

**Green Giants and Sleeping Giants:  
Environmental Interest Group Politics and the Nature of the State**

by

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(ABSTRACT)

The neglect that recent political science has shown toward the concept of the State has drastically reduced the efficacy of analyses of environmental interest group politics. This thesis is an attempt to introduce a revamped concept of the State into such an analysis. The State is defined as both administrative and ideological. Through drawing out the logic of the environmentalist position, it can be shown how environmentalism challenges both these aspects of the modern State. It will then be shown how the State plays a decisive role in setting the parameters in which interest group activity operates, and how those parameters dictate that only groups which deny the logic of their own environmental ideological position gain access to existing power structures. The State, through the marketization, scientization, and technologization of the issues, has effectively defined the language of debate. This language is not the natural language of environmentalism, just as the definitions of the arena, and the norms of legitimacy and behavior sanctioned by the State are unsuited to the claims of environmentalism. By showing that the State has both the capacity and the incentive to intervene, the original premise of bringing the State back in to this analysis of environmental interest group politics in the United States is justified.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents, \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ whose love and support means so much more than they will ever know.

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## 1.0 Introduction

As they were thus discoursing, they came in sight of thirty or forty wind-mills, which are in that plain; and, as soon as Don Quixote espied them, he said to his squire: "Fortune disposes our affairs better than we ourselves could have desired: look yonder, friend Sancho Panza, where thou mayest discover somewhat more than thirty monstrous giants, whom I intend to encounter and slay; and with their spoils we will begin to enrich ourselves: for it is lawful war, and doing God good service to remove so wicked a generation from off the face of the earth." "What giants?" said Sancho Panza. "Those thou seest yonder," answered his master, "with their long arms; for some are wont to have them almost of the length of two leagues." "Look, sir," answered Sancho, "those, which appear yonder are not giants, but wind-mills; and what seem to be arms are the sails, which, whirled about by the wind, make the mill-stone go." "It is very evident," answered Don Quixote, "that thou art not versed in the business of adventures: they are giants: and, if thou art afraid, get thee aside and pray, whilst I engage them in fierce and unequal combat." So saying, he clapped spurs to his steed, notwithstanding the cries his squire sent after him, assuring him that they were certainly wind-mills, and not giants. - Cervantes

The environmental lobby in the United States has been characterized as a "Green Giant" by some observers (Symonds, 1982). As such it is viewed as a powerful unified force seeking to further its interests by using all the resources available to it. In reality, this "Green Giant" is a collection of apparently disparate groups whose areas of environmental interest draw on some rather different constituencies and on distinct views of the environment. The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate that the environmental movement is relatively cohesive and can be considered a potent actor, even if it is broadened to include non-lobbying groups. However, the idea of a giant is inappropriate to this unity for one reason: the implication of the power of the movement is misleading. The fact that another crucial actor has been left out of the research on environmental interest group politics means that the influence of the State on the environmental movement has been completely ignored.

The neglect of the concept of the State has been a function of the positivist empiricist tradition in political science in the United States (US), which has tended to see the State as a neutral arena for the resolution of conflict (Olson, 1971; Dahl 1971). Once this "sleeping giant" is brought back in, we may turn our attention to the "Green Giant" once again, because only then may we see just how the State plays a crucial role in mediating the tenor, terms and arenas of debate and, therefore, in the nature of environmental interest groups.

Recent political analysis has seen a resurgence of interest in the role and nature of the modern State (Evans et al., 1985; Skocpol, 1980). This has been mirrored in sociology by an attempt to fuse resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) with theories incorporating the role of the State (Gale, 1986). This thesis is an attempt to reconcile the orthodoxies of interest group activity in the US with a realistic appraisal of the role of the State, as a result of the movement to "bring the State back in." I will argue that there is a strong case to be made that the State plays a crucial role in determining the nature of environmental politics, and that this State is not simply the bureaucratic-administrative apparatuses of government, but it is also the network of ideological legitimation that supports the broad aims of these agencies. Using such a conception of the State will offer up conclusions that not only take account of the conflict that occurs, but also address the context of this conflict.

## *1.1 The Logic of Collective Environmental Action*

The specific focus of this thesis will be on the contemporary environmental movement in the US. For the purposes of this thesis a very broad definition of the environmental movement will be used, and the arguments given later will serve as a justification for such an approach. The environmental movement is therefore taken to be all organized groups that cite concern for the

physical environment as the primary political issue. This definition includes all the groups from moderate reform environmentalists, through main-stream conservationists to "eco-anarchists" and deep ecologists. This appears to run the full gamut of all those groups who might have even the most tenuous claims to being part of a unified movement to those with strong ideological cohesiveness. However, this is justified by an underlying theme that consistently is present, if not always articulated, in even this broad sweep of groups. This is the concept, to varying degrees, of a crisis of industrialism and a failure of market-based structures of allocation. Attention is focused on this movement for a number of reasons.

Much of the work on interest group activity has struggled to reconcile the orthodoxy put forward in Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (Olson, 1971) with the contradiction of a movement characterized by an apparent lack of specific individual benefits to group members, such as the US environmental movement. The paradox of the logic of collective action with the nature of collective goods has remained a preoccupation for many analysts. The contention put forward in this thesis is that it is no coincidence that so much attention has been focused on this area. The environmental movement provides a clear indication that any analysis which neglects the role of the State will always have great difficulties in explaining the illogic of collective action. Furthermore this tendency will be especially marked in a sphere such as environmental politics, where the obvious imbalance between combatants (the extensive armory of corporate business and industry versus the virtual slings and arrows of mobilized public opinion) is not reflected in policy outcomes. By the logic of Olson, without "selective incentives," there should not be an environmental movement at all, and therefore its successes provide a fundamental challenge to the validity of this whole approach. Olson himself admits the inapplicability of his theory to such movements suggesting instead that where "nonrational or irrational behavior is the basis for a lobby, it would perhaps be better to turn to psychology or social psychology than to economics for a relevant theory" (Olson, 1971, p.161). In this thesis I do not turn political analysis away from this subject, but rather seek to turn political analysis back on itself by fully expropriating the fruits of its theoretical past through the use of the concept of the State.

## *1.2 Ecology and Ideology*

The second important reason why the environmental movement is worthy of study is because of its ideological underpinnings. The ideology of ecology is seen by many as an alternative to the leftist and rightist perspective that are both fundamentally welded together through their commitment to economic and technological growth. The analogy drawn by Jonathon Porritt is instructive. He compares the political context to a three-lane freeway with the different vehicles of the various ideologies in different lanes, with the ecological movement rejecting not only the lanes, but the very direction of the freeway and the vehicles on it. This reflects the duality that is a theme of this thesis (Porritt, 1985). In looking at conflict, we must look at different levels of conflict. In looking at consensus, we must address the varying levels and the varying degrees to which it exists. Whilst analytically it is necessary to study the context of conflict as well as the conflict itself, this is especially true of a movement which rejects the ideological context of modern industrial political life (Porritt, 1985, p.43). Not only is it original, in the sense of being unprecedented, it is also novel in the sense that it is a relatively recent phenomenon. Alvin Gouldner typifies this position:

With the world-wide emergence of the "ecology" movement,.....some scientists have now authorized themselves to evaluate the consequences of their work quite apart from its success or failure in achieving the goals of some bureaucracy, once more making problematic technology's traditional alliance with organizational management. In ecology, technology itself starts a critique of its own traditional instrumental rationality, commits itself to new moral evaluations, and takes initiative in searching for new political alliances. (Gouldner, 1976, pp.271-272)

In this way it could perhaps be seen as a paradigmatic shift in the Kuhnian sense.

To state the relative novelty of the ecological ideology is not to assert that environmental politics is a new phenomenon in the US. There is a definite tradition of environmental concern, especially based on the West Coast. John Muir, with his brand of "aesthetic" conservationism and

his founding of the Sierra Club in 1892, marked what may be seen as the institutionalization of environmental politics. Gifford Pinchot brought conservation into the American vocabulary as a household word (Nash, 1968), and through his association with Theodore Roosevelt gave environmentalism a respectability and an influence that hitherto had evaded it. Battles over particular areas and sites of natural beauty that were threatened by proposed industrial change characterized the early stage of the movement. Robert Mitchell refers to these as the "first generation issues" (Mitchell, 1979). However, only recently has there emerged a broader concern with the environment as a whole, with its attendant ideology of ecology. Included in this are Mitchell's "second generation issues," which take a less parochial approach, addressing such issues as air pollution, nuclear power and acid rain. With this shift there has been a move toward a more technologically-based approach on the part of the environmental movement. The publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* in 1962, with its attack on the use of DDT being framed in technical scientific terms, is seen as the turning point for the scientization of the issues.

To categorize all the different ideologies contained within the environmental movements as being the same would be a gross mischaracterization of the truth. From "deep ecology" through soft path developmentalism to reform environmentalism, there is a wide divergence of views, both prescriptive and descriptive. However, what will be argued in this chapter is that there is a broad but basic consensus as to the nature of modern industrial growth, and it is this fundamental feature of the ideologies that directly contradicts the nature of the modern State. This means that the fundamental differences in approach between different parts of the movement are derived from their relationship with the State. In the case of the mainstream lobbying groups, the nature of their relationship forces them to deny the logic of their own position in order to gain access to the existing power structures. In wedding themselves to market-based State structures, they inevitably divorce themselves from the "logic of environmentalism". The changing nature of the environmental issue, also means that it provides an unprecedented challenge to a political culture, which usually categorizes and copes with issues along more traditional ideological lines. This is why the environmental movement is so often classified, along with the peace and womens' movements, as part of

the emerging phenomena of "new social movements" (Offe, 1985b; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Luke, 1989b).

### *1.3 State Theory (Chapter 2)*

In order to provide a clear and cogent argument, it is imperative that the terms of reference be made plain. A theme of this thesis is that much analysis of US interest groups has failed to do this, and has belied a "hidden agenda". William Connolly has termed this "the bias of pluralism" (Connolly, 1969). In analytical terms the emphasis here means little more than the recognition of the importance of certain structural constraints. The methodological logic of including States in analyses, is put by Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol:

It is already well known by political scientists that the organizations and tactics through which variously situated social groups can (or cannot) influence policy processes are partially shaped by the structures of government within which groups must operate. More than this, the administrative, fiscal, coercive, and judicial arrangements of given states, as well as the policies that states are already pursuing, influence the conceptions that groups or their representatives are likely to develop about what is desirable, or possible at all, in the realm of governmental action. Thus, state structures help to inspire the very demands that are pursued through politics. (Evans et al., 1985, p.118)

States thus amount to important actors in the process as well as being an essential ingredient of the context. For this reason chapter two will specify what is meant by the State, how it is relatively autonomous, what functions it attempts to fulfill, and why it cannot always fulfill them. Within this framework, it will also be shown why it is justifiable for the State as defined, to be considered as a relatively homogeneous entity, tied to certain common goals, despite its structural diversity.

It is unfortunate that the movement to "bring the State back" into political analysis has tended to define this State in unnecessarily restrictive terms. By highlighting only those bureaucratic-administrative components of State activity, this movement has given itself an analytically-neat subject, but an incomplete one. This thesis is an attempt to draw together these components of the



State with the other ideological components that broadly act in unison. This means that there is a strong economic emphasis, but that this will not lead to a neglect of the less-overtly economic features. This approach will address the underlying network of societal norms and values, as well as the agencies of government. To bring back the State as only governmental-administrative agencies is merely to bring the old State back in with all the old problems. Only once the theoretical framework has been spelled out can a coherent case be made. The context of the analysis is at least as important as the context to be analyzed.

## ***1.4 State and Environmental Interests (Chapter 3)***

From the second justification given for studying the environmental movement comes the subject of chapter three. The relative novelty of environmentalism partly draws from the logic that it engenders. However, to argue that new ideologies have emerged as a result of this logic, does not show why the modern State has a role to play in that sphere. If none of these new ideologies posed no threat to the State then there would be no State role. This chapter will therefore outline in what ways the logic of environmentalism is fundamentally at odds with the nature of the modern State. Simply put, this is the assertion that, whilst the State is dependent on economic growth, environmentalism is antithetical to this goal as it is defined by the State. This conflict of interests results in the State playing an important role in mediating and directing the path of environmental politics.

