Cycles of Protest in the Post-War British Peace Movement

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(ABSTRACT)

The purpose of this paper is to describe and explain the dynamics of the post-war British peace movement. This examination will account for, and link the two distinct phases of activity which encompassed at their peaks, the periods of 1958 to 1960, and 1981 to 1983. The defence issue declined in salience in the intervening years and was largely ignored.

The paper sets out to account for these cycles of protest by determining four key factors; the creation of a potential clientele, the symbolic meaning of the movement, the catalytic historical events and the incentives for mobilisation. Three theories are used to explain these elements. Inglehart's 'Post-Materialism' thesis is utilised to explain the presence of a potential clientele in terms of a new value orientation that is emerging among post-war generations due to the unprecedented affluence experienced in their formative years. Parkin's case study of the first phase of the movement provieds the symbolic protest element, that explains the salience of the peace movement to these post-materialists. It also suggests that the clientele's interest in the issue lasts as long as the issue is significant and that as soon as it declines other issues claim their attentions and energies. The final vital element is explained by adapting Olson's cost and benefit 'Collective Action' theory to this non-economic case. This theory suggests that the prominent peace movement organisation, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, provided and distributed vital selective incentives that motivated the existing clientele into protest activity. However, once the costs of non-achievement of policy goals add to the costs of protest activity (which are being raised by the radicalisation of tactics) and the organisation becomes inefficient at distributing these selective goods, the incentive to participate is removed and activity begins to decline.

The combination of these three theories with the impact of historical atmosphere and a catalytic event creates a coherent explanation of the movement in both phases.

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Preface

In the summer of 1986 I visited the R.A.F. Greenham Common women's peace camp, a camp founded at the main gate in 1981 to protest the arrival of the first British cruise missiles, which has since spread to all nine of the gates at the base. Although these camps have been a focus for criticism and contempt, their unique character has served as inspiration to many feminists proving that autonomous action can be undertaken.

However, the harsh living conditions that the women put up with all year round, highlight the special dedication that camp life demands, especially since the local council's policy of eviction has been put into force. Although the women living at the base are deeply committed to the anti-nuclear cause, other sympathetic individuals would find the conditions of camp life hard to bear. Is it simply that these are exceptional women or are there underlying motivational factors that enable them to bear these exceptional costs ?

These peace women have formed an important part of the 1980's peace movement that has been led emotionally by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D). C.N.D. was founded in 1958 when post-war anti-nuclear sentiments first emerged. Its foundation marked the beginning of protest activity that peaked in 1960 and subsequently declined for twenty years.

This paper will examine these two phases of anti-nuclear activity and attempt to link them, by explaining several key factors, into a coherent explanation of the movement's dynamics and motivational forces. These key factors include; the creation of a potential clientele, the impact of historical period effects, the inherent symbolic meanings and the presence of motivational forces that determined the peace movement's cycles.

Introduction

The-post war anti-nuclear peace movement materialised in two distinct phases that encompassed, at their peaks, the periods of 1958 to 1960, and 1981 to 1983. Before and between these phases the peace issue was unimportant to the majority of the British population. Defence has rarely been a contentious issue, often the public are willing to assume that their national interests are being well served by the experts who advise the government.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the cycles that the post-war British peace movement has experienced.

The literature on this subject is sparing, dividing into three basic categories. The first and most ideologically motivated area is that concerning the polemics of peace, the arguments for and against British unilateral nuclear disarmament. Works in this field predominantly concentrate upon the mainstream activity, E.P. Thompson (1980), Ryle (1981) and Coker (1984), whilst a minority consider the specifics of feminist anti-nuclear polemics, Jones (1983) and Dorothy Thompson (1983).

The second area is limited to the explanation of the decline of the movement's first phase, most of these studies having been conducted in the in the inter-phase period, such works including those by Parkin (1968) and Myers (1973).

The third and final area of concentration is that concerned with the implications of the unilateralist movement for Britain's national defences and alliance commitments; Baylis (1977) and Freedman (1980), and of European defence policy.

Unfortunately, sources are most expansive on the first phase of the movement whilst the comparative recency of the second phase means its description is less exhaustive.

To my knowledge no explanatory work has been conducted linking both phases and accounting for the dynamics that motivated participants and later decreased their activity and involvement. This study will attempt therefore, to bridge the gaps left by existing research in this field, and to provide a coherent explanation of the movement's progress accounting for historical, structural and psychological factors. To achieve this end several factors have to be accounted for.

Firstly, a mass movement needs a potential clientele who agree that the issue is important. Thus, this potential clientele would have particular values that reflected concerns about the effectiveness of nuclear deterence.

Secondly, the build up of international and domestic events to create an atmosphere of tension and insecurity would enhance the salience of the issue. In this case, the salience of anti-nuclear feelings would be increased if tension between the super-powers grew and conflict looked likely. One symbolic event might serve to catalyse this reservoir of feelings into action.

Thirdly, involvement in the movement would have to seem worthwhile to the potential participant, not only because of the value of the issue but also because the individual would benefit or gain by it. The peace movement would thus have to offer the participant something more than the opportunity to join a good cause, it would also have to supply incentives that offset the effort involved

in protest. Moreover, as costs of participation escalate through the gradual radicalisation of tactics, a concomitant rise in incentives would have to occur to sustain activity. However, if incentives fail to keep pace with costs and no significant policy successes are achieved then the participant is unlikely to continue his activity, if motivated by rational perceptions of costs and benefits.

Although it cannot be said that human beings always behave rationally the concept of costs and benefits is a useful one, for it goes some way to explain the provision of incentives by social movements and pressure groups. This three point list forms the foundation of this paper. The first section will be devoted to the historical description of the post-war peace movements cycle, from the end of the second world war, through the alternate phases of activism and quiescence. It will also outline the international events that preceded the phases of activism, illustrating the build-up of super-power tension, the deepening of the Cold war and the impact of a catalytic event that motivated individuals into group activity. Conversely, the periods of quiescence will be shown to be periods of detente, when the super-powers are willing to peacefully co-exist and pursue measures designed to decrease tension.

The first section will therefore supply the background information on the post-war British peace movement and emphasise its fluctuating salience. The next stage in the process will involve the explanation of the formation of a potential clientele for the movement.

Firstly, a brief description of post-war occupational and educational changes will illustrate new structural tendencies. These changes will clearly have an impact upon societal attitudes but without an explanatory tool such effects would be hard to measure.

However, it seems that anti-nuclear sentiments did not emerge alone but were accompanied by other issues that were described as the 'new politics'. The same people who ascribed to unilateralism seemed to show sympathy with these other issues.

So what did these issues have in common ? The common element appeared to be an attachment to values that were not dependent upon the attainment of economic goals, but intellectual or aesthetic goals.

Inglehart's post-materialism theory will be used to explain the formation of a suitable potential clientele for the peace movement. This theory suggests that a process of gradual value change is taking place within European society, caused by the consistent rise in affluence. This rise in affluence is making people increasingly economically secure, so that materialist concerns are becoming less, and post-materialist considerations more, salient.

Inglehart's theory can usefully be applied to this case because it explains the creation of a clientele motivated towards this issue, that will remain sympathetic to it even after activity has ceased. Thus, involvement in the peace movement reflects a new value orientation, that emphasises non-economic ideals. Involvement in the peace movement will reflect this value orientation so long as the issue is salient. However, once the issue fades other post-materialist concerns will occupy the clientele and symbolically represent their underlying values.

To help explain the temporary symbolism of certain issues to a permanent value orientation I shall use Frank Parkin's Symbolic protest theory.

Parkin's study is not so much a theory as a sociological case study, that seeks to determine the symbolic relevance of the peace issue to different societal groups. His work can be used in conjunction with Inglehart's post-materialism theory, reinforcing the influence of education and affluence in society. Parkin's thesis suggests some of the motivational forces behind the involvement of individuals and groups in the first phase of the peace movement, but does not convey an overall definition of the incentives and benefits that the movement conveyed.

Whilst this second chapter will rely upon socio-psychological explanations of the creation of a potential clientele, the explanation of participation incentives in the third chapter will rely upon a hypothetical model.

This model, Olson's rational choice model, hypothetically suggests that man is a rational creature, who weighs up activity in terms of potential costs and gains.

Olson suggests that large, latent, non-material groups need to encourage members to participate by supplying them with selective incentives. Since inaction will reap the same benefits as action without the costs, and the large group gives a smaller fraction of the amount of the collective good, the rational man will have have no reason to participate. The provision of selective incentives is thus vital to the mobilisation of the potential clientele.

In applying this hypothetical model, I suggest, that although man may not always behave in a rational way, the idea of incentives would help explain the fluctuating fortunes of the peace movement. I shall suggest that these membership benefits can encourage and sustain activity. However, this is dependent upon several other factors. The movement may become inefficient at distributing these benefits, or failure to achieve the collective good may cause frustration that, added to the costs of participation, could no longer be balanced by selective incentives. Moreover, radicalisation of group tactics would serve to increase the costs of participation beyond the compensation level of these incentives. At this point motivatory forces would decline in strength, and the individual might either become inactive or reconsider tactical methods.

By following this process I hope therefore, to account for the creation of a potential clientele, the impact of historic events, the symbolic meaning of involvement and most importantly, the inherent motivating forces. By accounting for these factors it is possible to link the two phases of the movement, and explain the period of quiescence that intervened.

