the cache. However, we are not aware of any previous work that provides experimental data to demonstrate how cache configuration parameters influence time-driven attacks. It is extremely challenging to conduct performance comparisons under the same system with different cache configurations, as none of the existing CPU products provide configurable caches. This challenge prevents the experimental study about the impact of cache parameters on time-driven attacks.

In this work, we overcome the aforementioned difficulty and conduct a comprehensive study on how cache configurations impact the success rates of time-driven attacks. We leverage a modular platform – GEM5 [110] to measure the performances of time-driven attacks under various cache configurations. GEM5 is one of the most popular cycle-accurate full-system emulators in the computer-system architecture community [111, 112]. We leverage GEM5 to emulate the X86\_64 system with a configurable cache.

In our work, we measure the performance of Bernstein’s cache timing attack on AES [106]. Bernstein’s attack is one of the most classic time-driven attacks and still feasible on model processors [113, 114]. To make its performance comparable, we propose a new metric to quantify the

its success rate. In the measurement, we run Bernstein’s attacks on GEM5 instances with different cache configurations and provide systematic experimental data to describe the correlation of cache parameters and the attack’s performance. Our contribution can be summarized as follows:

- We use the GEM5 platform to investigate the cache configurations’ impacts on time-driven cache side-channel attacks. We configure the GEM5’s cache through seven parameters: *Private Cache Sizes*, *Private Cache Associativity*, *Shared Cache Sizes*, *Shared Cache Associativity*, *Cacheline Sizes*, *Replacement Policy*, and *Clusivity*.
- We extend the traditional success-fail binary metric to make the cache timing side-channel attacks’ performances comparable. We define the *equivalent key length (EKL)* to describe the success rates of the attacks under a certain cache configuration.
- We systematically measure and analyze each cache parameter’s influence on the attacks’ success rate. Based on the measurement results, we find the private cache is the key to the success rates; the 8KB, 16-way private cache can achieve the optimal balance between the security and the cost. Although the shared cache’s impacts are trivial, running neighbor processes can significantly increase the success rates of the attacks. The replacement policies and cache clusivity also have impacts on the attacks’ performances: Random replacement leads to the highest success rates while the LFU/LSU leads to the lowest; the exclusive policy makes the attacks harder to succeed compared to the inclusive policy. We then use these findings to enhance both the cache side-channel attacks and defenses and strengthen future systems.

## 6.2 Background

In this section, we provide the knowledge about modern cache model and the GEM5 platform, and explain how the Bernstein’s time-driven attack works.




Figure 6.1: A generic cache model. It is a two-level hierarchy: each CPU core has its own private cache; all cores could access a shared cache through the private cache.

### 6.2.1 CPU Cache Hierarchy

The CPU cache is in between of the CPU cores and the main memory. It stores copies of the frequently used data in main memory, aiming to reduce the average latency of data access from the main memory. Compared to the main memory, the cache is faster but smaller. Modern multi-core CPUs usually organize the cache as a hierarchy of multiple cache levels. Fig. 6.1 indicates a generic cache hierarchy model. Each CPU core is bound with a *private cache* and has this private cache's exclusive access permission. The whole CPU chip has one *shared cache* (a.k.a Last Level Cache (LLC)) that shared by all the CPU cores. The shared cache usually is larger but slower than the private cache. Commodity Intel CPUs follow this cache model and usually implement the private cache as two levels (L1 and L2) and split L1 cache into instruction and data caches. Private cache size typically is in KB scale while shared cache size is in MB scale.




Figure 6.2: The workflow of Bernstein's time-driven attack. It consists of two online phases: (a) profiling phase and (b) attacking phase, and two offline phases: (c) correlating phase and (d) searching phase.

## 6.2.2 Bernstein's Cache Timing Attack

The Bernstein's cache timing attack on AES [106] is one of the most classical time-driven cache attacks. It cracks the AES keys by measuring and analyzing the encryption time data.