The chapter will also address the differing degrees of commitment to the logic of environmentalism. As a broad generalization, the environmental movement can be seen as comprising three philosophical groupings; reform environmentalism, social ecology, and deep ecology. However, with regards to how faithfully the logic of environmentalism manifests itself in political

action, I shall argue that the movement divides into two, with reform environmentalism and some of the social ecologists denying the logic of their own position, whilst the rest of the social ecologists and the deep ecologists remain essentially coherent in their broad political positions. I am not arguing that deep ecology and parts of social ecology are the repositories of environmental truth and wisdom. I am asserting that they most nearly represent the logic that is present in the whole environmental movement. The logic of environmentalism is an assertion of a crisis of industrialism, and this crisis theme is clearly visible throughout the movement in rhetoric and philosophy, but is only present in the practice of part of the movement. The following chapter will outline the specifics of how the State engages in the activity of encouraging this situation, through its role as protector of the economy and of the normative underpinnings of this economy.

## *1.5 Agenda Control (Chapter 4)*

The definition of the State being offered gives the State two interconnected but discernible facets. The one side is essentially economic and deals with the capacity of the State to ensure the continued stability of its economic basis. The other facet is primarily ideological and is concerned with perpetuating the norms and values of that same basis. These two functions may be termed "efficiency" and "legitimacy" (Offe, 1984), or "accumulation" and "legitimation" (O'Connor, 1973; Wolfe, 1977). In terms of US environmental politics, the legitimacy factor comes into play as the State attempts to control the agenda and to regulate the nature of the conflict by defining the language of debate and the status of groups. Included in agenda control is the importance of defining which groups are "relevant." Thus, in a political culture such as the US, which stresses representative action, groups which have the largest memberships will tend to be regarded as the most important groups. However, this may be to ignore sets of groups which act extra-legally and therefore outside the realm of State structures, but which comprise an important part of the environmental

*movement*. In concrete terms this means that any analysis that examines groups such as the Sierra Club and fails to include the contribution of groups such as Earth First! are neglecting an important part of what makes the environmental movement a unique case study - the logic of environmentalism.

The fourth chapter will take into account the linkage between the environmental movement and legislative, executive, and judicial politics in the US. This is perhaps the more orthodox approach to measuring US environmental interest group influence. It will demonstrate how the State has influenced environmental politics so that they are unsuited to the logic of environmentalism. It has done this through defining legislative politics in territorial, fragmented and decentralized terms. It has attempted to frame the language of debate in marketized and scientific ways, and this has lead to the primacy of the "technologues" (Gouldner, 1976) as the personnel of environmental debate. It has also defined the legitimacy of political action to exclude certain types of groups, such as those who engage in direct action. Finally, through its use of the structures of legitimation - religion and education - the State has exerted a powerful impact on the "dominant social paradigm" (Pirages & Ehrlich, 1974; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984; Milbrath, 1984), which runs counter to the logic of environmentalism. In short the State has defined environmental politics as dealing with particularized benefits and territorialized externalities, which represent the prevailing norms of political and economic behavior. These norms counteract any claims that there is a universal ecological crisis whose urgency necessitates the immediate repudiation of the principle of "business as usual".

## 1.6 Conclusion

To embark upon an analysis of US environmental interest group politics by attempting to formulate a concept of the State might seem both a trifle unorthodox and also overly extended in its scope. However, I make no apology for the broad sweep of this thesis. To take in subjects as diverse as legislative behavior, deep ecological philosophy, the politics of science, the history of the US environmental movement, and theories of the State is to invite incompleteness in the component parts. However, only by placing environmental politics in its theoretical, historical and cultural contexts can a full understanding be reached. Only by considering the contributions of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir and Gifford Pinchot, can we fully appreciate the place of modern environmental writers such as Bill Devall and George Sessions, Murray Bookchin, Barry Commoner, David Brower and Rachel Carson. As political analysts, it is only by drawing upon the rich theoretical legacy of such writers as Antonio Gramsci, Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe can we fully appreciate the more empirical contributions of David Mayhew, Hugh Heclo and Robert Dahl, and thus avoid falling into the language of David Ricci's "small conversations". Through the neglect of the theoretical legacy, and a unabashed commitment to the principles of positivist empiricism, Ricci argues, we are witnessing *The Tragedy of Political Science*, that has specialized itself into irrelevance and ineffectualness. To avoid this is to forsake the principles of absolute precision and provability, in order that we may engage in something worthwhile - the "great conversation". As Ricci says, of this mode of discourse,

a great conversation relies very heavily on time-worn and emotional terms, many suffering from imprecise character but still carrying enough moral authority, by precedent, habit, experience, and spiritual commitment, to be capable of moving many people in the right direction much of the time. It is thus an extraordinarily wide-ranging affair, touching upon knowledge both stored up throughout history and newly achieved in manifold realms of learning today. (Ricci, 1984, p.301)

This thesis will therefore range widely and draw upon historical legacies in order to avoid falling into the trap of a stymieing specialism, rich in precision, but impoverished by its myopia.

The need to "bring the State back in" to political analysis, is the central theme of this thesis. It is almost a premise. It involves bringing in a realistic definition of the State, which addresses the issues and nature of State power in the US. To do this, the State needs to be seen as serving two functions, with each reflecting one of the two facets of State power - economic and ideological. The issue of environmentalism is used here to show that the State plays a very active dual role in the politics of certain issues and that this role is directed toward broadly unified aims. The conflict of the logic of environmentalism with the basis of State power provides an important case study for the observation of the nature of State activity. This means examining its role in defining the agenda and actors in the process as well as affecting their behavior in that context once they have been "selected".

The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to answer the question that, if the State does indeed play a role in environmental politics, how does that role reveal a fundamental alignment of interests between the different components of the modern US State. An over-simplification of the structure might be that the three central chapters deal with the "what", "why" and "how" of State activity, respectively. Executing this effectively will serve as justification for bringing the State back in to the study of US environmental politics. To attempt to frame a definition of the State, to attempt an analysis of the logic of environmentalism, and then to apply these to the reality of US environmental politics to show how the State operates is clearly a very broad objective. By its very nature it means that the different elements will probably be incomplete in their own right. However, it is only through attempting the project as a whole without breaking it up into its component parts that the underlying *raison d'être* can be justified. To "bring the State back in" can only be done if there is something that it can be brought back into. The context of environmental interest group politics will illustrate that charges that political science has neglected an important concept do not amount to charges at wind-mills.

## 2.0 The Nature of the State

### 2.1 *Introduction*

The State in modern industrial society presents the political analyst with very little and with everything at the same time. By its very nature it is difficult to identify and awkward to examine. Modern positivistic empirical political science has not the tools to identify and examine such a idiosyncratic beast as the modern State, and therefore much of the discipline has just written it off as not "provable," and thus as non-existent. The failure of pluralism, and then group theory, to identify the single most important participant in the process that they claimed to study was an understandable, if fundamental, omission. Corporatism moved towards a less-group centered theory, but failed to take this reasoning to its full extension with an adequate theory of the State. The recent resurgence of interest in the role of the State (Evans et al., 1985; Skocpol, 1980) is an implicit vindication of the Marxist and neo-Marxist<sup>1</sup> emphasis upon the role of the State in modern society.

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<sup>1</sup> For convenience the two categories of Marxist and neo-Marxist will be subsumed under the single category of Marxian.

Marx's own conception of the State was fundamentally flawed. To portray the State as "but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie," (Marx, [1848] 1972, p.337) ignores the complexity and capacities of modern States. Such a view underlay Lenin's doctrine for political action in which he saw the smashing of the capitalist control of the State as essential, because it represented one of the major tools of class domination. With the fusion of a Gramscian emphasis on the ideological hegemonic power of the State, it soon became clear that the State was not a set of rigid structures that could be altered in their purpose through merely gaining control of them. Inherent within the nature of these structures was the dynamic for action. Structures became more than mere instruments of domination. The contribution of the movement to "bring the State back in" has been in the highlighting of the importance of structural conditions for the historical consideration of revolutionary movements (Tilly, 1964; Katznelson in Evans et al., 1985). Charles Tilly's methodology emphasizes "big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons" at the expense of individual-centered analyses. "Systematic comparison of structures and processes will not only place our own situation in perspective, but also help in the identification of causes and effects" (Tilly 1984).

For environmentalists the battle is not only against the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and its massive reduction in funding for environmental regulatory reform, or against the mining industry and the environmental devastation of Appalachia as a result of strip-mining techniques. It is also a battle against the perception of the environment as a limitless resource to be exploited by humankind. Thus, environmental political action must seek to address the ideological norms and values of a society, as well as the governmental, bureaucratic and administrative structures. In defining his conception of "eco-anarchism", Murray Bookchin recognizes the centrality of the State in all its manifestations, for his conception of environmental political action:

In restructuring society around itself, the State acquires superadded social functions that now appear as political functions. It not only *manages* the economy but *politicizes* it; it not only *colonizes* social life but *absorbs* it. Social forms thus appear as State forms and social values as political values. Society is reorganized in such a way that it becomes indistinguishable from the State. Revolution is thus confronted not only with the task of smashing the State and reconstructing *administration* along libertarian lines; it must also smash society, as it were, and reconstruct human *consociation* itself along new communal lines. The problem that now faces revolutionary movements is not merely one of reappropriating society but literally reconstituting it. (Bookchin, 1982, pp.127-128)

This means that the State, for environmental politics, is not a simple set of coherent, consistent structures - it would be ludicrous to define the State as entirely homogeneous and free of internal conflict. Rather, it is a complex duality of ideas and practices, of concepts and structures that, although they often contradict each other, all serve the purpose of reproducing the prevailing economic, social and political structures. This complexity and these contradictions are the subject of this chapter.

The thrust of this chapter is that the emphasis on the State, the definition of the functions of the State (avoiding an overly-functionalist emphasis), and the notion of relative autonomy, all present useful contributions to the analysis of US environmental interest group politics. Therefore, the emphasis will be on Marxian notions of the State, as only they have attempted fully comprehensive analyses of the State. The chapter will attempt to give a definition of the State, and of its functions that can usefully be applied to the analysis of environmental interest group politics. Although brief justifications of the assumptions will be given, these should not be taken as comprehensive, as a fully comprehensive theory of the US State is beyond the scope of this thesis.

## ***2.2 The State and Political Theory***

Bringing the State *back* in implies that the State once played a role in political analysis. Although the nomenclature and the normative emphasis has varied, the State has certainly occupied an important position in political theory. For Thomas Hobbes, writing in the seventeenth century, the State became the "Leviathan": a method of regulating the naturally brutish nature of man in civil society. For him, the State was a function of the need for political authority in order to control man's inherent deficiencies. For Rousseau, the relationship between the citizen and civil society becomes translated into the form of a social contract between the individual and the sovereign.



Sovereignty and the notion of the sovereign represents the traditional characterization of what we now term the State. Through a recognition of the moral and political authority of the general will as embodied in the actions of the State, Rousseau saw man's path to true freedom and the way forward for enlightened societies.

Martin Carnoy defines Adam Smith's view of the State as the closest to the dominant perception of the modern State in all advanced capitalist countries, and especially in the US (Carnoy, 1984). Smith, in identifying the importance of the shared societal commitment to capitalist production and the need for some juridical entity that frames laws in such a way so as to enable the free market to exist, is reinforcing the view presented in this thesis, that shared norms and values are essential to the workings of an economy. However, for Smith the non-interventionist, minimalist State is the form necessary for the continued existence of capitalism. In reality, as the productive processes develop and change, the increasing importance (and cumulative effect) of externalities increases the incentive for State intervention. With finite natural resources and with exponential growth in industrial pollution, the State is forced to intervene to prevent in some way the perception that the activities of industry have caused a noticeable deterioration in the environmental standard of living.

In the "felicific calculus", the early Utilitarians believed they had the method for evaluating policies implemented by the State designed to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For John Stuart Mill and other early classic liberals, this view of the State was taken further. Mill recognized the right of men to be free, as long as that freedom did not infringe upon the freedom of others. The State therefore became a method of "regulating freedom". With regard to the interventionist role of the State, Mill was following in the footsteps of Smith by arguing that those actions which were "self-regarding" were no concern of the State. The assumption was that, all things being equal, the State had no role. Only when actions became "other-regarding", did the State have a justification for intervening in the affairs of men. For Mill, as for all the other classic theorists, views of the State had an unmistakably normative component. The State was seen as the

method by which desirable social arrangements could be set up and maintained. With a commitment to "science" on the part of political science, came the imperative to be seen to drop such normative considerations and to concentrate on the descriptive and the purely analytic.

