182

## ADAPTIVENESS OF POLITICAL INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS TO SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1960: A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION

by

#### Joachim Amm

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

Political Science

APPROVED:

Richard C. Rich, Chairman

Charles E. Walcott

Timothy W. Luke

December, 1990

Blacksburg, Virginia

6.)

LD 5655 V355 1990 A556 C.2

# ADAPTIVENESS OF POLITICAL INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS TO SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1960: A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION

by

## Joachim Amm

Committee Chairman: Richard C. Rich Political Science

## (ABSTRACT)

This thesis presents a theoretical conceptualization and operationalization for a forthcoming empirical study of the adaptiveness of business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations to social change since 1960. These three types of interest organizations are selected because they are particularly likely to have become targets of increased popular demands for environmental protection, a value change that has constituted one of the most important aspects of social change during the last three decades.

Despite different starting positions relative to their initial goals, organizations of all these three types needed to adopt some changes in order to conform to increased

environmental expectations. Such conformity is considered to be important for interest organizations to both maintain or increase their flow of resources by enhancing their legitimacy, and to improve their prospects for continued success in achieving policy goals.

Variables along three dimensions of basic organizational characteristics in which adaptive changes may have occurred - goals, structure, and strategy - are specified. Indicators and ways of measurement are suggested to not only identify adaptive changes, but also to determine whether or not those changes reflect conformity with new social expectations rather than symbolic or oppositional adaptiveness.

In addition to examining single interest organizations as the unit of analysis, a broader perspective is proposed to investigate the adaptiveness of the interest organization system as a whole.

## Acknowledgements

feel very fortunate that a number of Professors were willing to take time away from their own work to read and comment on mine. I am indebted to Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Lester Milbrath, Richard Rich, and Charles Walcott for their thoughtful critiques of an earlier draft of my research design. I also profited greatly from the many suggestions and the moral support provided by the members of my thesis committee, Richard Rich, Charles Walcott, and Timothy Luke, during the critical final phase of completing the project. My very special thanks go to Richard Rich for his indispensable scholarly advice and material support in times when I needed it most - this thesis was written on his personal computer. I also greatly appreciate his help with polishing up and sending out my questionnaire. Thanks to Helmut Lang who has been a valuable source of inspiration and material help. It has been a delight to work and share time with my fellow students in both Political Science and Sociology, too numerous to be mentioned individually. Finally, my warm thanks extend to Charles Taylor who made my stay in Blacksburg possible. In a number of respects, he and his wife Mary Frances have been like a host family to me. It was also a pleasure to work with him on a data project during the Summer of 1990.

## Table of Contents

	page
1. Theoretical Introduction	1
1.1. Relevance of the Topic	15
1.2. Objective and Outline of This Study	22
1.3. Methodological Remarks	26
2. Modernization Theory and Social Change in the	
United States	39
2.1. Push and Pull Theory	41
2.2. Some Empirical Evidence	45
2.3. Cleavage Change as the Rationale for the	
Selection of Organizational Types and the	
Choice of Time Frame	54
3. Adaptiveness and Different Organizational Starting	
Positions	64
3.1. "Positive" Adaptation and Opposition Tactics	66
3.2. Different Organizational Starting Positions	73
3.2.1. Type-Specific Differences and	
Propositions	74
3.2.2. Other Structural Components	80

(continued)

	page
4. Measuring Adaptiveness of Political Interest	
Organizations	84
4.1. Data Sources, Selection Criteria for Sample	84
4.2. Variables and Indicators	89
4.2.1. Adaptiveness	89
4.2.2. Social Integration Success	101
4.2.3. Policy Goal Success	109
4.3. Preview on the Empirical Analysis	111
5. Adaptiveness of the Interest Organization System	117
6. Summary	126
Bibliography	133
Appendix A.: Questionnaire	143
Appendix B.: Sample of Interest Organizations for Empirical Study	146
77.1 L a	140

## 1. Theoretical Introduction

Although political interest organizations are often advocates of change (or prevention of change), it is reasonable to assume that they can themselves also become subject to demands for change from the society. If public values and expectations change over time and organizations are not responsive, they may suffer a relative decline of legitimacy which may result in declining material resources, namely memberships and funds. Some theorists hold that even their survival may ultimately be threatened.

In this chapter I will examine the general problem and the relevance of studying organizational adaptation to changing external conditions by providing a brief overview of the literature. In the following chapters I will link this general discussion with the specific adaptive requirements posed by the contemporary social changes.

Organizations that do not conform to predominant public values may experience a decline of legitimacy<sup>2</sup>. Legitimacy

<sup>1.</sup> cf. Hage / Aiken 1970, p. 74; Hage 1980, p. 35

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>. Knoke and Wood (1981, pp. 70f) cite the American Civil Liberties Union's endorsement of a Nazi rally in Skokie, Il., and the consequences of this incident, as an example of how an interest organization can lose some of its

can generally be defined as "the rightful possession of power"3. With regard to interest organizations, "power" should be viewed as the manifest capacity to influence public policy decisions. Whether or not this influence is perceived as legitimate is largely determined substantive policy goals of an interest organization and In addition, acceptable their acceptance by society. organizational procedures, e.g. accountability, representativeness, and democratic decision making, enhance the legitimacy of an organization<sup>5</sup>.

Social acceptance of the policy goals is especially important for the legitimacy of an organization<sup>6</sup>. The crucial reason why adaptive changes may become necessary for an organization is that the definition of legitimacy changes

legitimacy - and its members - if it does not conform to prevailing public expectations (although in this case the loss of legitimacy did not particularly stem from <a href="mailto:changed">changed</a> public expectations).

<sup>3.</sup> cf. Steiner/Steiner 1980, p. 139

<sup>4.</sup> ibid., p. 142

cf. Hult/Walcott 1990, passim., esp. pp. 62f, 67ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>. Hage 1980, p. 379 stresses the importance of organizational outcomes that meet the desires of the population. He holds that this is what legitimates their existence.

over time7.

The need of political interest organizations to be adaptive also stems from the fact that, as voluntary organizations, they are potentially highly vulnerable to a withdrawal of for example, It can be assumed, that their members' voluntary commitment is weaker than that of employees in business firms where the relationship between the individual and the organization is based on the economic dependence of the employees8. This is why it should be in the self-interest of political interest organizations to be concerned about maintaining their memberships. They can do so by displaying adaptive qualities, that will likely assure their continued social legitimization.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 202) note that "social legitimacy for an organization is [...] always somewhat problematic, because the definition of what is legitimate is continually changing and evolving [...]".

<sup>\*.</sup> Work organizations <u>give</u> money to their employees in exchange for their labor, whereas political interest organizations <u>receive</u> money from their constituents in return for the service of interest representation.

<sup>9.</sup> The term "adaptive qualities" refers to organizational characteristics which are in compliance with social expectations directed at an organization at a given point in time. I avoid using the term "adaptation" where possible because there may be a number of organizations that are already in line with new social expectations a given time even without having to implement adaptive changes, namely those organizations that may have been "ahead of their time" in earlier periods.

This need for organizational adaptation to maintain or retain legitimacy, and its connection with social change, has been identified by a number of scholars. Hage and Aiken note that

"in a society with a high degree of social change, problems are continually confronting [...] organizations. The problems emanate from such diverse sources as population growth, technological developments, decisions of international and domestic governments, and changing values and beliefs of societal members" 10.

While mentioning different kinds of social change, Hage and Aiken view the growth in knowledge as the underlying general cause of social change. In their view, growth in knowledge constitutes "the most important factor in the environment that leads to instability in an organization" 11.

Parsons points out the need of organizations to develop an increased "adaptive capacity" to cope with strains emanating from the organizational environment<sup>12</sup>. Although they do not agree with Parsons, Pfeffer and Salancik summarize his account of organizational dependency on the larger society by saying that, according to Parsons,

<sup>10.</sup> Hage / Aiken 1970, p. xii

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>. ibid., p.74

<sup>12.</sup> cf. Parsons 1966, esp. p. 22

"since organizations used resources which [...] could find alternative uses elsewhere, organizations were continually being assessed on the appropriateness of their activities and the usefulness of their output. In other words, since organizations consumed society's resources, society evaluated the usefulness and legitimacy of the organization's activities"13.

Hall makes a similar, though more general point by quoting Meyer and Rowan as having argued that

"organizations are sometimes driven to incorporate policies and practices that are a part of the prevailing ethos in the society in which they are embedded. The environment has institutionalized concepts of how organizations should operate, and this leads organizations to incorporate the institutionalized practices" 14.

Hage's far more specific argument, relating to decision makers in work organizations, also focuses on organizational adaptiveness to external demands. He notes that

"when the environment dictates a particular value [...], dominant coalitions must [...] shift in order to maintain legitimacy with both resource controllers and their rank and file"15.

His point can be applied to political interest organizations when "resource controllers" are viewed as their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>. Pfeffer / Salancik 1978, p. 24, with reference to Parsons 1965

<sup>14.</sup> Hall 1987, p. 201, with reference to Meyer / Rowan 1977

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>. Hage 1980, p. 254

constituents. These constituents are both members or donors of the organization and members of civil society. As I will argue below, they are the ones most likely to transmit changing values of civil society to the organization.

Anthropologists Warner et al. also predict that what they call "great" or "large scale" organizations will adapt to social change:

"Despite their seeming rigidity, great organizations are probably far more flexible and more easily moved by the needs of the society than they appear to be. And despite the fact that they often seem conservative and their members reluctant to innovate as a social group, they respond adaptively to changes that occur in the larger social system" 16.

I have presented these comments in full to show that the theme of organizational adaptation has been identified and that there are some scholars who actually predict that organizations are responsive to new external demands and expectations. There is even more literature that predicts (and sometimes prescribes) organizational adaptation. One need only think of the whole body of economic studies on organizational development (OD) that I do not rely on because of its primary focus on work organizations. The problem with the sociological references cited above is that

<sup>16.</sup> Warner et al. 1967, p. 18

they are either too general or were written mainly with work organizations in mind.

When sociologists use the term "organizations", they tend to imply business firms and administrative bureaucracies. To them, political interest organizations fall under the category of "voluntary organizations", but there are not very many sociological studies on this type of organization<sup>17</sup>.

This poses a problem for someone who wants to study adaptation of political interest organizations empirically. There are no ready sets of specific hypotheses to work from and few previous empirical studies to resort to because, on the one hand, sociological theory identifies the problem of organizational adaptation but hardly concerns itself with the study of political interest organizations, while, on the other hand, Political Science literature does deal with political interest organizations but largely neglects the question of organizational change and adaptation in response to social change. Instead, most Political Science studies focus on the policy outcomes of political interest

<sup>17.</sup> The work of David Knoke is one of the exceptions. He also stresses the importance for voluntary organizations to conform with social expectations (cf. Knoke / Wood 1981, esp. pp. 72ff).

organizations' activities, on the way they get involved in the policy process, and on the tactics they apply to further their policy goals<sup>18</sup>.

Those Political Science studies that do consider resources and inputs of interest organizations<sup>19</sup> are most often based on economist Mancur Olsen's "rational choice" theory<sup>20</sup> and discuss the "free rider problem" and ways for organizations to circumvent it. Rational choice takes the individual's motivations to join interest groups as the starting point. While the initial formation of organizations can sometimes be analyzed within this theoretical framework<sup>21</sup>, rational choice is not very useful in analyzing the adaptation of

<sup>18.</sup> See Schlozman / Tierney 1986 for a recent example.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>. Examples are Salisbury 1969, and Walker, Jack L.: "The Origins and Maintenance of Political Interest Groups in America", pp. 390-406 in: American Political Science Review 77 (1983)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>. Olsen 1965. For the most comprehensive recent critique of Olsen's theory, see Moe 1980.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>. Even with regard to group formation, rational choice theory, with its notion of "selective material incentives" that organizations pursuing collective benefits have to offer to their members to overcome the "free rider problem", has not proven adequate to explain organizational patterns, mainly because there are also purposive and solidary incentives to join groups, and people are not rational in a strictly economical sense (cf. Berry 1989, p. 49, Loomis/Cigler 1986, p. 9, and Moe 1980, passim).

existing organizations to social change<sup>22</sup>.

Rational choice assumptions about group formation have sometimes been challenged with reference to what is known as "resource mobilization" perspective. This theory holds that the availability of resources from civil society is just one aspect that encourages group formation. New opportunities arising on the "system level" (i.e. provided by the government or private institutions and organizations) are other resources that lead to the same effect.

It is worthwhile to examine resource mobilization theory in more detail because it contains an implicit anti-thesis to the hypothesized need for adaptation of political interest organizations. It suggests that such responsiveness to expectations from civil society may not be necessary for organizations to survive or to prevent decline. McCarthy and Zald claim that the greater the absolute amount of resources available, the more organizations will develop to compete for them<sup>23</sup>, regardless of who provides them. To be sure, resource mobilization emphasizes new system opportunities and de-emphasizes mass discontent and grievances of the

<sup>22.</sup> cf. Kitschelt's similar argument, Kitschelt 1989, esp. p. 29

<sup>23.</sup> cf. McCarthy/Zald 1977, p. 1225

people as causes giving rise to new organizations24.

To illustrate this point, they note that a number of organizations exist despite small or nonexistent memberships because they receive extensive grant money from various foundations supporting their cause and making them financially independent of popular support<sup>25</sup>. Other system opportunities include court rules expanding "standing to sue" provisions that have led to a rise of public law firms<sup>26</sup> and the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 that have led to a rise of Political Action Committees (PACs)<sup>27</sup>. It has also been argued that the availability of new fund raising techniques (e.g. computerized mailing lists) has encouraged issue entrepreneurs to start organizations by defining new problems and grievances<sup>28</sup>.

If the funding of interest organizations by system level institutions not only extends to the initial stage of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>. cf. Harper 1989, pp. 137-139

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>. cf. Mitchell 1985, p. 13, Wenner 1989, p. 2, Sousa 1989, p. 10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>. cf. Harper 1989, p. 138

<sup>27.</sup> cf. Berry 1989, p. 25

<sup>28.</sup> cf. McCarthy/Zald 1977, p. 1215; see also Harper 1989, pp. 137-139

launching a new organization (to avoid free rider problems) for but. at least а substantial portion of the organization's budget, becomes a permanent state, then the interest organization is relatively independent of control of the public and possibly need not be responsive to expectations. Add the ever-increasing professionalization of interest organizations that tends to detach them from their social base<sup>29</sup> and the cooperation of like-minded interest organizations, and you have a perfect case of what, in the next section of this chapter, I will call high system integration and low social integration.

While resource mobilization implies that an organization need not fear its death as a consequence of refusing to be adaptive, there are other scholars who explicitly state that it is unusual to find interest organizations struggling to stay alive<sup>30</sup> because there is always some support from members of civil society. Pfeffer and Salancik illustrate this point by noting that "to survive, the organization need

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>. This trend has been observed by a number of scholars, for an example see Nullmeier 1989, p. 12. The point can be illustrated by the fact that some environmental organizations (Sierra Club, National Audubon Society) have hired professional agencies outside the organization to answer the mail they receive from their constituents.

<sup>3°.</sup> cf. Hall 1987, p. 189; Berry 1989, p. 61

only maintain a coalition of parties who contribute the resources and support necessary for it to continue its activities [...]"31.

Yet I would argue that since even these constituents themselves are also members of society and influenced by changing social norms and values, they may also penetrate their organization with new ideas and expectations, whatever their initial motives for joining the organization may have been<sup>3</sup> <sup>2</sup>.

This argument is in line with Hage's observation that knowledge growth (which he theorizes to be the root of new values and expectations) impacts "on how the members of organizations perceive tasks" and that it means "more complex and subtle perceptions of the environment and the recognition of new needs"<sup>33</sup>. The generational turnover may have the same effect over time, with new young members bringing new expectations and values into a political interest organization.

<sup>31.</sup> Pfeffer /Salancik 1978, p. 26

<sup>32.</sup> Berry (1989, p. 69) makes a very similar point.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3 3</sup>. Hage 1980, p. 473

This brief discussion shows that if it is not for the survival of an organization, it is for its legitimacy that adaptation becomes necessary. This corresponds with the quotes by Parsons and Hage cited at the beginning of this section.

But why should an organization be adaptive to new demands as long as its survival is not immediately threatened? The answer is that adaptation for renewed legitimacy would seem to be in the self-interest of an organization. Legitimacy helps keep up the fund-raising and prevent a relative decline, and it helps to increase the success in achieving policy goals because a broad membership and societal support base improves the reputation and the political clout of an interest organization in its interaction with other institutions in the policy process.

This constitutes yet another argument that would lead one to hypothesize that interest organizations will be adaptive, although it can be assumed that there may well be internal trade-offs between changes necessary for adaptiveness and established practices and goals of organizations. The degree to which new values and expectations will require an organization to depart from its original practices and goals probably determines in part whether or not an organization

is likely to be adaptive. Not all organizations are in the same starting position when it comes to implementing changes. I will pick up on this theme again in chapter 3.

I have shown in this section that there are scholars who emphasize the need for organizational adaptation to new expectations from civil society (although these hypotheses are quite general, not specifically related to political interest organizations, and have not yet been empirically tested), and that there are others who implicitly suggest that adaptation may at least not be necessary for the survival of an interest organization. I have argued that political interest organizations should nevertheless adaptive to social change because that leads to continued by civil society legitimization and to greater effectiveness.

I have not yet discussed what specific organizational changes would constitute adaptive ones. This will be done in chapter 3 because it is necessary first to discuss social change (chapter 2) in order to illustrate what organizational changes one would expect as a result of concrete historical social changes that have taken place. It is necessary to relate the discussion of legitimacy to a concrete historical level because, as has been argued above,

the definition of legitimacy changes over time.

