

A Case Study of Identity Politics in America: President George W. Bush and Nationalist Victimization Strategies towards Iraq

Maegen Gandy

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
In
Political Science

Scott G. Nelson, Chair
Timothy W. Luke
Charles Walcott

August 22, 2003
Blacksburg, Virginia

Keywords: Bush, identity, Iraq, nationalism, Self, Other

Copyright 2003, Maegen Gandy

A Case Study of Identity Politics in America: President George W. Bush and Nationalist
Victimization Strategies towards Iraq

Maegen Gandy

(ABSTRACT)

This thesis engages literature in the field of nationalism in order to explore the discursive construction of a Self-Other relationship in American foreign policy as it has been projected by President George W. Bush between September 11, 2001 and March 19, 2003. Political theorists advance numerous definitions of both the nation and nationalism that offer insight into the Self-Other dichotomy. Despite substantive differences, there is consensus among them that the 'national Self' must be accompanied by the presence and identification of Others who fall beyond political, cultural, and territorial boundaries. Without their presence, there would exist either one nation or none at all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Chapter I. INTRODUCTION</u>	1
<u>A. CONCEPTS AND PROJECT DEFINITION</u>	3
<u>B. NATIONALISM</u>	6
<u>C. A CASE STUDY, PRESIDENT BUSH AND IRAQ</u>	8
<u>D. ORGANIZATION</u>	10
<u>Chapter II. NATIONALISM THEORY</u>	12
<u>A. THE NATION AND THE SELF</u>	13
<u>1. La Naissance</u>	13
<u>2. Benedict Anderson. The Phenomenon of Nationalism</u>	14
<u>B. THE SELF, THE OTHER, AND VICTIMIZATION</u>	25
<u>1. Differentiating the Self from the Other</u>	26
<u>2. The extreme Self – Other relationship</u>	27
<u>3. Victimization</u>	30
<u>C. NATIONALISM’S NARRATIVE</u>	32
<u>Chapter III. THE CASE AGAINST IRAQ, A PRESIDENT’S</u> <u>CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF AND THE OTHER</u>	34
<u>A. INTRODUCTION</u>	34
<u>B. PART 1. THE FIRST 30 DAYS</u>	36
<u>C. PART 2. CONSTRUCTING A NARRATIVE AT HOME AND ABROAD</u> <u>OCTOBER 2001 – SEPTEMBER 2002</u>	53
<u>D. PART 3. THE FINAL PUSH AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN SEPTEMBER</u> <u>2002 – MARCH 2003</u>	71
<u>E. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION</u>	81
<u>Chapter IV. VICTIMIZATION STRATEGY</u>	86
<u>A. VICTIMIZATION, BINARY LOGIC, & FUNDAMENTALISM</u>	87
<u>B. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, THE GRAND STRATEGY</u>	93
<u>C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY</u>	98
<u>Bibliography</u>	99

Index of Tables

<u>Table 1: 2002 National Security Strategy - Self-Other descriptors</u>	29
<u>Table 2: The President's Strategy against Iraq, Sep 2001- Sep 2002, Action vs. Narrative</u>	71
<u>Table 3: The President's Strategy against Iraq: Nov 2002 - Mar 2003, Action vs. Narrative</u>	77

Chapter I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis engages literature in the field of nationalism in order to explore the discursive construction of a Self-Other relationship in American foreign policy as it has been projected by President George W. Bush between September 11, 2001 and March 19, 2003.¹ Political theorists advance numerous definitions of both the nation and nationalism that offer insight into the Self-Other dichotomy.² Despite substantive differences, there is consensus among them that the ‘national Self’ must be accompanied by the presence and identification of Others who fall beyond political, cultural, and territorial boundaries.³ Without their presence, there would exist either one nation or none at all.

The nature of national identities is frequently explored in political science by those who study comparative politics and international relations theory. Those within the first school classify nations by characteristics of political, economic and social structure, as well as language, race and geography. The second focuses on the study of “power

¹ Although these dates mark events between al Qaeda’s successful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the first day of US Operation Iraqi Freedom, they do not signify the beginning of the Self - Other relationship between the United States and Iraq. There has been an on-going low-intensity conflict in Iraq since the first Gulf War and the early 1990’s. Once former President Bush began to approach Saddam Hussein as a national enemy at that time, the practice continued under former President Clinton for eight years and then moved forward into the current Bush administration. Therefore, the dates selected for this thesis represent the most recent iteration of the Self – Other relationship between the two states, one that has unfolded through Washington’s new “war on terrorism.”

² Nationalism theory is often framed by classifying differing opinions into four general categories: primordialism, perennialism, modernism, and post modernism. Anthony Smith and Umut Ozkirimli offer two comprehensive overviews of nationalism literature that are divided along these general lines.

³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (New York: Verso, 1983), 3. Another important point of consensus includes the ambiguity of the phenomenon itself. Anderson writes that “nation, nationality, nationalism- have all proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse. Hugh Seton-Watson, author of far the best and most comprehensive English-language text on nationalism sadly observes: ‘Thus I am driven to the conclusion that no “scientific definition” of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists.’”

struggles” framed by a universal system of nation-states.⁴ Both schools often ignore the internal political and social construction of identity and Self that propels the actions of individual global members. Neither focuses on the construction and maintenance of internal or intra-national consciousness as it develops across cultures over time. States are treated as independent actors rather than as part of the development of a national consciousness, or the heterogeneous polities that they represent.

Understanding the development and maintenance of national identity is vital to political science and affects more than the basic assumptions of international relations theory or comparative political science. The nation-state is a complex construction, the fundamental building bloc of modern society. As such, its study as an independent political sub-discipline should receive a level of attention that is similar to the attention the fields of international relations and comparative politics devote to subjects such as security studies, international trade, or governmental political systems. Those who study nationalism theory may well agree. Benedict Anderson, for example, explains that “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.”⁵ Michael Hechter claims that “Nationalism and its close cousin, ethnicity, currently are the most potent political forces in the world.”⁶

The concepts under consideration here are important to the continuing study of nationalism. This thesis explores the discourse of nationalism from a perspective that investigates the relationship between the Self and the Other. I argue that a political

⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1985), 50. “Domestic and international politics are but two different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the struggle for power. All politics, domestic and international, reveals three basic patterns; that is, all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.”

⁵ Anderson (1983), 3.

⁶ Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.

strategy intimately related to the Self-Other dichotomy is integral to the construction and maintenance of the national Self. While acknowledging the role of cumulative nation-building assets and processes,⁷ the instrumental application of a strategy of victimization by national leaders is implemented in order to decrease internal differences and to create and sustain national identity.⁸

A. CONCEPTS AND PROJECT DEFINITION

The specific aims of this thesis are threefold. First it defines and anchors the use of victimization, one of many political strategies for national imaginings, within the broader historical context of nationalism's framework, and identifies it as an appendage of the practice referred to as Othering.⁹ Second, it illustrates the application of this strategy through the development of a recent case study in American politics. The current Bush administration escalated a practice of Othering with regard to Iraq that, "instead of simply promoting the Self and denigrating the Other" portrays the Self as the

⁷ These symbols, processes, and cultural markers include political, economic, social, and religious means of consolidating and increasing the salience of national consciousness and identity.

⁸ Mark Ashley, "It Takes a Victim: The Construction of National Identity and the Narrative of National Victimization" (Draft Paper, University of Chicago, 2001), Abstract. Thus far in my research, the term "victimization" has been unique to a paper presented by Mark Ashley at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 2001. I appropriated the term, along with its listed criteria, from his work, "Nations as Victims: Nationalist Politics and the Framing of Identity." Although Ashley's paper provides a concise three-point criterion from which to assess my argument, he limits his exploration of the topic to a case study of "the French Revolution and the recent debates over French linguistic purity." Beyond his analytic framework, for which I am appreciative, the concepts and ideas developed here are my own. For this reason, Ashley will not be mentioned beyond the scope of Chapter 1.

⁹ Ashley locates the application of the Self-Other dichotomy within multiple "schools" of political science. These include the Early National School, the Modernist School, the Cultural Studies School, the Constructivist IR School, and within his own proposed victimization hypothesis. My work develops the basis of the Self – Other relationship from a different perspective in Chapter 2. Although my construction of the Self does elaborate on the work of Benedict Anderson, who falls into Ashley's Modernist school classification, I also introduce a psycho-analytical and sociological approach that reveals the nature of the Self as it becomes conscious of an Other. This latter concept was developed from my exposure to Said, Freud, Volkan, and Foucault.

victim of the Other.¹⁰ Finally, this thesis discusses the immediate political relevance and importance of the strategy of victimization as a tool exhibited by nationalists who manipulate national symbols and cultural markers in order to influence political identity and consciousness.

The relationship between the national Self and the external Other is implicit within national identity where the interests of the Self are necessarily primary. Adrian Hastings argues that “nationalism is a movement which seeks to provide a state for a given ‘nation’ or further to advance the supposed interests of its own ‘nation-state’ regardless of other considerations.”¹¹ In order to ensure its survival, the minimum level of a nation’s political existence hinges on achieving or maintaining international political legitimacy as one among many nations competing for statehood.

Within the Self-Other narrative, the primacy of self is substantiated “from the belief that one’s own ethnic or national tradition is especially valuable and needs to be defended at almost any cost through creation or extension of its own nation-state.”¹² The rhetoric that supports this concept is frequently practiced and utilized by national political leaders and perhaps even taken for granted as part of a national narrative that domestically represents an International Relations paradigm of power politics.

This thesis explores a particular strategy of self promotion entitled victimization. It is a useful strategy and tool meant to gather civic political consensus and downplay

¹⁰ Ashley, 2. Ashley defines nationalists in the same vein as Brubaker; “nationalists promote the politicization of a particular set of values, ideals, norms, or practices of a particular group of people”. These agents may be political leaders, economic or cultural elites. Ashley, 1. There is no normative judgment associated with term.

¹¹ Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.

¹² *Ibid.*, 4.

internal domestic differences. It expands upon the utility of the Self-Other dichotomy and is comprised of three core components:

1) identification and promotion of the national Self as worthy or superior to other cultural communities (such as other nations); 2) identification and denigration of an external Other, whose qualities are inferior when compared to the Self; and 3) a discourse of real or invented suffering, subjected on the Self by the Other. Victimization may increase the popular salience of the nation by heightening awareness of nation-ness among a polity, by reframing the content of nation-ness to correspond to some shared characteristics, or by construing the alternative identity of the Other as threatening to the cultural or political life of the polity.¹³

The first two components distinguish the placement of the Other as opposed to the Self. The third, the discourse of suffering subjected on the Self by the Other, is distinct to this thesis and will receive the most emphasis. It should not be confused with the historical or cultural sense of suffering at the hands of another that is often a result of ethnic or sub national feuds. Rather, victimization is a political tool that is used to create and maintain nationalism and social identity. Again, it is a strategy that finds expression through the use of various forms of communication and is meant to reduce internal social differences within domestic polities.¹⁴

The strategy of victimization targets an enemy located beyond the conceived boundaries of the national political unit and constructs a threatening opponent of national values. Thematic differences between the Self and the Other are taken from popular and historical culture thus appealing to the civic population. At the same time, victimization is “contingent on the calculations of the entrepreneurs employing the tactic.”¹⁵ Usual occurrences may evolve into political statements that derive meaning in cultural

¹³ Ashley, Abstract.

¹⁴ The impact of communications technology on national identity is discussed extensively in the works of Benedict Anderson and Karl W. Deutsch and will be elaborated upon in the body of the thesis.

¹⁵ Ashley, 12.

expression. For example, when a deck of cards was issued by US Central Command that advertised the 55 “Most Wanted” Iraqi criminals, replicas and posters of these products quickly found a mass market on the internet.¹⁶

The extent of the published nationalism literature that pertains to the content of nationalist victimization strategy is not sufficient. It is often noted that nations feel threatened by one another and yet there is minimal investigation into why the feelings occur and how they are communicated and transferred throughout the polity. I make the case that these are significant gaps in our political understanding and are intimately connected to this paper’s proposed extension of the Self-Other dichotomy. The strategy of victimization should be explored routinely in the study of nations and nationalism. Ashley argues that “each of the literatures on the nation entails a theory (or, at a minimum, as set of assumptions) of the Self and the Other, but that none sufficiently theorizes how the Other is created” or maintained.¹⁷ Victimization strategy begins to explain how the Other is constructed and maintained in order to increase the salience of internal national identity and cohesion.

B. NATIONALISM

Two distinct literatures within political science contributed to the development of this proposal. The first and most extensive support has come from historical and contemporary nationalism theorists whose work devotes sole attention to the creation and development of the nation. Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and E.J. Hobsbawm are included among this genre. A second group of authors focus on nationalism within

¹⁶ America, *Highlighting America*; accessed 15 July 2003; available from <<http://www.americastore.com/irmowadeofca.html>>; Internet.

¹⁷ Ashley, 6.

specific cultures, historical periods and places. Vamik Volkan, Adrian Hasting, and Edward Said are among this latter group.

Despite these two thematic paradigms, the cumulative philosophical and practical literature on nationalism dates back approximately two hundred years.¹⁸ The term “Nationalismus,” or “nationalism,” first appeared in a 1774 text written by Johann Herder; since that time, the concept has continued to evolve and to describe a varying range of phenomena.¹⁹ During the past fifty years, the volume of nationalism literature has increased exponentially and is now additionally complicated by expansive interacting variables such as ethnicity, religion, language, race, technological development, nation, and state.²⁰ No longer confined to the realm of political science, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, and the like contribute to its growing genre.

Nationalism theories explore ideas of political identification and highlight the Self-Other dichotomy within and between national territorial boundaries. For example, Lloyd Kramer suggests that

nationalist ideas...shape the political actions and cultural identities of individuals as well as groups. The meanings of nationalism and national identity typically depend on various dichotomies that define the nation in terms of its differences from other places or people.²¹

¹⁸ John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 4. Anthony Smith identifies “founding fathers” of nationalism theory: “Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Korais, and Mazzini.”

¹⁹ Hechter, 5. Herder first associated the nation with a metaphysical quality that slowly dissipated during the 19th and 20th centuries. For him, “the Nation” is much grander and anchors a civic religion. This aspect of the term is practiced in the United States through the hero worship of historical figures such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, or in the ritualistic components of national holidays such as the 4th of July.

²⁰ Smith (1994), 3. “Sustained investigation of nationalism had to wait until after the First World War, and it is really only since the 1960s, after the spate of anti-colonial and ethnic nationalism, that the subject has begun to be thoroughly investigated by scholars from several disciplines.” Umut Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St Martins Press, 2000), 1. “It was only in the 1920s and 1930s, with the pioneering works of historians like Carleton Hayes, Hans Kohn, Louis Snyder and EH Carr, that nationalism became a subject of sustained academic inquiry.”

²¹ Lloyd Kramer, “Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism,” *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1996, 525.

Edward Said builds on this concept in his text *Orientalism*. He illustrates ways in which counter-cultures and nations must be made to denigrate or vilify one another within their own societies in order to substantiate their own identity. Said argues that the Orient did not and could not exist as a bounded and coherent community until it was ascribed an identity that opposed the West as a bounded and coherent community. He researches symbolic markers that propagate Self-Other political roles and that may be found in literature, music, and art. In this manner, the Self constructs the Other so that it enters into subconscious language of the Self and hence becomes identified as a natural component of reality.

Very few traditional theorists approach nationalism in a manner that investigates the actions of political actors rather than historical events or forces.²² When applied to the Self-Other dichotomy, such a method “can expose the mechanism by which the particular framing of nation-ness is malleable.”²³ Although Machiavellian and IR theories study power politics and social manipulation, the literature focused on internal nation building has not. I make the case that political actors adopt strategies and practices that not only designate cultural and political Others, but also construct narratives that identify the Self as the victim of the Other.

C. A CASE STUDY, PRESIDENT BUSH AND IRAQ

Following the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, President Bush aggressively escalated an Othering strategy within the framework of a War on Terror. Within the first 24 hours after the attacks, the President began to enforce a new

²² Constructivist approaches are becoming more popular in nationalism theory.

²³ Ashley, 4.

doctrine that would soon specifically focus on the government of Iraq. Although already firmly grounded as a vilified Other in the President's victimization narrative, during his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush identified Iraq as the leading perpetrator in a group of three terrorist states that he labeled the "Axis of Evil."²⁴ From that point on, the President continued to develop a narrative focused on Saddam Hussein's regime and successfully mobilized the United States Armed Forces on March 19, 2003 to dismantle the Ba'ath government.

This thesis explores and details the construction of the nationalist narrative developed throughout the President's campaign against Iraq between September 11, 2001 and March 19, 2003. The analysis is not normative in nature and does not speak to the veracity of the administration's claims. Rather, it attends to the information necessary for the explanation of political and cultural Self-Other identification and victimization strategies which are applicable over time and across cultures and nations. In order to assess elements of victimization within public addresses and published speeches, I perform a qualitative analysis of all the President's public appearances between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the beginning of US Operation Iraqi Freedom.

For example, the President made the following remarks during his January 2002 State of the Union Address:

We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world... Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is

²⁴ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Delivers State of the Union Address*, 28 January 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (15 July 2003). The regimes of North Korea and Iran make up the remaining two Axis of Evil states.

stronger than cynicism. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every life... America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.²⁵

This excerpt typifies the content included in a victimization narrative and fulfills its strategy's three basic requirements. President Bush identified the national Self as culturally superior to its vilified Other and posited the Self as a victim of the external national element, calling for national unity based on a cohesive group identity. Highlighted markers of historical cultural identity found form in elements of national belief and character.

Beyond a primary analysis of the development of President Bush's narrative against Iraq, I discuss the political implications of his particular strategy of victimization and its relationship to the construction of American national identity and nationalism. I analyze the President's victimization strategy within and beyond his focus on Saddam Hussein and discuss how discursive elements of religion also play a fundamental role in his Self - Other narrative. I argue that through his relationship to faith, one intimately entwined with national identity, his conception of Self begins to slip into a larger imagined community, namely that of civilization. I then conclude my thesis with a discussion that suggests how the President's victimization strategy compares to historic presidential narratives and how it will appear to future generations of Americans.

D. ORGANIZATION

²⁵ Ibid.

This paper consists of four chapters that mirror the primary discursive elements described in this introduction. Chapter 2 defines and anchors the use of victimization, one of many political strategies for national imaginings within the broader historical context of nationalism's framework. It identifies the strategy as an appendage of the practice referred to as Othering. Chapter 3 illustrates the application of this strategy through the selected case study in American politics. Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the immediate political relevance of the current Administration's use of victimization, especially as it begins to turn its attention beyond the conflict in Iraq. It reviews the importance of this strategy as a general tool exhibited by nationalists who manipulate national symbols and cultural markers in order to influence political identity and consciousness.²⁶ Chapter 5 suggests areas for further inquiry.

²⁶ Ashley, 1. Ashley defines nationalists in the same vein as Brubaker; "nationalists promote the politicization of a particular set of values, ideals, norms, or practices of a particular group of people". These agents may be political leaders, economic or cultural elites.