The commitment to the scientific method in post-war political science occurred in tandem with the emergence of the pluralist school of thought as the natural extension of the ideas central to liberal thought. Thus, although the normative aspect was declared redundant, the liberal perception of the State continued to dominate political analysis despite the fact that it was originally conceived as a normative rather than descriptive construct. However, as the underlying premise was that no State is a good State, and that only the normative demands of ensuring "freedom" and "justice" justified State intervention, the pluralists were left with the premise of the "non-State" and no incentive to bring the "real" State back in. The conclusion was the liberal-pluralist neglect of the State that has characterized recent political science in the US. As Wolfe writes, "[w]hen it discovered pluralism, the liberal tradition found its excuse for ignoring the state" (Wolfe, 1977, p.xii). For David Easton, Arthur Bentley, Robert Dahl, and Mancur Olson, politics then becomes an activity conducted in a neutral arena and characterized by pluralistic competition between representative groups. The State was stripped of its role and was thus relegated to the status of a non-entity.

In describing the emergence of the State as a concept in political analysis, it would be all too easy to simply assert that, whilst the liberal-pluralists did not have a complete conception of the State, Marxian thought rectified this error by bringing the State in and then by cultivating the concept to fit with modern capitalist realities. However, as Wolfe notes, the "attempt to conceptualize the state out of existence [by the pluralists] would not have been so serious were it not for an equally conspicuous failure of the one tradition that always understood the vacuity of liberal analyses - the *Marxist*" (Wolfe, 1977, p.xii). Neither side of the divide can easily be seen as so monolithic. Robert Alford provides a typology that begins to come to terms with the diversity of opinion on both sides, whilst retaining the useful division between those who failed to try to give

the State the primacy it deserves from those that do (Alford, 1975). He defines *pluralist* theories as those seeing the State as a diverse grouping of governmental agencies that choose between options presented to them by other groups. Alford goes on to differentiate *elite* theories which see the State as an agent of domination. Finally he refers to *class* theories which view the State as reproducing the class relationships in society. Whilst rejecting the overly sociological emphasis that is inherent in the label *class* analyses, this last category offers the greatest potential for a theory of the State, and thus will serve as a basis for the definition offered here. The *elite* theories do begin to give the State a realistic position in the schema of political analysis, but they are limited by their overly-instrumentalist view of its functions. Alford's typology does therefore illustrate, if somewhat crudely, the development that has occurred in theories of the State.

Carnoy offers a typology of State theories that roots out the subtleties within Alford's "class" analyses label (Carnoy, 1984). In delineating the "logic of capital" theory from the "independent State" theory from the "class struggle" theory, Carnoy emphasizes that the particular socio-historical conditions that gave rise to these various schools of thought, played a crucial role in affecting the substantive composition of these theories. Placing the US emphasis on the "logic of capital" (O'Connor, 1973) and "independent state" (Wolfe, 1977; Skocpol, 1980; Block, 1977) theories, he is recognizing the idiosyncratic nature of Marxian theorizing when applied to a country with such a low degree of class-consciousness, such as the US. However, the primacy of economic considerations, as inherent in the "logic of capital" position, seems appropriate for the US given its "free-market" attitude towards politics (de-emphasizing of the role of the State, and pluralistic competition for political power in individualistic, personalized contexts). Stating the contradictions of capitalism as manifested in the structure of the State, seems an attractive proposition when faced with reality of inter-agency conflict within US government. The conflict between the Department of the Interior and the Army Corps of Engineers over who has the right to control water projects in what areas (Reisner, 1987) or between the Chamber of Commerce and the Forestry Service over the relative importance of environmental conservation and economic growth, seems to cast doubts on any vision of the State as a unified coherent entity. To be able to explain those conflicts through

reference to economic contradictions, adds to the attraction of this approach because it offers some consistent rationale that may be applied to different situations.

Whilst the economic emphasis of the "logic of capital" theory sits well with the marketized emphasis in US politics, another feature of US society sits well with the "independent State" theory. The strength of shared norms is notable in a country the size of the US and with the diverse cultural background that it has. Thus James O'Connor's assertion that in "the USA, the dominant national ideology is individualism in all its forms," (O'Connor, 1984, p.3) seems to point to the importance of culture as a milieu for legitimation. Such legitimation goes beyond the mere satisfaction of material wants, as O'Connor defined earlier (O'Connor, 1973). The underlying dynamic of this legitimative process remains the economic conditions, while the legitimative aim of the State is "that of creating newer and higher types of civilization; of adapting the 'civilization' and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production" (Gramsci, [1933-4], 1971, p.242). This means that the scope of its influence (incorporating notions of "civilization" and "rationality") would render a purely economic analysis of cultural hegemony and legitimation a crude one. There is much to be said for combining the idea of the "logic of capital" with the "independent State" theory. This combines economic and cultural factors. It recognizes that the dynamic of the accumulation process applied to a complex social and cultural context, does not necessarily fit exactly the demands of the economy. Culture thus acts as a mediator in the effect of the economy on society. This is why O'Connor can argue that the ideology of individualism derives ultimately from the economy, but even though it has outlived its usefulness, it still permeates US society (O'Connor, 1984).

## 2.3 *Toward a Definition of the State*

The importance of ideology and values in the social and political activities of men and women should not be underemphasized. Why someone acts in a certain way is as important as the fact that they are acting in that way. Durkheim emphasized the importance of normative underpinnings for the continued existence of a social order. Modern environmentalists of all shades stress the profound impact of the prevailing mind-set on the way we view and deal with our environment (Devall, 1980; Milbrath, 1984). This means that a useful definition of the State must incorporate the capacity of the State to propagate ideological as well as economic norms. The State therefore is here defined as, *the bureaucratic and institutional agencies of economic, social and political regulation and control, and the network of normative and ideological legitimation that broadly supports the aims and foundations of those agencies*. There is a diversity within the various components of the State. It would be unrealistic to expect otherwise in such a broad definition as is being offered here. However, it is important to recognize that there is an overall unity to the rationale behind the actions of all the components. This is what justifies dealing with the State as a concept in itself, and not merely as a cluster of other concepts. Such a definition avoids the temptation to define the State purely in terms of bureaucratic and organizational features. This temptation has been succumbed to far too often in the analysis of US political institutions.<sup>2</sup>

As an extension of Durkheim's view, Gramsci identifies the importance the ideological role of the State as a method of ensuring the continuation of hegemony. This hegemony amounts to a cultural domination that runs in tandem with economic domination. The term ideological hegemony refers to the method by which the State maintains the "appropriate" norms and values. The second part of the definition of the State refers to a "network". For Gramsci, this comprised the churches, the education system, and the family. In a later chapter, I shall argue that in addition

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<sup>2</sup> Perhaps a good illustration of this may be seen in the index of Olson's seminal work which, under the entry for "State" reads "see Government" (Olson, 1971).

to these, the law, the political structures (legislative and administrative), and the culture, all contribute in the US to a dominant social paradigm (DSP) that contradicts the logic of environmentalism. This is why Dennis Pirages and Paul Ehrlich define the US DSP as specifically part of the "industrial DSP" (Pirages & Ehrlich, 1974). What this indicates is that some structures are more relevant in some circumstances than in others.<sup>3</sup>

The fluctuating importance of different structures, therefore reflects the different historical contexts of societies facing different stages of capitalist economic contradictions. It also illustrates the importance of stressing cultural hegemony as part of the armory of the State and as a subtle semi-autonomous creature that is not simply the instrument of the capitalist economic dynamic. This means that the word "network" should not be taken as indicative of a rigid Althusserian set of structures acting homogeneously and coherently in the pursuit of precisely-defined shared goals.<sup>4</sup> It is, therefore, valuable to recognize that there is limited potential for using ideological structures such as Althusser's "ideological state apparatuses" (ISAs) as the structures of legitimation, in any analysis (Althusser, 1971). The concept of ISAs implies a level of cohesion that does not sit well with the reality of US environmental politics. In literature on the US environmental movement, much has been made of the concept of the "dominant social paradigm" as something that "provides general guidance for both individual and societal behavior" (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, pp.1013-1014). It has been seen as in conflict with the ideals of environmentalism. The argument to be made here is that the hegemonic ideological power of capital reinforces the dominant social paradigm and that conflict between the paradigm and the environmental movement is, therefore, partly a failure on the part of the State. The dominant social paradigm is thus an ingredient in the process of legitimation. That it is challenged by the paradigm put forward by environmentalist who recognize the logic of environmentalism, is indicative of the contradictory

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<sup>3</sup> For example, Gramsci's Italian experiences caused him to lay a greater stress on the Catholic church than would be applicable to contemporary US society.

<sup>4</sup> Just as Heclo in using the term "issue networks" was trying to downplay the rigidity implied in the term "iron triangles", so the word "network" is being used here as attempt to avoid the rigidity of an overly-structuralist perception, whilst retaining the idea that this "network" is unified inasmuch as it supports a core of shared norms and aspirations.

nature of the State. The existence of "counter-paradigms" (however politically insignificant) demonstrates how the State must be seen to be responsive to a plurality of ideological demands. This does not mean that the State rolls over in the face of "counter-paradigms" - in fact the point of the thesis is to demonstrate just how the State attempts to counter their influence through the use of non-coercive (and therefore "legitimate") means.

## ***2.4 The Functions of the State in Capitalist Society***

The economy provides the basis and the resources for State activity. From the non-Marxian perspective, the role of the State in modern capitalist countries is seen as predominantly economic in that the bureaucratic Weberian conception of the State emphasizes the interventionist activities stemming from the resource of taxation. This means that it is logical to see one of the roles of the State as protecting that power-base, even from a non-Marxian perspective. The State strives to maintain the conditions for the effective accumulation of capital, for it is on that resource that the State is based. This means that the "logic of capital" plays a crucial role of determining the nature of the State. It is this dynamic in the "logic of capital" that many environmentalists see at the root of the cause of environmental degradation.

As a consequence of the accumulative role, the State also needs to ensure social stability because this is a requirement for effective capital accumulation. The State serves to legitimate itself, the economy, and the social structure from which it is derived. This amounts to the State ameliorating the effects of effective economic development. The social externalities become the concern of the State through its role as legitimator. Once again, the function of the State to legitimate can be accepted from a non-Marxian perspective. It is the foundation of Western democratic theory that governments are legitimate to the extent that they are based upon consent. This consent is

maintained through the government acting in the interests of the governed. Thus governments legitimate themselves by creating consent by acting in the interests of the governed. In this way, accumulation (as short-hand for maintaining the conditions for the effective capital accumulation) and legitimation may be seen as the prime functions of the State in capitalist society.

Analyses that accept these two functions as the primary ones for the State tend to identify these functions as contradictory:

[T]he capitalist state must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory functions—*accumulation* and *legitimation*. This means that the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which capital accumulation is possible. The accumulation of capital is necessary for the appropriation of surplus value, which is the motor of capitalist development. However, the state also must try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn from this surplus (and other forms of capital). (O'Connor, 1973, p.6)

The contradictory nature of these functions is not however drawn from the State itself. Rather it is drawn from the character of capitalist society from which the State is derived. Because that basis is contradictory it becomes inevitable that "problems of legitimacy and accumulation reinforce each other" (Wolfe, 1977, p.329).

The diversity in the terminology used to describe these functions belies a fundamental consensus on the topic. Offe terms the functions "efficiency" and "legitimation" (Offe, 1984). Using the former term may be useful because it avoids the imprecision in O'Connor's "accumulation" (O'Connor, 1973). States do not accumulate capital in the sense of being independent economic actors seeking to increase their rate of profit. Rather, profit is replaced by survival as the ultimate goal for States. States do however, try to ensure their continuation through reproducing the *conditions for effective capital accumulation*. As Carnoy notes:

Significantly, the American State is hardly involved at all in direct production. Trapped by the enormous power of private corporations and the sanctity of corporate-State "free enterprise" ideology, the American State must rely on taxation and debt creation to finance growing expenditures. This eliminates the possibility of surplus-producing public enterprises (rather, the State takes over highly unprofitable services such as passenger trains, mail delivery, and urban mass transit) and forces the State to raise taxes or debt in order to subsidize private capital accumulation or pay for the worst injustices of capitalist development. (Carnoy, 1984, p.224)



This is not to go as far as Fred Block who sees in the conflict a third actor in the "state managers" who are differentiated from the accumulators of capital, but who often work in tandem with them (Block, 1977). The need to ensure the conditions for the effective accumulation of capital comes from the State's reliance upon the economy and not from any inherent predisposition.

For convenience in this thesis, the terms accumulation and legitimation will be used as shorthand for describing the functions of the State, although it is recognized that there are problems with these labels.