Before doing this, a short discussion of why one should care about the adaptiveness and legitimacy of political interest organizations is in order. In other words: What underlying theory lends relevance to studying the adaptation of interest organizations?

## 1. 1. Relevance of the Topic

In addition to filling the gap in the literature and testing the broad hypotheses that predict organizational adaptation, there are two connected motives for studying the adaptation of political interest organizations to social change:

The first one is theoretical in nature and relates to the function of social integration these organizations perform as intermediaries between civil society (the people) and the larger social system, i.e. society's political and economic institutions.

Second, the important role political interest organizations play in shaping public policy in the political system of the United States is a practical reason that makes studying them

worthwhile. Considering their importance for society as a whole, it becomes all the more surprising that the issue of adaptation of political interest organizations has not yet been analyzed.

The first motive relates to the choice an organization faces between social integration and system integration. This problem was already mentioned briefly in the context of resource mobilization theory in the previous section.

The term "integration" refers to the use of coordinating devices to unify parts or members of a system into a more harmonized whole<sup>3</sup>. Streeck calls societal unity the result of social organization. In his view, "society, as a macro system, develops as an aggregation of aggregates, not of individuals", and he calls intermediary organizations (e.g. political interest organizations) the "constitutive carriers" of this process of societal integration<sup>3</sup>.

In other words: Political interest organizations can be viewed as societal coordinating devices. By providing channels of participation (through the selection,

<sup>34.</sup> cf. Hall 1987, p. 283

<sup>35.</sup> Streeck 1987, p. 472 (both quotes)

aggregation, and articulation of interests<sup>36</sup>) they obtain social legitimization not only for themselves, but simultaneously legitimize and stabilize the larger social system by contributing to the integration of its members<sup>37</sup>. They do so by "tying together" the disparate activities of members of society into the form of organized aggregates and thus facilitate the accomplishment of societal goals (another way to define "integration")<sup>38</sup>.

It is this function interest organizations perform for the larger system that constitutes the deeper meaning of why the adaptation of interest organizations to new popular demands is important.

Political interest organizations, as intermediaries, "stand between" civil society and society's institutional system

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>. cf. Tempel 1979, pp. 68ff.

<sup>37.</sup> While some functionalist theorists would probably stress the function of social integration for the stability of the larger system, I do not work from the perspective that system stability is necessarily a desirable outcome. Instead, as will become clear below, my approach is largely an empirical one. However, I do not claim to be "valuefree". If there should be any detectable normative undertones throughout this study, these will have to be attributed to my concern for <a href="legitimacy">legitimacy</a> rather than for stability.

<sup>38.</sup> Definition adopted slightly from Hage/Aiken 1970, p. 19

that makes up the epistemological image of society as a macro-system. On the one hand, intermediary organizations are connected with civil society because that is where they normally acquire their resources, including members. It is this function of integrating members of civil society (thereby "tying them together" and connecting them with the larger institutional system) that the term "social integration" denotes.

On the other hand intermediary organizations are also connected with (and to some extent part of) society's institutional system because they constantly interact with institutions, e.g. government agencies, Congress, political parties, and other organizations. This is what is meant by "system integration".

Thus, the problem for an interest organization becomes to find and maintain an appropriate balance between these two "logics of interaction" "seven under changing conditions on the "social integration" side (because of the changing definition of legitimacy by civil society). The organizational problem of balancing (or choosing between) social integration and system integration has been

<sup>39.</sup> cf. Streeck 1987, p. 473

identified by a number of organizational scholars, including neo-corporatist Streeck\*°, and - as mentioned by Weßels-Habermas\*¹. Even as early as 1961, in his classic study of "The Governmental Process", David Truman pointed out this duality by noting that "the function of the association [...] is to stabilize the relations among their members and to order their relations as a group with other groups"\*².

As was discussed above, political interest organizations may sometimes neglect their social integration unduly, be it because of general failure to be adaptive to new social demands (with civil society "moving away" from an interest organization) or because they prefer responding to system opportunities over adapting to new concerns voiced by the members of civil society (with the interest organizations "moving away" from civil society). In both cases the organization loses its touch with its social base.

It is important to stress again that if this leads to a consequent lack of social legitimization it may, at the same time, bear grave implications for the legitimacy and

<sup>40.</sup> cf. Streeck 1987, passim.

<sup>41.</sup> cf. Weßels 1988, p. 7, with reference to Habermas 1973

<sup>42.</sup> Truman 1971 (2nd ed.), p. 56

stability of the larger social system, unless there are other / new organizations or movements that can make up for the loss created by the established political interest organizations' failure to be adaptive and to channel new popular demands to the larger system as they are supposed to. This is so because there would be hardly any other channels left through which the people could effectively articulate their interests and find representation in the policy making process. Although not imminent, this might, in the most extreme case, lead to violent uprisings and widespread mass protests as system legitimacy breaks down.

My claim that interest organizations are essentially the only channels of effective interest articulation and representation rests on the weak role political parties in the United States play in this regard. This is the second reason why it is important to study the adaptiveness of political interest organizations. American political parties cannot reasonably be regarded as satisfactory vehicles for the representation of specific interests since there are only two well established parties that are very similar to each other in most of their ideological stances. Moreover these two parties are even characterized by a lower degree of both internal cohesion and organizational structure than

are political parties in most other democratic countries43.

the voting system of the United States In addition, discourages the formation of new parties because it makes it very difficult for them to get established politically. The relative weakness of political parties underlines the special role of political interest organizations in the United States. Combining this with the fact that in a country with a traditionally high propensity of its citizen to join organizations and a high level of political efficacy45 the smooth functioning of the process of interest representation appears to be a must, the importance of political interest organizations' responsiveness to popular demands becomes all the more clear.

Among others, David Truman and Robert Dahl have stressed the importance of interest organizations in a pluralist democracy; the work of Schlozman/Tierney and Berry provides

<sup>43.</sup> cf Loomis / Cigler 1986, pp. 5, 17

<sup>\*\*.</sup> Today, approximately 40 percent of all Americans are active in at least one organization (though by far not all of them are political interest organizations); cf. Lipsitz/Speak 1989, p. 285. Alexis de Toqueville observed already some 150 years ago that the Americans are a nation of joiners.

<sup>45.</sup> cf. the classic study by Almond and Verba, 1963

examples of more recent studies that make the same point 6.

To summarize this section, it has been argued that the deeper relevance that drives this study of adaptiveness of political interest organizations is derived from the important role of these organizations and their adaptiveness for the legitimacy and stability of the larger social system. The first two sections of this introduction have provided a brief theoretical introduction to the main theme of my analysis. Now it is appropriate to specify the goal of this study and to give an overview of how I will organize the subsequent chapters.

## 1. 2. Objective and Outline of This Study

The ultimate objective of my larger research project\*7 will be the empirical analysis of adaptation of three types of national political interest groups - business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations - to social

<sup>46.</sup> cf. Truman 1971 (2nd ed.); Dahl, 1961; Schlozman / Tierney 1986; Berry 1989 (2nd ed.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>. I will continue my work on this topic in the years to come.

change in the United States since 1960\*\*. However, in this study I will not seek to accomplish this goal but only to lay the theoretical and conceptual groundwork that is necessary for the empirical analysis.

Two general research questions for that later empirical analysis derive from the considerations presented in the introduction: "Do political interest organizations show adaptive qualities as a response to social changes?" and "Do organizations with more adaptive qualities experience more social integration success than those with fewer adaptive qualities?" While the analysis of the first question will provide an empirical answer as to whether organizational adaptation takes place (as predicted) or if non-adaptiveness is a problem for political interest organizations in the United States, the second one tests the underlying proposition that adaptiveness will bring renewed

<sup>\*\*.</sup> The rationale for choosing these three types and this time frame will be discussed in chapter 3.

<sup>49.</sup> cf. chapter 1.3. for methodological limitations on any answer to this question.

organization's success in maintaining or increasing public support. It will be conceptualized below as higher membership and budget figures (cf. chapter 4). The term is used, for the lack of a better one, to denote success on the "input side", relating to survival and/or legitimacy, and to distinguish it from policy goal achievement success on the "output side".

legitimacy (because that is essentially what accompanies social integration success).

In an extended perspective, a third question will be addressed: "Do organizations that implement more adaptive changes experience higher policy success rates?". The purpose of this is to test the common assumption that policy goal accomplishment is a function of the resources controlled by an organization<sup>51</sup>.

As I have indicated, a number of preliminary tasks have to be fulfilled before beginning the empirical analysis: In order to put the theoretical assumptions about adaptation of interest organizations to the test, they have to be applied to a concrete historical situation, i.e. a given case of organizations facing changing external expectations. To lay the groundwork for "combining" the theories of social change and organizational adaptation, chapter 2 will address social change in the United States in the light of modernization theory. It will provide some empirical evidence to show that change has actually taken place and that it can be assumed that political interest organizations are indeed confronted with new expectations from civil society.

<sup>51.</sup> For an example, cf. McCarthy/Zald 1977, p. 1221

Chapter 3 is devoted to the task of conceptualizing adaptive qualities of political interest organizations under the given historical conditions of social change. I will examine the kinds of adaptive organizational qualities that could theoretically be expected. The different starting positions of the three types of interest organizations will be analyzed. Possible strategies to avoid adaptation will briefly be examined.

Chapter 4 will identify variables that can be used to measure (changes towards) adaptive qualities and success rates of interest organizations. This chapter will also include a discussion of the questionnaire that I sent to 56 organizations to obtain data that cannot be found in any source books.

While chapters 3 and 4 deal with single organizations as the unit of analysis and focus on their internal adaptiveness, chapter 5 will discuss a different perspective, focusing on adaptation within and across the three types of organizations. The assumption here is that more adaptive organizations or types of organizations might possibly supplement or gradually substitute for those that are less adaptive in their function of integrating members of society and assuring legitimization.

Finally, chapter 6 will round out my analysis by summarizing the main points of this study. Since there will not yet be any results from the empirical analysis available for evaluation, I have titled this last chapter "Summary" rather than "Conclusion".

## 1. 3. Methodological Remarks

Two theoretical problems that impact on the empirical analysis should be examined. These are the linkage of social change to organizational adaptation and the definition of organizational boundaries.

Katz and Mair note that "before trying to test explanatory hypotheses [...], the first step is to test the descriptive hypotheses that underlie them"<sup>52</sup>. While I will be able to show that social change has taken place and to test whether or not organizational changes have followed, I will have to rely on theory to argue that those organizational changes are indeed adaptive ones, i.e. responses to social change.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>. Katz / Mair 1990, p. 26

In his study of interest organizations in what used to be West Germany, Weßels circumvents the problem of determining whether or not there is a lack of social integration on the part of interest organizations (and thus a need for adaptation) by asking both members of interest organizations and the public at large whether or not they feel represented by a number of interest organizations<sup>53</sup>. Unfortunately, I do not find myself in the position to conduct a comprehensive survey that would allow me to do the same for my study.

The problem of not being able to demonstrate empirically whether or not observed organizational changes are indeed responses to new expectations from civil society (even if they are in line with what I will hypothesize to be adaptive qualities) stems from the fact that there are many other factors, such as political, legal, or technological change, that may have led interest organizations to implement those changes. It is not even clear if such changes would be responsive (reactive) ones at all because it is conceivable that organizations also implement "pro-active", i.e. voluntary or anticipatory changes of all kinds.

It is unfortunate that these problems cannot be resolved,

<sup>53.</sup> cf. Weßels 1990, passim.

but it is virtually impossible to create an exact model of how social change translates into organizational adaptation, not to speak of the difficulties of getting data to test such a complex model. To illustrate this point, one need only think of the difficulties involved in measuring the motives leading to organizational decisions, including such problems as getting a handle on the values of the dominant coalitions of organizations, informal goals, structural ability to implement certain changes, etc. In addition, a complete model linking the two concepts would also have to be reciprocal or nonrecursive<sup>5 4</sup>, since organizations, as change agents, may sometimes be able to influence public opinion and the course that social change takes<sup>5 5</sup>.

These points show that a multitude of distorter, suppressor, and intervening variables that I cannot possibly control for will keep me from testing any causal linkages between the concepts of "social change" and "organizational adaptation". This is why I am choosing the strategy of evaluating organizational changes only on grounds of theoretical assumptions that they are adaptive ones, i.e. linked to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>. cf. Katz / Mair 1990, p. 26

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>. cf. Mitchell's argument that the ecological paradigm has "diffused from environmental activists to the public at large"; Mitchell 1985, p. 19

social change<sup>56</sup>. This strategy is in itself not unproblematic. Some explanations of how I plan to deal with the complexity of the given task is therefore necessary.

handle analysis of organizational To get а on the adaptiveness to social change, it is advisable to limit the scope of changes that are to be examined to a manageable is inevitable that, by doing so, many of the complexities of social change are not taken into consideration. On the other hand, reduction of complexity is a virtue as long as otherwise it would be impossible to study social change and its effects at all, e.g. because an overly complicated theory would not clarify anything.

I have opted to pick only one very important aspect from the spectrum of intertwined social change processes for the empirical analysis. The change towards <u>higher demands for environmental protection</u> is suitable for analysis for two reasons. First, it can be demonstrated quite unambiguously that a rise of environmental concerns has occurred (cf. chapter 2), and that this trend is not only a "real" but

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>. It would make little sense to simply correlate indicators of organizational adaptation with indicators of social change without paying attention to the mechanisms at work (a method that has been referred to as "correlates analysis").

also a sustained, long lasting, and thus important aspect of social change.

Calls for more environmental protection enjoy the continued support from large proportions of the population, as they appeal to practically all social strata. This may be so because environmental problems tend to cut across social classes and therefore affect larger proportions of the public than most other social problems<sup>57</sup>.

This leads the second reason why the rise of to environmental concerns should be chosen as the example of which the adaptation of change for organizations should be studied. The fact that demands for environmental protection come from all segments of the public makes it plausible that business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations are all likely to be increased environmental demands 5 8, be affected by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>. cf. Dunlap 1989, pp. 118f. It should be noted that not all classes are affected by these problems to exactly the same extent.

<sup>58.</sup> Chapter 2.3. argues that these three types of interest organizations were chosen as subjects for the empirical study because they are indeed more likely than other types to be the targets of demands for more environmental commitment. This is so because they are direct representatives of issues around which environmental demands revolve. Therefore they are least likely to have remained unaffected by environmental demands.

directly via their members (as in the case of labor unions and environmental organizations) or indirectly via pressures exerted on their corporate members (i.e. business firms - as corporate members of business associations - on which consumers exert pressure in the form of declining purchases, or on which governments exert pressure in the form of threatened regulations).

Weßels argues that it is obvious that such a broad trend as the one of increased demands for environmental protection must somehow "get through" organizations and institutions: "Organizations are, in this sense, a product of social change in terms of their characteristics, their number, and their importance" 59.

Another (practical) advantage of choosing the environmental value change as the aspect of social change to be studied is that the identification of organizational adaptations with regard to environmental matters is generally not very difficult or ambiguous. Chapter 4 will discuss at least some

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>. Weßels 1988, p. 12: "[...] solche Prozesse müssen zumindest durch Organisationen und Institutionen hindurch. Insofern sind Organisationen ihren Merkmalen nach, ihrer Zahl und ihrer Bedeutung nach ein Produkt des sozialen Wandels".

indicators which measure organizational changes that can only be attributed to a growing concern with environmental issues. However, it will also become clear that conclusions as to whether such adaptations are indeed positive responses to demands for more environmental commitment (and not just symbolic changes or ones really aimed at opposing more environmental commitment) can only be drawn if a qualitative examination of organizational changes supplements the analysis of quantitative indicators.

Another methodological problem that should be discussed here is whether or not the members of organizations should be viewed as part of the organization or as part of the organizational environment, i.e. civil society. This is an important question because - aside from the influence of organizational leaders' changing values - it is mainly the rank and file members who transmit changing social values and expectations from civil society to the particular interest organization, and who, by potentially terminating their membership if they are unsuccessful in doing so, might withdraw legitimacy from the organization.

<sup>6°.</sup> This is because it can be assumed that the members of the general public, unless they are constituents (members) or adherents, care less about the legitimacy and the internal doings of a specific organization (cf. similar argument in Pfeffer / Salancik 1978, p. 24). Yet it is exactly those present and potential future members of

This raises the question of how to define the boundaries of political interest organizations, and it requires me to anticipate part of my discussion from chapter 4. Supporters systems approach usually define organizations around the distinctions of inputs (resources). throughputs (processes, techniques) and outputs (outcomes in terms of achieving functions like integration, survival. goal attainment) 61. According to these terms, members have to be viewed as resources who at the same time produce other resources (funds, legitimacy, labor) for the organizations. This makes it relatively easy to determine the boundaries of work organizations in that they include their employees 2.

However, defining boundaries is more difficult in the case of voluntary associations like political interest organizations. This problem can be illustrated by realizing that political interest organizations usually consist of officers, staff, corporate and/or individual members, some of whom are active members while - unlike in work organizations - there may be many others who are passive

organizations (which may be a lot) that make organizational adaptation essential for (continued) legitimacy and social integration.

<sup>61.</sup> cf. Hage 1980, p. 10f

<sup>62.</sup> loc. cit.

"checkbook" members. In addition, there may be donors that are not members and adherents that support the cause (and enjoy the benefits) of an organization but are neither members nor financial supporters of the organization (those who rational choice theorists would call "free riders").

Following Hall, Knoke and Prensky describe association boundaries as "often fuzzy and porous [...], since many involve episodic supporters and passively interested constituents who can be mobilized under exceptional circumstances to provide financial or political sustenance"63. This means that there is a high degree of exchange with the environment caused by fluctuating levels of commitment. It can generally be assumed that, on the average, members of interest organizations devote far less time to their organization than do employees of work organizations because "voluntary associations are likely to constitute the major life activity" for most of their members 4.