Chapter II. NATIONALISM THEORY

This chapter defines and anchors the use of victimization, one of many political strategies for national imaginings within the broader historical context of nationalism's framework. It identifies victimization as an appendage of the practice referred to as Othering. Because the thesis suggests that President Bush constructed a victimization narrative that not only stressed a Self-Other relationship between Saddam Hussein's government and the United States, but also portrayed America as the victim of the Iraqi regime, this section focuses on the development of national identity through Self-Other relationships within the nationalism literature. It begins by introducing traditional nationalism theory and then works toward more focused concepts regarding the construction of political nationalist narratives.

The first section of this chapter explores Benedict Anderson's theory of modern nation formation in order to explain how nations have come "into historical being, in what ways they have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy."²⁷ The second section focuses on a more specified discourse of nationalism theory that elaborates the relationship between the Self, and the Other. It shows how the President's narrative not only vilifies the Other, but also depicts the Self as the victim of the Other. The third section illustrates how a given narrative of nationalism can derive from the political construction of national self identity. It speaks directly to the victimization narrative fostered by President Bush since September 11, 2001, and combines the literature presented within the previous sections to develop the primary argument within this thesis.

²⁷ Anderson (1983), 4.

A. THE NATION AND THE SELF

1. La Naissance²⁸

According to the academic literature on nationalism, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the idea of the nation-state emerged as a political canon, its position secure within an expanding global system of state renewal and regeneration.²⁹

Accompanied by varying levels of nationalism, historians

agree to differ in their estimates of how much of it (and what sorts of it) already existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They are at one in recognizing that that world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of course its strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it to constitute the most momentous phenomenon of modern history.³⁰

Once the international system of nation-states was established in Western Europe, “[s]ocieties belonging or seeking entry to the supra-societal system... had in fact no choice but to become nations.”³¹ Individuals within nations “thus had to organize within a national framework, namely, to present itself (themselves) as a continuous

²⁸ Louis Wirth, “Types of Nationalism,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 41, Is. 6 (May, 1936), 727-728. Hechter, 10. The term “nation” evolved from the Latin verb *nasci*, meaning “to be born.” The French verb for *nasci*, *naitre*, is complemented by *naissance*, an eighteenth century concept identifying individuals born in the same place and distinguishing finite groups of “us” (locals) and “them” (aliens).

²⁹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. Diamond and Plattner, *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood*. Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism*. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*. Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*. The concept of the nation became a canon for two reasons. First, it emerged as a universally accepted standard. Second, once begun, it was imitated and consistently repeated.

³⁰ Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 19 (1993), 213. “The discourse of nationalism is distinctively modern. It is variously argued to have originated in the seventeenth century British rebellion against monarchy, the eighteenth century struggles of New World elites against Iberian colonialism, the French revolution of 1789, etc.” Anderson (1994), 135. Benedict Anderson also begins his account of nationalism with the rise of the modern nation-state during the eighteenth century, specifically with the American Revolution of 1776, and continues his anthology through the “profoundly modular” twentieth century nationalisms that “can, and do, draw on more than a century and a half of human experience and three earlier models of nationalism.”

³¹ Wirth, 437.

community with a glorious past and a no less promising future.”³² In order to understand the depth and intensity of contemporary nationalism, one should understand how the nation evolved and why it plays such a defining role in both domestic and international relations.

2. Benedict Anderson. The Phenomenon of Nationalism

a. The nation as a culturally imagined community.

Benedict Anderson first introduced the concept of the nation as a culturally constructed phenomenon in 1983.³³ His first work, entitled Imagined Communities, is devoted to the discourse of nationalism and profoundly influences contemporary nationalism theory. Anderson’s work is vital to this thesis because it demonstrates how intuition and the practice of imagining are imbedded within nationalism and the nation’s sense of Self. He pinpoints how humanity’s relationship to the Divine is intrinsic to feelings of Self worth and unity. With a reference point directed toward humankind’s relationship to spirituality, Anderson attempts to explain how nations have come “into historical being, in what ways they have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.”³⁴ As one of the first scholars to outline a history of modern nationalism, he develops a theory of nation formation that begins with an account of the rise of the modern nation-state in the 18th century. He concludes his analysis with the “profoundly modular” twentieth century

³² Wirth, 437. The juxtaposition of cultural antiquity and progressive modernity within the nation are often essential elements which strengthen the political and social legitimacy of national identity. This concept will receive much attention in the following pages.

³³ Anderson (1983), Imagined Communities.

³⁴ Anderson (1983), 4-5. Benedict Anderson is the focus for this literature review because his work serves as a common base for the majority of contemporary nationalism theorists.

nationalisms that “can, and do, draw on more than a century and a half of human experience.”³⁵

Anderson wrote Imagined Communities to “offer some tentative suggestions for a more satisfactory interpretation of the ‘anomaly’ of nationalism.”³⁶ Nations are created by the design of men who seek universal political legitimacy in an imagined community, one distinctly limited and sovereign. It is specifically this perceived community and comradeship, this ultimate fraternity, “that makes it possible...for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”³⁷ A nation’s cultural, geographic, and political limitations represent the boundaries of its collective Self and differentiate its members from other similarly imagined communities, or Others.

a. National Congruence.

Many theorists have defined nationalism in a similar manner. For example, Ernest Gellner claims that the idea of nationalism “holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”³⁸ Therefore, once a nation and its political unit combine within the state, they are considered a nation-state. Though he does not address concepts such as fraternity or comradeship, Gellner does explain that “Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment.”³⁹ Both Anderson and Gellner imply that the national Self strives for political and cultural homogeneity that must be distinctly identified when compared to Others beyond it.

³⁵ Anderson (1983), 135.

³⁶ Anderson (1983), 4.

³⁷ Anderson (1983), 7.

³⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

³⁹ Gellner, 1.

The concepts of nation-ness and nationalism are neither simple nor agreed upon in a ‘scientific context’. Eric Hobsbawm argues that “[n]either objective nor subjective definitions are satisfactory, and both are misleading.”⁴⁰ For him, “[a]s an initial working assumption any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a ‘nation’, will be treated as such.”⁴¹ Anderson, on the other hand, consistently vies for a cultural interpretation of the nation, insisting that communities coalesce prior to conscious political machinations. He says that “[n]ationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being.”⁴²

Adrian Hastings similarly argues that “nationalism is a movement which seeks to provide a state for a given ‘nation’ or further to advance the supposed interests of its own ‘nation-state’ regardless of other considerations.”⁴³ He suggests that, “ethnicities naturally turn into nations or integral elements within nations” based on certain criteria.”⁴⁴ Hastings furthers Anderson’s argument with respect to Self-Other relationships. He concludes that the primacy of the Self is substantiated “from the belief that one’s own ethnic or national tradition is especially valuable and needs to be defended at almost any cost through creation or extension of its own nation-state.”⁴⁵ This characteristic heightens the emotional investment of its members in the collective Self and increases the feelings of comradeship and spirit that Anderson observes.

⁴⁰ E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8.

⁴¹ Hobsbawm, 8.

⁴² Anderson (1983), 12.

⁴³ Hastings, 4.

⁴⁴ Hastings, 12.

⁴⁵ Hastings, 4.

Unlike Hastings, who focuses on the development of nationalism within Britain, Anderson tracks the development of nationalism and the creation of the modern nation-state as it moves across cultures over time. He offers insight into past, present, and future social structures in which extreme national movements come to the fore. Anderson points out that even today, “many ‘old nations,’ once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-nationalisms within their borders – nationalisms which, naturally, dream of shedding this sub-ness one happy day.”⁴⁶ Nationalist pursuits are part of humanity’s continuing struggle for validation and legitimacy. Without understanding why, humans long to become part of something greater than what their limited humanity allows; the national Self not only imparts identity and a place of belonging, it can also empower its members with the luxury of free choice and Self-determination.

a. The nation a product of modernity

In order to chronicle the evolution of nationalism, Anderson illustrates how economic forces, when combined with growing community self-awareness, create conditions that stimulate nationalistic thought and situate the nation in between interconnected generations of humanity. Nation-states are at once a part of history and future posterity at the same time. They fight for political and social independence in order to ground themselves in a perceived “territorial and social space inherited from the prerevolutionary past.”⁴⁷ Anderson notes that “[i]f nation-states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and ‘historical,’ the nations to which they give political expression always loom

⁴⁶ Anderson (1983), 3.

⁴⁷ Anderson, (1983), 2.

out of an immemorial past and glide into a limitless future.”⁴⁸ Modern societies naively look back upon a territorial and cultural inheritance that is artificial, even mythical at times.

Anderson points to a paradox of nationalism where political modernity and cultural antiquity exist in tandem; while the historian sees the “objective modernity” of nations, the nationalist swears to its “subjective antiquity”.⁴⁹ For example, “The barons who imposed Magna Carta on John Plantagenet did not speak ‘English,’ and had no conception of themselves as ‘Englishmen,’ but they were firmly defined as early patriots in the classrooms of the United Kingdom 700 years later.”⁵⁰ National antiquity is a cultural facade, passed on to successive generations as implicit to group identity.

According to Anderson, the 1776 American Revolution and its aftermath created a nationalist “blueprint” that other societies would later adopt and customize.⁵¹ In each successive region a similar and yet distinctly unique sequence of events converges to produce the necessary changes that foster its growth. The roles of language, temporality, and social structure work in tandem to create unique environments through which individuals can imagine the nation. “The independence movements in the Americas became, as soon as they were printed about, ‘concepts,’ ‘models,’ and indeed ‘blueprints.’”⁵² As a result, the imagined community “has spread out to every conceivable contemporary society,” traveling east from the Americas via improving technologies.⁵³

⁴⁸ Anderson (1983), 11.

⁴⁹ Anderson (1983), 5.

⁵⁰ Anderson (1983), 118.

⁵¹ Anderson (1983), 67.

⁵² Anderson (1983), 81.

⁵³ Anderson (1983), 157.

Anderson proposes that “[s]ince the end of the eighteenth century nationalism has undergone a process of modulation and adaptation according to different eras, political regimes, economies and social structures.”⁵⁴ For example, its advancement has been profoundly affected by deteriorating forces in man’s social and religious life. Regarding the latter Anderson states that, “There is arguably no more important vicissitude for the modern epoch than the attempt to fashion non-theistic designs for government and politics...how humans have tried to cope with the retreat of the Divine from political and governmental affairs.”⁵⁵ The secular transformation of politics and society initiates immense changes that make the nation viable.

Anderson explains that the relationship between the national Self and the retreat of the Divine is significant in at least two ways. The first is also discussed by Anthony Smith in his text Nationalism and Modernism. Smith argues that

[n]ationalism is the natural response of human beings whose social world, with its stable groupings, has collapsed; yearning to belong to a durable community, they turn to the transhistorical nation as the only available replacement for the extended family, neighbourhood and religious community all of which have been eroded by capitalism and westernization.⁵⁶

From this perspective, the nation fills a role that validates humanity’s place in an otherwise chaotic world; it makes an individual feel a part of something greater than a single transitory self, part of a living memory that continues beyond death. Ernest Renan, a French theorist who Anderson often cites, contributes to this argument. He states that

⁵⁴ Anderson (1983), 157. Anderson specifically cites the combination of the printing press, the newspaper, the radio in 1895.

⁵⁵ Scott Nelson, “Contemporary Theory Introduction to Benedict Anderson” (Contemporary Political Theory Course Introduction, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2002).

⁵⁶ Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 97.

the nation “is, like the very existence of the individual, a perpetual affirmation of life.”⁵⁷ Citizens “see themselves sharing a common destiny and view their individual success and well-being as closely dependent on the prosperity of the group as a whole.”⁵⁸ As such, the nation-state is reified and culturally anthropomorphized by its members as a Self incarnate. “Nationalism encourages them to see themselves as contextualized members of a particular community.”⁵⁹ In effect, the nation Self assumes the role of the Divine whose will and instincts are defined by its members.

The second effect that occurred in response to changes in the dynastic realm and the retreat of the Divine relates to social infrastructure. Before the end of the 18th century, religious direction from the church and dynastic empires delineated a clear hierarchical structure for mankind. They taught that “societies were naturally organized around and under high centers” and that the Divine had a role in multiple facets of life.⁶⁰ “Language held less continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves.”⁶¹ With European society’s secular transformation and the spread of Biblical literature in regional vernaculars, the power of the sacred languages of Latin, Greek and Hebrew abandoned the clergy. The written word became subject to all elements of a horizontal society and elite knowledge was no longer exclusive. “Beneath the decline of sacred communities, languages and lineages, a fundamental change was taking place in modes of apprehending the world which... made it possible to ‘think’ the nation.”⁶²

⁵⁷ Ernest Renan, “What is the Nation,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (New York: Routledge, 1998), 17.

⁵⁸ Yael Tamir, “The Enigma of Nationalism,” *World Politics* 47 (April 1995), 425.

⁵⁹ Wirth, 430.

⁶⁰ Anderson (1983), 36.

⁶¹ Anderson (1983), 70.

⁶² Anderson (1983), 22.

Anderson continuously marks the importance of language as a tool for access to the evolving elite community. In Christendom the sacred languages were linked to a “fundamental conception about social groups”; they were “centripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal.”⁶³ Once language grew less malleable and “literacy increased, it became easier to arouse popular support, with the masses discovering a new glory in the print elevation of languages.”⁶⁴ Societies acquired an interconnected consciousness that linked their citizens together.

Ernest Gellner repudiates this assertion when he states that, “[n]ationalism is not deeply rooted in the human psyche; rather, it is deeply rooted in the “distinctive structural requirements of industrial society.”⁶⁵ Although Gellner’s theory also discusses the emergence of horizontally defined social groups, he suggests a different paradigm than Anderson. Gellner’s work divides history into three “fundamental stages: the pre-agrarian, the agrarian, and the industrial.”⁶⁶ He argues that it is impossible to conceive of the nation prior to the establishment of agrarian societies because “nationalism is rooted in a certain kind of division of labor” found only within a “particular social order,” neither limited nor “branded by social class.”⁶⁷ He explains that

(Nationalism) engenders a mobile and culturally homogeneous society, which consequently has egalitarian expectations and aspirations, such as had been generally lacking in the previous stable, stratified, dogmatic and absolutist agrarian societies.⁶⁸

Gellner claims that nationalism results from the product of industrial social structures, ones in which individuals are programmed and interoperable, organized “into large,

⁶³ Anderson, 15.

⁶⁴ Anderson, 80.

⁶⁵ Gellner 35.

⁶⁶ Gellner, 5.

⁶⁷ Gellner, 24, 8.

⁶⁸ Gellner, 74.

centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units.”⁶⁹ As such, it is unrelated to the human psyche.

Anderson’s argument is more convincing. Additionally, the emotional and spiritual connections that he describes between the nation and its members are reinforced by other nationalism theorists. For example, Walker Connor postulates that such a connection is the basis behind national differentiation between the Self and the Other.

[t]he essence of a nation is intangible... a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way. The nature of that bond and its well-spring remain shadowy and elusive.⁷⁰

This intangible concept of Self that both theorists foster is addressed in Anderson’s second text, The Spectre of Comparisons, published in 1998.

d. National formation and transformation.

The Spectre of Comparisons describes the phenomena Anderson calls bound and unbound seriality, methods of transformation and “formation of collective subjectivities in the modern world.”⁷¹ He explains that unbound seriality

has its origins in the print market, especially in newspapers, and in the representations of popular performance, is exemplified by such open-to-the-world plurals as nationalists, anarchists, bureaucrats, and workers.⁷²

Unbound seriality promotes the intuitive understanding of an individual’s place within society and facilitates the intangible connection between a nation and its members.

For example, the daily newspaper fosters an individual’s identity within a national collective Self, partially due to the repetitive exposure. It facilitates community

⁶⁹ Gellner, 35, 132.

⁷⁰ Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (New York: Routledge, 1998), 36.

⁷¹ Anderson (1998), 29.

⁷² Anderson (1998), 29.

awareness within geographic and ethnic populations and connects them to a nationally imagined community.⁷³ “The newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbors, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life.”⁷⁴ From a position of complete anonymity, a community member can purchase a local newspaper and step into a historical document. Even though no actual relationship generally exists between the reader and the individuals described, or between different readers, the newspaper links them together through common events in time. The same phenomenon occurs through alternate mediums such as the radio and the television.

Unbound seriality both contrasts with and merges in practice with bound seriality, which finds “its origins in governmentality, especially in such institutions as the census and elections.”⁷⁵ These forms of “statistical logic and politics” create “something that newspapers were ill-equipped to engender: serial, aggregable, counterposed majorities and minorities, which, starting as formal entities, were positioned in due course to assume political reality.”⁷⁶ For example, Anderson describes the growing importance of political identification in the late 20th century and its relationship to the census and the random-sample survey.⁷⁷ He shows how these tools help to frame the exact boundaries of neighborhoods which can then be used for political purposes such as gerrymandering and electoral mobilization. In this particular case, bound seriality “enables us to see more clearly that fragile but sharp line between ethnicity and

⁷³ Anderson (1983), 44.

⁷⁴ Anderson (1983), 35.

⁷⁵ Anderson (1998), 29.

⁷⁶ Anderson (1998), 38.

⁷⁷ Anderson (1998), 43.

nationalism.”⁷⁸ It makes reality measurable, observable and thus malleable by political leaders with both the knowledge and the power to control it.

The combination of bound and unbound seriality is immensely important to this thesis because President Bush consciously and unconsciously affects their interplay within the United States. With regard to unbound seriality, his rhetoric, actions and speeches are not only the topics of daily newspaper headings, but also appear on primetime television newscasts and radio broadcasts. Where bound seriality is concerned, the President signs multiple executive orders and legislative acts that are designed to increase computable aggregate data, both nationally and internationally, in order to obtain control over transnational terrorist groups and immoral state regimes that threaten the security of the United States.

a. Moving beyond the self

From a different perspective, Anderson’s work is also useful when discussing the intangible connection between a community’s individual members and its collective national Self. This is because the contributing elements that enable one to “imagine” the Self, also substantiate and develop the very pathways upon which one may begin to “imagine” the Other as a distinctly separate phenomenon. In order to be able to imagine the Self, one must be able to imagine the Other.

I now want to turn to the connection between the Self and the Other in order to explore the relationship between the inner and outer alignments of national boundaries and offer an explanation for a different component within the complex phenomenon of nationalism. The dichotomy between the Self and the Other serves as a

⁷⁸ Anderson (1998), 43.

conceptual foundation to President Bush's public narrative regarding Iraq. It is the basis of his victimization strategy.

B. THE SELF, THE OTHER, AND VICTIMIZATION

Section A defines a number of important concepts with respect to this thesis. For example, Anderson identifies the nation as a culturally constructed "imagined community" that inspires feelings of comradeship and fraternity among fellow members. He describes how the nation fosters a relationship with its citizenry and represents a collective Self. Both Anderson and Gellner imply that once a nation becomes congruent with the state, it exhibits political, cultural and geographic boundaries that differentiate it from already existing and emerging imagined communities, or Others. Adrian Hastings illustrates the primacy of the Self in comparison to Others, claiming that nation-states advance their own interests irrespective of Others out of a sense of cultural exceptionalism.