This paper speaks in general terms about the British peace movement, interchangeably with the formal organisation, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D.). In the first phase of activity such an assumption is well justified as C.N.D. was the only significant organisation that emerged, until its splintering into the mainstream and 'Committee of 100' factions. In the second phase other groups were prominent but C.N.D. remained the emotive figurehead of the movement. Such a caveat is recognised in the body of this paper, emphasising the contrasting character of the movement in its second phase whilst maintaining the relevance of the newly emerging value orientation. Although this caveat is noted, the interests of parsimony are best served by the utilisation of these terms interchangeably, unless otherwise stated.

Thus, the next chapter will outline the historical background to this mass movement, highlighting the international and domestic events that precipitated the growth of the anti-nuclear consciousness, that catalysed sentiments into actions, and the actual progress of the movement and it's policy alteration impact.

Historical Development of Pacifist Dissent

Pre-1945

Anti-war elements in Great Britain are rooted firmly in a tradition of anti-military dissent, deriving from two very different sources. The older source derives from the Quaker peace testimony during Cromwell's reign in the late 1650's, which laid the foundations for more formalistic Christian pacifism.

The other major origin of anti-war dissent in Britain emanated from a very different source; the labour movement of the 20th century. Pacifism was justified in terms of the brotherhood of man and upon a perception of war as a capitalist instrument of power, but most simply it argued that it was the working man who was asked to die for his country.

Into the twentieth century the First World War provided a catalyst for pacifist sentiment as expressed, most especially by the No-Conscription Fellowship (N.C.F)., which laid the foundations for organised protest.

However, in later decades the Spanish Civil War and the appeasement of Hitler served to dampen some of this pacifist commitment.

Post War Quiescence

The initial post-war era, 1945-1957, was characterised by quiescence towards developments in the field of defence and nuclear technology. Martin Ceadel suggests this was surprising in the light of the transformations that were occurring in the settlement and establishment of the post war international power structure and Britain's new diminished role within it. Peace time conscription subsisted, American military bases were established and 1954 over 45,000 American personnel were in Great Britain. Moreover, their presence on British soil was not accompanied by an explicit agreement on the degree of dual control.[1]

This "special relationship"[2] of cooperation in conventional military matters between the U.S.A and Britain was not mirrored in the sharing of nuclear information and technology. America curtailed further exchanges of nuclear information and removed the British right to veto use of the U.S. atomic bomb.

Another development in Britain's international status was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) in April 1949. Rather than being perceived as a relinquishing of British defence sovereignty, N.A.T.O represented the culmination of Bevin's efforts to attain an American commitment to Western European security, following the Czech coup and Berlin blockade. Thus,

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[1] This matter has been a source of despair to successive British governments, as they have sought to achieve a definitive statement on American consultation before the launching of any bombers or weapons, which the U.S. Government has been tardy in supplying.

[2] The term "special relationship" was apparently first used by Winston Churchill in his Fulton Speech on 5th March 1946 when, referring to the wartime alliance, he urged the "continuation of a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and and Empire and the United States.eq.Quoted in D. Maclean (1970:37).

the Charter assured Europe of a welcome commitment to her security and that America would not return to isolationism, as it had done after the First World War.

Moreover, Britain also saw the commencement of development of its independent nuclear deterrent under the government of Clement Atlee. Although Parliament was not even informed of this important initiative, the general public seemed largely supportive of it. The climate of opinion was sensitive to fear of Soviet expansionism and the worsening of the Cold War and aware that the United States had terminated collaboration in its nuclear arms development. Furthermore, the development of the British H-bomb helped restore some of her jaded national pride.

The prevailing belief was that the Hydrogen bomb was, 'the first weapon powerful enough to enable a small country like Britain to pose a threat to one the size of the Soviet Union. The H-bomb was a great leveler in all senses.'[3]

It was argued that not only did America need a nuclear ally to be able to cover all Soviet targets, but that Britain could also be left dangerously exposed if there were a sudden change in America's stance towards greater isolationism. In 1955, Harold Macmillan, then the Minister of Defence, outlined the dangers of over reliance upon the U.S. nuclear deterrent to the exclusion of the British contribution;

> Politically it surrenders our power to influence American policy and then, strategically and tactically it equally deprives us of any influence over the selection of targets and the use of vital striking forces. The one, therefore weakens our prestige and our influence in the world, and the other might imperil our safety.
> [4]
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[3] Ceadel (1985:220)

[4] Hansard, vol. 537, col. 2128 (2 March 1955)

Growing Anti-Nuclear Sentiments

The Korean War (1950 to 1953) did not serve to enhance the Anglo-American relationship although a massive rearmament programme was undertaken in 1950 and 1951 to support the U.S. operations. However, as time progressed some friction did emerge over allegations that America had connived in the excesses of the brutal Syngman Rhee regime and that General MacArthur was behaving in an arrogant idiosyncratic manner.[5] American fears of Soviet incursion into Western Europe precipitated plans for the rearmament of Germany just five years after the end of the war, which met with bitter British and especially French opposition.

However, the most climactic event in the 1950's for Britain, and the one that highlighted her demise as a world power and her subservience to the U.S.A. was the Suez Crisis of November 1956. The invasion proved that Britain was unable to mount a swift and effective large scale military manuever and that, in the face of American economic pressure, she could be forced to back down.

In 1954 a small anti-nuclear movement emerged to support the intermittent activities of Gandhian pacifist groups and after a Commons debate in the same year (5 April) the Labour Party set up a Hydrogen Bomb National Campaign that sought to collect support for multilateral disarmament and a strengthening of the United Nations. The petition collected half a million signatures.

In 1955 concern about the damaging physiological effects of fallout from nuclear testing led to the emergence of over one hundred local committees for the Abolition of Nuclear Tests. The gradual growth of these groups and thus of the sentiments that would lead to the foundation of The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, was assisted by, according to writers in this field, several important international and domestic events.

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[5] See Watt (1983)

The invasion of Hungary in 1956 highlighted the weaknesses of small nations against superpowers and also led to an important intellectual defection from the Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.) and a tarnishing of the U.S.S.R's image. One of the most famous defectors was E.P.Thompson, who, in 1956, with other alienated radicals formed the 'New Left' in British politics.

The following year Duncan Sandys published a Defence White paper which made explicit the strategy and implications of Britain's nuclear deterrent. The paper made it clear that British defence policy would in future rely upon 'massive retaliation', the doctrine espoused by John Foster Dulles, with the hydrogen bomb. It also announced the beginning of development of the 'Blue Streak' missile project and surprisingly candidly admitted:

> at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack by nuclear weapons exists.[6]

In May 1957 Britain conducted her first hydrogen bomb test on Christmas Island. In the preceding month (April) Gandhian pacifists set up the Emergency Committee for Direct Action Against Nuclear War (later called simply the Direct Action Committee or D.A.C.) which was formed to obstruct the Christmas Island test. Despite being unsuccessful in this attempt, D.A.C. continued to mobilise demonstrations and was, in fact, the original organiser of the first Easter Aldermaston[7] march in 1958.

On the 2 November 1957 J.B.Priestly articulated, in a New Statesman article, the nascent anti-nuclear sentiments that were burgeoning in Britain in a statement that helped to catalyse the movement.[8]

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[6] Ceadel (1985:222)

[7] Aldermaston, Berkshire is the home of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) where the first British nuclear bomb was manufactured.

[8] Canon Collins in 'Threat Under Fire' said Priestly's article exposed the "utter folly and wickedness of the whole of the nuclear strategy." Collins (1965:302)

> The British of these times...seem to be waiting for something...great and noble in it's intention that would make them feel good again. And this might well be a declaration that after a certain date one power able to engage in nuclear warfare will reject the evil thing forever.
>
> [9]

This article provoked such a volume of correspondence that it prompted the editor of 'The New Statesman', Kingsley Martin, to invite sympathetic intellectuals to discuss the possibilities of organising anti-nuclear sentiments. Those he called together included Canon John Collins of St. Paul's, historian A.J.P Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Michael Foot and others who decided, in January 1958, to wind up the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests and found a new movement, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D.). Canon Collins became C.N.D.'s first chairman and Bertrand Russell it's president.[10]

The intent of the founders was neither to base the C.N.D. upon pacifism nor to exclude pacifists. They intended to mobilise both religiously and humanistically motivated people, as this first committee reflected. Whilst the cooperation of members of any political party was encouraged the founders intended to form an independent movement with no formalised political affiliation that would therefore appeal to a broad range of people and groups in British society. The organisation was to be loose and although C.N.D itself was committed to peaceful agitation at its conception, the members of the Direct Action Committee (D.A.C) who utilised more vigorous measures, were nevertheless welcome to participate in C.N.D.

At its first meeting on February 17 1958 C.N.D declared itself fully unilateralist; being opposed to a British independent deterrent, to a British nuclear contribution to N.A.T.O., and to the stationing of American bases on British soil.

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[9] 'Britain and the Bombs' in The New Statesman, 2 November 1957, reprinted in Lomas and Taylor (1971:57)

[10] Bertrand Russell had formerly been a hawk over atomic weapons but by 1954 had warned in a radio broadcast that although, "the general public still thinks in terms of the destruction of cities,"it was now clear that, "a war with the hydrogen bomb is quite likely to put an end to the human race." The Listener (30 December 1954) no.1135-1136.

As late as May 1957 Russell was denying that he was in favour of abolition of nuclear weapons, but he gradually began to convert his fear of the outcome of war into unilateralist sentiments.