Fig. 6.2 shows the workflow of Bernstein's attack. On the victim server, the attacker performs two online phases. During the *profiling phase* (Fig. 6.2 (a)), she or he encrypts millions of different plaintexts with a **known key**, then collects and profiles each execution time to build the reference time model. During the *attacking phase* (Fig. 6.2 (b)), she or he collects attacking time data by measuring the execution time of millions of encryptions with an **unknown key**. Then two

offline phases postprocess the attacking data to guess the unknown key. Specifically, during the correlating phase (Fig. 6.2 (c)), the attacker mathematically correlates the time model and attacking data to shrink the key search space by generating value candidates for each key byte. Finally, in the searching phase (Fig. 6.2 (d)), the attacker brute-force searches the reduce key space to recover the secret key.

Only the two online phases need to be performed on the victim server. Although the Bernstein's attack is computationally expensive (typically needs  $2^{22}$ - $2^{23}$  encryptions for profiling and attacking phases respectively [106]), it does not require attacker's intervention during the attack. Thus, conducting this attack does not need much computer architecture knowledge and the victim system's access privilege.

### 6.2.3 GEM5 Platform

GEM5 is a modular platform for computer-system architecture research [110]. GEM5 is the combination of two influential projects: M5 [189] and Gems [190]. The former is renowned for CPU simulation while the latter is for memory system simulation. Therefore, GEM5 can cycle-accurately emulate the full X86 system encompassing system-level architecture and processor microarchitecture. It provides the interfaces to manipulate the configuration of almost all system components, including processing units, cache, and main memory. In the full-system mode, GEM5 runs a real operating system on it and allows users to interact with the OS. Hence, users can run any applications on GEM5 as running on real-world hardware. The downside of GEM5 is that its execution is 1000X slower than real hardware.

## 6.3 Measurement Design

We measure the performances of Bernstein's attacks running on different GEM5 instances. We configure these instances' caches using seven cache parameters, including *Private Cache Size*, *Pri-*

*private Cache Associativity, Shared Cache Size, Shared Cache Associativity, Cacheline Size, Replacement Policy, and Cache Clusivity.* We elaborate all the cache parameters in Section 6.3.1. GEM5 instances play the role of victim servers; hence we only need to run two online phases (Fig. 6.2 (a) and (b)) on it. Under each cache configuration, in accordance with the references [106, 113, 114], we conduct  $2^{22}$  encryptions for profiling and attacking phases respectively. To quantify the performances of the attacks, we define the success rate of the time-driven attack in Section 6.3.2.

### 6.3.1 Cache Parameters for Configuration

GEM5 platform gives us the full privilege to configure the cache. Without loss of generality, we configure the cache in our measurements to a two-level hierarchy as shown in Fig. 6.1. Under such implementation, there are seven controllable cache parameters listed below:

1. **Private Cache Size (PCS)** The total amount of private cache space. It generally falls in the range from 2KB to 32KB. Intuitively, smaller PCS makes the attacks easier.
2. **Private Cache Associativity (PCA)** The number of cache blocks in a private cache set. Its range typically is between 2-way and 32-way. Intuitively, larger PCA results in lower success rates of the attacks.
3. **Shared Cache Size (SCS)** The total amount of shared cache space. It usually is a value in between 2MB and 32MB. Intuitively, the smaller SCS the easier attacks.
4. **Shared Cache Associativity (SCA)** The number of cache blocks in a shared cache set. It commonly is consistent with the PCA and intuitively has similar impacts.
5. **Cacheline Size (CLS)** The size of the basic unit of cache storage. The common CLSs are 32Bytes, 64Bytes, and 128Bytes. Intuitively, larger CLS leads to lower success rates of the attacks.
6. **Replacement Policy (RP)** The algorithms to manage the contents stored in the cache. The RP's impacts are highly-depend on the application's memory locality.

7. **Cache Clusivity (CC)** Clusivity describes whether the data in one level of cache present also in other levels. It is either inclusive or exclusive. Intuitively, the exclusive policy makes the attacks easier.

We reconfigure the cache of GEM5 platform through changing the above parameters. In the subsequent sections, we elaborate these cache parameters and their possible theoretical impacts on the time-driven attacks.

### 6.3.1.1 Private and Shared Cache Size

Both private and shared cache copy a portion of the main memory that possibly contains the next data that CPU will use. Apparently, larger PCS and SCS provide broader coverage and lower cache-miss rate; However, taking into account the production cost factor, commodity systems usually limit their PCS in KB scale and SCS in MB scale.