Section A also explores numerous concepts that contribute to the relationship between the individual and the national Self. First, Anderson discusses the importance of antiquity and history to the nation. These concepts are important because they illustrate humanity's fascination with the placement of an individual's worth within the context of a larger collective. Thus, after addressing the past, he turns to the future and locates the Self within the perceived immortal community of which they are a part. Last, Anderson describes the effect of communications technologies and introduces two modes of seriality. As already noted, bound and unbound seriality represent the binary formation of cumulative elements that encompass an individual's identity within the collective Self. This said, those elements not only provide avenues to explore ideas of national political

identification, they can also help to highlight the differences between a nation's internal members and national Others, those imagined communities beyond its cultural, political, and territorial boundaries.

1. Differentiating the Self from the Other

Although conceptual Others fall outside of Anderson's direct focus, his theories still provide a minimum set of assumptions that validate the existence of Self-Other relationships. These relational dualities filter through Anderson's compound design of bound and unbound series. For example, if reading the daily newspaper affects feelings or conceptions of nationalism regarding the imagined community, then the same activity will also affect feelings or conceptions of the Other. Or, from a similar though slightly different paradigm, if an individual's identity is affected by being told what he or she is, then a person's self awareness will also be affected by being told what he or she is not.

Although Anderson explores the connections between the individual and the collective Self, he does not develop the formative relationship between the Self and the Other. This thesis argues that both are equally important to understanding national identity. Many theorists support this relational argument and stress that the Self cannot be fully understood without the presence of an Other. For example, Vamik Volkan, in his text Blood Lines, From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Nationalism, begins to explain the Self-Other relationship on an individual level. He says that

Before ego (self) identification can take place, a child has to accomplish a task called differentiation. This refers to the baby's separating his existence from that of the mother or other caregiver... Identification involves not only the active role of the child, but also the influences of the person with whom the child is identifying.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Vamik Volkan, *Blood Lines From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 86,87.

Thus, on a societal level, nationalism is not only defined by a community's relationship with the Self, it is also effected by the Self's relationship with Others. Interaction between each imagined community may fall upon a spectrum between friend and foe. As allies, President Bush depicts Great Britain as a supportive Other and very similar to the United States. At the same time, the three members who constitute the "Axis of Evil," Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, are depicted as culturally opposite of American identity.

2. The extreme Self – Other relationship

Nationalism theory often generates reverse images regarding the Self and the Other so that their identities come into conflict or appear to represent opposing ideologies and behavior. Hans Kohn, for example, constructs a binary relationship between typologies of nationalism. On one side of the dividing line he describes the rational and political form of nationalism found in the West; on the other he writes of the mystical and cultural version prevalent in the East.⁸⁰ In addition to Kohn, David McCrone discusses Edward Said's use of the binary relationship between the Orient and the Occident within Orientalism. He claims that "[t]he point [Said] is making is that the development and maintenance of every culture requires the existence of another different and competing alter ego."⁸¹ Said develops his understanding of the cultural duality that Western civilization enforces with regard to the Orient. He illustrates how the Occident has historically presented the two sides as opposing civilizations.

Rather than depict the Self as one among many Others, extreme binary relationships often frame the Self as an opposing counterpart to a given Other. For

⁸⁰ Hans Kohn, in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (New York: Routledge, 1998), 164.

⁸¹ Ashley, 15.

instance, in this particular example, Self identity is facilitated through the concepts of citizen and non-citizen.

The invention of citizenship and the invention of the [O]ther, are genetically related. The creation of the modern citizen... entailed the generation of a reverse image from which this identity could assess and affirm itself as such. The construction of the imaginary of “civilization” required the production of its counterpart: the imaginary of “barbarism.” These images have a concrete materiality, in the sense that they are bound to abstract systems of disciplinary nature such as schools, law, the state, prisons, hospitals, and the social sciences.⁸²

This concept is elaborated in Said’s work between the “civilized” Occident and the “barbarous” Orient. He observes that the dichotomy between the two materializes in literature, music and art. He reveals that Orient could not be constructed as a bound and coherent community until it was ascribed an identity that opposed the West as a bounded and coherent community. Such is the case between the current Self – Other relationship constructed by the President.

President Bush frequently uses counterpart images of civilization and barbarism in his contemporary political narrative. He routinely emphasizes a polar dichotomy between the Self and the Other in his speeches, press conferences, radio addresses, and public documents. For example, during the war on terror against Saddam Hussein, the President referred to the conflicting political practices and ideologies of the United States and Iraq. With respect to ideology he compared America’s idealized experience of liberty and freedom to the fundamentally oppressive constraints of the immoral Iraqi regime. Regarding political practice, he contrasted America’s responsible and defensive implementation of nuclear deterrence to Saddam Hussein’s offensive use of chemical and

⁸² Beatriz Gonzalez Stephan “Modernizacion y disciplinamiento: La formacion del ciudadano-del espacio publico y privado,” in “The Social Sciences, Epistemic Violence, and the Problem of the ‘Invention of the Other,’” Santiago Castro-Gomez (2000), 274-275.

biological weapons of mass destruction. President Bush expresses the differences between the Self and the Other as the ultimate dichotomy between good and evil.⁸³

The President’s interpretation of the Self-Other relationship between the United States and Iraq is typified in the introduction of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.⁸⁴ This document was published in September of 2002 and illustrates the President’s conceptual bipolar separation between the United States and the Other. Although Iraq is named only once within the document’s Introduction, it is overtly identified with the following characteristics and terms shown below. The numbers associated with each descriptor specify the amount of times each word was used within the 11 paragraph introduction. For example, with regard to the Other, Terror(ists) was used 15 times while Violence was used only once. In regard to the Self, as well as all nations supportive of the Bush Administration, the President used the word Freedom 24 times.

Table 1: 2002 National Security Strategy - Self-Other descriptors

<u>OTHER</u>			
Terror(ists);	15	Totalitarianism	Radicalism
(En)danger(ous)	7	Shadowy	Corruption
Enemies	7	Murderers	Violence
War	4	Evil	
Threat(s)(ened)	3	Penetrate	
Tyrants	2	Suffering	
Foes	2	Aggression	

⁸³ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Delivers State of the Union Address*, 28 January 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (15 July 2003). This will be detailed in Chapter 3.

⁸⁴ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 17, 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html> (15 July 2003).

SELF

Chaos	2	Vulnerable	
Freedom	25	Principles	Birthright
Peace	8	Advantage	Order
Defend	5	Partner	Friends
Democracy	4	Victory	Together
Strength	3	Human Rights	Heritage
Prosperity	3	Right	Help
Opportunity	3	True	Accountability
Allies	3	Duty	Dignity
Liberty	2	Values	Success
Commitment	2	Calling	Reward
Protecting	2	Advancement	Triumph
Benefits	2	Mission	
Responsibility	2	Conviction	
Cooperating	2	Hope	
Civilization	2	Just	
Safe/Secure/Stable	7		

The dichotomy between the Self and the Other in the document is readily apparent and repeated throughout the President's narrative, well before and after the September 2002 publishing. The extensive range of modifiers in this list of words makes up the fundamental descriptions dispersed throughout the President's narrative after September 11, 2001.

3. Victimization

The President invokes a Self-Other relationship in its most extreme form. His narrative not only vilifies the Other and idealizes the Self, it also accuses the Other of consciously victimizing the Self and all of civilization. According to the President, the Self is *engaged in a defensive war, endangered by an evil enemy* who, on September 11, 2001, *exploited and penetrated the safety and security of civilization*. President Bush uses these labels to campaign that the Other represents danger and threatens the Self, both

physically and psychologically. In its extreme binary relationship, the Self becomes bound to the meaning of the Other as they threaten one another's existence; both identities escalate to opposite sides of an American ideological spectrum. Wherever goodness exists, the Other seeks to root it out. Wherever liberty and freedom reign, the Other hopes to destroy it. By introducing the Other as a credible threat to the nation, the President increases the salience of US nationalism. He constructs an image of the Self based on shared qualities that distinguish the nation from the Other. He argues that the nation's suffering is a direct result of its behavior.

Victimization creates a proactive appendage to the practice of Othering. What begins as a conceptual struggle for survival between two hypothetically opposing sides, results in the development of a potent narrative intended to substantiate a political-military policy of regime change within Iraq. By placing the Self on an ideological pedestal, by vilifying the Other, and by presenting the Self as a past and potential future victim of the Other, President Bush hopes to morally justify his actions with respect to the Iraqi regime. He searches for support both domestically and internationally through a strategy of victimization. Although much of this strategy entails a narrative of familiar words and meaning, it is also comprised of actions that substantiate that meaning. As President Bush's discourse illustrates, there is a constant interplay between the two, a leap frog which enables the President to act upon his narrative with deliberate timing and force.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ This concept will be discussed in Chapter 3.

C. NATIONALISM'S NARRATIVE

Not only do the Self and the Other represent the boundaries of an imagined community, a nation's connection to the Self, as Anderson describes, "commands profound emotional legitimacy."⁸⁶ The same can be said with regard to the Other who interacts with the Self in a relationship that falls between friend and foe.

Nationalist ideas... shape the political actions and cultural identities of individuals as well as groups. The meanings of nationalism and national identity typically depend on various dichotomies that define the nation in terms of its differences from other places or people.⁸⁷

President Bush introduces the dichotomy between the Self and the Other through presentations of bound and unbound series. For example, the presidential warnings of imminent danger on the front page of the daily newspaper affect American conceptions of an aggressive national enemy. At the same time, the operationalization of classified knowledge provided by a new Department of Homeland Defense on the precise location of terrorists also contributes to the perception of the Other.

President Bush acts as a filter between Others and the Self because of the nature of his position as Head of State. It awards him credibility in the eyes of his constituents and reinforces his words with authoritative meaning. Thus, the relationship between the Self and the Other is malleable and vulnerable to his position of political leadership; the content and construction of his victimization narrative is significant to national identity. Adrian Hastings speaks about narratives which introduce "threats to national identity... episodes in which national salvation is, or seems to be at stake."⁸⁸ He explains that

this sharpens the sense of 'us' and 'them', the absolute duty of loyalty to the horizontal fellowship of 'us', and the moral gap separating us from the

⁸⁶ Anderson (1983), 4.

⁸⁷ Kramer, 525.

⁸⁸ Hastings, 190.

other, from the threat to our ‘freedom, religion and laws’ that they constitute... if... ritualized, it is to ensure that each subsequent generation is socialized into a certain us/them view of the world, a view at once nationalist... Such events and their ritualisation do far more than maintain nationhood; they are potent instruments for the promotion of nationalism.⁸⁹

A perceived threat upon the Self propels members to defensive action and can be compounded by including multiple elements of national identity like religious foundations or shared antiquity. It is as Gellner explains; “nationalist sentiment is a feeling of anger aroused by the violation” of the nation-state.⁹⁰ Perceived danger to the legacy of the collective soul unifies the members of a nation.

The following Chapter explores the manner in which President Bush escalated a victimization strategy toward Iraq. It isolates aspects of his narrative which idealize the Self and vilify the Other. The President constructs a threat to the Self and attempts to unify its members in pursuit of a common cause. He calls upon antiquity and historical memory at the same time he speaks of a divine destiny and higher calling. The President confirms the uniqueness of the Self in a recitation of positive values and principles of identity. His narrative of an extreme Self-Other dichotomy expands beyond the range of conceptual opposites and often spills over in an attempt to define civilization. His strategy of victimization argues that as the United States races to save civilization, the enemy rushes to destroy it.

⁸⁹ Hastings, 191.

⁹⁰ Gellner, 1.

Chapter III. THE CASE AGAINST IRAQ, A PRESIDENT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF AND THE OTHER

A. INTRODUCTION

Thus far this thesis has developed concepts integral to the construction and maintenance of national identity. It has also described and illustrated the potency of nationalist narratives that utilize the Self-Other dichotomy as a political strategy for national imagining. This section will draw from those ideas to analyze the actions and narrative of President Bush as he implemented a victimization strategy with regard to Iraq. President Bush not only promoted the Self and vilified the Other, he portrayed the Self as a victim of the Other by constructing a framework of tension and cultural opposition between them. He defined their meaning through national symbols and cultural markers in an attempt to mold American political identity and consciousness. His design was to fashion a believable reality that prompted the nation to comprehend a Self – Other relationship that represented a battle between good and evil. His narrative would appeal to nationalism on a fundamental level, inciting defensive feelings that would unite and overcome a physical and ideological aggressor.

This case study divides the 18 months between September 11, 2001 and March 19, 2003 into three sections that build a comprehensive timeline of events.⁹¹ Each section measures American domestic and foreign policy with regard to Iraq against the content of addresses and speeches delivered by President Bush within the same period. As such, section B chronicles the first thirty days after September 11th and describes the most

⁹¹ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush Addresses the Nation*, 19 March 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html> (15 July 2003). March 19, 2003 marked the beginning of US Operation Iraqi Freedom and the end of the President's evolving narrative meant to oust the Iraqi regime.

defining period during the construction of the president's nationalist narrative. It argues that prior to any official political or military action targeted against the Iraqi government, President Bush firmly established the basis of a narrative that would allow him to advance on Iraq within the framework of the war on terror. What began as a national response to eradicate al Qaeda terrorists, evolved within the President's narrative to become a war on terror. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein soon became the first battle within a larger war. Section C covers the following 11 months and chronicles how the President slowly modified his narrative to place Saddam Hussein's regime at the center of his victimization arguments. This timeframe also marked the transition from Phase I to Phase II of the Bush Administration's war on terror, lasting from mid-October of 2001 until September 10, 2002.⁹² Section D chronicles the period between September 11, 2002 and March 19, 2003. During this final six months before the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush increased the intensity and public visibility of his victimization narrative. He argued that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to the nation and to civilization. The Iraqi leader would never voluntarily stop terrorizing his people, his neighbors, or the rest of the world. The final section of Chapter 3 concludes with an analysis of the President's narrative in order to illustrate how the strategy was politically successful. It addresses discrepancies between the President's actions, which ultimately send American forces into Iraq, and his rhetoric, which presents Saddam Hussein as an immediate threat and aggressor to international peace and national safety. The apparent contrast highlights how the political rhetoric of the President's

⁹² The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Rallies the Troops in Alaska*, 16 February 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020216-1.html> (15 July 2003). The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts*, 11 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html> (15 July 2003). The Bush administration divided the war on terror into phases.

victimization strategy alters lines of truth and meaning. It thus reveals the potency of his victimization narrative.

B. PART 1. THE FIRST 30 DAYS

“Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts...Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil despicable acts of terror... These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong... America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining”
September 11, 2001. 8:30 PM EDT⁹³

It would be nearsighted to discuss the construction of the President’s victimization strategy on Iraq without first specifying where it began. Regardless of when the Bush administration decided to focus on regime change within Iraq or to hold Saddam Hussein accountable to the United Nations’ 1991 disarmament agreements, the President’s public narrative against the Iraqi leader began on September 11, 2001, when he declared war on terror. On this day in the first year of the 21st century, according to President Bush, America faced a new phase in the history of its national warfare. President Bush warned Americans that, “The mindset of warfare must change. It is a different type of battle. It’s a different type of battlefield. It’s a different type of war.”⁹⁴ The President communicated that until that day the United States had never faced an

⁹³ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 11 September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html> (15 July 2003).

⁹⁴ The Office of the Press Secretary, *U.S. and Indonesia on Terror and Tolerance*, 19 September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010919-2.html> (15 July 2003). This statement was made despite recent US 20th century history. There have been numerous occasions in American history when the nation perceived a highly transnational and subnational threat. During the 1930s and 1940s, for example, the FBI worked to expunge a perceived fascist/communist threat from the country. During World War II, Japanese Americans were interned in camps because of suspected anti-American activity.

enemy dependent on stealth and composed of interconnected sub-national and transnational components.

President Bush argued that policy and infrastructure changes in national defense were necessary because September 11, 2001 marked the arrival of a new national enemy. The emergence of a threatening Other saw the strongest nation on earth unable to deny its physical vulnerability and unable to perform its primary defensive functions. Before the third hijacked aircraft ever hit the Pentagon, President Bush described the crisis on national television.

Today we've had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country. I have spoken to the Vice President, to the Governor of New York, to the Director of the FBI, and have ordered that the full resources of the federal government go to help the *victims* and their families, and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act. Terrorism against our nation will not stand.⁹⁵

In the wake of these attacks, President Bush immediately began campaigning for American domestic support. In response to al Qaeda's tactical successes he set down a doctrine that would codify his intentions and direct his public actions against global terrorism. Because the new enemy maintained a transnational presence, he also aggressively sought approval and cooperation from the international community, both at the United Nations and on the more private bi-lateral level between himself and other heads of state. From the outset, his narrative included all three components of a victimization strategy. Not only did he portray the Self as superior to the vilified Other, he argued that the Self was a victim and suffered at the Other's expense.

⁹⁵ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President After Two Planes Crash Into World Trade Center*, 11 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html (15 July 2003).

The President understood the importance of a persuasive delivery. He thought his largest challenge would be to

redefine the terms of the conflict, the campaign, in a way that the leaders would understand, and in a way that the people of the world understand... This is a new type of struggle. It's really the first series of battles in the 21st century... I think that the real challenge for America and our allies in this effort is to do a couple of things: One, condition the world, starting with our own country, that this will be a different kind of battle, series of battles; that they will be fought visibly sometimes, and sometimes we'll never see what may be taking place... terrorism knows no borders, it has no capital, but it does have a common ideology, and that is they hate freedom, and they hate freedom-loving people... This is a war not against a specific individual, nor will it be a war against solely one organization. It is a war against terrorist activities.⁹⁶

Based on his understanding of the events surrounding September 11, 2001, the President constructed the Bush Doctrine to lead the United States through what he would define as civilization's new struggle in the 21st century. To do this, he fashioned a hypothetical threat that reflected America's contrary image, one opposite in American practice and ideology. Where Americans represented the virtues of peace, justice, freedom and civilization, the Other represented the barbarous and corrupt, the evil and tyrannical.

Within the first 24 hours after the national crisis, the President constructed an extreme Self-Other typology, as defined in Chapter 2, and anchored the basic characteristics of his victimization narrative, a set of terms that would continue to evolve during the next 18 months. He employed a victimization strategy to communicate his interpretation regarding this newly conceived antithesis of the national Self, one that would eventually revolve around the regime of Saddam Hussein. From its beginning, the Bush Doctrine encompassed the necessary components to identify the Iraqi government as a principle element within the President's victimization narrative. This initial

⁹⁶ *U.S. and Indonesia on Terror and Tolerance*, 19 September 2001.

framework allowed the President to focus his narrative on Iraq thereafter. It foreshadowed the American policies, both domestically and internationally, that would remove Saddam Hussein from power in March of 2003.

1. Establishing the Bush Doctrine, The First 24 Hours

Within 24 hours of September 11, President Bush publicly defined the three most important precepts of his nascent campaign.⁹⁷

Precept 1. An Act of War on Civilization

“The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war... Freedom and democracy are under attack... This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. We will rally the world... The freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side.”