Block's case might be seen as supported by the role of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the Reagan era. As an institution, it has created a role for itself in environmental protection (though that is defined as market-based regulatory protection), and therefore has created a level of personnel committed to the aims of the agency. It is currently confronted with an administration which appears, for all intents and purposes, to be dismissive of environmental claims. Thus, is the EPA an example of this new autonomous bureaucratic class? Although there is conflict with the executive arm of the government, the broad commitment to the same perception of the environment as a market-externality pervades both branches. Conflict appears at one level, but consensus exists at another. Hence, there is little that the EPA can do to stop an administration that cuts its research budget by 40% in three years (1981-1983) (Dickson, 1984), because it recognizes the legitimacy of executive authority. The EPA, as the whole administrative structure, relies upon the economy as the source of funding through taxation. The attempts by the Reagan administration to reduce taxation levels represent the State legitimizing itself at the expense of ensuring effective accumulation (hence the massive budget deficit).

Whilst a class of "relatively autonomous" State managers may seem to be a logical derivative of a relatively autonomous State, as defined in this chapter, such a conclusion ignores the most fundamental aspect of the definition. The State is *not* only the bureaucratic agencies. It is also the

network of normative and ideological legitimation that broadly supports the aims and foundations of those agencies. One without the other is not the State. This is a difficulty that dogs the analysis of Theda Skocpol, in her otherwise admirable attempt to analyze the New Deal in terms of neo-Marxist theorizing about the State (Skocpol, 1980). Block and Skocpol both define the State very narrowly in terms of bureaucratic agencies. Skocpol talks of political "structures [that] powerfully shape and limit state interventions in the economy, and [that] determine the ways in which class interests and conflicts get organized into (or out of) politics in a given time or place," (Skocpol, 1980, p.200) without realizing that the State itself plays a crucial role in determining those structures.

With regard to US environmental politics, Richard Gale addresses the advances made in resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), by integrating this approach with a concept of the State (Gale, 1986). Whilst the attempt is being made to bring the State back into environmental politics, as this thesis argues is necessary, the State that Gale uses is merely the "[g]overnmental agencies [which are] the organized manifestations of the state" (Gale, 1986, p.205). Thus he confines his State to being only such agencies as the Department of the Interior, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife. Once again this falls prey to the incompleteness of definition that characterizes Skocpol and Block's approaches. Clearly, the move by some analysts to bring the State back in has led to a laudable emphasis upon the State as a concept, but has all too often involved bringing the old State back in and with, it all the old problems.

The duality of State functions is perhaps better categorized by O'Connor's other terminology, where he contrasts social capital expenses with the social expenses of production (O'Connor, 1973). This emphasizes the *economic* logic behind both functions. Legitimation is therefore a social expense of production. However, because something derives from the economy does not mean that its subsequent development is always going to exactly reflect the economy. A cultural tool of legitimation, such as the persistence of "individualism" in the US, may take time to become embed-

ded, and thus will not be removed quickly, if structural changes in the economy render that particular ethos redundant (O'Connor, 1984; Bell, 1970). There must be some sort of cultural lag that influences the rate of change in the methods of legitimation. Put simply, changes in legitimation will not adapt as quickly as will the social capital pattern of expenditure.

### **2.4.1 Legitimation as a Function of Accumulation**

In the delineating of functions of the State, there often resides the implicit assumption that these functions are equal or equivalents in some sense. This is by no means a logical assumption for economistically-orientated Marxian thought. It seems much more consistent to consider legitimation as a result of accumulation. Legitimation amounts to the mitigating of the social externalities created by an economic system. The economic externalities are subsumed under the function of accumulation. It does not stand on its own as an objective of government: there would be, theoretically, no need to engage in legitimation if there were no externalities whose effects needed to be countered. This means that successful legitimation often amounts to the same thing as accumulation: it is the effective maintenance of the conditions that allow for capital accumulation to take place.

It has already been noted that States do attempt things beyond their capacities, and this is why legitimation is not merely a subset of accumulation: the State may try to legitimate itself through the propagation of an ideology or an ethos that is not ultimately beneficial to the accumulation process. This may be an answer to O'Connor's dilemma about American individualism being in conflict with American capitalist development. It is also partly a reflection of the argument put by Skocpol and Evans et al., that States do not always have the resources to effectively fulfill their functions (Skocpol, 1980; Evans et al., 1985). This is not to assert that the failure to legitimate

correctly amounts to a contradiction of the accumulation process. This would be to stand the Marxian argument on its head by asserting that it is the *failure* to legitimate that is in contradiction with accumulation. Rather the case is made that accumulation and legitimation are often in conflict, even when successful. The benefits of legitimation may not be immediately apparent, and yet the costs are an immediate drain on the accumulation process.

The social and capital costs of legitimation must draw down the rate of profit. Increased welfare means increased taxation to pay for the additional outlay, and hence amounts to a reduction of profit for the private interests. However, the increased cost of legitimation does not reduce the rate of profit at the same rate as the costs of legitimation grow. This is because paying welfare benefits, for instance, causes those who would otherwise be making no contribution to the economy to have some purchasing power, however small. This provides stimulation for the economy through providing demand, and through providing tax revenue on purchased goods. Also, various cultural ideas such as "blaming the victim" and "scapegoating" (O'Connor, 1984, p.14) reduce to an absolute minimum those who actually claim such benefits. The social control aspect means that there are hidden benefits to successful legitimation. Social disruption is costly to contain; therefore, a lack of social disruption is in fact a saving that increases the rate of profit. O'Connor makes the additional point that the uneven distribution of benefits and costs means that it is the competitive sector and the labor force that end up disproportionately financing the Welfare State whilst the monopoly sector capital pays few of the costs. He concludes that "the state budget can be seen as a complex mechanism that redistributes income backward and forward within the working class" (O'Connor, 1973, p.162). Successful legitimation, although a cost, has benefits that accrue to the capitalist economy, and therefore it should not be seen purely as a cost.

It is the "logic of capital" that creates the need to legitimate. Legitimation, at its base, is an economic imperative. However, the way in which it is attempted depends on the conditions that prevail. Culture mediates the demands of an economy. There can be no constant deterministic structural linkage between the demands of an economy and the way in which the State seeks to

legitimate itself. If legitimation were an untainted mechanistic response to the accumulation process, then there would exist no regulatory legislation designed to mitigate the environmental damage of industrial production. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act incur costs for industry that are not quantifiable in purely economic terms, except in terms of costs rather than benefits. Their value comes to the State in the maintenance of social order that they allow, by making the State seem responsive to notions of the collective good, and by the simple physical maintenance of certain minimal standards of every day existence for society. Industry, if allowed complete freedom of action, would probably opt to discard environmental regulations, and yet the State needs to impose environmental regulatory reform, in order to maintain its legitimacy. This is an indication of the relative autonomy of the State.

## *2.5 The Relative Autonomy of the State*

The theoretical move from the State as neutral arena, as liberal-pluralist thought has portrayed it, to State as actor, as it is portrayed here, includes within it the assumption that the State has a set of interests. If the State is not merely an instrument of domination, then there must be some independent "reasons" why it should act. These "reasons" are its interests, and these are the functions of accumulation and legitimation. For a State to act it must have the incentive to do so and not merely the capacity. These incentives may cause the State to pursue contradictory functions. Thus the State must have a theoretically identifiable set of interests, but they need not be consistent. It is these interests that, as will be shown in chapter three, are antithetical to the fundamental logic of environmentalism. As seen in the earlier quotation, Marx and Engels saw this interest as being exactly that of the dominant class. Such a view is rejected by non-Marxians and Marxians alike. Profound changes took place within Marxist thought as a result of the Miliband-Poulantzas debate over the relative autonomy of the State. Thus the State is now generally char-

acterized as being relatively autonomous from the dominant class, but because it relies upon the structure of society as currently constituted (i.e. favoring the dominant class), it will usually act in concert with the interests of the dominant class.

Ralph Miliband stresses the class-consciousness of the members of the State:

Those who control and determine selection and promotion at the highest level of the state service are themselves most likely to be members of the upper and middle classes, by social origin or by virtue of their own professional success, and are likely to carry in their minds a particular image of how a high-ranking civil servant or military officer ought to think speak, behave and react; and that image will be drawn in terms of the class to which they belong (Miliband, 1969, pp.63-64).

However, as the US has less class-consciousness than Miliband's native Britain, this further limits the utility of his perception of the State. Some recent analysis in the neo-Marxist vein, has suggested that the State is not even directly tied to the interests of the dominant class, but rather that it constitutes an independent third actor in class conflict (Skocpol, 1980), devoid of class-consciousness (Block, 1980). However, these analyses fail to provide evidence of this lack of class-consciousness on the part of the State, and they fail to see that conflicts between the under-represented and State-managers tend to manifest themselves along class lines (Carnoy, 1984, p.221). To suggest that the State is relatively autonomous avoids the danger of an over-simple, though methodologically attractive, definition tying the State directly to the interests of one class. To portray the State as completely autonomous and devoid of class consciousness, falls prey to the same attraction of seeing the State as an instrument of the dominant class, and thus to similar over-simplification.

The inevitable question begged by the issue of relative autonomy, concerns whether the State, as an actor, becomes merely one more participant in the struggle for power. It would be something like the position of Block alluded to earlier (Block, 1977). This is not the case. The State should not be brought back into political analysis as merely another actor. Its relevance is that it is in a unique position. As far as the accumulative functions of the State are concerned, the argument that the relative autonomy of the State means that it is just another actor in the competition holds good. However, the uniqueness of the State stems in large part from its legitimating function. Accumu-

lation is by no means unique to the State: all of the economic interests in society are involved in accumulating capital. The same is not true of legitimation.

Miliband uses the phrase, "the engineering of consent" to apply to legitimation (Miliband, 1969, p.183). The perpetuating of ideological norms and values through ideological and cultural hegemony, is a subtle and complex process. It would be all too easy to collapse the argument into a "conspiracy theory", arguing that all the institutions in society are acting consciously and consistently in the interests of one group. This is not the case. *Most* of the powerful institutions in society (the mass media, the family, education, the work ethic et al.) will *tend* to work towards the same broad ideological ends (i.e. those upon which they are based) *most* of the time. This might be seen as supporting the case that legitimation is just another resource in the competition for power. This is wrong for two reasons: firstly the legitimation that occurs is uni-directional. That is, it tends towards the same broad ends. It might not always be successful but there is constant dynamic that causes the attempt to be made. Secondly, it must be remembered that the State is the only actor that needs or tries to legitimate its actions. The actions of the private sector need no legitimation because they are given legitimacy by the broad ideological norms of the society. These are the concerns of the State. Clearly, the relative autonomy of the State does not mean that the State is just another actor, because the legitimating function is unique to the State, and sets it apart from the other actors. In the network of ideological legitimation the State has a unique set of resources. Stating the relative autonomy of the State can easily lead to the extreme position that the State is completely autonomous. However, this not only disposes of the original rationale behind the concept, it also destroys the subtlety within it. To quote Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer "autonomy remains very relative" (Evans et al., 1985, p.62).

## 2.6 *Conflict Within the State*

The idea that the State functions in a uni-directional manner needs some clarification and justification. This is especially the case with environment issues in the US. Perhaps more than any other issue, the environmental is dealt with by a diverse and extensive range of institutions at many different levels and in many different ways. The atmosphere of confrontation between the EPA and other environmental vestiges of the Carter and Nixon years, which currently characterizes relations with the present Reagan administration, highlights the importance of being able to incorporate notions of conflict within the concept of the US State. Evans et al., have stressed that the State attempts actions that are beyond its capacities. In this respect they are making an important contribution to the debate over the State, because they are resisting an overly-functionalist definition of the State which is so often a characteristic of Marxian definitions. Evans and Rueschemeyer are therefore successful in their efforts "not to fall into the functionalist trap of assuming that because the state is 'necessary' it will therefore have the inclination and capacity to fill the required role" (Evans et al., 1985, p.46). This potential for failure indicates that there must also be the potential for conflict within the State. The question then becomes: does this negate the argument that the State acts in a uni-directional manner? The answer is that it does not, and this is due to the duality notion.

The shift toward a more locally-based response (whether that locality be state-wide or county-wide), and toward a greater emphasis upon the courts as political problem solvers, demonstrates again the unique nature of the environment as an issue in the US political context. Trends such as these emphasize the complexity of State actions in response to its functional requirements. When we talk of the State, as defined earlier, we are talking about a duality of functions. These functions overlap, and, to an extent, are derived from each other. This duality needs to be understood in order that the uni-directional nature of State functions can be justified. Conflict on one level does not necessarily imply conflict upon another, more fundamental level.



