The Interaction of Civic Nationalism and Radical Islam: A Theoretical Examination and Empirical Analysis

Frank Charles Marinello

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
In
Political Science

Dr. Wolfgang Natter, Chair
Dr. Scott Nelson
Dr. Rachel Scott

May 8th, 2006
Blacksburg, Virginia

Keywords: Civic, Nationalism, Islam, Terrorism, Group Identity

The Interaction of Civic Nationalism and Radical Islam: A Theoretical Examination and Empirical Analysis

Frank Charles Marinello

(ABSTRACT)

This thesis engages the question of the impact of religion on civic nationalism in the western European context. Civic nationalism, it suggests, is an identarian nationalist construct that is pursued by a liberal state's population through various historical linkages, myth construction, modern outlook, and propaganda. (Smith 2001) (Gellner 1997) The central question is whether civic nationalism, as a method of unifying a population, can compete with the concentrated cultural influence of an equally viable identity construction. Radical Islam is the focus point of this comparison. A powerful religious identity, radical Islam instills in its members a similar sense of unity through belief in core values and utilizes the existence of external threats to reinforce its allegiances. Through this theoretical and empirical exercise, the profound challenge of the civic nation to maintain feelings of unity without inspiring the imagination and mysticism usually inherent in nationalism is investigated. A victim of its own values, the civic nation aspires to harness the unifying force of more negative forms of nationalism without the hateful and exclusive practices usually associated with such group identities while also denying the deep theocratic roots that give nationalism its impermeable quality. The competition of these identarian constructions is empirically examined through a multi-form analysis of reactions to the July 7th, 2005 terrorist bombings of the London transportation system.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

The creative process required to write this thesis was aided by the insights and guidance of an excellent committee. My thanks to my chair, Dr. Wolfgang Natter, for his guidance in this process from initial research question to completed thesis. Your deep understanding and input at each stage was invaluable to not only the work itself, but my development as a theorist. I deeply appreciate your interest in my theoretical ideas and the time you invested to make them a reality.

To Dr. Rachel Scott, my thanks for your patience in helping me grapple with the concepts within Islam that until recently had been completely foreign to me. Your knowledge helped bridge the vital gap between ignorance and understanding. It is always a privilege to work with a colleague that so obviously loves their field, and that affection was evident in each of our conversations.

Thanks to Dr. Scott Nelson, who I have had the pleasure of learning from for the past six years. It was in comparative government, my first class with you, that I was introduced to this concept known as nationalism and for that I will be forever grateful. Your constant demand for growth has helped instill within me a personal work ethic and sense of self-critique that I know will continue to positively effect my work in the coming years.

Finally, thank you to my family for your unwavering love and support through this entire graduate process. You have always told me to pursue what I love without question, and that advice has stayed with me to this day. Your example has inspired me not only to work hard in whatever I begin, but to maintain a high level of integrity in every effort no matter how small. I am proud to be your son and brother.

Chapter I: Introduction

The nation is a modern mystery to social science. Bound up so often in the realm of concept and metaphysics[1], the nation is an "imagined community" of shared history and culture that is neither wholly constructed nor evolved. (Anderson 1991) Although the study of nationalism has been ongoing since the early 20th century through such theorists as Hayes and Kohn, the struggle to define this subtle, subjective, and internal notion has yet to ease. (Eley and Suny 1996) This thesis will examine civic nationalism, a small facet of the larger theoretical concept of nationalism. Civic nationalism, it will be suggested, is an identarian nationalist construct that is pursued by a liberal state's population through various historical linkages, myth construction, modern outlook, and propaganda. (Smith 2001) (Gellner 1997) Civic nationalism is instrumental for the purpose of creating a unifying sense of comradeship that becomes dominant in times of external threat[2]. It is the realities of what each individual turns to in these perceived times of need which must be elaborated more clearly to better understand the metaphysical mechanisms at work within nationalist identity.

The Research Question

This thesis will engage the question of the impact of religion on civic nationalism in the western European context. The central question will be whether civic nationalism, as a method of unifying a population, can compete with the concentrated cultural influence of an equally viable identity construction. Radical Islam will be the focus point of this comparison. A powerful religious identity, radical Islam instills in its members a similar sense of unity through belief in core values, and, as it will be shown, also utilizes the existence of external threats to reinforce itself. It will be argued that the civic nation's

---

[1] Metaphysics is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter." While the point of this thesis is largely to delve into this concept called nationalism, it will continually be a struggle between the empirical and the metaphysical as this discussion moves from the metaphysical satisfaction that nationalism can create in people to the visceral and real actions that people take in its name.
[2] The politics and realities of how threats to a society are identified represents a theoretical complexity that will not be addressed in this thesis. Threats to both individuals and communities are an aspect of perception that can be argued to exist independently. Threat establishment will, therefore, be described as a tool of the civic nation as assumed protector of its citizenry. The reality of these threats is not of direct consequence, and cannot be appropriately addressed given the established research timeline.

valuation of an open and free society represents a threat to radical Islam resulting in active attempts by its members to weaken peoples' allegiance to their community. More specifically, I will argue that while a cultural force of equal influence to nationalism, such as radical Islam, is necessary to provide a viable identarian construction for an individual, it is not always sufficient to explain the transition of a central allegiance away from a civic national identity to that new identity.(Zubaida 2004: 407-420) A change in identity hegemony is not solely due to the overpowering cultural force of radical Islam, but also to a degradation of the civic nation as a necessary and sufficient metaphysical and material foundation. (Eley and Suny 1996) It will be elaborated that this degradation is a concurrent action resulting from a variety of concerns including the decreased role of the civic nation in the lives of its members, a disconnect between methods of maintaining unity and professed values, and finally, a foundation rooted in rational thought that exposes the community itself to logical criticism in a unique way.

This thesis will theorize that the civic nation of a developed and stable liberal state no longer provides the sufficient sense of comradeship that it has in earlier historical periods. The decline of civic nationalism allows people to adopt other equally powerful culture forces such as religion and "ethnic narcissism"[3] as alternative metaphysical centers. Much in the way that Anderson proposed the opposite during the age of Enlightenment, with religion's universal appeal being dissolved by the power of vernacular languages and local writings, civic nationalism, due to its foundations of openness, is becoming equally disenfranchised as a viable identarian construction. (Anderson 1991) While religion in the civic nation does still exist, it represents a private matter that is intrinsic to the freedoms of liberal society. People who hold to more radicalized beliefs such as types of Islam identify themselves with religion on a level that

---

[3] "Ethnic Narcissism" is a concept taken from *Warrior's Honor* by Michael Ignatieff. This "narcissism of minor difference" (which is also a chapter within the book) refers to the perpetual need of cultural societies to differentiate from the undesirables of a population. Increasingly minute differentiations serve as points of contention in apparently homogeneous settings. In the text, Ignatieff refers to members' of the Serb – Croat conflict using differences in cigarette brand amongst other cultural trivialities to separate themselves from their ethnic enemies. The use of this term is intended to give some reference to the "ethnic" aspect of nationalism, and to recognize that ethnic difference also plays a generous part in an overall understanding of nationalism's effects.
Ignatieff, Michael. 1997. *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

supersedes this peaceful coexistence, instead requiring that the morality of their value structure be applied to all people regardless of choice.

Civic nationalism remains a tenuous concept in modern social science. The extent and purpose of a non-ethnic nationalist community is very contentious. Ignatieff calls civic nationalism a realist acknowledgement of the world, the near impossibility of a region containing a single ethnic group makes various other forms of nationalism far more contrived. (Ignatieff 1994: 5-7) Civic nationalism remains an ideal level of nationalism that is set opposite of ethnic nationalism. Embodying values of multicultural inclusion and liberal values, this concept codifies a state into a community of individuals who voluntarily associate themselves with other people who are said to share these values, and their territory. (Brown 2000: 51-61)

To further examine civic nationalism and radical Islam, a descriptive and illustrative empirical analysis of the London bombing incidents of 2005 will be utilized. What makes this empirical direction so appropriate is that the men involved in this attack were natural born citizens of the United Kingdom with well-documented links to their communities according to a July 13th, 2004 al-Jazeera report. The goal of this analysis will first be to highlight the various forces at work within the British nation, and the value changes necessary to move a member of such a civic nation to lash out at it violently. Study into the identity of the British civic nation will give insight into the process of determining who is given membership in this society and how it handles threats to security. (Kepel 1997) Second, the analysis will define the stages that define this allegiance shift. A media analysis will be utilized to determine the backgrounds of the men involved and establish the demonstrated change from a participant of the civic nation to violent action against it. Finally, an examination of the government's communication and policy language in relation to these events will be undertaken to study the various value messages expressed by the British civic nation. This emphasis on the British government's response recognizes the aspect of civic nationalism that is inherently constructed, and these reactions to breaches of security are strong indicators of the overall ability of this unique civic nation to cope with new threats of identity.

Conceptual Foundations and Literature Review

The essence of this thesis is a theoretical argument that will be constructed through and within a literature review. The purpose of this literature review is to initially discuss the various topics that will comprise the building blocks of the nation theory being developed. (Marshall and Rossman 1999) The overall state of nationalism literature and the ethno-symbolist and modernist approaches to multi-cultural civic nationalism will be the primary starting point for this discussion. This will be followed by an explanation of the radical Islam to tie this theoretical discussion to the beliefs of the men involved in the London Bombings. This will also provide some content that will be referenced by the case study. For the purposes of this introduction, the foundation of study for nationalism and Islam will be discussed.

Nationalism and Civic Nationalism

Borrowing heavily from the works of Smith, this thesis will approach nationalism as a deeply historical and symbolically linked community. (Smith 1999) The ethno-symbolist perspective is ontologically appropriate for the theoretical discussion because of its attention to the various complexities surrounding the formation of the nation. A modern national consciousness can be rooted in a combination of historical identities that embody the conflict and cooperation inherent in long term national awareness. The modernist school of writing will be equally utilized in this study. The most central of the modernist authors will be the work of Anderson. (1991) Examining the growth of national consciousness during the Age of Enlightenment, Anderson's emphasis on the "imagined" nature of the nation recognizes the tacit connection of national identity, and the understanding that a person can feel a part of a whole without direct affiliations with the people around them. (1991) A large group identity is, however, not without its darker side. The exclusion inherent within ethnic nationalism remains in the civic form through the state's justification of violence against its enemies.(Ignatieff 1994: 249) In times of conflict, those who are within the nation are pushed into a system of "othering" that creates a culturally clear distinction from those who are not included in the group's membership. (Said 1978) If the civic nation is bound in ideals of inclusion, can it function as an identity construction without these intense exclusionary notions of purer forms of nationalism? When a civic nation is bound by certain values and acts against

4

them, what is the affect when the misalignment between message and action becomes apparent to its members? These are just some of the questions that are addressed theoretically.

Religion and Radical Islam

While it is not the intent of this thesis to speak towards religion as a general concept directly, several thinkers have taken this direction. Kedourie asserts that religion has been "swept aside by modern society" and can no longer provide the level of satisfaction necessary to fully satiate the individual. (Grosby 2001: 97-119) Civic nationalism, radical Islam and various other identity forces seek to fulfill this need in a more satisfying way. Schleiermacher, in a piece "On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers" states that religion continues to aid in the modern human need to "be a part of a greater whole". (Grosby 2001: 97-119) What defines the "greater whole", however, is something that varies between basically all religions. These statements are nothing more than assertions since a religious connection may vary across individuals, however, they do highlight the western world's privatization of religion into a more internal struggle, and to redefine itself through identity construction. Grosby notes that Islam discourages connections with the secular nation to a degree higher than many other faiths such as Christianity or Buddhism resisting this push towards the internalization of religious values. (Grosby 2001: 97-119) The shadow of radical Islam and its violent resistance to liberal society personifies the need to externalize religion to a greater degree. (Burke 2003) The reactive power of civic nationalism to cohesively join together the population of a state against a threat, however, has not been entirely successful in the face of this externalization. This lose of cohesion inhibits the ability of the civic nation to maintain loyalty within its members and instill the sense of unity it requires.

Islam, as a whole, is very resilient to the pressure to westernize ideas and practices, which often times causes it to be placed in direct opposition to western and even liberal philosophy. (Rejwan 2003) This dichotomy between Islam and civic national values is very much a generalization of the complex relationship that Muslims have with their governments. While it masks the true breadth of the relationship, it is the resistance against open society, I will argue, that the purveyors of radical Islam seek to reinforce within Islam. Historically, however, Islam has been known as a holistic religion.

Religion, law, identity, cultural expectation, and tradition are all, to some extent, directly influenced by the teachings and outlook of the Muslim faith. (Brown 2004) The Qur'an, like all religious texts, is open to interpretation, and the debate over the meaning of parts of this holy book has led people of various goals to act in the name of God through it. This "ikhtilaf," or divergence of thought, has been continually reshaping the face of Muslim politics for the better part of the late twentieth century. (Esposito 1983) The "ummah," or Muslim community, is conceptualized as joining together all followers of Islam regardless of geographic or secular ties into a single community. (Ahmad 1983: 218-229) The manipulation of these values by various extremist scholars makes these cultural bonds all the more potent and appealing to certain people. Radical Islam not only presents itself as a powerful cultural phenomenon, but also one that actively delegitimates various other allegiances such as civic nationalism. This active effort to degrade allegiance works in combination with the previously discussed internal problems of the civic nation to create a more volatile situation.

The British Empirical Analysis and Methodology

In July of 2005, the United Kingdom saw a sequence of low-impact terrorist bombings initially believed to be separate incidents; the proximity of the targets, as well as the uniformity of their detonations (around 8:50am), soon led British officials to investigate this "incident"[4] as a coordinated attack on British soil. The question that perplexed many was how these attacks were undertaken by British-born citizens, who in all regards seemed at the very least tacitly to their communities, but were compelled by radical Islam to lash out at the civic nation.

Connecting Radical Islam and Nationalism

The purpose of the empirical analysis will be to establish a correlation between the crisis of allegiance between civic nationalism and radical Islam with the events that took place in the United Kingdom. The question that must be asked is what process of allegiance shift took place that helped justify the destruction and death towards the secular state and its citizens that was pursued by the London bombers. While there is sufficient literature discussing the cultural power of radical Islam to compel people to

---

[4] The term "incident" was first used to describe this terrorist attack by Tony Blair in his speech to the British people in July of 2005. From that point on, this designation was used almost universally by news outlets.

6

action, as well as the nature of civic nationalism in modern times, this study will investigate these concepts with a new theoretical and methodological perspective that emphasizes the shortcoming of the civic nation as a metaphysical center. Emphasizing freedom and law, civic nationalism does not possess the divine and inescapable qualities integral to traditional understandings of nationalism. While the civic nation is held in a place of central metaphysics, the community it creates is far from imagined. The grounding of civic nationality in rational thought as opposed to faith and comradeship removes any trace of metaphysical mystery from the civic nation, and leaves it in a condition of identarian emaciation.

Methods of Analysis

In order to delve into this empirical study, methods will be employed to accurately assess the conditions that led to the London Bombing terrorist incident. An analysis of media reports regarding the home situation will be used to establish information regarding the group's affiliations and political views. To avoid a measure of media bias, comparisons will be made and documented between three news sources. First, BBC News will be utilized with an understanding of its connection to the United Kingdom's overall liberal outlook. Second, Al-Jazeera will be used with recognition to its greater sensitivity to Islamic politics than other news outlets. Finally, The Guardian news outlet will provide a tertiary source of similar information. The combination of these three news sources will generate a more accurate picture of the facts surrounding these subjects and allow for a more confident analysis of the data found.