*Theoretical expectation of PCS's impacts.* We attack the AES implemented in OpenSSL library. OpenSSL precomputes the results of each AES step and stores them as a 4KB lookup table [174]. Given the time-driven attacks rely on the time differences of overall cache hits and misses, theoretically, a PCS less than 4KB renders higher miss rates and consequently causes higher success rates of the attacks. After 4KB, the attacks are impossible since the private cache can hold the entire lookup table.

*Theoretical expectation of SCS's impacts.* We discuss the impacts of SCS in two different scenarios. Theoretically, given the SCS is in MB scale that is much larger than the 4KB table, if there are no other processes running on the neighbor CPU cores, the SCS impacts to the attacks' success rates could be negligible. On the other hand, if there are random neighbor processes running, the SCS's impacts can be non-trivial. In the next section, we will experimentally examine whether the facts align with these theoretical expectations.



### 6.3.1.2 Private and Shared Cache Associativity and Cacheline Size

The basic data copying unit between caches and main memory is referred to as *cacheline*. A cacheline contains multiple bytes. The commodity CPUs usually divide the caches into multiple *sets* that each of them contains N cachelines (referred to as *N-way associativity*). Each cacheline of the main memory must go to a particular cache set but can choose one of the N positions in the set to reside. Either PCA or SCA (i.e., the N) is a trade-off between miss-rate and the searching cost.

*Theoretical expectation of CLS, PCA, and SCA's impacts.* The larger CLS leverages more spatial locality hence has lower miss-rates. The larger PCA leads to lower miss-rates as well. Lower cache miss-rates result in lower success rates of the attacks. Similar to SCS, if there are no running neighbor processes, SCA's impacts will be trivial. Otherwise, SCA's impacts are analogous to PCA's.

### 6.3.1.3 Replacement Policies

When a cache-miss occurs and the cache is full, the cache should make room for the new entry. Replacement policies are sophisticated algorithms to choose the existing cache entries to evict. Since the mission of the cache is storing the data that CPU is most likely to use next, the RPs speculate about which existing entries have the least chances to be used in the future. Given this heuristic is difficult, there is no universal optimal choice among available RPs.

In our measurement design, we examine four most common RPs: (i) *Least recently used (LRU)*. It keeps tracking what cache entries are used and discards the least recently used entry first. (ii) *Least-frequently used (LFU)*. It counts how many times each cache entry is used and discards the least often used entry first. (iii) *First in first out (FIFO)*. Cache with the FIFO works in the same way as FIFO queue. It always discards the entry loaded first. (iv) *Random replacement (RANDOM)*. It randomly chooses the candidate entries and evicts them when necessary. It doesn't require tracking any cache access history.

*Theoretical expectation of RP's impacts.* The relations of the RPs and the miss-rates highly depend on the memory access patterns of the crypto algorithms. Therefore, without the measurement data, it is difficult to predict the impacts of RPs on the time-driven attacks' success rates. We will use the measurement results in the next section to illustrate it.

#### 6.3.1.4 Cache Clusivity

Cache Clusivity describes the data consistency policy between the private and shared cache. We consider two CCs: *inclusive* and *exclusive*. With the inclusive policy, all entries in the private cache will also present in the shared cache. Evicting a shared cache entry results in the eviction of the corresponding private cache entry. Whereas with the exclusive policy, the shared cache contains only the entries that do not present in the private cache. A hit entry in shared cache will be moved to private cache while an evicted entries from the private cache will be stored in the shared cache.

*Theoretical expectation of CC's impacts.* The inclusive policy implies less cache-miss penalties but smaller unique memory capacity. The exclusive policy is the opposite. Given the AES lookup table is small, cache-miss penalties will dominate the influences on the attacks' success rates. Hence we expect the inclusive policy leads to lower success rates compared to the exclusive policy.

### 6.3.2 Metric Definition: the Success Rate of an Attack

Conventionally, the metric for cache side-channel attack performance is a dualism: either success or failure. For any attack, no matter the difficulty, if it can crack the unknown key using reasonable computational resources and time, we label it with success; otherwise, we label it as a failure.