Conflict has two levels. First there is the conflict itself, and then there is the context in which the conflict takes place and the way it is conducted. This is a rejoinder to Steven Lukes' argument about the importance of seeing power as much in terms of who prevails in deciding which decisions are made, as in terms of who prevails in those decisions (Lukes, 1974). In order to reach a full understanding of conflict it is necessary to examine the context, and the terms of political discourse, because "close attention to the biases of a political system, requires among other things, critical scrutiny of the contours of those conceptual contests that help to constitute the life of the polity" (Connolly, 1983, p.7). If, for example, there is conflict between groups for symbols, then it is necessary to ask why those particular symbols are important. If two interest groups are vying for influence in the legislature, then it must be examined why the legislature is the aim of the groups. If funding for elections is provided, then it must be asked why the electoral process is seen as the appropriate arena for the expression of conflict. It is in this light that we must examine actions such as the Sierra Club setting up of its own Political Action Committee. No two countries share the same political systems, and therefore it is counter-intuitive to assume that there is something "natural" about one particular type of political process. It is the political process that determines the nature of conflict.

The duality in the definition of conflict leads to the conclusion that conflict at the less fundamental level does not imply a lack of direction or conflict in State activity at the more fundamental level. This fundamental level is essentially the accumulative and legitimative functions. If the State is founded upon and supports the most basic tenets of society, such as the property relations and the class relations, then conflict within its bureaucratic component does not imply conflict within its most basic ideological assumptions. This is very much the concern of Bell, Habermas, and O'Connor, who place the emphasis of their analyses upon the linkage between economic and cultural structures, and thus are addressing more fundamental issues than analyses that address only aspects of the economy or aspects of culture.

A challenge is provided to any case for the contradictions of capitalist development by the US. It is seen as the most powerful capitalist nation and yet it thrives upon an ethos of individualism, which seems in contradiction to the needs of an economy characterized by corporate power. For O'Connor the argument is that American individualism is indeed in conflict with the economic demands of the society. Therefore, there is crisis<sup>5</sup> (O'Connor 1984). In a similar way Daniel Bell points out the emergence of a strong "adversary-culture" in culture itself (Bell, 1970). Bell cites Dadaism in painting, the theatre of the absurd in the performing arts, and the beat generation in music and writing, as indications of this. He argues that, in culture, hedonism has replaced the Protestant work ethic and brought about a crisis. The Bell argument is easily countered because it is based upon a false premise. Bell is defining culture in terms of bourgeois culture. He is generalizing from the specific, and this particular specific is not generalizable to the whole society, because the interests of the two major classes are not the same, and he is only referring to the interests of a single class. Culture, as defined as the activities of humankind not directly related to the demands of physical survival, is clearly not the exclusive preserve of one class. For O'Connor, the crisis results from the existence of some sort of "cultural lag", which dictates that culture does not shift mechanistically in response to changed economic conditions.

The existence of conflict *per se* does not necessarily imply a lack of coherence within an institution. The level of that conflict is the crucial determinant of whether we speak of a unified entity or not. Conflicts over budget allocations between different components of the State (e.g. the EPA

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<sup>5</sup> The concept of crisis is a recurrent theme in Marxian literature, and stems from the dialectic methodology employed. The concept of crisis however, is by no means confined to Marxian thought as it is essential to the Overload and Ungovernability theses. However, the concept of crisis contains within it the idea that the situation is unsustainable. According to Jürgen Habermas, "crises arise when the structure of a social system allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system" (Habermas, 1975, p.2). To witness the continuation of American individualism and American capitalism seems to indicate that the two features are not in fact contradictory. The temptation with political analysis is to portray the present, the contemporary, as at the apex of social change. According to generations of commentators we have been standing at the staring into the abyss of profound social upheaval for centuries. The temptation is more easily succumbed to in Marxian thought. Accordingly, capitalism has been in continual crisis since its inception. This debases the concept of crisis. Thus "crisis" will here be used to refer to the manifestations of contradiction. Contradiction provides the momentum and the dynamic for social, political change, and therefore should not be seen as a static phenomenon. If it is viewed as static, then it faces the same problem as the concept of crisis: if crises or contradictions continue to persist, then the situation must be sustainable, and therefore they cannot be crises or contradictions (in the static sense).

and the OMB) do not amount to fundamental conflict over the nature of the environment. We may broadly characterize the attitude of *all* State agencies toward environment destruction as an economic externality to be dealt with through the use of regulatory reform conducted on market-based criteria. This is illustrated through the extensive use of cost-benefit analyses by governmental agencies (see chapter four). The unity within the State is less apparent than the conflict. The very fact that it is easier to see the State as characterized by conflict than as a unified entity, is a function of the State seeking to legitimate itself by de-emphasizing its own identity and role in society.

## ***2.7 Conflict, Contradiction and Incapacity***

Observing that States need to fulfill the dual functions of accumulation and legitimation does not amount to saying that States are always successful in achieving these ends. Indeed, the argument that accumulation is in contradiction dictates that success on one criteria may amount to failure on another. However, this is to talk of outcomes. If we talk of processes, then, at this lower level, it can also be observed that States do not always successfully achieve their aims. They do not always have the capacity. To argue that what States do is what they succeed in doing, is to work backwards and to fall into the functionalist trap.

The preservation of wilderness in its natural state or historic sites in their original condition means the ruling out of exploitation of its natural resources by economic interests in these areas. Thus, calls for certain sites to be preserved, if given enough support, amount to demands for the State to legitimate itself through being responsive to these "popular demands". However, the fragmentary nature of US environmental administration (both on the local-federal and the legislative-executive axes) means that what one part of the State considers to be a reasonable de-

mand may not seem so reasonable to another State agency, or to another state administration.<sup>6</sup> If the tract of land in question is sizable then it may extend across the geographical and jurisdictional boundaries of different components of the State. This being the case, a commitment to the implemented preservationist policy on the part of one State component, does not amount to the successful implementation of that policy, because half-hearted commitment from the other agency may, in practice mean that, economic interests are allowed to exploit certain parts of this designated area in one way or another. To move from the hypothetical to the practical, this means that the sanctity of national parks has not been consistently observed.

In the case of the Florida Everglades National Park, an initial incapacity to set the boundaries to coincide with the ecological demands of the region threatened the longevity of what Alfred Runte describes as the case "where the United States had come closest to the ideal of total conservation" (Runte, 1979, p.187). In the case of the Yellowstone and Yosemite National Parks the intrusion of the railways, the automobile, pollution and eventually the sheer volume of human traffic, meant that in fulfilling the demands that caused the Parks' creation, the State was creating the impetus for their destruction. It was not in the capacity of the State to thoroughly conserve these areas as wilderness. Although the State, as a macro-entity, might seek to legitimate itself through a policy of preservation of certain sites, contradictory demands, conflicts at administrative levels, and the reliance by the State on those levels for the implementation of policy, means that the State may be frustrated in its efforts to legitimate itself through public lands policy. In short, it may not have the capacity to fulfill one of its functions.

The existence of conflict at any significant level of State organization, is a natural restriction on the capacity to coherently pursue a strategy. As the hypothetical land preservation example illustrates, this conflict may be intra-State. It may also be between competing client groups. Thus the demands made on the State by differing industrial interests may amount to conflicting demands.

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<sup>6</sup> In order to distinguish between the "State" as a theoretical concept and the "state" as one of the fifty in the US, the former will always be capitalized, whilst the latter will not be. The only exception to this will be in quotations where the original form will be maintained.

The State, being relatively autonomous does not have control over the demands of capital, and the demands of capital do not have direct control over the State. This means that the State cannot control the demands and the inputs that it receives. It can only attempt to influence them through its cultural and ideological influence. However, in short-term scenarios, the State cannot create a new dominant social paradigm to meet the need of each new policy dilemma. The legitimative abilities of the State, although subtle and complex, are far from being omnipotent.

Some aspects of culture may be more appropriate to their original historical epochs than to the ones they continue into. Hence, O'Connor identifies individualism in the US as incompatible with the current economic structures, although its instigation was the as a response to the demands of the "logic of capital" (O'Connor, 1984). Ideological legitimation is something of a blunt instrument in terms of what it may achieve (it is not blunt in the methods of achieving these ends), and thus is directed to only the broadest societal norms of behavior that are relevant. Structures of hierarchy (Bookchin, 1982), of authority, and of perceptions, are what the State may deal with through ideological legitimation. It cannot deal with the complexities and constancy of change entailed in the workings of the corporate capitalist dynamic. The legitimation of the broad societal norms does however help to add legitimacy to the functioning of the economy. Thus, the State seeks to legitimate the perception of our environment as a resource that we may rightfully tap, rather than seeking to legitimize the day-to-day activities of the Mobil Corporation.

## **2.8 Conclusion**

The important changes that have taken place in the Marxian conception of the State, whereby it has changed from the instrumentalist perception of an institution acting in the interests of the dominant class to the structuralist view whereby the State is relatively autonomous and tends to

act in the interests of the status quo, have had a profound impact on the theoretical aspect of political analysis. Unfortunately, these changes have not yet fully penetrated the empirical side of the discipline. The aim of this chapter has been to present a fusion of these changes that should result in a concept of the State that can readily and usefully be applied to the reality of US environmental interest group politics. This definition of the State incorporates the structuralist perspective of Poulantzas' early writings, with the dual functions idea put forward by O'Connor and Offe, with the non-functionalist perspective of Evans et al., which all yields a relatively autonomous State that strives to aid the accumulation process and to legitimate its own existence, without necessarily succeeding in those ends because it does not always have the capacity or the resources. This means that the State is not only acting when it is successful. This avoids excessive functionalism and destroys the mythology of those definitions that paint the State as this almost magical force that is behind all unexplained actions.

Perhaps the analogy might usefully be drawn between the concept of the State and the influence of Ronald Reagan (or of any President) in the US Congress. If Reagan were not physically perceptible and yet operated normally, we should not deny that his influence was there in the legislation that came out of Congress. Legislation would have been initiated by him, or at his behest, or even in the anticipation of his approval. In some cases he may have been unable, despite his best efforts, to obtain passage of a bill. The president has no official powers of persuasion. His resources depend very much upon transitory conditions (e.g. his public popularity). The legislative result may be a hodge-podge of success and failure, but behind it there would always be the intention of a single actor to consistently put forward a program. The program itself may even be contradictory. This is not to deny that he is an political actor. The State as a unified entity *is* physically imperceptible, but, like Reagan, it is a single actor putting forward its program, as best it can, using the resources available to it.

## 3.0 The Logic and Ideologies of Environmentalism

### 3.1 *Introduction*

The State has been shown in the previous chapter to have a unified identity that justifies using it as the central term of reference for this analysis. I have attempted to show that the concept of duality means that conflict within the State does not necessarily mean that the State, as a whole, is not relatively unified. Just as the State is relatively autonomous so it is relatively unified. As long as, there is cohesion, then this allows us to identify the State as an actor with interests. This cohesion is at this second level of abstraction, which is concerned with the norms and contexts of behavior. While some liberal-pluralist thought has seen the necessity of taking on board the idea of the State,<sup>7</sup> this unified entity is perhaps their point of departure from the argument being presented here. To argue that the State is relatively cohesive is a complex case. This is also true of the case that the environmental movement in the US is relatively cohesive in terms of ideology. At first glance this sits ill with the reality of a movement that encompasses such a diverse range of opinion, tactics, resources and political legitimacy. However, this chapter will outline the common

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<sup>7</sup> "[A]ny complete conception of the political process must incorporate the facts of individual differences and must reckon with the inclusive system of relationships that we call the state." (Truman, 1971, p.52)

thread that does run through the environmental movement and which is in direct contradiction with the nature of the State as outlined in the previous chapter.

The fact that the State has contradictory aims to these broad environmental aims means that those groups which come closest to a rejection of the inherent logic of their own position are designated as the most acceptable groups, and thus are given the most productive access to the State. What I am essentially arguing is that the ideological stance of the most powerful environmental groups represents a "false consciousness" that is purposely encouraged and endorsed by the State as a method of mitigating the more costly effects of environmental claims. "Business as usual" is not a natural component of any environmental group's ideology, but it is a very natural component of the State's ideological armory. However, the espoused ideology of "reform environmentalism" reflects just that "business as usual" perspective. It is reform environmentalism that is the mainstay of the most prominent environmental groups, and therefore may be seen as the dominant strain of environmentalism.<sup>8</sup> The other strain is here identified as "deep ecology" and parts of "social ecology". Both parts when taken together constitute the full range of environmental thought.