Unlike mere adherents, I will nevertheless consider all members, as is common usage, to be part of the organizations

 $<sup>^{63}</sup>$  . Knoke and Prensky (1984), as cited in Hall 1987, p. 53f

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup>. Hage / Aiken 1970, p. 10

rather than part of their environment: This allows me to operationalize "social integration success" of interest organizations in terms of their membership and funding trends, namely as the success in converting mere "adherents" "constituents" (members and donors) 65. After all, it is only the size of their membership and (with limitations 66 budgets that gives an organizations measurable legitimacy that can be perceived as such by outside observers, although adherents may also contribute to an organization's legitimacy, e.g. by occasionally promoting its goals (e.g. in surveys), thus helping to create a favorable "opinion climate" for the organization. Members and (with limitations) funds are also the only practically feasible indicators of social integration success, unless one has the opportunity to conduct in-depth surveys to measure the social legitimization of an organization 7.

<sup>65.</sup> Terms adopted from McCarthy / Zald 1977, p. 1221

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup>. Larger budgets indicate increased legitimacy and social integration only if the additional money does not come from the "system level" (government grants, grants from private foundations, and the like).

<sup>67.</sup> As indicated above, social integration of members of society and social legitimization of an organization are closely interrelated: An organization, by increasing its membership base, integrates more members of civil society into itself, in return it gets more legitimization from civil society (materializing in the form of membership and budget increases). Thus both "social integration" and "organizational legitimization" are related to the degree to which an organization cares about its social base (and about

Finally, a note on my general theoretical approach seems warranted. The theoretical review in this chapter makes references to a number of theorists from quite different traditions, including functionalism, resource research mobilization, rational choice, and democratic theory, and so does much of the rest of this study. Such a strategy of utilizing and combining single aspects from a wide array of different sources appears to be legitimate, especially for the study of a subject matter that involves aspects from both sociology and political science and that has hardly been explored as of yet. Fligstein, as cited by Hall, notes that

"each school of thought has tended to view its theory as a total causal explanation of organizational phenomena. This suggests that one of the central tasks in organizational theory is to reorient the field in such a way as to view competing theories as contributing to an understanding of organizational phenomena" 68.

However, the underlying theoretical framework that gives relevance to the study of adaptation is essentially provided by functionalist theory. The notion of interrelated subsystems that make up the social system places interest organizations, as intermediaries, in a larger context and

adaptation). This is why membership and funding trends are alternately referred to as measures of either concept.

<sup>68.</sup> Fligstein, Neil (1985), as cited by Hall 1987, p. 298

emphasizes their role for society as a whole, i.e both civil society and society's institutional system. The problems of social integration and system integration are identified as conditioning each other and are looked at in a combined fashion.

This embedding of organizations in a larger societal context is something that a micro approach, e.g. rational choice, is not capable of. Similarly, some other sociological perspectives tend to focus either on organizational inputs (with survival as the rationale) or on outputs (with effectiveness and internal efficiency as main objectives)<sup>69</sup>.

Functionalism as an explanatory strategy of social systems has been criticized for its tautological quality . However, it can be quite useful as an underlying epistemological framework for purposes of analyzing more specific phenomena,

<sup>69.</sup> See Hult / Walcott 1990, esp. pp. 6-12, for a brief account of the "natural (open) systems approach" and the "control (closed) systems approach". Although ever since Max Weber's ideal-type construction of bureaucracy functionalism has been mainly associated with a concern for efficiency (i.e., output orientation, cf. Hage 1980, p. 15), there is also an emphasis on inputs and adaptation (for examples see Parsons 1966, Hage/Aiken 1970, Hage 1980).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup>. This is because it can be argued that functionalist theory implies that systems give meaning to functions while at the same time these functions (through later effects) explain these (earlier) systems; cf. Rosenbaum 1988, esp. pp. 129, 134, 137.

such as the study of adaptation of interest organizations to social change. In addition, the functionalist concept of "structural differentiation" helps to conceptualize adaptive qualities of interest organizations and to identify variables to measure them<sup>71</sup>.

This chapter has provided an introduction to the topic of organizational adaptation in a general fashion. Now that this groundwork has been laid, I can introduce the concrete historical topic of social change and subsequently elaborate on its specific impact on interest organizations.

 $<sup>^{71}</sup>$ . This will become clear in chapters 3 and 4.

## 2. Modernization Theory and Social Change in the United States

A variety of forces are continuously transforming society. Social change reflects such diverse trends as technological change and computerization, new religiosity, genetic engineering, change of gender roles, tertiarization and globalization of economic markets, growing health awareness, and the rise of environmentalism. While some changes may be relatively short-lived (e.g. rise in crime and drug abuse), others are likely to have more long-lasting effects on society. Most of these change processes are related to each other; they may affect each other and be mutually reinforcing.

The common denominator for most of these changes has been identified as the growth in societal knowledge, also referred to as "modernization". According to Hage, modernization "occurs through the processes of mass education, rising communication, and the like". It is obvious that the rapid development of computer technology represents an immense knowledge growth. This technological change, in turn, is responsible for much of the shift that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>. Hage 1980, p. 470

has occurred in the economy, namely the increased role of information and the growth of the service sector. The term "post-industrial society", introduced by sociologist Daniel Bell<sup>2</sup>, applies to countries that have experienced high degrees of such social modernization leading towards increasing economic tertiarization.

The changes in the United States during the last four decades provide an example for this<sup>3</sup>. An immense shift towards the service sector has taken place that most likely is mainly a consequence of technological changes. While 46 percent of the GNP was accounted for by the production of goods and 54 percent by services in 1948, that ratio had changed to 34 to 66 percent by 1978<sup>4</sup>. Likewise, the distribution of the total work force among the three sectors of the economy has changed substantially. While roughly 20 percent were employed in the agricultural sector, 40 percent in the industrial sector (i.e. in production of goods), and 40 percent in the service sector in 1940, that ratio had changed to 3 to 30 to 67 percent by 1980<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>. cf. Bell, Daniel: The Coming of Postindustrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1973

<sup>3.</sup> Lipset 1986, p. 8

<sup>4.</sup> cf. Harper 1989, p. 29

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>. Harper 1989, p. 29

Such broad changes in the economic structure certainly affect the people's way of life, and - combined with higher overall levels of education and information in post-industrial society<sup>6</sup> - they likely lead to the gradual alteration of some of their beliefs and values. It is primarily this "cultural modernization" that leads to new popular demands. These, in turn, constitute the need for organizational adaptiveness in order to ensure their continued legitimacy.

#### 2. 1. Push and Pull Theory

The theories on how social change and civil society relate to each other can roughly be divided into "push" and "pull". The former points out a pro-active role of the people as they "push" the system for the recognition of new values. The latter emphasizes the "pull" of objective events originating from the system level that move the people to become (re)active to defend their existing needs.

<sup>6.</sup> cf. Katz/Mair 1990, pp. 23f; Wootton 1985, p. 29

<sup>7.</sup> cf. Inglehart's term "culture shift" (Inglehart 1990)

<sup>8.</sup> cf. Offe 1985, pp. 842-844, Kitschelt 1989, pp. 13f

some extent with Pull theory corresponds to Truman's disturbance theory which holds that people will become active when they experience the "continual frustration of established expectations consequent upon rapid changes in the related techniques"9. Pull theory has been utilized to explain the rise of new social movements in the light of many people's desire to defend the wholeness of the "life world" against system imperatives that threaten to "colonize" it10. These threats often relate to a diagnosed loss of the system's self-corrective steering capacities. For an example of how civil society is adversely affected by developments on the system level, Offe cites the massive growth of technological systems, such as industrialized agriculture, atomic energy, and military defense11, for which there are hardly any social control mechanisms.

For the purpose of this analysis, pull theory is useful in that it suggests that increasing objective problems sharpen the people's perception of their needs and further contribute to new (or previously unrealized) demands that push theory predicts to be a consequence of value changes

<sup>3.</sup> Truman 1971, p. 57; underlinings added

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>. Terms in quotes by Jürgen Habermas ("Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns", 1981)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>. Offe, op. cit., p. 846

triggered by knowledge growth. For an example of "pull", Wenner notes that environmental crises, such as the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, helped focus public opinion on environmental protection<sup>12</sup>. Pull and push theory supplement each other by providing different explanations for the recognition of values among civil society, although push theory also stresses the change of values.

In the context of value changes, one central finding is that, beginning in the 1960s, there has been a sharp rise in quality-of-life demands and environmental awareness on the part of the public. This trend has been identified by various authors, including, among others, Inglehart, Milbrath, and Offe<sup>13</sup>. Inglehart and Milbrath have also studied these changes empirically. Milbrath and Offe both claim that a major social "paradigm shift" is underway or that a new "cleavage" is opening up<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>. Wenner 1989, p. 2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>. cf. Inglehart 1989, 1990; Milbrath 1984, 1989; Offe 1985

<sup>14.</sup> cf. Offe 1985, pp. 821, 832; Milbrath 1984, passim, 1989, p. 118f. This new cleavage provides my rationale for choosing the three types of political interest organizations and will be further discussed in chapter 2.3. Milbrath also notes a growing emphasis on openness and participation, another major theme of cultural modernization.

The rise of quality of life demands has often been linked to higher levels of affluence that characterize post-industrial societies<sup>15</sup>. It has been argued that if one does not have to struggle for material well-being any more, one will start to develop different perspectives that lead to new interests, concerns, and demands<sup>16</sup>. Taking into consideration both the fact that higher affluence is often accompanied by more leisure time<sup>17</sup> which people will often spend pursuing nature-related activities<sup>18</sup> and the increasing and often visible deterioration of the natural environment, a value change towards more environmental awareness should not come a surprise.

As I argued in chapter 1.3., the environmental value change should - for the purpose of this analysis - be chosen as the aspect of social change on the basis of which I will analyze the adaptiveness of political interest organizations. Therefore it is necessary to present some empirical evidence for the rise of the people's environmental awareness and

<sup>15.</sup> cf. Ladd 1989, pp. 18f; Dunlap 1989, pp. 95f

<sup>16.</sup> cf. Inglehart 1990, p. 5, Loomis/Cigler 1986, p. 15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>. cf. Katz / Mair 1990, p. 24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>. Dunlap cites a "rapid increase in outdoor recreational activities among Americans" in the 1960s (Dunlap 1989, p. 95)

demands.

### 2. 2. Some Empirical Evidence

Although many of the public opinion polls during the last three decades that included questions relative to the environment are not strictly comparable (because they have asked different questions and because single polls have not been repeated on a regular basis<sup>19</sup>), piecing their results together nevertheless provides a picture of solid evidence for the assumption that a broad and sustained change towards more environmental awareness has taken place in the United States.

Unfortunately, no poll data are available for the first half of the 1960s, a circumstance which may, itself, be explained by the fact that environmental demands by a large public were new and just beginning to rise<sup>20</sup>. However, opinion polls on the environment were conducted between 1965 and

<sup>19.</sup> This is true e.g. for the questions the Gallup Poll and the Harris survey have asked with regard to environmental awareness.

<sup>2°.</sup> cf. Dunlap 1989, p. 94

1970, and the findings showed a steep increase in environmental awareness.

Table 1 provides a summary of the survey results from that period. The Gallup Poll found that the percentage of people who viewed the reduction of air and water pollution as one of three national problems that should receive the attention of the government tripled within this five year period (from in 1965 to 53 percent in 1970). The Opinion percent 17 It found Research Corporation arrived at similar findings. that, from 1965 to 1970, the percentage of people concerned about regional pollution problems rose sharply (from 28 to percent regarding air pollution, and from percent regarding water pollution). These findings in line with those from the Harris Survey which found that higher percentages of the population named pollution control as the government spending area they least liked to see cut (44 percent in 1965, 54 percent in 1970). Harris even found that more people were willing to pay for the environment. 55 percent of those surveyed in 1970 (as opposed to 38 percent in 1969) responded "yes" when asked if they were willing to pay \$ 15 per year more in taxes to support air pollution programs.

In addition, there is a lot of descriptive evidence that

Table 1:

Trend Studies of Public Concern for
Environmental Quality, 1965 to 1970

National Trend		Perc	ent	Resp	onse	bу	Year
Studies		65	66	67	68	69	70
Gallup	"Reducing pollution of air and water" selected as one of three national problems that should receive attention of government	17	-	-	-	-	53
Opinion Research Corp.	Air/water pollution viewed as "very or somewhat serious" in area a. air pollution	28	48	53	55	_	69
	b. water pollution	35	49	52	58	_	74
L. Harris	Willing to pay \$ 15 a year more in taxes to finance air pollution control program			44	-		54
	"Pollution control selected as government spending area "least like to see cut"					38	55

Source: Table adopted slightly from Dunlap 1989, p. 97 (Table 4.1.). See Dunlap, loc. cit., for the citation of the original data sources and of complete question wording

American environmentalism obtained its mass support base in the 1960s, with the political institutionalization of environmental concerns (National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA, and creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA) and the celebration of the first "Earth Day" in the early 1970s serving as the first milestones of success.

What makes the emergence of a mass support base for environmental matters so important is that after its sharp and remarkable rise in the 1960s, American environmentalism did not fade from public attention in the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, it can be shown that a long-lasting value change has occurred among the American public, quite contrary to Downs' expectation that a decline of the public interest for the environment was likely after some time<sup>21</sup>.

Although not much comparable evidence is available, there are at least two surveys that have been repeated often enough (with the same questions asked) to allow for drawing the conclusion that concerns for environmental protection remained on a high level throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The "General Social Survey", conducted by the National Opinion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>. cf. Downs, Anthony: "Up and Down with Ecology: The 'Issue-Attention-Cycle'", pp. 38-50 in: Public Interest, vol. 28 (1972)

Research Center of the University of Chicago, has asked the Question "Are we spending too much, too little, about right on improving and protecting the environment?" on a nearly annual basis since 1973. Also beginning in 1973, the Roper Institute started collecting opinion data on the extent of demands for environmental protection and adequate energy, and on whether the people felt that environmental protection laws and regulations had gone too far or not far enough.

The results from the "General Social Survey" are presented Table 2. Beginning in 1973 with a high level environmental demands (61 percent said that too little was spent on protecting the environment), there was a marginal decline of environmental concerns in the course of the late 1970s (in 1977 and 1980, 48 percent said too little was spent on the environment). Yet even during the late 1970s, those who wanted more environmental spending outnumbered those who wanted less spending by a ratio of roughly 3 to one to 4 to one (48:15 percent in 1980, 48:11 in 1977). 1980s. was slight increase of During the there а environmental awareness again (65 percent saying too little was spent in 1987 and 1988) that must possibly be viewed as a reaction of the people to President Reagan's anti-

Year	Too Little	About Right	Too Much	DK	• N •
1973	61	26	7	6	1498
1974	59	27	8	7	1476
1975	53	31	10	6	1490
1976	55	31	9	5	1494
1977	48	34	11	7	1524
1978	52	33	10	5	1528
1980	48	31	15	6	1465
1982	50	32	12	6	1504
1983	54	31	8	6	1592
1984	59	33	4	4	485
1985	56	32	8	4	747
1986	59	29	5	6	725
1987	65	25	5	5	482
1988	65	26	5	4	714

Source: "General Social Surveys", National Opinion Research Center (University of Chicago), as cited in Niemi, Mueller, Smith 1989, p. 79 (Table 3.4.)

DK = Don't Know, N = sample size

environmentalist policies22.

The results from the Roper surveys are in line with those from the General Social Surveys. Table 3 shows that the percentages of the people that demanded more environmental protection and adequate energy in 1980 roughly equalled or even surpassed the corresponding figures for 1973. More environmental protection was favored by 37 percent in 1973 and by 36 percent in 1980. That figure rose again in the following years and reached the value of 46 percent in 1982. More adequate energy was favored by 35 percent in 1982, as opposed to 45 percent in 1980 and 37 percent in 1973, with fluctuating values in the years in between.

In 1983, 48 percent of the respondents said that environmental protection laws had not gone far enough. The corresponding figure for 1973 had been 34 percent. This figure went up and down (on a slightly lower level than in 1973) during the late 1970s until 1981 but then started to rise again and surpassed the 1973 value in 1982 for the first time (with 37 percent). At the same time, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>. cf. Amm 1989, pp. 53-62

National Survey Results of Trends of Public

Concern for Environmental Quality
from Roper Studies, 1973 - 1983
(Responses in Percent)

Year	More on the protecting		laws and regulations have			
	environment	energy	not far enough	too far		
1973	37	37	34	13		
1974	39	41	25	17		
1975	39	40	31	20		
1976	44	33	32	15		
1977	35	43	27	20		
1979	38	43	29	24		
1980	36	45	33	25		
1981	40	39	31	21		
1982	46	35	37	16		
1983	n.a.	n.a.	48	14		

Source: Figures from Roper, as cited in Dunlap 1989, pp. 108f. (Table 4.3.). No data are available for 1978. See Dunlap, loc. cit., for the citation of the original data sources and of complete question wording

percentage that said environmental laws and regulations had gone too far amounted to 13 percent in 1973, then increased and peaked at 25 percent in 1980, but only to fall back to 14 percent by 1983.

Viewing the results from the surveys presented in this section together, it is fair to conclude that after a massive increase of environmental concerns during the midand late 1960s, the overall level of environmental awareness remained high during the 1970s, and it even started to rise again in the 1980s. Since environmentalism is obviously no short-lived phenomenon but a continuous concern shared by many people, it is reasonable to assume that a value change towards higher demands for environmental protection has indeed taken place since 1960<sup>23</sup>.