However, this binary metric does not have sufficient granularity to support performance comparison of the attacks labeled with success. To compare two successful attacks or evaluate a single successful attack running under different hardware environments, we need to measure the attacking difficulty i.e., the amount of demanded computational resources and time. Accordingly, we leverage the classical cryptanalysis concept [191] and propose the *equivalent key length (EKL)* to

indicate the *success rate* of the time-driven cache side-channel attack. The *EKL* is formally defined as the following:

**Definition 6.3.1.** *The equivalent key length (EKL) is a normalized metric to represent the key search space. The EKL value  $\in [0, 1]$  is computed as in Equation 6.1, where  $n$  is the length of the target key,  $v_k$  denotes the number of candidate values for the  $k$ -th key byte after the correlating phase and  $k \in [0, n - 1]$ .*

$$EKL = 1 - \frac{\sum_{k=0}^n \log_2 v_k}{8n} \quad (6.1)$$

In our measurement, we use 16-byte keys, i.e.  $n$  is 16. *EKL* being 0 represents the original search space, i.e. the correlating phase (Fig. 6.2 (c)) fails to reduce the number of candidate values of any key byte. On the other extreme, *EKL* being 1 represents the single element search space, i.e. the correlating phase fully reveals the unknown key.

We indicate the success rate of time-driven attacks using the ratio of *EKL* to the number of encryptions in attacking phase. Apparently, with the same amount of attacking encryptions, larger *EKL* implies a higher success rate. Increasing the number of encryptions could boost the *EKL*, however, will demand more measurement cost. One does not need to make the *EKL* achieve 1 at the correlating phase. We only need to reduce the search space to a reasonable size before entering the brute-force search phase (Fig. 6.2 (d)). Practically, an *EKL* at 0.8 achieves a good balance of the measurement cost and the brute-force search cost.

## 6.4 Measurement Results

We perform our measurements on a 10-node cluster. Each node is equipped with a 24-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2620 2.4GHz CPU and a 192GB RDIMM main memory. We launch multiple GEM5 instances. Each instance emulates the system with two 3GHz CPU cores, 4GB main memory, and a two-level cache. Different instances have different cache configuration; each configuration is one combination of seven cache parameters' candidate values described in Section 6.3.1. In

Table 6.1: Measurement Environment

Host System	
CPU	Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2620
main memory	192 GB RDIMM
GEM5 Platform	
CPU core #	2 cores (3 GHz)
main memory	4 GB
CPU cache	two-level configurable
operating system	Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS
OpenSSL version	1.0.2 LTS

each GEM5 instance, we run a Bernstein’s time-driven attack to attack the AES implemented in OpenSSL 1.0.2. This OpenSSL version uses the lookup table and is vulnerable to cache timing side-channel attacks. The measurement environment is summarized in Table 6.1.

We measure the attack’s success rates under every instance and show them in Fig. 6.3, then analyze the impacts of each cache parameter respectively. In a nutshell, the private cache has a significant effect on the attacks’ success rates; larger private cache size and associativity could make the attacks more difficult. The shared cache parameters have minor impacts on the attacks without regard to the neighbor processes. The replacement policies can significantly affect the success rate of attacks while the cacheline size’s effect is insignificant. The clusivity also influences the success rates; using the exclusive policy makes the attack harder than using the inclusive policy. We elaborate on the impacts of each cache parameter in the following sections.

### 6.4.1 Private Caches’ Impacts

**PCS** Fig. 6.3a shows how the Private Cache Size impacts the success rates of the attacks. We can observe that the overall trend of the impact is that the larger PCS leads to a lower success rate. Moreover, we can see a cliff-like drop in the success rate when the PCS increases from 4KB to 8KB.

The observed fact, by and large, matches the theoretical expectation stated in Section 6.3.1.1. The larger PCS results in fewer cache-misses (i.e., fewer time differences) and makes the time-driven




Figure 6.3: The success rates of time-driven attacks impacted by different cache parameters. NP stands for the neighbor processes running on the neighbor CPU core. The x-axis represents the numbers of encryptions conducted during the attacking phase (Fig. 6.2(b)). The y-axis indicates the equivalent key lengths (Section 6.3.2).

attacks more difficult. The cliff drop between 4KB and 8KB is caused by the AES lookup table size (4KB). When the private cache is larger than 4KB, since there are no other processes co-located on the same core, the entire lookup table theoretically can reside in the private cache. It means the cache-misses will not happen; hence, the time-driven attacks will not succeed. However, disagreed with the expectation, the measurement result shows that, although it is much harder, the attacks still have the chance to succeed with a PCS larger than 4KB. It implies that the AES computation itself and the system operations can kick some lookup table entries out of the private cache.

