

THE NEW TRADITIONALIST MOVEMENT:

A STUDY OF CHURCH, STATE, AND ECONOMY

by

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The political religious right of the 1980's has become a leviathan. This leviathan may be threatening this country's established ideals of liberty and justice to all its citizens. Similar sentiments were echoed by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1955 when he wrote, "The singular fact is that radical right agitation has facilitated the growth of practices which threaten to undermine the social fabric of democratic policies" (p.207, 1955). At least since the founding of this country's federal government, right wing extremism has been one of the most controversial and misunderstood issues of study and debate in American social thought. The traditions of religious, ethnic, economic, and political tolerance in our society is once again being challenged.

Throughout the course of U.S. history, right wing religious groups have emerged in an attempt to seize power and put into practice their own unique political ideology. From the Anti-Masonic movement in the 1820's, to the Klu Klux Klan in the 1920's, on to the McCarthy era of the 1950's, our political history is spotted with the emergence and dissolution of right wing extremism. The goal of this study is two-fold. First, we will look at the components of the current religious right wing political

preeminence and compare this movement on popular support with a recent past right wing movement (e.g. McCarthyism). Second, we will try to assess the relative power of status class and cultural explanations in their ability to predict religious and political right wing adherence.

CHAPTER II

STATUS CLASS AND CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

Aggregate data collected on McCarthyism by Lipset and Raab (1978) will be used in comparing how today's new rightist movement is similar or different to McCarthyism. This will be done by looking at what issues were important to the McCarthyist movement and then comparing it with today's new rightist issues. In 1955, both Lipset and Hofstadter drew upon the idea of status class politics in their analysis of McCarthyism (Bell, p.308, p.84). Both suggest that status discontent contributed to the development of McCarthyism. Status politics differs from interest politics, which is usually considered the motive behind political participation (Verba and Nie, p.2). Interest politics can be said to be the clash between groups and blocs over material aims and needs. Status politics are the "clash of various projective rationalizations arising from status aspirations and other personal motives" (Hofstadter, p.84). In other words, status class politics is not the articulation of material needs, but psychological ones. Two 20th century periods that exemplify the manifestation of status class politics are the early 1920's and the 1950's (Hofstadter, p.85). Both were periods of prosperity in the U.S. in which the dominant motif for political action was expressed in

proposals of moral reform, not material need (Hofstadter, p.85).

Status discontent occurs in a status social class when there are incongruities in the stratification system which produce feelings of dissatisfaction in the status groups (Lipset and Raab, p.23). In other words, there is a gap between the power and prestige a social class expects and the actual power and prestige the class enjoys. Lipset and Raab suggest,

:...there are groups which feel that they are losing their power and status. There are, among the deprived, the "never-hads" and the "once-hads."
(1978, p.23)

The never-hads feel as though they are being cheated out of the status which they are due. And the once-hads feel the current status which they enjoy is being challenged by other groups which will lead to a loss of prestige for themselves. This concept of status is very much influenced by the writings of Max Weber (Lienesch, p.410). Weber suggests that social groups can best be understood as seeking either class, or status. Status is shared claims of prestige, while class is the shared control or non-control of economic resources (Weber, pp.180-190, 1946). Weber goes on to suggest that in certain times, status and class can be independent in their influence upon social groups (Weber, pp.180-195,

1946). He gives a clear example of this in the lack of class antagonism between the poor whites, those not owning slaves and property, to the plantation owners of the old Southern United States (Weber, p.88, 1971). The poor whites were typically more hostile to the poor blacks than they were to the rich Southerners who frequently exhibited a large element of patriarchal sentiment (Weber, p.89, 1971). Clearly in this situation, class, or economic differences are being overshadowed by social status. It is this idea which both Hofstadter and Lipset focus upon in their theories (Lienesch, p.410).

In keeping with this general theory of status class politics, my hypothesis is that today's right wing resurgence is closely related in status explanation support to movements of the past. The general idea here is that those status class groups, including those who are rural in residence, low in income, below average in education, older in age, and small independent businessmen and farmers which were threatened in the past, again see themselves in a similar position. This is not to say that those persons who supported the old rightist movements are the same ones as today. Clearly, many of those who supported McCarthyism may now be dead, or occupying different social positions than they did in the 1950's.¹

What we are suggesting is that those social positions in our society that felt that their social status were

being threatened in the past, again feel that way today. The 1950's brought such unanticipated economic growth, while the 1970's brought little anticipated growth as well as high unemployment (i.e. stagflation). In both instances, these groups see themselves being discriminated against because they are not rising in relative income as fast as they think they should be. If this is true, then we can account for the resurgence of modern rightist extremism in the same fashion as Lipset and Hofstadter accounted for McCarthyism. In particular, we expect to find that those persons who are hard line supporters of the new right will be rural, low in income, below average in education, older, and be disproportionately small independent businessmen and farmers.

A problem with this type of status class analysis is the criticism that has been levied at status class explanations (Hofstadler, 1963; Page and Clelland, 1978; Lienesch, 1982; Wood and Hughes, 1984). Addressing the criticism of his 1955 article, Hofstadter openly acknowledges the influence of cultural factors as well as status discontent (Hofstadter, p.100). Cultural and socialization explanations suggest that even though persons occupy different social positions than they did in the past, they still carry with them the ideas that they gained while in their previous social position. Lipset and Raab refer to this as "cultural baggage" (1978, p.118).

Status discontent can account for the generation of the feelings of anxiety in social class groups of the once-hads and the never-hads, but when the members of these groups become upwardly mobile, they should no longer experience the generation of new feelings of status threat that they had in the past. The generation of new feelings of status threat should stop, but the previous feelings of anxiety are still retained. This pattern may be especially pronounced in the children of those groups who experienced status threat in the past. As the children grow up and leave home, they still carry with them those ideas (cultural baggage) which they were taught (socialization) as children.

In their analysis of anti-pornography movements, Wood and Hughes find that cultural and socialization explanations are much more appropriate in explaining this moral reform issue, than is status discrepancy. Moral reform is a large factor in the current new right movement. Wood and Hughes suggest that,

...motivations to support moral-reform movements are an outgrowth of socialization processes and an expression of cultural values. The overall world view and belief system found among moral-reform supporters has been termed cultural fundamentalism. (1984, p.89)

The idea of cultural fundamentalism involves an adherence to traditional norms, respect for the family and

religious authority, asceticism, and an ongoing moralistic outlook on one's world. This explanation of moral reform concerning pornography may also lend itself to other issues of the new right. The question that must be answered is how much support for the new right, and on what issues, can we account for by employing the status discontent model, and how much can we account for by using the cultural socialization model. Oberschall (1984) suggests that the importance of status discontent has been over rated, but that it is relevant (Oberschall, p.10). Oberschall also suggests that the socialization model of explanation is "not concrete enough for clarifying the motivations and commitments" of the current moral reform movement (Oberschall, p.2). But, Oberschall goes on to suggest that status explanations should be viewed as congruent, not contradictory with socialization explanations (Oberschall, p.11). Congruence of these two theories This is the exact position of this paper, which will illustrate the point with an examination of the current moral reform movement in America. The next two chapters on the old right and the new traditionalist should help clarify this more.

CHAPTER III
THE OLD RIGHT

The old rightist movement that will be used as the base of comparison for the new Christian right movement is the McCarthyist movement of the 1950's. McCarthyism gave the U.S. a good inclination of how powerful right-wing extremism could manifest itself into public policy. Other right wing extremist groups had long tried to establish themselves into the engine of government, but none left the wake of change that McCarthyism brought about (Lipset, p.323). The Klu Klux Klan, Populism, and even the Know-Nothings all had important successful political victories within communities, groups, and small regions, but all lost momentum before they could build national power and control (Lipset, p.322). McCarthyism was an exception to this tendency of only operating within the confines of local regions. McCarthyism was in fact not a normal political movement. McCarthyism had no official members and no organized chapters (Lipset and Raab, p.220). McCarthyism was a tendency of the times. Senator McCarthy was more of an instrument of this tendency, than he was a creator (Lipset and Raab, p.220).

In a way, Lipset views McCarthyism as a symptom of the changes taking place in society at that time. The post-war period in the U.S. was one of unparalleled

prosperity. The national income and the average workers income, both tripled between 1940 and 1950 (Lipset and Raab, 209). Increases in real income was disproportionately shared by the lower income groups (Lipset and Raab, p.209). The lowest income fifth improved its average real income by about 70 per cent, as compared to 40 per cent for the highest fifth. Actual income increased more for the highest fifth, but it was relative income that increased more for the bottom group and, the greatest income growth was among the second and third lowest income fifths. They increased their real income by an incredible 80 per cent (Lipset and Raab, p.210). The significance this change would have on an individual can be made apparent to the reader by simply thinking of how a near doubling of one's own current income would affect one's own life style.

