A Comparison of EU-U.S. Payments for (Agri-) Environmental Services

Kathy Baylis University of British Columbia

Leo Simon University of California, Berkeley

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Introduction

- Both regions have seen a large increase in AE programs
- Both regions have used AE programs to comply with trade agreements
- Both have used AE programs to make farm subsidies more politically palatable



Introduction

...AE programs in the two regions are very different.

 We will outline some differences, and similarities and briefly discuss possible reasons for the alternative policy approaches

Outline

Comparison over

- Who initiated programs? Why?
- Services targeted
- Vehicle
- Seller Selection and opportunity cost
- Baseline and additionality
- Leakage/Spillover
- Permanence
- Monitoring/Compliance

Possible reasons for the differences
Implications and future research

Who initiated AE programs and why?

Similarities

- Administration/Commission to address trade constraints.
- Department/DG of Agriculture to compensate for outside regulation.
- Side-objective is transferring income to farmers.

Difference

- In EU, AE programs are now more consumer/taxpayer driven,
- U.S. still primarily supply driven.

Services Targeted

Similarities

 Both target similar environmental services (e.g. water quality, soil erosion, nutrient management) which are negative externalities of ag. (substitutes)

Differences (1)

 EU also targets environmental services that are positive externalities of ag. (complements)

Evidence for Substitutes vs. Complements

• U.S. focus on land retirement (87 %)

- Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),
- Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP)
 - VS.
- Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
- Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program
 (WHIP)
- Farmland Protection Program (FPP)
- Grasslands Reserve Program (GRP)
- Conservation Security Program (CSP)

Evidence for Substitutes vs. Complements

EU focus on working lands (82%)
Agri-environmental payments
Land abandonment
Less Favoured Area (LFA) payments

Externality	EU	United States
Soil erosion	Landscape	CRP, CSP
Chemical and nutrient run-off	Organic; stocking rates	EQIP, CSP
Water pollution	Agri-environmental payments	EQIP, WRP, CSP
Habitat destruction	Natura	WHIP, WRP, GRP, CSP
Habitat creation	Natura; Agenv. payments	WHIP
Landscape	Agenv. Payments	None (FPP)
Biodiversity	Rare breeds; pasture	None
Rural development	LFA	None
Cultural heritage	Traditional methods, LFAaylis and Simon, 2005	None

Services Targeted

Differences (2)

 EU targets negative externalities resulting from intensification, whereas U.S. targets negative externalities resulting from extensification.

Evidence for Intensive vs. Extensive

Objective

Reduce Intensification

Reduce Extensification

Support Intensification

Support Extensification Chemical reduction; Organics

None

None

LFA payments; non-abandonment

Baylis and Simon, 2005

United States

None

CRP; WRP; Sodbuster and Swampbuster EQIP (e.g. CAFO)

None

Service vs. Vehicle

 In 3 programs discussed yesterday morning, trees were the vehicle to producing water quality/quantity.

• All three programs targeted vehicle, not service per se.

Vehicle

Differences

- U.S. targets (expected) environmental outputs, and the EU targets inputs.
- Has implication for transaction costs (high information and technical service requirements in United States)

EU Programs - Vehicle

Program	Input	E(Output)
	EU	
Natura	partial	partial
Organic	total	
Reduction in Inputs	total	
Afforestation	total	
Traditional farming methods	total	
Rare breeds	partial	partial
Animal welfare	total	
LFA payments	total	
	Baylis and Simon, 2005	

	U.S. Prog	rams - Vehicle
Program	Input	E(Output)
	United States	
CRP	Cost-share (7%)	Rental (93%)
EQIP		Total
WRP		Total
WHIP		Total
FPP	Total	
CSP	Total	
	Baylis and Simon, 2005	

Seller Selection and Opportunity Cost

Differences

- U.S. programs more likely to reflect benefit-cost than EU
- bidding or competition on quality for CRP, EQIP (pre-2002, some measure still in place)
- EU AE programs (mostly) pay for activity.
- EU payments based at national or regional levels

Baseline and Additionality

Similarities

- Both countries use cross-compliance
- Both countries use AE programs to help support reach/exceed cross-compliance standards.

Differences

- U.S. programs designed to be additional (Due to cost-share provision of EQIP, WHIP) and bidding process (for CRP).
- Exception is CRP land over time.
- Cross-compliance alone would get many of the benefits (of reducing negative externalities) in EU (but probably not politically feasible)
- Additionality in EU r.e. positive externalities

Leakage/Slippage

Differences

- U.S. retirement programs increase price, (and intensification) – not so in EU.
- EU programs encourage extensification, which may increase some negative externalities.

Permanence

Similarity

- Main source of permanence is (farmer) retirement (CRP in U.S., farmer retirement programs in EU).
- Unintended consequence.
- Permanence not on radar (GRP, WRP exception).

Monitoring and Compliance

Similarity

 Never been a known incident of anyone in EU being sanctioned on crosscompliance, and concerns with compliance in U.S.

Are these PES?

✓ Voluntary One buyer (government) x Not Additional (compensation for regulation) **x Multi-objective** x Some payments target inputs, not environmental service x No "link" to demanders of service

Possible reasons for differences

Factors affecting AE policy

- Demand
- Supply
- Political (rent-seeking)
- Structural/Institutional

Indication that demand more important in EU (e.g. public access), than U.S.
Political structure, level of implementation and access affects outcome.

Implications

 Differences in programs will lead to different amount and type of agricultural production.

• EU programs more easily used to transfer income to more farmers.

• Which determinant dominates will influence how hard programs is to change.

Future Research

 How to get a greener ag policy? Prospects for modularity

- Optimal design with joint production
- Study political constraints
- Determinants of AE policy
- Bargaining model of AE policy
- Implications for WTO design


Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-stat
Agricultural value-added as a % of GDP (t-1)	0.326	0.126	0.01
Farm size (t-1)	-0.120	0.020	0
Rural population as % of total	-0.077	0.018	0
Percent of farm land that is irrigated (t-1)	-2.147	1.517	0.157
Farm chemical consumption per ha (t-1)	-0.023	0.005	0
Agricultural expenditure (t-1)	0.080	0.171	0.64
percent of MEPs that are Green party members	0.076	0.027	0.006
Environmental expenditure as a % of GDP	4.404	0.839	0
Domestic tourism per capita	0.044	0.037	0.228
Cross compliance programs	0.398	0.243	0.101
Participation in EU elections relative to domestic elections	-0.040	0.006	0
Participation in domestic general elections	-0.088	0.025	0
Percent of seats elected using proportional representation	1.364	0.473	0.004
GDP per capita	0.248	0.123	0.043
GDP per capita ²	-0.003	0.004	0.366
year	0.104	0.076	0.171
dummy for 2002	-0.035	0.494	0.944
Constant	6.511	2.724	0.017
R ²	0.940		


Baylis and Simon, 2005


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Senate Agriculture Committee Members, 2001