**PCA** Fig. 6.3b indicates the attacks' success rates influenced by the Private Cache Associativity. We observe that the success rates and the PCA are negatively correlated: larger PCA leads to lower success rates. We also find that there is a sharp success-rate decrease from 8-way to 16-way. The 16-way and 32-way associativities make the attacks have nearly the same success rates.

For the most part, the impact of PCA matches the expectation discussed in Section 6.3.1.2. A larger PCA results in less cache misses hence makes the attacks harder to succeed. The experimental results imply that if a cache set has 16 entries or more, the loaded entry mostly can find an appropriate place in the set without flushing the data needed by next cache reads. Accordingly, from 8-way to 16-way, the cache-misses become very occasional. It causes that the success rates fall quickly from 8-way to 16-way, and 16-way and 32-way make similar success rates.

Above findings suggest that the private cache parameters have significant influences on the success rates of the time-driven attacks. The influences mostly comply with the theoretical expectations with a few unexpected singular points.

## 6.4.2 Shared Caches' Impacts

**SCS** We use the *stress* tool to generate random memory-intensive workloads and run these workloads as the neighbor processes. Fig. 6.3c and 6.3d show the attacks' success rates impacted by Shared Cache Size without and with the neighbor processes (NP) respectively. As anticipated, without NP, the SCS has negligible impacts on the success rates. Differing from the expectation, although running the NP can make the attacks easier, changing SCS still has no significant impact on the success rates. The reason is likely to be that the MB-level shared cache is huge compared to 4KB AES lookup table; so the table entries always have similar chances to be found in shared cache no matter it is 4MB or 32MB.

**SCA** Fig. 6.3e and 6.3f are the success rates of attacks impacted by various Shared Cache Associativity without and with the NP respectively. SCA without the NP matches the expectation: it barely affects the success rates. On the contrary, similar to SCS, despite the NP can increase the

attacks' success rates, the SCA's impacts are still trivial.

Our findings in this section suggest that shared cache parameters have no significant impact on the attacks' success rates with no regards of the NP. As distinct from the theoretical expectation, although running a memory-intensive NP can make the attacks easier to succeed, it cannot boost either SCS or SCA's impacts on the attacks' success rates.

### 6.4.3 CLS, RPs, and CCs's Impacts

**CLS** We measure the attacks' success rates affected by different CacheLine Sizes. Disagreeing with the expectation in Section 6.3.1.2, Fig. 6.3g indicates that the impacts of CLS are subtle and random. There are two possible explanations. One reason is that the AES computation has good spatial locality that many next cache-reads are within 32B. The other is that the AES has bad locality that many next reads are out of the 128B range. Later we will indicate that the former explanation matches the fact. So changing the CLS will not significantly change the cache-miss rates.

**RPs** We also measure the attacks' success rates under a variety of Replacement Policies described in Section 6.3.1.3. Fig. 6.3h indicates the RPs have significant impacts on the success rates. The attacks under RANDOM have the highest success rates while under FIFO have the runner-up ones. The LFU and LRU lead to similar success rates that are lower than the other two RPs.

The measurement results imply that AES computation has good temporal and spatial localities. It is consistent with the findings regarding CLS. So the LFU and LRU result in the least miss-rates, i.e. lowest success rates of the attacks. Since the RANDOM does not leverage any localities, many cache misses can occur, makes the attacks easy to succeed. The FIFO leverages the localities to some extent, makes its success rates lie between the RANDOM and the LFU/LRU.

**CCs** We finally measure the Clusivity's impacts. In contrast to the expectation described in Section 6.3.1.4, Fig. 6.3i shows the exclusive policy makes the attacks more difficult to succeed. The reason is that private cache's cache-misses dominate the AES computation time. Since the exclusive policy stores all private cache evicted entries into the shared cache, the private cache miss rates are low. Conversely, the inclusive policy removes the private cache entries whenever their copies in the shared cache are evicted, hence increases the private cache miss rates and makes the attacks easier.