The impact of such a change should facilitate profound changes among individuals, especially those who had previously had little disposable income. It was this group who was affected most by the change. Lipset particularly points to the new small businessman who worked his way up from the working class as an example (Lipset, p.342). This group was particularly susceptible to the new era of economic mobility, but along with the new wealth also came new insecurities. As Lipset and Raab put it,

The man who amasses wealth himself feels more insecure about keeping it than do people who possess inherited wealth... (he) feels aggrieved about social reform measures which involve redistribution of the wealth, as compared with individuals... who have grown up in an old traditionalist background (p.210, 1978).

The main point here is that the production of similar feelings of insecurity are shared by similar groups which have recently gained economic resources. If one has nothing to lose, then one does not feel the anxiety that the newly acquired economic groups do. And, if one has always had money, then he or she has feel the anxiety of the newly acquired, because you have always had money and you have little reason to doubt the security of the resources which have always been available.

The social base that supported the activities of McCarthy can be demonstrated by using a number of quantitative studies done at the time. The data used for the analysis of McCarthyism came from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, the International Research Associates (INRA), and the Roper and Gallop Polls of that period. Some private sources were also used and they will be cited where appropriate. The analysis of McCarthyism comes from Lipset and Raab's book, The Politics of Unreason.

These analyses suggest that support for McCarthyism came disproportionately from Catholics, the Irish, New Englanders, Republicans, the less educated, the lower class, manual workers, farmers, and older people (Lipset and Raab, p.224). Lipset and Raab began their analysis with political identification indicators. Table I (p. 14) illustrates the breakdown of support for McCarthyism by party identification. The most striking feature of table I is the fact that the majority of subjects were either neutral or anti-McCarthy. Of those who supported McCarthyism, the greatest percentage were Republican. Table I suggests a definite positive relationship between degrees of party commitment and attitudes toward McCarthyism (Lipset and Raab, p.225).

Table II shows the relationship between support for McCarthyism by education and party preference. Table II clearly shows a pattern of greater support for McCarthyism among Republicans and the less educated. These relationships are consistent with what is already known on the effects of education on political attitudes (Lipset and Raab, p.226). Generally, the greater the education, the greater the tolerance of difference and ambiguity. Education also brings with it an increased regard for due process (Lipset and Raab, p.226). If education has a profound effect on pro-McCarthy attitudes, then it should follow that occupational factors are similarly correlated

TABLE 1

RELATIONSHIP OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
TO ATTITUDE TOWARD MCCARTHY
1954, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN-ANN ARBOR

PARTY COMMITMENT	ATTITUDE TOWARD MCCARTHY				
	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Antis Over Pros	Number
Strong Democrat	10%	37%	50%	40%	(248)
Weak Democrat	09	44	40	31	(288)
Independent-Democrat	08	42	40	33	(097)
Independent-No Party	12	54	21	09	(082)
Independent-Republican	12	50	32	20	(068)
Weak Republican	12	47	33	21	(159)
Strong Republican	25	43	27	02	(146)

TABLE 2

SUPPORT FOR MCCARTHY BY EDUCATION AND
 PARTY PREFERENCE, 1954 (INRA)
 PERCENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN APPROVERS AND DISAPPROVERS

Education	Party Identification		
	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Graduate School	-59	-44	-28
Colleqe	-44	-24	-19
Vocational- Some Colleqe	-41	-20	-19
High School	-27	-8	-5
Primary School	-18	-8	+6

to McCarthyism. Those occupations which require the highest education (i.e. professionals, executives) should be the most anti-McCarthy. Table III shows this to be the case.

In the sample, the professional and clerical class has the largest percent difference between approvers and disapprovers. Farmers were the most favorable toward McCarthyism (Lipset and Raab, p.227). Blue collar workers were more favorable to McCarthy than those in the white collar middle-class occupations. Clearly, McCarthy's main opponents were among the professional, managerial, and clerical personnel. McCarthy's support came from the self-employed businessman, the farmer, and the manual worker. The strength of McCarthy is clearly found in the lower classes and among the rural population (Lipset and Raab, p.228).

Lipset and Raab also suggest that McCarthyism reflects strains inherent in the varying statuses of American religious and ethnic groups (Lipset and Raab, p.229). Tables 4 and 5 help illustrate this point. Table 4 is a comparison between Protestants and Catholics broken down by party identification. Catholics as a group were much more supportive of McCarthy than were Protestants. Lipset and Raab suggest that we can account for this in that Catholics and other recent immigrants with relatively low status, or ethnic ties to the Axis nations were more

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD MCCARTHY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN-ANN ARBOR
PERCENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN APPROVERS AND DISAPPROVERS

Occupation	Percent	Number
Professional and Business	-40	(246)
Clerical and Business	-44	(102)
Skilled Worker	-30	(337)
Unskilled Worker	-16	(144)
Farmer	-17	(104)

likely to favor the actions of McCarthy, while those with ethnic origins from Allied nations and those with higher status are more likely to oppose McCarthy (Lipset and Raab, p.229). This is of course due to the fact that Axis nations which had lost WWII, especially Eastern Europe, were feeling the threat of communist rule.

Table 4 suggests that strong Democrats and Independents were the least supportive of McCarthyism, while the strong Republicans were relatively strong supporters of Senator of McCarthy. Between Protestants and Catholics, Catholics show more support for McCarthyism. Overall, only the strong Republican Protestants show more support for McCarthyism than the whole group of Catholics. The lowest party identification supportive groups (i.e. strong Democrats and Independents) among the Catholics supported McCarthyism more than the weak Republican Protestants and came close to the same amount of support as the highest group of McCarthy Protestant supporters (i.e. the strong Republican Protestants).

Table 5 is a breakdown of Protestant denominational support for McCarthyism. As previously stated, those groups with high SES tended to be anti-McCarthy, while those groups with low SES tended to be more pro-McCarthy. The higher the status of a group, the more the group felt antagonistic towards McCarthy (Lipset and Raab, p.230). The only exception were the Methodists. Although the

TABLE 4

ATTITUDES TOWARD MCCARTHY ACCORDING TO RELIGION
AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION
1954, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN-ANN ARBOR

Attitude				Weak	Strong
Toward	Strong	Weak	Inde-	Repub-	Repub-
McCarthy	Democrat	Democrat	pendent	lican	lican

Protestant					
Pro	7%	6%	7%	11%	23%
Anti	55	45	35	33	28
Anti over Pro	-48	-39	-28	-22	-5
Number	(148)	(213)	(173)	(128)	(123)

Catholic					
Pro	18%	23%	19%	20%	39%
Anti	33	20	21	28	23
Anti over Pro	-15	+3	-2	-8	+16
Number	(51)	(58)	(55)	(25)	(18)

TABLE 5

PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS SUPPORT
FOR MCCARTHY, 1952, ROPER

Denomination	Attitude Toward McCarthy (percent)			
	Pro McCarthy	Anti- McCarthy	Difference	Number
Episcopalians	29%	44%	-15	(157)
Methodists	29	33	-4	(509)
Presbyterians	37	36	+1	(208)
Lutherans	33	31	+2	(207)
Baptists	28	24	+4	(471)

Methodists are lower in SES than the Presbyterians and Lutherans, they were more anti-McCarthy. It is interesting to note that education and occupation affect support for McCarthyism negatively (e.g. as education goes up, support for McCarthy goes down), while party affiliation has the opposite effect (e.g. Republicans are the strongest supporters of McCarthy)

The data support Lipset and Raab's argument that McCarthy supporters are highest among those status groups that they hypothesized would be so. Those low in income and education, those who lived in rural areas, Catholics, low SES protestants, and self-employed businessmen are the highest supporters of McCarthyism. In short, those groups which Lipset and Raab believed to be most likely to experience status discontent were the very same groups that were most supportive of McCarthyism.

Now we must turn our focus to the current issues of the new traditionalist movement in America and test whether we can account for this by using same status discontent model, or if the cultural-socialization model is more appropriate.

CHAPTER IV
THE NEW TRADITIONALISM

The current political movement of the 1980's to advance moral reform issues is a coalition of different groups which have come together to promote their shared interests. This section is intended to introduce these different groups which have come together to form this new traditionalist movement. More importantly, this section should highlight those issues which the new traditionalist movement promotes and those issues which will be used in our current analysis of the moral reform movement that will be compared to McCarthyism. Today the new traditionalist movement has become well organized and well financed. It now has clear-cut goals and means for achieving those goals.