Precept 2, Good vs. Evil - Extreme Binary Logic and Victimization

“This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail.”⁹⁸ “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them... We go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.”⁹⁹

Precept 3, Total War¹⁰⁰

“The American people need to know that we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy... we are prepared to spend what ever it takes to... protect our national security.”¹⁰¹ “I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. Our first priority is to get

⁹⁷ The Office of the Press Secretary, *News releases for September 2001*, September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/> (15 July 2003).

The three guidelines developed here were extracted from two publicly aired speeches given by President Bush on 11 and 12 September, 2001. It is important to note that phrases and sentences quoted throughout the paper have been condensed and taken out of context.

⁹⁸ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team*, 12 September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html> (15 July 2003).

⁹⁹ *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 11 September 2001

¹⁰⁰ The President defines the war on terrorism as a “total war,” not limited by territorial, political, economic or military constraints, international reaction, or human resources. There is no middle ground or potential political compromise, just complete victory or defeat.

¹⁰¹ *Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team*, 12 September 2001.

help to those who have been injured, and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.”¹⁰²

Each component of the Bush Doctrine attempts to affect the imagined community. It enlists members within the collective Self to identify with the President’s narrative by drawing direct links between national antiquity, the gravity of the nation’s immediate circumstances, and its future posterity. These connections between the Self and its members reinforces public perceptions of what it means to be an American and what the nation symbolically represents, both domestically and as an international actor in a larger global community. They present the Self as a victim of the Other who, because of a unique identity, must face down the evil Other for the good of the Self and all those nations who view civilization in the same manner.

a. Precept 1, An Act of War on Civilization

The first of the doctrine’s three precepts includes a combination of ideas that locates the Self amidst its national history. It compares the President’s advertised struggle against terrorism to previous world wars that are grounded in conception of national antiquity. It immediately places the current conflict on a global level and in the context of a familiar American tragedy.

Enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.¹⁰³

¹⁰² *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 11 September 2001

¹⁰³ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20 September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (15 July 2003).

Here the President implies that the terrorists' actions were not only similar to the Japanese attacks that spurred America's involvement in World War II, but also far worse. For, while the Japanese surprise invasion was certainly tragic in 1941, it still met with a military target. The twenty-first century terrorists, on the other hand, murdered thousands of innocent civilians, an immoral act that is off-limits in ethical forms of modern warfare.¹⁰⁴

The President's message is clear where terrorists are concerned; although they are a new threat, they also share in the Self's alleged antiquity. "We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century... they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism."¹⁰⁵ President Bush describes a 21st century enemy that represents the quintessential Other that America has faced in its past glory. The tragic memory of Pearl Harbor emerges as part of the narrative's vocabulary. Both September 11th and December 7th will remain part of a living memory in which the United States was attacked without provocation and victimized by a merciless enemy, one that personifies everything America has historically and philosophically opposed well before 1941. The President argues that terrorists personify the great evils of the 20th century and as such, enlist not merely the United States but the entire free world. If they could they would make all of mankind victims in their quest for power. Thus, where the Self is seen standing guard over freedom everywhere the Other is imagined to threaten freedom everywhere, a danger to any nation that is weak or unprepared.

¹⁰⁴ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (United States: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 128. "We call them murderers only when they take aim at non-combatants, innocent bystanders (civilians), wounded or disarmed soldiers... The crucial point is that there are *rules* of war..."

¹⁰⁵ *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20 September 2001.

The World Trade Center, al Qaeda's first target on September 11th, was home to numerous international companies and represented global freedom and trade to many Americans. The President embraces its symbolism in his narrative; what began as an attack on two New York City buildings during the morning daylight hours of September 11th, represented an attack on civilization and the free world by night. Therefore, the United States responds not just for itself, but also in the capacity as freedom's caretaker and the defender of progress throughout the world. The image of the Self he invokes is meant to maintain an international identity that will lead the world into a safe and peaceful existence. The President transposes the Self into a supra-national arena where the American nation also emerges as civilization's representative.

President Bush continuously reaffirms that the United States has embarked on a mission to defend and save the world.¹⁰⁶ "Now that war has been declared on us, we will lead the world to victory, to victory."¹⁰⁷ While the President is adamant that America and a growing list of allies "will rid the world of the evil-doers," his international call-to-arms expands the number of organizations and regimes who make up the Other; what initially looked to be a finite roll call of al Qaeda operatives quickly encompasses all terrorists and similar or supportive organizations across the world.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Rallies Troops at Travis Air Force Base*, 17 October 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-20.html> (15 July 2003). On October 17, 2001, the President rallied troops at Travis Air Force Base in California where he related the following story. "Recently, a four-year-old son of a cargo specialist said good-bye to his Dad here at Travis. And according to his Mom, the boy has been telling the neighbors that 'Daddy is saving the world.' The boy is right. The boy is right. The future of the world is at stake. Freedom is at stake... We must be steadfast. We must be resolved... We can be alert and we will be alert, but we must show them that they cannot terrorize the greatest nation on the face of the Earth."

¹⁰⁷ The Office of the Press Secretary, *National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims Of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 13 September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-7.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁰⁸ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President Upon Arrival*, 16 September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html> (15 July 2003).

This is apparent nine days after the September 11 attacks when, during an address to a joint session of Congress and the American people, the President stated that “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”¹⁰⁹ After al Qaeda and the Taliban, Saddam Hussein’s regime would be the next to fall.

The September 20th address defines the parameters of success and failure regarding the President’s new mission. In order to save civilization, the promise to eradicate all transnational terrorist organizations necessitates the identification and organization of every nation into two categories, virtual rival teams aligned either with the Self or the Other. The President argues that without the knowledge and the intervention of America and her new group of allies, freedom and democracy --not just in the United States, but also within the world-- are at risk. Thus begins the second precept of the Bush Doctrine.

b. Precept 2, Good vs. Evil - Extreme Binary Logic and Victimization

This second important doctrinal precept illustrates the moral weight associated with opposing identities contained in the Self-Other dichotomy. President Bush’s new narrative regarding global war divides humanity into two spheres: good and evil. This extreme binary logic of Self and Other morally grounds the opposing sides in relation to one another. The President speaks not of competing civilizations but of an ordered and civilized world of nations that must confront a barbarous and evil system of enemy regimes. His ideological design envisions a conceptual battle between opposing forces where neutrality is an impossibility. The common cultural catch phrase has

¹⁰⁹ *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20 September 2001.

become, ‘either you are with us or you are against us,’ either good or evil.¹¹⁰ Evil is a term that is at once immoral and yet often religious in meaning. It implies a proactive seeking out of the innocent and unsuspecting. Evil is a predator, always looking for a victim.

The President constructs a moral dichotomy that is black and white. He decides that

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime... This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight.¹¹¹

In this declaration, President Bush provides a litmus test for an intended 21st century alignment of friend and foe. He warns the international community that “We’re enforcing the doctrine that says this: If you harbor the terrorists, you are guilty of terror. And like the terrorists, you will be held responsible.”¹¹² In this manner, he presents the American Self as the judge and adjudicator of acceptable forms of national and international behavior.

Although the President does not isolate Saddam Hussein at this point in his narrative, his meaning is directed specifically at the Iraqi leader. Within hours of the destruction of American targets by a single transnational terrorist organization, President Bush sounded out a warning that would put more than Afghanistan’s Taliban government

¹¹⁰ Nicole Gnesotto, “Reacting to America,” *Survival*. 44, (2002-2003:4): 99-106
Despite its dramatic flare, the President’s rigid conception of morality limits US foreign policy. “[T]his principle of prior authority makes any debate among allies, whose priorities by definition are hardly likely to be identical, very difficult.” Political expression and decision-making becomes confined and artificially narrow in a complex world that offers only binary choices. Gnesotto, 99-106.

¹¹¹ *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20 September 2001. Although this remark was taken from a September 20th address, it is a sentiment that was initially expressed on September 11th and reiterated during almost every presidential speech within thirty days thereafter.

¹¹² *President Rallies Troops at Travis Air Force Base*, 17 October 2001.

on notice. He made a promise to eradicate all terrorist organizations and those governments who harbor them. It is a promise to wrest immoral regimes from state power and return a country's political control back to the deserving nation who had unwillingly been held hostage. Once liberated, a broken and yet promising nation would once again have the chance to join civilization and be free to pursue its God-given natural rights.¹¹³ A community's evil captors would disappear once confronted by an international coalition led by the United States. Hence, as civilization's benefactor, America would bestow God's gift to man to those too unfortunate or incapable at grasping it for themselves.

The President's victimization narrative adds an important addendum to the traditional concepts of nation and nationalism. He argues that political units that align with transnational terrorists belong in a category outside of the nation they claim to represent. In his view, a nation and its corresponding political leadership can only be legitimate if a member of the civilized world.¹¹⁴ Thus, those governments that support terrorism in any capacity are merely hostile regimes that must eventually be exiled from the nations they control. Governments that defy the second precept of the Bush Doctrine do not merit a place in civilization and are assigned a position within the Other. Therefore, the Other is composed of a new unconscious transnational coalition of sub-national groups, not the traditional nation-state. The President's victimization strategy is

¹¹³ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President's Radio Address*, 06 July 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020706.html> (15 July 2003). "And we are thankful for our freedom, the freedom declared by the founding fathers, defended by many generations and granted to each one of us by Almighty God."

¹¹⁴ This is roughly the same as civic nationalism. President Bush holds the United States as the model nation. To his mind, any human being would choose such a model if given the opportunity.

designed to establish the Self-defined nation as the requisite political unit of civilization and global politics.

c. *Precept 3, Total War*¹¹⁵

The President's addendum to the definition of the traditional nation drives the third component of the Bush Doctrine. This component declares that because the danger to the Self is so great, it requires every possible means, every resource available, to eradicate the enemy. The Other's sub-national makeup is why he continually warns Americans that the enemy in this war is different than ever before. As exiles of civilization, terrorists hide among the innocent and unsuspecting citizens of the world, enabled and empowered by supporting regimes. Therefore, for the good of the Self and its coalition, individuals who comprise the Other must be dispelled. The danger to the Self is too great to risk further attacks on the scale of the New York City tragedy.

According to the President's victimization narrative, before September 11, 2001 the world could not imagine the extent of the threat posed by terrorism. American citizens felt a sense of security, now rendered false, because of their geographical isolation between Europe and East Asia. The President concludes that this is the reason that the best defense against terrorism is an aggressive offense—one that takes conflict to the Other. He states that

September the 11th brought home a new reality, and it's important for all our citizens to understand that reality. See, a lot of us, when we were raised, never really worried about the homeland. We all believed that two oceans would forever separate us from harm's way, and that if there was a threat gathering overseas, we could pick and choose whether or not we wanted to be involved in dealing with that threat. September the 11th delivered a chilling message to our country, and that is oceans no

¹¹⁵ The President defines the war on terrorism as a "total war," not limited by territorial, political, economic or military constraints, international reaction, or human resources. There is no middle ground or potential political compromise, just complete victory or defeat.

longer protect us. And therefore, it is my obligation to make sure that we address gathering threats overseas before they could do harm to the American people.¹¹⁶

This statement is not historically accurate. The United States has been physically vulnerable to attack for some time, at least since the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor during World War II. Additionally, the nuclear strike capability posed by the Soviets during the Cold War were also an overseas threat posed by another ideological Other.

Regardless of this reality, the President still argued that “This will be a different kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy.”¹¹⁷ He stressed to the public that it would require time to amass the knowledge and understanding of a new enemy. Unlike past global wars where the Other was overt and posed a clear and imminent threat, this war must be filtered on many levels precisely because of its covert nature. Although the nation is engaged in a total war, it may not seem that way. Many of the conflicts and battles will be waged in a covert manner. The President promises to use every available American asset in pursuit of the Other, whether through military action, financial means, or law enforcement. Within the third precept of his doctrine President Bush continually defines this all-out pursuit as his mission and pledges to use national and coalition support.

My administration has a job to do, and we’re going to do it. We will rid the world of the evil-doers... people have declared war on America... we need to be alert to the fact that these evil-doers still exist. We haven’t seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time... This is a new kind of—a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to

¹¹⁶ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President in Terrell for Senate and Louisiana Republican Party Luncheon*, 03 December 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021203-3.html> (15 July 2003).

¹¹⁷ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Radio Address of the President to the Nation*, 15 September 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html> (15 July 2003).

take a while... But this administration, along with those friends of ours who are willing to stand with us all the way through will do what it takes to rout terrorism out of the world.¹¹⁸

Although the President's narrative indicates that the US is only taking action in self-defense, never before has the United States waged a total war against such a limited enemy. Never before has every asset been focused on an entity so minutely defined and yet so geographically diverse. The President explains that the war will be a long crusade, partly because the threat exists everywhere. President Bush commits every necessary national asset to root out the evil across the world. In order to succeed in his crusade this begs the question of whether there will be a requisite inquisition. After all, one is either good or evil, innocent or guilty; this applies both to the individual and national levels.

Within 24 hours after September 11th, all three precepts of the victimization strategy were in place. The Bush Doctrine vilified the Other as evil and idealized the Self as the force of good. The President depicted the threat imposed by the Other as the largest and most unpredictable danger ever faced in US history. As such, it would continue to victimize innocent citizens because of an insatiable hatred. From day one, Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi regime were included as participating members in the narrative's force of evil. Although the President had yet to call out the Iraqi leader, his warnings indicated that Iraq would be pursued at some future date during the war on terror. Before being singled out as the most dangerous and imminent threat, however, President Bush needed to stabilize his narrative in front of the domestic and international communities.

2. Building Domestic and International Momentum

¹¹⁸ *Remarks by the President Upon Arrival*, 16 September 2001.

After President Bush introduced the Bush Doctrine on prime time television, he continued to reinforce his victimization narrative at home and abroad. Additionally, allies such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who attended the President's national address on September 20, 2001, showed physical and ideological support. In a photo opportunity before his speech the Prime Minister confirmed and reiterated President Bush's sentiments.

This is a struggle that concerns us all, the whole of the democratic and civilized free world. And we have to do two things very clearly; we have to bring to account those responsible, and then we have to set about at every single level, in every way that we can, dismantling the apparatus of terror, and eradicating the evil of mass terrorism in our world...this struggle is something that should unite people of all faiths, of all nations, of all democratic political persuasions, and I believe it will.¹¹⁹

By the time Prime Minister Blair's message reached an American audience, the US government had already accomplished a number of acts in response to the attacks only nine days earlier. On September 13th emergency funding was requested for FY2001 in the sum of \$20,000,000,000. On September 14th and 15th Congress authorized the use of force against the responsible terrorists; certain military reservists were called to active duty; and Osama bin Ladin was named the principle leader of the al Qaeda terrorist network. By the evening of his speech, the President also appointed Tom Ridge to lead the Office of Homeland Security and directed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to authorize overseas deployments.¹²⁰ By this time, the moving parts of the American infrastructure were gaining momentum in order to fulfill the declarations made by the

¹¹⁹ *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20 September 2001.

¹²⁰ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President: "We're Making Progress"*, 01 October 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011001-6.html> (15 July 2003). Within nine days the President "deployed over 29,000 military personnel and two carrier battle groups, as well as an amphibious ready group (ARG) and several hundred military aircraft. We've called about 17,000 members of the Reserve to active duty, as well as several thousand National Guard operating under state authority."

President. The results of his actions induced change in the everyday lives of Americans. What initially felt overwhelmingly uncomfortable, hearing of increased threat alerts and failed hijacking attempts, grew into a firm resolve to withstand the daily suffering together. Living with precaution began to feel natural and the Other's existence became a familiar presence as America's government moved the nation closer to active retaliation in Afghanistan.

For example, while an executive order froze identified terrorist assets domestically on September 24th, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 to control their finances globally four days later. The President personally met with the heads of state of over thirteen countries and began gathering support for a proposed anti-terrorism bill called the Patriot Act. Most importantly in the tactical fight against the Other, and amidst a series of anthrax scares on the East Coast, allied planes and missiles attacked targets in Afghanistan on October 7th announcing the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom.

3. Where is Iraq?

Throughout this thirty day period, Iraq was mentioned twice during public discussions with the President. The first instance occurred during a photo opportunity with President Megawati of Indonesia on September 19th. Specifically regarding Iraq, President Bush was asked the following questions:

1. Do you have any reason to believe Iraq is connected with the terrorist attack? And if so, what would your response be?
2. A specific message to Iraq?¹²¹

¹²¹ *U.S. and Indonesia on Terror and Tolerance*, 19 September 2001.

At neither time did the president focus specifically on Saddam Hussein or Iraqi regime during his response. Instead he reiterated that his doctrine represented a message to every country.

Anybody who harbors terrorists needs to fear the United States and the rest of the free world. Anybody who houses a terrorist, encourages terrorism will be held accountable. And we are gathering all evidence on this particular crime and other crimes against freedom-loving people... I would strongly urge any nation to reject terrorism, expel terrorists... We're on the case. We're gathering as much evidence as we possibly can to be able to make our case to the world about all countries and their willingness to harbor or not harbor terrorists.¹²²

Although the Iraqi government is indirectly implicated here, President Bush refrained from using Saddam Hussein as a specific example.

During a press conference on October 11th, however, the President did speak of Iraq when asked the following question:

Q: We understand you have advisors who are urging you to go after Iraq, take out Iraq, Syria and so forth. Do you really think that the American people will tolerate you widening the war beyond Afghanistan?¹²³

Rather than refrain from targeting the Iraqi leader or implying immediate guilt, President Bush stated the following:

This is a long war against terrorist activity. And the doctrine I spelled out to the American people in front of Congress said not only will we seek out and bring to justice individual terrorists who cause harm to people, murder people, we will also bring to justice the host governments that sponsor them, that house them and feed them... There is no question that the leader of Iraq is an evil man. After all, he gassed his own people. We know he's been developing weapons of mass destruction... And so we're watching him very carefully. We're watching him carefully.¹²⁴

¹²² *U.S. and Indonesia on Terror and Tolerance*, 19 September 2001

¹²³ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Holds Prime Time News Conference*, 11 October 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html> (15 July 2003).

¹²⁴ *President Holds Prime Time News Conference*, 11 October 2001.

The President uses the same adjective to describe Saddam Hussein as he does to describe the already established Other: evil. He makes a connection between the Iraqi leader and those who harbor terrorists, individuals who will be prosecuted as terrorists and who equally define the Other within the victimization narrative. President Bush leaves a window open with respect to Saddam and implies that there will be a follow up in his particular case.