The media analysis will center on establishing the actions, movements, and words of the London bombers. More specifically, the nature of their ties to community, town, and state, such as connections to local mosques and schools, will be identified, as well as how these associations have shifted over time through interpretation of their behavior.

Finally, a policy language analysis will be provided of the UK's new measures against foreign dissidents. The emphasis of this analysis will be to assess the policy's ability to both slow, stop, or reverse the decline of civic nationalism and the rise of violent Islam directed towards the United Kingdom. These policies will also be retroactively applied to the information gathered regarding the attacker's actions before the incident to assess whether the policy would have altered the outcome in some way. A

comparison will also be drawn between the methods of British policy and the values that their civic language promotes.

    An analysis of three speeches made by Tony Blair will also be used as a method of identifying the response of the civic nation to these attacks. Examining the makeup of these speeches, with an emphasis on the language and phrasing will give unique insight into how the civic nation reacts to a crisis of allegiance. The first speech to be used will be Prime Minister Blair's speech to the United Kingdom on the day of the attacks. Second, the speech given at the introduction of the new UK citizenship measures will be used to connect the speech analysis with the policy aspect. Finally, Blair's answers at "Prime Minister's Questions" the week after the attacks will be used since these answers are usually more fluid and adaptive than a completely prepared speech.

Desired Outcomes of the Empirical Analysis

The overall objective of this empirical study will be to examine the interaction of two conceptually broad concepts, namely civic nationalism and radical Islam, in a complex environment such as the United Kingdom. If the process outlined within the theory section is indeed confirmed with sufficient effort given to the dismissal of intervening and spurious relationships then it will be recommended in the concluding section that further case examinations be pursued in a similar methodological manner.

Overview of the Thesis

The thesis will be divided into four major sections. First, a brief methodology section will outline the process of analysis that will be used to fully examine the British empirical analysis and the theoretical examination. Second, the literature review and theory section will establish a ground work of shared theoretical understanding through which the conceptual interactions that have been theorized in this thesis will be defined. Third, the process and results of the case study will be given, concluding with a section applying the theoretical relationships to the actual situations. Fourth and finally, the concluding section will examine the viability of the theoretical framework with relation to the empirical analysis and sum up the positive and negative results of the overall exercise. This conclusion will also make efforts to identify the next logical step in terms of research in the field, as well as give suggestions of how to better study this topic in the future.

Chapter II: Methodology

Approaches to the study of nationalism are quite wide ranging. From the more ethnographic works of Ignatieff to the statistical works of King, Keohane, and Verba, it has become obvious that all forms of methodology are viable in exploring this phenomenon. The following section will outline the methods of the entire thesis from aspects of conceptual research and literature review through to each aspect of the empirical analysis. The goal of this section will not be to explicate the various rudimentary building blocks of the research, but rather to place this methodology in comparison with other approaches. The comparison given will strengthen the reasoning for each methodological choice and present a strong argument for the tools that have been selected. It is also essential to create a codified blueprint for the work as a whole to give an order to the pursuit and to maintain conceptual clarity throughout. This section should not be interpreted as a justification of the numerous methodological choices made for this thesis, but rather an explanation of why each of these choices is optimal for the study being presented. It is not only for the sake of ontological due diligence that this is done, but to utilize methodology as a tool of reinforcement rather than restriction.

The first section will highlight the conceptual sections of the thesis. The methodology of designing the process trace of the theory will be explained in detail. This section will also go into the various methodologies behind the design of the research question itself, as well as the theoretical hypotheses presented as its answer.

The second section will involve the British empirical analysis aspect of the thesis. As with any multi-faceted approach, the inclusion of each various method must present a meaningful investigatory addition to the study. The use of each tool of the study will be individually discussed and then concluded with a more holistic argument for the resulting amalgamation of techniques.

Theoretical Methodology

Much of the theoretical section of this study surrounds establishing a relationship and interaction between a series of concepts. As is stated in *Designing Social Inquiry*, "social science conclusions cannot be considered reliable if they are not based on theory and data in strong connection with one another and forged by formulating and examining

the observable implications of a theory."(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 19) This dual emphasis on both empirical and theoretical methodology represents the efforts of this thesis to provide a meaningful empirical analysis that also draws implications that can be generalized to many other cultures and situations. This theoretical "leverage" will become increasingly evident through the literature review section through which the broad definitions of overall theory will be reinforced. (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) The generalizability of this study will also be greatly reliant on the connections made through the literature review section, and, more specifically, the process tracing used as the centerpiece of the theoretical argument.

The Research Question Examined

The first step toward establishing the methodology of a thesis is to examine the strength of the research question itself, and, specifically, how the question may be found incorrect through the course of the exercise. (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 19) The central research question of this thesis concentrates specifically on civic nationalism and whether that identity formation can endure as a unifying factor when in metaphysical competition with an equally influential and diametrically opposed formation, such as the form of radical Islam being studied. Since the main argument of this thesis is designed to expound on the overall weakness of civic nationalism as an identity construction, the question is how this question can be equally disproven through this study. If, through this study, it is found that the civic nation is capable of keeping its citizens aligned with the sovereign state to any measurable degree, then the belief that the civic nation is foundationally weak will be incorrect. Although it is possible for the research question to be proven wrong, this finding will still be a very interesting ontological contribution.

Process Tracing

Process tracing is a method by which the effect of some variables upon others can be demonstrated through causal stories. (George and Bennett 2005) The overall goal of this process is to investigate an amount of interconnectedness between the concepts being used that reinforces the slow evolution of allegiance and the complexity of nationalism as a construction. George and Bennett argue that the interconnectedness of a process trace is one of its true strengths lending to the idea that identified intervening variables represent positive additions to the overall explanations.(2005: 206-207) The goal of utilizing this

research method as the central theoretical body is to allow for the vast complexity inherent in a social organism, such as the civic nation. At the very core of the research question remains the bi-variate relationship of the civic nation's cultural power as the dependent variable, and the effects of Islam as the independent variable. As it was discussed in the introduction, however, it is meaningful internal conditions within each of these concepts that generate the change in relationship. The effects of intervening variables on both conceptualizations are necessary and essential to an understanding of the research question. Process tracing is, therefore, very well suited towards dealing with multiple variable interactions. What ensures the reliability and utility of this system is the process itself, as stated earlier the interdependence of the system allows for a coheasity that is malleable while being strong enough to withstand methodological scrutiny. As George and Bennett suggest, if an intervening variable is found to play a meaningful role in a certain step of the overall allegiance shifting process, then the hypothesis must be retroactively adjusted to compensate for such a change. (2005: 207) Such changes will most likely be identified in the theory testing phase of the thesis and will be addressed in the concluding section.

An essential foundation for theory is a concrete starting relationship between the two main concepts. To accomplish this, the literature review section will attempt to appropriately define the concepts being used and reinforce these definitions with previous literature on the subject. The epistemological understanding of civic nationalism and Islam will serve as a fixed point from which to assess the significance of each process point. It must be conceded at this point that, in the reverse, a misalignment of each concept would cause the overall process tracing to be initially flawed and, therefore, possibly reach an incorrect conclusion. The literature review section will make several observations concerning the foundations of both Islam and nationalism that must be addressed and defended fully before the interaction between each can be truly investigated. This forms the theoretical section of this thesis into a defined two part pursuit. First, the literature review will define the terms and place this thesis within the overall literature involved. Second, it will pursue the hypothesized interaction between the two main terms throughout the various stages of the interaction.

Empirical Analysis

As explained in the introduction, the empirical analysis aspect of this thesis will be largely a theory testing exercise. While it can not be said that any theory would line up well with a real world example purely in terms of efficacy, the goal of the empirical analysis will be to investigate the interaction of the theoretical concepts in the modern world. With the complexity of any cultural environment being studied, more and different variables must be accounted for; therefore, this section will start with small supplementary view of overall situation in the United Kingdom directly associated with the specifics of the empirical analysis. While the exclusionary principles of the theoretical model will remain intact for the empirical analysis, it is necessary to provide greater evidence for these exclusions. The use of a single case is useful to provide the high level of cultural detail needed for this theory to be examined, although

Designing Social Inquiry (DSI) critiques the use of a single case quite severely in a number of its sections. (King et al 1994) It will be a useful exercise to counter their points to help explain how the single case is most appropriate for this situation. DSI states that if there is only one frame of reference, one cannot remove the possibility of alternative explanation since it is impossible to "find variation in the explanatory variable" and alternate hypotheses could not be investigated through original observations. (King et al 1994: 119) The great advantage of a case is that although the thoughts and beliefs of the people involved plays some role in the situation, it is the deeds, movements, and language of the individuals that is being studied. This creates a far stronger foundation from which to judge motivation and explanation. Through the police investigations and government documents being utilized, the connection between the men being studied and their connections to radical religious groups will be more than apparent. Although causality would dictate that with these men no longer alive their true motivations are known only to themselves, the exclusion and systematic removal of other variables that may have lead to such an extreme violent outburst will not be entirely impossible. It is the gravity of the actions being studied that allows for clear lines of reasoning and motive to be gleaned. If this case was dealing with a more subtle demonstration of religious allegiance, than this critique would be correct, but in the case of this terrorist act, establishing Islam as the explanatory variable is not a

justifiable concern. With regards to the variation of the explanatory variable, as explained earlier, the fluctuation of both the independent and dependant variable is precisely the reason that this theory is being approached through the process-trace. The interdependence of the steps in the overall process-trace welcomes any variation as a part of the overall system. Finally, all subsequent hypotheses will indeed need to be tested through the original observation of the case; however, the variety of methods being used to examine the data will help to triangulate the effects being studied.

DSI's second critique of the single case method is the opportunity for measurement error in a poor research design. The true risk of this error is that the hypothesis given may be incorrectly proven correct, or alternate hypotheses that are uncovered may be wrongfully dismissed. (King et al. 1994: 210) The first, more obvious, answer to this critique would be that this case does not revolve around operationalized variables in the spirit of DSI, and, therefore, is less bound by the statistical rule structure of the text. Secondly, the goal of this study is to examine the correlation between civic nationality and religious allegiance not causality, since the subject being studied is conceptual and only observable through actions and words of the people compelled by them. While measurement error is a concern with all social science research, the inclusion of other cases in this study, as DSI suggests,[5] would not do very well to adjust for this problem. The addition of extra cases would simply make the issue over-complex as a whole since each state has its own unique form of civic nationality, and religious expression that would have to be adjusted for theoretically. The positive gain of error reduction would be clouded by the vast complication of cross-cultural comparison. Admittedly, the addition of various other cases will be essential in reinforcing the theory in the future, but at this stage a single case is appropriate for testing its basic viability and far more in the realm of logistical possibility given the time allotted for research.

The final critique of DSI regards "determinism," reminding that there is always a chance that some "omitted variable" has an unforeseen effect on the information being studied. (King et al. 1994: 210) All social science research provides reasoning

---

[5] The 6th section of DSI that contains this set of questioning is entitled "Increasing the Number of Observations", and makes the case for increasing the number of observable phenomenon to add to accuracy and reliability. pp. 208

for relationships that is only probabilistically accurate, and therefore the reduction to a single case severely undermines the probability that the explanation given is valid. (1994) Once again DSI quite accurately conveys a major problem of social science research, and this admittedly cannot be compensated for with any amount of efficiency. The addition of cases in this situation would not alleviate this problem to any measurable degree, however, due to the increased possibility of spurious relationships involved in the variations in culture. The theoretical foundations of this thesis explain that civic nationalism is inherently immeasurable statistically. It is neither appropriate nor plausible to measure any of the given concepts in such a rigid, quantitative vein. A dismissal of quantitative reasoning is not, however, a disregard for empirical evidence. For the purposes of correlation, the various types of data being provided should be compelling enough to observe the theorized relationship in context.

The Methods of the Empirical Analysis

The purpose of this section is to explain how the various methods that will be used to examine the London bombing incident contribute to the investigation of the research question. Each method is designed to illuminate a particular aspect of the bombing incident provide reinforcing information that will determine the condition of both Britain's civic national identity, and the state of religious allegiance in that society. Information regarding the cross tabular, media, speech, and policy analyses will be given in detail individually and the section will conclude with a defense of the methods as a codified methodology for the analysis.

Speech Analysis: The Parliament

Within days of the London bombings, the government of the United Kingdom had released not only statements and speeches, but also a policy agenda to combat the fear and disconcertion that had spread throughout the country. A truly integral part of this communication is information from the Prime Minister who is often looked to as the leader of current government. Much in the way that President Bush spoke on the rubble of the World Trade Center in 2001, Tony Blair was compelled to step forward and comment on the tragedy. The tone of these speeches played a significant role in terms of the actions taken by the United Kingdom; it helped to frame the response to the situation. It is in times like this that specific appeals to civic nationalism are expected to appear in

14

public speeches. The head of government is expected, in times of crisis, to bring the people together. The truly compelling issue at hand is how this was done. To answer this question, an analysis of three speeches will be utilized.

In order to explain this methodological choice, a series of questions must first be answered. The first is why the speeches of the Prime Minister specifically were chosen to be examined. Second, why dialogue analysis, as opposed to other methods of speech analysis? Third, the choice of the three specific speeches being used: the Prime Minister's first speech after the bombings, the first Prime Minister's questions after the bombings, and the speech before Parliament at the introduction of the first set of citizenship reforms. Finally, the purpose of this examination in the overall study must be explained to highlight how this pursuit of a common language affects civic nationalism's cultural struggle.

As it was explained in the introduction, civic nationalism is something that is knowledgably manipulated by the state to bring together a citizenry in times of inner turmoil, conflict, or crisis. While this type of manipulation is a key aspect of understanding civic nationality, the establishment of such feelings is not to easily accomplished, as will be explained in the theoretical section. The insulation from external threat remains one of the key roles of nationalism as a "defense mechanism" of state solidarity. With each crisis, the ability of the government to maintain order and control over its territory is drawn into question, and attempts to rally a population together through a language of unity ensure that support remains with the state's actors. Although it is a civic construction, this type of "othering" creates the "us versus them" mentality needed to maintain social control in times of relative discomfort and fear. (Said 1978) Through a textual analysis of three speeches by the Prime Minister, several important pieces of information can be gathered. By identifying a repeatable pattern of nationalistic language, the perceived existence of the civic nation can be ascertained in its production. The very acknowledgement of its existence, in combination with its attempted invigoration through speech demonstrates the state's agenda to manipulate these nationalistic feelings for its own purposes. The identification of state agency in this situation is vital to the overall study because it moves the concept of civic nationality from the realm of theory into the arena of political decision making. No longer existing as

an amorphous or loose concept, civic nationalism has become a recognized tool of a national regime, and with that realization, the importance of the overall research question is reinforced. The speech analysis of the empirical analysis, therefore, represents a significant step between the theoretical workings and real-world applications of this project.

When examining the speeches in question, a textual analysis will be used to identify what will be called "nationalistic language." This will be defined as any language which specifically references the state level community, values, morals, identity, or any other indicator of shared consciousness. (Brown 2000: ; Gellner 1997: ; Ignatieff 1994: 249; Smith 1999) This language will then be catalogued according to frequency and analyzed in the following ways. First, the proportion of the speech dedicated to nationalist language compared to other subjects will be analyzed, and the significance of the nationalist section will be discussed. Second, the type of nationalistic language will be separated into three main sections: statements which are specifically directed towards internal unity and togetherness, statements that are intentionally directed towards separating those within a national community from those "against" it, and finally, statements that urge actions to uphold a "nationalist" way of life. This cataloguing will help to examine British nationality as a construction. One would expect to find an over abundance of positive nationalist statements with a minimum of negative (type 2) statements within the British civil nationality due to the United Kingdom's history of promoting a free and liberal society. With the civic nationalism of the United Kingdom established, a more thorough examination of the citizens involved in the London bombings can now be pursued.