The new traditionalist movement has basically four major themes on which it now operates (Reichley, p.543). First, the new traditionalist members see the way to defend internal freedom as a strong national defense.² Second, they believe that Americans have common international economic interests and that the federal government should be used to represent these common interests. An example of this would be the use of federal troops to protect U.S. based companies when challenged abroad. Third, the U.S. is the "exemplar of freedom"³ for

the rest of the world to strive towards. U.S. democratic capitalism, not communism, is seen as the only political-economic ideal under which "true" freedom exists. And fourth, the new traditionalist movement has a strong commitment for the support of traditional values such as a strong reverence for God and country and the belief that the only legitimation of sex is through marriage.

The new traditionalist movement is in a way an updated version of old-fashioned liberal politics (Lienesch, p.548). To be more specific, it is a version of Lockean liberalism in that it has aligned itself with market capitalism and it accepts the values of political democracy. This is different from other classical conservative leaders and thinkers such as Burke, or Disraeli (Reichley, p.548). Kevin Phillips states:

There are conservatives whose game it is to quote English poetry and utter neo-Madisonian benedictions over the interests and institutions of established liberalism. Then there are other conservatives--many I know--who have more in common with Andrew Jackson than with Edmund Burke. Their hope is to build cultural siege-cannon out of the populist steel of Idaho, Mississippi and working-class Milwaukee, and then blast the Eastern liberal establishment to ideological smithereens (1976, p.88)

The new traditionalist movement is a product of a transitional population in which conservative Christian

leaders came together with political leaders and formed the new traditionalist coalition. Why did Christian groups enter into this coalition? During the 1960's and 70's, conservative Christian groups were beginning to come under fire for their tax privileges. The I.R.S. was planning to tax those private Christian schools that maintained a strong racial imbalance. TV evangelists were going to have their broadcasts more closely regulated, and the tax regulations concerning church property were under pressure to be changed (Lienesch, p.409).

An interest group such as conservative religious followers fit well with the right wing political conservatives of the Republican party. Together they form the backbone of the new traditionalist movement. The conservative preachers receive interest group representation from the politicians and the politicians get ready-made constituent support from the preachers.

The new traditionalist movement takes much of its economic philosophy from the 19th century Frenchman, Jean Baptiste Say. Say's law is the basis for the theory of supply side economics (Reichley, p.539-41). According to Say's law, "supply creates its own demand". There are in fact, few economists who would disagree with this idea that a market economy has the propensity to reach its own level of equilibrium. The disagreement for economists is when depressions in the business cycle occur in a market

economy. This is where economists such as Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes diverge from Say's law. At what point does a market economy need external stimulation? It is during the depressionary dips that Keynes would call for government intervention. A market economy reaches an equilibrium, but can do so at great human expense (i.e. unemployment), if strict supply-side policies are followed.

The application of supply-side economics can be clearly seen in the Nixon, Ford, and currently the Reagan administrations (Reichley, p.540). In all three recent Republican administrations, economic policies were carried out that considered inflation far more dangerous than unemployment (Reichley, p.540). This is where the new traditionalist movement takes its economic ideology. The new traditionalist movement is anti-regulation and pro-big business.*

It has been suggested that the popularity of Christian television programming has also played a significant role in the development of the new traditionalist movement (Hager, 1983; Hadden, 1983; Mueller, 1983; Lienesch, 1982; Yinger and Cutler, 1982; Reichley, 1981; Crawford, 1980). The electric church has done well in organizing political representation and raising the money needed to secure this representation. The electric church is in itself, big business. One

estimate is that the electric church made more than 500 million dollars in net profit, for 1983 (Lienesch, p.404). The mission of saving souls is now also one of raising money.

The electric church has what Hager has described as a "high-tech/low road" approach. Direct mailing plus television exposure results in large monetary income. The electric church has syndicated itself through independent networks. It has its own cable channel, the CBN (Christian Broadcasting Network). An example of successful religious fund raising is Rev. Jerry Falwell's Old-time Gospel hour. It had 18 million viewers and an annual budget of \$63.7 million dollars in 1983 (Hager, p.80). Falwell raises money through assertive television fund raising and direct mailings. In the late summer of 1983, Falwell's moral majority sent out 3.5 million pieces of mail to prospective donors.

Why has the electric church become so popular? The answer is two-fold. First, the electric church has easy access to large numbers of people. Second, the message being sent to the public has become well packaged and marketed. The first reason is easily explained.

Over 98 percent of all the homes in the U.S. have televisions. The average American spends three or more hours watching television everyday (Hughes, p.292). To reach large numbers of people in America, the electric

church uses television, and to those who might not see the television a letter is sent. The next reason for the popularity of the electric church is a little more complicated.

The message being sent out by the electric church is not only to put one's faith in the Lord, but also in the electric church. The message of the electric church is one of universal traditional values. Four key themes have been emphasized. They are family, nation, God, and discipline and work (Hager, p.81). The electric church not only produces these symbols in abundance, but it also tries to monopolize the use of these symbols. The Moral Majority, for instance, dichotomizes things as either right or wrong. New and different ideas, such as atheism⁵, homosexuality⁶, and legal abortion⁷ are in the new traditionalist lexicon as the dangerous, the un-American, and the ungodly. One can see how these ideas are in direct conflict with new traditionalist ideology. One is either with the electric church, or against them. There seems to be little or no middle ground.

The electric church has two major marketing tactics. It plays on the fears of the public and it uses scapegoats (Hager, p.81). They play upon the rising crime statistics. They promote military build-up² as the only means of avoiding nuclear war and they ask how parents would think about homosexual teachers abusing their

children, not teaching them. These are just a few of the tactics used. Concerning scapegoating, the Moral Majority for instance lists the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Organization of Women, and the National Education Association as communist organizations (Hager, p.82). The Moral Majority go as far as to label the American Library Association as perverted pornographers. The message being sent out by the electric church is also of a current nature. The message is sent on a weekly and nightly basis, which ensures that it has topical importance.

As previously stated, the resurgence of political conservatism may well be linked to that of the problems of a transitional population. During periods of rapid and significant social change, anomie becomes more common. How a population deals with anomie is determined by its own unique cultural choices. One clear way of dealing with anomic feelings is to turn to religion, especially when religion in the electric church is so inviting. You no longer have to put your faith in a poor preacher on a soap box. The electric church has developed "painless salvation". A poor sinner no longer needs to repent in a church service. The followers of the electric church can stay home in the comfort of their own home and be saved. There is no need to get all dressed up in a coat and tie, or long dress. All the follower has to do is send in a donation and keep watching. If you sleep through the

morning show, there are plenty of afternoon and night shows. They have large choruses and some full bands and orchestras. The electric church has even gone a step further. Throughout the year, faithful followers who enjoy the show at home, can now make modern day holy pilgrimages. The leading electric churches all have incredible wealthy complexes from which they broadcast, such as Oral Robert's Holy City or Jerry Falwell's Liberty Baptist Church and University complex. Followers make their trek to their favorite holy city and have a chance to be on their favorite show.

The electric church reaches out to large audiences. It presents a well organized and well fashioned message. The electric church fills the void in a targeted portion of the population that readily accepts its message. Who constitutes the targeted portion of the population? This paper, along with Stacey and Shupe, is suggesting that it is the rural in residence, those low in income, below average in education, older, and small businessmen and farmers (1982, p.296).

Most of the conservative religionists in the new traditionalist movement agree on basic religious principles. These principles are: the virgin birth, the atonement, the resurrection, the second coming, and the inerrancy of the Bible (Lienesch, p.418). After these, there is a split as to where the next emphasis in

religious principles should be. The first group are the Charismatics. They are the Pentecostal, Holiness, and Apostolic sects. The Charismatics emphasize baptism in the Holy Spirit. They are very individualistic. The second group are the Fundamentalists. Their emphasis is on the teaching of creationism. The third group are the Evangelicals. They emphasize moral reform and the banning of pornography and prostitution. The fourth group are the conservative Catholics. Their emphasis is on anti-abortion (Lienesch, pp.418-19).

Because of these four different groups, the new traditionalist movement has at times, found itself in periods of internal argument. One attempt to unify these differences was the prayer in school^e issue. This is a widely accepted principle among all groups (Lienesch, p.419).

One point that we have drawn is that the new traditionalist movement is a coalition of conservative preachers and politicians who have come together to form a political interest movement. Paul Weyrich of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress states, "Organization is our bag. We preach and teach nothing but organization." The group is both well financed and well represented in our congress.