In the first press conference called by the campaign executive committee, Canon Collins described the aim of the movement to be a "sharp, virile and successful campaign to rid Britain of dependence on nuclear weapons, if need be by unilateral action."[11]

The next two years were characterised by mass demonstrations and growing support from churchmen, radical socialists, trade unionists, and the young, as characterised by the famous Aldermaston Easter marches, these disparate forces being united under "Ban the Bomb" banners. However, in these first heady days of excitement the Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.) did not join the protests because of the ideological implications of C.N.D.'s platform for the Soviet Union. Indeed, the C.P.G.B.'s allies found themselves in a strange position at the 1957 Labour Party Conference at Brighton when they found themselves defending Gaitskell:

> The 1957 Conference offered the strange spectacle of the E.T.U and other Communist led unions found themselves defending the N.E.C. from the irresponsible unilateralists.
> [12]

By April 1960 a Gallup poll[13] indicated that 33 per cent of those questioned favoured the relinquishing of nuclear weapons entirely, marking the zenith of of C.N.D.'s impact and popularity. At the Scarborough Labour Party Conference in October 1960 a unilateralist motion was carried on a card vote by 3,282,000 votes to 3,239,000.[14]

However, the unilateralist debate was, according to several observers, being influenced by party power play. Cynkin suggests that the unilateralist motion was;

> a result of temporary political rebellion within the party against the moderate Hugh Gaitskell's leadership rather than a manifestation of ideological convictions, as demonstrated by the fact that Gaitskell's decision to 'fight, fight, and fight again' against this position helped reverse it the following year.
> [15]

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[11] Driver (1964:45)

[12] Harrison (1960:237)

[13] Quoted in Ceadel (1985:237)

[14] For details of the motion see Craig (1982:139)

[15] Cynkin (1985:36)

Gaitskell had indeed seen the defence issue as a test of strength and had utilised it to reaffirm his leadership. Thus, the divisions within the party on other issues dictated the position individuals assumed on this, newly emphasised issue. This apparent victory for C.N.D. was therefore marred by suspicions about the sincerity and integrity of Labour's espousal of unilateralism. Parkin underlines this point:

> Indeed, suspicion... began to mount as it became clearer that the anti- Bomb movement was being used as a convenient stick with which to beat the party leader.
> [16]

For those C.N.D. activists who perceived the Scarborough decision as a significant victory it appeared that their struggle was over, and thus they failed to further consolidate their position or take seriously enough Gaitskell's determination to reverse the decision. However, Charles W. Lomas and Michael Taylor suggest that in all probability the Scarborough vote did not represent a real majority of the Labour Party and that "not more than 40 to 45 per cent of the members actually favoured the unilateral resolution. It was the bloc vote of the big unions that carried the day."[17]

Clearly the unions had played a major role. Unilateralism became an issue, when in 1959, the two largest unions, the Transport Workers and the Municipal and General Workers voiced support for it. By 1960 this union support had grown into a landslide. However, although the unions did abandon this stance in 1961 for the sake of party unity, they did not endorse Gaitskell's 'Policy for Peace' position either.

1960 saw the democratisation of the C.N.D organisation with the institutionalisation of an annual conference convened to determine policy direction. However, whilst public support was burgeoning the movement itself was experiencing severe internal tension, as dissension and frustration mounted. Frank E. Myers, in his discussion of the causes of C.N.D.'s decline at that time

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[16] Parkin (1968:117)

[17] Lomas and Taylor (1971:114)

They do not state however, the average percentage vote that other motions received at the Conference so that it is very possible that this decision was no exception to the trend for low turnout in conference decisions.

suggests that the movement faced two crises, "one over the question of policy, the other over tactics."[18] Arguments arose in 1960 specifically concerning the methods and tactics that should be employed to increase the effectiveness of the campaign, and eventually this schism manifested itself in the departure of Bertrand Russell, in September, when he joined ranks with Ralph Schoenman and D.A.C. leaders to form the Committee of 100.

Since the General election in 1959 D.A.C had been conducting illegal protests against Strategic Air Command bases attracting increasingly large numbers of participants especially the young. C.N.D. had always opposed all but legal activities conducted in its name, and thus these calls for civil disobedience caused a dilemma for the movement which, frustrated as it was with the failure to achieve suitable policy changes, was searching for new ways to attain its ends.

The Committee of 100 projected a militant image that attracted the younger elements and more radical leftist organisations such as the Communist Party, Trotskyists and Anarchists and which alienated many of the older members of the original C.N.D. More critical news coverage emphasised this more radical character, showing dramatic scenes of sit-ins and demonstrations and protestors clashing with the police. Most notably, examples of these debacles occurred when mass arrests followed the close of the Trafalgar Square rally in London in 1961, and during the attempted invasion and disruption of nuclear air bases, the latter bringing about prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act of 1911.

Accompanying these changes was the transformation of the Labour Party's attitude towards the movement which had become decidedly lukewarm since the reversal in party defence policy in 1961, from a unilateralist to a multilateralist posture. Gaitskell died in 1963 and Wilson took over as leader of the party. The left largely dropped the defence issue and became apologists for the same policy that they had so opposed under Gaitskell. Reiterating the underlying issues that had provided the momentum for previous Anti-bomb sympathies, Parkin suggests that;

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[18] Myers (1973:83)

> because the new leader was not identified with groups and attitudes inimical to traditional socialist doctrines and inner party democracy, the main impetus behind the nuclear weapons campaign was removed.
> [19]

Moreover, the Labour party was looking towards the 1964 election, and hoping to make itself a more attractive election package, so many members were seeking to unite the party and heal the wounds that internal fractional arguments had opened up, with detrimental effects on the 1959 election. The marked coolness towards them that C.N.D. noted at the Labour Party Conference at Scarborough in 1963 was made explicit when in that same year Michael Foot, Judith Hart and Anthony Greenwood all failed to stand for re-election to C.N.D.'s National Council. These defectors qualified their actions (or more aptly inaction) by claiming that the Bomb was no longer a salient issue with the British public.

Many people cited the survival of the Cuban Missile Crisis as evidence that deterrence worked, in that such a tense and dangerous situation had been overcome without either power resorting to use of nuclear weapons. The Partial Test Ban Treaty agreed in Moscow in 1963 was another effective placebo that suggested to the general public, that not only were the super-powers prepared to talk, which in itself encouraged peaceful coexistence but that there was also the possibility that Arms Control agreements might follow. It seemed therefore that the Cold War was thawing and that detente was prevailing over escalation and aggression.

By Easter 1964 much of C.N.D.'s enthusiasm had waned; there was no Easter Aldermaston march, Canon Collins, dissatisfied with the movements isolationism from the rest of Europe, had resigned as chairman, and the Committee of 100 was so wrought with disagreement with D.A.C. that Bertrand Russell had resigned. The Committee of 100 had experienced major problems with on-going arrests of its members and its need therefore to constantly renew its roll with people prepared to face arrest. It became increasingly disorganised and eventually wound itself up in 1968, long after it had ceased to operate effectively, and as new issues emerged to consume radicals' energy, such

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[19] Parkin (1968:134)

as the Vietnam War, student politics, ecology and feminism. By 1971 C.N.D. membership had dwindled to 2,047.[20]

The Second Phase of The Peace Movement

Later in the 1970's the anti-nuclear campaign began to revive, attracting members with academic expertise (like Dan Smith and Mary Kaldor) to the unilateralist cause, to a degree that had not occurred in its first phase. The interest of the church, always strong in the peace movement, was illustrated in 1977 when Monsignor Bruce Kent became C.N.D. Chairman, bringing with him a cachet of moral legitimacy.[21] Moreover, C.N.D. membership rose by 30 percent from 1978 to 1979. (See appendix A)

Several issues put this growing movement into perspective. The Cold War had reactivated and the optimism that greeted S.A.L.T. I soon dwindled into disillusionment as it became obvious that the ceilings set were so high that weapons production would actually have to be increased, rather than cut, to meet it. S.A.L.T. II was not ratified by Congress and doubt was increasing about the sincerity of the superpower's claims that they wished to see arms reduction.

Whilst the first disarmament conference since 1933 was preparing to meet in May 1978, its message of hope was undermined when, at the same time N.A.T.O. leaders agreed to increase defence spending by 3 percent per annum in real terms. This news was further confounded when it decided to modernise it's tactical nuclear forces. As Bruce George and Jonathan Marcus point out;

> the catalyst that united the nascent 'peace movement' with the broader constituency of public concern was the decision made in 1979 to modernise N.A.T.O.'s long range Intermediate Nuclear forces by deploying Cruise and Pershing II missiles in five West European nations.

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[20] New York Times, May 18, 1983.

[21] The presence of the clergy in the movement's ranks had always had this effect, and may well have contributed to relative docility in the the treatment of the protestors by the police.

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These weapons, and the Soviet equivalent the SS-20 missiles, spread disquiet amongst the European populations who became nervous about the arms build up in Europe. This concern was augmented by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the 24 December 1979 which was accompanied by American sanctions, which further deepened the Cold War.

In following year, March 1980, the government reluctantly published "Protect and Survive" outlining civil defence measures that were designed to quell fears about the survivability of nuclear war. Its impact was exactly the opposite. Unfortunately the precautionary advice was so pitifully inadequate, its reception so ignominious, that it failed to encourage anyone. E.P Thompson's timely response "Protest and Survive"[23] was published a month later to salute the launching of E.N.D. (European Nuclear Disarmament), which received a significant backing from M.P.s in the House of Commons. E.N.D. was set up as a campaigning and resources organisation to promote communication and cooperation between the blossoming European peace movements including those struggling to make their voices heard in Eastern Europe.

The emergence of this more international spirit was very different from the first phase of the peace movement, when its mobilisation against nuclear weapons occurred in isolation from the Continent, with no concomitant campaigns and no formal links or organisation.