Media Analysis: The London Bombers

While media analysis is not the optimal method for gathering information about specific individuals, the time constraints and realities of this project demand that creative means of information retrieval be used. This does, however, present an interesting opportunity to examine the news coverage of British media in comparison to international sources. Media sources possess a variety of both positive and negative attributes that must be accepted and adjusted to obtain the information desired. Not being a primary source, media coverage can possess any amount of bias or slant towards or against the

16

subject of each story. Media coverage can also be censored in some situations by state oversight, or information may have been held back to aid in investigations or security. Finally, since the information is being gathered by a secondary source, verification of the information's authenticity can be quite difficult. Alternatively, media sources command far larger resources than a single academic researcher. The access of press officials also is broader than the private citizen, gaining information that may be out of reach to others. The positive benefits of this method must be discussed further.

The investigation of the men responsible for the London bombings has been extensively covered by a variety of news sources, and an assortment of information pertaining to the daily lives and practices of these terrorists is now a part of the public record. For this reason, media sources are an optimal way to establish the environment in which these men were raised, and help to demonstrate the interaction of Islam and civic nationality in their communities. The bias of media as a source will be adjusted for through a process of data triangulation. Three separate news sources will be used to reconfirm data, and detect any active bias within any one news source. For this purpose, the main news source will be from the British Broadcasting Company. This is a decision of pure utility. The BBC, due to the location and victims of the tragedy, has covered the bombings in far greater detail than any international news agency. This makes it an excellent source of information, but still leaves the information susceptible to the aforementioned bias. To help adjust for this news from the English version of Al-Jazeera will be pulled to counter the framing of the BBC's reporting. Al-Jazeera is an excellent choice for two major reasons. First, since it reports largely to the Arab and Muslim world any western biases inherent to media are not likely to be present. Secondly, Al-Jazeera still endeavors to be seen as a credible international news outlet, and therefore is unlikely to actively skew its findings in a contrary direction. The relationship between these two news outlets is one of "expected" bias. The BBC is undoubtedly expected to have a British bias due to its location and role as the U.K.'s primary news carrier. Al-Jazeera is the primary news carrier of the Arab world and, therefore, is expected to have a slight bias on issues involving Islam and Arab politics. The third source for this study will be taken from the Observer, a national news source that is known as being more vocally critical on British issues than the BBC. This will help to provide a domestic

perspective that is in opposition to the BBC with a different social agenda. Through the combination of these three sources, a more accurate picture of the men being studied can be constructed.

The goal of this media study is to catalogue two major subjects in relation to the London bombing incident. First, the media study will be used to reconstruct the backgrounds of the men responsible. The theoretical section will cover the construction and maintenance of civic nationalism and by confirming this in subjects, the congruence between the two will be reconfirmed. In order to achieve this, an embrace of certain civil actions and practices will be identified. Any record of the men working within their communities, having ties to legitimate political parties, voting behavior, and or service efforts will be documented with the hope of presenting these men as former citizens "in good standing." Affiliations with non-violent groups will hopefully be a key piece of evidence for this point. The dynamic shift to violent protest will also be traced vis-à-vis the more radical practices of these men up to the point of the attacks in order to identify evidence for the shift to a religious loyalty. A key piece of media in this aspect will be the notes or videos left behind by the bombers explaining their reasoning for their actions. These notes represent an almost primary source of information for how these men perceived their own allegiances. The precise attraction that radical Islam exerts toward certain people will not be examined in this case, but rather the emphasis will be more generally on the effect the acceptance of that identity construction on allegiance to the civic nation.

The second aspect of the media study will be to examine the reaction of the British state to the bombing and the situation as a whole. The key identifiable characteristic will be examining the correlation between the words and deeds of the government. Much attention will be paid to whether or not the nationalistic conceptions of British values are maintained in this situation, or if incongruence between the liberal civic nationality and governmental action begins to appear. It is expected that some incongruence will be present during the initial stages of recovery do to fear and lack of coordination, but that the connection between governmental language and action will merge back into consistency as information on the event grows and perceived control over domestic security increases.

Policy Analysis: The British Anti-Terror Agenda

Policy analysis is essential to the empirical analysis because of the nature of public government. While hard-lined language may be an indicator of future legislation, only physically introduced measures and plans are true evidence of governmental activity. The purpose of the analysis is to investigate two basic items. First, that the government is taking measures to maintain the state's civic nationalism, and second to examine whether those measures taken are consistent with the values and cultural norms of that nation. While civic nationalism is a method of maintaining state unity in times of crisis, often liberal values are not made a priority at these times. It is this hypocrisy between speech and implementation that will be discussed with relation to civic nationalism in the theory section.

The first section of the policy analysis will surround establishing a set of operational definitions for the standard terms in the policies being outlined. Terms such as terrorism, citizenship, unity, civilization, freedom, justice, British-ness, and others will need to be discussed individually to understand how the measure being analyzed treats each concept.[6] (Collins and Glover 2002) A focus of this examination will be the breadth of each term's definition. It will be assumed that the generalization of negative terminology to encompass more actions is an inherently defensive act on the part of the government. Likewise, any attempt to sharply and narrowly define positive terminology whether it be rights, freedoms, or beliefs will be seen as a defensive move on the part of the government.

Second, the usage of words which are consistent with the language of nationalism seen in the policy analysis will confirm that the state is seeking to effect or maintain nationalistic feelings at least in some small way through measures and legislation. This confirmation is significant because the policy being used can then be compared to the values being professed in the British national language. It can be assumed (although it will be confirmed that) the nationalistic language of Britain will be identified as

---

[6] Several of the words being used in this section, specifically terrorism, unity, freedom, justice and civilization are discussed in detail in *Collateral Language* by John Collins and Ross Glover. This work goes into the usage of these works in the post September 11th, 2001 world and how they are manipulated for various purposes within the United States context. The meanings contrived by this book are not inherently useful due to the American context, but the language surrounding terrorist activity is still an excellent starting point for this analysis.

extremely egalitarian and civil due to its Western acclamation and open cultural society. The actual intent of the policies then should interline with the professed value of both the language and the legislation itself. This seems a logical progression since policy should be a reinforcement of language and vice versa.

Conclusions

The preceding methodology section represents not only a selection of various tools, but also an amalgamation of method and theory. While it is important to understand the choices made in relation to how research will be conducted for this thesis, it is equally important to understand how each of these choices interacts with others. The combination of multiple methodologies within a single case will give a depth of understanding that will be a definite contribution to the study of nationalism and radical Islam. With the opportunity to continue, the exclusions that have had to be made for the sake of project time can be investigated more thoroughly, and a better understanding of this subject can be reached. Though this section has separated these various methodologies within the actual thesis, the incorporation of all of these methods into a single analysis will hopefully invigorate the theory section with the temperance of real world experience.

Chapter III: Theory and Literature

It has been stated that the process of this thesis will be to move from the theoretical to the tangible. Much in the same way, the following section will endeavor to make periodic landmarks, moving from generalizable terms to the theoretical specifics of the research question. In order to utilize concepts within a relationship, the operational definitions of each must be fully explored. The purpose of this is to build a solid theoretical foundation to properly examine the research question of whether or not civic nationalism can compete against an equally compelling cultural allegiance such as religion. To this end, nationalism will be examined in detail moving from early understandings of the general terminology to the specifics of liberal civic nationalism with an emphasis on placing this thesis within the current literature. Concurrently, this section will also center on addressing the literature and theory specific to both Britain and radical Islam to properly frame the empirical analysis and give proper notice to the cultural specificity of the region.

Nationalism as an Idea

Whether a society is based on principles of individualism or communalism, the camaraderie shared by those who live within a given place is undeniable. It seems human nature that people are more comfortable with others who mirror their own upbringing and overall perspective. Valuing the same ideals and holding the same truths gives people a common ground from which a passive trust can develop. This trust brought on by comfort is due in part to the need of people to perceive those they interact with as rational individuals. (Berlin 1997) A common thought process or value structure makes a person's behavior more predictable, and so the stress of interacting with this person is reduced. Hans Kohn stated that the central explanation for nationalism is a human predisposition towards preferring that which is familiar. The human mind understands that the man from some other area may be in all ways better than one's own next door neighbor, but it is the lack of common ground and the possibility that this person is far worse in some core way that drives people to insolate themselves from those who are different. (Kohn 1967)

There is some debate as to what nationalism truly is as a concept. Since nationalism is simply the identification of a behavior within groups of various sizes, it is

21

difficult to establish even a working conceptual definition that encompasses the variety of situations that people identify as nationalistic. Nationalism is concerned with how people identify themselves as being a part of a society. Anderson called this society the "imagined community" and explained that people develop a "horizontal comradeship" with those around them (Anderson 1991). The description of this community as "imaginary" should not be construed that it is in some way unreal to those within it, but rather due to the lack of a direct personal connection between the members of these groups. Lacking a defined hierarchy and structure, the loose nationalistic connection between people wanes in times of prosperity, but unifies in situations that call for will and abilities far exceeding the grasp of "individual and small interacting groups." (Druckman 1994: 43-68) How this amorphous connection is established, and for that matter, how there is even a recognizable trend between each incarnation has been debated fiercely between a variety of theoretical schools on the subject.

Nationalism is a term that is used to describe two separate areas of study. The first category, commonly referred to as "statist" nationalism is a concept attributed to the need for groups to be self-governed (Gans 2003: 29). Associated with the legitimacy, a nation is described as a cultural grouping that exists separately from the borders of the demarcated world. Nationalism in this respect refers to the desire of these cultural groupings to maintain their own borders and not be controlled by others. (Dogan 1994: 281-305) A distinction is made between benign and malignant nationalisms in this direction of study with malignant versions desiring self rule, and benign nationalisms having a relative complacency with the governments of their geographical homeland. (Evera 1994: 5-39) This type of study also utilized early examinations of fascism and the hyper-nationalism associated with the use these feelings to justify the expansionist agendas of the time, and to separate this aggressive nature from the more "positively" driven national consciousness of the liberal world. (Hertz 1941: 409-415) The earlier studies of Wolf maintain that nationalism as a political movement should be the end result of all study of the subject since addressing it separately from its consequences would not be inherently useful. (1973: 441-443) Nationalism in this direction of study is considered to be more of an issue of state security, and is less concerned with the

psychological factors that joined these groups together and made the nationalist perspective possible.

The other direction of study on this topic revolves around studying nationalism itself as a freeform concept as opposed to nationalism as a political movement with a specific end. Han Kohn's *The Idea of Nationalism* examined nationalism through historical discourse to investigate how this feeling of connectedness developed throughout Western history. (1967) Kohn examined nationalism as a logical progression of human nature to seek out comfortable surroundings and to understand the actions of those around them. Kohn attempted to identify the various types of nationalism by connecting them to the various regions of Europe in the past. Kohn associated civic forms of nationalism with Western Europe, citing the development of liberal philosophy in that region . Germany and eastern regions of Europe were associated with less civic notions of nationality citing the xenophobic and ethnically based associations of the area. This notion of a continuum between civic and ethnic nationalisms would help to shape the study of nationalism throughout the 20ᵗʰ century, although it has been noted that neither purely civic nor ethnic forms of nationalism exist functionally. (King 2002: 367-389; Kuzio 2002: 20-39)

Nationalism as a Concept: The Beginnings

Defining nationhood has been a long standing challenge to the scholars of the past century. Max Weber was very instrumental in early modern understanding of this concept, and he chose to approach the subject in terms of what nationalism was not. He comments that all aspects of culture that may define what brings a nation together cannot explain the formation of each of these groupings. In the same vein, however, he notes that a completely subjective definition of such a concept would lead to vast over-generalization. (Smith 2001) Smith, in the preceding explanations of Weber's understanding, notes that consensus for such a conceptual definition has never been attained within the academic community, but there have been several exclusionary principles that have united the various definitions that have been developed. First that "the nation is not a state, and that it is not an ethnic community (2001: 12)." This is due to the fact that a nation is not a legal entity in the international community, and it does

not possess an institutional framework that highlights a sovereign body. More difficult, according to Smith, is the differentiation that it is not an ethnic community. To this point, he argues that a nation is accentuated by its historical binds to a "homeland" and the establishment of a public culture that defines and differentiates itself. (2001: 12-14) He also emphasizes the great importance of "the need for self-determination" and "need for autonomy." (2001: 12) Throughout this examination, the primary understanding of what the nation is not will remain constant, although Smith's justification for these exclusions will be challenged. Each author has a measure of specificity to his or her examination, and the variation will be quite striking. With this basic overview in place, a more detailed examination of the individual definitions of ethnic-nationalism can proceed.

Perennialism: The Early Works

Early nationalist works that predated the Second World War took a unique stance on the creation of the nation that lingers to this day. For early authors, the nation was an ancient and persistent grouping of peoples that existed before the birth of the modern state. This was very empirically useful in explanations of why some people rebelled against their own societies to gain independence. Perennialism does not demand specific traits from an understood or recognized grouping of people, but simply suggested that people at their core feel their connection to homeland and shared culture before modern constructions of the state. (Smith 2001) Since this type of ancient bond it is often used in a nation's defense of its rights, this represents a strong counter-argument to later political theorists who will argue that the nation is a creation of modernity. Perhaps the most useful contribution of this perspective is the concept known as "recurrent perennialism" which argues that a nation forms and dispels throughout time persisting to reform once again when the environment is correct. (Smith 2001: 51) This remains a core concept to many other theorists that do not prescribe to the perennialist perspective itself, but see explanatory value in this conceptualization. (Smith 2001)

The modern offshoot of this perspective, known as "Neo-perennialism" comes from such authors as Adrian Hastings, who utilizes several of the observations of modernism to reinforce his own perennialist position. Hastings argues that a nation exists well before each person conscious of it; therefore, the cultural foundations of many

nations formed well before the time that modernists claim. The feeling of belonging that is a key piece of a national identity would have been constructed before it could even be named. (Smith 2001: 14-15) Arguments like this have breathed new life into the perennialist argument, as will several modernist writers who incorporate aspects of this theory into their perspective.

The Modernist Perspective

The modernist perspective is perhaps the widest ranging of the "top down" approaches to nationalist study. It represents at its core a new effort to understand the nation. In many ways a creation against perennialism, early theorists rested their efforts on determining the beginnings of these social entities and not as much their effects on daily life.