Figure I (page 35) illustrates the ideological dispersion of the new traditionalist movement according to

our factor analysis (see table 7, p.45). The three major issues isolated are intolerance of liberals, moral government issues, and moral family issues. Whereas it is not obligatory for follower to support all categories, the person who agreed with all of the make up of the new traditionalist movement would be an ideal type member. The ideal type would support all ideologies in each factor not just one or two.

For example, one publicised person who supports most of the new traditionalist ideas is Colorado brewer Joseph Coors. Coors is a businessman who embodies all the ideals of the new traditionalist movement. Coors, along with Paul Weyrich, formed the Heritage Foundation of Washington, D.C. in 1973 (Crawford, p.11). The Heritage Foundation has become one of the major think tanks for conservative thought in the United States. The Heritage Foundation has close ties with the National Republican Congressional Committee and the National Republican Senatorial Committee. In 1974, Coors formed the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress with Weyrich and Richard Viquerie (Crawford, p.15). Conway and Siegelman comment on this beginning:

Then in 1974, the Coors-Weyrich team collaborated in the birth of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, and with the help of Richard Viquerie's direct-mail machinery, the aggressive PAC got off to a cunning start...it used its money to play an

activist behind-the-scenes role, seeking out and organizing sympathetic individuals and groups and training them in coordinated political strategies. (1984, p.111)

While Coors fits well into the political and business ideologies, he is also a strong advocate of the religious ideologies that make up the new traditionalist movement. Weyrich, Coor's close friend and partner, was at one time executive director of the moral majority (Conway and Siegelman, p.361).

Another example of this coalition between church and state can be seen in the former Secretary of Interior, James Watt, who was once head of Coors's "special interest" law foundation in Colorado and is a close associate of Coors. Watt is a member of the Assemblies of God, the largest Pentecostal denomination in the United States. Watt directly brought his religious convictions into politics. When asked about his long-range environmental policies as Secretary of Interior, Watt replied in a congressional committee, "I don't know how many future generations we can count on until the Lord returns..." (Conway and Siegelman, p.363). This type of ideological position opened up many previously restricted areas to new corporate exploitation. Coors's political groups may also have had input into the nomination of Dr. Everett Koop as surgeon general. Koop is an ardent fundamentalist and nationally prominent anti-abortion crusader (Conway and Siegelman, p.361).

As an ideal type, Coors exemplifies the complete embodiment of new traditionalist ideologies, but he does so on a level of leadership instead of a following. We must also look at the follower. In the first section, Harris's idea of a cultural crisis was brought about in conjunction with the switching of religions. This theme recurs in looking at a holistic view of the new traditionalist movement. Alan Crawford suggests:

The New Right, a political revolt of the insecure and resentful, is the result, at least in part, of the incapacity of its adherents to come to terms with modern society—with the corporate state, with large business institutions, and with the organized labor movement. Despite their talk of defending free enterprise and sympathizing with the working man, the New Right is deeply distrustful of the institutions that exist to support business and labor. (1980, p.208)

Two important points are brought out in this passage: insecurity and resentment. Insecurity may be attributed to cultural change. The feelings of resentment may be brought about by the feelings of insecurity, or in other words, status frustration.

Previous research on the new right has empirically tested for specific variables that might be used to pinpoint supporters. Johnson and Tanney, in a study of the support for the Moral Majority, have isolated many characteristics of Moral Majority supporters. The major

factor effecting support for the Moral Majority was that of a Christian Right orientation (Johnson and Tanney, p.192). Moral Majority supporters tend to be older and less educated people. They tend to be culturally ethnocentric and tend to have an authoritarian type personality. Johnson and Tanney conclude that:

:...it is not the conservative Christian in general who supports the Moral Majority, but those people who rather rigidly adhere to traditional religious ideologies and are intolerant of and somewhat threatened by those who disagree with them.
(1984, p.195)

Hunter agrees with this conclusion. He specifically looks at Evangelicals and suggests that most Evangelicals "are firmly committed to the liberal traditions of social and political tolerance" (Hunter, p.375). Hunter continues that it may be the Fundamentalists, not Evangelicals, who are the real enemies to the traditions of pluralism in the United States. Whereas Evangelicals may not directly support the ideology of intolerance, they do support it indirectly. By supporting the pro-life and other ideologies of the new traditionalist movement, they also lend support to those leaders who are in a position to degrade U.S. pluralism.

There are several contradictions in the alliance between these conservative politicians and preachers. One is the suspicion that the new traditionalist movement

holds for big government. The new traditionalists dislike big government and are working for the deregulation and dismantlement of many government programs. The government that governs least, governs best. The new traditionalist movement wants the federal government to step away from its previous role in which it dealt with social, racial, and personal economic problems of society.

The new traditionalist movement contradicts earlier patterns by supporting government growth. The difference is that new traditionalists want a hands off policy on social, racial, and economic problems, but they want growth of defense and the use of the government as a moral watchdog. Government is seen as the last protector against those ideas which threaten the traditional family, such as pre-marital sex⁹, homosexuality⁶, abortion⁷, and the equal right's amendment.¹⁰ They want the government not to force busin¹¹, or racial integration in the schools, but they want the government as a policeman of personal behavior and their moral code. The new traditionalist movement wants shrinkage of social welfare programs, but increases in the national defense programs.

The new traditionalist movement tends to reduce everything to either right or wrong. There seems to be little or nothing in between. It is this aspect of the new traditionalist movement that may be most dangerous as a challenge to the basic principles of liberty and pluralism in the United States.

**Intolerance of
Liberals**

- *Homosexuals**
- *Atheists**
- *Communists**

**Moral-Government
Issues**

- *Support for Military
Spending**
- *Confidence in Big
Business**
- *Anti-Busing**

**Moral-Family
Issues**

- *Anti-Abortion**
- *Anti-Premarital
Sex**
- *Anti-ERA**

**IDEOLOGICAL DISPERSION IN THE
NEW TRADITIONALIST MOVEMENT**

FIGURE 1

CHAPTER V
METHODS AND ANALYSIS

-Hypothesis-

The research of this paper has a two-fold purpose. The first is to compare the current conservative movement in America to McCarthyism in order to test the validity of our hypothesis that the current movement is quite similar to that of the recent past in popular support due to dynamic economic conditions. If we find that our hypothesis is true at a significant level in our sample, we can then explain and predict the emergence of certain moral reform movements as they occur in the future. The analysis will be done by taking the General Social Survey (GSS) for the years of 1979 and 1982 and looking at the makeup of those persons who responded in favor of past movements issues and then comparing them to those who respond in favor of today's issues. We predict that there will be a strong correlation between those SES variables that were found to be significantly related to the issues of McCarthyism with SES support for present issues.

If this hypothesis is correct, then the demographic makeup of those who supported the issues of McCarthyism will be much the same as those who support the new right issues. We should find that those who live in rural areas, are low in income, below average in education,

older in age, and who are small independent businessmen and farmers are the strongest supporters of the new traditionalist movement, as they were the strongest supporters of McCarthyism. Those social forces that once threatened the status positions of these social classes have made a resurgence. Other current researchers in this area (Yinger and Cutler, 1982; Patel, Pilant, and Rose, 1982; Mueller, 1983; Johnson and Tamney, 1984; Rothenburg and Newport, 1984; Hunter, 1984) have concentrated on the constituency of the "New Religious Right" but, none look at the way in which this movement compares to other right wing movements of the past. The second purpose is to test whether we can account for the production of moral reform issues in the late 1970's to present by employing the cultural-socialization model, and/or the status frustration model. It is my argument that if we view new traditionalism in an historically comparative manner, we will find that support for new traditionalist issues comes from traditional rightist support groups, but that support may also be growing in non-traditional rightist support sectors of the population due to the effect of socialization and cultural change. If this is true, support is being understated by other researchers when they conclude that the new right is supported by only a minority of Americans and that the new right poses no threat to civility and plurality in America (Yinger and Cutler, 1982; Johnson and Tamney, 1984). Hadden states,

This is not to say they (the New Christian Right) will not be mischievous. They will. But their views are simply too far afield from the mainstream of American values to garner sufficient political strength to impose their family policy package on this nation.

-Data-

The data used for the current analysis comes from the nationwide survey conducted by National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Data collected in General Social Survey (GSS) for the years of 1977 and 1982 are used for the analysis. The useable number of subjects is 3,390. The sampling design for these years was a full probability sample with predesignated respondents. The primary sampling units surveyed were standard metropolitan statistical areas and non-metropolitan counties selected in NORC's master sample (Davis, p.186). The sampling units were broken down into block groups and enumeration districts that were stratified according to race and income.