On June 17 1980 the British government announced approval of the siting of the new cruise bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth, both in Oxfordshire. These locations would prove to be important foci for the movement's activities. This announcement was compounded in July when

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[22] George and Marcus (1984:63)

L.R.N.T.F was approved on December 12, and entailed 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II to be installed in five N.A.T.O. countries, Britain receiving 160 cruise with single key control.

[23] Thompson (1980)

the government decided to further modernise Britain's nuclear forces by purchasing Trident (D-5) submarine missiles to replace the outdated Polaris system.

However, the news for the peace movement was not all menacing, in October 1980 the Labour Party conference at Blackpool returned to a unilateralist stance as post election dissatisfaction witnessed the reassertion of the Left within the party. After the election the political parties had been involved in internal disputes and thus the initial protests occurred outside them, favouring the emergence of a revitalised C.N.D.

On the 4 November 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected as President of the U.S.A. resulting in a marked return to Cold War rhetoric. As Ceadel suggests the election brought forth "a president more suited to the deterrence of his countries' enemies than to the reassurance of his countries allies"[24]

In September 1981 a march was organised from South Wales to the Greenham Common base by a group called 'Women For Life on Earth'. With only forty to fifty participants of both sexes, this small march signalled the humble beginnings of the Women's peace camps, which were conceived after large scale demonstrations greeted the arrival of this march at the base. The organisers decided that a constant vigil at cruise missile bases would not only slow the silo building process, but would also put media pressure on the government to respond to their aims.

The peace movement of the 1980's found itself to be a coalition of many diverse groups, as it had in been in the 1960's, but different factions came to dominance. In the first phase the Quakers formed the largest single bloc within the movement whilst second time around it was the women's groups that predominated. Another new element had come to life in the intervening years, the environmentalists and the ecologists, who threw their weight behind the cause, and also in opposition to nuclear power.

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[24] Ceadel (1985:230)

Initially the character of the protests mirrored those conducted by C.N.D. in the early sixties;with marches, rallies, vigils outside bases and demonstrations. In October 1981 250,000 marched in London, and on June 6 1982 a Hyde Park, London, rally mustered similar numbers.[25]

However, other independently organised events were taking place, like those at Greenham Common where the gate camps continued around the base, and which was declared women only in February 1982. This move was met with opposition from male activists who resented their sudden exclusion from base life, even although other mixed camps existed, most notably at the Molesworth base. The women, although welcoming male support during day time wished to be women only at night primarily for security reasons. They wished to set up an ideal autonomous society in which activity could not be taken over by male participants and which could establish non-hierarchical decision making. On December 12 1982, 30,000 women formed a nine mile chain around the base, with the entrances being blockaded the following day by 2,000. On New Years Day 44 women scaled the perimeter fence at Greenham and danced upon the missile silos until detected an hour later, and subsequently arrested. This direct action, initiated independently by the women thus preceded C.N.D's decision to employ Non-Violent Direct Action (N.V.D.A.) in their attempts to counter deployment of Trident, at the November 1982 C.N.D. national conference at Sheffield.[26]

This diffusion of independent activities was also illustrated at the local government level, by the Labour controlled Metropolitan Counties, which declared themselves nuclear free zones and disseminated information emphasising the futility of civil defence in the event of nuclear war. Indeed these local authorities were successful in frustrating and aborting the Government's plans for a large scale civil defence exercise 'Operation Hard Rock' in July 1982. This kind of opposition to government policy undoubtedly contributed to the abolition of the Metropolitan Counties in 1986.

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[25] C.N.D. and police estimates always differ on these statistics. At the Hyde Park rally C.N.D. claimed 250,000 participants whilst the police suggested 125,000. Despite these differences even the latter figure is impressive considering that it took place during the Falklands Conflict.

[26] A C.N.D. survey of members opinion's showed that 74% of membership approved the use of N.V.D.A. although 33% said they would not take part.

1983 saw a change in the reaction to the peace movement from both the government and the media. As media coverage became steadily less favourable, especially towards the Greenham women, the government responded with an information campaign, both reinforcing the benefits of N.A.T.O. membership and discrediting C.N.D. Coordinating this counter campaign was the 'Defence Secretariat 19' which was headed by the Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine, a man selected by Mrs Thatcher not only for his ideological soundness but also for his publicity skills. Some of this information was dissemminated through other semi-official anti-C.N.D. groups which increased in number in late 1982 and continued to be active after the termination of 'Secretariat 19'. Other independent groups also emerged to counter the public opinion impact of C.N.D., most notably 'Peace Through Strength' and 'Women and Families For Defence', the latter being founded by Lady Olga Maitland to directly counter the women's peace groups.

This increased activity both on the part of C.N.D (and affiliated groups) and from these counter groups was precipitated by the advent of the General Election scheduled for June 9 1983. C.N.D. aimed to make defence the most prominent and determining issue at the election. The campaign saw the election as a rare opportunity to influence policy directly. This campaign centered around the slogan;" *If You Can't Change The Government, Replace The Government*" and was targeted at Conservative candidates in marginal seats. Michael Heseltine, in return sent advice to these constituencies on how best to combat C.N.D. activities in the run-up to the election and with information 'exposing' alleged links of well known C.N.D. members to dubious left wing organisations.

The 1982 C.N.D. conference had identified the focus of the movements activities at this critical time as concentrating on the deployment of Cruise and Trident (these issues had always commanded most public sympathy) and had prepared the ground accordingly. Since C.N.D. rejected the notion of fielding its own candidates it endorsed the candidates most likely to support disarmament, whether from the Labour party or the Liberal party. The latter had proposed an immediate freeze on deployment of nuclear weapons at the Liberal party council in Harrow in November 1982.

Although allied with the S.D.P. who were unequivocally multilateralist, individual Liberal candidates differed from this policy.

However, one of the Campaign's major difficulties was the Labour party's confusion and disunity over the defence issue. In keeping with it's conference decision the party manifesto did indeed endorse unilateralism, pledging to remove all American nuclear weapons and bases from Britain. If elected it promised to abandon N.A.T.O.'s dual track decision by cancelling the deployment of Cruise and Trident in Britain, reducing defence expenditure and the developing a non-nuclear defence policy. However, in order to compromise with the multilateralists whilst satisfying the unilateralist contingent, the party's policy towards Polaris was worded in deliberately vague terms. Moreover, the 1982 Conference decision had hedged on its disarmament pledges by promising that such a move would be conducted in consultation with its N.A.T.O. allies. This would have made the introduction of a non-nuclear defence policy within five years impossible, given the length of time collective N.A.T.O. decisions consume.[27]

In the election the disunity that the compromise had failed to paper over became apparent as both Callaghan and Healey asserted in campaign speeches that Polaris would not be renounced without equivalent Soviet concessions. Whilst the ground had been well prepared on the issues of Cruise and Trident, it was this confusion surrounding Polaris that the Conservatives seized upon.

The election defeat had serious implications for C.N.D. and for the Labour party alike. The Conservatives claimed a mandate for their defence policies that was hard to dispute. C.N.D. was stunned by the inadequacy of Labour's disarmament arguments and questioned the efficacy of relying upon the party. Other tactics would have to be considered. Despite widespread opposition to Cruise and Trident, the Campaign was unable to consolidate it into an overall stance on defence.

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[27] The vagueness and ambiguity of the language of the manifesto was expressed most clearly in it's determining paragraph:

> Unilateralism and multilateralism must go hand in hand if either is to succeed. It is for this reason that we are against moves that would disrupt our existing alliances, but are resolved on measures to enable Britain to pursue a non-nuclear defence policy...

Labour Manifesto (1983:35)

Moreover, one of the biggest worries facing the movement was that the election defeat would serve to drain the momentum of, and commitment to, the cause.

At it's 1983 Conference Labour decided to re-endorse unilateralism under the tutelage of its new leader, Neil Kinnock, a member of C.N.D., who nevertheless sought to unite the party and restrain the hard left. At the Conference Kinnock attempted to remove the word 'unconditionally' from the motion to scrap all nuclear weapons and to emphasise the importance of consultation with N.A.T.O. and the British contribution to its conventional forces.

The C.N.D. and the Labour party did have some influence on Conservative policy in the form of small, incremental concessions. The government announced, for example, that it would not renew its commitment to an annual 3% increase in defence spending in real terms after the N.A.T.O. agreement lapsed in 1986. It also showed reluctance to proceed with plans for the deployment of E.T.- emerging technology, a system designed to decrease N.A.T.O. reliance upon nuclear weapons because it would prove too costly and British industry could not compete with America in it's manufacture. However, the government has maintained support for S.D.I. (Star Wars) upon the same basis of reasoning, in that it would supply opportunities for British industry.

The Conservative government also tried to appear more independent from the U.S.A. on non-N.A.T.O. issues such as Central America and the Greneda incident. However, the Conservative's moderation might have owed more to the need to impress its flexibility upon the British public than to the pressure of C.N.D.

In September 1984 the Liberal Assembly at Bournemouth overrode the advice of their leader David Steel, and voted 611 to 556 in favour of the removal of U.S. nuclear bases from British soil and a pledge of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. In October, the Labour party conference at Blackpool reasserted their continuing commitment to unilateral disarmament, removal of all American bases and the cancellation of Trident.