The sections of chapter 2 have so far discussed social change in the United States in the light of social and cultural modernization theory and provided some evidence that an environmental value change has occurred. Since this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>. Even though one must be cautious at interpreting opinion poll findings because they may express temporary preferences rather than strongly held values (cf. distinction made by Milbrath 1989, p. 58), the evidence for more environmental awareness is so unanimous and consistent over time that the strong assumption about a value change seems warranted.

theory provides the basic rationale for choosing three types of political interest organizations for the empirical study, this choice (and the expectation that these three types may have become targets of new environmental demands<sup>24</sup>) shall be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

## 2. 3. Cleavage Change as the Rationale for the Selection of Organizational Types and the Choice of Time Frame

In the empirical study of organizational adaptiveness, the major national business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations will be analyzed<sup>25</sup>. The importance of these organizations is underlined by the fact that they are the principal representatives of the interests of the three factors of production, capital, labor, and nature<sup>26</sup>. However, the rationale for choosing them for this study is derived theoretically and relates to the social change processes discussed in the previous sections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>. This question also has already been partially addressed in chapter 1.3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>. Milbrath (1984), Schlozman/Tierney (1986) and Wenner (1989) also focus much of their analyses on these types of interest organizations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>. They are not the exclusive representatives, though. Farm groups are an example of another lobby representing interests related to nature.

In the context of the declining industrial sector of the economy and the rise of new values of the people, a cleavage change has been analyzed by some theorists. The old social cleavage that revolved around the "conflict of ownership of the means of production"<sup>27</sup> and redistribution, but did not question economic growth<sup>28</sup>, lost some of its importance. Simultaneously, a new value-based polarization, focusing on quality of life and challenging economic growth, emerged and partially replaced the old class-based one<sup>29</sup>.

Milbrath cites "solid evidence" that a "new environmental paradigm" which gives priority to environmental protection over economic growth may eventually replace the "dominant social paradigm" that places economic growth over environmental protection<sup>30</sup>.

The declining role of popular demands generated by the old cleavage has been attributed both to the fact that the tertiarization of the economy leads to less solidarity (due to a higher degree of atomization of the work force), and to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>. Inglehart 1990, p. 258

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>. cf. Offe 1985, p. 832

<sup>29.</sup> Inglehart, op. cit., p. 7

<sup>3°.</sup> Milbrath 1989, pp. 118f

the increasing skepticism - even of the political "left"about redistributive interventions of the state in the face
of overburdening welfare state activities and the
inefficiency of its operation<sup>31</sup>. The rise of the new
cleavage also relates to modernization, as higher education,
more leisure time, and the increase of objective problems
lead to value changes in civil society (as has been
discussed above).

To be sure, class conflict has never been very fierce in the United States, and the welfare state has never been as comprehensive as in other Western democracies. Yet the diagnosed shifts in the United States (changing economic relationships, rise of environmental awareness, etc.) support the assumption that the tendency of a gradual cleavage change is in the predicted direction in this country, however relatively weak the old economic cleavage may have been.

In the context of relative cleavage changes, the importance of studying the adaptiveness of business associations, labor unions, and environmental groups becomes clear:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>. cf. Inglehart 1990, p. 7-11; Habermas 1989, esp. pp. 48-70

On the one hand, they represent exactly those groups that are the central (interest representing) actors organized around the two fundamental social cleavages - the old classbased one as expressed in the division between capital and labor and represented by business associations versus labor unions (criticism of capitalism), and the new value-based one, as expressed in the division between economic growth environmental protection represented and and bv environmental organizations versus business and (in some cases) labor (criticism of industrialism). On the other hand, since it is the case that, to a considerable extent, social change themes affect substantive issues relating to just these two main cleavages, interest organizations of all three types - if to slightly different degrees - are likely to become subject to new demands (changing demands for legitimization) and are pressured social to show adaptiveness.

Two factors make it likely that all of these three types of organizations will be affected by new demands:

First, social change leads to a considerable degree of value reorientation and altered demands among <u>broad but relatively</u> <u>evenly distributed proportions</u> of civil society, likely to include some managers and some workers just as well as parts

of all the rest of the population: Loomis and Cigler cite "changing societal divisions" 32, and Lipset notes that "the sources of support and larger socio-economic concerns [...] sometimes cut across the traditional pattern of political cleavages" 33.

Second, it can be assumed that the articulation of these changed demands will not single out as targets just those interest organizations that are the principal representatives of the issues around which these demands revolve. This, in turn, also means that those types of interest organizations that are confronted with new demands are those that already have predefined stances on the issues these demands relate to. These positions may be in conflict, or at least not in accord, with the new demands.

To be sure, the three types of organizations are in different starting positions relative to the degree to which adaptiveness to societal value changes would require them to depart from their original goals and practices. In other words: While business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations are all affected by the

<sup>32.</sup> Loomis/Cigler 1986, p. 16

<sup>33.</sup> Lipset 1986, p. 2

consequences of social change, more or less adaptation may be needed to cope with the new demands. At the same time it is not immediately clear whether or not all of the organizations will even try to get in compliance with the expectations generated by new values. It is conceivable that some organizations might try to pursue opposition tactics, e.g. by just pretending to live up to new expectations. These considerations make it interesting to study their responses empirically.

The practical importance of the adaptiveness of the three selected types of political interest organizations to social change is underlined by the fact that all of them not only had their distinct social roles before the strong wave of social change in the 1960s, but all of them - including business and labor as the internal opponents within the old economic cleavage - are still needed today.

For example, although labor unions are in contradiction with the new demands in so far as they are in favor of economic growth, they are still needed for their promotion of redistribution in a society that experiences significant income gaps<sup>3,4</sup> despite higher levels of overall affluence. Loomis and Cigler note that "with the rise in individual expectations, class divisions and conflicts did not disappear, but were drastically transformed"<sup>3,5</sup>. Similarly, value-changes are social trends, but they never reach all members of society<sup>3,6</sup>.

These considerations point to the fact of growing societal differentiation, defined as a change to greater complexity<sup>3</sup>, that is accompanied by the recent social changes: The values and concerns of the people have become more diverse and complex. Even in a society with growing overall levels of affluence, economic sustenance is still a real concern for many people - yet some of these people may at the same time favor environmental protection. The

<sup>34.</sup> In 1960, 17.0 percent of all money income was received by the lowest 40 percent of American families and 41.3 by the highest 20 percent. After a small change towards more equal income distribution (ratio 17.6: 40.9 percent in 1970), the income gap widened again (ratio 16.7: 41.6 percent in 1980, and 15.4: 43.7 percent in 1986); cf. Ladd 1989, p. 48.

<sup>35.</sup> Loomis / Cigler 1986, p. 15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>. This is why I hypothesize not all types of interest groups may be pressured to adapt to the same degree: While value changes are likely to have occurred among the constituencies of all types, the intensity may have reached different levels.

<sup>37.</sup> Hage/Aiken 1970, p. 18 (with reference to a definition by Parsons)

importance of the old cleavage has not declined to the same degree as that of the new one has increased, and it certainly has not vanished.

Just like the selection of the three types of interest organizations, the time span for studying organizational adaptiveness is also defined by the recent social change processes. My analysis will cover the period from 1960 to 1990. It has been shown above that extraordinarily high rates of social change (social and cultural modernization) have occurred in the United States during the 1960s. This is also stated by most scholars who analyze social and organizational change<sup>36</sup>. However, there is also a good theoretical case for studying organizational adaptiveness up until 1990.

First, there may have been a lag between the occurrence of broad value changes and the time at which the organizations were exposed to new demands stemming from them. This is because the existing constituents at the time may not necessarily have undergone the same value changes as rapidly as society in general, and it may have been only the gradual generational turnover in their memberships that may have

<sup>38.</sup> cf. Lipset 1986, pp. 2f, Wenner 1989, p. 2

increased the pressure for them to adapt to a noticeable extent.

This would partially correspond with Inglehart's view that value changes are taking place predominantly as "cohort effects". He states that

"[...] traditional values and norms remain widespread among older generations; but new orientations have penetrated younger groups to an increasing degree. As younger generations gradually replace older ones in the adult population, the prevailing worldview [...] is being transformed"<sup>3</sup> 9.

Second, interest organizations may not have introduced adaptive changes immediately, e.g. if they tried to avoid compromising any of there existing goals or practices. Some organizations may have realized only later that changes are necessary. Some other organizations may never have changed. Such postponed adaptive changes may be explained by the fact that the changes of the 1960s have proven to be permanent rather than temporary (cf. environmental awareness) - thus the pressure on non-adaptive organizations may presumably have been kept up ever since.

Finally, it may have taken some time again until after the implementation of adaptive changes those organizations have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>. Inglehart 1990. p. 9

experienced increasing success rates again. Therefore the empirical analysis of my second research question (cf. chapter 1) requires an analysis that covers an extended time frame.

This chapter has argued that high rates of social change have taken place in the United States in the 1960s and that studying the adaptiveness of business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations to the consequences of social change is worthwhile. Chapter 3 will discuss what may constitute adaptive qualities under the given historical circumstances and what organizational adaptations could theoretically be expected.

# 3. Adaptiveness and Different Organizational Starting Positions

While chapter 1 discussed the meaning and relevance of the interest organizations adaptiveness of in general theoretical terms, chapter 2 provided some practical historical relevance for studying the adaptiveness of three types of political interest organizations in the United States since 1960. Now the question becomes how interest organizations can maintain or regain crucial legitimacy in the face of new or increased popular demands for environmental protection.

Social change impacts on organizational legitimacy in that (as was argued in chapter 1) the definition of what the people consider as legitimate can change over time, and this definition most likely has changed along with the environmental value change discussed in the chapter 2. Civil society has become more complex in so far as the rise of the new expectations has, to some degree, spread across all social strata and has led to more amorphous new social divisions in addition to - but not complementary with - the

<sup>1.</sup> This is why, for example, business associations and labor unions are confronted, if to different degrees, with the same new environmental demands as environmental organizations.

old social class divisions that continue to exist.

This social differentiation, defined above as growing complexity, suggests that political interest organizations should also differentiate internally because they are all to some degree penetrated with the new demands (transferred by their constituents) and thus roughly reflect the changed value constellations in society. Berry writes that continued member support of an organization is "not ensured". "The initial issues that bring people into a group may lose importance and be replaced by others". Although this argument relates mainly to fairly specific policy issues, it appears reasonable to assume that it also holds true for more general, e.g. value-based motives of joining an organization.

Organizational differentiation is a concept derived from functionalist theory. Orum notes that a successful system "is one that can handle the demands placed upon it by its environment" more efficiently through differentiation, meaning "the creation of more specialized and focused structures"<sup>3</sup>. This usage of the term refers, as is common

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>. Berry 1989, p. 69

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>. Orum 1989, p. 99

for functionalists, only to structural differentiations that can improve an organization's "adaptive capacity" in that it enables it to react flexibly to future changes in the environment.

The is important point here that (structural) differentiation is related to the assimilation of developments generated outside the organization. Pfeffer and Salancik note that "structural differentiation [...] derives [...] as a function of the number and importance of different interests that must be coopted"4. I will use the term "differentiation" in a broader sense which expands it beyond the structure of organizations to include their goals.

# 3. 1. "Positive" Adaptation and Opposition Tactics

Three dimensions of organizational characteristics in which changes could generally occur are suggested in the literature. Those are goals, structures, and strategies. While Hage and Aiken choose a structural approach in their study of "Social Change in Complex Organizations", they

<sup>4.</sup> Pfeffer/Salancik 1978, p. 273

mention goals and strategies (i.e. "technologies" with regard to work organizations) as possible alternative approaches<sup>5</sup>. Similarly, Wenner explores the variations in organizational structure, "tactics" (i.e. strategies), and "policy preferences" (i.e. goals)<sup>6</sup>.

The analysis of organizational adaptiveness to the substantive new popular demands for a higher environmental commitment should examine organizational records and changes in two of the these three dimensions, goals and structure. These two dimensions - and especially the goal dimensionare related to legitimacy that is derived from the social acceptance of an organization's "substantive values" and policy goals.

In the following, I will use the term "adaptive qualities"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>. Hage/Aiken 1970, pp. 125-128

<sup>6.</sup> Wenner 1989, p. 5

<sup>7.</sup> cf. Hult/Walcott 1990, p. 70.

<sup>8.</sup> Both substantive and process values can secure or contribute to an organization's legitimacy (cf. chapter 1). However, the environmental value change (that this study focuses on) clearly produces substantive, i.e. goal-related, demands directed at interest organizations rather than procedural ones. Some authors argue social change also brought about new demands relating to process values (e.g. increased demands for participation, cf. Inglehart 1990), but those are difficult to measure and will not be examined in this study.

that are in line with external demands at a given time, whereas "adaptiveness" means being in accord with external demands in general (i.e. at different points in time). "Adaptation", on the other hand, describes the process of implementing changes in response to external conditions?.

As for the dimension of goals, the incorporation of environmental policy goals into the agenda of an interest organization would constitute an adaptive change. In most cases it would also mean a goal differentiation, since the task scope of an organization becomes more complex when environmental goals are added to the existing policy goals. Given the current social change trends, the display of environmental goals is surely an adaptive quality. Ladd notes that the pursuit of "objectives that fit with prevailing views of the populace" can count on public support<sup>10</sup>, thus giving an organization more legitimacy.

The incorporation of environmental goals would seem to be an almost trivial conclusion from the discussion above, yet it

<sup>9.</sup> Adaptive qualities are the product of adaptiveness under the historical circumstances at one time, regardless of whether or not adaptation was necessary to attain these adaptive qualities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>. Ladd 1989, p. 388

is by no means clear that all three types of organizations have actually adopted environmental goals. While it is logical that most business associations and labor unions needed to adopt environmental goals, they faced trade-offs with their initial goals. Such conflicts may have kept them from adding environmental objectives. Even conservation groups did not simply find themselves in a state of adaptiveness from the beginning. They also had to implement changes because their original goals tended to be too narrow to live up to the newly expanded environmental expectations.

Although the incorporation of environmental policy goals clearly means adaptation in the general sense that an adjustment to new external conditions takes place, this does not necessarily mean that this adaptation is "positive", i.e. in accord with the new expectations. It could actually be symbolic or even "negative", i.e. aimed at combating, slowing down or circumventing the social trend towards higher levels of environmental commitment. In this sense, the proclamation of environmental goals may really be an opposition strategy rather than positive adaptation. Thus, when examining an interest organization's policy goals, caution is necessary because it is possible that official goals, as stated in its official programs, may not reflect

the actual policy agenda and may never get implemented11.

The second dimension in which (changes towards) adaptive qualities responsive to environmental demands could be expected is the structure of organizations. The inclusion of an environmental unit or department in the formal structure of an interest organization would seem to constitute positive adaptation. In practice, this assumption applies only to business associations and labor unions because it can be taken for granted that environmental (conservation) organizations have been in a state of adaptiveness from the beginning with regard to this structural variable<sup>12</sup>.

It is highly probable that the addition of an environmental department or unit to the formal structure of an interest organization would mean a adaptation indeed in accord with the environmental value change because it not very likely that an organization goes as far as to change its structure just to pretend environmental commitment. However, the slim chance that the latter may have happened cannot be totally ruled out. To double-check whether or not in a given case

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>. Chapter 4 argues that the actual policy concerns of an interest organization should be examined to deal with this problem.

<sup>12.</sup> Even the latter may have established <u>additional</u> new environmental units with different titles and tasks.

the inclusion of an environmental unit is really an opposition strategy, sources capable of giving a qualitative evaluation of the respective interest organization's environmental commitment should be consulted.

The same caution in interpreting adaptiveness is indicated in the case of an interest organization's employment of (more) environmental specialists (e.g. environmental lawyers, biologists, etc.), another variable of structural differentiation.

An interest organization's sponsoring of environmental advertising - a variable of adaptiveness relative to the dimension of strategy - is even more likely symbolic adaptation or opposition strategy than positive adaptation, for it can be positive adaptation only as an "additional aspect" accompanying positive goal adaptiveness. In all other cases it would have to be viewed as an effort to win popular legitimacy by simply proclaiming or pretending environmental commitment. To assess whether or not environmental advertising is positive or symbolic adaptation

<sup>13.</sup> As was mentioned earlier, there are no publications that contain such evaluations in a systematic fashion. Therefore, the safest way to get information (that is also reliable) would be to ask members of what they know and think about their organization's environmental commitment.

in the case of a given interest organization, the contents of the advertisements would have to be analyzed and would then have to be examined in the light of the activities the organization actually engages in (and if it lives up to what is proclaimed or promoted in the advertisements).

In this section I have presented variables relative to the adaptation of interest organizations to new environmental expectations, and I have argued that these variables have to be analyzed qualitatively because they could mean positive as well as symbolic adaptation or negative adaptiveness. This distinction was made with those organizations in mind that might have deliberately tried to circumvent the negative effects of non-adaptiveness by implementing "quasi-adaptations".

In addition to these different kinds of adaptiveness, there is also the possibility of an interest organization's failure to be adaptive at all in cases where adaptive changes would seem necessary. One could argue that many of these organizations may be "passively" opposed to social change trends, but it is also possible that they lack not only the willingness but the ability or readiness to implement adaptive changes. For example, if the membership of an organization does not fully reflect new social trends

or is internally divided on certain issues (e.g. in cases where these conflict with their initial concerns) it is relatively likely that an organization may try to avoid those issues<sup>14</sup>.

These arguments point to the different starting positions interest organizations found themselves in when they were confronted with the new environmental expectations. I will discuss some of these differences in the next section to enhance the understanding of why different patterns of organizational responses to the new external situation should be expected.

# 3. 2. Different Organizational Starting Positions

The three types of interest organizations I am studying are not strictly comparable in a number of aspects. Their differences impact not only on the operationalization of some concepts for the empirical analysis of their adaptiveness (membership structure, need to establish environmental goals and departments), but they lead me to expect type-specific differences in the degree of their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>. cf. Berry 1989, p. 69

adaptiveness.