Perhaps the most cited of these theorists is Ernest Gellner. Initially published in the 1970's, Gellner's works embraced a new understanding of nationhood, and was decisively critical of the pereniallist perspective. He argues that perennialism should not be considered a theory because it presupposes that national identity is simple a fact of human existence, and that this "it's just natural" perspective hinders research into its causes and consequences. (Gellner 1997: 7)

Gellner proposes that with the industrialization of the world and the rapid movement of societies from agrarian to urban environments a gap has formed in the identity of the average person. No longer able to ascertain meaning and identity from their surrounding environment, they are forced to look for similarity within the masses that surround them. This connection lies dormant as a strong, but not dominant part of one's identity until a catalyst invokes this national identity into action. The first of these catalysts is "socioeconomic condition," which changes during economic downturn, great influxes of other cultures, and situations that affect the livelihood of a given national group. (Gellner 1997: 60) Existing cultural traditions such as a weak state or lack of enforcement can also be a catalyst by making a group more likely to pursue its own "solutions" to problems. (Gellner 1997: 61) Finally, Gellner points to the ideologies and moralities of those individuals within a nation and the effect that those considerations have on their actions. Specifically he argues that "roots against reason" place the logic of

the enlightenment against the romanticized and illogical feelings associated with national identity. (Gellner 1997: 66-71)

In conclusion of his study, Gellner examines the Czech nation for the point of its creation. He uses this case because of the variety of starting points given by historical sources within this country. He concludes that the Czech nation is a force born from historical traditions, but also altered by the modernization of that country. (Gellner 1997: 96-101) A modernist, he states can take stock in the pereniallist creations of some culture, but also sees the modern world as having a profound effect on how those cultural feelings are expressed. (Gellner 1997: 93)

Wimmer proposes a far more inclusive definition of nationalism on which to base modernist research. In his analysis, the nation is compromised of five major aspects that each present a method of inclusion and exclusion to the people in a society. First culture is separated into those who are accepted within an "imagined community" (see Anderson) and those minorities that are singled out. The law dictates who in the nation is an official citizen, and who is considered foreign. The social aspect separates those who have regional claim to a territory and those who have immigrated into a region. The military aspect is its army, which pushes out mercenaries with no actual allegiance who embody the nation. Finally, the political aspect separates those who claim to be representing the will of the nation, and those who represent foreign interests. (Wimmer 2002)

Spencer and Wollman place a good deal of significance on the difference between "good" and "bad" nationalism. (Spencer and Wollman 2002) In particular, they utilize the example of Yugoslavia as a demonstration of exclusionary nationalism. The fraction of the Yugoslavian state after the death of Tito exemplifies the kind of pressure that newly freed national feelings can exert upon a society. The violence between competing nations in this region illustrates the various forms that nationalism can take. Within all areas of this region, national groups formed from historical associations, religious identity, cultural roots, or even more modern associations. Each group is undoubtedly nationalistic, possessing a want to defend itself against cultural attack, and desiring autonomy, but the various particularities of these groups represents a very violent and "bad" form of exclusionary nationalist fervor. Yugoslavia is a very interesting case

because it represents the creation of nationalist groupings in reaction to the loss of a patriotic force. With the fall of Tito's generated civic nationalism, communities were left with a vacuum in their social identities that quickly became filled with these ethno-nationalist identities. (Spencer and Wollman 2002: 138-141)

Some theorists go so far as to label ethno-nationalism as the typology for negative nationalism itself. Brown uses a historical case study to reinforce his hypothesis that civic nationalism, which is generated around a unifying civic value, represents the positive nationalist outlet. Brown sees the dynamic between civic and ethnic nationalism to be not just polar opposites, but rather a scale with some incarnations falling in a place between the two. Perhaps the most positive of these is multicultural nationalism, which he defines as a civic nationalism that attempts to incorporate the cultural identities of the ethnicities it encompasses. Ethnic nationalism is the opposite to him in this regard because of its inherently "reactive" nature that forces it to lash out at opposition, and cause extreme types of actions. (Brown 2000: 66) In the case of Rwanda, Brown suggests that the myth of superiority surrounding the Tutsi population of that state lead to a division between the ethno-cultural nationalism of the unified Hutu tribes, and the civic nationalism installed by the colonial powers. (Brown 2000: 162-164)

In *Theories of Nationalism*, Smith sums what it is that keeps people bound to a nation in such a complete way, but is tentative regarding the motives of this kind of social grouping. The first is that there is an inherent human need to belong to a group for the purposes of social belonging and self-identity. Smith rebukes this idea, stating that the nationalist collectivization that has taken place throughout the world was largely due to colonial influences, and without such influence much of the world would be devoid of this kind of social stratification. (Smith 1983: 28) Smith argues that while there is some human need to belong, the kind of minor and varied association that nationalism provides is far from socially healthy. (Smith 1983)

Second, nationalism is very well suited to replace the social gaps lost by the destruction of other social identities. It is this ability to develop from both positive and negative outcomes that has caused the intense growth in the past century. Finally, perhaps the most destructive drawing force of nationalism is its ability to overshadow associations

27

placed against it with ancient or even mythological claims that place it close to the core of someone's identity. (Smith 1983)

The irony of nationalism in Smith's perspective is that this modernist creation that was manipulated by the Western colonizers so very well, eventually leads to the uprisings against colonialism. The key to understanding the violence and destruction caused by this Western concept is then to return to its creation within Europe. Smith uses the work of Kant to demonstrate the beginning of the individualist perspective, and the danger that these self-creating identities contain. Kant revolutionized the European perspective of morality and identity with his pursuits of free will as an inherent human right. This kind of revelation leads to this new form of imagined identity construction that was based around no legal or even physical grouping. This type of ideology helps us to understand the violence that takes place in the name of the nation. Free will enables those with the certain disposition to alter their own morality in the face of some perceived situation. No longer anchored to the religious or philosophical morals of the past, humanity was free to forge its own moral foundation, and at the same time was given the ability to alter it at any time. (Smith 1983)

Smith sees the containment of nationalism throughout the world as a push from a more dangerous "ethnocentrism" to a more diverse "polycentrism," which sees value in the multitude of nations in the world. This type of understanding, however, should not be seen as a push for homogenization. Smith warns against the push by some theorists for a global citizenship, reminding the academic community that it was this type of alien western typology that caused the unseen consequences in the nationalist framework. Peaceful coexistence, or "integration," is not something that can be placed upon a society (or the world in this case), but rather it must be sought out and blended into a culture slowly and without pressure (Hah and Martin 1975: 361-386). Smith, like most modernists, is very concerned with the shift of nationalist sentiment from ethnic origins to religious. The combination of the vehemence of nationalist conflict with the intense stratification of religious practices has created a very volatile new hybrid within the world that must be researched in more detail. (Smith 1983)

The Ethno-Symbolic Perspective

Myths and Memories of the Nation represents Smith's departure from pure modernism into "ethno-symbolism," which emphasizes the shared symbols, cultural iconology, and history that generate nationalistic feelings. Smith also investigates "myths" and reconstructive histories as a source of cultural cohesion. He makes special consideration to the fact that history is often subjective within a culture. Each group decides what to remember and forget, without remorse for what is lost. History becomes a self-defense mechanism to forestall a danger, or heal a past injustice. This is known to happen during long periods of warfare, when normal expressions of culture are destroyed. (Smith 1999: 84) The rampant secularization of a region can also bring about this practice, as a way to preserve the tradition thoughts and beliefs of a people. (Smith 1999: 84) Finally, myths can be a shield against commercialism, and the homogenization that rampant consumerism can bring to less developed societies. (Smith 1999: 84) The ethno symbolic approach is very interested in the recurrence and staying power of nationalism as a force in the world. Smith states that the nationalism of the late 20th century represents a cultural wave effect with new nationalisms rising and falling in search of equilibrium with the global community. He indicates that nationalism is not the most powerful of global forces, but it remains tenacious and unpredictable. Perhaps the most telling trend of nationalism is its slow decline as states are more inviting for various ethnic groups and borders are slowly reworked to compensate for national stress. Smith argues that the overall trend of nationalism is towards peaceful existence, although it may appear in more ugly forms. (Smith 1999)

This observation is not enough, however, since ethnic nationalism remains a very dangerous factor of the modern world. Smith postulates that the persistence of these ethnic outbursts is caused by reference to a group's "golden age". This is the historical memory of the myths, ideals, heroes, and stories that each nation possesses, and uses to inspire each successive generation. Smith argues that the power of a nation is best judged by the degree that these stories are accurately conveyed and recorded between generations. This golden age is not, however, a fantasy to the people who possess it. It sets the standards for each group, for "what is and what is not to be admired and

emulated." (Smith 1999: 263) This kind of deep normative memory is central to what makes nationalism so very persistent. (Smith 1999)

Perhaps the greatest contribution of Smith is his of the notion of "ethnie" (the French for ethnic community) to the nationalist debate. (Smith 1998: 191) The use of symbols is very important to the growth of a nation because it makes unique small aspects of a culture, and gives people tangible means with which to identify him or herself. These "ethnies" remain grounded in ideas of "collective destiny" and "shared memory", which allow them to move within a populous, being adopted in some scenarios, and pushing people out in others. (Smith 1999: 192)

"Nations and Culture" voices some of the concerns of Hutchinson regarding the modernist claim that nations are homogeneous. He argues that the "value-empty" approach employed by many modernist thinkers does not open research up to the historical interpretation and politicalization that every nation applies to its shared history. (Hutchinson 2001: 74-97) This facet of nationalism must be addressed, he argues, before a universalized or communal citizenship can be pursued. Culture is not simply a unique facet of each person's identity, but also a tool used by some political forces to press forward some agendas, and undermine others. Hutchinson cites examples in the Ukraine, Russia, and China in which nationalism is used as valued political force. The cultural neutrality that some modernists espouse to, the author argues, simply does not exist in many contexts. (Hutchinson 2001: 74-97)

The ethno-symbolic approach is not perhaps the most useful of the theoretical perspectives that have been examined thus far, but it does present a line of reasoning that is vital to any discussion of ethnicity. Far too often, other theories seem to interpret the idea of history and experience as an objective action, but this approach reminds us that all historical interpretation is, at its core, subjective, and the choices made by each person along history help to determine how a nation perceives itself. One must be mindful that the causes that some people die for may well be historical fictions that have become true through the things done in its name.

The Social Constructivist Perspective

Benedict Anderson is an excellent example of a modern day cultural theorist. With work and case studies ranging from Indonesia to Europe, Anderson's approach can be considered a cultural genealogy of various factors that have lead to nationalism's rise to a global force. Perhaps the most telling of Anderson's work is his broad definition of nationalism, which he sees as "an imagined political community, and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." (Anderson 1991: 6) This community is "deeply horizontal" with little vertical hierarchy and exists within a population that does not necessarily express its own membership outwardly. (Anderson 1991: 7)

The nation, to Anderson, represents a continuation for those who are part of it. As people live and die, the nation lives on in remembrance of those who have sacrificed for it. This aspect of nationhood is attributed to the desecularization of society that came with the Church's decline in people's lives. As people began to lose faith in the self-salvation offered by religion, they began to hunger for other ways to endure beyond their own death. The nation was able to fill that vacuum as a way for the memories of a people to persist far beyond a generation. Anderson warns that this aspect of nationhood is very dangerous to the world at large. To threaten a group's nationality is equivalent to threatening the souls of all those who strived to maintain it. It is this grave investment in the nation that Anderson claims is the cause for the unthinkable violence and horror done in the name of preservation. (Anderson 1991)

Anderson also sees the diversification of language as an essential spawning point for national identity. With the decline of the religious tongues, each individual culture was able to print its own books in a local dialect. This caused a separation in media, and eventually in culture itself. Language became a much greater divide as the books one read or the stories they heard were dictated by what was in their own language. This destroyed any semblance of shared identity held by people within Europe at the dawn of publication and polarized each culture around its chosen vernacular. Anderson's work points towards language as a great divide amongst people causing confusion and limiting even the most basic conversations. This caused many people to disdain those who spoke other languages and write them off as uneducated or unfriendly. Language above all other

cultural factors is physically divisive, and it is this real world difficulty that helps to reinforce Anderson's theory. (Anderson 1991)

Inclusion and Exclusion

Nationalism at its core represents an interaction of the two major cultural principles of inclusion and exclusion (Heath et al. 1999: 155-175; Smith 2005: 436-470). Inclusion represents the positive nature of nationalism to bring people together in peril-less situations. Inclusive ideologies affect a sense of pride, togetherness, and connectivity that improves people's lives and pushes them to support their communities and each other. The civic nation is inherently inclusive since it lacks the genetic barriers to entry that are a part of more ethnic forms of nationalism. The connection between people in a civic nationality is not blood, but rather an intense desire to maintain the atmosphere of freedom and protection inherent in a liberalist society. In theory, all who conform to the ideologies of the nation are invited to participate in the application of these values. Civic nationalism does not, however, in some way override the ethnic origins of the people within these societies (Smith 2005: 436-470). People are taught to appreciate the differences of those around them, and not to include these factors into their national consciousness. Feelings such as racism and ethnocentrism are theoretically discouraged by the civic nation, but how are these feelings addressed in terms of other nationalities? Association with a certain nationality displays a passive belief in the superiority of that society over others. If this is the case, can a civic nation be built on concepts of inclusion but still fulfill these feelings of competition? These feelings are rooted in a human need to belong, and while they are inherently positive, the actions people will take in order to preserve this environment can be both violent and negative.

Alternatively, nationalism is also very much defined by feelings of exclusion. Inclusion within an ethnic nationalism is an inherited trait that can not be gained by a change in political or moral values. (Yack 1999) Civic nationalism, theoretically, does not possess this genetic requirement, but in practice it is quite difficult to remove the motive of exclusion from it. Yack comments that members of a civic nation are victims of the "myth of consen,t" believing that they are unified solely by adherence to a chosen set of common principles. (1999) He notes major problems to this belief. First, the practice of birth right citizenship conveys inclusion within civic society without any

professed allegiance to political ideology, while also mirroring the genetic heritage of ethnic nationality. Second, the practice of geographical citizenship maintains that people born within the sovereign borders of a state are members of its citizenry. This also devalues loyalty to the core principles of the civic nation. This political mythology represents the motive of the civic nation to actively manipulate the ethnic nationalities of its citizenry and to combat these negative feelings of exclusion with more positive outlooks. An excellent example of this is the work of Habermas, who tried to steer German nationalism away from its ethnic roots in the era of German unification preferring to utilize a more civic value system. (1999)

Civil Nationalism as a False Construction

Increasingly it becomes obvious that civic nationalism is not functional in its idealized form. Altering observed practices from cultural and ethnic groups, liberal societies attempt to simulate this feeling of unity while discarding the overtly negative mentality, but with several major flaws. The first and most obvious problem is the dual allegiance between ethnic and civic origins for each individual. (Gorenburg 2000: 115-142) Adherence to a civic nationality is in theory a choice, and in practice an association of proximity and time. (Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005: 135-155) Ethnic nationality, alternatively, is an inherited allegiance that can be either accepted as a group association or dismissed as a simple piece of genetic heritage. Ethnicity, however, can not be eliminated entirely. Regardless of one's predisposition, ethnicity is a trait which must be dealt with to a certain degree. (Eriksen 1991: 263-278) Be it the negative prejudices of others or family tradition, members of civic nations, such as Turkey, must deal with the inequities of a multicultural world along with the pressures to conform to the ideals of civic nationality. (Conover, Searing, and Crewe 2004: 1036-1068; Smith 2005: 436-470) This places members of a purely civic state in a situation where the allegiance to one's ethnic origins may be diametrically at odds with loyalty to the sovereign state around which the civic nation exists.