By 1984 fears were mounting within C.N.D. that the organisation had grown inefficiently large, bureaucratic and institutionalised. Monsignor Bruce Kent's resignation in October 1984 after five years of service, reflected his dismay at the massive administrative burden that he had been encumbered with. By 1984 C.N.D. had an annual financial turnover of well over a million pounds, with over 106,000 national members over 1,000 local groups and 2,000 other affiliated organisations. C.N.D. owned several buildings and employed forty members of staff.[28] Thus the size of the machine and the expense of its activities led many in the campaign to question whether the administration had become too large and consequently too cumbersome for effective organisation of responsive activity.

Since 1984 the campaign has continued to organise mass actions at American air bases, although the numbers taking part and media interest have declined. In a sense C.N.D.'s biggest problem is that it doesn't seem to be controversial enough or newsworthy enough to capture public attention anymore, since its activities have become unremarkable.

The Greenham Common women's peace camps have continued to experience evictions, that were first instituted in May 1982, and which now necessitate a continual process of imprisonment for those arrested who refuse to be bound over to keep the peace. Their camp activities largely revolve around monitoring the movement of the Cruise transporters, that arrived in November 1983 to make the system operational, and which frequently leave the base on maneuvers. Large demonstrations continue to be organised by the camp women, the news spread by links with many autonomous feminist groups. C.N.D. frequently participates in these activities although the women strongly defend their independence. In 1986 relations soured between the women only camps and the main C.N.D. organisations after accusations were made that women had been raped at the Molesworth C.N.D. mixed gender camp by fellow protestors. These tensions were accentuated by the reluctance of 'Peace News' and 'Sanity' to cover such stories that, it was thought, would have

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[28] Smith (1984)

very serious detrimental effects upon the campaign's public image. Such disputes have not, as yet, been resolved.

Summary

This historical background illustrates the atmosphere that prevailed both internationally and domestically before, during, and after the nascence of these two phases. Whilst it is nigh impossible to evaluate the individual impact of each event and development it is clear that international tension and a deterioration into Cold War ideology, preceded the growth of each phase, with one specific event acting as a symbolic summation of this trend. Thus, some sort of catalytic event occurred that mobilised growing frustrations into expressive action. In the first phase it was the H-bomb tests that most dramatically mobilised participants, whilst in the second phase the announcement of the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles served as the catalytic force.

The second phase was different in some respects from the first, in that emergence of anti-nuclear pacifist feelings occurred in concurrence with similar developments on the European continent. Thus, activity was organised on some particular occasions at the same time as demonstrations in West Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Furthermore, the feminist element, undetectable in the first phase has had an important and separate contribution to make. Indeed, the degree of sacrifice and endurance that living in a peace camp involves, has proved inspirational to the mainstream peace movement.

Although it is not fair to say that the peace movement is non-existent at the present time, it is obvious that the 1983 election took its toll on the energy and commitment individuals were prepared to devote to campaign activities.

The impact of the political parties is not simple, especially the Labour party, which has on successive occassions served to encourage and dash the hopes of achievement of a drastic change in British defence policy towards implementation of unilateralist measures. Whilst the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament seeks to remain politically independent, it is necessarily dependent on the election of a party sympathetic with its aims. The Conservative party obviously has no intention to bow to extra-parliamentary pressure. This however, places their fate in the hands of organisations for whom political practicalities and election success are paramount. It remains to be seen whether Labour's commitment to unilateralism will prevail over the sheer difficulties implementation will entail, or whether C.N.D. can regenerate momentum sufficiently powerful to force the government of the time to change defence policies. It would seem, realistically, that C.N.D. will have to, necessarily, rely upon the integrity and commitment of a political party.

Structural and Psychological Determinants of Participation

The thesis of this paper requires that three key factors are determined. To understand the dynamics of the post-war British peace movement and why it went through two distinct phases we need to find;

1. A suitable clientele

2. A symbolic, catalytic event/ issue

3. Internal dynamics- a system of rewards/ benefits for participation

The first aim of this chapter therefore is to identify a suitable clientele who would be prepared to participate in protest activity. They would have to be psychologically primed to consider the issue to be of sufficient value to merit the costs of participation, and to be ready to consider protest as a viable means of grievance expression. Thus, the participants in the movement would have to have a value system that allows this issue to seem of vital import in their lives. The theory I will utilise to suggest how such a value orientation could develop is Inglehart's post-materialism thesis that

suggests that post war economic circumstances facilitated the development of a new value hierarchy that focussed not on material considerations but on 'higher' non-material priorities.

To begin this analysis I shall first examine some of the structural trends in post war society that has helped to shape new psychological perceptions. These structural changes occurred in two important fields, in occupation and education. Next I will consider the arguments of Inglehart's theory and attempt to apply them to this case study, discovering in the process that although it adds significant insight into the creation of a suitably primed clientele it does little to enhance our understanding of the momentum of the movement.

Following this examination I will report on Parkin's theory and determine it's relevance to this case.

The Transformation of Modern Society

Occupational Changes

Since the war, and the institution of the welfare state Britain has experienced a massive growth in the bureaucratisation of social and political institutions.

In the 1950's several social observers expressed fears that middle class 'culture' was being forced into decline both economically, by the 1945 Labour government and powerful trade unions, and psychologically to a state of self abnegation, feeling guilty and over-privileged.[29] Moreover, it was believed that the growth of government intervention and economic control that was creating these new roles as administrators and technocrats was also serving to suppress the individualism, verve

[29] For an impassioned defence of 'middle class culture' and a mourning of the growth corporations and bureaucracies see, Lewis and Maude (1949)

and imagination that had formerly characterised the entrepreneurial middle class. W.H. Whyte in 1956,[30] said that the Protestant work ethic was being replaced by a newly generated social ethos, that emphasised humanistic values. This new ethos placed emphasis not upon competitive materialistic goals but upon intellectual and aesthetic needs.

Further expansion of the public sector in the areas of education, welfare, social and health services in the 1970's saw an influx of professionals such as doctors, dentists, lawyers, accountants and educators into the employ of government agencies. The private sector also experienced the same tendency with much of the market place being dominated by big business and multi-national corporations rather than by small firms. At the same time there had been an upward shift of those previously categorised in the working class domain who were now employed in low level white collar occupations. Moreover, those who still worked in the manual sector in some specific areas were proving that the manual/ non-manual division did not adequately predict economic reward. Thus, some people employed in traditionally working class blue collar occupations were earning high incomes, giving rise to the label 'new working class'. Many of these 'new working class' were then, closer, in economic terms at least, to lower middle class groups than they were to the most socially deprived at the base of the social pyramid.

It was obvious therefore, that just as manual/ non- manual divisions no longer provided an essential class character so the traditional economic classes were becoming more heterogenous and diverse, making it harder to identify clear, conflicting class interests.

Those post-war observers who be-moaned the decline of the middle class were, paradoxically, speaking of an enlarging middle class and an undermining of the of the traditional economic base of the working class. What they feared primarily was the dilution of the essential traditional class character that had, in their opinion, provided the impetus for industrial development and economic growth in Britain. This breaking down of class differentiations was demonstrated as a demoralising

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[30] Whyte (1956)

factor for those in bureaucratic work who witnessed their relative economic advantage being whittled away.

The post-war occupational changes thrust individuals into large, bureaucratic organisations that enlarged and diversified the middle class and raised the position of previously low paid blue collar workers. These class changes also owed much to increased affluence that post-war life provided.

Educational Expansion

In modern post-industrial society, observers suggest that the broadening of the education system, indeed the 'educational revolution'[31] and the increased degree of university attendance created an abnormally large class of highly educated individuals with an enhanced capacity for criticism of society. However, at the same time as intellectualising the middle class, this trend would also manifest the isolation of some of its members from mainstream political and social perceptions.

Education is also extremely important in understanding mobilisation into political activity. Its relationship with socio-economic status is vital. It is the better off who receive the highest quality of education and who progress to the highest level, and generally receiving superior education ensures a higher income. Additionally;

> Every major survey of political behaviour has determined that the more education a person has received, and the better the quality of that educational experience, the more likely it is that he or she will be involved in political activity.
> [32]

Thus, the better educated are attracted to political activity because this socialising experience has engendered ideal values in them on how society should be structured. When attending university students are exposed to more integrated and intense communication networks, and a heightened

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[31] Converse (1972)

[32] Marsh and Kaase (1979:112)

sense of efficacy and a plethora of organisations to become involved in. Thus education has an impact on the propensity to participate and to participate in more costly acts like protest. Whilst protest potential correlates well with education it might be that age cohort effects are interacting also. Thus, this expansion of educational opportunities and increased affluence have affected the permanent value orientations of a whole generation.

Students are well known for their propensity to protest not only because of education;

> Young people enjoy the physical vigor, the freedom from day to day responsibilities of career and family, and have the time to participate in the pursuit of the energetic kinds of political activity implied by a high protest potential....Moreover, young people are said to be somehow naturally vulnerable to strong and purist kinds of ideological motivation.[33]

That is not to say that only young people participated in peace movement activities, the presence of older elements clearly suggests more than life cycle effects, it suggests some different kind of value orientation. However, if we believe that unconventional political activity is unidimensional as Barnes and Kaase hypothesise and that the costs of involvement increase away from the easier acts like signing petitions, then we can plausibly conclude that propensity to up the risks and progress along the continuum could well be dependent upon age. For the young have less to lose. However, as established earlier it is not only the young who participate, but those who share other characteristics, they are fairly affluent and well educated.

The situation is complex and many different factors are at work. Since the Second World War some of the middle class, stabilised by secured affluence and acclimatised to a new social environment, that of the bureaucratised welfare state combined with an 'educational revolution', have developed a new value orientation critical of the political assumptions of modern society. Only when the stakes were significantly raised could the activities of the peace movement be described as youth dominated.