-New traditionalist index-

To measure new traditionalist issue support, we have selected ten items which were asked in 1977 and 1982. Topics include military spending², communism³, confidence in business leaders⁴, atheism⁵, homosexuality⁶, abortion⁷, prayer in school⁸, pre-marital sex.⁹, the equal rights

amendment¹⁰, and businq¹¹. These items are all associated with the research reviewed in Chapter IV, The New Traditionalism. Each item has been suggested as an important make-up of the new traditionalist movement. All ten items should be strong indicators of support for new traditionalist issues if the current literature on the new right is accurate. The purpose of the new traditionalist index is to establish more firmly which persons strongly adhere to traditional moral-social ideas. In other words, we are trying to remove those persons who strongly support one, or only a few traditional moral issues, but not the other issues. For instance, the liberal, highly educated feminist may believe that pornography is an exploitation of women and supports anti-pornography campaigns, but on the other hand this person may be totally in favor of the equal rights amendment and the right to have legal abortions. If only one issue is tested without taking into account the single issue supporter, we may have the effect of washing out the nature of a status discontent relationship. Using the new traditionalist index as a control, we should get a more reliable dependent variable with which to carry out our analysis. All ten issues are represented in figure I (p. 35). The responses were used to build an attitudinal index scale to measure support for the new traditionalist movement. Where necessary, response categories were recoded so that support for new

traditionalist ideology was indicated by high scores. Support for new traditionalism is indexed by approval of prayer in school, military spending, and business leaders, and by disapproval of abortion, the ERA, communism, homosexuality, busing, atheism, and pre-marital sex.

These ten items were selected because of their availability in the GSS and their embodiment of the current major new traditionalist issues (Reichley, 1981; Lienesch, 1982; Mueller, 1983; Haqer, 1983). We found that the GSS was the most comprehensive national survey available to test our question, as well as being the same data source for Wood and Hughes who we replicate in part. Even so, we still recognize the limitations of the GSS and its compatibility to our study. We hope that the results of this study can spark interest which will lead to further research and finance of the subject. These ten items measure support for the new traditionalist movement in all sectors of ideological dispersion. Some issues, such as attitudes towards the atonement and the inerrancy of the Bible are not included in the new traditionalist index due to the non-availability of data for the sampling years. Even with some issues omitted, the ten items used for the index should clearly identify those respondents whose attitudes correspond with new traditionalist ideology.

For each of the items concerning new traditionalist ideology, the value of 0 was given to a non-supportive position. The value of 1 was given to all "no opinion" answers, and the value of 2 was given to all supportive answers. With ten items, the scores on this scale range from 0 to 20. For bivariate and multivariate analysis, the respondents have been grouped into three categories. Scores between 0 to 7 will be considered a non-supportive position concerning new traditionalist ideology. Scores from 8 to 12 will be considered indifferent, and scores from 13 to 20 will be considered supportive. Correlates of the individual items of the scale will also be used to measure associations with SES variables.

The appendix shows the full text of each question as asked in the GSS. We prefer an attitudinal index because the data collected for McCarthyism measures issue support for those persons who agreed with the movement. New traditionalist members in this study refer to those men and women who are clearly associated with the New Traditionalist Movement. Association can range from monetary support to actually working for one of the make-up groups in the movement (e.g. moral majority). Because the new traditionalist movement has no definitive manifesto, it is impossible to say, prepared to back up the statement with unimpeachable authority, that such-and-such a person is a new traditionalist. But, one could say

with reasonable confidence that Jerry Falwell, or Joseph Coors is a new traditionalist, and that someone who gives money and time to the moral majority and other political fundamentalist groups, is a new traditionalist supporter.

-factor analysis of new traditionalist index-

The factor analysis begins with simple frequency distribution of the new traditionalist index (table 6, page 43). Table 6 presents the basic frequencies for "newtrad", broken down by the three categories of strong supporter, indifferent group, and non-supporter. A factor analysis will be included of the ten items in the scale to test for multicollinearity between variables. Results are presented in table 7. Those groups of questions that are highly correlated (factors) will be combined in the analysis.

For our sample, 27.4 percent agree with new traditionalist ideology and can be considered supporters. 34 percent fell into the neutral category. And anti-new traditionalist, the largest group, constitute 38.6 percent of the sample. Anti-new traditionalist outnumber pros by only 11.2 percent. This is much closer than the difference between McCarthy supporters and opposition (see table 1, p.13). The difference between pro-McCarthy and anti-McCarthy averages above 22 percent on table 1. The increase of percentage support should have the effect of

TABLE 6

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR THE
NEW TRADITIONALIST INDEX, 1977 and 1982, NORC

	Pro- New Traditionalist	Neutral	Anti-New Tradtionalist
Index Score	(13-20)	(8-12)	(0-7)
Frequency	608	755	857
Percent	27.4%	34.0%	38.6%
Percent Antis Over Pros (+11.2)			

increasing the significance of pro-new traditionalists ideology in the first part of our analysis.

The factor analysis performed on our ten item scale can be found on table 7. The factor analysis was done using principal component extraction and oblique rotation. Three very clean factors load from our analysis. The first factor is the combination of intolerance for communists (libcom), athiest (libath), and homosexuals (libhomo). Hughes and Hertel (1985) argue that these three items do in fact measure attitudes toward the tolerance of liberals (1985, p.16). We agree. All three items deal with the choice of perceived liberal lifestyles. Factor I will be our test of intolerance for liberals and we will create a new dependent variable from factor I.

Factor II is a combination of agreement with increased military spending (natarms), confidence in big business (conbus), and disagreement with the practice of interracial busing (busing). All three items in factor II deal with moral government issues. Factor II will be our test of attitudes toward moral-political issues and we create a new dependent variable. Factor III is our final extracted factor, which does not bunch together as well as factors I and II. The first three items in factor III (abnomore, premarsx, and era) hold together very well, but the fourth item prayer, attaches itself on with a very poor loading. Prayer also attaches itself to factor I in

TABLE 7

FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR THE
 NEW TRADITIONALIST INDEX, 1977 and 1982, NORC
 PATTERN MATRIX FACTOR LOADINGS USING PRINCIPAL
 COMPONENT EXTRACTION AND OBLIQUE ROTATION
 WITH STRUCTURAL FACTOR LOADINGS IN PARENTHESIS

	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
	Intolerance of Liberals	Moral Government Issues	Moral Social Issues
<hr/>			
Libcom	.86457		
Libath	.84829		
Libhomo	.79154		(-.32093)
Natarms		.63850	
Conbus		.60846	
Busing		.57087	
Abnomore			-.70551
Premarsx	(.32939)		-.64829
Era		(.31399)	-.63347
Prayer	(.30068)		-.34055

the structural factor matrix (in parenthesis) at about the same significance level (which is very low) as it does factor III. Clearly, prayer is not measuring the same issue as is the other items in factor III. The other three items stick together very well and deal with moral-family issues (abortion, pre-marital sex, equality of women). These three items will be combined to form our third dependent variable, while prayer is dropped from the factor.

-Comparison to Lipset and Raab-

The next step of the analysis will be identifying political party commitment by those persons who strongly support new traditionalist issues (high scores on the new traditionalist scale), and then breaking them down in the same fashion as did Lipset and Raab for McCarthyism. Table 8 shows the relationship between party identification and attitude toward new traditionalism (Lipset and Raab, p.225). Table 9 controls for education and support for new traditionalism by party identification (Lipset and Raab, p.227) Table 10 looks at support for new traditionalism by occupation (Lipset and Raab, 227). Table 11 looks at attitudes towards new traditionalism according to religion and party identification, while table 12 concentrates on specifically Protestant denominational support for the new traditionalist movement (Lipset and Raab, p.230).

-Comparison to Wood and Hughes-

We will use a multiple regression to compare the relative explanatory power of status discontent and socialization variables. Each multiple regression was done in two distinct phases. First we entered the status frustration variables into the regression. Second, we entered the socialization and control variables as a comparison.

For our indicators of status discontent and socialization, we have adopted those same variables as Wood and Hughes use in their regression analysis of pornography (1984, pp.92-95). The main difference between our analysis and that of Wood and Hughes is our cumulative moral-reform dependent variable, as opposed to one (pornography), and our use of a more current time sample. We feel that our use of many moral-reform issues and the concentration of our survey for the period of 1977 to 1982 has the potential to significantly contribute to our understanding of the issues addressed by Wood and Hughes.