In addition to type-specific differences concerning the <u>need</u> and the intensity of <u>pressure</u> to be adaptive, there are also other, less type-specific differences that may lead an organization to fail to be adaptive, usually determined by <u>structural components</u>, e.g. an organization's lack of effective internal communication and information flow.

### 3. 2. 1. Type-Specific Differences and Propositions

Business associations and labor unions are representatives of the old cleavage. It can therefore be assumed that most organizations of both types have a need to implement adaptive changes towards increased environmental commitment to come into compliance with changed substantive public expectations. Both types face trade-offs with their original economic and developmental goals, as they have never been critical of economic growth<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>15.</sup> They could be categorized as "private interest groups" because they pursue material benefits for their own relatively narrow constituency, whereas environmental organizations, as "public interest groups", pursue a broad collective benefit by seeking to further the interests of an ascribed public good (cf. Kitschelt 1989, passim. Terms originally became prominent in the context of rational choice theory).

Despite an equal need for adaptation, both types are in different starting positions with respect to the pressure on them to be adaptive.

the hand. On one the constituencies of different organizations will be influenced by new social trends to some degree but need not necessarily reflect these trends equally. Since the constituents of business associations are likely to be more affluent, on the average, than those of labor unions, business associations would seem likely to be more pressured than labor unions to implement environmental goals and units. This is because large proportions of "postmaterialists" (those who place a higher emphasis on the quality of life) are recruited from the more affluent social strata16 from which business associations mainly draw their constituents. The reverse logic could be applied to the constituents of labor unions.

Yet I hypothesize that the empirical findings will show labor unions to be more positively adaptive to environmental demands than business associations. This is because there are a number of other factors that offset the influence of constituents.

<sup>16.</sup> cf. Inglehart 1990, p. 259

First, the vast majority of business associations have only corporate memberships, i.e. business firms from the respective sector that the association represents. This is why it can be expected that new demands for environmental adaptiveness are likely to be mediated to business associations only indirectly through a relatively small number of like-minded firms rather than directly by large numbers of people - the pressure to adapt may not be that strong. Unlike business firms, business associations are unlikely to get a lot of direct pressure from customers because they do not sell goods.

Second, business associations are stronger than unions in terms of their financial resources and sheer numbers<sup>17</sup>, as well as in terms of their political clout<sup>18</sup>. Those factors may have given them some independence to resist pressures to implement adaptive changes. In addition, the traditionally

<sup>17.</sup> In Schlozman and Tierney's fairly representative sample of organizations with Washington offices, trade and business associations accounted for 87.1 percent, labor unions for 8.3 percent, and environmental organizations for 4.6 percent of all organizations of these three types (computed from Schlozman/Tierney 1986, pp. 67, 80).

<sup>18.</sup> Lindblom argues that the government depends on business (cf. Lindblom 1977, pp. 122-123), and even Dahl finally admitted that there are differences of resources and power and influence between different interest organizations (cf. Dahl 1982, p. 207).

high public support for the private sector of the economy<sup>19</sup> has hardly declined during the rise of post-materialism, thus the high reputation of businesses and their interest representatives may have partially offset the pressures for environmental adaptiveness. Especially during Ronald Reagan's Presidency in the 1980s, the opinion climate was quite favorable for business associations.

Labor unions, on the other hand, were probably not only confronted with at least some demands <u>directly</u> from their constituents to place some emphasis on environmental quality (if not for higher levels of worker affluence, then for worsening objective living conditions due to environmental deterioration to which many workers have been exposed). Industrial unions also faced the challenge of eroding memberships<sup>20</sup> due to technological change, the shift to the service sector and its social consequences (atomization of the work force, individualism, less solidarity). In addition, public opinion towards some unions was probably low due to cases of internal corruption.

<sup>19.</sup> cf. Stone/Barke 1989, p. 171

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>. Unions claimed almost 25 percent of the work force during the 1950s, now that figure has fallen to well below 20 percent (cf. Lipsitz/Speak 1989, p. 288, see also chapter 5).

Given these adverse conditions and the fact that unions can do nothing about the broad economic shift away from the old industrial sectors, it is likely that labor unions may have actively sought to diversify their goals in order to remain attractive and legitimate and to partially counterbalance their overall decline. While diversification activities may have included non-adaptive measures<sup>21</sup> it is likely that adaptive changes towards more environmental commitment may have been viewed as welcome opportunities to regain legitimacy, despite painful departure from some of their original goals related to economic growth.

In summary, labor unions have presumably been more adaptive to increased environmental demands than business associations. Yet I hypothesize environmental organizations have been even more adaptive than both other types although there was no strong need for environmental groups to implement adaptive changes to adjust to the new social conditions.

Although there may not have been a need to implement very wide-ranging changes, it is likely that there may have been some pressure, even on these organizations, to be adaptive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>. cf. discussion of opposition strategies in chapter

Indeed the interest organizations promoting pro-nature goals were known as conservation groups until into the 1960s, not as environmental organizations. Some of them were founded in the late 19th and early 20th centuries<sup>22</sup>, and had relatively small and elitist constituencies of fishermen and hunters who usually promoted land and wildlife protection. In the 1960s these groups were suddenly confronted with a mass constituency that demanded the representation of more comprehensive ecological goals. The ecological approach views nature in its totality of complex and highly integrated systems of relationships, and it focuses on such "second generation issues" as air pollution, toxic wastes, acid rain, pesticides etc.<sup>23</sup>

It is reasonable to expect that conservation groups had little difficulty in expanding their goals so as to incorporate the new issues into their agenda. This is because these groups were relatively close to the new demands to begin with, and they did not face any trade-offs with original goals of economic growth. The prospect of a relatively effortless expansion of their operations in the context of favorable social changes that made them the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>. cf. Lipset 1986, p. 6f

<sup>23.</sup> cf. Mitchell 1985, p. 6; Caulfield 1989, pp. 48-52

natural representatives of environmental interests within the newly emerging cleavage may have provided an additional incentive for goal adaptiveness.

## 3. 2. 2. Other Structural Components

There are some other, structural determinants of an organization's readiness to implement adaptive changes that are not type-specific but should be mentioned briefly because they also may explain why an organization might fail to be adaptive even though adaptive changes would appear to be necessary.

With regard to goal adaptiveness, a lack of leadership, insufficient information flow, and the goals of groups within an interest group might hamper the ability of an organization to implement goal changes that are in line with the signs of the time. And in addition to possible tradeoffs with existing goals, the values of the "dominant coalition" of an organization contribute to the likelihood of whether or not it will implement necessary goal changes<sup>2 \*</sup>. Hage notes that "we would expect dominant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>. cf. Hage 1980, p. 187

coalitions with pro-change values to steer organizations towards higher rates of innovation"25.

A strongly hierarchical organization may have difficulties in identifying the need for adaptations quickly, since the staff might be reluctant to advocate changes for fear of reprisals<sup>26</sup>.

Similarly, the presence of traditions may hamper an organization's adaptiveness. When traditional practices become all too established, changes become difficult. This corresponds with Merton's observation about formalization. He notes that if

"adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself, there occurs the familiar process of <u>displacement of goals</u> whereby an instrumental value becomes a terminal one"<sup>27</sup>.

The age of an organization may also decrease its readiness to implement changes. Hall notes that "even when an organization is a change agent, if the change is accomplished, the organization tends then to resist further

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>. ibid., p. 184

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>. cf. Hage 1980, pp. 38, 167

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>. Merton 1940, p. 563

changes"28, thereby implying that organizations may refuse to differentiate long held goal agendas29.

3.2., I expect environmental To sum section up a group, to be more adaptive to new organizations, as environmental demands than labor unions, and labor unions to adaptive than business associations, although structural components could reduce the readiness to change of individual organizations of any type. Environmental organizations are in the most advantageous starting position because the new social expectations require them to implement less painful adaptive changes than the other two types of organizations.

Chapter 4 will build on the examination of adaptiveness and the expectations outlined in this chapter. It will specify indicators (and begin a discussion of statistical procedures) to measure adaptiveness to environmental demands. To prepare for the empirical analysis of the second and third research question posed in chapter 1, chapter 4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>. Hall 1987, p. 28. Hall even cites the "labor union movement" as an example to illustrate his point.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>. This is an implicit negation of the expectation of goal adaptiveness by the organizations in my analysis, since some organizations of all three types have been around for a long and have long held goals.

will also discuss variables relative to social integration success and policy goal success.

# 4. Measuring Adaptiveness of Political Interest Organizations

## 4. 1. Data Sources, Selection Criteria for Sample

Scholars who want to study political interest organizations empirically are confronted with some difficulties. There are few published source books that provide data on interest organizations.

In the case of the very frequently cited publication Encyclopedia of Associations, figures are confined to a relatively small number of fact indicators, i.e. "hard" data obtained from official records, that may be used as sufficiently valid indicators for only some hypothesized organizational trends. The advantage of the Encyclopedia is that is has been issued regularly for more than thirty years and thus provides comparable data on interest organizations for the entire time span since 1960.

A second well respected source, the <u>Public Interest</u>

<u>Profiles</u>, published by the Foundation for Public Affairs,
provides substantially more information, including data for
some important qualitative indicators. I will include data
from the <u>Encyclopedia</u> in the data set for my analysis in so

far as they are available, although they do not cover the entire range of years and organizations for the longitudinal and cross-type comparative research design. The <u>Public Interest Profiles</u> were first published only in 1978 (and biannually thereafter), thereby only allowing for the analysis of changes between 1978 and 1990, and this publication does not cover labor unions, nor a number of important trade associations, since it focuses only on public interest groups.

In order to make up for these problems and to obtain some additional data that are not included in either of the two publications, I have developed a ten-item questionnaire and sent it to the organizations in my sample. The text of the questionnaire is added as Appendix A. Even this questionnaire had to ask for official ("objective") data. No opinion data are available for the empirical analysis, since thus far no membership interviews or surveys of interest organizations could be conducted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>. Two of the items (questions 5 and 6) ask for information on changes in organizational decision making. This information will be used in a future study.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>. In the future, it may be possible to conduct content analyses of statutes and charters, as recommended by Katz and Mair (1990, pp. 17f), to get a contextual understanding of recorded information.

In addition to these three main sources, the <u>Congressional</u>
<u>Information Service (CIS) Index</u> will be consulted for data
to measure policy effectiveness of interest organizations.

The variables represented in the questionnaire will be discussed in the next sections. At this point it should be remarked that, for practical reasons, the questionnaire could not be pretested. To partially make up for this deficit, it was given to a small number of academic experts on interest groups who helped to identify ambiguous questions that were then changed or eliminated in the final version of the questionnaire.

It should also be noted that some restraint was necessary with regard to the amount of information requested. A number of questions ask for information for not more than four data points (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990) per variable and organization. This limitation was inevitable because asking too many questions or for too many details per question probably would have sharply decreased the prospect of a good response rate.

My sample of 56 national interest organizations for the empirical study is relatively evenly distributed across the three types of organizations. It includes 20 business

associations, 17 labor unions, and 19 environmental organizations. The organizations are listed in Appendix B.

While the type-related classification of the interest organizations in my sample has been a straightforward matter, the selection criteria for being added to the sample in the first place are more diverse and a little less stringent. My interest was in both including the most important national organizations of each type and selecting a high percentage of organizations that had been in existence before 1960 so that adaptive changes could be analyzed from the beginning of increased social change rates.

The limitation to the national level and the focus on importance is forced by practical constraints. It is due to the fact that I want to present a representative picture despite technically not being able to handle a very large sample size. The question therefore becomes how an organization's "importance" could be evaluated.

I have taken the repeated mentioning and high evaluation of

<sup>3.</sup> In most cases, identification by name was unproblematic. In cases of doubt the main purpose of an organization was checked in the <u>Encyclopedia of</u> Associations.

importance by the authors of Public Interest Profiles as the for the inclusion of main indicator ofimportance environmental organizations and the non-profit business associations in my sample4. The amount of revenues, as cited by Wenner<sup>5</sup>, is an indicator of importance that I used to determine which business associations without a tax-exempt status were added to my sample. Finally, I have considered membership figures, as cited in the Labor Almanac6, to be the most crucial indicator of the importance of labor unions. Therefore I used it to determine a union's inclusion in the sample. There are both industrial and service sector unions in the sample.

Since we can expect type-specific differences in what constitutes importance for each type, it would have been unreasonable to apply the same selection criterium, i.e. one fixed indicator of importance, across all three types of

<sup>\*.</sup> The selection criteria in this publication, in turn, included "the extent of a group's influence on national policies", the "quantity of news coverage over several years", and the "representative nature" of an organization in its field of interest (cf. Foundation for Public Affairs 1984, Foreword).

<sup>5.</sup> cf. Wenner 1989, Appendix

<sup>6.</sup> cf. Paradis/Paradis 1983, passim

organizations7.

As mentioned above, age should be the other main selection criterium. There were trade-offs between age and importance in a number of instances of environmental organizations, simply because there were not enough important old organizations so that I had to fill up my sample with organizations launched during the 1960s and 1970s. But in a majority of cases across all three types, the age condition is met in that organizations were founded before 1960.

After this general introduction to data sources and selection criteria for my sample, I can now turn to a discussion of variables and indicators.

## 4. 2. Variables and Indicators

#### 4. 2. 1. Adaptiveness

The first research question, "Do political interest organizations show adaptive qualities as a response to

<sup>7.</sup> In addition, the information necessary for such cross-comparison would possibly not have been completely available or comparable across types.

social change?", can be answered empirically only by measuring adaptive qualities that are theorized to be responses to social change: It was argued above that no model can be established to test a causal linkage because other factors that may have led an organization to implement changes cannot be controlled for. Variables that reflect adaptive qualities of organizations under the current social change trends were mentioned in broad terms but need to be specified.

As for the inclusion of environmental issues in the agenda of an organization, it is possible to look at goals and some formal structural differentiations. One way of identifying the incorporation of environmental goals is to examine changes of an organization's statement of purpose over time. To analyze such changes, both the Encyclopedia of Associations and the Public Interest Profiles can be consulted. In addition, my questionnaire asks business associations and labor unions whether or not they have formally included environmental goals any environmental protection in general, promotion environmentally sound technologies, recycling, environmental research, etc.) in their statement of purpose, bylaws, or charter, and when this was done.

The information from these three sources together should yield sufficient information to analyze formal goal differentiations so that an indicator can be created from the combined information provided by these sources. The indicator will be subjective in so far that for the Encyclopedia and the Profiles I will have to decide what goals I will consider environmental ones, since the information these sources provide come in no fixed format.

I will also have to apply different criteria for environmental organizations than for business associations and labor unions because it was argued that the old conservation groups pursued some environmental goals from the beginning. Therefore, for them, only the incorporation of "second generation" ecological goals will be considered adaptive goal changes.

As for the coding, an organization with earlier environmental goal adaptations will be attributed a higher score than one with later adaptations, or one that never adopted any environmental goals at all<sup>8</sup>. The number of

<sup>8.</sup> A four point scale may be developed, based on the decade in which environmental goals were first adopted, with a 3 denoting adaptations in the 1960s or earlier, 2 in the 1970s, 1 in the 1980s, and 0 for no environmental goal adaptations. The possible dropping of old, antienvironmental goals from an organization's official

environmental goals adopted in each decade cannot be accounted for in this measure of environmental goal adaptation since no comparable data are available for the entire time span since 1960°.

It may be objected that measuring formal goals is not the best way to detect actual goal changes of an organization, e.g. because official statements of purpose are not amended very quickly, or because they are sometimes kept deliberately vague or overly positive and thereby conceal the "real" goals of an organization that are partially influenced by informal goals.

This is why the empirical analysis will consider another indicator for environmental goal adaptation, namely one that is based on the current concerns of an organization. It should help to determine whether or not an organization has really become (more) concerned with environmental issues over time. The <u>Profiles</u> provide lists of "current concerns" for the organizations and years it covers. Since this amount

statement of purpose cannot be accounted for in the analysis.

<sup>9.</sup> This problem may possibly be overcome in my future research. If funds will be available and channels of access to interest organizations can be opened, I might obtain qualitative information that will, among other things, allow for a (decade-wise) evaluation of the "strength" of environmental goal adaptations.

of information is not sufficient for my purposes, I have included a question in the questionnaire that asks organizations to identify the three policy issues that were most important to them in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990.

The responses will reveal if the interest organizations named any environmental (or for conservation groups: ecological) concerns among the three most important ones for each of these four years, and if the proportion of environmental concerns among the top three policy issues has increased over time. Since the questionnaire asks for only four points in time and leaves out the of years in between, I will have to be sensitive to the possibility that the policy agendas of the organizations may have reflected policy issues that dominated the political agenda in Washington only in these four particular years. This will include looking to see if issues disappear from the list of concerns at later dates.

Current concerns reflect policy goals that are more specific and short-lived than the general goals stated in the official statement of purpose. It is likely that I may find more inconsistent trends regarding the number of environmental concerns, including possible decreases over time. It is questionable if coding this variable in a

similar way as variable one is theoretically justifiable, especially since the number of issues to be listed in the questionnaire had to be limited to only three 10.

Even though it is not clear at this time whether or not this indicator can be used for statistical procedures, it can at least be utilized descriptively for an evaluation of the trends identified by the analysis of variable one, i.e. to check if the official adoption of environmental policy goals is reflected in actual policy concerns, and thus positive adaptation, or if such formal adaptations appear to be only symbolic.