The second problem associated with the liberal attempt to maintain the civic nation is the metaphysical foundations around which it is built. The ethnic nation is not based around a value assumption. Since members of an ethno-cultural nationalism are connected to their group through blood ties, there is a level of infallibility to the

relationship. "Blood" relationships have a familial quality that draws a level of loyalty beyond choice. Each person has no choice when it comes to their ethnicity and this creates a shared fatalism that unites. (Ignatieff 1994: 249)

The great flaw of civic nationalism is the assumption that a chosen allegiance is in some way more powerful than a given one. Civic nations are built around a choice to dedicate oneself to a liberal society. This foundation is flawed for two major reasons. First, liberal doctrine is a man-made set of principles that is able to be both argued for and against. (Grosby 2001: 97-119) It is within the realm of reason that a person could be convinced to disregard their values in a way they could not disregard their religion. The ability to disregard is not congruous with the ability to alter one's allegiance. Although civic nationality can be indoctrinated into a citizenry in either childhood or adult-life, the ability of liberal philosophy to be normatively engaged in logical debate makes it vulnerable to other allegiances which cannot be engaged logically due to their infallible nature within the human mindset. One can argue that liberal society is the best way to maintain peace between people, but it cannot be argued that it is better to be one religion than another without engaging in semantics. This fallibility makes civic nationality inherently weak in comparison with many other cultural allegiances. The second major weakness of civic nationalism is what can be called the passivity of compliance. Since civic nationalism utilizes both geographical and birth based citizenship instead of pursuing an active allegiance to liberal principles, it is both possible and probable that an individual may be counted as a member of a civic nation without being in any way loyal to that nation. This is a concept identified as "uncritical conformity" (Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005: 135-155) An individual can both enjoy the benefits of liberalist society and even participate in its functions without valuing its continued existence or counting themselves among its members. Even more insidiously, a person who has a direct conflict with liberal principles can present themselves as a member of a society for the purpose of degrading the allegiance of others. It can not be said that this is not possible in terms of ethnic nationalism or religion, but rather that the ability of a person to sway someone from their given values is far diminished in these alternative situations.

It cannot be said, however, that civic nationalism is a completely weak identity construction. The history of the Western world is full of examples of liberal societies

joining together in times of conflict and overcoming issues of religion, ethnicity, and culture to endure. Like all forms of nationalism, civic nationalism is most potent in times of external threat. (Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005: 135-155) These external threats help to codify the inclusionary or exclusionary principles of a nation, and bring people closer together by placing a value on nation in everyday life. (Eriksen 1991: 263-278) As Smith and the Ethno-symbolist school suggest, symbols and shared historical memory keep nationality viable in times of relative peace, but in the case of civic nationalism two major issues have hindered the reinforcement of these values. (Billig 1995: ; Smith 1999) The first is the freedom of liberal society itself. Notions of nationalism that do not encompass liberalism are free to be bolstered by supporters at all times. The value liberal society places on alternative viewpoints, freedom of speech, and individual belief, in concert with civic nationalism's inherent ability to be logically critiqued allows for a situation in which the principles that liberalism values being inherently destructive to its own survival. With the progression of history, developed western civic nationalisms have fallen victim to their own success. With the change of Western warfare from a geographically local to a distant issue, the need for the civic nation as a unifying force in the lives of a state's citizenry has declined. Since it has been many years since a direct threat to a state's sovereign territory has been apparent in Europe, an individual's membership in a civic nation has been moving from a place of pride in one's mindset to a vestigial label. While "banal nationalism" does press against this through the active use of nationalist language discussed earlier, the pure effort of a true threat undoubtedly begins to decay the allegiance. (Billig 1995) Without the active reinforcement brought on by the manipulation of nationalism, the persuasive force of ethnic origins, religion, and other identifying allegiances have been allowed to be central in the mindset of the individual.

Once this alteration has taken place, the engagement of someone's loyalty to the civic nation will no longer have the metaphysical centeredness it previously possessed for two major reasons. First, since civic nationalism is inherently weaker than other identity constructions as has been previously discussed, it is unlikely that a person would choose to forsake some other cultural construction in lieu of a less compelling notion. Second, since metaphysical centeredness can only be gained through a combination of a

powerfully compelling cultural force seeking dominance, and a considerable weakening of the current metaphysical center, it would require a severe devaluing of the new cultural value system to allow for this change to take place. Much like the decline of religion during the Reformation, a severe degradation of a cultural system is not something which happens regularly. This places civic nationalism in a perpetually negative relationship in which new allegiance can only be generated in times of external conflict, and peace inherently devalues the connection itself. The question is then how does civic nationalism protect itself from this inherent structural flaw? The answer to this goes back to civic nationalism's utilization of particularly non-liberal practices to compete with ethnic loyalties. Just as birth and geographical citizenship are used to mimic ethnic heritage, the civic nation is forced to employ non-liberal methods to maintain the loyalty of the citizenry. (Newman 2000: 21-41) The first anticipated method of peaceful reinforcement is an increased use of nationalist language in times of relative peace. (Billig 1995) Attempting to mimic the needs of a country in times of conflict, the state is compelled to establish a need for it within the citizenry. Second, actions can be taken to reduce the lawfulness of questioning the civic nation itself through political manipulation. (Eley and Suny 1996) Although civic nationalism can be debated logically, it is within the power of the state to reduce the likelihood that the average citizen would engage in this discourse through punitive measures.

"Group identity" will be classified into the scale of three major affiliations used by Talmune. The first and most basic of these is "affective involvement," which classifies an individual's identification with their familiar surroundings and homeland. The second, known as "goal involvement," encompasses the individual's alignment of goals with the perceived group or nation, tying the success of him or herself with the success of the whole. Finally, "ego involvement" represents a complete connection of emotion between the individual and the group. (Davis 1999: 25-47; Mayerfeld 1998: 555-578; Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005: 135-155; Tamir 1993)

Using these classifications, liberal civic nationalism can be identified in times of relative prosperity as a largely affective involvement with the nation being more of a positive association than an allegiance. British nationalism specifically can be identified as a largely inclusive system that approaches this level of attachment for the majority of

its citizenry. (Heath et al. 1999: 155-175) Rothi et al demonstrate that this attachment, as was theorized earlier, does increase in response to a perceived threat within the United Kingdom, although they note that the perception itself is also based existing allegiance. (2005: 135-155) British national consciousness was far more prevalent during the imperialist period up until the earlier twentieth century due to the group involvement brought on by the aggressive expansion of British interest. (Kumar 2000: 575-608) British civil loyalty has somewhat declined since the end of the British imperial period that culminated with the end of the second World War, however, moves have been made to accentuate loyalty towards the civic nation through more passive means such as citizenship oaths, and language. (Sales 2005: 445-462)

Radical Islam

While the dynamic against civic nationalism has thus far been described in relation to a more general arrangement of cultural forces including ethnicity, it is necessary to address Islam specifically as a cultural force and to define several key terms to facilitate further discussion. It is undeniable that the modern world has been in many ways shaped by the force of radical Islam as an identity construction manifesting ever more commonly after September 11th, 2001. Unique unto itself, Islam represents one of the most holistic major religions with insight to not only the spiritual world, but also to how humanity should be governed albeit in a very generalist sense. Classical Islam dictates that God's law, or "al-Sharia", should be used to gather a just and right society of the faithful. (Brown 2004: 120) This combination of spiritual and real world values highlights the intense need for Islam to retain a moral centeredness in the lives of believers. Like all religions, Islam hinges on the infallibility of faith and dogmatism absent from the need to fully explain that which is believed. Islam, not being intensely involved in the Enlightenment in Europe, never engaged the intense push to pragmatism that, as discussed earlier in the discussion of Anderson, redefined the role of western Judeo-Christian religions to a less centered position in people's lives (Thompson 2003). The far expanded role of Islam in comparison to these other religions has created a contrast, as Islam has had a significant impact on the state-craft of the countries that contain Muslims in high numbers. In situations where a secular state has grown around a Muslim community, a certain amount of tension has developed, and in some situations,

37

such as Egypt in the 1980's, caused violence against these leaders. (Esposito 1999: 138-139) It should not be generalized, however, that this implies that people of Islamic faith, or even ones with extremely conservative beliefs, cannot peacefully exist separately from an Islamic society. More specifically, it is certain radical interpretations of Islam (such as those professed by the people examined in the empirical analysis) that are threatened by Western society more directly. (Er-Rashid 2003)

The work's of Sayyid Qutb remain some of the most influential works of Islamic scholarship of modern times, having provided the philosophical foundations for the Islamic movements in Egypt of the 70's and 80's and radical Islam around the globe. (Esposito 1999: 137) Through an examination of Qutb's interpreted teachings by al-Qaeda's scholars and the further ideological inferences made through these interpretations, radical Islam can be properly framed as a hostile and violent identity construction. Through this effort, this section will define radicalized Islam not through its cultural strength, that being inherent to all incarnations of peaceful Islam, but rather a philosophy defined by an intensely paranoid and self-reinforcing ideology that has helped the violent acts carried out in its name to be justified. More generally, radicalized Islam is classified by a series of ideological goals that can be applied to groups less violent than the ones being studied. Usually classified by an intense sense of purpose, radicalized Muslim's are characterized by a codified sense of what it means to practice the Islamic faith. This is personified by the shock that Qutb expresses in his writings upon seeing the degradation of Egyptian society. (Burke 2003: 50-53) The moral center of Islamic faith is the Qur'an, the religious text of poetry and word that passes the teachings of Allah or God through his true prophet Mohammed. Although the Qur'an in its native Arabic is universal throughout the Muslim faith, interpretations of its teachings are wide ranging with the semantics of various passages being points of contention between different religious scholars. Perhaps the most common of these is the use of the term "jihad", which has been defined differently throughout the span of history as something as a range of things from "inner struggle" to "holy war."(Cook 2005)

According to the Qur'an, it is the obligation of a proper Muslim to actively pursue jihad, and with the variety of definitions of the word the actions taken in its name can be quite different. (Brown 2004) Qutb's writings took exception to the secular rule of

modern society questioning a system that places human beings in charge of others. (Qutb 1964) To Qutb, the removal of Allah from the rule of men represented a great desecration of Islam's teachings.   The main drive of Islam is to realize "tawhid al-rububiyya" or the oneness of God in all things, and thus mirror human existence after the will of Allah. (Ramadan 2004) The Muslim world had lost sight of this aim within itself and this corruption within the leaders of Islam was deemed by Qutb as "al-Jahiliyya." (Esposito 1999) Qutb himself dismisses the western conception of "religion" as "belief in the heart, having no relation to the practical affairs of life." (Qutb 1964) This rejection of the western liberal way of life and its emphasis on a coexistence of religion absent from secular society is one step towards placing radical Islam in an opposed position to the conception of civic nationalism. The very man-made quality so valued by the liberal world represents a complete threat to the followers of Qutb and al-Zawahri's reading of Islam as well as less violent conservative Islamic groups. What began as an observation on the leadership of the Muslim world by Qutb to unify the Islamic world had been reinterpreted over time to represent a far more external and foreign threat to Muslims from the west by al-Zawahri and al-Qaeda. (Burke 2003)

Al-Jahiliyya: Corruption and Paranoia

To truly grasp the perspective of radical Islam, a deeper understanding of al-Jahiliyya must be investigated. A word meaning "pre-Islamic barbarism", Qutb used al-Jahiliyya to describe the world beyond the influence of Islam that had become degraded and morally bankrupt, as well as a state of being outside the laws of his view of Islam. (Kepel 1985: 37; Scott 2003: 42) Taking issue with the concept of democracy itself amongst other things, Qutb objected to putting men in charge of society instead of deferring to the guidance of Allah. This constituted a violation of "hakimiyya" since these societies give sovereignty over people to things other than God. (Kepel 1985: 48) Taking a pragmatic view of the situation, Qutb believes that a vanguard of Muslims must fight against al-Jahiliyya society and bring the entire world under the rule of Allah, not to convert people to Islam, but to govern them in a way that "applies" the tenets of Islam to the whole of society. This fight against corruption must be pursued, in Qutb's eyes, because the existence of al-Jahiliyya threatens the continuation of Islam itself and actively wishes to destroy it. (Scott 2003: 43) Muslims who were apart of these societies

had been made accessories to this condition by involving themselves in the democratic acts that place men in the position to be objects of worship. (Kepel 1985: 49-56) Declaring for a "takfir" or excommunication against these Muslims, Qutb declared that these people had become "apostates", or Islamic people who have turned away from the teachings of Allah. (Kepel 1985: 58) Qutb leaves his definition of al-Jahiliyya quite open, not commenting on whether it applies to the leadership that guides these societies or the people as a whole. (Kepel 1985: 56-57)

This open definition has paved the way for scholars such as al-Zawahari to interpret this to the widest degree possible. To the beliefs of these radicals, al-Jahiliyya encompasses a threat to Islam in a variety of ways. Using the ethnic and religious histories of the West, radical scholar's theorize that western involvement in Islamic affairs represents not only the society of al-Jahiliyya corrupting the very existence of Muslim rule on earth, but also a manifestation of Jewish and Christian plots against their religion. (Esposito 1999: 212-289) This Crusader/Zionist plot represents the sheer paranoia that defines radicalized Islam and is key to explaining the extreme actions against the West. Member's of radical Islam who act in its name are fighting against this perceived near universal threat to Islam and are unwilling to coexist with such a ruined civilization.

At this point, it must be emphasized that although al-Qaeda subscribes to an interpretation of Qutb's teachings, it is not in itself a religious group with philosophical ends, but rather an amorphous and disconnected paramilitary organization with express strategic goals. More specifically, the overall goal of al-Qaeda is the removal of western influence from Muslim regions, in particular Saudi Arabia, occupied Iraq, and Afghanistan, through direct violent acts on both governmental and civilian targets throughout the western world. Those people who are indoctrinated into this group are trained to believe that the religious justifications taught by al-Qaeda scholars morally justify the methods of the group and its ends. Al-Qaeda's vilification of the west represents an attempt to unify the Islamic world as a whole against a common and incurable enemy. It is this perceived irredeemability between sides that creates the stark contrast between radical Islam and civic nationalism necessary for the ideological conflict being discussed.

Civic Nationalism and Radical Islam: The Interaction

So it has come to pass that in the modern multi-cultural world, members of a civic nation with a value in the liberal ideals indoctrinated by the state have been introduced to the radical ideals of extremist Islam. As it was theorized, the transition between values must both result in an increase of a new allegiance and the degradation of the current one. The central question is now can civic nationalism withstand the concentrated cultural influence of an equally viable identity construction? The answer to this question cannot be answered easily, however, it will be argued that a civic national consciousness bereft of the purposefulness of external threat ceases to be nationalism in a defining form, and enters a state of weak association that remains metaphysically centered only if no cultural association actively works to reveal the weakness of its foundations and assume the metaphysical center.

If this is true then the idealized form of civic nationalism described by Kohn, Ignatieff, and Smith is not nationalism at all, but rather a separate allegiance to liberal values that cannot be properly classified as nationalistic unless the various methods and practices of religo-ethnic nationalism is incorporated into it (Ignatieff 1994: 249; Kohn 1967: ; Smith 1999). The aspiration of Western society to this goal of the "good" civic nation represents an ethno-centric understanding of the world that only works in a society based in active compliance and submission to the ideals of the liberal state. This places the civic nation in a precarious state in which virtually any group identity rooted in an infallible notion of either destiny or truth can draw away its members, and dominate their values. Radical Islam represents a power cultural force that not only actively pursues metaphysical centeredness by nature, but also inherently devalues the western liberal value system. The rationalism brought forth by the Enlightenment, like all identifications, can not displace a current cultural allegiance, and the very "progressive" nature of liberal thought weakens its comparative foundations. This leaves the civic nation as an identity construction that can only be maintained through a normative, imperialist, or violent way that reassures the righteousness of the nation through action alone where logic fails. The question is then, where does this leave a multi-cultural civic nation with little to no external agenda and equally little threat to its sovereign existence? This will be heuristically examined in the empirical analysis.