The argument attempted here is not an analysis of the environmental movement as a unified entity in the sense that there is a shared political perspective. Clearly there are substantial differences within the movement. However, it will be shown that the movement does possess a shared logic. Underlying the movement and stemming from the fact that all its facets are reactions to one overarching stimulant, there does exist a broad but coherent ideological framework. However, in attempting to gain political influence, a wing of the movement has had to "moderate" its underlying logic, in order to gain legitimacy and influence. In this sense I would agree with Gouldner that:

As humane as it doubtless is, and as correct as it doubtless is in many of its diagnoses of impending shortages, the new "ecological" movement can also be regarded as a new ideology that is being "Shopped" as a possible source of institutional legitimation for a society in which the established basis

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<sup>8</sup> The twelve most prominent groups are; the Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, National Parks and Conservation Association, the Izaak Walton League, National Wildlife Federation, the Wilderness Society, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, National Resources Defense Council, Friends of the Earth, Environmental Policy Institute and Environmental Action. These groups all tend to adhere to an ideology of reform environmentalism.



of equilibrium -the increasing GNP- is threatened. The new ecology movement may thus function, whatever its intentions, as the ideology appropriate for a time of austerity, of material shortages, of declining or static standards of living, of the conservation of energy supplies and raw materials. (Gouldner, 1976, p.245)

However, this analysis only applies to the explicit ideology of the dominant political wing and not to its underlying logic, or to the other part of the movement.

The structure of this chapter is that it will first address the ideological roots of the environmental movement through an examination of the movement's historical development. This leads to the conclusion that the movement's history led to a dominant conservationist ideology. Thus the following section deals with this factor in the form of "reform environmentalism". It is then argued that, for a number of reasons, the movement gave birth to a non-conservationist wing in the 1960s and 1970s. The next section therefore deals with this ideology as manifested in "deep ecology" and "social ecology", and goes on to show, through an examination of the dominant strains of environmental thought, that the logic of deep and social ecology is, in fact, the underlying logic of the whole environmental movement, and so this unity is examined. Finally, it will be shown why this logic of environmentalism is in direct contradiction to the nature of the State in US society, as outlined in the previous chapter.

### ***3.2 The Roots of Environmentalism***

The Yosemite Act of 1864 created the first national park in the US. It was conceived as a response to the threat to the Yosemite area and the Sierra redwood trees, and drew the attention of a number of Californian activists, who successfully campaigned for their conservationist ends. The irony is that the creation of the first national park was not a result of a popular vein of environmental concern. Rather, the national park idea emerged out of a deep-seated sense of a lack

of cultural identity on the part of many Americans. There was not the man-made culture and legacy to match that of the Old World, and so Americans turned to the natural wonders of their land, as testimony to their cultural heritage. Yosemite and Yellowstone were not testimony to progressive American environmental awareness: "Monumentalism, not environmentalism, was the driving impetus behind the 1864 Yosemite Act" (Runte, 1979, p.29). The dominant theme was not Nature for its own sake, but rather Nature as a substitute for human inadequacy.

In the national park there can be seen both the conceptual origins of American environmentalism and the practical implementation of those ideas. From 1864 until the 1960s and 1970s, US environmentalism can be broadly characterized as "conservationist". Some authors make the distinction between the "preservationist" tradition and the "conservationist" tradition (Sale, 1986). This fits in neatly with the characteristics of the two leading environmentalists. John Muir, as preservationist seeking to preserve the original, and Gifford Pinchot, attempting to use natural resources in such a way so as to conserve resources, represented the dominant wings of the early movement. Clearly there is distinction, but there is an underlying agreement in the feasibility of environmentally-sound management and society as presently constituted. This justifies calling both these strains of thought "conservationist". Its aim was not to challenge the feasibility and legitimacy of existing political and economic structures. Its aim was to conserve those natural features that were threatened by unchecked development. The national park idea was a method of protection of the old without challenging the right of the new to prevail. Indeed, as Bill Devall notes, this idea of inherent worth in the new, as against the old, is a fundamental theme of US culture (Devall, 1980). As such, it lays the basis for the legitimate desecration of the environment in the name of modern development.

The turning point away from an exclusively conservationist position on the part of the environmental movement came about in the 1960s and 1970s because of four factors. Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, in 1962, and Stewart Udall's *The Quiet Crisis* in 1963, are often identified as the beginning of a new focus in the movement, because of the broadening of the issues to a national rather

than local focus. However, the most important feature of Carson's work was the way the issues and alternatives were framed. For the first time, the environmental movement was responding to the march of modern technology and development by using modern technical arguments. Rather than merely pointing out the environmental damage, Carson highlighted the long-term inefficiency of the methods of industrial development (specifically of the effects of DDT). Here the movement was moving away from an overtly moral stance to one based on economic efficiency. However, Carson did not represent the whole environmental movement. With a rich strain of biocentric thought to draw on, exemplified in the writings of Henry David Thoreau and Aldo Leopold, there emerged an overtly non-conservationist wing to the movement. Deep ecology has specifically challenged the logic, but not the intentions of reform environmentalism, and attempted to frame a consistent radical ideology. It ran as an alternative to the conservationist tradition in which Carson and Udall were writing.

The second major change in environmentalism came about as a response to changing political conditions. The emergence of a strain of "New Politics" as a result of the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights movement and the Watergate affair, and as an indirect result of the New Deal, marked a decline in the perceived legitimacy of much of the "Old Politics". Limited political dissent achieved an unprecedented degree of legitimacy. Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter cast the New Politics as an alternative to the "Reconstituted Right" that lay dormant and chastened during the Nixon years, only to emerge with a vengeance in support of Reagan in the eighties (Ginsberg & Shefter, 1985). It was the New Politics that lay behind the environmental, consumer, and occupational, health and safety legislation in the 1970s. The Ginsberg and Shefter thesis does not have to be accepted in its entirety. It does place undue emphasis on the electoral logic of politicians appealing to these coalitions without fully addressing the cultural and ideological roots of these movements. It does, however, have the utility of identifying some sort of profound change in the tenor of US politics in the late sixties and mid seventies. It was these changes that meant that the political context was more suited to the demands of the environmental movement.

The derivations of the environmental movement, especially of the legalistic aspects, share more than just a passing similarity to the Civil Rights movement and the student movements of the late sixties. Classifying environmental politics along with the Civil Rights, anti-war and student movements is justified in terms of their chronological similarity and the continuity of personnel. In many cases the advocates of Civil Rights moved on to the environmental movement, taking with them the techniques that they employed in the Civil Rights movement (Andrews, 1980). The ethos of mounting fundamental challenges to the prevailing social, and therefore economic structures, had become entrenched in the political culture. However, by entrenching these demands in the very system that the demands were challenging, their radicalism was severely compromised. This process may account for the "softening" of environmental claims in order that they could be taken up by the existing political structures. Whatever the effect of this influence, it is clear that the prominence of environmental issues on the political agenda was not attributable solely to the merits of the case: the context of profound social and political changes played more than just a passing role.

The third factor that transformed the tenor of environmental politics was the result of the Second World War. The post-war boom years are identified by many environmentalists as the apotheosis of technology run riot and the environment run aground. The demand for massive increases in industrial productivity during the war years resulted in an unprecedented spurt in industrial activity and technology. Barry Commoner identifies the period from 1946 onwards as a time when the increased levels of pollution grew at a faster rate than population levels (Commoner, 1972). It was not merely that there was more pollution as a result of increased demand, but rather it was that pollution per capita increased. As an indication of industrial development, pollution is often a useful index. What Stephen Fox calls the "dirty innovations" of the war became part and parcel of post-war industrial world (Fox, 1985, p.301). The increased inefficiency of energy use went hand in hand with an increased absolute level of consumption. By 1955 the US was already consuming over half of the world's non-renewable resources. The war, by giving a powerful impetus to industrial production, also gave impetus to the production of environmental externalities. Whilst awareness of the increased level of environmental destruction may not have increased at a

rate exactly corresponding to the destruction, some sort of increased awareness of the issues was unavoidable. The Los Angeles "smog" was evidence enough for many Californians.

The fourth factor that led to change cannot be so easily ascribed to a rigid time period as can the other three. The changing American perception of wilderness has been a process that has been gradual but constant since the earliest days of the US. Roderick Nash identifies wilderness as an essential ingredient of US civilization, but concludes that, "While the American conception of wilderness has almost always been a compound of attraction and repulsion, the relative strengths of these attitudes, both in single minds and in national opinion, has not remained constant" (Nash, 1967, p.231). He sees a profound shift from the frontier perception of wilderness, as threatening and inhospitable, to the modern perception of wilderness, as an integral and desirable component of American identity. This latter view owes much to the legacy of men like Muir and Pinchot, who gave birth to both the idea of positive wilderness and to the movement that espoused this as the basis of its conservationist ideology.

Muir's love for the California Sierra mountains meant that he was a strong opponent of any plan to compromise that landscape in the name of development. Thus, for him and others, the plan to dam the Hetch Hetchy Valley mooted since 1882, amounted to desecration of a natural wilderness in the name of economic expediency. This case was made all the more pertinent by the fact that the 1890 act forming the Yosemite National Park designated Hetch Hetchy as a wilderness preserve. An attack on the sanctity of Hetch Hetchy meant, in effect, an attack on the very principle of wilderness conservation so recently enshrined in the 1864 Yosemite Act. Despite a vigorous campaign to stop the plan the valley's fate was sealed by a congressional vote in 1913. The eventual failure of the conservationists to save Hetch Hetchy was, in many ways, a threat to the validity of the environmental movement.

To argue that the failure of the conservationists in the Hetch Hetchy case was important, is not the same as saying that the movement was a failure at this point. The similar case of the pro-

posed Echo Park Dam on the Colorado-Utah boundary which threatened the Dinosaur National Monument, became something of a *cause celebre* among environmentalists in the 1940s and 1950s. In this instance the environmentalist cause prevailed and Dinosaur avoided the fate of Hetch Hetchy.<sup>9</sup> The movement was far from stymied by Hetch Hetchy.

These early examples of environmental action are important because they provided the basis and the impetus for the subsequent development of the movement. In both these cases, there was no question that conservation of unspoiled resources should be nothing more than an addendum to the inevitable march of industrial society. The environmentalists in the Dinosaur incident were keen to make public their stance through the publication of a letter in the *Denver Post* just before the relevant legislation was about to pass through Congress. It is significant that they declared that they "are NOT anti-reclamationists, and are not fighting the principle of water use in the west" (Quoted in Nash, 1967, p.219). To have done so would have been seen as heresy. John Wesley Powell first articulated the idea that the semi-desert of the western US had not the ecological capacity to sustain the vast influx of settlers, in 1876. The response was a deafening silence until his ideas were unwittingly taken up with abandon in the federal water projects that emerged from the depths of the depression in the thirties (Reisner, 1986). Challenging the right and the feasibility of an existing population to exist where it did and the way it did was clearly not the way forward for an aspiring public interest movement. As long as the movement remained conservationist in character, it remained true to its history and also gained a public acceptability that may have laid the roots for the surprisingly pro-environmentalist attitude of the American public (Mitchell, in Vig & Kraft, 1984).

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<sup>9</sup> Although it should be noted that the compromise worked out between the environmentalists (specifically David Brower for the Sierra Club) and the Bureau of Reclamation, sacrificed the Glen Canyon in order to save Echo Park. This was to be a decision that Brower, upon subsequently seeing Glen Canyon, was bitterly to regret (Reisner, 1986).

### *3.3 Interest Representation: Groups, Movements and Ideologies*

This thesis is essentially concerned with questions of the representation of interests. The case of the environment is of particular value because it demonstrates how the phenomenon of collective goods is dealt with by the State. Environmental goods as collective goods are indivisible. This means that environmentally-sound management is in everyone's interests. Interests are not the same as wants or preferences. To argue this is to destroy a useful distinction between two related concepts. We do not always want what is in our interests. Hence acts like euthanasia are illegal in the US, because it is considered that anyone who would advocate this policy could not be acting in their interests. What *is* in our interests is that course of action which, had we the ability to choose retrospectively between the outcomes of all possible policies, we would choose (Connolly, 1983). Clearly, we do not have enough information to make fool-proof judgements about our interests at the time that we usually need to make those judgements. This means to define interests, in practical terms, as only those represented by one set of groups is to inject an unacceptable degree of subjectivity into the argument.