Chapter 3 suggested that the establishment environmental unit ordepartment within a business association or labor union should be examined as structural variable to measure responsiveness to new environmental demands. The questionnaire covers this

<sup>10.</sup> It is, however, also possible that the responses to this item of the questionnaire will yield results that clearly show consistent trends and thus suggest sufficient validity of the indicator for using it in the statistical analysis. In that case, the combined number of times an interest organization mentions environmental concerns in 1960 and 1970 could be compared with that figure for 1980 and 1990 combined. A 3 could be assigned to organizations with high scores in both of these combined values, a 2 to those with an increasing trend, a 1 to those that score zero for both values, and a 0 to those with a decreasing trend.

variable. This variable can be treated as dichotomous since it is unlikely that an interest organization would establish more than one environmental unit. It is therefore easy to code this variable, based only on the time the structural change occurred. A higher score will be given to organizations that established an environmental unit earlier, a lower to those that did so later, and the lowest to those that did not establish an environmental unit at all<sup>11</sup>.

While this indicator measures adaptiveness in general (as opposed to non-adaptiveness), chapter 3 suggested that additional qualitative information, such as comments from organizational members or other insiders, is necessary to assess whether the incorporation of an environmental unit represents a positive adaptation, if it aims at pretending environmental commitment, or if it is really a move to combat calls for more environmental commitments<sup>12</sup>.

The same comment goes for two more structural variables,

<sup>11.</sup> To allow for the theoretical possibility of the establishment of more than one environmental unit, I may multiply the number of such units with the score that is based on the time of their establishment (as just explained).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>. I may be able to conduct case study membership surveys or interviews in the future.

suggested by Hage, that might be used as surrogate measures of goal differentiation of an organization - the increase in the the number of occupational specialties and the frequency of leadership changes. Hage theorizes that an increasing number of occupational specialties reflects a growth in task scope<sup>13</sup>, and that new leaders, especially when brought in from outside, are likely to bring in new ideas and possibly new goal orientations<sup>14</sup>.

However, these variables do not necessarily measure changes towards an increased environmental commitment. Unless there is solid descriptive evidence for this causation, the mere percentage changes cannot be interpreted as expression of an organization's desire to become more environmentally oriented, since, in the case of these two variables, there may have been many other motives for replacing leaders or employing new specialists. The latter, in fact, may even be a reflection of increased budgets, and in that way an indirect measure of success.

While these indicators should thus not be used for statistical procedures, they should nevertheless be recorded

<sup>13.</sup> Hage 1980, passim, e.g. p. 388

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>. ibid., pp. 196, 277

and be utilized descriptively as circumstantial evidence for the qualitative interpretation of the findings concerning the other variables where possible. The number of leadership changes from 1960 through 1990 will be recorded as one value for each organization, indicated by the names of the presidents or directors as reported in the <u>Profiles</u> and in the <u>Encyclopedia</u>. If not an indicator for environmental reorientation, this value will at least provide a rough indicator for the general degree of renewal and flexibility of an organization<sup>15</sup>, both preconditions for adaptiveness.

The number of occupational specialties will not be measured directly in my project. The term would have to be defined first because the organizations' answers to a questionnaire item asking for that number would have to be based on identical criteria to make the responses comparable. I may include this question in a future survey. For now, all I can analyze are the percentage changes in staff size of interest organizations per decade, despite the fact that the validity of this indicator must be viewed as limited. Even though, in the case of political interest organizations, the staff size is a reasonably valid measure for the <u>number</u> of specialists

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>. This interpretation would not be valid for organizations with mandatory term limitations for the leaders.

(since the staff size of interest organizations is usually small and almost all of them tend to be specialists in some profession16), it does not necessarily measure goal differentiation, for more staff may be doing the same things as before, only at a larger scale. On the other hand, a significant increase in staff will lead one to expect that at least some broadening of an organization's task scope may have occurred. Figures for staff size are reported in the Profiles and the Encyclopedia, but not for all organizations in my sample. Therefore the question for staff size in the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 is also included in the questionnaire.

Chapter 3 mentioned the sponsoring of advertisements by an interest organization to stress its or its constituents' contributions to environmental quality as a likely indicator of organizational attempts to avoid both substantive adaptation and the negative consequences of non-adaptation. The inclusion of this indicator was motivated by the fact that several interest organizations of which one would not

Washington lobbying operations of an average interest organization is five or fewer (Berry 1989, p. 71). For a solid interpretation of staff size trends, additional qualitative information is necessary on how many of the staff are environmental specialists, and whether they tend to advocate or oppose environmental goals. This information may be obtained in future surveys and interviews.

immediately expect high rates of adaptive qualities with regard to environmental goals have run advertising campaigns in magazines (ranging from Scientific American to Rolling Stone) in which they emphasize their environmental commitment, e.g. the Chemical Manufacturers Association. This example points to the need for a careful interpretation interest organization's environmental advertising, ideally based on qualitative examination а advertisements as mentioned in chapter 3.

However, the questionnaire only includes a question on whether or not the organizations have sponsored any advertising stressing their contribution to environmental quality in the past thirty years and when.

After analysis of the indicators of adaptiveness introduced above is completed for the interest organizations of my sample, the entire sample could be divided into two subsamples of those organizations that show a high degree of adaptive qualities and those with little or no adaptive qualities. Both of these sub-samples could then be

<sup>17.</sup> An "index of environmental adaptiveness" I will propose in section 4.3. could be utilized to divide the sample up in two groups. The division of the sample into a group of more adaptive and one of less or non-adaptive interest organizations is indicated because for adaptive organizations environmental advertisements would seem to be

examined in terms of how many environmental advertisement campaigns the organizations within each group have sponsored since 1960. The total sums could be compared to test if the organizations with less substantial adaptive qualities have run more advertising than those organizations with more positive adaptations on the other indicators. If this should be the case, it would suggest that organizations that were not positively adaptive in terms of incorporating environmental policy goals had attempted to compensate for this deficit by pretending and proclaiming environmental commitment through above-average advertising efforts.

A second example of how an interest organization might try to circumvent adaptation could be a non-adaptive differentiation of its task scope, namely the provision of new services and selective incentives to its members, thereby trying to keep up its membership without substantive goal adaptation. This possibility, theoretically derived from rational choice theory, is mentioned by Sousa's and by Streeck's.

a legitimate undertaking, whereas this is not the case for organizations that are really non-adaptive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>. cf. Sousa 1989, p. 7

<sup>19.</sup> cf. Streeck 1987, p. 478

The questionnaire lists a number of selective incentives, such as free subscriptions to publications, consulting services, special merchandise offers, travel programs, group purchases (insurance) etc., and it asks the organizations to check which of these they offer to their members and to indicate the year when these services were introduced<sup>20</sup>.

The responses could be analyzed in the same way as described above for environmental advertising. The two sub-samples of the more and the less positively adaptive interest organizations could be examined in terms of how many new selective incentives the respective organizations of both groups introduced since 1960, thereby testing if the less adaptive organizations have indeed attempted to compensate for this deficit by introducing more new selective incentives than the more adaptive ones.

### 4. 2. 2. Social Integration Success

To answer research question two, "Do organizations with more adaptive qualities experience higher social integration success rates than those with less adaptive qualities?",

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>. In addition, the change of the number of newsletters and publications over time, as listed in the <u>Encyclopedia</u> and the <u>Profiles</u>, could be examined.

indicators for social integration success must be established that can then be correlated with indicators of adaptiveness.

Chapter 1 presented an argument that social integration and the social legitimization of an organization are closely interrelated concepts. Organizational legitimacy is largely determined by the degree to which its goals conform with social expectations at a given time. If this conformity is high, an organization should experience stronger support from the public than if it is not because the social base of adherents is likely to be larger than for organizations whose goals are rejected by many people.

Adaptive organizations are therefore in a better position to integrate more members of society into themselves (and thereby, indirectly, into the larger system): If the support base broadens, it is likely that the number of their constituents will increase accordingly. As their memberships grow, the organizations accomplish higher rates of social integration. Likewise, if an organization fails to be adaptive, social integration success rates are likely to go down because at least some of the existing members will possibly terminate their membership and thereby partially withdraw legitimacy from the organization.

Not only membership trends but also budget trends of an interest organization should be used as a variable to measure social integration success rates21. On the one hand, organizational budgets can, in most cases, be expected to be roughly a function of membership size because more members bring an organization higher revenues from membership fees. In this sense, no extra "budget" variable would be needed if "membership" is already utilized as a variable to measure social integration success. But on the other hand, growing social support for an interest organization often expresses itself not only in higher membership figures but also in both a higher number of non-member donors (cf. definition of "constituents" in chapter 1.4.) and larger contributions members. This component of "indirect" social from integration cannot be measured by the membership variable but by budgets in that higher levels of donations will be reflected in higher budget figures.

<sup>21.</sup> The strategy of conceptualizing social integration success of an interest organization as higher memberships and budgets could be criticized by pointing to the fact that these two variables could also be viewed as indicators of an organization's lack of social integration in the first place (i.e. to indicate whether or not adaptation is necessary). Some might see the argument become circular. However, I do not base my assessment of an organization's need for adaptive changes on these variables. In fact, I do not test this need empirically at all. Instead, I have made this assumption only theoretically, based on how legitimacy can be maintained under new external conditions, and I have argued above that there has been a necessity for all interest organizations to implement some adaptive changes.

Membership data are reported consistently in the <u>Profiles</u> and the <u>Encyclopedia</u>, therefore they did not have to be included in the questionnaire. Although membership figures represent true interval data, annual percentage changes should be recorded in the data set. They are also interval, but they do not involve the problem of widely differing variances for interest organizations of different types that is likely to be encountered with the absolute figures because the corporate memberships of business associations are significantly smaller than the individual membership figures of labor unions and environmental organizations.

There are other differences concerning membership data that I will have to be sensitive to in the interpretation of my findings. Double memberships are possible in the case of environmental organizations. Business firms can also be members of their sectoral business association and of several of the peak business associations (e.g. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, Business Council) simultaneously. Members of labor unions do not have this possibility. Therefore, increases in support for environmental organizations and business associations could theoretically result in inflated increases of membership figures.

Union membership is confined to the specific sectoral union22. The size of their adherents base is predefined by the prosperity of their respective sector or branch of the economy. That, in turn, may change along with the shift from the industrial to the service sector. It represents a factor that can hardly be controlled for in the statistical analysis23 but has to be considered in the interpretation of findings. It may mean decreasing rates of integration success for unions not necessarily some accounted for by non-adaptiveness to new values but caused by economic change. The corporate membership of business associations could also be influenced by economic changes, increasing economic concentration entails smaller absolute numbers at least of large corporations, meaning that the (potential or real) membership base of business associations may be shrinking - unless this effect is compensated or overcompensated for by a growing number of small and medium size businesses24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>. cf. Berry 1989, p. 70

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>. This effect may be controlled for by "weighting" the membership and budget figures of labor unions in such a way that they get adjusted for the percentage change effects that one would arrive at when the different <u>overall</u> <u>employment trends</u> in the economic sectors they represent are considered and held constant across these sectors.

<sup>24.</sup> I will be able to determine trends in the universe of businesses relatively precisely by analyzing the respective statistics, such as, e.g., included in the annual

Another example of how the possibility of membership increases can be constrained by third factors is that, for purposes of exclusiveness and prestige, membership in the Business Roundtable is restricted to only roughly 200 of the largest industrial, financial, and commercial institutions in the nation<sup>25</sup> and therefore cannot increase<sup>26</sup>.

Budget figures are included in the Encyclopedia, but not consistently for all interest organizations of my sample. That is why a question about the total income for each of the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 was included in the questionnaire. Because of different variances per type for the absolute figures, annual percentage changes of organizational budgets should be recorded in the data set. Before that, the raw figures have to be adjusted for inflation rates and expressed in a constant dollar unit of measure so that the interpretation of changes over time will not be distorted.

To assess social integration success, it is best to measure only those portions of an organization's budget that are

Statistical Abstract of the United States.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>. cf. Schlozman/Tierney 1986, p. 40

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>. Organizations with such restrictions should be exempted from statistical analyses.

attributable to fees and contributions from members and donors, i.e. that come from the social base of an organization. If an organization's budget increases due to higher amounts of government or foundation grants it would mean that budget figures measured higher system integration of organizations rather than social integration success.

Because of a lack of complete information on funding sources to compute the budget proportions accounted for by fees and contributions for all the organizations in my sample and across time, the <u>Public Interest Profiles</u> will be consulted for information on the funding sources for the organizations it covers from 1978 to 1990. Since the organizations covered by this publication include basically all the tax-exempt charitable ones (that are the most likely to get outside grant money<sup>27</sup>) it will be considered an exhaustive basis to single out the organizations with large and growing percentage shares of their budgets accounted for by grant money. Only the remaining ones should then be analyzed for the influence of adaptiveness on the budget-based part of social integration success measurement in the statistical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>. Environmental organizations are the ones most likely to receive such grants, accounting for 28 percent of their combined budgets in Wenner's 1989 study. Business associations received no grants from government or other sources (cf. Wenner 1989, p. 11).

analysis.

One other factor should be taken into consideration for the evaluation of budget trends. Not all organizations are in the same starting position concerning their likelihood of receiving donations. Most environmental organizations are tax-exempt either under Section 501 (c) 3 or 501 (c) 4 of the Internal Revenue Code, meaning that they are charitable (non-profit) organizations and donations are either fully or largely tax-deductible. Contributions to some of the peak business associations may also be tax-deductible - under Section 501 (c) 6 of the Internal Revenue Code - "if ordinary and necessary in the conduct of the taxpayer's business". Most of the sectoral business associations and all labor unions, on the other hand, are not charitable, thus donations are not tax-deductible.

Since it is known that donations are more likely to be made if they are tax-deductible than if they are not, increases in support for environmental organizations could result in higher increase rates of donations (and budgets) for them than increase rates of donations to labor unions should they experience similar levels of higher public support. The interpretation of findings must be sensitive to these

differences if necessary28.

The discussion shows that, overall, membership data are the more direct measures for social integration success than budget data. Both indicators should be utilized as dependent variables for the analysis of research question two only if a preceding comparison of these two variables should yield a reasonably high correlation. Otherwise, only membership trends should be used as dependent variable<sup>29</sup>.

## 4. 2. 3. Policy Goal Success

In an extended perspective that was briefly mentioned in chapter 1, one should ask if and how the policy goal success of an organization is related to its performance in terms of adapting to the new environmental expectations of civil society.

Adaptive changes likely manifest themselves as higher subsequent social integration success (to be shown in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>. To facilitate a valid interpretation, tax-deductible contributions may be discounted by the tax rate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>. Budget data are, non the less, valuable indicators of support from the society and organizational viability.

statistical analysis), meaning more members and increased resources for an interest organization. This leads to the expectation that the chances of that organization to achieve its policy goals are improved. Only resources make it possible to work towards goal achievement in the first place<sup>30</sup>, and the more resources, the greater the chance to articulate policy goals effectively.

There is one surrogate indicator that can reasonably be consulted to measure the effectiveness of an interest organization. It is the total number of times per year an organization is invited to testify before interest Congressional Committee and Sub-Committee hearings 1, as listed in the Congressional Information Service (CIS) Index that was first published in 1970. Only organizations of a high reputation that are known to be able to mobilize people or that can provide expert knowledge get invited to testify at Congressional hearings.

There is no better published indicator for organizational

<sup>30.</sup> cf. Mc Carthy/Zald 1977, pp. 1220f.

<sup>31.</sup> Since the availability of more resources (as a consequence of more legitimacy due to environmental adaptation) can be expected to improve an interest organization's overall policy success, the total number of hearings that an organization get invited to - i.e. not only those on environmental issues - should be analyzed.

policy effectiveness available, although this one does not measure policy goal success directly<sup>3</sup> . Nevertheless, chances are that an organization's effectiveness and policy goal success is roughly a function of its reputation and of its level of direct access to the policy making process. This is what my surrogate indicator measures.

The number of testimonies at Congressional hearings per year can be entered directly into the data set for each interest organization in my sample. For those years that the information comes only in the form of cumulative four- or five-year indices, annual means will have to be computed. It is unfortunate that the data begin only in 1970, but there is no comparable source of data available for the 1960s.

#### 4. 3. Preview on the Empirical Analysis

Although not fully developed at this time, a few brief additional remarks should be made on how the different research questions and propositions arrived at in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>. A direct indicator would be the frequency by which policy initiatives supported by an interest organization actually get signed into law. Obtaining data for such indicator requires very extensive research and was not feasible for this study.

previous chapters might be analyzed.

A) To determine if the organizations in my sample have shown adaptive qualities as a response to social change (research question one), the data on the indicators discussed in section 4.2.1 will be evaluated descriptively. As was mentioned above, no statistical procedures will be used because the display of adaptive qualities cannot be linked causally to social change indicators. The indicators of adaptiveness to environmental demands that have reasonable construct validity (excluding such indicators as percentage changes of staff size or the turnover rates in leadership functions) may then be combined into an "index of environmental adaptiveness"33 so that the organizations in my sample can be classified as more or less adaptive ones. Based on such classification, the analysis of environmental advertising and selective incentives, as outlined in section 4.2.1., becomes possible.

of ormal adoption of environmental goals, the actual inclusion of environmental issues in current policy agendas, and the establishment of environmental units. The coding schemes suggested in section 4.2.1. could possibly be adopted and merged because they relate to substantively similar variables and because they have nearly equal ranges of initial values, so that the component variables of the index would be weighted equally (which is desirable because of their nearly equal importance) without extensive recoding.