Chapter IV: Empirical Analysis

The Bombing of the London Transportation system: Background

On July 7th, 2005 Prime Minister Tony Blair stepped out of the G8 conference and commented to reporters that a series of four explosions had occurred in London around 8am. [7](*Blair says "terror will not win"*; Blair *In Full: Blair on Bomb Blasts* 2005)While he could not confirm, he did comment that the close timing of the attacks seemed to suggest a coordinated terrorist attack on British soil.[8] The four bombs were placed at various sections of London's transportation system with two attacking the double-decker bus system, and the second two targeting the London's underground rail system on the Circle line and Picadilly line.[9] At the time of the bombing it was unknown what groups of people were responsible for the attacks. As relief and recovery efforts continued it became clear that each attack had been carried out by a single man, armed with around ten pounds of homemade explosives held in backpacks.[10] At this point, four men: Mohhamad Sidique Kahn, Hasib Hussain, Jermaine Lindsay, and Shehzad Tanweer were now confirmed as being the bombers themselves, and the investigation into the backgrounds and motives of this group commenced.[11]

---

[7] 2006. *Blair says "terror will not win"* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4659933.stm.
  2006. *Dozens killed in London serial blasts* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/812224c7-006d-4424-b15b-ec3e8381a4d7.htm

[8] Katz, Liane. 2005. What we know about the bombings. *The Guardian*.
  Press, Associated. 2006. *London Bombings were 'coordinated'* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
  2006. *Bus 'ripped apart' in the explosion* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4659387.stm.
  Wenbourne, Scott. 2006. *London blasts: 'People were screaming'* BBC News Online, 7 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4659633.stm.

[9] 2006. *London toll crosses 50* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4b6eab37-d592-4cff-ae92-c731ce1850a7.htm.

[10] 2006. *London Bombs likely crude, homemade* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8464d8b0-8f0b-433e-b4ab-7880a2a3e9f6.htm.
  Cowan, Rosie, and David Adam. 2005. Experts link explosives to July 7 bombs. *The Guardian*, 23 July 2005, pp 2.

[11] 2006. *Pictures of London suspect released* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2463ca8c-c411-4ba4-94af-211dd13ac930.htm.
  2006. *UK Bombing inquiry widens* BBC News Online, 16 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/03397e06-24c2-4634-8dac-7d845b4e90ab.htm.
  Hayman, Andy. 2006. *Police News Conference: Full Text* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4676909.stm.

The attacks on London by the four bombers represents a very interesting moment in the history of the United Kingdom. The British approach to multiculturalism has been held in very high esteem by its people. The origin of 'Britishness' comes from the expansive influence of the British empire.(Conover, Searing, and Crewe 2004: 1036-1068) Originally indicating a servant of the British crown, the decline of Britain after the Second World War led the national identity of the state to change directions; embracing the conflict between liberal capitalist thought and the communist bloc in the 20th century, Britain transformed into a society which truly embraced the liberal philosophy of free society. (Nairn 2002) Moving away from the ethnic origins of the various British isles, being Scottish, Welsh, English, or Irish was subsumed by the civic conception of nationality to embrace the influx of immigrants from various former colonies and other locations. (Nairn 2002) Becoming very tolerant of expression, the United Kingdom became home to an array of individuals from strict religious scholars to "liberal" writers. (Nairn 2002) This system has not been historically without conflict. The present conflict is demonstrated notably in the 1980's when the sensationalization of the book *The Satanic Verses* caused a large amount of protest within the Muslim community due to its portrayal of the prophet Mohammed and Islam. (Hardy 2005)

Policy Analysis

It was theorized in earlier sections that the dialogue used by British leadership after the attacks would be saturated with identifiable nationalist language. As noted previously, this is due to the civic nation's malleability as an imagined concept and the need to arouse feelings of togetherness and unity in a time of crisis. The proceeding analysis centers on speeches given by Prime Minister Tony Blair on three separate occasions. The inspection will move linearly starting with the Prime Minister's comments on the day of the attacks from both the G8 conference he was attending, and from Downing St. in London after his arrival. Second, the dialogue of the first "Prime Minister's Question Time" after the attacks was examined for civic nationalist dialogue from both the Prime Minister and his fellow members of Parliament. Finally, the comments given during the Prime Minster's introduction of his 12 point anti-terrorist agenda were examined separately from the policy overview itself.

The main purpose of this exercise is two-fold. First, the presence of civic nationalist language in a significant form must be identified, which then will be followed by an analysis of its content. Language which is inherently positive will be labeled as civic while non-liberal nationalist language will be labeled and discussed as such. Through this process, the unique nature of Britain's civic language will be investigated, and later compared to the language of its government's policy agenda in order to confirm the existence of any incongruence between the two discourses.

The July 7th Speeches

Prime Minister Tony Blair made his initial comments from Gleneagles at noon on the day of the attacks. This preliminary speech can be separated into three observable themes. First, the Prime Minister announces his planned actions for going from the G8 conference he was attending and accessing the situation in London personally. While this is not directly a civic national language it is undoubtedly driven by a want to reassure the British people that the situation is under control. Secondly, Mr. Blair expresses his dismay at the timing of these attacks, as they take much needed attention away from the problems of poverty in Africa and the environment that were being discussed at the G8 conference. Finally, the Prime Minister utilizes very stark civic national terminology to define the current conflict between the UK and terrorism. He reminds those involved in terrorist attacks that "our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people…" He also states that extremists will "never succeed in destroying what we hold dear…" These statements are undoubtedly classifiable as the civic national language of Britain, emphasizing the freedom and values of British society. Mr. Blair's speech also seeks to polarize the situation between those who support the British way of life, and those who seek to destroy it. (Blair *In Full: Blair on Bomb Blasts* 2005)[12]

In his second speech of the afternoon, Mr. Blair continues two of his major themes centering on praising the British people for their actions, and condemning the perpetrators of the attack. While the first speech defines the incident as a "terrorist

---

[12] All quotations and analyzed transcripts used for this speech were taken from the BBC Online News archive.
Blair, Tony. 2006. *In Full: Blair on Bomb Blasts* 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4659953.stm.

attack" the second adopts harsher terminology labeling it as an "atrocity". The emphasis of "values" in Mr. Blair's speeches is very much apparent once again making four separate references to British "values" and their "way of life." This second speech is once again a call for solidarity in time of crisis, illustrating the state's use of the civic nation to foster unity. Mr. Blair's words also directly sought to include those people of Islamic faith within the British civic nation calling them "decent and law-abiding people who abhor this act of terrorism." This is also very identifiable civic national language highlighting the drive to maintain the tenets of inclusion above those of exclusion. In sum, both of Mr. Blair's speeches on July 7th stood perfectly in line with the United Kingdom's image as a multi-cultural and inclusive civic nation. The Prime Minister, as the lead representative of the United Kingdom's government, both confirmed the summonable existence of the civic nation and sought to utilize it for the purpose of national unity.(Blair *In Full: Blair on Bomb Blasts* 2005)

The July 13th Prime Minister's Question Time

The semi-structured environment of the "Question Time" in the UK parliament affords a unique opportunity to examine the themes of British civic nationality. Since much of this process involves questions from various members of the UK parliament towards the Prime Minister the inclusion of the wording of the questions as well as the answers is an equally useful exercise.

The majority of dialogue surrounding the July 7th attacks on London centers on the backlash felt by the British Muslim community in the weeks after the incident. The questioning begins with Mr. Keith Vaz asking if these attacks on the Muslim community would "imperil the diverse and multicultural society that is Britain today and which is the envy of the world?" Mr. Blair responds by reaffirming the "unity of the country" and completely speaking out against the attacks on Muslim communities. In his next comment, Mr. Blair adopts a far more exclusionary tone with regards to new anti-terrorism legislation asking the parliament to investigate ways to "exclude people from entering the United Kingdom who may incite hatred or act contrary to the public good." It is interesting to note that the term "public good" goes without any form of quantification its meaning undoubtedly understood as that which supports the civic nation and the state. The Prime Minister also continues his use of exclusionary language in

terms of the terrorists involved bleakly labeling them as an "extreme and evil ideology" once again polarizing the liberal British nation against such forces.[13] These comments though are persistently de-escalated with inclusionary statements regarding the law-abiding Muslims of the United Kingdom. This type of quantification helps to illustrate the cultural haze inherent to civic nationalism that prevents it from making the harsh exclusionist statements of other more negative forms of nationalism. The whole of these proceedings centers on this intense need of the civic nation to be positively inclusive to those in agreement with its values. Each of the comments made by various members of Parliament seeks to differentiate the lawful Muslims from the extremists being polarized against in the wake of extensive Muslim hate crimes.[14] This once again displays the ontological confusion of the civic nation in comparison to more negative forms of nationalism, and the constant active effort of the state to navigate this intellectual confusion and maintain a language of liberal inclusion. (Hansard Debates 2005)[15]

The Announcement of Parliament's Anti-Terrorism Agenda

On August 5th, 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair came forward to outline the new anti-terror agenda of the UK government. [16](Blair *Full Text: The Prime Minister's statement on anti-terror measures* 2005) As discussed earlier, the purpose of this policy analysis is to compare Mr. Blair's overall nationalist language with the policy he is promoting in terms of intent of each, as well as examining the state's active effort to maintain a condition of civic nationalism within the country.

---

[13] This statement was also found within the media analysis

  Reporters, Guardian. 2005. Guardian Weekly: Ministers warned of Iraq link to terrorist attacks in Britain: Blair says London Bombers driven by 'evil ideology', not his foreign policy. *The Guardian*, 22 July 2005, 1.

  Freedland, Jonathan. 2005. Comment and Analysis: After the aftershock: The realisation that Britons are ready to bomb their fellow citizens is a challenge to the whole of society. *The Guardian*, 13 July 2005, 21.

  2006. *Blair pushes tougher anti-terror law* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9ee081d9-e338-4a09-ae23-8f31fe27b6a4.htm.

[14] 2006. *British Muslims fear blast backlash* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/e0cd1983-ece9-492a-a588-2d92067256ee.htm.

  Dodd, Vikram. 2005. Religious hate crimes rise fivefold. *The Guardian*, 23 July 2005, pp 4.

  Hardy, Roger. 2006. *UK Multi-culturalism under spotlight* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2005 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4681615.stm.

  Muir, Hugh, and Vikram Dodd. 2005. BNP seeks to make capital out of bombings: Faith hate Fivefold rise in reported offences. *The Guardian*, July 23, 2005, 4.

[15] The full transcript for this speech was taken from the United Kingdom Parliament's website archive. All quotations and language appear as they were recorded by this source.

[16] The transcript for this speech was taken from *The Guardian Unlimited* website as a record of Mr. Blair's words. It did not contain any editorial or journalistic commenting or information.

The announcement can be subdivided into two major sections with the first containing initial statements, and the second being the actual twelve point agenda being proposed. Upon analyzing Mr. Blair's words it becomes obvious that two distinct sides to the speech exist. The first can be described as pure civic national language, while the second is intensely exclusionary and firm towards those who would harm British citizens. The British national language used by the PM surrounds the United Kingdom's position as being a liberal and free society. Mr. Blair starts by calling Britain a "tolerant and good-natured nation" dismissing "unacceptable acts" of racial backlash as "isolated". He continues by drawing a distinct line of distinction between the "mainstream Muslim community" and "extremism" praising the first for its "concern" and "support" in the upcoming measures. This is also in line with civic nationalism's trend of inclusion towards people accepting of the government's authority and the overall way of life that was spoken of in the theory section. (Blair *Full Text: The Prime Minister's statement on anti-terror measures* 2005)

The twelve-point plan proposed by Mr. Blair, however, does not contain a similar language or intent. Of the twelve major points of the policy, three of them contain the word "exclusion" in some form. Each of these policy points center around removing unwanted elements from British society. The first measure moves to extend the ability of the government to pursue the "deportation and exclusion" of those who are "fostering hatred, advocating violence to further a person's beliefs or justifying or validating such violence." This is an excellent demonstration of negative terminology being used in broad conceptual terms to allow for greater governmental involvement, since words such as "hatred" without context can be re-interpreted to an enormous degree. The eleventh point of the policy continues the trend of exclusion, calling for the removal of unwanted Muslim elements from the country including the "closure of a place of worship which is used as a centre for fomenting extremism" and drawing "up a list of those not suitable to preach who will be excluded from Britain." Mr. Blair calls on Muslim leaders to provide this information to the government.[17] This once again represents a civic effort to include those who wish to be a part of a liberal society, but only at the exclusion of those who are deemed unfit to participate. The twelfth and final point echoes this effort by calling for

---

[17] 2005. Government to compile list of extremists. *The Guardian*, 20 July 2005.

the establishment of an "international database of those individuals whose activities or views pose a threat to British security" and that these people "will be excluded from entry with any appeal only taking place outside the country." The broad negative language of this policy goal is evident in the addition of the word "views", which permits a much wider assortment of people to be excluded in comparison to those who have acted against British security.

Terrorism is the main subject of many of the policy points outlined in the August 5th speech. Mr. Blair declares quite broadly that the goal of terrorism is to "intimidate" and that the British people are "not inclined to be intimidated." Terrorism as an act is not defined in the document, which is in keeping with non-civic nationalist efforts to broadly define negative elements discussed earlier. The second point of the policy declares the intent to make "condoning or glorifying terrorism." While the third point of the policy refuses asylum to "anyone who has participated in terrorism or has anything to do with it anywhere." The 6th point of the policy calls for an increase in the amount of time that terrorism suspects can be detained before being charged, while the 7th policy point calls for the use of "control orders" whose violation would lead to imprisonment for British nationals in the same situation. The 5th policy point calls for a decrease in the time that extradition proceedings involving terrorist acts can take, also the 9th policy point specifically denounces the group "Al-Muhajiroun," a radical Islamist group, and calls for a widening in the governments ability to denounce other groups in the same fashion. When all of these measures are interpreted both individually and as a group, a noticeable agenda of power consolidation and restriction that is not in line with the British claims of "tolerance" and "good-nature" becomes quite obvious. An expansion of the states right to exclude, deport, denounce, detain, and incriminate is by no means outside the rights and duties of the modern state, but stands in complete disagreement with the professed values held paramount in its nationalist language. Each of these measures represents the civic nation's need to incorporate ideals and measures that are not necessarily in step with its goals as a free society for the purpose of security and sovereignty. This separation between the words and actions inherent in the civic nation provides the ontological grounds to delegitimize its own allegiance.

The final set of points in the policy center around British citizenship. The 4th policy point involves streamlining the process to strip citizenship from British nationals, and extending this ability to those "engaged in extremism." The tenth policy point surrounds an increase in "citizenship ritual" maintaining standards to require people to "swear allegiance to the country" and "have a rudimentary grasp of English." These are an excellent example of the attempt to remove the "uncritical conformity" inherent to state citizenship and to create a more voluntary and active membership. (Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005: 135-155) The anti-terror policies set forth by Tony Blair represent an effort by the United Kingdom government to reinforce British civic nation through non-liberal means. While the hope of this is to increase perceived security, it does not address the core problems inherent with allegiance to civic nationality.

The Prime Minister's closing comments at the conclusion of his announced agenda resumes the civic national language observed in both the beginning of the speech and in previous comments. Mr. Blair reinforces the inclusion of the overall Muslim community, and resumes the language of British "values." Interestingly, these closing comments embrace membership in the civic nation as a "duty" to support these professed values. This represents the Prime Minister's desire to maintain his tone of active and voluntary nationality within the understood and expected language of the British civic nation.