The association of the nomenclature "interest groups" with only those groups that engage in State-endorsed interest representation is to accept the agenda of the State as the agenda for analysis. This is the case with liberal-pluralist theories of interest groups. Groups that engage in direct action, anarchist strategies and congressional lobbying, all have an equal claim to be representing collective interests, as none of these groups can claim a monopoly on the ability to assess the outcomes of all possible policies retrospectively. Thus the term "interest group" is used in this thesis to refer to any organized group that engages in activity designed to represent interests in the manner that is deemed most appropriate. Practically, this means the the National Wildlife Federation, Greenpeace and the Clamshell Alliance are all to be treated as interest groups.

To classify all these groups together is not to assert that there are not fundamental differences between the groups. In the case of environmental interest groups there is the common bond of the "logic of environmentalism". However, the fundamental distinction is State-driven. The relationship of the groups to the State is the fundamental source of differentiation within the movement. Thus, because the agenda of the State should not be the agenda of analysis, this distinction is being treated as less relevant than the unity that derives from the logic of the environmental movement.

The fact that direct action and eco-anarchist groups are here termed interest groups is not to deny that they may be part of the emerging phenomenon of "new social movements" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Offe, 1985b; Luke, 1989b). Along with the peace movement and the womens' movement, they may well represent an unprecedented challenge to existing political and structures than has been mounted by existing groups. However, they share with mainstream environmental pressure groups the feature that they are concerned with the representation of interests and, as that is the core subject of this thesis, this justifies classifying all these environmental groups as interest groups. The fact that all these groups are being classified together and that it will later be argued that they all share the "logic of environmentalism" is not to say that they all share the same ideology.

The difference of tactics, strategies and techniques does not derive from a difference in interests. It may well derive from a difference in the perception of those interests. This is a function of ideology. The Marxian definition of ideology is of a system of beliefs that is shaped and suits the workings of the capitalist system. From this perspective the end of capitalism portends the end of ideology. Thus ideology becomes another method of legitimation. Ideology is defined in this thesis as a set of related ideas with purposive intent. This means that ideology may be anti-capitalist and, more relevantly, anti-market or anti-State by this definition. Similarly, by not specifying that ideologies have to be rational and consistent, this allows the possibility of referring to reform environmentalism as true to *its* ideology of environmentalism whilst disregarding *the* logic of



environmentalism. Whilst there are a multiplicity of ideologies of environmentalism, there can only one logic.

### 3.4 *Business as Usual?*

The State has a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo, for it is upon the status quo that it rests. It relies upon the accumulation of capital by private interests in society to enable it to gain resources and legitimacy. Thus the State favors the maxim "business as usual". The existence of environmental externalities that become so overarching that they become a crisis is not in the State's interests. If this is, in reality, the case then the State will seek to define the crisis in such a way that its real importance is not recognized. The argument of this section is that the whole environmental movement contains an underlying logic that is manifested in the notion of crisis. This notion of crisis may be described in another way: not business as usual. Raymond Dasmann's view is typical:

We can try to continue with business as usual, to pursue goals of economic growth and material progress without concern for long-term consequences, or we can change direction. If we go on as before we will have at most a few more decades before serious breakdowns of civilization takes place. Before that time there will be recurring and increasing catastrophes affecting great numbers of people. These have already begun. However, if we start now to change our course, while we still have abundant supplies of energy and raw materials, we can develop ways of living on this planet that can be sustained, not just for decades but for thousands of years. (Dasmann, 1975, p.1)

Thus there is potential conflict with the State, whose interests lie with the continuation of the economic bases of society. This section is concerned with examining both parts of the environmental movement - reform environmentalism as shallow environmentalism and deep ecology and social ecology as deep environmentalism - as a prelude to demonstrating that they share the same logic.

### 3.4.1 The Soft Path to a Shallow Grave?

A document prepared by the representatives of the twelve leading US environmental groups, in an attempt to promote the unity and therefore the influence of the movement, declares that, "[c]ontinued economic growth is essential. Past environmental gains will be maintained and new ones made more easily in a healthy economy than in a stagnant one" (Cahn, 1985, p.7). On the face of it, the foremost environmental groups are advocating a policy of economic growth,<sup>10</sup> with ameliorative conservation measures designed to mitigate the inevitable excesses of industrial development:

American industry has demonstrated that technological or process changes designed to protect resources can also represent sound business opportunities. For some electric utilities, investments in energy conservation and diverse, small-scale energy technologies have become attractive alternatives to traditional central-station power generation. Redesign of industrial processes and products to save energy has also saved money for producers and consumers. Integrated pest management and better irrigation technologies are saving money for many farmers. Increasingly, environmentally sound practices are being seen as good for business. (Cahn, 1985, p.6)

In reality it is exactly that policy that has led to the need for an environmental movement at all. Without advocating a change in the criteria for the evaluation of worth, the same results are inevitable. As long as US energy policy is based on the premise of economic efficiency and not environmental efficiency, sulphur dioxide emissions from Midwestern industries will continue to plague Canada and the Northeast in the form of acid rain. As long as the policies of the US Reclamation Service remain tied to the ethos of cheap energy and expensive irrigation, projects such as the short-lived Saint Francis and Teton dams will continue to be built, and the phenomenon of free-flowing North American rivers will be a dying one. The contemporary belief in the compatibility of sound environmental principles and economic growth is not an exclusively modern phenomenon. Its roots lie embedded in the way the movement developed, and in the principles that guided early environmentalists. It was Gifford Pinchot, one of the most influential early conservationists

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<sup>10</sup> It should be noted that the phrase "economic growth" is taken here as referring to the orthodox conception of growth as measured by GNP. As Stretton notes, "practical disagreements about environmental policy are rarely simple conflicts between growth and conservation. They are conflicts about what to use, what to produce and how to pay for it - conflicts between people competing in familiar ways for rival values or for shares of scarce goods" (Stretton, 1979, p.4). However, for simplicity the phrase "economic growth" is here taken as synonymous with the dominant criteria for the evaluation of economic growth.

who described conservation as "the open door to economic and political progress" (Pinchot, 1947, p.505).

In Muir's lifetime the effect of industrial development on the US environment, whilst profound, was not as obtrusive as it is today. The refuge of the mountains and the wilderness areas provided exactly that - refuge. Even when David Brower developed his affection for the Colorado Basin, he was able to escape almost completely from the influence of civilization, much as the "modern primitive man" Joe Knowles had attempted to do when he marched off naked into the Maine woods to live purely off the land for two months in 1913 (Nash, 1967). Today the technological changes that have yielded a decrease in the importance of oceans and continents as dividers of nations, have also seen a corresponding increase in the impact of development on domestic environments. Refuge is harder to find, whilst regulation is easier to see in the once wild areas of the US. Within set boundaries, such as the North American Continent, an ever-increasing level of development is something that must inevitably lead to crisis of sorts, if that development is ecologically destructive. Limited resources, combined with unrestrained and irreversible expropriation of those resources, is not a sustainable situation. An unsustainable situation is usually characterized as a crisis.

In criticizing reform environmentalism deep ecologists tend to characterize it as a reflection of the dominant social paradigm. Dunlap and Van Liere define the DSP in the US as comprising the following factors: "(1) commitment to limited government, (2) support for free enterprise, (3) devotion to private property rights, (4) emphasis upon individualism, (5) fear of planning and support for the status quo, (6) faith in the efficacy of science and technology, (7) support for economic growth, and (8) faith in future abundance" (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p.1015). The DSP in the US, thus contains within it a commitment to individualism and consequently an anthropocentric conception of reality. The uniqueness and superiority of humans with respect to the rest of nature, is a theme that has permeated Western thought through Judeo-Christian belief (White, 1967) and through the European enlightenment tradition, and is the basis for the deep ecology criticism of

reform environmentalism. It is this area that has been the subject of much debate. However, it is not this aspect of the DSP that is inconsistent with the logic of the environmental position. Broadly speaking, the commitment to the notion of a non-interventionist state, and the deference to technocratic authority are the features of reform environmentalism that raise the most difficulty. To an extent, an anthropomorphic conception of the world is an inevitability, regardless of espoused commitment to ecological egalitarianism. There is no reason to believe anything other than that each species has to perceive reality through the eyes of its own species. However a deference to technology and an anti-state attitude are by no means as inevitable as anthropomorphism.

The view of the compatibility of economic growth with environmental awareness, is not held exclusively by the leading environmental interest group leaderships. There is a theoretical tradition that espouses the notion of "limits to growth" and sees the need to reconcile modern industrialism with environmentalism, without challenging the fundamental right of industrialism to prevail. The Club of Rome school first espoused the "limits to growth" concept (Meadows et al., 1974). They were attempting a paradigmatic shift, as deep ecologists see as necessary, in that they sought the integration of economics with ecology. This was a necessity brought about by the inability of the Earth to sustain life as currently constituted. In theory, this is in line with deep ecology aims, but the practice of these Worldwatchers differed substantially. The synthesis that the Worldwatchers sought amounts to a compromising of ecological first principles in order to take into account prevailing economic first principles.

The Schumacher proposal of creating a profusion of small markets, although an attempt to drive some fundamental theoretical distinction between small (as "beautiful") and large (presumably as unwieldy), remains tied to the basic principle of the market allocation of resources (Schumacher, 1973). Although the emphasis is upon people rather than goods, this does not challenge the underlying allocative patterns of distribution. It is upon this allocative strategy that the State rests. This, in turn compromises points (1) and (5) of the DSP. Competition for resources based upon a neutral arena of allocation is not only a misconception of the State, it is also a logically derived

misconception of economic markets. The difficulty of classifying environmental benefits in terms of economic goods, reflects the more substantive difficulty that markets have in taking the environment into account.

The environmental end as a "public good" or as a "collective good" stands as the center-piece for much of the analysis of environmental politics. In a sense, it provides the best test for a system that claims to be truly representative. Its novelty stems from the indivisible nature of most environmental goods. No-one can be consistently denied the benefits of clean air, if it truly is universally available. Thus, there is the potential for an interest group movement with a boundless constituency of "free riders". Olson's answer to this dilemma was to speculate that "selective incentives" were what provided the rationale behind individuals' decisions to join groups seeking collective goods (Olson, 1971). The distribution of collective goods is not the concern of the market, for allocation is inherently equal in these cases. In the same way, but as the logical negation of this, public "bads" (Mitchell, in Russell, 1979) are also non-divisible. The environmental movement is concerned with public "bads" rather than public goods, inasmuch as the need for the latter only arises as a reaction to the existence of the former. Put simply, there would be no demand for clean air if the air were clean. It takes the existence of pollution to catalyze a public movement in favor of clean air.

A public "bad" is often described as an externality. By definition, this makes it a by-product of an economic system whose effect is excluded from consideration in the prevailing economic rationale. Environmental destruction thus figures as an externality to a free-market economy. The need for a regulatory agency such as the EPA, is taken as self evident by the whole environmental movement. That it is the largest regulatory agency in the country is perhaps testimony to the magnitude of the problem of defining something as extensive as the environment as an externality. The need for legislative influence is recognized throughout the movement. "You've got to have legal machinery, you've got to have money and lobbying - all the work the shallow environmentalists are doing. If we lost the shallow environmentalists overnight, we'd be in big

trouble - those big corporations and agencies would roll over the environment in no time" (Sessions quoted in Sale, 1986). Protection of the environment can only be achieved through an interventionist State, even if that State is using the carrot and stick method of allocative incentives and penalties, thus bolstering the marketization of the environment. Such a pro-State ethos is in conflict with principle number (1) of a DSP which generally identifies a non-interventionist free market economy as a central tenet of American popular thought.

As long as environmental issues are defined as externalities and as long as the attempts to mitigate the effects of these externalities come as government initiatives, then this means that the government has the capacity to define the priority of the externality. As long as environmental concern is not embedded as part of the criteria for evaluating economic growth, then the environment can be defined in and out of politics at the whim of each administration. That the relatively environmentalist administration of Jimmy Carter has been followed by the anti-environmental administration of Ronald Reagan, is testimony to this fact. It is no coincidence that, at a domestic level, the current administration manifests a much stronger anti-State stance than its predecessor. However, it is important to stress the underlying unity of both administrations in their perception that the environment had to be dealt with through an interventionist government. It was only the desirability of this that the administrations differed over. As Andrews notes, "[b]y 1980 two parallel trends in environmental regulatory policy had emerged during both Democratic and Republican administrations. One was a growing commitment to 'regulatory reform,' which included efforts to use economic incentives to achieve regulatory purposes, increase regulatory purposes, increase regulatory oversight by the Executive Office of the President, and streamline and coordinate regulatory paperwork.....The other was a continued growth in the actual body of regulations, as the agencies gradually geared up to implement the full scope of their statutory responsibilities" (Andrews in Vig & Kraft, 1984, p.161). Clearly both administrations viewed the environment as externalities to be dealt with through legislative and regulatory means.