- B) To test the proposition that there have been typespecific differences with regard to the adoption of an environmental commitment in so far as labor unions have proven to be more adaptive than business associations and environmental organizations have been still more adaptive than labor unions, the sample could be divided up by the three types, and the mean value on the "environmental goal adaptation" index, suggested under A), of the as organizations within each type could be computed. These values could then be compared across the three types of interest organizations.
- C) To determine if interest organizations with more adaptive qualities have experienced higher social integration success rates than those with less adaptive qualities (research question two), the environmental goal adaptiveness index could be correlated with both the average annual increase rates of members and of budgets, as indicators of social integration success. If these procedures yield sufficiently strong positive relationships<sup>3 4</sup>, evidence is provided that

<sup>3\*.</sup> I do not deal with a probability sample. I could argue that no attention needs to be paid to the statistical significance of the findings (T-value significance level) because my sample contains practically all of the most important national interest organizations of each type-provided that the data base for the different indicators that make up the indices is nearly complete due to a high response rate to my questionnaire.

the answer to research question two may be "yes". The problem with the method suggested here is that it "wastes" a lot of information that is contained in the dependent variable(s) for which nearly uninterrupted yearly values are available. But unfortunately, the independent variables that the index is based on allow for hardly any differentiated evaluations (only some component indicators could be analyzed by decade).

D) Finally, to determine if organizations that have implemented more adaptive changes have experienced higher policy success rates than those with less adaptive changes (research question three), the average annual number of testimonies before Congressional Committees, as the policy indicator, could be correlated with the goal success environmental goal adaptiveness index, representing analogy to the procedure suggested under C). A positive correlation would support the commonly held position that goal success is a function of an interest organization's resources (which are theoretically dependent on its legitimacy).

This chapter has discussed data sources and specified variables that can measure the adaptiveness of political interest organizations to social change. Table 4 presents a

#### Table 4:

# Summary Listing of Variables for Measuring Organizational Adaptiveness to Environmental Expectations and for Measuring Organizational Success Rates (as discussed in this chapter)

### a) Positive, Symbolic, and Negative Adaptiveness

- Inclusion of environmental goals in official programs, bylaws, or charters
- Actual adoption of environmental issues in agenda of current policy concerns
- establishment of an environmental unit or department (business associations and labor unions only)
- increase of employment of environmental specialists
- leadership turnover rates
- trends of sponsoring environmental advertising
- offering of new selective incentives

#### b) Social Integration Success

- membership increase rates
- budget increase rates

#### c) Policy Goal Success

 frequency of invitations to testify before Congressional hearings summary listing of the variables that will be analyzed. This chapter has also, in a first step, outlined some ideas of how the research questions developed in chapter 1 and the proposition from chapter 3 could be tested empirically. While the discussion has focused on the adaptiveness of single organizations, the next chapter will take on a broader view and present some thoughts on how adaptive the interest organization system has been as a whole, i.e. when the adaptiveness of the three types of interest organizations I am studying is analyzed in a combined perspective.

#### 5. Adaptiveness of the Interest Organization System

In an extended perspective, I will try to assess the adaptiveness of political interest organizations to social change not only in terms of adaptations and changes within each single organization but also in terms of the "interest group system" as a whole. It is conceivable that as many organizations of one particular type prove to be little adaptive and declining in their role of integrating members of society into themselves and into the system, organizations of another type might simultaneously flourish and greatly expand their memberships.

Considering the integrative capacity of the interest organization system as a whole, the latter organizations could be viewed as compensating the relative losses of the former. Or in other words: Even if not every single organization proves to be adaptive to social change, the overall interest group system could still be adaptive.

It could even expand and differentiate as a whole, e.g. if the formation of new organizations and split-offs from existing ones overcompensate for the disappearance (e.g. by mergers, or even deaths) of non-adaptive and defensive old ones. Cigler and Loomis note that such "an expansion of the interest group universe" would be a "natural consequence of growing societal complexity". Warner et al. also predict an overall trend towards a greater differentiation of the system of organizations<sup>2</sup>.

The theoretical foundation for this broader perspective that, - in a more or less Darwinian tradition - focuses on the substitution of organizations within the system of all organizations, is provided by the "population ecology approach". Hall sums up the essence of this theoretical perspective:

"[T]he population-ecology model does not deal with single organizational units but is concerned with populations of organizations. Organizations that have the appropriate fit with the environment are selected over those that do not fit or fit less appropriately"<sup>3</sup>.

The population ecology approach tends to deny the possibility of internal organizational changes and adaptations. It holds that new concerns give rise to new organizations that fit better in the changed environment

<sup>1.</sup> Loomis/Cigler 1986, p.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>. cf. Warner et al. 1967, p. 20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>. Hall 1987, p. 300, with reference to Aldrich, Howard E. and Pfeffer, Jeffrey: "Environments of Organizations" (in: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 2)

rather than bringing change to existing organizations. It downplays the role of an organization to determine or at least influence its own fate.

The population ecology approach, none the less, provides an enriching perspective for this study (and despite the fact that only three types of organizations are analyzed in this study) because it not only sets itself apart from the single-organization focus in the preceding chapters but also might allow for a quantitative analysis of a corresponding substantive argument which, in turn, is related to the theory of a social cleavage change. The argument labor unions have lost much of their role of counterbalance associations6 of business and that to the power environmental organizations have gradually assumed that role'.

<sup>\*.</sup> This corresponds with the consideration above that existing organizations may lack the willingness, readiness, and ability to adopt goal-related changes. For example, some organizations may perceive it to be more advantageous for their effectiveness to keep their focus on their initial issues (rather than to differentiate their task scope) because they may feel it is easier to mobilize support for a small range of issues (or to provide lawmakers with expertise on a small number of specific issues) than it would be if they adopted a broader policy agenda.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>. cf. Hall 1987, p. 302

<sup>6.</sup> cf. Lipsitz/Speak 1989, p. 307

<sup>7.</sup> cf. Vogel 1989, passim

The population ecology approach corresponds with assumptions of the resource mobilization approach. The latter holds that the availability of resources will lead new increases in organizations to develop and compete for them8. It can be assumed that such favorable conditions were present for groups and actors pursuing environmental objectives, because the support base for these concerns broadened along with the environmental value change. Thus the proposition could be derived that find that a proliferation of we may environmental organizations has taken place.

It is be relatively difficult to analyze the assumptions of the population ecology approach empirically because that requires an examination of the entire populations of interest organizations of different types. Truman noted in 1961, i.e. even before the strong wave of social change and, presumably, an increased proliferation and differentiation of the interest group system had begun, that "the exact count of the number of associations in the United States that have some occasion to utilize the governmental process is a virtual impossibility".

s. cf. Mc Carthy/Zald 1977, p. 1225

<sup>9.</sup> Truman 1971 (2nd ed.), p. 57

The empirical study will nevertheless attempt to accomplish just that task by counting the entries of business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations in the Encyclopedia of Associations over time. This can be considered a relatively valid indicator of interest group system proliferation because the Encyclopedia provides a nearly complete overview of all associations on the national, state, and local level. The annual change rates of the total number of interest organizations of each of the three types I am studying can be computed and then be compared across these three types<sup>10</sup>. In addition, the total combined membership figure trends for each organizational type could be computed from the information provided by the Encyclopedia and could then also be compared.

As a preview of the empirical analysis, a look should be taken at the study of interest organizations conducted by Schlozman and Tierney in 1986. Based on an assessment of the information provided by the <u>Index to Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1960</u> and the <u>Washington Representatives 1981</u> listings, these authors find that of all trade and business

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>. The counting process may become fairly tedious because of the high number of organizations and because the format of the Encyclopedia does not allow for a simple count of pages or lines of citation to determine the growth trend of each type of interest organization.

associations that were active in 1960, 61 percent were still active in politics in 1981 while 10 percent were inactive or out of business<sup>11</sup>. The corresponding figures for labor unions were 77:4 percent, and for citizen groups 33:27 percent<sup>12</sup>. These figures indicate that unions have a greater "staying power" than both business associations and citizen groups. It would therefore not quantitatively support the assumption that environmental organizations have "filled in" for labor unions since 1960.

However, the picture presented by these figures is incomplete because it just examines the fate of organizations that were already active in 1960 and does not account for those organizations that were newly formed since then. This is why Schlozman and Tierney have analyzed the "Washington Representatives 1981" directory again to find out how many of the organizations listed in this source were launched during the 1960s and 1970s.

Based on 80 percent of their sample of 2810 interest

<sup>11.</sup> cf. Schlozman/Tierney 1986, p. 79

<sup>12.</sup> Missing percentages to 100 percent account for both organizations that were still active, but not in politics, and for those for which no information was available. It should be noted that "citizen groups" include other (unspecified) organizations in addition to environmental organizations.

organizations that had their own offices in Washington in 1981, they found that of all business and trade associations 15 percent were founded during the 1960s and 23 percent were founded during the 1970s<sup>13</sup>. The corresponding figures for labor unions were 7 and 14 percent, and for citizen groups 19 and 57 percent.

Together, the two analyses show that while a higher percentage of citizen groups has been deactivated than any of the other two types since 1960, a much higher percentage of new citizen groups has been formed since then. On the other extreme, of all three types, labor unions have the highest proportion of organizations still active that were already active in 1960, but at the same time they have the smallest percentage of new organizations that were founded since then.

This means that fluctuation rates are higher for citizen groups than for labor unions, with business associations ranging somewhere in the middle. But higher turnover rates only indicate a higher flexibility of the citizen group than of the labor union sector of the interest organization system.

<sup>13.</sup> cf. Schlozman/Tierney 1986, p. 76

A partial substitution of these two sectors would have been a reasonable interpretation of the figures only if a higher percentage of citizen groups than of labor unions had been founded since 1960 and a lesser percentage of labor unions active in 1960 had still been around than of citizen groups. Since this is not the case, no clear conclusions can be drawn from Schlozman and Tierney's figures as to whether or not a partial substitution of these two interest group sectors has taken place, be it in their function of integrating members of society or in their substantive policy role of counterbalancing the influence of business interests within the old and the new cleavage.

The reliability of the figures obtained from Schlozman and Tierney to measure replacement tendencies among types of interest organizations are not very high because they were obtained from both incomplete and different. incomparable, data sources. My analysis could possibly yield more reliable findings because it will be consistent and comparable (based on only one comprehensive serial publication), and because I will be able to take into consideration combined total membership figures rather than only the changes in the number of differently large organizations.

This chapter has laid the groundwork for the study of organizational adaptiveness across business associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations. This represents a second approach I will employ in my empirical study of the adaptiveness of interest organizations to social change. It should be viewed as an important supplementation to the analysis that focuses on adaptation within individual organizations.

#### 6. Summary

Studying the adaptiveness of political interest organizations to social change is a challenging task for a number of reasons. Different types of political interest organizations have different basic characteristics, e.g. in terms of their membership structure, and different starting positions concerning their need to implement adaptive changes in order to conform to expectations of society. That makes it difficult to compare the adaptive performances of different types of interest organizations.

In addition to the diversity of political interest organizations, social change processes are also very complex. Many changes take place simultaneously in the economic system, the political system, and in civil society and are intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

To get a handle on this diversity and to reduce complexity, this analysis has limited its scope to three types of interest organizations and their adaptiveness to what modernization theory has identified as an environmental value change that has occurred in the United States in the 1960s. Since then, popular demands for environmental protection and quality have remained at a high level. This

marks environmental value changes as significant and lasting social change.

associations, labor unions, and environmental organizations were chosen the as three types organizations to be studied because they are the types that have most likely been directly affected by the increased popular demands for environmental protection and quality of life. The are the principal interest three types representatives organized around the "new" ecological cleavage (environment versus industrial growth) and the "old" economic cleavage (capital versus labor) that also continues to be relevant.

The importance of organizational adaptiveness to new social trends was theorized to be based on the the organizations' need to maintain their legitimacy in order to continue to perform their function of social integration that, in turn, is important for the legitimacy and stability of the larger social and political system. The linkage between this theory about organizational adaptiveness and modernization theory was found to be that new value preferences alter the definition of what the people view as legitimate.

The importance of substantive, i.e. policy goal-related,

adaptiveness (e.g. to conform with environmental expectations) is underlined by the observation that it appears to be more important for maintaining popular legitimacy than adaptiveness to popular expectations for procedural values (such as accountability)<sup>1</sup>.

environmental To obtain conformity with the new expectations, it was theorized that certain organizational goal and structure adaptations may be expected, unless these conditions are already met. This is unlikely, though. I have argued that all three types of interest organizations were in need of some adaptive changes because even environmental 1960s the organizations, until known as conservation organizations, did not pursue a wide enough array of goals to conform with the increasing ecological concerns of many people.

In addition to developing the theoretical framework for the analysis of organizational adaptiveness to current social

<sup>1.</sup> The example of some environmental organizations shows that an organization with low accountability can enjoy equal levels of public support and legitimacy as one that is more accountable, as long as the policy goals of both organizations are accepted by society. For examples of accountable and unaccountable organizations, cf. Gittell and Holcomb 1990, p. 26; for social integration success rates of these organizations, cf. membership trend figures in Mitchell 1985, p. 25.

change trends, this analysis has begun to lay the groundwork for testing a number of research questions empirically. The empirical analysis is not a part of this study but I have attempted to develop some indicators of adaptive qualities to measure organizational adaptiveness. The discussion of variables and indicators was complicated by two obstacles.

First, the study of adaptiveness specifically of political interest organizations is а ground breaking effort. Therefore no previous studies could be resorted to for ideas  $\mathsf{of}$ topic could best be and experience how the are some sociological studies on the operationalized. There innovation of work organizations, but it would have made little or no sense to utilize their indicators for my project2.

Secondly, there are very few published data on interest organizations that could be useful to analyze for the purpose of this study, and getting additional data directly from the interest organizations is immensely difficult, especially when it comes to requests for information concerning matters of their internal operation. Such

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>. For example, "financial viability" as a measure of effectiveness (cf. Price/Mueller 1986, p. 131) cannot be applied to political interest organizations since the selling of products and goods is not their (main) purpose.

critical information is nevertheless for assessing organizational adaptiveness in terms of whether it positive (conforming with social demands), symbolic (pretending conformity) or negative (opposing social demands, often combined with pretending conformity). Due to these difficulties, some of the indicators for measuring adaptiveness that I suggested in chapter four may not seem to be too compelling or appealing. But they are as good as can be under the given circumstances of data availability that leave much to be desired.

In addition to the analysis of whether or not adaptiveness a given for political interest organizations (i.e. if adaptive changes have been implemented where necessary) and what type-specific differences there are concerning adaptiveness to environmental demands, I will ask if adaptive changes have led to renewed legitimacy, conceptualized as social integration success as measured by the resource flow of an organization (membership and funding trends). I will also try to determine if the policy goal a function of its success of an organization is adaptiveness.

The analysis of changes that have occurred in the interest organization system as a whole will be addressed by means of

evaluating the overall adaptiveness of each of the total populations of the three organizational types I am studying relative to each other, both in terms of changes in their absolute numbers and their combined memberships over time. This perspective, based on the population ecology approach, expands my study beyond its focus on the adaptiveness of (i.e. within) single organizational units. It is also an effort to avoid totally neglecting adaptive trends among the many state-level or less important national organizations that could not be included in my sample.

While there is a good argument for the possibility that population ecology could be right in assuming that organizational adaptiveness to social change has occurred mainly across types of organizations or across organizations within one type (specialization), it is just as plausible to assume that individual organizations have been adaptive internally. Therefore, both possibilities must be studied for a comprehensive evaluation of organizational adaptiveness to social change. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence that organizations do change. For an example, many authors describe most of the old conservation organizations

as adapting to new environmental expectations. It remains to be seen to what degree the forthcoming empirical analysis will support this finding and if there will be similar findings for business associations and labor unions.

<sup>3.</sup> e.g. Mitchell 1985, p. 8: "By the end of the 1960s the conservation groups had adopted [...] the ecological perspective and an agenda which included second generation issues."

#### <u>Bibliography</u>

#### Data Sources, Primary Sources

- Absher, Jim: <u>Sierra Club Member Survey Results</u> (unpublished manuscript, Urbana, IL, 1989)
- CIS / Annual. [1987, 1988, 1989]. Index to Congressional Publications and Public Laws. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Information Service, [1988, 1989, 1990]
- CIS / Five-Year Cumulative Index, 1970 1974. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Information Service, 1975
- CIS / Four-Year Cumulative Index [1975-1978, 1979-1982, 1983-1986]. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Information Service, [1979, 1983, 1987]
- Encyclopedia of Associations. [Vols. 3-6, 8-25], Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1960, 1963, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1974-1990
- Foundation for Public Affairs, John F. Mancini (ed.): <u>Public Interest Profiles</u>. [Vols. 1-5], Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Public Affairs, [1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986]
- Foundation for Public Affairs: <u>Public Interest Profiles</u>
  <u>1988-89</u>. [Vol. 6], Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1988
- Gifford, Courtney D.: <u>Directory of U.S. Labor Organizations</u>. 1986-87 Edition. Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1986
- National Wildlife Federation: <u>Conservation Directory 1989</u>.
  Washington, D.C.: National Wildlife Federation, 1989
  (34th ed.)
- Paradis, Adrian A. and Paradis, Grace D.: <u>The Labor Almanac</u>. Littleton: Libraries Unlimited, 1983
- Responses from various interest organizations to author's "Interest Organization Survey Questionnaire", September 1989

- Sierra Club (ed.): <u>The Sierra Club. A Guide</u>. San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1989
- State of New York, Dept. of State, Charities Registration Unit: "Financial Report Summaries" for various interest organizations (Albany, N.Y., 1990)
- U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (ed.):

  Statistical Abstract of the United States 1980. 101st
  Edition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
  Office, 1980
- ----"---: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990. 110th Edition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990
- U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (ed.):

  <u>Handbook of Labor Statistics</u>. Bulletin 2070.

  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
  1980
- ----: News. Union Members in 1989 (Press Release USDL 90-59, February 7, 1990)

#### Books and Articles

- Alexander, Jeffrey C.: "Differentiation Theory. Problems and Prospects", pp. 1-15 in: Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Colomy, Paul (eds.): Differentiation Theory and Social Change. Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney: <u>The Civic Culture</u>.

  <u>Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations</u>.