President Bush closed the first thirty days after September 11, 2001 with a clear message for Saddam Hussein. His narrative accomplishes this in three ways, both directly and indirectly. First, the Bush Doctrine dictates that state sponsored terrorism falls within the boundaries of the Other and will be targeted by the Self. “[T]his government will call others to join us, to make sure this act, these acts, the people who conducted these acts and those who harbor them are held accountable for their actions. Make no mistake.”¹²⁵ Second, the President publicly announces that Iraq specifically will be monitored and assessed. And third, something less well known to the public, the same day that the United States began to attack targets in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001, it also informed the UNSC that organizations and countries besides al Qaeda and Afghanistan could become military targets.¹²⁶

The combination of these actions enabled President Bush to construct a victimization narrative around Saddam Hussein. They placed Iraq in direct confrontation to the stated goals and civilizational requirements dictated by the standards of the war on

¹²⁵ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Pledges Assistance for New York in Phone Call with Pataki, Giuliani*, 13 September 2001; Text available online at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-4.html>> (15 July 2003).

¹²⁶ “US Ambassador to the United Nations John D. Negroponte’s Letter to the UNSC President on October 7, 2001.” 08 October 2001; Text available at <http://www.usis.it/file2001_10/alia/a1100807.htm> (20 July 2003)

terror. The following months would see a subtle but deliberate transition of focus within the President's narrative. By January the Iraq would be named the nation's prime target. By September President Bush would step up his victimization narrative in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

C. PART 2. CONSTRUCTING A NARRATIVE AT HOME AND ABROAD OCTOBER 2001 – SEPTEMBER 2002

President Bush soon began to settle into his victimization narrative, seemingly confident that the political momentum created within the first thirty days after the terrorist attacks would continue to support his new doctrine. On October 26, 2001 he signed the Patriot Act, a significant piece of domestic legislation that he called “an essential step in defeating terrorism, while protecting the constitutional rights of all Americans.”¹²⁷ During his remarks at the bill signing he stated that

With my signature, this law will give intelligence and law enforcement officials important new tools to fight a present danger... The changes, effective today, will help counter a threat like no other our nation has ever faced. We've seen the enemy, and the murder of thousands of innocent, unsuspecting people. They recognize no barrier of morality. They have no conscience. The terrorists cannot be reasoned with. Witness the recent anthrax attacks through our Postal Service.¹²⁸

Although never able to directly link a string of anonymous anthrax cases to a known terrorist organization, the President used the isolated events to support his arguments for passing the legislation. Postal workers facing bioterrorism were added to an already established group of American heroes who rose up to defend the nation on 9/11. They served as yet one more example of how “Our nation faces a threat to our freedoms” from

¹²⁷ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President at Signing of the Patriot Act, Anti-Terrorism Legislation*, 26 October 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011026-5.html> (15 July 2003).

¹²⁸ *Remarks by the President at Signing of the Patriot Act, Anti-Terrorism Legislation*, 26 October 2001.

the Other when they joined the ranks of the Armed Forces, police officers, firefighters and citizens already sacrificing for the nation against terrorism.¹²⁹ Their behavior would be made to represent the national Self.

President Bush argues that bioterrorism is one more element in the war on terrorism and represents a different front of the same war. The “first attack” came by plane while “The second attack against America came in the mail.”¹³⁰ The perpetrators of both are the uncivilized terrorists, members of the Other who threatens and will continue to victimize innocent Americans and allies of the collective Self.

We are the target of enemies who boast they want to kill—kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians. We’ve seen that type of hate before—and the only possible response is to confront it, and to defeat it...Those who celebrate the murder of innocent men, women, and children have no religion, have no conscience, and have no mercy.¹³¹

With this description of the Other, the President took his victimization narrative to confront terrorism to the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, 2001.

1. The President’s Narrative at the United Nations

President Bush began his remarks at the United Nations by citing the principles of self defense found in the UN Charter. “Every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of civilization: We will defend ourselves and our future against terror and lawless violence.”¹³² He attempts to enlist the support of the international community by prophesying that, “The only alternative to victory is a nightmare world where every city is a potential killing field... This threat cannot be

¹²⁹ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Discusses War on Terrorism*, 08 November 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011108-13.html> (15 July 2003).

¹³⁰ *President Discusses War on Terrorism*, 08 November 2001.

¹³¹ *President Discusses War on Terrorism*, 08 November 2001.

¹³² The Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters*, 10 November 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html> (15 July 2003).

ignored. This threat cannot be appeased. Civilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened”¹³³ President Bush applies his victimization strategy in order to increase the salience of his narrative in front of the assembled United Nations members. He warns that without action and support of US policies, the whole of civilization will be victimized.

After the initial shock of September, the President primarily appealed to domestic feelings of justice and order. This he continues to a lesser extent at the United Nations where he explains that, “There is no corner of the Earth distant or dark enough to protect them. However long it takes, their hour of justice will come... We choose lawful change and civil disagreement over coercion, subversion, and chaos.”¹³⁴ The dichotomy between civilization and barbarism, as well as the concept of justice that is noted here, will always remain a focus for President Bush’s narrative. It will not, however, continue to be his only focus.

While lobbying the international community, the President begins to focus his narrative towards rhetoric that speaks of a “just peace.” It points to a community of nations that can be grasped once the danger posed by the evil Other is confronted and abolished. In front of the United Nations the President describes this goal as the duty of this generation, one which America will lead to its conclusion. As the symbolic figurehead of the United States, President Bush leans forward on the prow of civilization to navigate a steady course across dangerously rough waters and towards more peaceful and following seas. The American Self willingly takes on the burden and responsibility of leadership for the rest of the world.

¹³³ *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters*, 10 November 2001.

¹³⁴ *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters*, 10 November 2001.

For the sake of all humanity President Bush begins to proselytize in the name of peace and progress. As his focus moves beyond Afghanistan and to the rest of the world, his narrative consistently slips into a rhetoric where the Self encompasses not only the nation. His focus begins to visualize a just peace that will unite civilization. The Self-Other dichotomy reemerges and the President's narrative suggests that as the Other tries to tear civilization apart, the Self resists its every step.

Every other country is a potential target. And all the world faces the most horrifying prospect of all: These same terrorists are searching for *weapons of mass destruction*, the tools to turn their hatred into *holocaust*... We must press on with our agenda for peace and prosperity in every land... In our struggle against hateful groups that exploit poverty and despair, we must offer an alternative of opportunity and hope.¹³⁵

The President believes that the United States agenda represents the only way to achieve this opportunity and hope internationally. The global Self must put up a defense.

This address represents the moment when President Bush publicly begins to press for action beyond Afghanistan. It marks a major transition in his narrative against Iraq, one exponentially more important than the introduction and focus on world peace as a mythical universal goal. By invoking the concept of a holocaust, the President invokes a Judeo-Christian image meant to arouse a pan-national response. He figuratively links the current Self-Other relationship with the horrifying and unacceptable atrocities committed against innocent victims in World War II. Through a historic-religious framework he connects the danger posed by transnational terrorist organizations to the designs of immoral regimes that pursue weapons of mass destruction. Though still undesignated as the principle Other, Iraq now represents the prototype nation that President Bush

¹³⁵ *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters*, 10 November 2001. Italics added for emphasis.

describes as civilization's ultimate threat. The President's narrative against Iraq finds its linchpin.

On November 10, 2001 the President reveals his future avenue of approach against Iraq in front of the international community, one that would eventually see the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's regime. He quickly begins to press an international agenda in order to generate domestic and coalition support for US action against Iraq. His narrative continues to interpret the war on terrorism as a deeper confrontation than the one between America and one transnational organization. He attempts to make this point by addressing the UN General Assembly as a collective "we", saying that "It is our task—the task of this generation—to provide the response to aggression and terror. We have no other choice because there is no other peace. We did not ask for this mission, yet there is honor in history's call."¹³⁶ Once again, the President utilizes a victimization strategy with a universal Self.

With this combination of ideas, President Bush left the United Nations. Three days later, on November 13, 2001, he authorized the detention and treatment of non-citizens in the global war against terrorism. As the Commander in Chief, and through the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution passed earlier in September, President Bush directed procedures regarding the detainment and interrogation of terrorists captured during the war.¹³⁷ This law affects not just individuals captured and suspected of terrorist activities within the United States and Afghanistan, it also includes

¹³⁶ *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters*, 10 November 2001

¹³⁷ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Calls for \$48 Billion Increase in Defense Spending*, 04 February 2002; Text available online at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020204-1.html>> (15 July 2003). On February 4, 2002, in an address to service personnel at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, the President noted that, "Afghanistan is only the first step, the beginning of a long campaign to rid the world of terrorists." The Joint Resolution is part of one objective, "And that's to run down al Qaeda and the rest of the terrorists, and maybe give them a free trip to Guantanamo Bay."

international suspects turned over to American control by allies in the war against terror. Any regime, including that of Iraq, targeted by the US coalition during the global war on terrorism would be subject to internment and interrogation. All Others would be treated in the same manner, lacking rights and liberties guaranteed to members of the narrative's civilized world. This is significant because the last Afghani city controlled by the Taliban regime fell to US forces on December 7, 2001. The short time between the creation of the detention order in mid November and the "liberation" of Kandahar in early December illustrates the President's intent to use his authority in future conflicts.

In addition, President Bush continues to meet personally with over twenty heads of state regarding the war on terror between mid October and the end of November. By December 28th, three weeks after the fall of Kandahar and two weeks following Chairman Hamid Karzai's installation as Afghanistan's interim leader, President Bush signed the Defense and Intelligence Authorization Acts and met with General Franks to discuss the continuing war.

These events increased the perceived ideological differences between the United States and Iraq. Although the President had yet to officially identify Saddam Hussein's regime as the principle threat against the Self, this would soon change. On January 29, 2002, during the State of the Union address, President Bush finally isolated the Iraqi government as a principle member of his victimization narrative. He qualified the immoral regime as the leading player within the triumvirate he calls the "Axis of Evil." When the nation gathered to hear his thoughts on the state of America, the President addressed the Self and finally informed them that the United States would deal with Saddam Hussein.

2. January 29, 2002. Introducing the Axis of Evil

“Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.”

President Bush, January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address¹³⁸

President Bush developed and deepened his victimization strategy against Iraq between September 2001 and January 2002. It should not have been surprising to individuals familiar with his narrative that he isolated Saddam Hussein’s regime as the most dangerous government among a hostile “Axis of Evil” during that month’s State of the Union Address. The January 29th speech, with the exception of this christening, did not introduce new elements to his victimization narrative; instead it reinforced the doctrine’s already existing concepts. Since his last national address on September 20, 2001, the President had worked aggressively to solidify his developing narrative. Many of his most telling positions with regard to Iraq were expressed in front of smaller and less formal, politically supportive audiences. Instances include school speeches, military addresses, and business or party functions.

This section of Chapter 3 compares the content of the 2002 State of the Union Address to the victimization narrative that President Bush constructed after September 11, 2001. It will illustrate how the President’s narrative developed prior to the State of the Union, revealing a gradual build of major concepts and themes. In order to do this, I transfer between the State of the Union Address and similar passages delivered by the President during earlier presentations.

¹³⁸ *President Delivers State of the Union Address*, 29 January 2002.

January 29, 2002: During the State of the Union Address, President Bush told the nation that,

This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity—a moment we must seize to change our culture... we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace... We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed. Beyond all the differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger together... We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass... We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every life... In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential.¹³⁹

In this statement, President Bush references another rare moment in American history when a consequential choice faced humankind. “When in the course of human events” is the phrase that was used by Thomas Jefferson in the introduction of the American Declaration of Independence.¹⁴⁰ As part of a common American experience, the antiquity of the “founding” was a defining moment in United States history when, as the result of “a long train of abuses and usurpations,” Americans were bound by “duty... to provide new guards for their future security.”¹⁴¹ President Bush links the successful and determined Self of the past to the contemporary Self of the present; it is a present where regardless of individual differences of race or religion, all Americans are part of one nation, where an attack on one is an attack on all. As Americans led the world in establishing the first democratic modern nation, so too would they lead it in establishing a world entirely comprised of modern democratic nations.

¹³⁹ *President Delivers State of the Union Address*, 29 January 2002

¹⁴⁰ Thomas Jefferson. “The Declaration of Independence,” in *A Documentary History of the United States*, ed. Richard Heffner (New York: NAL Penguin Inc., 1985), 15.

¹⁴¹ Thomas Jefferson, 16.

October 17, 2001: Three months before the State of the Union, the President made similar comments to the California Business Association. There he spoke of the same historical opportunity, the same unity and diversity, and a rediscovery of what America represented at its founding—why Americans first came to the proverbial land of liberty or in pursuit of the American dream.

This great state (California) is known for its diversity—people of all races, all religions, and all nationalities. They've come here to live a better life, to find freedom, to live in peace and security, with tolerance and with justice. When the terrorists attacked America, this is what they attacked. And when we defend America, this is what we defend. We are fighting for the security of our people, for the success of our ideals, and for stability in large parts of the world. We fight evil people who are distorting and betraying a great religion to justify their murder... Yet, for all of us, an American is an American, no matter where we live, no matter what our race, no matter how we pray... when terrorists attack them, they attack us all... I applaud the American people for your courage in a time of trial. We're living through a unique moment in American history. This is a time of rediscovery, of heroism and sacrifice and duty and patriotism. These are core values of our country, and they're being renewed. We found them waiting for us just when we needed them... The true character of this great land has been revealed in adversity... Americans are generous to our neighbors in need. Americans are tolerant toward our fellow citizens of every background. Americans are alert to danger, but calm and determined in the work ahead. And Americans are reaching out across the world to say: We wage a war on the guilty, not the innocent. We're friends to people of all faiths and enemies only to those who choose to make enemies of us. And Americans know we must act now.¹⁴²

President Bush addresses the American Self in every speech and every address. He defines the Self through tension and in opposition to what the Other hates and attempts to destroy. This lengthy list includes tolerance, heroism, sacrifice, duty, patriotism, freedom, peace and other core values. Again he argues that Americans did not choose war; it was thrust upon them by the Other, an enemy guilty of betrayal and murder. His

¹⁴² The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Outlines War Effort*, 17 October 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-15.html> (15 July 2003).

narrative suggests that the Other poses a “grave and growing” danger to an innocent Self that has been undeservedly victimized.

January 29, 2002: In order to overcome the mounting danger posed by the Other, the President counsels against naiveté, urging Americans to be vigilant. During the State of the Union he again warned that, “America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.”¹⁴³ This theme within his narrative adds further emphasis to the need for action abroad; the only successful defense necessitates offensive activity outside of national boundaries.

October 30, 2001: The President addressed this same issue during a speech at Thomas Wooten High School in Rockville, Maryland where he announced the Lessons of Liberty Initiative. In the context of another national memory he told the audience that

America and the cause of freedom have determined enemies; that there are people in this world who hate what America stands for. They hate our success, they hate our liberty. We have learned all too suddenly that there are evil people who have no regard for human life, and will do whatever it takes to try to bring this mighty nation to its knees. On the Korean War Memorial in Washington are these words, “Freedom is not free.” Our commitment to freedom has always made us a target of tyranny and intolerance. Anyone who sets out to destroy freedom must eventually attack America, because we’re freedom’s home. And we must always be freedom’s home and freedom’s defender...And the truth of the matter is, the best way to fight for the homeland is to find the terrorists, wherever they hide, wherever they run, and to bring them to justice.¹⁴⁴

In order to achieve justice the Self must pursue the Other in its own habitat and keep it on the defense.

¹⁴³ *President Delivers State of the Union Address*, 29 January 2002

¹⁴⁴ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Launches "Lessons of Liberty"*, 30 October 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-7.html> (15 July 2003).

The President's narrative suggests that although the national Self will come under attack by Others because of its symbolic importance, the United States is not the only nation in danger. President Bush argues, as he did in front of the United Nations, that the entire world encompasses this new war's "battlefield." He forcefully stresses the danger posed by the Other to all of civilization. This is a confirmation of the ideas in the first precept of the Bush Doctrine and those expressed within the President's victimization narrative during the first thirty days after September 11, 2001. "This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. We will rally the world and bring them to justice."¹⁴⁵ America must take its place as the world hegemon and lead the rest of civilization to meet the Other before it returns to strike the innocent once more.

January 29, 2002: In order to meet the global threat, President Bush commits the nation to future international involvement and describes the extent of its potential duration. His narrative again stresses the role of immoral regimes and offers a clearer perspective to the imminent danger posed by the Other.

Our cause is just, and it continues... What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning... Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning...tens of thousands of others are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it.

¹⁴⁵ *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 11 September 2001.

President Bush vows that the United States will not yield in its fight until terrorism is routed from the earth. This includes the annihilation of all members that make up the Other, particularly Iraq.

November 21, 2001: This vow reiterates a commitment the President made during a Thanksgiving meal he shared with troops and families at Fort Campbell, Kentucky on November 21, 2001. There he explained that

Afghanistan is just the beginning on the war against terror. There are other terrorists who threaten America and our friends, and there are other nations willing to sponsor them. We will not be secure as a nation until all of these threats are defeated. Across the world and across the years, we will fight these evil ones, and we will win.¹⁴⁶

In late November the regimes that belonged to the Other, at least those beyond the Taliban, remained nameless. It was clear that the war on terror would continue until the dangers posed by terrorism no longer threatened the civilized world. The President waited to reveal Iraq's placement in the Other until the national spotlight directed the senses of the Self on him.

January 29, 2002: Once in the public eye, the President marked Iraq as the primary focus of his Self-Other narrative.

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens – leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections – then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking *weapons of mass destruction*, these regimes pose a *grave and growing danger*. They could provide these arms to terrorists,

¹⁴⁶ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Shares Thanksgiving Meal with Troops*, 21 November 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011121-3.html> (15 July 2003).

giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

The President's victimization narrative against Iraq is now fully developed. Iraq is a leading member of the Other, one more example of evil's influence over mankind. Saddam Hussein's immoral involvement with weapons of mass destruction and his heavy role in the axis of evil makes him a "grave and growing" danger to civilization. The Self is a victim who must become a savior to liberate the world.

2. February – September 2002. Phase I to Phase II

The end of January saw a small climax of rhetoric and activity in the President's victimization strategy against Iraq. Once he had introduced his doctrine and sent US troops into Afghanistan to displace al Qaeda and the Taliban, the President verbally prepared the nation to focus on Saddam Hussein. At this point, however, although the President's narrative was complete, his victimization strategy had yet to mature. For example, not only did the President need to prepare the military to face a new tactical objective, his strategy also required time to acclimate within the nation. Americans could not adjust to the change of focus quickly. It would take time for the Self to accept Iraq as an Other who required an American military response. Therefore, the President would spend the next 11 months subtly preparing the Self for action against Saddam Hussein and convincing the collective that the danger facing them was indeed "grave and growing."

Although the President conducted approximately 50 bi-lateral meetings with other heads of state between February and September of 2002, he took little visible public action against Iraq after the State of the Union Address. Instead, while outwardly

focusing on the Middle East peace process, the November 2002 national elections, and the corporate scandals of Enron and Arthur Anderson, he spent this eight month period building a consistent narrative against Saddam Hussein. His presentations were again directed at smaller and politically supportive audiences.

During these discussions, the President continued to refer to the Bush Doctrine, constantly reinforcing its principle themes. For example, on February 4th at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, President Bush qualified his Self-Other narrative once again.