## 6.5 Discussion

**1) Takeaways** *Private cache configuration is the key to the success rates of the time-driven cache attacks.* Although larger PCS and PCA cannot completely prevent the time-driven attacks, they can make the attacks much harder to succeed.

*Shared cache configuration is trivial to the attacks' success rates, but the neighbor processes can have significant impacts on the success rates.* A memory-intensive neighbor process can make the attacks one order of magnitude easier.

*Replacement policies and cache clusivity also can influence the attacks' success rates.* In this Bernstein's AES attack case, the random replacement leads to the easiest attack; the exclusive policy makes the attack easier compared to the inclusive policy.

**2) Suggestions for the attackers** Increasing the eviction rate of the AES lookup table entries from the private cache can make the time-driven attacks easier to succeed. A feasible way is binding a noise process with the same CPU core running the AES encryptions. It leads to a higher possibility of kicking the table entries out of the private cache.

**3) Suggestions for the defenders** A luxury private cache definitely can reduce the vulnerability to time-driven cache attacks. However, in order to achieve the optimal cost-efficiency balance, it



is better to set the private cache parameters at some inflection points, for example, 8KB PCS and 32-way PCA for this AES attack case.

If AES lookup table size can fit into private cache, using lock-into-cache instruction to ensure the entire table in the private cache can sharply reduce the attacks' success rates. Besides, assigning a CPU core exclusive and reserving a shared cache space for the AES encryptions can also make the cache less vulnerable to the time-driven attacks.

It is not necessary to keep the replacement policy andclusivity consistent between the private caches and shared cache. One can use Random replacement and exclusive policy for one private cache used by AES encryptions, then apply other replacement policies andclusivity to remaining private caches and shared cache, to balance the cache-attack resistances and the system performance efficiency.

## 6.6 Limitations

There are a few limitations in our measurement design from both the attacks and the systems aspects.

*It is unclear whether our measurement design is compatible with other cache side-channel attacks.*

The targeted Bernstein's attack relies on the statistical patterns of the encryption time rather than any cache-behavior based analytic attack models. Its advantages include that it is portable between different systems with rare adaptations, and its performance is easy to be measured. However, some other time-driven attacks use the attack models based on particular cache effects, for example, the cache-collision effect [107]. The current measurement design may need case-by-case modifications for investigating these specific time-driven attacks. The current design also may be not compatible with other crypto algorithms, e.g. DES, RSA and with the access-driven attacks.

*Our measurement design does not count the effects of some modern hardware technologies.* The GEM5 platform accurately emulates the cache latency and behaviors, but it does not implement

some advanced hardware techniques, e.g. the prefetcher. The prefetcher predicts the future cache accesses and loads the data to the cache before any possible cache-misses happen. It may significantly change the impacts of some cache parameters, including cacheline sizes and replacement policies, on the attacks' success rates. It is difficult to theoretically model the prefetcher's effects since it depends on the prediction accuracy for specific encryption algorithms.

## 6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we systematically studied how cache configurations impact the success rates of time-driven cache attacks. We addressed the difficulty of conducting apples-to-apples experimental comparisons and proposed the methodology to measure the attacks' performances under different cache configurations. In our measurement design, we made the cache-attack performances comparable by extending the traditional success-fail binary metric to the quantifiable success rate metric. We leveraged the GEM5 platform to emulate the X86 system with the configurable cache. We configured the cache through seven cache parameters, including Private and Shared Caches' Size and Associativity, Cacheline Size, Replacement Policy, and Clusivity. From the measurement results, we found that the private caches' impacts on the attacks' success rates are significant while the shared caches' are trivial; the replacement policies and cache clusivity also have clear influences on the attacks' performances. We provided suggestions to the attackers and defenders and implications for the future system designs according to our measurement findings.

Our measurement work is focused on cache timing based side channels. It remains an interesting open question of whether one can similarly characterize other types of more complex side channels in a systematic fashion.

# Chapter 7

## Conclusion and Future Work

In this dissertation, we have tried to improve the execution efficiency and scalability of cybersecurity applications. We demonstrated how to leverage application-specific characteristics to achieve fast and scalable implementations of cybersecurity applications on the HPC platforms. We investigated three sub-areas in cybersecurity, including mobile software security, network security, and system security. We targeted various HPC platforms, including multi-core CPUs, many-core GPUs, and reconfigurable Micron's Automata Processors.