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[33] ibid., p.101.

It is clear that structural societal changes had some impact upon the creation of a clientele likely to participate in such a cause as the peace movement. However, there must be a better and more coherent way to explain the new value orientations that seem to have appeared, Inglehart's post-materialism theory offers just such a package.

Post-materialism

Inglehart's theory of 'post-materialism' first appeared in 1961 and was successively updated in 1977 (in 'Silent Revolution') and 1981, attracting a great deal of academic interest and popularity. Many theorists have utilised the 'post- materialist' phenomena as a tool to explain the emergence of new issues in post-war Western Europe.

The theory, suggesting that a new sociological group with new political concerns and aspirations are appearing, forms an umbrella explanation for the emergence of such issues as student politics, environmentalism, feminism, opposition to nuclear weapons and nuclear power and espousal of gay and lesbian rights.

Although Inglehart does not speak specifically about the peace movement some of the questions that he utilises to tap the post-materialist value orientation do refer to issues with which it is associated.

- Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

- Move towards a friendlier, less impersonal society.

- Move towards a society where ideas count more than money.

[34]

These sympathetic goals are not incompatible with the values that inspire participation in the peace movement and thus allow the utilisation of the post-materialist theory in the analysis of the creation of a likely clientele.

Post-materialism embodies two fundamental hypotheses,[35] the scarcity hypothesis and the socialisation hypothesis.

The Scarcity Hypothesis:

This states that an individual's priorities reflect the socio-economic environment and places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in shortest supply. This hypothesis is established upon a derivation of Abraham Maslow's[36] need hierarchy theory, which states that physiological needs, such as safety and sustenance, hold priority over social, aesthetic or intellectual needs. However, it suggests that once physiological needs are satisfied then an individual's priorities for aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction will take precedence. Inglehart proposes therefore that this rank ordering or hierarchy of needs can be defined in basic terms of 'material' needs; needs for sustenance and safety, and 'post-materialist' needs; such as those for esteem, self expression and aesthetic satisfaction.

This scarcity hypothesis proposes therefore, that individual's pursue those needs that are in shortest supply in this order. In post-war Western Europe therefore, the bulk of the population enjoy economic security and ample sustenance and thus Inglehart says that individuals will start to to put

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[34] Inglehart (1981:884)

[35] As described in the 'American Political Science' article of 1981

[36] Maslow (1954)

greater emphasis upon non-physiological needs. The underlying expectation is thus that, periods of high prosperity and affluence will encourage the development of post-materialist values, whilst economic decline would deter their spread. However, this phenomena must be considered in terms of the second fundamental element of the theory, the socialisation hypothesis.

The Socialisation Hypothesis

In this hypothesis Inglehart suggests that it is the experience of affluence in an adult's formative years that primarily affects his value priorities. However, post-materialist values reflect, not one's actual economic position per se, but one's subjective sense of security, these feelings being affected additionally by the influences of cultural setting.

The socialisation hypothesis suggests that the subjective sense of well being in youth crystallises into a value hierarchy that remains intact throughout adulthood with little modification. Human development is fairly rapid in youth but the likelihood of change to the basic human personality decreases steadily after adulthood is reached.

Thus, because value orientations are cemented in the formative years, Inglehart says that new non-physiological values generated by prosperity will not start to emerge for another ten or fifteen years after the period began, when that age cohort begins to enter the electorate and adulthood. Inglehart's post-materialist theory suggests therefore, that a new value cleavage will begin to cross cut traditional economic divisions precipitated by intergenerational cohort effects.

In 1981 Inglehart was able to test his hypothesis in the light of time series data that was not available when he first devised this influential theory. He was hoping to facilitate by this analysis the distinguishing between cohort effects, life cycle effects and period effects, the latter two being rival explanations for the emergence of 'post-materialist' values in Western publics.

His hypothesis predicted that the experience of unprecedented prosperity between 1940 and 1973 would lead to a substantial growth in the proportion of post-materialists whose numbers had previously been minimal in advanced industrialised countries. Thus, if this unprecedented prosperity began in 1940[37] then Inglehart would expect that large proportions of 'post-materialist' individuals would emerge in the electorate in the youngest age cohort in 1950. Furthermore, as time progressed after 1950 he would expect that proportions of post-materialists continue to grow, as this first generation of post-war youth ascended the age cohorts.

However, if life cycle effects were the real motivators of young 'post-materialists' this value orientation would not ascend the age cohort ladder as time progressed and these espoused views would be proved to be a product of youthful alienation, an inherent idealism that would fade away as they took on economic and family responsibilities.

In his 25 year study Inglehart found that life cycle effects were not at work, indeed there was a tendency for given cohorts as they grew older to put *less*, not more emphasis upon money.

The explanation for this tendency according to Inglehart, was due to a period effect with,

> the sharply rising prosperity of the post war era producing a diminishing emphasis on money within each age cohort, quite independently of generational change or aging effects.[38]

Despite the admitted impact of period effects, Inglehart maintains that the intergenerational pattern still pre-dominated in that the differences between the youngest and oldest age groups were persistently and significantly large. However, it was not until 1963 that 'post-materialists' began to emerge most clearly and until 1970 when they attained parity with materialists in an age cohort, naturally the youngest, when the first totally post-war generation reached maturity. The 'post-materialists' in this age cohort were concentrated among, consistent with the theory, the most

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[37] Questionable in my opinion seeing as Western Europe had been involved in war for a year and would continue to suffer it's devastation and economic strictures for another five years.

[38] Inglehart (1981:883)

affluent strata; young professionals, managers and university students. The same groups indeed, described in the preceding section.

In the 1960's the university students were the only group in which 'post-materialists' outnumbered materialists.[39] Their protests and confrontations with the university authorities seemed to characterise the new phenomenon; called the 'generation gap'. Being the first emerging post war generation they represented the vocalisation of burgeoning 'post-materialist' sentiments. Their presence at university also served to expose them to new communication networks that developed their efficacy and political skills.[40]

Although student politics provided the most obvious vocalisation of these values, they represented the growth of an underlying orientation that was not a product of life cycle effects, but a permanent feature of modern society.

The post-materialist theory also provides some explanation of this clientele's greater protest potential. Unconventional political behaviour would be less expensive to 'post-materialists' since it threatened things valued more by materialists. Moreover, this clientele would have more energy to devote to such activities because they were not being used to secure material or physiological goods. Post-materialists might also be more prepared to use unconventional means of participation because of their dissatisfaction with conventional forms of political expression.

Thus, the post-materialist value orientation would not only encourage the expression of new issues but would also provide new radical tactics.

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[39] Inglehart (1981:885)

[40] Habermas (1979) argued that the rise of 'post-materialism' was not caused by the differing generations but by exposure to specific networks. Thus, for a student the university milieu would provide a socialisation process in which an anti-establishment point of view would predominate.

Inglehart (1981:885)

Inglehart does however, issue a caveat upon the applicability of his theory to the British system which he suggested, would experience the same social forces but to a lesser degree than her Continental counterparts and America.

The reason for this warning is that Britain did not enjoy the same levels of economic affluence as her Continental neighbours. Britain's pre-war economic progress was second only to the United States and the highest in Europe. However, by 1950 her relative economic position had declined to third place, and by 1970 Britain had been over-taken by one after another of her European neighbours.

In accordance with this fact the theory suggests that those people who had grown to adulthood before World War II and had known security in their formative years, although few, would be relatively numerous in comparison with other European nations. Thus, in the 1970's at the beginning of Inglehart's research he expected the British cohorts in their mid-50's to show the highest frequency of 'post-materialist' values. Since Britain's economic growth rate following the war had been approximately half that of her European counterparts, he expected the increase in 'post-materialist' values the war to be around half as great as that within the rest of Europe.

Inglehart's theory does seem to be applicable to this case, in that it supplies an explanation of the gradual emergence of a potential clientele for the British peace movement. It suggests that post-material value orientations were gradually growing among the generations who had experienced unprecedented post-war affluence. This affluence accompanied increased access to university education that would reinforce and develop this new social perspective. Moreover, it would also suggest that by the 1980's the peace movement would be able to command support from a larger potential post-materialist clientele.

Inglehart's theory thus supplies a fundamental element to this study, the presence of a potential clientele. The next stage of this study must therefore, account for the motivational factors that mobilised some of these post-materialists into action. Parkin's case study of the first phase of

C.N.D.'s activity reveals some of symbolic meanings that participation represented. His study preceded Inglehart's theory and did not attempt to define the sociological forces that precipitated the growth of a suitable peace movement clientele. However, his examination is compatible with Inglehart's theory because the participants he describes; affluent, well educated radicals, display post-materialist characteristics. Thus, the description of symbolic motivations serves to reinforce Inglehart's theory.

Symbolic Protest

Parkin examined C.N.D's first phase of activity, using observation and quantative techniques to derive his theory of symbolic activity.

Firstly, his study examined the psychological motivators of these participants in terms of Pluralist theory. Those involved displayed a sense of anomie and alienation that drove them to support the activities of this mass movement, suggesting in pluralist terms that their lack of integration was due to a low degree of involvement in integrating intermediate organisations. However, Parkin discovered that;

> C.N.D. supporters can not be thought of as displaying the hallmarks of an alienated sub-section of society in the sense of lacking intermediate links to the social order, as predicted by the pluralist theory of mass politics.

[41] The participants appeared to be active members of many other groups, leading Parkin to suggest that this alienation was more determined by social status.

In fact Parkin found that the majority of the supporters were members of the middle class, displaying an affluent, well educated background, despite their low appreciation of class labels. He

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[41] Parkin (1968:16)

found therefore, that the alienation they exhibited was due to an already developed general deviation from societal norms.