-Status discontent variables-

Our indicators of status discontent include variables dealing with old middle-class dimensions, geographic mobility, the upwardly mobile, and the over-rewarded

status discrepant (Wood and Hughes, pp.92-93). To measure old middle-class dimensions, Wood and Hughes developed a set of occupational categories with constructed dummy variables (p.92). For regression analysis, four dummy variables (coded 0 and 1) are included representing (1) manual workers, (2) lower white-collar workers, (3) self-employed business persons, and (4) self-employed professionals (Wood and Hughes, p.93). To measure geographic mobility, from rural to urban areas, a dummy variable was constructed which equals 1, for respondents in non-metropolitan areas (less than 50,000) when 16 years old whose current place of residence is now within a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. If not, the dummy variable equals 0 (Wood and Hughes, p.92). Upwardly mobile persons are the next group to be evaluated in our status discontent model. Dummy variables were created for upwardly mobile groups. Those who indicated that at age 16 their family income was below average, but that their current family income was above average were coded 1, while all others are coded 0 (Wood and Hughes, p.93). In respect to the groups chosen as being upwardly mobile, we differ from Wood and Hughes who only test upwardly mobile Blacks and Catholics. We feel all other groups who meet the criteria of being upwardly mobile also have the chance of experiencing status discontent and should be included. The fourth dimension of status discontent is the over-

rewarded status discrepant. Two dummy variables (high income with low education and high income with low occupational prestige) are used. Both of these groups are coded 1, all others 0 (Wood and Hughes, p.93).

-Socialization and control variables-

Indicators of cultural and socialization effects include variables of age, sex, education, conservative Protestant religion, rural residence, rural residence at age 16, and living in the southern region of the U.S. (Wood and Hughes, p.95). A dummy variable was constructed indicating affiliation with conservative Protestant denominations (Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other fundamentalist groups). Dummy variables are also constructed for years of education and age in years. Two dummy variables were constructed for sex (1=male, 0=female), living in a rural area (1=currently resides in an area less than 50,000 in population, 0=otherwise), living in a rural area at age 16 (1=lived in a rural area at age 16, 0=otherwise) (Wood and Hughes, p.93).

For our control variables, we use income, income at age 16, occupational prestige, race (Black), and religion (Catholic) (Wood and Hughes, p.95). The use of these control variables is needed because the indicator of over-rewarded Black and Catholic status discrepant are interaction variables, and the effects of all component

variables need to be included in the analysis (Wood and Hughes, pp.93-94). For occupational prestige, we use the Hodge, Siegel and Rossi occupational prestige scale (Davis, pp.285-88). For family income at age 16, we use a 5-category ordinal scale (1=far below average, 2=below average, 3=average, 4=above average, 5=far above average) and for current income we use the GSS 1 to 12 scale (Wood and Hughes, p.94).

CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

-bivariate and multivariate analyses-

Tables 8 thru 12 constitute a replication of Lipset and Raabs' analysis using the new traditionalist index as a dependent variable in place of McCarthyism. This is our first empirical test of the social base of support for the new traditionalist movement. Table 8 is a breakdown of support for new traditionalist movement. Table 8 suggests a definite relationship between degree of party commitment and attitude toward new traditionalism. The difference between support for McCarthyism in 1954 and support for new traditionalism in 1977 and 1982 is that this relationship was positive for McCarthy support (Table 1, p.13), while a deviation holds true for new traditionalism. For McCarthyism, strong commitment to the Democratic party was a good predictor of anti-McCarthy attitudes, while a strong commitment to the Republican party was a strong predictor of pro-McCarthy attitudes. In our analysis, the best predictor of anti-new traditionalist attitudes is an independent stance toward party commitment. Strong party commitment, be it with the Democratic or Republican party, is our best political identification predictor of pro-new traditionalist

TABLE 8

RELATIONSHIP OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
TO ATTITUDE TOWARD NEW TRADITIONALISM
1977 AND 1982, NORC, DAVIS

PARTY COMMITMENT	ATTITUDE TOWARD MCCARTHY				
	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Antis Over Pros	Number
Strong Democrat	36%	39%	25%	-11%	(419)
Weak Democrat	27	33	40	13	(583)
Independent-Democrat	17	27	56	39	(311)
Independent-No Party	19	32	49	30	(082)
Independent-Republican	26	33	41	15	(197)
Weak Republican	26	39	35	09	(308)
Strong Republican	41	36	24	-17	(167)

attitudes. A strong commitment to any political ideology tends to bring with it adherence to traditional ideas and intolerance of other ideas in our sample.

Table 9 shows the relationship between support for new traditionalism by education and party preference. Table 9 shows where the strength of new traditionalist support lies. Table 9 is like the analysis of McCarthy (Table 2, p.14) in that the pattern of support clearly increases as education decreases. And, we still see the relationship between party commitment and support for new traditionalism. Table 9 suggests that as party commitment increases in strength, and the education of the respondent decreases, the more likely the person will support new traditionalist ideas.

Table 10 shows the relationship between occupation and attitude toward new traditionalism. Like McCarthyism (see table 3, p.16), we should find an increase in support for new traditionalism as occupational level drops. Education has been shown to have a similar effect, and education is of course related to occupational achievement. Table 10 shows this to be the case. Farmers also show a much stronger support for new traditionalist ideas than they did for McCarthyism. As education and occupational levels rise, so does opposition to new traditionalism. As Lipset and Raab point out, the higher the education, the greater one's tolerance of difference

TABLE 9

SUPPORT FOR NEW TRADITIONALISM BY EDUCATION AND
 PARTY PREFERENCE, 1977 AND 1982, NOEC
 PERCENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN APPROVERS AND DISAPPROVERS

Education	Party Identification		
	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Graduate School	-58	-68	-40
College	-41	-50	-22
Vocational- Some College	-20	-60	-18
High School	+2	-15	+2
Primary School	+27	+20	+53

TABLE 10

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD NEW TRADITIONALISM, 1977 AND 1982, NORC
PERCENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN APPROVERS AND DISAPPROVERS

Occupation	Percent	Number
Professional and Business	-39	(367)
Clerical and Business	-25	(720)
Skilled Worker	-12	(266)
Unskilled Worker	-8	(715)
Farmer	+24	(034)

and ambiguity, as well as an increased regard for due process (1978, p.226).

Tables 11 and 12 show support for new traditionalism by religion. Table 11 is a comparison between Protestants and Catholics broken down by party identification. We find that the same relations brought out in tables 8 and 9 hold when controlling for religion. Regardless of religion, the lower the respondent's party commitment, the more likely he or she will not support new traditionalism. Table 12 is the breakdown of Protestant denominations. As for McCarthyism, Episcopalians are the most liberal, while Baptists are the most conservative and are most likely to support the moral reform movements in both time periods. The major difference between the two studies are the middle groups of denominations. Lutherans are now second most liberal, while in 1952 they were second most conservative. Methodists have switched in exactly the opposite direction being second most liberal in 1952, and second most conservative in 1977 and 1982. Presbyterians have remained the middle group throughout both studies.

-Regression analyses-

Tables 13 thru 20 presents the results of eight regression analyses. Two regressions were performed on each of our four dependent variables. The first dependent variable (newtrad) is the total summation of the new

TABLE 11

ATTITUDES TOWARD NEW TRADITIONALISM ACCORDING
TO RELIGION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION
1977 AND 1982, NORC

Attitude				Weak	Strong
Toward	Strong	Weak	Inde-	Repub-	Repub-
McCarthy	Democrat	Democrat	pendent	lican	lican

Protestant					
Pro	39%	31%	25%	30%	43%
Anti	20	32	42	33	22
Anti over Pro	+19	-1	-17	-3	+21
Number	(248)	(365)	(434)	(235)	(139)

Catholic					
Pro	34%	25%	20%	16%	32%
Anti	32	45	46	33	21
Anti over Pro	+2	-20	-26	-17	+11
Number	(112)	(155)	(164)	(55)	(19)

TABLE 12

PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS SUPPORT
FOR NEW TRADITIONALISM, 1977 AND 1982, NORC

Denomination	Attitude Toward McCarthy (percent)			
	Pro McCarthy	Anti- McCarthy	Difference	Number
Episcopalians	5%	58%	-50	(066)
Lutherans	21	39	-18	(187)
Presbyterians	22	36	-14	(099)
Methodists	31	31	00	(271)
Baptists	39	26	+13	(481)

traditionalist index, while the next three dependent variables (intolerance of liberals, moral government and moral family issues) are only those variables which attained high loadings in our factor analysis. For each independent variable, we present the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficient along with the t-value to evaluate statistical significance. The first regression for each dependent variable includes only those variables which test for status discontent. The second regression includes variables presenting cultural and socialization variables, control variables, as well as status discontent variables.