Process Trace and Media Study: The London Bombers

While the overall backgrounds of the four men involved has remained largely a mystery to those investigating this terrorist act, the investigation has yielded enough information to conclude two very vital points of information for this study. First, the four men involved in the London bombings were naturalized British citizens having been raised in families that did not share their extremist views.[18] The men were "clean skins" in that they had never before been flagged for illegal or extremist activity within the

---

[18] LaVille, Sandra, and Ian Cobain. Ibid.From cricket-lover who enjoyed a laugh to terror suspect. 13 July 2005.
  Sapsted, David, and Duncan Gardham. 2006. *Lost years of the 'nice boy' who killed 25* The Daily Telegraph, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
  Leppard, David. 2006. *MI:5 judged bomber 'no threat'* The Sunday Times, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1697562,00.html.

United Kingdom.[19] As discussed earlier their presence within the country and their peaceful existence within it tentatively designates each of these men as member's of the British civic nation at most, and at least practitioners of the "uncritical conformity" discussed previously as a major symptom of the civic nationalism.(Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005: 135-155) While a more definite sign of civic allegiance could not be found, the participation of these men in community activities indicates that they were at the very least "productive members of society." Second, taking information from the suicide tape found in Kahn's belongings it is obvious that at some point these men were indoctrinated into an extremist form of Islam. By their actions, movements, planning, and communications it can be concluded that at the time of their deaths they had adopted a value structure congruous with the teachings of al-Qaeda's terrorist philosophy including a disregard for the lives of the people that would be their victims, and a desire to remove western influence from the Arabic peninsula. (Khan 2005) In his suicide video, Khan professes that:

> "Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate
> atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them
> makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for
> protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel
> security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing,
> imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight." (Khan
> 2005)

With these words, the connection of these men to radical Islam and the concept of al-Jahiliyya becomes more apparent. Their perception of the society they reside within with its Crusader/Zionist agenda has now been changed to reveal a violent force that seeks to eradicate Islam completely. Situations such as the occupation of Iraq only reinforce this paranoia as a persistent and undeniable threat. The epiphany of this corrupting force's existence provides the flashpoint that moves these men from conservative Muslims to a group of people that are willing to disregard the laws of

---

[19] McGrory, Daniel, Michael Evans, and Dominic Kennedy. 2006. *Killer in the classroom* Times Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-1693463,00.html.

western society, which, as discussed earlier, they see as an abomination to Allah, and commit violent acts against it. Accepting themselves into the role of Qutb and al-Zawahari's vanguard (consequently the translation "al-Qaeda"), these men have joined the fight to bring Islamic rule to the world, and eradicate the threat of al-Jahiliyya society. (Burke 2003) As discussed in the introduction, the allegiance of these men to their various group identities is both connected and independent. While each allegiance can rise and fall with the individuals' activities and situations, there must be an active interaction between the two perceptions if one group identity comes into direct conflict with another. This is due to the centrality and defining nature of group identities discussed in the theory section. For this reason, the reconstruction of the estimated events before the bombings can denote the existence of four separate stages of metaphysical centeredness and national identity. The true purpose of identifying these stages is not to discuss the phenomenon of allegiance shift and value change, since this concept exists commonly in all aspects of human interaction, but rather to illustrate the dynamic between a rationally based allegiance such as civic nationalism and an extremist ideology. The media analysis discussed previously has been used to gather as much information as possible on these men and to construct a timeline of their activities.

Stage 1: Civic-Liberal National Allegiance

The primary stage of this analysis can be placed as the point in the timeline of these men in which Islam maintained a non-metaphysical centeredness in their perceptions, and each valued their British civic nationality. It is not being suggested that the central group identities of these men is completely verifiable, but judging their actions at this time this conclusion can be made. By all accounts this stage took place more then three years ago, before these men were exposed to their extremist ideologies. In the case of Jermaine Lindsay, the bomber of the Piccadilly Train Line, this period was defined by his conversion to Islam when he was 15 at the wishes of his mother.[20] The three other men were raised in economically stable Islamic households from presumably birth, although the exact financial and personal histories of the families are not a part of the

---

[20] Sapsted, David, and Duncan Gardham. 2006. *Lost years of the 'nice boy' who killed 25* The Daily Telegraph, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].

public record.(LaVille and Cobain 2005) In this stage each of these men considered religion to be a personal choice or a matter of family tradition, and in that way were aligned with the free values of the civic nationalism. They can be considered members of the British civic nation since at this point they were embracing the benefits of a liberal society, they were law-abiding with no criminal records, having families of their own, and maintaining active employment. In all respects, these four individuals could be considered active members of a secular civic nation with their own religious attachments. The legitimacy of the state and the civic nation is recognized independently of a religious value structure. In this way, religion is embraced within the desired liberal framework as a non-political and non-intervening affiliation.

Stage 2: The Growth of Religious Attachment

This stage is highlighted by the growth of religion as a competitive central identity. While the legitimacy of the civic nation as a construction continues to be unquestioned, the value judgments made due to religion are on a noticeable increase. This stage is seen through a growth of daily religious activity, attending various functions with religious groups, and associating with like minded individuals. For suspected bomber Shehzad Tanweer, this period was defined by attendance to the Bangali mosque as well as two other local mosques.[21] Friends of Tanweer also reported that he attended mosque daily. Hasib Hussain, the suicide bomber responsible for the bombing of a bus in Tavistock Square, journeyed on a "Hajj" or pilgrimage to Mecca.[22] Jermaine Lindsay began to regularly visit the Hamara youth centre in Leeds where he is said to have met the other three bombers.[23] The background of Mohammad Sidique Khan during this stage is much less documented pending current MI:5 investigations into his background.[24] It was confirmed, however, that it was Khan who initially exposed the other three men to

---

[21] LaVille, Sandra, and Ian Cobain. 2005. From cricket-lover who enjoyed a laugh to terror suspect. *The Guardian*, 13 July 2005.

[22] Ibid.

[23] 2006. *Fourth bomber's name disclosed* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/beds/bucks/herts/4683285.stm.
 Sapsted, David, and Duncan Gardham. 2006. *Lost years of the 'nice boy' who killed 25* The Daily Telegraph, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].

[24] Harding, Luke, and Rosie Cowan. 2005. Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two Bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel. *The Guardian*, 19 July 2005, 1.

more extremist views. If this is the case, then Khan's time during this stage is well before the other three bombers.

In this second stage, the increase in religious belief and behavior places secular society itself within the realm of critique as the disconnect between a member of civic society and a member of a religion is realized by the person. It can be assumed that at this point, religion (in this case Islam) represents a viable central metaphysical identity, but the legitimacy of the civic nation remains intact thus preventing a change in value structure. This is not a condition of mere convenience, but since the overall moralistic values of both religion and civil society maintain a level of congruity at this stage there is no conflict between the each identity that cannot be addressed through civil discourse. With the coming stage, however, the legitimacy of the civic nation as a means of critique and communication will begin to decline.

Stage 3: Extremism: The Delegitimation of the Civic Nation as a Group Identity

This stands as the critical transitional stage of this process. As discussed earlier, it is not sufficient conceptually for an equally powerful cultural force to gain true metaphysical centeredness in the mind of an individual who already possesses a legitimate group identity. In regards to the empirical analysis, it can be said that each of the four bombers involved in the July 7th bombings at one time were members of a multi-cultural secular and civic nation. While the existence and pursuit of religious interests to this point have been containable within the bounds of expression in liberal society to this point, the introduction of new elements represents a dynamic change in the relationship between civic nationality and religious allegiance. It is at this stage that a competitive cultural identity, in this case radical Islam, begins to delegitimate the cultural centeredness of the dominant group identity. It is in this stage that the weaknesses inherent to the civic nation as a group identity become most apparent. While this interaction could most likely take place between any two cultural identity constructions, the essential foundations of civic nationality specifically make it inordinately more vulnerable to delegitimation. As discussed in the theory section, civic nationalism is a rationally debatable allegiance that is bound in the logic of the enlightenment. This leads to a situation in which a religious allegiance bound in concepts of "faith" is juxtaposed against a rationale perspective that must explain its reasoning in far more tangible terms.

Secondly, the hypocrisy between the civic nation's professed goals and the methods required for it to maintain a sense of unity in the modern world create a noticeable disconnect that is not apparent in other identity constructions such as religion or ethnicity. While other less logically inferred group identifications can associate their overall goal of survival and continuity with nearly any means, the civic nation's aspirations to maintain societies through the purely positive, inclusive values of liberal society without the negative connotations of nationalist exclusion are rarely maintained in times of antagonism and conflict. This disconnect provides a point of contention through which the civic nation's legitimacy can be decayed through simple debate. Within the case, the flashpoint for this interaction took place at the Hamara Centre in Beeston England.[25] A community gathering point, it is this mutual location that has been connected to Khan, Tanweer, Hussain, and Lindsay. It is here that Khan is believed to have been teaching his extremist views to the local youth of the area.[26] Using the tape as evidence, Khan most likely preached the philosophy of al-Qaeda, indoctrinating the young men with the teachings of this form of radical Islam, which he paid homage to them directly as "today's heroes."(Khan 2005) During this period, the viability of religion as a central group identification is confirmed and reinforced through continued and elevated religious association such as the activity discovered at the Hamara centre. Through the simultaneous delegitimation and accentuation of these two cultural identities a transition to a new metaphysical center is accomplished. At this point, civic nationality remains a secondary group identity, but is constantly undermined by the new central understandings of their radicalized form of Islam.

Stage 4: The Domination of Radical Islam as a Central Group Identity

In this final stage, religion has subsumed civic nationality as a proper metaphysical center and in doing so continually degraded the values and moral

---

[25] LaVille, Sandra, Audrey Gilian, and Dilpazier Aslam. Ibid.'Father figure' inspired young bombers. 15 July 2005.

[26] McGrory, Daniel, Michael Evans, and Dominic Kennedy. 2006. *Killer in the classroom* Times Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-1693463,00.html.
 2006. *Report: UK blast mastermind identified* al-Jazeera, 14 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2e3a2360-01fa-48ac-aec7-683cf262503d.htm.
 2006. *Image of bombers' deadly journey* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4690149.stm.

requirements of the civic nation's previously central position. As such, civic nationalism no longer exists within the value structure or group identity of the individual as more than a vestigial label of origin. At this stage any actions against the civic nation are completely morally acceptable to the existing value structure and the tenets and methods of coexistence inherent to liberal society are seen as meaningless exercises in futility due to the extensive feelings of hypocrisy and betrayal that indoctrinated individuals encounter. At this stage, the United Kingdom has been personified as the external enemy that is vilified by the scholar's of al-Qaeda, such as al-Zawahari, making way for all out "jihad", as it is defined by these same scholars as violent and direct resistance. Within his suicide tape, Khan confirms the centrality of his Islamist faith saying it is "how our ethical stances are dictated." The complete disconnection from the secular world is apparent in his language calling the west "your democratically elected governments" completely disregarding his documented participation in British society up until this point. Khan also displays very intense allegiance to Islam saying that he is "directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters." This statement gives evidence to Khan's belief in the extremist teachings of Qutb and al-Zawahri highlighted earlier due to his obvious disregard for Muslim people within the British capital. (Khan 2005)[27]

During this stage of cultural allegiance, the bombers began planning and carried out their attacks against the people of the United Kingdom. Openly disregarding the laws of the secular state, three of the men traveled to Pakistan to attend military training camps and to make contact with leaders of terrorist groups.[28] During the months before the attacks both Hussain and Tanweer were investigated by the police under suspicion of petty crime, which, given the incongruence of these actions previous to their involvement

---

[27] All quotations from the previous discussion were taken directly from transcripts of Mohhomad Sidique Khan's discovered suicide tape
   2005. London Bombings: The Iraq Connection. *The Guardian*, 20 July 2005, 23.
[28] Harding, Luke, and Rosie Cowan. Ibid.Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two Bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel. 19 July 2005, 1.
   2006. *Pakistan in post-London crackdown* al-Jazeera, 20 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/90a3b894-5754-46fb-8b55-bf8ed3356024.htm.
   2006. *World leaders stand by Londoners* al-Jazeera, 22 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/10ad2ae0-2bc5-4ca3-a82a-87cd4a54a8d9.htm.
   2006. *Security tightened after London blasts* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/EA91351E-6b19-4e5b-8ebc-9ff153f2257f.htm.
   Asser, Martin. 2006. *Al-Qaeda shadow looms over London* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4661273.stm.

in extremist Islam, indicates a change in perceived value structure from previous times.[29] Lindsay married his wife Samantha Lewthwaite in an Islamic ceremony, but did not register their marriage with the British state. (Sapsted and Gardham 2005) All of this behavior in obvious connection with the bombings themselves paints the picture of four men who held no value in the civic nation whatsoever. This complete embrace of religion as a primary group identity facilitated the attacks undertaken by these four men, and helps to explain how this transition from normal citizen to terrorist bomber took place. It should be noted that it is this type of individual that the policy's set forth by the United Kingdom attempt to remove from society, only to subsequently appear more hypocritical to those who are suspicious of the civic state.

Findings of the Media Analysis

While comparing the various coverage of the London bombing for the purpose of the preceding analysis, the media's portrayal of the four bombers remained for the most part universal. The Guardian Unlimited remained a more reactionist media outlet using far harsher language to portray the activities of Mohhamad Khan especially; painting him as a killer and manipulator of innocent young people. Al-Jazeera was decidedly slower to announce the bombings than the other two news sources, first attributing the blasts to an equipment malfunction in a story not found in either UK news source.[30] The BBC had an extensive amount of coverage on the bombings themselves and was much more factual in its discussion of the bombings, although it was later condemned for displaying several disturbing images of bomb victims.[31] Each media source also questioned the viability of the British multicultural society, and gauged the reaction of various British citizens.

---

[29] McGrory, Daniel, Michael Evans, and Dominic Kennedy. 2006. *Killer in the classroom* Times Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-1693463,00.html.

[30] 2006. *London Underground hit by explosion* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/799582be-2c61-4a3c-aa40-899c729be1d4.htm.
[31] 2006. *Papers reverberate with shock* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4662729.stm.
   2006. *Bus 'ripped apart' in the explosion* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4659387.stm.
   2006. *London Bomb blasts "insensitive" and "sensationalist" are some of the adjectives used by complaints to describe BBC News coverage of the London bomb blasts on the day.* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4673233.stm.

Conclusions

  This empirical section examined various actions done in the name of both radical Islam and civic nationalism within the United Kingdom. It was established that the United Kingdom employs a specific nationalist language to define itself as a civic nation. Elaborated on as being inclusionary and open, the need for an increased sense of security after the London bombings of July 2005 led Parliamentary officials to redefine the requirements for membership within the British civic nation through a shift in policy language and began to actively exclude people on the basis of these ideas. This new language centered on the exclusion of those who do not actively value the benefits of the civic nation. The pursuit of exclusionist goals, I argued, creates the schism between the traditional values of the civic nation, and the current efforts to redefine itself into a more secure way to combat this new threat of radical Islamic violence. This exemplifies the civic nation's struggle to maintain positive liberal values at its core, while fighting against its primordial and ethnic origins that utilize exclusion, xenophobia, and hatred. Concurrently, the media study examined a brief timeline of the bombers and their transition from passive participation in the civic nation to violent attack against it. Al-Jahiliyya is the metaphysical flash point that triggered these violent acts and pushed these individuals to see the system of government and society around them as a threat to their religion and its continuation. At this point the civic nation and its claims of inclusion and religious freedom were disenfranchised, and its bonds as an "imagined community" were comparatively weakened. Radical Islam, with its deferment to God and supreme truth, was a more compelling metaphysical center in comparison to the rationally grounded and conflicted civic nation.