### 7.1 Summaries

In Chapter 3, we have presented the  $O^3FA$ , a new finite automata-based, deep packet inspection engine to perform regular-expression matching on out-of-order packets without requiring flow re-assembly. Our proposed approach leveraged the insight that various segments matching the same repetitive sub-pattern are logically equivalent to the regular-expression matching engine, and thus, interchanging them would not affect the final result. The  $O^3FA$  at the core of the proposal consisted of the regular deterministic finite automaton (DFAs) coupled with supporting-FAs (a set of prefix-/suffix-FA), which allows processing out-of-order packets on the fly. It is faster and more scalable

compared to the conventional approaches because it requires no packet buffering and stream re-assembly. We have proposed several optimizations aimed to improve both the matching accuracy and speed of the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine. Our experiments showed that our design requires 20-4000 less buffer space than conventional buffering-and-reassembling schemes on various datasets and that it can process packets in real-time, i.e., without reassembly.

In Chapter 4, we provided a framework – ROBOTOMATA allowing users to easily and efficiently deploy their domain-specific applications on the emerging Micron’s Automata Processors (AP), especially for large-scale problem sizes leading to high reconfiguration costs. We observed that AP suffered from two major problems: the programmability and the scalability issues. Firstly, the current APIs of AP required manual manipulations of all computational elements. Secondly, multiple rounds of time-consuming compilation were needed for large datasets. Both problems hindered programmers’ productivity and end-to-end performance. Accordingly, in ROBOTOMATA, we used a paradigm-based hierarchical approach to automatically generate optimized low-level codes for Approximate Pattern Matching applications on AP, and we proposed the cascadeable macros to ultimately minimize the reconfiguration overhead. By taking in the following inputs - the types of APM paradigms, the desired pattern length, and the allowed number of errors as input - our framework can generate the optimized APM-automata codes on AP, so as to improve programmer productivity. The generated codes can also maximize the reuse of pre-compiled macros and significantly reduce the time for reconfiguration. We evaluated our framework by comparing to state-of-the-art research using non-macros or conventional macros with real-world datasets. The experimental results showed that our generated codes can achieve up to 30.5x and 12.8x speedup with respect to configuration while maintaining the computational performance. Compared to the counterparts on CPU, our codes achieved up to 393x overall speedup, even when including the reconfiguration costs. We highlighted the importance of counting the configuration time towards the overall performance on AP, which would provide better insight in identifying essential hardware features, specifically for large-scale problem sizes.

In Chapter 5, we presented a GPU-based static Android program analysis framework for the security vetting. We focused on the IDFG constructions since it is the core of Android program

analysis and takes most part of the overall analyzing time (up to 96%). We found our plain GPU implementation largely underutilized the GPU's capacity due to the following four major performance bottlenecks: frequent dynamic memory allocation, the branch divergences, load imbalance, and the irregular memory access pattern. Accordingly, we leveraged the application-specific characteristics and proposed three advanced optimizations, including matrix-based data structure for data-facts, memory access pattern based node grouping, and worklist merging. The matrix-based data structure was also designed to reduce memory consumption. Our experiment results showed that the matrix-based data structure for data-facts and worklist merging optimizations can significantly improve the performance compared to the plain GPU implementation, while the memory access pattern based node grouping optimization can slightly improve the performance. The optimal GPU implementation can achieve up to 128X speedups against plain GPU optimization. The matrix-based data structure optimization also can save 75% memory space on average compared to the original set-based data structure.

In Chapter 6, we found that it is unclear how different cache parameters influence the attacks success rates. This question remained open because it was extremely difficult to conduct comparative measurements. The difficulty came from the unavailability of the configurable caches in existing CPU products. Accordingly, we proposed the methodology to fairly measure the attacks' performances under different cache configurations. In our measurement design, we defined the equivalent key length (EKL) to describe the attacks success rates and proposed the quantifiable success rate metric to make the cache-attack performances comparable. We utilize the GEM5 platform to measure the impacts of different cache parameters, including Private and Shared Caches' Size and Associativity, Cacheline Size, Replacement Policy, and Clusivity. Key findings from the measurement results included (i) private cache has a key effect on the attacks success rates; (ii) changing shared cache has a trivial effect on the success rates, but adding neighbor processes can make the effect significant; (iii) the Random replacement policy leads to the highest success rates while the LRU/LFU are the other way around; (iv) the exclusive policy makes the attacks harder to succeed compared to the inclusive policy. We finally leveraged these findings to provide suggestions to the attackers and defenders as well as the future system designers.