Tables 13 and 14 show the results of our first set of analyses using newtrad as the dependent variable. The findings in table 13 indicate that the amount of variance explained by our first model is low ($R^2=.077$). We do still find that of the 7 percent of the variance explained, our best predictors are upward mobility ($\beta=.139$) and over-rewarded education ($\beta=.164$). In Table 14, we see an increase in variance explained ($R^2=.157$). Of this, the strongest predictors are age ($\beta=.226$), having a conservative Protestant religion ($\beta=.172$), and education ($\beta=.147$)

Tables 15 and 16 are for our second set of regression analyses using intolerance of liberals as our dependent variable. Our first regression in table 15 explains more

TABLE 13

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES
FOR NEW TRADITIONALIST INDEX

	B	beta	t
<hr/>			
<u>Status Discontent</u>			
<u>Variables</u>			
Manual	-.081	-.090	-1.737
Lower White Collar	-.098	-.101	-2.030
Self-Employed Business	-.061	-.027	-.924
Self-Employed Professional	-.163	-.139	-3.105
Geographic Mobility	-.007	-.005	-.262
Upward Mobility	.141	.139	6.435
Over-rewarded Education	.188	.164	7.255
Over-rewarded Prestige	.027	.030	1.131
Constant	.283		
R ²	.077		
F	21.618		

TABLE 14

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES, CULTURAL AND
SOCIALIZATION VARIABLES, AND CONTROL VARIABLES
FOR THE NEW TRADITIONALIST INDEX

	B	beta	t
<u>Status Discontent Variables</u>			
Manual	-.041	-.045	-.887
Lower White Collar	-.053	-.055	-1.091
Self-Employed Business	-.029	-.013	-.443
Self-Employed Professional	-.070	-.061	-1.221
Geographic Mobility	.004	.003	.111
Upward Mobility	.065	.064	1.119
Over-rewarded Education	.004	.003	.120
Over-rewarded Prestige	.073	.082	2.244
<u>Cultural and Socialization Variables</u>			
Age	.006	.226	10.033
Sex	.009	.010	.435
Education	-.057	-.147	-4.371
Conservative Religion	.162	.172	5.028
Rural Residence	.038	.039	.713
Rural at Age 16	.024	.026	1.055
<u>Control Variables</u>			
Income	-.006	-.036	-1.498
Family Income at Age 16	.004	.007	.261
Occupational Prestige	.015	.049	1.061
Black	-.059	-.050	-2.235
Catholic	.124	.117	3.546
Constant	-.028		
R ²	.157		
F	19.479		

TABLE 15

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
 STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES
 FOR INTOLERANCE OF LIBERALS

	B	beta	t
<u>Status Discontent</u>			
<u>Variables</u>			
Manual	-.038	-.039	-.908
Lower White Collar	-.114	-.105	-2.614
Self-Employed Business	-.162	-.065	-2.750
Self-Employed Professional	-.120	-.148	-4.194
Geographic Mobility	.004	.003	.145
Upward Mobility	.147	.135	7.568
Over-rewarded Education	.264	.229	12.096
Over-rewarded Prestige	.060	.061	2.721
Constant	.349		
R ²	.145		
F	59.995		

TABLE 16

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES, CULTURAL AND
SOCIALIZATION VARIABLES, AND CONTROL VARIABLES
FOR INTOLEBANCE OF LIBERALS

	B	beta	t
<u>Status Discontent Variables</u>			
Manual	-.003	-.003	-.073
Lower White Collar	-.071	-.066	-1.608
Self-Employed Business	-.116	-.047	-1.993
Self-Employed Professional	-.086	-.068	-1.634
Geographic Mobility	.004	.003	.147
Upward Mobility	.147	.135	2.797
Over-rewarded Education	.037	.032	1.286
Over-rewarded Prestige	.093	.094	3.114
<u>Cultural and Socialization Variables</u>			
Age	.006	.199	10.534
Sex	-.006	-.006	-.335
Education	-.085	-.197	-6.709
Conservative Religion	.139	.133	4.728
Rural Residence	-.022	-.021	-.453
Rural at Age 16	.006	.006	.287
<u>Control Variables</u>			
Income	-.007	-.045	-2.231
Family Income at Age 16	-.006	-.011	-.512
Occupational Prestige	.021	.063	1.669
Black	.061	.047	2.547
Catholic	.093	.080	2.921
Constant	.173		
R ²	.217		
F	39.236		

variance ($R^2=.145$) than did our first regression (table 13) for newtrad. The strongest predictors are again upward mobility (beta=.135) and over-rewarded education (beta=.229). Also having a significant effect is the self employed professional (beta=.148). In table 16 we add socialization and control variables, but this time we not only find another increase in variance explained ($R^2=.217$), but we also find the status discontent variable of upward mobility retaining it's significance (beta=.135). Age (beta=.199), education (beta=.197), and conservative religion (beta=.133) are again significant in socialization variables.

Tables 17 and 18 are for the third set of regression analyses using moral-social issues as our dependent variable. The first regression (table 17) fails to explain any of the variance ($R^2=.015$) with no significant predictors. When we add socialization and control variables the variance explained increases ($R^2=.139$) and we find some interesting results. The best predictors for moral social issues are being Black (beta=.307), and conservative religion (beta=.212). Especially strong as a predictor is Black with an f score of (-15.508).

Tables 19 and 20 are for the fourth set of regression analyses using moral family issues as our dependent variable. Table 19 (like table 17) explains very little of the variance ($R^2=.047$) with only upward mobility

TABLE 17

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES
FOR MORAL GOVERNMENT ISSUES

	B	beta	t
<hr/>			
<u>Status Discontent</u>			
<u>Variables</u>			
Manual	-.049	-.050	-1.074
Lower White Collar	-.023	-.021	-.484
Self-Employed Business	.055	.022	.855
Self-Employed Professional	-.089	-.066	-1.719
Geographic Mobility	.044	.030	1.557
Upward Mobility	.067	.061	3.107
Over-rewarded Education	.047	.040	1.941
Over-rewarded Prestige	-.097	-.098	-3.971
Constant	.649		
R ²	.015		
F	5.503		

TABLE 18

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES, CULTURAL AND
SOCIALIZATION VARIABLES, AND CONTROL VARIABLES
FOR MORAL GOVERNMENT ISSUES

	B	beta	t
<u>Status Discontent Variables</u>			
Manual	.021	.021	.483
Lower White Collar	-.001	-.001	-.027
Self-Employed Business	.050	.020	.805
Self-Employed Professional	-.000	-.000	-.004
Geographic Mobility	.039	.027	1.192
Upward Mobility	.001	.001	.027
Over-rewarded Education	-.024	-.020	-.762
Over-rewarded Prestige	-.036	-.036	-1.127
<u>Cultural and Socialization Variables</u>			
Age	.003	.085	4.188
Sex	.029	.029	1.484
Education	-.050	-.116	-3.705
Conservative Religion	.221	.212	6.986
Rural Residence	.015	.014	.289
Rural at Age 16	-.054	-.053	-2.404
<u>Control Variables</u>			
Income	.012	.073	3.364
Family Income at Age 16	.014	.025	1.106
Occupational Prestige	.011	.034	.829
Black	-.393	-.307	-15.508
Catholic	.138	.119	4.032
Constant	.325		
R ²	.139		
F	22.064		

TABLE 19

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES
FOR MORAL FAMILY ISSUES

	B	beta	t
<hr/>			
<u>Status Discontent</u>			
<u>Variables</u>			
Manual	-.055	-.057	-1.141
Lower White Collar	-.031	-.030	-.612
Self-Employed Business	-.049	-.020	-.734
Self-Employed Professional	-.030	-.023	-.551
Geographic Mobility	.015	.011	.539
Upward Mobility	.200	.183	8.984
Over-rewarded Education	.119	.010	4.637
Over-rewarded Prestige	.001	.001	.045
Constant	.320		
R ²	.047		
F	14.883		

TABLE 20

REGRESSION ANALYSIS PRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF
STATUS DISCONTENT VARIABLES, CULTURAL AND
SOCIALIZATION VARIABLES, AND CONTROL VARIABLES
FOR MORAL FAMILY ISSUES

	B	beta	t
<u>Status Discontent Variables</u>			
Manual	-.019	-.202	-.405
Lower White Collar	-.033	-.031	-.648
Self-Employed Business	-.046	-.019	-.702
Self-Employed Professional	-.030	-.024	-.502
Geographic Mobility	-.026	-.020	-.796
Upward Mobility	.072	.066	1.212
Over-rewarded Education	-.056	-.047	-1.707
Over-rewarded Prestige	.065	.068	1.951
<u>Cultural and Socialization Variables</u>			
Age	.006	.205	9.492
Sex	-.043	-.045	-2.106
Education	-.037	-.087	-2.683
Conservative Religion	.176	.174	5.347
Rural Residence	.086	.082	1.583
Rural at Age 16	.055	.055	2.359
<u>Control Variables</u>			
Income	-.004	-.025	-1.104
Family Income at Age 16	-.034	-.060	-2.396
Occupational Prestige	.040	.125	2.844
Black	-.019	-.015	-.713
Catholic	.192	.169	5.340
Constant	-.033		
R ²	.122		
F	16.710		

(beta=.183) being a significant predictor. For table 20, the variance explained increases ($R^2=.122$) with significant predictors being conservative Protestant (beta=.174), Catholic (beta=.169), age (beta=.205) and for the first time occupational prestige (beta=.125).