There is a choice to make: Either you're with us, or your with the terrorists. Either you're with freedom and justice, or you're on the side of tyranny and oppression. And the good new is, civilized people everywhere are taking the side of freedom and justice.¹⁴⁷

He also reiterated the bi-polar philosophy on February 16th in front of troops in Alaska. "As you probably figured out by now, I view this current conflict as either us versus them, and evil versus good. And there's no in between. There's no hedging."¹⁴⁸

A month later on March 13th, during the six month anniversary of September 11th, the President warned that, "Every nation should know that, for America, the war on terror is not just a policy, it's a pledge."¹⁴⁹ The President continued to present his moral philosophy in a consistent manner, even in front of students at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. There, on February 22nd, President Bush described the moral salience that his narrative ascribes to the American Self.

The enemy hit us, and they made a huge mistake. Not only will our nation seek justice, but out of the evil will come incredible goodness. Out of the evil will become America more resolved not only to defend freedom, more resolved to sacrifice, if necessary, to defend the freedom, but America is

¹⁴⁷ *President Calls for \$48 Billion Increase in Defense Spending*, 04 February 2002.

¹⁴⁸ *President Rallies the Troops in Alaska*, 16 February 2002.

¹⁴⁹ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush Holds Press Conference*, 13 March 2002; Text available online at < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html > (15 July 2003).

resolved to show the world our true strength, which is the compassionate, decent heart of the American people.¹⁵⁰

The President tries to show the international community that the United States is not like the Other. Even in China he attempts to persuade his audience of the rightness of his cause and of the veracity of his victimization narrative; he wants them to see the nation in the same way that he does. In order to substantiate this point he often speaks of the American Dream and the symbolism of the Statue of Liberty. President Bush believes in the truth of his words and actions.

In addition to using the time between February and March to reinforce the Bush Doctrine, the President begins to speak of a shift from the first phase in the war on terror to the second phase. It is a telling change that indicates the presence of a future conflict on the horizon. On March 11th he explains;

Now that the Taliban are gone and al Qaeda has lost its home base for terrorism, we have entered the second state of the war on terror—a sustained campaign to deny sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world.¹⁵¹

Once this concept is folded into the narrative, Iraq quickly becomes a more prominent feature within his speeches and during his press conferences.

For example, on March 13th the President held a press conference where he was asked whether or not he would take unilateral action against Iraq.¹⁵² Although he states that the “first stage is to consult with our allies and friends,” an event that he claims is ongoing, he also definitively states that, “I will not allow a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction...Our policy is to deny

¹⁵⁰ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush Meets with Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar*, 22 February 2002; Text available online at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030222-2.html>> (15 July 2003).

¹⁵¹ *President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts*, 11 March 2002.

¹⁵² *President Bush Holds Press Conference*, 13 March 2002.

sanctuary to terrorists anyplace in the world, and we will be very active in doing that.”¹⁵³

This statement is both clear and careful. It publicly merges Saddam Hussein into the Other by referencing both his participation in terrorist organizations and his immoral use of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time it leaves options for future action wide open.

At the end of March, President Bush begins to discuss “regime change” as a possibility for Saddam Hussein’s future.¹⁵⁴ This policy against Iraq signifies that, “we’re entering a second stage of what I think will be a long war.”¹⁵⁵ The President attempts to explain his meaning in this regard.

And so fellow citizens, you need to know the strategy of this new phase is this: We want every terrorist to be made to live like an international fugitive, on the run, with no place to settle... At the same time, the civilized world must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale. We’ve got to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, because there is no margin for error and there is no chance to learn from any mistake.¹⁵⁶

Although President Bush communicates the primary directive of the agenda for this new phase, he is still silent regarding his specific intentions towards the immoral Iraqi regime. The one thing that the President clearly commits to is the notion that although US policy supports regime change, he does not yet have a timetable for entering Iraq.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ *President Bush Holds Press Conference*, 13 March 2002.

¹⁵⁴ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Press Conference by President Bush and President Fox*, 22 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-10.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁵⁵ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President to the Travel Pool While Walking Through the Lunch Line Ft. Bragg, North Carolina*, 15 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020315-2.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁵⁶ *Remarks by the President to the Travel Pool While Walking Through the Lunch Line Ft. Bragg, North Carolina*, 15 March 2002.

¹⁵⁷ *Press Conference by President Bush and President Fox*, 22 March 2002.

The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Discusses Security and Defense Issues*, 21 August 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020821-1.html> (15 July 2003).

The months between April and August continue see a decrease in presidential speeches and appearances concerning Iraq and the war on terror. Besides the establishment of the Department of Homeland Defense in June, nothing overtly significant takes place in political policy channels either. The majority of substance that pertains to the President's Self-Other narrative comes from isolated speeches, especially those similar in nature to the presentation given at the Citadel on December 11, 2001, the Virginia Military Institute on April 17, 2002, and at West Point on June 1, 2002. Just within these isolated presentations, the content of his victimization narrative grows stronger.

For example, when the President spoke of the war effort to Citadel Cadets in Charleston South Carolina he reiterated the fundamental essence of his complete narrative.

Today I will set forth the commitments essential to victory in our war against terror... To win this war, we have to think differently... America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and fights... We are also beginning to see the possibilities of a world beyond the war on terror. We have a chance, if we take it, to write a hopeful chapter in human history. All at once, a new threat to civilization is erasing old lines of rivalry and resentment between nations. Russia and America are building a new cooperative relationship... The vast majority of countries are now on the same side of a moral and ideological divide. We're making common cause with every nation that chooses lawful change over chaotic violence—every nation that values peace and safety and innocent life.

Staring across this divide are bands of murderers, supported by outlaw regimes. They are a movement defined by their hatreds. They hate progress, and freedom, and choice, and culture, and music, and laughter, and women, and Christians, and Jews, and all Muslims who reject their distorted doctrines. They love only one thing—they love power. And when they have it they use it without mercy.

The great threat to civilization is not that the terrorists will inspire millions. Only the terrorists themselves would want to live in their brutal and joyless world. The great threat to civilization is that a few evil men will multiply their murders, and gain the means to kill on a scale equal to

their hatred. We know they have this mad intent, and we're determined to stop them. *Our lives, our way of life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and never allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction.*¹⁵⁸

The President's narrative places "every hope for the world" on his commitment to defeat Saddam Hussein. He argues that physical security of the Self, both on a national and international level is threatened. The values that underline American identity, qualities of love, mercy, joy, hope, freedom, progress, laughter, culture, peace, safety, innocence and choice – these things that define the American sense of Self – are hated for their very goodness. The President warns that these values and principles that apply to men and women; African Americans and Arab Americans; Jews, Muslims, and Christians; generations long gone and generations not yet born, will become extinct if the Other is allowed to persist. All of this the President predicts. In his own manner of threat, he implies that without his security solution, there may be no Self.

After one year of President Bush's narrative, the Self – Other relationship between the United States and Iraq became second nature to many Americans. The change was effected over such a long period, that it would be difficult to pinpoint a time since 9/11 that Iraq was not an obvious member of the Other. Throughout the summer of 2002 life began to appear routine once more as the nation became desensitized to the regularity of the President's narrative. This pattern, however, would soon change and Phase II of his war on terror would begin in earnest.

¹⁵⁸ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets*, 21 November 2001; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html> (15 July 2003). Italics added for emphasis.

D. PART 3. THE FINAL PUSH AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN SEPTEMBER 2002 – MARCH 2003

Before presenting the flurry of the last six months of the President’s victimization strategy, I will briefly review the progression of his actions and narrative up to this point. Both his actions and his narrative are fundamental to his strategy and often remained below the public radar. Despite the absence of visible activity against Iraq between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2002, President Bush gradually refocused his narrative towards Saddam Hussein’s regime. He transferred the nation’s attention from an Other who was led by al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, to an Other led by Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq’s immoral government. He attempted to sustain the unity inspired from the national tragedy in order to affect his policy against Iraq.

The following timeline depicts the significant elements of the President’s public narrative and actions involving Iraq since 9/11. It is important to remember that between September of 2001 and 2002, the military was mobilizing and preparing for combat.¹⁵⁹

Table 2: The President’s Strategy against Iraq, Sep 2001- Sep 2002, Action vs. Narrative

31 October 1998	Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) ¹⁶⁰
----- <i>Bush Administration</i> -----	
11 September 2001	Terrorist Attack on US by al Qaeda
12 September 2001	Bush Doctrine defined
18 September 2001	Authorization to Use Military Force in War on Terror
07 October 2001	US informs UNSC that other countries and organizations may be militarily targeted in US War on Terror

¹⁵⁹ US troops were also engaged in other global conflicts. For example, US troops spent months in the Philippines to combat terrorism with Joint Task Force 510 during Operation Enduring Freedom.

¹⁶⁰ “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (PL 105-338),” October 31, 1998: Text available online at <ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/~PeterR/IR/docs/IraqLib.htm> (20 July 2003). Although Public Law 105-338 was signed on October 31, 1998 by President Clinton, it represents formal American Policy regarding Iraq at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The law states that, “[i]t should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.”

08 October 2001	Office of Homeland Defense established
----- <i>First 30 Days</i> -----	
10 November 2001	President speaks to the United Nations and introduces danger of transnational terrorists uniting with regimes pursuing WMD
13 November 2001	President Bush signs the Military Detention Order
29 January 2002	“Axis of Evil” presented at the State of the Union
11 March 2002	President introduces concept of transition from Phase I to Phase II in War on Terror. Phase II meant to deny terrorists sanctuary and prevent the proliferation of WMD
01 June 2002	West Point Graduation Address, President confirms that the “gravest danger to freedom” is terrorists uniting with regimes pursuing WMD (also stated at the Citadel)
06 Jun 2002	Department of Homeland Security established
28 December 2002	President and General Franks confirm that further contingency planning is ongoing for War on Terror
21 August 2002	President meets with General Franks and Secretary Rumsfeld on contingency planning for War on Terror

During the year, President Bush would not answer any questions about his intentions regarding Iraq, except to say that Saddam Hussein was a member of the Axis of Evil and that he was consulting with other state leaders about the future of the War on Terror. He waited to expose his plans for Iraq until one month before the 2002 national elections. At that time, President Bush made the final move in his narrative that put Iraq on center stage of the war on terror.

1. September 2002, A sense of urgency

President Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly just a day after the one-year anniversary of 9/11. There at the New York Headquarters, he began to press the UN to take a stand against Iraq and to hold the nation accountable for its numerous resolution transgressions.

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without

consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?¹⁶¹

In addition to this set of rhetorical questions, President Bush also revealed Saddam Hussein's part in the construction of an imminent physical threat to the security of the United States and her allies. He warned that "[s]hould Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year."¹⁶² The information was conceptually similar to previous claims made by the President, except this time it projected a very threatening prediction of Iraq's destructive capability.

The President's address at the UN was followed by a presentation by Secretary of State Colin Powell. After Secretary Powell's remarks President Bush discussed deadlines for his dealings with Iraq. He stated that

"There will be deadlines within the resolution. Our chief negotiator for the United States, our Secretary of State, understands that we must have deadlines. And we're talking days and weeks, not months and years."¹⁶³

The President's intent was clear and his narrative was engrossed in communicating the "growing danger" posed by Iraq. His narrative had spent a year warning the world that Saddam Hussein would prove dangerous to humanity. With the introduction of a short timeframe for his capabilities, his case became more threatening and thus stronger. For example, in a radio address to the nation on September 14th, the President stated that

Saddam Hussein has violated every one of these 16 resolutions—not once, but many times. Saddam Hussein's regime continues to support terrorist groups and to oppress its civilian population... Today this regime likely maintains stockpiles of chemical and biological agents, and is improving

¹⁶¹ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly*, 12 September 2002; Text available online at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html>> (15 July 2003).

¹⁶² *President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly*, 12 September 2002.

¹⁶³ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush Discusses Iraq with Reporters*, 13 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020913.html> (15 July 2003).

and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical and biological weapons. Today Saddam Hussein has the scientists and infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program, and has illicitly sought to purchase the equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should his regime acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.”

His position as the President afforded him the opportunity to represent the nation’s interests in front of the international community where he asked other states to join in solidarity with the United States.

We must choose between a world of fear, or a world of progress. We must stand up for our security and for the demands of human dignity. By heritage and choice, the United States will make that stand. The world community must do so, as well.¹⁶⁴

The President’s design intended to rally international support but did not depend on its approval. On September 19th he sent a resolution to congress requesting an authorization for the use of force against Iraq. He told reporters that, “if the United Nations Security Council won’t deal with the problem, the United States and some of our friends will.” The policy of the government is regime change.”¹⁶⁵ Although he offered the UN a chance to sign on in support of his actions, he made it very clear that international support was not needed or required. He had already made the decision that the US would defend its interests and the interest of his definition of civilization. He said that

The danger to our country is grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more biological and chemical weapons. And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the orders were given. The regime has long-standing and

¹⁶⁴ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Discusses Growing Danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Regime*, 14 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁶⁵ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush, Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism*, 25 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html> (15 July 2003).

continuing ties to terrorist organizations. And there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. The regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within one year... We refuse to live in this future of fear. Democrats and Republicans refuse to live in a future of fear. We're determined to build a future of security. All of us long for peace, peace for ourselves, peace for the world.¹⁶⁶

America's perception of Iraq's ability to affect the United States increased tremendously with this information and inspired fear within the community. A common memory of 9/11, coupled with this information, left Americans facing what they considered to be an unacceptable threat. It aroused a sense of fear and intimidation within the community.

1. October 2002 – March 2002. Disarming Iraq

Because the President had already constructed the Iraqi regime as the Other, Americans were able to comprehend this latest connection as a natural progression of the war toward armed conflict against Saddam Hussein. The country had already been moving towards a confrontation in Iraq. Additionally, the President's access to classified material increased the legitimacy of his claim. With privileged knowledge he gained privileged power when he stated that,

The Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency... Countering Iraq's threat is also a central commitment on the war on terror. We know Saddam Hussein has longstanding and ongoing ties to international terrorists. With the support and shelter of a regime, terror groups become far more lethal. Aided by a terrorist network, an outlaw regime can launch attacks while concealing its involvement... We must confront both terror cells and terror states, because they are different faces of the same evil.¹⁶⁷

For this reason, it appeared extremely unlikely that the President had not made up his mind concerning the commitment of American troops to in Iraq. Surprisingly, however,

¹⁶⁶ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush Discusses Iraq with Congressional Leaders*, 26 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-7.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁶⁷ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution*, 02 October 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-7.html> (15 July 2003).

at the beginning of October he told reporters that, “I haven’t made up my mind we’re going to war with Iraq. I’ve made up my mind we need to disarm the man.”¹⁶⁸ These statements made the President’s actions confusing, especially after he signed HJ Res 114 into law in order to “authorize the use of US Armed Forces against Iraq.”¹⁶⁹

Between November 2002 and March of 2003 the President’s narrative continues to counter his political actions. The following table illustrates the interplay between the narrative and actions that comprise the Presidents victimization strategy, and related events of significance.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ The last section in this chapter approaches this topic. October 1, 2002. President speaks to the press after meeting with members of Congress.

¹⁶⁹ October 16, 2002 “The 107th Congress is one of the few called by history to authorize military action to defend our country and the cause of peace. Either the Iraqi regime will give up its weapons of mass destruction, or, for the sake of peace, the United States will lead a global coalition to disarm that regime. If any doubt our nation’s resolve, our determination, they would be unwise to test it.”

¹⁷⁰ Selections provided by month on the Official White House website. <www.whitehouse.gov>

November: The Office of the Press Secretary, *News releases for November 2002*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/> (15 July 2003).

December: The Office of the Press Secretary, *News releases for December 2002*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/> (15 July 2003).

January: The Office of the Press Secretary, *News releases for January 2003*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/> (15 July 2003).

February: The Office of the Press Secretary, *News releases for February 2003*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/> (15 July 2003).

March: The Office of the Press Secretary, *News releases for March 2003*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/> (15 July 2003).

Table 3: The President's Strategy against Iraq: Nov 2002 - Mar 2003, Action vs. Narrative

November 8, 2002

The United Nations voted on November 8th – both after the 2002 US elections and after the President signed HJ Res 114 – to pass Resolution 1441 and reinstate inspections in Iraq.

Remarks by the President after the UNSC passed the resolution.

“Any act of delay or defiance will be an additional breach of Iraq’s international obligations, and a clear signal that the Iraqi regime has once again abandoned the path of voluntary compliance...Any Iraqi noncompliance is serious, because such bad faith will show that Iraq has no intention of disarming...America will be making only one determination: is Iraq meeting the terms of the Security Council resolution or not? If Iraq fails to fully comply, the United States and other nation will disarm Saddam Hussein.”

November 13

Secretary General Annan receives a compliance letter from the Iraqi government. Preparations for inspections begin.

November 20

President Bush and President Havel of the Czech Republic at a Press Conference in Prague

“War is my last choice, my last option. I hope we can do this peacefully.”

”They are cold-blooded killers who will take innocent life in the name of a hijacked religion.”

November 21, 2002

President Bush and PM Blair met in Prague with reporters.

Q: Mr. President, you put a formal request to Britain and other countries to supply troops for a possible conflict in Iraq.

Would not answer the question... instead said “my expectation is, is that we can do this peacefully, if Saddam Hussein disarms.”

December 2, 2002

President signs the National Defense Authorization Act

“We’re a nation at war. America must understand that we’re at war.”

“Defeating the enemy requires fighting a different kind of war, what we call the first war of the 21st century. We’re pursuing the terrorists wherever they dwell. It doesn’t matter where they –where they hid, we’re after them, one by one. We follow them wherever they run.”

“The people of Iraq, like all human beings, deserve their freedom. And the people of Afghanistan—with the help of the United States Armed Forces—have gained their freedom”

December 7, 2002

Weekly radio address

“This weekend is the deadline for the Iraqi regime to fully disclose to the UN Security Council all of its weapons of mass destruction. Disarming that regime is a central commitment of the war on terror. We must, and we will, prevent terrorist group from threatening the American people with catastrophic harm....Thus far we are not seeing the fundamental shift in practice and attitude that the world is demanding. Iraq’s letters to the UN regarding inspections show that their attitude is grudging and conditional. And in recent days, Iraq has fired on American and British pilots enforcing the UN’s no-fly zone. Iraq is now required by the United Nations to provide a full and accurate declaration of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. We will judge the declaration’s honesty and completeness only after we have thoroughly examined it...Americans seek peace in the world. War is the last option for confronting threats... By showing our resolve today, we are building a future of peace.”

December 7, 2002

Statement by the Press Secretary

“The Iraqi regime today submitted to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) what it claims is a declaration of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems...The US Government will analyze this declaration with respect to its credibility and compliance with UNSCR 1441. We will continue to work with other countries to achieve the ultimate goal of protecting the peace by ending Saddam Hussein’s pursuit and accumulation of weapons of mass destruction.”

December 31, 2002

President speaks to the press pool in Crawford, Texas.

“One of my New Year’s resolutions is to work to deal with these situations in a way so that they’re resolved peacefully. But thus far, it appears that, first look, that Saddam Hussein hasn’t heard the message...My biggest job and most important job is to protect the security of the American people, and I am going to do that. And I had made the case and will continue to make the case that Saddam Hussein—a Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is a threat to the security of the American people.”