Their opinions revolved around a central attachment to moral ideals above expediency, that encapsulated criticism of the basic normative assumptions upon which society was built. Thus, involvement in C.N.D.;

> was frequently not simply a matter of opposition to the Bomb, but also a capsule statement of his position on a variety of unrelated issues which the bomb was felt to symbolise.[42]

So, although C.N.D. supplied important affectual and expressive functions it additionally supplied a latent function as a rallying point for radicals, in which the means ultimately were more important than the ends, and for which the issue was symbolic so long as it was saliently emotive above other valued issues. However, involvement in C.N.D. was not indicative of an ideologically formal system of beliefs but a facet of a collection of opinions on specific issues, derived from a post war rejection of all-encompassing theories. Parkin suggests therefore, that the character of mass movements will essentially involve the middle classes because their relative affluence allows them to develop a different kind of value perception. Moreover, their success will be undermined by the prevailing attachment to ideals over expediency, and to the possibility of the emergence of another issue that could capture their attention and energies.

In a sense this point suggests that dedication to the cause of unilateral disarmament is not so strong that failure to achieve it will demoralise the participant, for there remain many other suitable issues for them to turn to. Attainment of the goal is not of the upmost, for the dynamics of involvement make the means almost as satisfying.

These propositions do not undermine Inglehart's thesis, in fact they seem to add credence to it. However, it does emphasise an element not stressed in the other theory that highlights the fleetingness of the issue in the perceptions of the 'post-materialist' participants. The demise of the

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[42] ibid., p.38.

issue although dissatisfying did not cause deprivation in that other issues would emerge to tap their value orientation. Thus, these alienated middle class individual's are involved in protest as symbolic of their general dissatisfaction with societal assumptions.

Parkin distinguishes the differing symbolic meanings that the movement embodied for the diverse groupings that sheltered under the 'Ban the Bomb' umbrella.

For the Church elements the peace movement provided a modern day moral crusade that could rescue it from the rut of inactivity, and attract new, inspired and energetic members. Thus, this kind of evaluation of the benefits of the cause involved an implicit criticism of the way the Church functioned in modern society;

> this is one of the great opportunities of the modern age to preach the Gospel, not in fine sermons, but in action... Unless the Church is represented in this movement...this opportunity will be lost and a generation will be confirmed in their scepticism about the Church.

[43] The division that this debate caused in the Church reflected the schism between political and pietistic perceptions of the Churches' role in society. Clearly, for the non-conformist Churches the cause was symbolic of the radical fervour that had characterised their origins, the Church of England, more established in the status quo, proved more resistant to this movement.

At the same time the presence of the clergy enhanced public perceptions of, and respect for, C.N.D.

The Communist party (C.P.G.B.) was slow to join the movement at its inception because they preferred to campaign in favour of test bans, which was in line with the U.S.S.R's proposal for a moratorium and would, they thought, unite the masses better than unilateralism could. Moreover, C.N.D. was unsparing in it's criticism of Soviet as well as Western bombs. In 1960 they reversed their party line as they began to recognise, as the Trotskyist groups had at the beginning, that the movement provided a vital opportunity to recruit radicalised and energetic new members.

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[43] Methodist Recorder 17 May 1962, p.9.

However, their official involvement did bring some advantages for the movement as a whole, (whilst it remained strong enough to resist any attempts to hi-jack the organisation), injecting experienced and tireless organisers.

The Trotskyist organisations, the Socialist Labour League (S.L.L.) and the International Socialists (I.S.), recognised recruitment opportunities whilst remaining fundamentally critical of the movement's middle class character and what they perceived as its discouragement of prospective working class supporters.

The decision to employ civil disobedience tactics was at once praised and criticised;

> because they are middle class .... they see protest as an essentially individual matter.
> [44]

For intellectuals the movement symbolised an opportunity for Britain to regain glory, with a gesture that would prove to the world that although she was no longer the power she had been, she had now grown to moral maturity. Parkin illustrates this point with a quote form the novelist Vera Brittain in 1955, whose sentiments were representative;

> Ten years ago this country faced the world as a great power. Today, it has the opportunity to seek another kind of glory: the possession of great moral leadership, of showing the world a third way between the two great powers.
> [45]

At the same time they enjoyed the affectual benefits of being brought out of the isolation that their position in society necessitated, and supplied the movement with conceptualisation of policies and aims.

As discussed in the historical section of the paper the unilateralism issue supplied a means to fight other battles, for the Labour party and the unions. The position espoused on the defence issue was a clear indicator of the position held towards Gaitskell's leadership. Once the leader was gone

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[44] Newsletter 17 October 1959, p.296.

[45] Parkin (1968:106)

so had the salience of the defence issue, even for those who had so fervently espoused unilateralist sentiments.

Finally for the youth involved in the movement, their participation expressed rebellion against British society The Bomb was a symbol of " the older generation's moral and political bankruptcy."[46]

Parkin's symbolic protest thesis is indeed persuasive, it outlines some of the motivating factors for involvement in the peace movement in its first phase and seems to be coherent with Inglehart's explanation of a new value orientation. However, for Parkin's theory to be justified it is necessary to determine its applicability to the second phase of the peace movement.

Two particularly different groups emerged in the 1980's that had not been apparent in the initial phase, environmentalism and feminism. For these two groups symbolic meanings are easy to hypothesise.

The environmentalists must perceive the nuclear bomb as the culmination of man's thoughtless and destructive use of technological development that has precipitated the rape of his environment and now, the possible destruction of all life.

For the feminists, especially the peace camp women, the movement has permitted women to join together and enjoy a sense of unified identity. For these women the Bomb, or more aptly in current terms, Cruise, has become a symbol of; " nuclear terror, male domination and imperialist exploitation."[47]

Thus we can see that just as the theory is plausible for the first phase of the peace movement, it can also be applied to the second phase of the British anti-nuclear peace movement.

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[46] Parkin (1968:157)

[47] Harford and Hopkins (1985)

Summary

This chapter has helped establish the development of a potential clientele for the movement. The existence of a new value orientation made the issue salient and engendered a willingness to participate in protest activity. Inglehart's 'post-materialism' thesis fits in coherently with the circumstances of this case, and explains the presence of likely participants both in the first and second phase. The previous historical section identified both the building atmosphere of reservations towards the nuclear guarantee and the catalytic events that motivated sentiments into action.

Parkin's explanation of symbolic protest provides insight into the motivations that mobilised different groups support. It also suggests that these committed participants went on to participate other salient issues that tapped their existing value orientation once the peace issue had declined.

However, the thesis so far lacks a sense of the strong motivation and energy that participation demands. The next chapter will attempt to supply a finer understanding of the benefits that participation confers to offset the costs inherent in involvement. Additionally by explaining such incentives it will account for the decline of the movement and of participants dedication in similar terms.

Olson : The Provision of Incentives For Collective Action

The final task of this paper involves the explanation of the forces that caused the potential clientele to be motivated into peace movement activity. The theory that will be used is Mancur Olson's 'Collective Action' theory that supplies a theoretical cost and benefit analysis of group participation.

Olson states that groups exist in society primarily to further the interests of their members. These groups aim to provide collective goods for their members although they may also serve personal or individual interests. However, personal benefits are best achieved by individual action, so members join groups to attain collective goods that they could not gain by themselves.

Olson suggests that a rational man would weigh up the costs of achieving the collective goal against the benefits it would bring. However, the nature of collective goods dictates that groups cannot prevent those who don't bear the costs from enjoying the benefits. Mancur Olson argues that;

> those who do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective goods can not be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of the good, as they can be where non-collective goods are concerned.

[48] Olson uses the analogy of the modern state to illustrate this point. The state, despite the emotional attachment nationalism encourages in the citizen, can not rely upon voluntary contributions to pay for the services it provides. These services, such as military and police protection and the court system, would be impossible to withhold from non-contributors, and thus the state has to finance them with compulsory taxation.

Group participation therefore, will have to be induced either by coercion or by the provision of selective incentives. However, the size of the group will determine members willingness to bear the costs and the likelihood of provision of the good.

In small groups the fraction of the benefit that each participant enjoys will be relatively large so that each or at least one of the members will find that the personal gain exceeds the total cost of providing that amount of collective good. However, the fact that those who do not pay for the goods can still enjoy them, neccessarily means that there will always be sub-optimal provision of collective goods. This is because individuals only enjoy part of the benefit their expenditure provides. Moreover, the amounts of the collective goods an inactive member receives free will be a disincentive to the provision of more of that good at their own expense. This tendency will be exaggerated as the size of the group increases; " the larger the group the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective group."[49]

As the size of the group increases the smaller the fraction of the total group benefit the individual receives. In the larger group therefore, the individual will not gain a great enough share of the collective good to bear the burden of supplying, even a small amount of it. Unlike the medium, or 'oligolopolist' sized group, the individuals contribution in the large group will not make a perceptible difference to its progress. Thus, in a large group;

> it is certain that a collective good will not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside inducements that will lead members of the large group to act in their common interest.

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[48] Olson (1965:15)

[49] Olson (1965:35)

[50]

Moreover, size also affects the costs of organisation both at the group's inception and for everyday functioning. The small group will need little or no formal organisation because the collective good can be obtained by individual action. The middle size group will need tacit or informal agreements to co-ordinate activity, but the large group will need a formal organisation to ensure efficient functioning. For the participant in a larger group therefore, organisation costs will add to the costs of benefit procurement.