## 7.2 Future Work

There still is plenty of research spaces at the intersection of high-performance computing and cybersecurity. In the following, we explore the potential research opportunities in the three subareas of security, including network security, program security, and system security, then discuss the future research directions, respectively.

### 7.2.1 High-Performance Network Security

The main goal of Chapter 3 is to demonstrate the O<sup>3</sup>FA idea and engine design; in the future, we aim to deploy this engine on real hardware. In particular, because the automata in O<sup>3</sup>FA can operate concurrently, the O<sup>3</sup>FA engine can be implemented on parallel architectures such as FPGAs [125] and GPGPUs [25], potentially leading to higher traversal efficiency. Moreover, since the size of the O<sup>3</sup>FA state buffer is typically at the KB level, better performance can be achieved by storing this buffer in SRAM (rather than in DRAM).

We also can implement the O<sup>3</sup>FA on Automata processor using our ROBOTOMATA framework. Since O<sup>3</sup>FA uses automata processing as its computational core, AP is a suitable platform to accelerate O<sup>3</sup>FA implementation. Moreover, since O<sup>3</sup>FA contains a regular DFA which can be large and complicated, using hierarchical construction and cascadeable macro in our ROBOTOMATA framework can ultimately optimize the O<sup>3</sup>FA implementation.

### 7.2.2 High-Performance Program Security

Currently, our GPU-based framework focuses on accelerating the construction of Android program IDFG on GPU. We leave the plugins for various vetting tasks in CPU. In the future, we can consider moving the plugins into GPU as well to minimize the slow data transfers between CPU and GPU. The plugin and the IDFG construction should be implemented as two GPU kernels, and the plugin kernel should launch the IDFG construction kernel. Such realization should involve dynamic

parallelism (DP) technique. Using DP requires fine-grained application-specific optimizations to minimize the kernel launching overhead.

IDFG construction is also the core of program analyses for many other languages. In the future, we can consider generalizing our GPU implementation to support the static security checks for other languages. Moreover, we can extend the generic GPU IDFG construction framework to make it portable to other parallel platforms including FPGAs, Intel Xeon Phis, and GPU clusters.

### 7.2.3 High-Performance System Security

We can extend our comparative measurement for cache side-channel attacks to answer some other interesting in-depth questions.

*Are this measurement's approach, findings, and conclusions transferable to other cache side-channel attacks?* To answer this question, we should extend our experiment to measure the performances of other side-channel attacks. However, as mentioned in Section 6.6, we might need to modify the current measurement design to fit other attacks. For example, with the purpose of measuring the performance of the access-driven attacks on GEM5, one needs to run malicious processes concurrently with the victim crypto process on the GEM5 platform.

*Do the RISC-based embedded systems' cache configurations have the same impacts?* In order to answer it, we plan to measure the attacks' performance on the Rocket emulator [192] whose cache also can be configured. Different from the GEM5 that implements the CISC ISA, the Rocket implements the RISC-V specification and can emulate the SoC embedded platforms. This extension will complete our measurement by covering all scale systems from embedded to server systems.

*How accurate is this emulation-based measurement? Can we apply the conclusions to predict the cache timing attack vulnerability of unseen systems?* Though the GEM5-based measurement results can largely reflect the real hardware's impacts, according to the limitation stated in Section 6.6, they might not exactly match the actual performances on modern commodity CPUs. In the future, we can run the attacks on real CPUs with corresponding cache configurations to exam-

ine the deviations, and then try to use the statistic approaches to model these deviations. Moreover, inspired by the works that model and predict the system performance variability [193, 194, 195], we can build the vulnerability prediction model based on the measurement and deviation analysis results. The possible linear and nonlinear statistic tools that we can leverage to build the model include linear Shepard and Delaunay triangulation. This model will be useful to predict the success rates of cache attacks on the unseen systems. The predictions can provide implications for future system designs to reduce the cache-attack vulnerability.



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