  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963
- Amm, Joachim: <u>Die Entwicklung der Strategien der US-</u>

  <u>Umweltbewegung unter den Bedingungen von</u>

  <u>Deregulierungspolitik</u> (Diplom Thesis, unpublished,
  Berlin, 1989)

- Berry, Jeffrey M.: The Interest Group Society. Glenview / Boston / London: Scott, Foresman / Little, Brown, 1989 (2nd ed.)
- Blau, Peter M. and Schoenherr, Richard A.: <u>The Structure of Organizations</u>. New York / London: Basic Books, 1971
- Blau, Peter M. and Scott, W. R.: <u>Formal Organizations</u>. San Francisco: Chandler, 1962
- Block, Fred: <u>Postindustrial Possibilities</u>. A <u>Critique of Economic Discourse</u>. Berkeley / Los Angeles / Oxford: University of California Press, 1990
- Bosso, Christopher J.: Adaptation and Change in the Environmental Movement (paper prepared for delivery at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL)
- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: <u>Interessengruppen und</u>
  <u>Interessenverbände</u> (Informationen zur politischen
  Bildung Nr. 217), München: Franzis, 1987
- Burns, James MacGregor, J.W. Peltason, Thomas E. Cronin:

  <u>Government by the People</u>. Bicentennial Edition 1987 1989, National Edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
  Hall, 1987
- Caulfield, Henry P.: "The Conservation and Environmental Movements: An Historical Analysis", pp. 13-56 in:
  Lester, James P. (ed.): Environmental Politics and Policy. Theories and Evidence. Durham / London: Duke University Press 1989
- Carper, William B. and Snizek, William E.: "The Nature and Types of Organizational Taxonomies: An Overview", pp. 65-75 in: Academy of Management Review, 5-1980-1
- Clark, Terry Nichols and Inglehart, Ronald: The New Political Culture. Changing Dynamics of Support for Welfare State Policies in Post-Industrial Societies (paper prepared for delivery at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA)
- Congressional Quarterly, Special Report: <u>Power of the Earth</u>. Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jan. 20, 1990)

- Dahl, Robert A.: <u>Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy</u>. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982
- ----: Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961
- Dunlap, Riley E.: "Public Opinion and Environmental Policy", pp. 87-134 in: Lester, James P. (ed.): Environmental Politics and Policy. Theories and Evidence. Durham / London: Duke University Press 1989
- Dunlop, John T.: <u>The Management of Labor Unions. Decision</u>

  <u>Making with Historical Constraints.</u>

  Lexington/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990
- Faia, Michael A.: <u>Dynamic Functionalism: Strategy and Tactics</u>. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1986
- Gittell, Marilyn and Holcomb, John: <u>Interest Group Sectors:</u>

  <u>Comparative Resources</u>, <u>Tactics</u>, <u>and Accountability</u>

  (paper prepared for the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA)
- Goldfield, Michael: <u>The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States</u>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987
- Habermas, Jürgen: <u>The New Conservatism</u>. <u>Cultural Criticism</u>
  <u>and the Historians' Debate</u>. Cambridge: The MIT Press,
  1989
- Hage, Jerald: <u>Theories of Organizations</u>. Form, <u>Process</u>, and <u>Transformation</u>. New York etc.: John Wiley & Sons, 1980
- Hage, Jerald and Aiken, Michael: <u>Social Change in Complex Organizations</u>. New York: Random House, 1970
- Hall, Richard H.: <u>Organizations. Structures, Processes, and Outcomes</u>. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1987 (4th ed.)
- Harper, Charles L.: <u>Exploring Social Change</u>. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989

- Hartmann, Jürgen: <u>Verbände in der westlichen Industriegesellschaft. Ein international vergleichendes</u>
  <u>Handbuch.</u> Frankfurt / New York: Campus, 1985
- Hult, Karen M. and Walcott, Charles: <u>Governing Public</u>
  <u>Organizations. Politics, Structures, and</u>
  <u>Institutional</u> <u>Design</u>. Pacific Grove: Brooks / Cole,
  1990
- Inglehart, Ronald: <u>Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial</u>
  <u>Society</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990
- Katz, Richard S. and Mair, Peter: The Official Story: A

  Framework for the Comparative Study of Party
  Organization and Organizational Change (paper
  prepared for delivery at the 1990 Annual Meeting of
  the American Political Science Association, San
  Francisco, CA)
- Kimberly, John R.: "Organizational Size and the Structuralist Perspective: A Review, Critique, and Proposal", pp. 571-594 in: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 21 (December 1976)
- Kitschelt, Herbert: Explaining Contemporary Social

  Movements. An Exploration in the Comparison of

  Theories (paper prepared for delivery at the 1989
  Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
  Association, Atlanta, GA)
- Knoke, David: "Associations and Interest Groups in the US", pp. 1-21 in: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 12 (1986)
- Knoke, David and Wood, James R.: Organized for Action.

  Commitment in Voluntary Associations. New Brunswick:
  Rutgers University Press, 1981
- Ladd, Everett Carll: The American Polity. The People and Their Government. New York / London: W. W. Norton, 1989 (3rd ed.)
- Lindblom, Charles E.: <u>Politics and Markets</u>. New York: Basic Books, 1977

- Lipset, Seymour Martin: "The Sources of Public Interest Activism: An Introduction", pp. 1-8 in: Foundation for Public Affairs, John F. Mancini (ed.): Public Interest Profiles. [Vol. 5], Washington D.C.: Foundation for Public Affairs, [1986]
- Lipsitz, Lewis and Speak, David M.: <u>American Democracy</u>. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989 (2nd ed.)
- Loomis, Burdett A. and Cigler, Allan J.: "Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics", pp. 1-26 in: Cigler, Allan J. and Loomis, Burdett A. (eds.): Interest Group Politics. Washington D.C.: CQ Press 1986 (2nd ed.)
- Luhmann, Niklas: "The Paradox of System Differentiation and the Evolution of Society", pp. 409-440 in: Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Colomy, Paul (eds.): Differentiation Theory and Social Change. Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990
- Luthardt, Wolfgang und Waschkuhn, Arno (eds.): Politik und Repräsentation. Beiträge zur Theorie und zum Wandel politischer und sozialer Institutionen (Schriftenreihe der Hochschulinitiative Demokratischer Sozialismus, 20), Marburg: SP-Verlag, 1988
- Manheim, Jarol B. and Rich, Richard C.: <u>Empirical Political Analysis</u>. <u>Research Methods in Political Science</u>. New York / London: Longman, 1986
- McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N.: "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory", pp. 1212-1241 in: American Journal of Sociology, 82-1977-6
- McCleary, Richard and Hay, Richard A., Jr.: Applied Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences. Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1980
- McFarland, Andrew S.: <u>Interest Groups and Political Time</u> (paper prepared for delivery at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA)
- Merton, Robert K.: "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", pp. 560-568 in: Social Forces, Vol. 18 (May 1940)

- Milbrath, Lester W.: <u>Environmentalists</u>. <u>Vanguard For a New Society</u>. Albany: SUNY Press, 1984
- ----: Envisioning a Sustainable Society. Learning Our Way Out. Albany: SUNY Press, 1989
- Mitchell, Robert Cameron: <u>From Conservation to Environmental</u>
  <u>Movement: The Development of the Modern Environmental</u>
  <u>Lobbies</u> (Resources for the Future, discussion paper
  QE 85-12), Worchester, 1985
- Moe, Terry M.: The Organization of Interests. Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups.

  Chicago / London: The University of Chicago Press,
  1980
- Münch, Richard: "Differentiation, Rationalization,
  Interpenetration: The Emergence of Modern Society",
  pp. 441-464 in: Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Colomy,
  Paul (eds.): Differentiation Theory and Social
  Change. Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New
  York: Columbia University Press, 1990
- Naisbitt, John: <u>Megatrends. Ten New Directions Transforming</u>
  Our Lives. New York: Warner Books, 1982
- Naisbitt, John and Aburdene, Patricia: Megatrends 2000. Ten New Directions for the 1990's. New York: William Morrow, 1990
- Niemi, Richard G., John Mueller and Tom W. Smith: <u>Trends in Public Opinion</u>. A Compendium of Survey Data. New York / Westport / London: Greenwood Press, 1989
- Nullmeier, Frank: "Institutionelle Innovationen und neue soziale Bewegungen", pp. 3-16 in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung das Parlament Nr. B 26/89, June 23, 1989
- Offe, Claus: "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics", pp. 817-868 in Social Research, 52-1985-4 (Winter 1985)
- Olsen, Mancur, Jr.: <u>The Logic of Collective Action</u>. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965
- Orum, Anthony M.: <u>Introduction to Political Sociology. The Social Atonomy of the Body Politic</u>. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989 (3rd ed.)

- Parkin, Sara: <u>Green Parties</u>. An <u>International Guide</u>. London: Heretic Books, 1989
- Parsons, Talcott: <u>Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative</u>
  <u>Perspectives</u>. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966
- Petulla, Joseph M.: American Environmentalism. Values,

  <u>Tactics, Priorities</u>. College Station / London: Texas

  A&M University Press, 1980
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Salancik, Gerald R.: <u>The External</u>
  <u>Control of Organizations</u>. A Resource Dependence
  Perspective. New York etc.: Harper & Row, 1978
- Price, James L. and Mueller, Charles W.: <u>Handbook of</u>
  <u>Organizational Measurement</u>. Marshfield: Pitman
  Publishing, 1986
- Ritzer, George: Sociological Theory. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988 (2nd ed.)
- Rosenbaum, Alexander: <u>Philosophy of Social Science</u>. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988
- Salisbury, Robert H.: "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups", pp. 1-32 in: Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13 (1969)
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman and Tierney, John T.: Organized
  Interests and American Democracy. New York: Harper &
  Row, 1986
- Sousa, David: <u>Union Decline</u>, <u>Political Activity</u>, <u>and the Problem of Pluralist Balance in American Politics</u> (paper prepared for delivery at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Northeast Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA)
- Steiner, George A. and Steiner, John F.: <u>Business</u>, <u>Government</u>, and <u>Society</u>. A <u>Managerial Perspective</u>. New York: Random House, 1980 (3rd ed.)
- Stimpson, James A.: "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay", pp. 914-947 in: American Journal of Political Science, 29-1985-4
- Stone, Allan and Barke, Richard P.: Governing the American Republic. Economics, Law, and Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989

- Streeck, Wolfgang: "Vielfalt und Interdependenz.

  <u>Überlegungen zur Rolle von intermediären</u>

  <u>Organisationen in sich ändernden Umwelten</u>", pp. 471495 in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
  Sozialpsychologie, 39-1987-3
- Taylor, Andrew J.: <u>Trade Unions and Politics</u>. A <u>Comparative Introduction</u>. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989
- Tempel, Karl G.: <u>Parteien und Verbände in der pluralisti-</u>
  <u>schen Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland</u>.

  Berlin: Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit
  Berlin, 1979 (Politik in Schaubildern, Heft 8)
- Tokar, Brian: "Marketing the Environment", pp. 15-20 in: Z Magazine, February 1990
- Truman, David B.: <u>The Governmental Process. Political</u>
  <u>Interests and Public Opinion</u>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971 (2nd ed.)
- Tuttle, Thomas C.: "Technology, Organization of the Future, and Nonmanagerial Roles", pp. 163-180 in: Hage, Jerald (ed.): Futures of Organizations. Innovating to Adapt Strategy and Human Resources to Rapid Technological Change. Lexington / Toronto: Lexington Books, 1988
- Vogel, David: <u>Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of</u>
  <u>Business in America</u>. New York: Basic Books, 1989
- Warner, William Lloyd, Darab B. Unwalla, John H. Trimm: <u>The Emergent American Society</u>, Vol. 1: <u>Large-Scale Organizations</u>. New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 1967
- Wenner, Lettie McSpadden: <u>Groups Competing on Environmental</u>
  <u>Issues</u> (paper prepared for delivery at the 1989
  Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
  Association, Atlanta, GA)
- Weßels, Bernhard: Institutionen und sozialer Wandel. Grenzen der Adaptionsfähigkeit? Ein forschungsstrategischer Diskussionsbeitrag zu einigen organisationssoziologischen Aspekten (unpublished manuscript, Berlin, 1988)

- Weßels, Bernhard: <u>Vielfalt oder strukturierte Komplexität?</u>

  <u>Zur Institutionalisierung politischer Spannungslinien</u>

  <u>im Verbände- und Parteiensystem</u> (Berlin: Science
  Center Berlin, Diskussionspapier 2/1990)
- Wootton, Graham: <u>Interest Groups</u>. <u>Policy and Politics in America</u>. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985

Apper	ndix A: Questionnaire
	INTEREST ORGANIZATION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR:
1)	Please indicate the total staff size of your organization's national headquarters for each of the following years.
	YEAR TOTAL STAFF  1960 1970 1980 1990
EN	VIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 4 !
2)	Has your organization formally included any environmental goals (e.g. environmental protection in general, promotion of environmentally sound technologies, recycling, environmental research, etc.) in its statement of purpose, bylaws, or charter? PLEASE CHECK ONE:
	NO ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS FORMALLY INCLUDED YES, INCLUDED 1980 OR THEREAFTER YES, INCLUDED 1970 - 1979 YES, INCLUDED PRIOR TO 1970
3)	Which of the following responses best answers the question: Has your organization established an environmental department, division or unit? PLEASE CHECK:
	NO ENVIRONMENTAL DEPARTMENT OR UNIT ESTABLISHED YES, ESTABLISHED 1980 OR THEREAFTER YES, ESTABLISHED 1970 - 1979 YES, ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO 1970
4)	In the past thirty years, has your organization sponsored any advertising stressing your organization's contribution to environmental quality? If so, please give year(s) of campaign(s).
	NO SUCH ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS YES, IN (PLEASE GIVE YEARS)

change decision since	your organization adopted <u>formal</u> policy s to introduce more participatory on making in the national headquarters 1960? IF YES: IN WHAT YEAR(S) WERE THESE ES ADOPTED ?	YES	МО
ways for influence level	your organization <u>formally</u> created more or the state and local chapters to nce decision making on the national since 1960? IF YES: IN WHAT YEAR(S) HESE MEASURES ADOPTED ?	YES	NO
7) Di-			
	ase identify the three policy issues that ant to your organization in each of the fo		
<u>1960</u>	1		_
	2		_
	3		_
<u>1970</u>	1		
	2		•
	3		-
1000	•		
<u>1980</u>	1.		
	2		
	3		
1990	1		_
	2		
	3		

8) Does your organization offer any of the following services exclusively to its individual or corporate members? If so, please check and indicate the year when those services were introduced.

	PLEAS	E CHECK	YE.	AR
	IF O	FFERED	INTRO	DUCED
free subscription to publication(s	s) <u>——</u>			
consulting services				
legal assistance services				
special merchandise offers				
travel/vacation/outings programs				
group purchases (insurance etc.)				
others:				
9) From the following list of or	ganizat	ional ad	ctiviti	es,
please check those three that we				
your organization in each of the				
<u> </u>	-			
	1960	1970	1980	1990
Lobbying the Federal Government				
Litigation				
Advertising Campaigns				
Calls for Strikes				
Direct Action (Demonstrations,				
Boycotts, etc.)				
Publications (Newsletters, etc.)				
Research				
Membership Building				
Grassroots Organizing				
Other Activities (PLEASE DESCRIBE)				
(122.122 2201.122				
10) Finally, what was your organi	zation'	s total	income	in
each of the following years?				
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				
1960 198	30			
				-
1970 199	0			
	· · · · · · ·			

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ANSWERS. PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE ENCLOSED REPLY ENVELOPE.

# Appendix B: Sample of Interest Organizations for Empirical Study

#### A.) Business Associations

American Business Conference American Council for Capital Formation American Iron and Steel Institute American Petroleum Institute Business Roundtable Chamber of Commerce of the United States Chemical Manufacturers Association Citizens for a Sound Economy Committee for Economic Development Conference Board Edison Electric Institute Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States National Association of Manufacturers National Coal Association National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors National Federation of Independent Business National Planning Association National Tax-Limitation Committee National Taxpayers Union Society of the Plastics Industry

#### B.) Labor Unions

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union

American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)

American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees

American Federation of Teachers

Communications Workers of America

International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America

(cont.)

International Union Allied Industrial
Workers of America
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
International Union, United Mine Workers of America
Laborers' International Union of North America
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union
Service Employees International Union
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association
United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union
United Steelworkers of America

#### C.) Environmental Organizations

Conservation Foundation Defenders of Wildlife Ducks Unlimited Earth First! Environmental Action Environmental Defense Fund Environmental Law Institute Environmental Policy Institute Friends of the Earth (FoE) Greenpeace U.S.A. Izaak Walton League of America League of Conservation Voters National Audubon Society National Wildlife Federation Natural Resources Defense Council Nature Conservancy Sierra Club Sierra Club Legal Defense Club Wilderness Society

#### Vita

Joachim Amm was born on November 15, 1963, in Rendsburg, West Germany. He obtained his "Abitur" from the Gymnasium Kronwerk, Rendsburg, in May 1983. After 14 months "alternative" service at the local youth hostel, he moved to West Berlin in October 1984 to study Political Science and Journalism at the Free University. He obtained his "Diplom Politologe" degree - the German equivalent to an M.A. in Political Science - from the Free University Berlin in July 1989. From 1986 to 1989 he received a stipend from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn. Internships during his studies included work for the parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany at the West German "Bundestag" in Bonn (8/85 - 10/85), and for the Public Relations Dept. of HEW, an electricity company, in Hamburg (9/86 - 10/86). In 1987, he spent five months in the United States as a visitor to the "Environmental Studies Center" of the State University of New York at Buffalo (8/87 -12/87). From August through October, 1988, he was employed by the Dept. of the Environment, State Government of Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel. Joachim Amm enrolled the Master of Arts graduate program in Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Blacksburg, VA) in August 1989.