Olson emphasises the importance of distinguishing between market and non-market groups. They differ in terms of the goods that they supply. In a market situation;

> the collective good -the higher- price, is such that if one firm sells more at that price, other firms must sell less, so that the benefit it provides is fixed in supply

[51] Conversely, in non-market situations increased membership of a lobbying organisation will not necessarily reduce the benefit for others.

The members of a market group will therefore, wish to reduce its size because of the limited benefit available from this 'exclusive collective good'. In the non-market situation however, the supply of this 'inclusive collective good' will expand as the group expands.

Applying these terms to this case study would make us describe the British peace movement as a large, or latent, non-material group pursuing inclusive collective goods, that sought to mobilise potential and existing members with selective incentives.

In Olson's theory, selective incentives consist of negative inducements, coercion, or positive social, inducements. For these positive, social inducements to be effectively distributed within a latent group, its structure would have to consist of a number of small or federated groups.

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[50] Olson (1965:44)

[51] Olson (1965:37)

The British peace movement was structured in this way, both in terms of being locally organised and being composed of many diverse, religious and political groupings. Thus, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's ability to supply motivating positive inducements was well developed.

The positive inducements that the peace movement offered through locally and nationally organised groups were both affectual and informational. They supplied the member with newsletters, social functions and opportunities to make new friends.

These selective incentives, that only members enjoyed, mobilised the clientele into protest activity and offset costs involved.

However, these incentives could not sustain activity over a long period of time. One explanation for this failure might be that C.N.D. was losing its ability to provide these positive inducements. Although there is no evidence to prove this in the first phase, it is plausible in reference to the second phase. Recent debate within C.N.D. has centred upon the inefficiency of its bureaucracy and the confusion that prevails at the national offices. Local groups have complained of the time spent waiting for materials and information requested from the central C.N.D. office. Furthermore, it is possible that the frustration of not being successful in their lobbying became a cost for active C.N.D. members, that added to the existing expense of participation. This frustration may also have caused members to re-evaluate the tactics they were using, and encourage some to move on to more radical action. This radicalisation of tactics would have further raised the costs involved in pursuing the collective goal, unilateral disarmament, and caused many members to become disenchanted and inactive. A minority persisted using civil disobedience tactics. This raising of the costs of activity may seem irrational but may also reflect emotional or ideological motivations.

Membership of ideological groups may help participants in the peace movement to bear greater costs. Most radical belief systems make the ultimate goal more valuable than the individual sacrifices needed to achieve it. An ideological member's ability to face greater costs therefore, could be a way to gain status and approval within their group.

Membership of the peace movement thus entails complex forces for those participants already enrolled in other groups. Membership of these other groups would confer other selective incentives that might have priority over those supplied by the peace movement. Succinctly deeper loyalties may exist. Such dynamics, complex as they are, are beyond the thesis of this paper.

This chapter has explained the last element of the thesis of this paper, by accounting for the selective incentives that mobilise the post-materialist clientele. It also helps explain the decline of C.N.D. activity after the initial peak of protest, by suggesting that selective incentives were either no longer being effectively provided or had decreased in salience.

The following chapter will bring together the vital elements of this paper; the creation of a potential clientele, the symbolic meaning of the movement, the catalytic historical events and the incentives for mobilisation.

Conclusion

Having examined theories that may help to explain the nature of C.N.D.'s cycle of protest one now confronts the task of trying to shape them into a coherent explanation, that accounts not only for its initial support but also for it's decline and subsequent renaissance.

The first section of this paper outlines the informational background and the historical context of C.N.D.'s cycle. What was most surprising was that events in the 1950's did not excite fears earlier. Undoubtedly this owed much to the British population's preoccupation with national reconstruction (both physically and mentally) and a desire to return to normalcy. The fifties were primarily a period of readjustment and foundation laying.

Inglehart's thesis explains this period well. This atmosphere of quiescence, in a time that obviated the demise of British world influence was also the socialisation period for those who would later participate in new social movements. Regrowth occurred at a relatively rapid rate fostering unprecedented affluence so that by 1958 a clientele emerged who were no longer preoccupied by material considerations but could afford to espouse more intellectual needs. Their increased access to higher education helped them develop a critique of some of the fundamental assumptions of British society. This swell of opinion amongst the young was accompanied by a concomitant value sympathy from older privileged intellectual elements who had enjoyed pre-war affluence.

The implementation of British hydrogen bomb tests proved to be the catalytic event that prompted this clientele to convert these values into actions.

Post-materialism provided the clientele with with a whole range of political and social opportunities which peace movement involvement symbolised.

For the Church, it offered an opportunity to dispel scepticism about it's responsiveness to modern issues, to show that it was an active moral force. For intellectuals it offered an opportunity to re-assert national glory, not as a political or military force but as a moral leader. For political groupings it supplied an active, dedicated source of support and for the young a chance to express their alienation and to expose the older generation's "moral and political bankruptcy."[52] The 'Ban the Bomb' movement was not the sole issue supported by post-materialist participants but it was the most salient at that time.

The costs of participation, in time and energy, were offset by the selective incentives C.N.D. membership offered. These social and informational incentives consisted of newsletters, social functions and a source of new friendships. These non-collective benefits enhanced participation and made the effort involved bearable. For a time.

However, the anti-nuclear peace movement demanded such a high degree of enthusiasm, principled commitment and drive that the failure to achieve desired policy ends would eventually cause a peak of frustration, that selective benefits could no longer stave off.

In the first phase the Labour party dropped its commitment to unilateral disarmament and the national nuclear defence system remained. Moreover, a thawing in the Cold war seemed to reduce the danger of nuclear war, the super powers appeared more responsible and sensitive, and unilateral disarmament appeared less necessitous.

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[52] Parkin (1968:158)

The debate over new tactics caused divisions within the movement to emerge, which eventually resulted in splintering, with many members retiring into disillusionment, whilst a minority progressed to more radical activity. Civil disobedience proved to be no more effective and far less appealing to the general public. Since involvement in the movement was symbolic of a post-materialist type value orientation, many individuals transferred their energies into other compatible causes, raised by current international and domestic events. However, in the late 1970's international events caused these sympathies to re-emerge. Super-power tension reappeared nuclear technology continued to advance, and the British government announced its intention to update national nuclear forces with new missile systems.

The announcement of the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Britain proved to be the catalytic event for the peace movement in the 1980's. These tactical nuclear weapons (both American and Soviet) aroused fears about the arms build-up in Europe.

The defence issue returned to the spotlight capturing the attention of the post-materialists and focussing their energies. The conversion of anti-nuclear sentiments into action was further encouraged by the appearance of similar movements on the Continent and the American bases where Cruise missiles were to be first deployed provided a natural focus for protest action.

In the second phase C.N.D. and other organisations offered selective incentives that mobilised participants. The Greenham Common women's peace camp incurred greater costs for activists but also offered stronger social incentives, that created a powerful collective identity.

By November 1982 frustration at tactical ineffectiveness and the failure to procure a softening of the government defence posture became apparent. C.N.D. decided to resort to direct action, alienating many members for whom arrest was too great a cost to incur. After a year of intense activity members found that selective incentives could no longer prevent disillusionment and outweigh the costs participation imposed. The movement had made some impact.

The Labour party was committed to unilateralism although this was treated warily by those who remembered the betrayal of the 1960's. Suspicions were justified when the 1983 election witnessed a party divided on defence as it was on many other issues. C.N.D had made a concerted attempt to make defence the most important election issue, and had applied its energies to marginal constituencies, but Labour's defeat dashed their hopes. By 1983 the first Cruise missiles were declared operational with the arrival of the transporters at R.A.F. Greenham Common. This must have served to instill frustration and disillusionment.

Moreover, C.N.D.'s bureaucracy had become so cumbersomely large that many local groups despaired of ever receiving desired information and the organisation was admonished for becoming too institutionalised and hierarchical. This inefficiency and disorganisation also impaired C.N.D.'s ability to provide and distribute incentives goods to its members.

The argument of this thesis, concerning the dynamics and cycles of protest of the anti-nuclear peace movement can be summed up in an eight stage process that applies to both phases thus:

1. Post-materialism generates a clientele.

2. International tension builds up, the Cold war deepens.

3. Catalysing, symbolic event- e.g. the domestic government engages in utilisation or, announces purchase of, new nuclear technology.

4. 1-2 years of intense protest, uniting diverse groups.

5. Threshold is reached when C.N.D stops efficiently providing selective incentives that can outweigh costs of participation and frustration with non-success.

6. Splintering occurs, majority gradually stops participating and a minority raises costs and radicalises tactics.

7. Other emerging issues capture the attention of post-materialists.

8. Movement dwindles.

However, the peace movement in Britain has not yet died, despite the lack of attention paid it, and the inherent problems it has encountered. The Women's peace camps still exist, operating with their own group dynamics, and the Liberal party has joined the Labour party in commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament. It is possible that the energies of the peace movement could be reactivated if the organisation could re-generate benefits and incentives that outweigh costs of activity and frustration. Presumably such regeneration would have to involve attempts to streamline the organisation and improve the provision of incentives to mobilise the existing potential clientele. Such a task, although difficult, is not entirely inconceivable.

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Appendix A. Resurgence of C.N.D. Membership in the 1980's

GROWTH OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

	MEMBERS	LOCAL BRANCHES	INCOME($)
1980	3,500	150,000	40,000
1983	70,000	250,000	750,000

SOURCE: 'Missiles a Major Issue in the British Vote'
New York Times May 18, 1983.

Appendix A. Resurgence of C.N.D. Membership in the 1980's

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