-discussion-

Our two-fold analysis partly agrees with both Lipset and Raab, and Wood and Hughes. We find that those persons who adhere to new traditionalist ideology do in fact come from low education, rural, low occupational skills, and conservative religious sectors of the population. But, we also find that strong commitment to political parties, be they Democratic or Republican, are strong predictors for agreement with new traditionalist attitudes. We find that the base of support for a status discontent explanation is present, but when we control for cultural and socialization effects in our regression model, much of the status discontent effects disappear. But, we do find that out of all our status discontent variables, upward mobility does significantly predict adherence to moral reform attitudes when they take the form of intolerance of liberals (table 16).

We agree with Wood and Hughes who conclude that the strongest predictors of adherence to moral reform movements are age, religion, and education (1984, p.94).

But, we also find that these variables can vary in their predictive power depending upon the type of moral reform issue being tested. We conclude that for our time frame and sample, socialization and cultural variables have the greatest predictive power toward moral reform attitudes, but the significant effect of status discontent (upward mobility) upon intolerance of liberal ideology was also found to be true. This leads us to believe that status discontent must still be accounted for on certain types of moral reform movements. We have only isolated three types of moral reform attitudes in our study. Undoubtedly, there are more and research in this direction should help us better understand the sweeping moral movements which have and are occurring in our society.

-Conclusion-

We have isolated three conclusions from our findings. First, we can no longer generalize about moral reform issues unless we take into account the many different types of moral reform movements that occur. Second, strong commitment to either the Republican or Democratic party is strongly related to agreement with traditional values and ideals. And third, the status discontent linked to upward economic mobility can still significantly contribute to our understanding of the generation of moral reform movements.

The three types of moral reform issues that we isolated were intolerance of liberals, moral government reform, and moral family reform. These three issue types were discovered by the breaking down of a ten item scale which covered only a specific area. Even so, we still found one variable (prayer in school) which did not correlate well with our other three moral reform types. In the manner which people process and group information, they do not group the issue of prayer in school along with other issues that we had originally thought were similar. Obviously, we have not isolated the true nature of prayer in school and need to expand our model to incorporate more moral reform issues. This helps to remind us of the complexity of the human mind and how it operates on a multi-dimensional level.

Some of the issues our model may have neglected are intolerance for conservatives and moral social reform. If some groups are intolerant of liberals, we may find there are also those who are intolerant of conservatives. In other words, we may find intolerance for any extreme position, be it liberal or conservative. Concerning moral social reform, there are those who feel that it is our moral obligation to feed the hungry, give the poor medical treatment, and redistribute the wealth (e.g. socialism). They too were neglected in our model, but are no doubt present in our society.

Next, we must account for the change in ideological position by strongly committed Democrats to the same issue support as strongly committed Republicans. One explanation we would suggest is the overall change in the way people now view American politics as compared to the past. Both the Democratic and Republican parties have complained of loss in rank and file support. Even in our national elections, only 50 percent of all eligible voters cast their ballots. Many changes have taken place in the last two decades. Watergate and the Vietnam war have both contributed to political apathy as well as distrust. It is popular to stand alone and be independent. The 1970's has even been labeled the "me-generation". The flight of once committed party members to a more independent stance has left a select few who are still strongly committed to political ideals. We may find that those who are strongly committed to either major party in the U.S. share feelings of discontent about those who have abandon the traditions of the past, be they liberal or conservative.

And last, we found the strongest status discontent predictor is being upwardly mobile. One explanation we would suggest that may account for this is the different manner in which the status discontent of the late 1970's and early 1980's was generated as compared to the 1950's. Lipset suggested it was the dynamic economy of the 1950's which lead people to believe that other groups in society

were rising in economic station faster than they were entitled. This caused feelings of status discontent. In the 1970's, we also find a dynamic economic system in operation, but dynamic not in the sense of economic growth, but dynamic in the sense of stagnation and decreased real income.

The late 1970's was a period of high unemployment and high inflation (e.g. stagflation) not seen in this country since the great depression of the 1930's. People had come to believe and expect a better life for themselves than their parents. One of the realizations of the "American Dream" is own a home, and in the late 1970's we find scores of potential homeowners thwarted by interest rates which topped 20 percent and made house payments virtually impossible to make, even by a two income family. Besides this, inflation was running at such a high level for some periods that wage raises could not keep up with raising prices. An increase in salary actually meant loss of buying power. We are not surprised that those who are upwardly mobile exhibit considerable status discontent. When one moves up in education, occupational, and economic level over their parents, yet they cannot afford to buy a home like their parents had done at a lower SES level, it is easy to see why they become frustrated.

We are only suggesting that these are one account of why the late 1970's has brought with it resurgence of

moral reform. We fail to account for prayer in school as an issue, and we do not isolate other types of moral reform movements. Only through more research in this area can we better account for this phenomenon and hopefully in the process, better understand ourselves.

NOTES

1.Of course, some hard core supporters of McCarthyism who did not experience social class mobility may have stayed the course for two decades and re-emerged after a period of political hibernation, but we think their numbers would be small.

2.Military spending, see pages 21 and 26 for reference.

3.Communism, see page 21

4.Confidence for business leaders, see page 24

5.Atheism, see page 26

6.Homosexuality, see pages 26 and 34

7.Abortion, see pages 26 and 34

8.Prayer in school, see page 29

9.Pre-marital sex, see page 34

10.Equal Rights Amendment, see page 34

11.Busing, see page 34

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Appendix

Items included in New Traditionalist index

1. Prayer in School (prayer-item 117)

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. What are your views on this--do you approve or disapprove of the court ruling?

approve (anti-New Traditionalism, 1)
no opinion (middle, 2)
disapprove (pro-New Traditionalism, 3)

2. Military Spending (natarms-item 69)

We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or the right amount.... The military, armaments, and defense.

Too much (anti-NT, 1)
No opinion/about right (mid, 2)
Too little (pro-NT, 3)

3. Confidence in Business (conbus-item 162)

I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? Major Companies.

Hardly any (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion/only some (mid, 2)
 A great deal (pro-NT, 3)

4. Atheist (libath-item 79)

There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religions...

If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

Not favor (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion (mid, 2)
 Favor (pro-NT, 3)

5. Communist (libcom-item 82)

Now I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist.

Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

Not favor (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion (mid, 2)
 Favor (pro-NT, 3)

6. Homosexual (libhomo-item 84)

And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual?

If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

Not favor (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion (mid, 2)
 Favor (pro-NT, 3)

7.Pre-Marital Sex (premarsex-item 218)

There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Wrong only sometimes/not wrong (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion (mid, 2)
 Always wrong/almost always wrong (pro-NT, 3)

8.Busing (busing-item 131)

In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (negro/black) and white school children from one district to another?

Favor (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion (mid, 2)
 Oppose (pro-NT, 3)

9. Abortion (abnormore-item 205)

Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children?

Yes (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion (mid, 2)
 No (pro-NT, 3)

10. Equal Rights Amendment (era-item 253)

Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, some what oppose, or strongly oppose this (the ERA) amendment ?

Strongly favor/somewhat favor (anti-NT, 1)
 No opinion (mid, 2)
 Somewhat oppose/strongly oppose (pro-NT, 3)

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THE NEW TRADITIONALIST MOVEMENT:

A STUDY OF CHURCH, STATE, AND ECONOMY

by

Timothy Mark Miller

Committee Chairman: Bradley R. Hertel

Department of Sociology
(ABSTRACT)

In the past, emergence of right-wing conservative moral reform movements has resulted in profound changes for our society. Two of the most visible examples would be the 18th Amendment establishing the prohibition of alcohol and the movement to destroy communism in America, McCarthyism. Since the mid-1970's, a movement in America has been gaining strength to once again morally reform America. Some of the issues now on the new right agenda are: banning abortion, getting prayer back in school, and defeating the Equal Rights Amendment.

In this study, we first draw an historical comparison between the current moral reform movement and one of the past (e.g. McCarthyism). Second, we test the relative explanatory power of two different theories that attempt to account for the origins of moral reform ideas using data from 1977 and 1982.