January 6, 2003

Remarks by the President in a photo opportunity with his cabinet

Q: Sir, with three weeks to go until the UN inspectors report back, are you seeing any signs of compliance by Iraq?
“his declaration was clearly deficient, it is discouraging news for those of us who want to resolve this issue peacefully,”

January 14, 2003

Q: The weapons inspectors say they need until March, maybe six months, maybe a year. Is this what you had in mind when you went to the UN back in September?

“What I have in mind for Saddam Hussein is to disarm... So far, I haven't seen any evidence that he is disarming. Time is running out on Saddam Hussein. He must disarm I'm sick and tired of games and deception. And that's my view of timetables.”

January 28, 2003

State of the Union

“This nation is leading the world in confronting and defeating the man-made evil of international terrorism... Our war against terror is a contest of will in which perseverance is power. In the ruins of the two towers, at the western wall of the Pentagon, on a field in Pennsylvania, this nation made a pledge, and we renew that pledge tonight: Whatever the duration of this struggle, and whatever the difficulties, we will not permit the triumph of violence in the affairs of men—free people will set the course of history... Once again, this nation and all our friends are all that stand between a world at peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm. Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of all mankind. And we accept this responsibility... America's purpose is more than to follow a process—it is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world. All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. And we're asking them to join us, and many are doing so. Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decision of others. Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.”

January 31, 2003

Remarks by the President and PM Blair in the Cross Hall

“Saddam Hussein is not disarming...As Dr. Blix said in his report to the Security Council earlier this week, he's not doing that... we made it clear that failure to disarm would lead to serious consequences... This just needs to be resolved quickly. Should the United Nations decide to pass a second resolution, it would be welcomed if it is yet another signal that we're intent upon disarming Saddam Hussein. But 1441 gives us the authority to move without any second resolution...This is a matter of weeks, not months. Any attempt to drag the process on for months will be resisted by the United States.”

February 6, 2003

Statement by the President

“The dictator of Iraq is making his choice. Now the nations of the Security Council must make their own. On November, 8th, by demanding the immediate disarmament of Iraq, the United Nations Security Council spoke with clarity and authority. Now the Security Council will show whether its words have any meaning. Having made its demands, the Security Council must not back down, when those demands are defied and mocked by a dictator... On September 11th, 2002, the American people saw what terrorists could do, by turning four airplanes into weapons. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons... The game is over.”

February 10, 2003

The President's remarks on Iraq at the “Congress of Tomorrow” reception

“And there's no doubt in my mind, when the United States acts abroad and home, we do so based upon values—particularly the value that we hold dear to our hearts, and that is, everybody ought to be free. I want to repeat what I said during my State of the Union to you. Liberty is not America's gift to the world. What we believe strongly, and what we hold dear, is liberty is God's gift to mankind. And we hold that value precious. And we believe it is true... We're called to extend the promise of this country to the lives of every citizen who lives here. We're called to defend our nation and to lead the world to peace, and we will meet both challenges with courage and with confidence...”

February 22, 2003

Remarks by President Bush during a press opportunity with Spanish President Aznar in Texas

There's not even a resolution put on the table yet. There will be one soon. And so the people will be able to see what they're asked to vote on. We just got off a phone call with Tony Blair and Silvio Berlusconi. It was a four-way conversation to talk about the resolution and the strategy... this is a chance for the Security Council to show its relevance

March 6, 2003

National press conference in the East Room

“Great Britain, Spain, and the United States have introduced a new resolution stating that Iraq has failed to meet the requirements of Resolution 1441. Saddam Hussein is not disarming. This is a fact. It cannot be denied.”

“We’re still in the final stages of diplomacy...working with Security Council members to resolve this issue..”

“I’m convinced that a liberated Iraq will be – will be important for that troubled part of the world. The Iraqi people are plenty capable of governing themselves. Iraq is a sophisticated society. Iraq’s got money. Iraq will provide a place where people can see that the Shia and the Sunni and the Kurds can get along in a federation. Iraq will serve as a catalyst for change, positive change...So there’s a lot more at stake than just American security, and the security of people close by Saddam Hussein. Freedom is at stake, as well, and I take that very seriously.”

“I’ve not made up our mind about military action. Hopefully, this can be done peacefully. Hopefully, that as a result of the pressure that we have placed—and others have placed—that Saddam will disarm and/or leave the country.”

“If I thought we were safe from attack, I would be thinking differently. But I see a gathering threat. I mean, this is a true, real threat to America. And, therefore, we will deal with it.”

March 11, 2003

Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix filed a document with the UN detailing 29 “clusters” of unresolved disarmament issues, covering chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them...”

March 16, 2003

Atlantic Summit in Portugal between Port/UK/US/Spain

President Bush announced Iraq’s “last opportunity for a political solution.”

The month between November and March were predictable in the sense that no nation acted outside of its character. The President maintained his ultimatum for Iraq and then waited for Saddam Hussein to resist his measures. By March 17, 2003, the President’s afforded diplomatic window had closed. March 16 was the final day that the UNSC could vote down the President’s resolution of for UN support of an American led campaign inside the country. On the 17th, the President gave Saddam and his sons 48 hours to leave the country. He also said that,

In the case of Iraq, the Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 687 – both still in effect – the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will... The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours... Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.

Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will

help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.¹⁷¹

The President justified his actions as humanitarian in nature. He wanted the world to understand that the United States was liberating and not conquering the Arab nation. His decisions would free innocent victims from oppression.

Thus, on March 19, 2003, the President made an announcement from the Oval Office in the morning. He said,

My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger... We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.... I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm... And helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment.¹⁷²

The President's victimization was successful in the sense that he pushed his intentions through from thought to deed. He achieved his stated goal against Saddam Hussein under the auspices of a political platform that vilified the Other and honored the character of the Self. He interpreted American action as an honorable defensive action to alleviate the suffering caused by the Other, both for the Self, but also for the President's concept of civilization.

¹⁷¹ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours*, 17 March 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁷² The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush Addresses the Nation*, 19 March 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html> (15 July 2003).

E. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION

President Bush successfully implemented a victimization strategy with regard to Iraq. He fashioned concepts integral to the construction and maintenance of national identity into a potent nationalist narrative, one that relied on a Self-Other dichotomy as a political framework for American national imagining. This chapter supports the argument that the President promoted the Self and vilified the Other. It illustrates how the President's narrative also portrayed the Self as a victim of the Other by effecting tension and cultural opposition. The President constructed meaning through national symbols and cultural markers in order to mold American political identity and consciousness. His design aimed to fashion a believable reality that prompted the nation to comprehend a Self – Other relationship that represented a battle between good and evil. He appealed to American nationalism on a fundamental level, inciting defensive feelings that would unite and overcome a common enemy.

In order to do this, President Bush's narrative maintained factual discrepancies that should be revealed in order to better understand the function of victimization. These discrepancies illustrate the nuances of his narrative that vilifies the Other and exonerates the Self from any fault or wrong doing; they confuse the difference between what is done, what is said, and what is true. For example, the President misrepresents and misidentifies concepts of war and peace. He frequently notes that the United States is waging an unlimited and offensive war on terror. He says, "make no mistake about it, we're going after them all. And we'll win; we're going to win. Terrorists are going to realize they

can't face down freedom."¹⁷³ Amidst these promises, however, President Bush also claims that everything he does is 'to keep the peace' or 'for the sake of peace.' This juxtaposition of rhetorical generalities misapplies their meanings and does not represent reality. The action of 'waging a war' at the same time as 'keeping the peace' is contradictory. The very presence of war disallows a concurrent state of peace. By warning Americans and the international community that dangerous terrorists are everywhere at war, or by promising civilization that he will not stop the war on terror until he has removed terrorists from the earth, does not presume peace at present or in the near future. The concept of 'bringing and keeping peace' via the means of war becomes somewhat absurd, especially when the President explains that the war will continue beyond his own term limit and well down the path of future presidents. War by definition is a violent act that includes additional and collateral damage. By using force the President chooses to forget the number of innocent people who will also die because of his decisions.

This type of conflicting duality is frequently exhibited in the President's narrative, essential to the elements of the victimization strategy. As explained in Chapter 2, the act of *forgetting*, or the use of *selective memory* regarding America's past enables the Self to vilify the Other and make its own aggressive or negative activity a product of the enemy's doing. This is the case in a second example of contradictory action and rhetoric that concerns accountability. Here, the President blames Saddam Hussein for a war that the Iraqi leader did not initiate or pursue offensively.¹⁷⁴ President Bush's narrative

¹⁷³ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Freezes Terrorists' Assets*, 24 September 2001; Text available online at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html>> (15 July 2003).

¹⁷⁴ This does not imply that Saddam Hussein's regime was innocent of UN violations, human rights abuses, or transnational terrorism.

explains that war with the Other was forced on the United States despite the fact that it was his own command that ordered military action. The President overlooks his own involvement in initiating the war and his lack of effort to prevent it. He disregards the fact that *he* defined the Other in his political narrative and that *he* constructed the requirements that induced the US to enter into armed conflict.

Another contradiction between the President's actions and rhetoric concerns the issue of whether or not President Bush intended to invade Iraq throughout the duration of his narrative. The limited scope of this thesis did not address any information from venues beyond the official public record as published by the Press Secretary's office. Therefore, in this case, the discrepancy between the President's intentions and his narrative appears when he argues that war against Saddam Hussein is his last choice, a decision forced on the United States. His victimization strategy attempts to construct this as a believable reality. He wants the Self to believe that the nation goes to war only as a last choice. It makes the decision ethically acceptable to domestic standards regarding the application of force. Though the President may have his own reasons for his foreign policy, his actions are justified publicly as the defense of United Nation's resolutions, as the defense of a credible threat of nuclear terrorism, and the liberation of a people who have been oppressed by a dictator for decades. When analyzed, however, this rhetoric contradicts the President's actions. President Bush had already mobilized US troops into the region months before his narrative evolved into its ethical justification. Indeed, the President took office in 2000 already in support of the government's policy of regime change for Iraq.

Even so, the President continued to suggest that, “I hope we’re not headed to war in Iraq. I’m the person who gets to decide, not you. I hope this can be done peacefully.”¹⁷⁵ His narrative, in which he indicates his desire for the country to avoid war, contradicted the reality of his actions that prepared thousands of American troops to engage Iraq. Even though his actions represented his intentions, his rhetoric continued to maintain a desire for peace and a wish to refrain from military action. For example, just two weeks before conventional troops landed on the al Faw Peninsula, President Bush reiterated his indecision. “I’ve not made up our mind about military action. Hopefully, this can be done peacefully. If I thought we were safe from attack, I would be thinking differently. But I see a gathering threat. I mean, this is a true, real threat to America. And, therefore, we will deal with it.” Once more, the President’s comments indicate a desire to refrain from armed conflict at the same time they communicate his intention to “deal” with an imminent and physical threat. The picture provided to the American Self is one of confused purposes and it leaves a distracted sense of foreboding with respect to the future.

The gradual build and intense climax of the President’s narrative against Iraq, his consistent strategy of victimization, and his direction of military mobilization contradict his statements of indecision. The first section of Chapter 3 argues that President Bush indirectly began his narrative against Iraq within 24 hours after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Soon after, he presented his case to the United Nations and promised to remove Saddam Hussein regardless of any decision made by the international community. During the 18 months leading up to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the

¹⁷⁵ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President's New Year's Day Message*, 31 December 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021231-2.html> (15 July 2003).

President was asked if it is “your firm intention to get rid of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.” When the President replied, “Yes...It’s the stated policy of this government to have a regime change,” he implied that Saddam Hussein would be removed by any means necessary, including the use of armed force.¹⁷⁶

The President’s strategy of Victimization thus balanced a victimization narrative with his actions that steadily brought US military capabilities to their target. As he planned for attack against Iraq and began preparations for the costs of war, both foreign and domestic, his rhetoric built the Other to increasingly alarming levels of threat and danger. At key moments his narrative climaxed to initiate changes in US law or international agreements that afforded him more power. He did not actually reveal his military plans until the nation acclimated to his narrative and could view the revelation of imminent and pressing threat as a natural progression of events. In this way, President Bush’s victimization strategy was successful.

¹⁷⁶ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Urges Congress to Support Nation's Priorities*, 08 July 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020708-5.html> (15 July 2003).

Chapter IV. VICTIMIZATION STRATEGY

“The attack on our nation was also an attack on the ideals that make us a nation. Our deepest national conviction is that every life is precious, because every life is the gift of a Creator who intended us to live in liberty and equality. More than anything else, this separates us from the enemy we fight. We value every life; our enemies value none – not even the innocent, not even their own. And we seek the freedom and opportunity that give meaning and value to life. There is a line in our time, and in every time, between those who believe all men are created equal, and those who believe that some men and women and children are expendable in the pursuit of power. There is a line in our time, and in every time, between the defenders of human liberty and those who seek to master the minds and souls of others. Our generation has now heard history’s call, and we will answer it.”¹⁷⁷

President Bush, Ellis Island, September 11, 2002

Thus far in my thesis, I have explored how President Bush constructed and sustained a Self – Other relationship between the United States and Iraq. I illustrated how the President’s narrative utilized national symbols and cultural markers in order to influence American political identity and consciousness. As discussed in chapter 2, this case study revealed how

[n]ationalist ideas... shape the political actions and cultural identities of individuals as well as groups. The meanings of nationalism and national identity typically depend on various dichotomies that define the nation in terms of its differences from other places or people.”¹⁷⁸

President Bush constructed a Self–Other dichotomy which entered the language of the Self. His narrative has become an increasingly natural component of the national imagination. This phenomenon indicates that nationalism is not just a feeling of belonging to a group, not only an intangible essence of community. It is also a practice that must be maintained and constructed. A nation’s unity as the Self depends upon the presence of Others from which it may differentiate itself.

¹⁷⁷ *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 11 September 2001.

¹⁷⁸ Lloyd Kramer, “Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism,” *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1996, 525.

Now I would like to turn to the political relevance of President Bush's victimization narrative and discuss its current and future impact on American nationalism and US foreign policy. In this chapter, I also point to the limitations of this study and make suggestions for future research. Section A analyzes the political implications of the President's victimization strategy within and beyond his focus on Saddam Hussein. It explains that victimization narratives are used for many purposes and in many ways. Leaders who use the technique may be motivated by individual reasons. For example, I argue that the President's personal relationship to his Christian faith not only affects his narrative, but also predisposes him to view reality through a lens of victimization. I illustrate how his religion enables him to project the interests of the Self as both universal and fundamental to the rest of civilization. Section B puts the President's actions into historic perspective and focuses on his probable place within national memory and American antiquity. And finally in section C, I discuss recommendations and areas of future inquiry into nationalism and strategies of victimization.

A. VICTIMIZATION, BINARY LOGIC, & FUNDAMENTALISM

Chapter 3 introduced a number of concepts that accompany the President's victimization strategy. It speaks of the narrative's binary logic, a discourse that deepens the extreme Self – Other relationship and relegates the Self and the Other to two opposing ideological poles. It explains how binary logic delimits and constricts US foreign policy while dividing humanity along an axis of good and evil. And, it illustrates how the President's concept of the Self slips in between a national imagining and projects his construction of the Self onto a larger civilizational identity. There is, however, yet another aspect of the President's narrative that chapter 3 did not detail, one that is

addressed here at length. Its significance revolves around the President's connection to fundamental Christianity, a form of binary logic that makes his civilizational imaginings possible.

There is a vivid connection between the President's victimization strategy and his fundamental faith in Christianity. No matter the makeup of his audience, President Bush consistently talks of God. He consistently constructs his conception of reality within a binary framework, a duality of good versus evil. And, he consistently identifies the American Self as civilization's representative and defender of liberty and freedom, God's gifts for all of humanity.¹⁷⁹ He says that

I want you to know that out of the evil done to America is going to come some great good. I truly believe that. I believe by being firm and strong, we can keep the peace. I know that if we remember our values, remember that freedom is not America's gift to the world, freedom is a God-given gift to the world—if we remember that value—we remember our uniqueness and the values we hold dear, we can bring peace, and that's going to happen.¹⁸⁰

President Bush speaks of his faith not just to domestic audiences, but to all audiences. Even in China he told a group of students at Tsinghua University about his perception of the national Self. In Beijing he said that

America is a nation guided by faith. Someone once called us "a nation with the soul of a church." This may interest you—95 percent of Americans say they believe in God, and I am one of them. When I met President Jiang Zemin in Shanghai a few months ago, I had the honor of sharing with him how faith changed my life and how faith contributes to

¹⁷⁹ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President's Remarks at Religious Broadcasters' Convention*, 10 Feb 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030210-5.html> (15 July 2003). The President remarked at the 2003 National Religious Broadcasters' Convention where he said that, "Liberty is God's gift to every human being in the world. We're called to defend our nation and to lead the world to peace, and we will meet both challenges with courage and with conviction."

¹⁸⁰ The Office of the Press Secretary, *Iraq Must Disarm Says President in South Dakota Speech*, 03 November 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021103-3.html> (15 July 2003).

the life of my country. Faith points to a moral law beyond man's law, and calls us to duties higher than material gain.¹⁸¹

As President Bush carries this message throughout his travels, he is on a mission to spread God's gift of freedom to all of civilization.¹⁸² The war on terror has provided this minister an international pulpit, it has offered him what he sees as a unique opportunity to change the culture of America and the culture of the world. During his 2002 State of the Union address President Bush reiterated this when he told the nation that, "This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity – a moment we must seize to change our culture."¹⁸³ To him, the war on terror is more than a test for the Self, it is also a test for the rest of the world.

The President comprehends that he has a moment to direct the course of history, one he has been willing to share with other world leaders if they accept his rules and his leadership. For example, at the United Nations he offered the General Assembly a chance at co-authorship. He counseled them that, "[w]e have a chance to write the story of our times, a story of courage defeating cruelty and light overcoming darkness."¹⁸⁴ References to his faith come through even there as he speaks of God, the light of the world, overcoming darkness and evil.

President Bush does not believe that the opportunity to author of a new future has come to him and the United States by chance; he does not believe in chance. Rather, the President has been matched to this task for a purpose; it is a test that he is determined to pass.

¹⁸¹ *President Bush Meets with Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar*, 22 February 2002

¹⁸² *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters*, 10 November 2001. "We did not ask for this [mission](#), yet there is honor in history's call."

¹⁸³ *President Delivers State of the Union Address*, 29 January 2002

¹⁸⁴ *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters*, 10 November 2001.