  In these pursuits, this study has been a mixed success. The empirical study has been effective in identifying each of the various building blocks alluded to within the theory section. The disconnect that occurs, however, is in establishing the connection between the civic nation's efforts to maintain itself, and the allegiance shift that was examined in the media study. While it is unfortunate that the empirical section was unable to explicate the relationship fully, the evidence gathered still points to the conclusion that the civic nation's inability to define itself concretely facilitates its degradation a metaphysical center. The next step in this research would be to create a

new research design that is more geared towards the interaction of the civic nation and citizens with shifting allegiance like the ones that were examined in this empirical analysis.

Chapter V: Conclusions of the Thesis

   The goal of this thesis was to assess the viability of the civic nation as a sufficient metaphysical anchor in comparison to other equally notable cultural forces such as the radical Islam. Through this theoretical and empirical exercise, the profound challenge of the civic nation to maintain feelings of unity without inspiring the imagination and mysticism usually inherent in nationalism has been investigated. A victim of its own values, the civic nation aspires to harness the unifying force of more negative forms of nationalism without the hateful, and exclusive practices usually associated with such group identities while also denying the deep theocratic roots that gives nationalism its impermeable quality. The twenty-first century has now been defined by this conflict between the righteous and the reasonable. No longer the battle of rational ideas of the twentieth century's Cold War, civic nationalism is now confronted by identarian alternatives such as radical Islam that do not require affirmation through rationalist logic, but instead are defined by a concrete theocratic sense of purpose that is bound within faith. The goal of multi-cultural society has always been one of inclusion and acceptance of differences, but it is the very openness of these societies that remains the target of many radical groups. The civic nation is not a necessary and sufficient metaphysical foundation to compete against other cultural forces, in fact it stands that any cultural identity that seeks to dominate as a metaphysical center will most likely be able to delegitimate the civic nation and assume centrality. Shedding the exclusionary aspects of more primordial forms of nationalism, civic nationalism in modern times is a supposedly evolved and accepting cultural identity. Has this professed evolution destroyed its ability to compete against other identarian constructions? The continued survival of civic nationalism hinges on two major ideas. First, the civic nation must maintain a society's need for it by maintaining cohesion through externalized threat. Second, the civic nation must fight against its own hypocrisy, or embrace practices that transform the civic nation from a rationale concept to the level of theocratic imagination and exclusion enjoyed by ethnic nationality. The eternal struggle of the civic nation has always been the demand for both security and freedom. Embracing a legitimacy founded in the acceptance of shared laws, the civic nation assumes that its members actively believe in these tenets, however, this is not the case due to the geographical and tacit traditions of civic national

membership. In combating alternate ideologies such as radical Islam, the civic nation must accept that it is comparatively weak, and embrace the idea that it does not need to be a central allegiance for everyone, but rather for those whose beliefs align with it. The twenty first century will not be defined by the civic nation's inclusion of everyone, but rather the establishment of what it is to live in a tolerant and liberal way. The true salvation of civic nationality lies in its realization of what it is, and not its crazed denial of what it is not. Therefore, the civic nation is left with the option of embracing its own primordial foundations to create a more defined sense of membership and exclusion, providing the proverbial security for those it includes. This thesis has reinforced the idea that the wish to be a part of a civic nation does not represent the choice of a certain nationalist side in the metaphysical conflict for dominance, but rather the desire to stop fighting.

Nationalism and other group identities are concepts that are difficult to define, and moreover difficult to study. This thesis represents an attempt to overcome these difficulties. Success in this endeavor has been varied, since an attempt to study this topic empirically is tantamount to examining the smoke of a fire rather than the flame itself. The empirical analysis and its various methodologies represent this effort, and while it does not strongly establish the relationships discussed in the theory section, it does give evidence to their existence. The process of revealing the intricacies of this relationship is something that can be pursued far beyond this single work. Through this process, concepts that have had to be made fixed and rigid due to the constriction of this research agenda can be studied as the complex and flowing concepts that truly are. Hopefully a more graceful and expansive research design will be able to establish the theorized relationships in a more compelling way.

More then anything, this thesis was limited by both time and resources. A more detailed and primary investigation of the four London bombers would yield far more concrete data, and access to a larger amount of British statistical data would help to bolster the lacking quantitative aspects of this study. An internal comparative study would have also been helpful in establishing the weakness of civic nationalism in comparison to other cultural forces. Most notably a comparison of Islamist bombers and

their change in behavior with IRA bombers in Northern Ireland would have been an excellent direction.

The next stage for the study is to broaden this pursuit to incorporate other various attempts at creating this type of civic nationality. Most notably a comparison of the various civic nation's of the world and how each of these constructions have been designed to deal with the inherent weaknesses of civic allegiance. An in-depth study of the United States of America's civic nation and the impact of the neo-conservative perspective on world events on establishing the need for its nationalism would be an excellent next step in this study. The failure of the Yugoslavian communist state would also be an excellent research direction as a comparison of the civic nation in conflict with more ethnic and less religious forms of nationalism. Finally, a study of the former USSR and its position as the failed alternative civic state and the consequences of its collapse would give a great amount of insight into the successes and failures of civic society as a unifying force.

References Cited

Journalistic Sources

2006. *Blair pushes tougher anti-terror law* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9ee081d9-e338-4a09-ae23-8f31fe27b6a4.htm.

2006. *Blair says "terror will not win"* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4659933.stm.

2006. *British Muslims fear blast backlash* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/e0cd1983-ece9-492a-a588-2d92067256ee.htm.

2006. *Bus 'ripped apart' in the explosion* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4659387.stm.

2006. *Dozens killed in London serial blasts* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/812224c7-006d-4424-b15b-ec3e8381a4d7.htm

2006. *Fourth bomber's name disclosed* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
Available from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/beds/bucks/herts/4683285.stm.

2005. Government to compile list of extremists. *The Guardian*, 20 July 2005.

2005. Guardian Weekly: Ministers warned of Iraq link to terrorist attacks in Britain: Blair
says London Bombers driven by 'evil ideology', not his foreign policy. *The Guardian*, 22 July 2005, 1.

2005. Hansard Debates. In *The House of Commons*. London.

2006. *Image of bombers' deadly journey* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].
Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4690149.stm.

2006. *London Bomb blasts "insensitive" and "sensationalist" are some of the adjectives
used by complaints to describe BBC News coverage of the London bomb blasts on
the day.* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4673233.stm.

2005. London Bombings: The Iraq Connection. *The Guardian*, 20 July 2005, 23.

2006. *London Bombings were 'coordinated'* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].

2006. *London Bombs likely crude, homemade* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8464d8b0-8f0b-433e-b4ab-7880a2a3e9f6.htm.

2006. *London toll crosses 50* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4b6eab37-d592-4cff-ae92-c731ce1850a7.htm.

2006. *London Underground hit by explosion* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/799582be-2c61-4a3c-aa40-899c729be1d4.htm.

2006. *Pakistan in post-London crackdown* al-Jazeera, 20 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/90a3b894-5754-46fb-8b55-bf8ed3356024.htm.

2006. *Papers reverberate with shock* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4662729.stm.

2006. *Pictures of London suspect released* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2463ca8c-c411-4ba4-94af-211dd13ac930.htm.

2006. *Report: UK blast mastermind identified* al-Jazeera, 14 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2e3a2360-01fa-48ac-aec7-683cf262503d.htm.

2006. *Security tightened after London blasts* al-Jazeera, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/EA91351E-6b19-4e5b-8ebc-9ff153f2257f.htm.

2006. *UK Bombing inquiry widens* BBC News Online, 16 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/03397e06-24c2-4634-8dac-7d845b4e90ab.htm.

2006. *World leaders stand by Londoners* al-Jazeera, 22 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/10ad2ae0-2bc5-4ca3-a82a-87cd4a54a8d9.htm.

Asser, Martin. 2006. *Al-Qaeda shadow looms over London* BBC News Online, 2005
 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4661273.stm.

Blair, Tony. 2006. *Full Text: The Prime Minister's statement on anti-terror measures*
 Guardian Unlimited, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from
 http://politics.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,15935,1543385,00.html.

---. 2006. *In Full: Blair on Bomb Blasts* 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4659953.stm.

Cowan, Rosie, and David Adam. 2005. Experts link explosives to July 7 bombs. *The
 Guardian*, 23 July 2005, pp 2.

Dodd, Vikram. 2005. Religious hate crimes rise fivefold. *The Guardian*, 23 July 2005, pp
 4.

Freedland, Jonathan. 2005. Comment and Analysis: After the aftershock: The realisation
 that Britons are ready to bomb their fellow citizens is a challenge to the whole of
 society. *The Guardian*, 13 July 2005, 21.

Harding, Luke, and Rosie Cowan. 2005. Pakistan militants linked to London attacks:
 Two Bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to
 have visited Israel. *The Guardian*, 19 July 2005, 1.

Hardy, Roger. 2006. *UK Multi-culturalism under spotlight* BBC News Online, 2005
 [cited 2 April 2005 2006]. Available from
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4681615.stm.

Hayman, Andy. 2006. *Police News Conference: Full Text* BBC News Online, 2005 [cited
 2 April 2006 2006]. Available from
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4676909.stm.

Katz, Liane. 2005. What we know about the bombings. *The Guardian*.

Khan, Mohammad Sidique. 2005. Transcript of Recovered Suicide Tape, edited by al-
 Jazeera: BBC News Online.

LaVille, Sandra, and Ian Cobain. 2005. From cricket-lover who enjoyed a laugh to terror
 suspect. *The Guardian*, 13 July 2005.

LaVille, Sandra, Audrey Gilian, and Dilpazier Aslam. 2005. 'Father figure' inspired
 young bombers. *The Guardian*, 15 July 2005.

Leppard, David. 2006. *MI:5 judged bomber 'no threat'* The Sunday Times, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1697562,00.html.

McGrory, Daniel, Michael Evans, and Dominic Kennedy. 2006. *Killer in the classroom* Times Online, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-1693463,00.html.

Muir, Hugh, and Vikram Dodd. 2005. BNP seeks to make capital out of bombings: Faith hate Fivefold rise in reported offences. *The Guardian*, July 23, 2005, 4.

Sapsted, David, and Duncan Gardham. 2006. *Lost years of the 'nice boy' who killed 25* The Daily Telegraph, 2005 [cited 2 April 2006].

Wenbourne, Scott. 2006. *London blasts: 'People were screaming'* BBC News Online, 7 July 2005 [cited 2 April 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4659633.stm.

Academic Sources

Ahmad, Khurshid. 1983. The Nature of Islamic Resurgence. In *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, edited by J. L. Esposito. New York: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities*. 9th ed. London: Verso Publishers.

Berlin, Isaiah. 1997. *The Sense of Reality*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: SAGE Publications.

Brown, Daniel. 2004. *A New Introduction to Islam*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Brown, David. 2000. *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics*. London: Routledge.

Burke, Jason. 2003. *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Collins, John, and Ross Glover, eds. 2002. *Collateral Language*. New York: New York University Press.

Conover, Pamela Johnston, Donald D. Searing, and Ivor Crewe. 2004. The Elusive Ideal of Equal Citizenship: Political Theory and Political Psychology in the United States and Britain. *The Journal of Politics* 66 (4):1036-1068.

Cook, David. 2005. *Understanding Jihad*. Berkley: University of California Press.

Davis, Thomas C. 1999. Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity. *Political Psychology* 20 (1):25-47.

Dogan, Mattei. 19

94. The Decline of Nationalism within Western Europe. *Comparative Politics* 26 (3):281-305.

Druckman, David. 1994. Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective. *Mershon International Studies Review* 38 (1):43-68.

Eley, Geoff, and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds. 1996. *Becoming National*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Er-Rashid, Haroun. 2003. Muslims and the West: A Paradigm for Polarization. In *Islam and the West: Political Perspectives on Modernity*, edited by M. J. Thompson. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 1991. Ethnicity versus Nationalism. *Journal of Peace Research* 28 (3):263-278.

Esposito, John L. 1999. *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* 3rd
 ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

---, ed. 1983. *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Evera, Stephen van. 1994. Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. *International Security* 18 (4):5-39.

Gans, Chaim. 2003. *The Limits of Nationalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 1997. *Nationalism*. New York: New York University Press.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gorenburg, Dmitry. 2000. Not with One Voice: An Explanation of Intragroup Variation in Nationalist Sentiment. *World Politics* (53):115-142.

Grosby, Steven. 2001. Nationality and Religion. In *Understanding Nationalism*, edited by M. G. a. J. Hutchinson. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Hah, Chong-Do, and Jeffrey Martin. 1975. Towards a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism. *World Politics* 27 (3):361-386.

Heath, Anthony, Bridget Taylor, Lindsay Brook, and Alison Park. 1999. British National Sentiment. *British Journal of Political Science* 29 (1):155-175.

Hertz, Frederick. 1941. The Nature of Nationalism. *Social Forces* 19 (3):409-415.

Hutchinson, John. 2001. Nations and Culture. In *Understanding Nationalism*, edited by M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson. Malden Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Ignatieff, Michael. 1994. *Blood and Belonging*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

---. 1997. *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Kepel, Gilles. 1997. *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe*. Translated by S. Milner. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

---. 1985. *The Prophet and the Pharaoh. Translated by J. Rothschild. Berkely: University of California Press.*

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

King, Leslie. 2002. Demographic trends, pronatalism, and nationalist ideologies in the late twentieth century. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25 (3):367-389.

Kohn, Hans. 1967. *The Idea of Nationalism*. New York: Collier Books.

Kumar, Krishan. 2000. Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective. *Theory and Society* 29 (5):575-608.

Kuzio, Taras. 2002. The myth of the civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn's framework for understanding nationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25 (1):20-39.

Marshall, Catherine, and Gretchen B. Rossman. 1999. *Designing Qualitative Research*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Mayerfeld, Jamie. 1998. The Myth of Benign Group Identity: A Critique of Liberal Nationalism. *Polity* 30 (4):555-578.

Nairn, Tom. 2002. *Pariah: Misfortunes of the British Kingdom*. London: Verso Publications.

Newman, Saul. 2000. Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why States still Matter. *Comparative Politics* 33 (1):21-41.

Qutb, Sayyid. 1964. *Milestones*. New Delhi: Millat Book Centre.

Ramadan, Tariq. 2004. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rejwan, Nissim. 2003. A Wild Goose Chase: To Cope, Must Islam "westernize"? In *Islam and the West: Political Perspectives on Modernity*, edited by M. J. Thompson. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Rothi, Despina M., Evanthia Lyons, and Xenia Chryssochoou. 2005. National Attachment and Patriotism in a European Nation: A British Study. *Political Psychology* 26 (1):135-155.

Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.

Sales, Rosemary. 2005. Secure Borders, Safe Haven: A contradiction in terms? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (3):445-462.

Scott, Rachel. 2003. An "official" Islamic response to the al-Jihad movement. *Journal of Political Ideologies8(1):39-61.*

Smith, Anthony D. 1999. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*. London: Routledge Publishers Inc.

---. 2001. *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publisher's Ltd.

---. 1983. *Theories of Nationalism*. 2nd ed. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers.

Smith, Thomas W. 2005. Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey. *Human Rights Quarterly* 27 (2):436-470.

Spencer, Philip, and Howard Wollman. 2002. *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: SAGE Publications.

Tamir, Yael. 1993. *Liberal Nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Thompson, Michael J., ed. 2003. *Islam and the West: Political Perspectives on Modernity*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolf, Ken. 1973. Comparing or Evaluating Nationalism. *The Review of Politics* 35 (3):441-443.

Yack, Bernard. 1999. The Myth of the Civic Nation. In *Theorizing Nationalism*, edited by R. Beiner. New York: State University of New York Press.

Zubaida, Sami. 2004. Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions. *Nations and Nationalism* 10 (4):407-420.