I believe there is a reason that history has matched this nation with this time. America strives to be tolerant and just. We respect the faith of Islam, even as we fight those whose actions defile that faith. We fight, not to impose our will, but to defend ourselves and extend the blessings of freedom. We cannot know all that lies ahead. Yet, we do know that God has placed us together in this moment, to grieve together, to stand together, to serve each other and our country. And the duty we have been given – defending America and our freedom – is also a privilege we share...our cause is even larger than our country. Ours is the cause of human dignity; freedom guided by conscience and guarded by peace. This ideal of America is the hope of all mankind. That hope drew millions to this harbor. That hope still lights our way. And the light shines in the darkness. And the darkness will not overcome it. May God bless America.”¹⁸⁵

President Bush’s rhetoric takes the form of psalms and benedictions. He uses biblical imagery and finishes almost every speech with a blessing. His narrative never loses sight of a line of morality that defines his concept of the American nation and its purpose in the world. As a man of faith, his rhetoric and actions indicate that he believes he stands firm to a higher calling, a higher duty that dictates universal values.

President Bush reiterated his commitment to these values and to his faith in God’s design for humanity at the National Prayer Breakfast in DC just one month before hostilities began in Iraq. During the breakfast he said that Americans

can also be confident in the ways of Providence, even when they are far from our understanding. Events aren’t moved by blind change and chance. Behind all of life and all of history, there’s a dedication and purpose, set by the hand of a just and faithful God. And that hope will never be shaken.”¹⁸⁶

Just as he believes in his own purpose within God’s design, the President intuitively follows a victimization strategy and foreign policy that are supported by religious

¹⁸⁵ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President's Remarks to the Nation*, 11 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020911-3.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁸⁶ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush: "World Can Rise to This Moment"*, 06 February 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206-17.html> (15 July 2003).

underpinnings. His actions and his narrative follow a historical discourse that has pitted good against evil since Eve encountered an anthropomorphic reptile in the Garden of Eden.

President Bush believes that he has been placed in his position of leadership by God to serve a specific purpose, to delineate good from evil and expand American universal values across the globe. He carries out his duties as a preacher from American antiquity, motivating his parish through traditional Christian rhetoric of fear and love, the most passionate persuasions available to humankind. This kind of conceptual dichotomy is what he uses to sway the public. His binary narrative of good and evil, love and hate, fear and power, draw from the base of his faith in the Creator, his fundamental understanding of Christianity as a war waged by Satan against God. President Bush warns his congregation that evil is everywhere in the world and dangerous. Evil preys upon innocent victims and hates most those of us who stand closest to the Lord. In his narrative, this relationship with God and freedom are the reasons that the Other hates the American Self so passionately. The President explains that

America and the cause of freedom have determined enemies; that there are people in this world who hate what America stands for. They hate our success, they hate our liberty. We have learned all too suddenly that there are evil people who have no regard for human life, and will do whatever it takes to try to bring this mighty nation to its knees... Our commitment to freedom has always made us a target of tyranny and intolerance. Anyone who sets out to destroy freedom must eventually attack America, because we're freedom's home. And we must always be freedom's home and freedom's defender.¹⁸⁷

Americans defend God's gift and therefore defend God on earth.

This is why the President publicly interprets the tragedy of September 11th as not only an attack on the national Self and on civilization, but also as an attack on God.

¹⁸⁷ October 30, 2001. *President Launches "Lessons of Liberty"*, 30 October 2001.

Because the evil ones struck freedom and liberty, God's gifts to humankind, the President believes it to be his duty to respond with equal force. He believes it to be his responsibility and privilege to lead the nation and the world in the defense of God and freedom. The President says that, "[h]istory has called us into action. And we are going to lead."¹⁸⁸ His is a holy crusade that he promises will not end until all involved or associated with terrorism are smited from the earth.

This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while... But this administration, along with those friends of ours who are willing to stand with us all the way through will do what it takes to rout terrorism out of the world.¹⁸⁹

The President's narrative thus slips in between a national Self and a larger identity that involves all of civilization. The nation is still the primary unit of political and cultural imaginings. That has not changed. What is different is that American national interests become defined as civilizational interests within the President's narrative. He draws a line between civilization and those who oppose it. God's kingdom covers the expanse of civilization and the President feels bound to promote what he considers America's universal values throughout that imagined community. It is a place where immoral regimes and transnational groups, as he defines them, are not welcome.

Some may then ask the question of whether or not nationalism is as viable as described by Anderson. Is it "the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time?"¹⁹⁰ With increasing communications technology, globalization in economics, and a world in which civilization can be imagined as a human race rather than as a mixed

¹⁸⁸ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Bush Meets with German Chancellor Schroeder*, 23 May 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020523-1.html> (15 July 2003).

¹⁸⁹ *President Remarks Upon Arrival*, September 16, 2001.

¹⁹⁰ Anderson (1983), 3.

community of competing nations, this is an important question that should be followed closely. At this point in time, however, this vision is still far off. President Bush may slip in and out of a civilizational rhetoric, but it is one that is always led by the United States, the American Self. It is not a world of equals where tolerance of diversity is a normality. Rather, the President's understanding of civilization describes an international community under one figurehead and under one way of life. Thus in this regard, his fundamental conception of civilization becomes a radically imagined reality. And, in some respects, it is similar to the world sought by another man with fundamental aspirations for civilization, the very one who triggered the President's war on terror.

B. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, THE GRAND STRATEGY¹⁹¹

Section A of this chapter describes how political rhetoric can alter lines of truth and meaning within a strategy of victimization. It illustrates how a nation may begin to imagine both the Self and the Other through the limited information it receives from a filtered political narrative. It offers examples of how President Bush interprets events and characteristics of the Other that play into his victimization rhetoric. It is important to recognize that the President's personal understanding of his Christian faith affects his victimization narrative. It depicts ways in which he holds preconceived conceptions of the Other based on a discourse of fundamental Christian beliefs and perceptions. It illustrates how the President projects the interests of the Self as both universal and fundamental to the rest of civilization. In section C, I will explain where the President's narrative falls when compared to historic presidential narratives.

¹⁹¹ Robert Kagan, "One Year After: A Grand Strategy for the West?" *Survival* 44, (2002): 135. "American grand strategy, broadly defined, is probably not often understood, even by Americans. The simplest way of describing it is that it always has been about the promotion of a liberal international order."

It is likely that America will look back on President Bush in generations to come and remember him as another US presidential proponent of “nationalist internationalism.”¹⁹² The President’s vigilant attempts at authorship of a new political reality of the 21st century will blend in among other manifest exceptionalists spotted throughout the short duration of American presidential history. Both of these jingle-like compound concepts, “nationalist internationalism” and “manifest exceptionalism,” direct their focus on the same American political characteristic.¹⁹³

This is the belief, intertwined with the philosophical views of the founding fathers, that ours would be the providential nation, the redeemer nation, the one whose dedication to liberty and individual worth would be the foundation of a new moral society.¹⁹⁴

Ever since the first generation of American nationalists placed the phrase, “Novus Ordo Seclorum” on the Great Seal of the United States, “A new order of the ages,” every successive generation has generated new ways to propagate national feelings of American exceptionalism.¹⁹⁵ At the dawn of the 21st century, President Bush is no exception.

America’s unique form of nationalism has always been based on a progressing sense of cultural morality. Therefore, as each generation searches to redefine itself as something unique and different, something that distinguishes it from events and memories of the past, it also attempts to maintain the momentum of progressing nationalist imaginings into the future. Each moral victory builds upon the last in order to maintain and construct “a more perfect Union.” For example,

¹⁹² Kagan, 136.

¹⁹³ Kagan, 136.

¹⁹⁴ Kagan, 136.

¹⁹⁵ Daniel Bell, “The ‘Hegelian Secret’: Civil Society and American Exceptionalism,” in *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*, ed. Byron Shafer (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991), 63.

The supporters of American wars see them as moralistic crusades: to eliminate monarchical rule (the war of 1812), to defeat the Catholic forces of superstition (the Mexican War), to eliminate slavery (the Civil War), to end colonialism in the Americas (the Spanish-American War), to make the world safe for democracy (the First World War), and to resist totalitarian expansionism (the Second World War and Korea).¹⁹⁶

Each of these conflicts illustrates how American nationalism is connected to a sense of morality, justice and progress. They set a precedent for US political behavior that publicly substantiates its national interests and foreign policy in terms of moral obligation.

Thus, as President Bush leads the United States into a new war on terror, it fits well within America's ongoing development of selfhood. His victimization strategy is little different than the ideological conflict maintained by President Ronald Reagan during the Cold War. President Reagan constructed a narrative that invoked an extreme Self-Other relationship, a battle between the United States, his "City on a Hill," and the Soviet "evil empire." President Bush, despite his claims that the war on terror is fundamentally new to the world, also preaches that the terror invoked by the "axis of evil" is only an iteration of the evils America has faced in the past. He argues that it is an extension of the battle that Americans fought during the Cold War, during World War II, and during similar historical conflicts that defended American fundamental values of freedom and liberty. The President thus partners the cultural American mission against a new and yet familiar enemy, one that the Self was designed to oppose, one that it was created to face by its founders, and one that he believes must be defeated in order to safely maintain God's gift to humankind.

¹⁹⁶ Seymour Martie Lipset, "American Exceptionalism Reconfirmed," in *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*, ed. Byron Shafer (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991), 24.

By finding a new civilizational Other to replace the former Soviet Union, the President's narrative will one day become part of American mythology, eventually taking its place amidst similar narratives in American antiquity. President Bush recognizes this chance at historical immortality and sees his narrative within a continuous progression of American moral advancement in the world. He says that

America has always had a special mission to defend justice and advance freedom around the world. Whatever the difficulties ahead, we are confident about the outcome of this struggle. Tyranny and terror and lawless violence will not decide the world's future. As Ronald Reagan said, and as every generation of Americans has believed, the future belongs to the free. In a time of war, we reassert the essential values and beliefs of our country. In the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln pointed toward a new birth of freedom. Leading America into global war, Franklin D. Roosevelt defined the four freedoms: freedom of speech and religion, freedom from fear and want. Whenever America fights for the security of our country, we also fight for the values of our country. In our time, we will defend the land we love and we will act on the ideals that gave it birth.¹⁹⁷

The President's narrative consciously takes into account its place in American history. It constructs an envisioned reality, a form of nationalism that Americans are traditionally comfortable with. US citizens need to justify acts of violence and aggression with a moral sense of duty and obligation. They seek the reassurance that their actions mean something more than mere Self-interest. They long to be a part of a community that has meaning and encompasses a rightness that is universal.

For this reason, American moral beliefs and imaginings do not stop at national boundaries. Rather, they spill over into a larger framework that encompasses all of civilization.

¹⁹⁷ The Office of the Press Secretary, *President Promotes Compassionate Conservatism*, 03 November 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020430-5.html> (15 July 2003).

Almost invariably Western leaders claim they are acting on behalf of “the world community... The very phrase “the world community” has become the euphemistic collective noun... to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.¹⁹⁸

President Bush, along with many Americans, does not differentiate between the interests of the Self and the interests of civilization. As discussed in Section B of this chapter, he perceives national interests as civilization’s interests in part because of his personal faith. His bond to fundamental Christian beliefs inspires his particular strategy of victimization. It is one reason why a political leader may pursue such a narrative, but not the only reason.

Herein lies the essence of this thesis and the reason why the strategy of victimization should receive more attention in the field of political science. I argue that President Bush employs a strategy of victimization in order to legitimate his conception of the nation as the universal model of civilization. He draws from a personal source of inspiration and motivation that coincides with a specific political intent. His intent, however, his inspiration and his reasons for using a victimization strategy are his alone. He is only one of many American presidents and politicians who employ a single and personalized variation of victimization. He uses the strategy to construct a narrative that affects the American conception of the Self and that tries to direct the national interest based on his own moral compass.

By using the President’s narrative against Iraq as a case study, I hope to communicate that national identity and Self-determination are in some way products of this particular political tool. It is by no means a strategy applied to all national narratives, particularly because many political leaders do not feel compelled to rely on its

¹⁹⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 39.

methodology or employ its extreme Self-Other content. But its analysis in many cases does offer insight and understanding into how the Self and the Other are constructed and maintained in the national conscious. It shows how a political leader can filter, define, and present to the public a conception of reality that makes it possible to comprehend a particular Self-Other relationship. I argue that this type of strategy has frequently been used in the past and will continue to be employed as a political tool for national imaginings well into the future.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY

The victimization narrative is a useful tool not just for politicians. It is also useful for students of politics who wish to understand the practice of nationalism, how it is propagated and how it is defined by political leaders. President Bush's narrative provided an excellent example of how the Self-Other dichotomy is constructed and integrated into the polity. At the same time, however, his case also inspires many questions, both regarding his specific victimization strategy, as well as questions regarding the political history of victimization and the evolving phenomenon of nationalism.

For the future development of this Self-Other narrative, there are many avenues one could approach. For example, executive administrations should be viewed as a system of interconnecting parts rather than a single player. Therefore, for this specific case study, future efforts should explore the effects that the President's administration had not only on his narrative, but on the President's actions as well. Additionally, different individual methods could be explored to highlight alternative uses of victimization and how they are communicated to the polity.

Bibliography

- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. New York: Verso, 1983.
- Anderson, Benedict. *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*. New York: Verso, 1998.
- Ashley, Mark. "It Takes a Victim: The Construction of National Identity and the Narrative of National Victimization." Draft Paper, University of Chicago, 2002.
- Bell, Daniel. "The 'Hegelian Secret': Civil Society and American Exceptionalism." In *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*, ed. Byron Shafer. 46-70. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991.
- Berns, Walter. *Making Patriots*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- Castro Gomez, Santiago. "The Social nces, Epistemic ScieViolence, and the Problem of the 'Invention of the Other.'" *Foundations of Colony and Formations of Modernity*. (May 2000): 274-275.
- Calhoun, Craig. "Nationalism and Ethnicity." *Annual Review of Sociology*. Vol. 19 (1993): 229-233.
- Connor, Walker. "A Nation is a Nation." In *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. New York: Routledge, 1998: 36-46.
- Connally, William. Chp 2. Global Political Discourse. (need to find pgs and book title)
- De Tocqueville, Alexis. *Democracy in America*. New York: Random House Inc., 1981.
- Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F., eds. *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish*. New York: Random House Inc., 1995.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Gnesotto, Nicole. "Reacting to America." *Survival*. 44, (2002-2003:4): 99-106.
- Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Hechter, Michael. *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Heffner, Richard D. *A Documentary History of the United States*, New York: NAL Penguin Inc., 1985.

- Hobsbawm, E.J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.
- Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony D., eds., *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- United States. Congress. Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (PL 105-338). Passed October 31, 1998; Text available online at <http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/~PeterR/IR/docs/IraqLib.htm> (20 July 2003).
- Kagan, Robert. "One Year After: A Grand Strategy for the West?" *Survival* 44, (2002): 135-139.
- Kramer, Lloyd. "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism." *The Journal of the History of Ideas* 58. no 3 (1997): 525-45.
- Jefferson, Thomas. "The Declaration of Independence." In *A Documentary History of the Untied States*, ed. Richard Heffner, 15-17. New York: NAL Penguin Inc., 1985.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Brief Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1985.
- Nelson, Scott. "Contemporary Theory Introduction to Benedict Anderson." Contemporary Political Theory Course Introduction, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2002.
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *News releases for September 2001*. September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President After Two Planes Crash Into World Trade Center*. 11 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*. 11 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team*. 12 September 2001; Text available online at

- www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Pledges Assistance for New York in Phone Call with Pataki. Giuliani*. 13 September 2001; Text available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-4.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims Of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*. 13 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-7.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Radio Address of the President to the Nation*. 15 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President Upon Arrival*. 16 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *U.S. and Indonesia on Terror and Tolerance*. 19 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010919-2.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*. 20 September 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Freezes Terrorists' Assets*. 24 September 2001; Text available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President: "We're Making Progress"*. 01 October 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011001-6.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Holds Prime Time News Conference*. 11 October 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Outlines War Effort*. 17 October 2001; Text available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-15.html (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Rallies Troops at Travis Air Force Base*. 17

- October 2001; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-20.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President at Signing of the Patriot Act. Anti-Terrorism Legislation.* 26 October 2001; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011026-5.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Launches "Lessons of Liberty".* 30 October 2001; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-7.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Discusses War on Terrorism.* 08 November 2001; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011108-13.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President To United Nations General Assembly U.N. Headquarters.* 10 November 2001; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Shares Thanksgiving Meal with Troops.* 21 November 2001; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011121-3.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets.* 21 November 2001; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Delivers State of the Union Address.* 29 January 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Calls for \$48 Billion Increase in Defense Spending.* 04 February 2002; Text available online at
<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020204-1.html>> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Rallies the Troops in Alaska.* 16 February 2002; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020216-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush Meets with Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar.* 22 February 2002; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030222-2.html> (15 July 2003).

- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts*. 11 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush Holds Press Conference*. 13 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush Holds Press Conference*. 13 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President to the Travel Pool While Walking Through the Lunch Line Ft. Bragg, North Carolina*. 15 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020315-2.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Press Conference by President Bush and President Fox*. 22 March 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-10.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush Meets with German Chancellor Schroeder*. 23 May 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020523-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Urges Congress to Support Nation's Priorities*. 08 July 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020708-5.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Discusses Security and Defense Issues*. 21 August 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020821-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President's Remarks to the Nation*. 11 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020911-3.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly*. 12 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush Discusses Iraq with Reporters*. 13 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020913.html> (15 July 2003).

- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Discusses Growing Danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Regime*. 14 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush. Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism*. 25 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush Discusses Iraq with Congressional Leaders*. 26 September 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-7.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President. House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution*. 02 October 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-7.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Iraq Must Disarm Says President in South Dakota Speech*. 03 November 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021103-3.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Promotes Compassionate Conservatism*. 03 November 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020430-5.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *Remarks by the President in Terrell for Senate and Louisiana Republican Party Luncheon*. 03 December 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021203-3.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President's New Year's Day Message*. 31 December 2002; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021231-2.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush: "World Can Rise to This Moment"*. 06 February 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206-17.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President's Remarks at Religious Broadcasters' Convention*. 10 Feb 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030210-5.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours*. 17 March 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html> (15 July 2003).

- The Office of the Press Secretary. *President Bush Addresses the Nation*. 19 March 2003; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *News releases for November 2002*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *News releases for December 2002*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *News releases for January 2003*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *News releases for February 2003*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/> (15 July 2003).
- The Office of the Press Secretary. *News releases for March 2003*; Text available online at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/> (15 July 2003).
- Ozkuirimli, Umut. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. New York: St Martins Press, 2000.
- Ernest Renan, "What is the Nation," In *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 17-18. New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*, New York: Random House Inc, 1994.
- Shafer, Byron E. ed. *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism and Modernism*. New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Snyder, Jack. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.
- Tamir, Yael. "The Enigma of Nationalism." *World Politics* 47 (April 1995), 425
- "US Ambassador to the United Nations John D. Negroponte's Letter to the UNSC President on October 7, 2001." 08 October 2001; Text available at <http://www.usis.it/file2001_10/alia/a1100807.htm>
- Volkan, Vamik. *Blood Lines From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.
- Walzer, Michael, *Just and Unjust Wars*, United States: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992.

The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.
September 17, 2002; Text available online at
<www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html> (15 July 2003).

Wirth, Louis. "Types of Nationalism," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 41, Is. 6
May 1936: 727-728.