If differing administrations' environmental policies belie an underlying unity of purpose (i.e. that of the State), then it is this underlying consensus which reform environmentalism advocates. On a philosophical level, the anthropocentric conception of nature ensures that the environment must remain inherently subject to man's influence, and this is, if you will, a philosophical externality. Only if it is internalized as part of humankind (or humankind as a part of it) can the environment be anything other than external. On a more concrete level, the reform environmentalism commitment to economic growth (as currently defined) leaves the environment as something to be dealt with by interventionist government policy, and thus to be defined by the State. The relevant part of the State here is the bureaucratic agencies that most authors have seen as the complete State. Only a paradigmatic shift which incorporated US society as a whole, could cause the environment to be anything other than an externality. It is exactly this paradigm shift which the deep ecologists seek. This shift would, they argue, avoid the shallowness of the prevailing environmental position. Avoiding such theoretical incoherence is not merely a nicety. It has become, from the deep ecologist perspective, a necessity if ecological crisis is to be averted.

### 3.4.2 Deep Ecology and the Logic of Environmentalism

As the *enfant terrible* of mainstream environmentalism, deep ecology has provided a degree of diversity to the movement that was hitherto characterized by its uniform conservationist stance. As a fringe part of the movement, deep ecology has been more concerned with developing a comprehensive and coherent ideology, than with attaining political legitimacy as a mainstream lobbying movement. Drawing upon the inheritance of Leopold, Thoreau, Gary Synder, and Alan Watts, the deep ecologists have attempted to carve themselves out a philosophical niche that stands at odds with Western, anthropocentric, enlightenment thought. To them the failure of reform environmentalism to extract itself from the premises of the DSP represents a failure to realize the full potential of environmentalism as a radical critique of modern corporate capitalism.

Arne Naess first drew the shallow/deep distinction within the environmental movement (Naess, 1973). Later, along with Sessions, Naess was to propose the eight fundamental principles of deep ecology:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in themselves....These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy *vital* needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. the flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technical and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating *life quality* (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

(Devall & Sessions, 1985, p.70)

At the heart of these points is the conscious effort to move away from an anthropocentric, interventionist perspective where the Earth is perceived merely as a resource to be tapped by man. By articulating a biological egalitarianism, deep ecology is challenging the *right* of humankind to destroy the environment, rather than merely challenging the efficiency of a strategy that leads to environmental destruction.

In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Foucault's attempt to move the emphasis away from studying human behavior in individualistic terms, the deep ecologists are trying to reduce the status of humankind as individuals, to "plain citizens"<sup>11</sup> in Nature. No longer, they argue can humankind afford to fall back on their supposed exceptionalism as justification for environmental irresponsibility. Insofar as humankind is exceptional, it is with regard to the degree of damage that

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<sup>11</sup> To use a phrase of Aldo Leopold's.



has been perpetrated on the environment. This greater level of damage imposes the burden of *greater* responsibility rather than the abdication of it altogether. To follow Leopold's exhortations to "think like a mountain", means that the concept of humankind as the basic unit, as the center of consciousness, has been collapsed so that a holistic perception of the place of humankind in Nature has been attained. This means the "arrogance" of humankind no longer would dominate the way we think. This attitude is referred to by Carson when she says, "[t]he 'control of nature' is a phrase conceived in arrogance" (Carson, 1962, p.297).

Whilst the philosophical standpoint of deep ecology might not be as conceptually-developed, or as coherent as its advocates would have us believe (Luke, 1989a), it does indicate the starting-point for the relevance of deep ecology for State influence on US environmental politics. It is their philosophical position that leads to their tactics, which in turn, leads to their delegitimization by the State. It may well be that,

[b]y seeing Nature as a significant form of otherness with properties of sentient subjectivity, deep ecology proposes society adopt new codes of human responsibility to change the human exploitation of Nature into co-participation with Nature. However, its practitioners often weaken and marginalize their appeal by adopting ancillary positions that are poorly thought out, ineffectively argued, or politically naive. (Luke, 1989a, p.2)

However, the coherence of an ideological position does not dictate its political potency. These ancillary positions are just that. They are the political and economic implications of the philosophical position. Their inadequacy does not imply the incoherence of the theoretical foundation from which they are derived. After all, it could be argued that the Reaganite position on strengthening defensive capacity contradicts the commitment to reduce fiscal spending, and yet, it would be difficult to argue that Reaganite policies have not affected defense spending in relatively profound ways. Incoherence, in practice, does not mean incapacity to influence.

The moral derivatives of deep ecology impart to this position an imperative that allegedly over-rides all others. Hence Naess and Sessions' principle number (8) of deep ecology which states the obligation of all those who subscribe to the other principles, to engage in attempts to make changes. Such changes are revolutionary. In expanding principle number (6) Devall and sessions

assert that: "Economic growth as conceived and implemented today by the industrial states is incompatible with (1)-(5). There is only a faint resemblance between ideal sustainable forms of economic growth and present policies of the industrial societies" (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p.73). They cannot be anything other than revolutionary. To question the right of a society to operate in the way it does, and to challenge its feasibility, is to earmark themselves as "extremists" on the US political scale. The mere assertion that "Deep ecology seeks transformation of values and social organization" (Devall, 1980, p.303), does not label them as revolutionary. The *combination* of that ideology with the practice of direct action is what justifies calling them revolutionary. The efficacy of that action does not dictate the relevance of the label for them, for it is a function of their minority status.

Deep ecology challenges the prevailing political, economic and environmental order. The political actions of deep ecologists therefore tend towards the less-orthodox and, in the eyes of the State, the illegitimate. The idea of "ecotage" and of "monkeywrenching" involves proponents such as Earth First! in the practice of direct action. This action is nonviolent but disruptive to established norms of economic behavior and development. Strategies of disrupting road surveying (where those roads are in wilderness areas), of disabling the machinery of development (bulldozers and chainsaws) and of destroying the economic viability of tapping natural resources (by driving steel pins into trees earmarked for timber, in order to destroy their marketability), are logical extensions of the perceived need for a paradigm shift. The attempt is being made to shift forcibly the paradigm of political activity, so that "ecotage" becomes a legitimate tactic.

The strategies employed by some deep ecologists are one particular instance of applying the logic of deep ecology to the realm of political practice. However, it is not the only path. The belief that prevailing economic norms are incompatible with ecologically-sound existence does not necessitate direct action. It might be believed, for instance, that direct action is not a useful weapon unless it is practiced on a massive scale and that this is impractical, given the US cultural antipathy toward such "extremist" practices. In this case the impetus of deep ecology might be towards the

more traditional lobbying techniques. The anarchist tradition within social ecology represents another application of the logic of environmentalism. Here lobbying and ecotage are rejected in favor of an anti-State deconstructionist mode of political activity. What I am arguing is that the underlying logic of deep ecology and parts of social ecology is, in fact, the underlying logic of environmentalism. This is because it challenges the source of environmental problems by challenging the legitimized market-based State. This does not mean that all environmentalists must use direct action. To share the same logic does not mean that there is necessarily a shared evaluation of different political strategies. Such evaluations are inevitably related to psychological, social and cultural factors.

### 3.4.3 Straddling the Divide: The Case of Social Ecology

Murray Bookchin seeks to draw a distinction between environmentalism and ecology:

By "environmentalism" I propose to designate a mechanistic, instrumental outlook that sees nature as a passive habitat composed of "objects" such as animals, plants, minerals and the like that must merely be rendered more serviceable for human use.....Environmentalism does not question the most basic premise of the present society, notably, that humanity must dominate nature; rather, it seeks to *facilitate* that notion by developing techniques for diminishing the hazards caused by the reckless despoilation of the environment....[E]cology deals with the dynamic balance of nature, with the interdependence of living and nonliving things. Since nature also includes human beings, the science must include humanity's role in the natural world - specifically, the character, form, and structure of humanity's relationship with other species and with the organic substrate of the biotic environment. (Bookchin, 1982, pp.21-22)

This distinction parallels the delineation I am proposing between shallow and deep environmentalism. In using the idea of relative depth in my characterization of the different strains of environmentalism<sup>12</sup> it is implicit that this is a matter of degree. Thus, in dichotomizing the movement, it might appear that I am ignoring important subdivisions. Certainly, "social ecology" represents one such subgroup. However, within that sub-group, the differing positions as to the

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<sup>12</sup> My terminology does not reflect Bookchin's use of "environmentalism" as distinct from "ecology" because, environmentalism, as concern for the physical environment as a political issue, includes ecology, whereas ecology does not include all of environmentalism. Thus, ecology is treated in this thesis as a subset of environmentalism.

desirability of treating the environmental crisis as an externality to be dealt with through market-based measures dictates that social ecology straddles this dichotomy. Bookchin, along with Ivan Illich, Andre Gorz, and Karl Hess represent the "deep" side of this divide and therefore are true to the logic of environmentalism.

If the distinction between shallow and deep environmentalists is based upon the perceived relevance of the market to avoiding the environmental crisis, and if the market-based economy (the accumulation process) serves as the basis of the State, then the distinction arises from whether they see the corporate State as containing the possible seeds of salvation. It will be argued in the following chapter that the professionalization, scientization and "technologization" of environmental issues are State-induced phenomena. Thus Hazel Henderson's commitment to these phenomena must cast her as offering State-based solutions: "A coalition of consumer, environmental and social-welfare groups, together with decentralists, co-op and community-technology forces and media-alternative activists, with the backing of public interest professionals in law, economic and accounting and the sciences, might have the power to change the current David and Goliath battle scenes between producers and the rest of us" (Henderson, 1980, p.302). The commitment of Amory Lovins to a regulatory solution to the energy crisis is similarly State-based and therefore market-derived (Lovins, 1977). This distinction between Lovins and Henderson, and the other social ecologists is made by Luke in labelling the former as "alternativist," and the latter as more orientated toward revolutionary solutions (Luke, 1987b).

Karl Hess' identification of the process of technologization as the source of inappropriate environmental attitudes leads to the conclusion that the "dymystification" of technology is central to any lasting societal change (Hess, 1979). This emphasis upon the importance of perceptions, be they of technology, hierarchy (Bookchin 1982), or needs (Illich, 1978), as indicative of State-influence is what marks these social ecologists as remaining true to the logic of environmentalism. The identification of the dominant social paradigm as a crucial ingredient in the current

environment-despoiling State-society relationship is central to the critique that environmentalism offers to modern corporate industrialism, and to the logic of that environmental position.

Certainly there is a distinction between the social ecologists and the deep ecologists. There is also a distinction within social ecology. For the purposes of this thesis the crucial distinction remains whether the ideology views the State, as currently constituted, as the appropriate means by which to avoid the environmental crisis. This is the distinction that is relevant, and along this line of division, the social ecologists are dichotomized. Those that view market-based, State-sanctioned solutions are therefore categorized as "shallow environmentalists" along with reform environmentalism. Those who reject such panaceas are categorized along with the deep ecologists, because they have remained true to the logic of environmentalism. It is this logic which is the subject of the next section.

### *3.5 The Logic of Environmentalism and the Notion of Crisis*

What this section will demonstrate is that both reform environmentalism and "deep environmentalist" perspectives share a common thread, that goes beyond just subject matter. This thread is the notion of crisis - the idea of not "business as usual". It is this idea that is inimical to the interests of the State. Thus, in practice, it is often hard to identify amongst reform environmentalists, because it is not in their interests to decry the status quo in language that appears too revolutionary. The logic of all the movement is to deny "business as usual" despite the "business as usual" political stance of the major environmental interest groups.

### 3.5.1 Deep Environmentalism and Shifting Paradigms

Naess' differentiation between shallow and deep ecology rests on the assumption that shallow ecologists are only concerned with the problems and populations of developed countries (Naess, 1973). Certainly, deep ecology has taken on board the dependency line of thinking, arguing for a distinction between "core" and "periphery" states, with the problems of the latter being largely a function of their relations with the former. However, the very urgency of the deep ecologist perspective, although not ruling out fundamental systemic changes, forces them to focus on localized environmental issues. Thus although "semi-deep" ecology groups such as Greenpeace, which advocates direct action, are internationalist in organization and perspective, the dominant influence of deep ecology remains focused at a local level by groups like Earth First!. In practice, this local level amounts to the developed nations. The fact that they decry the parochial approach of reform environmentalism, and yet have an unmistakably narrow geographical focus, is an indication of how far the situation is one of crisis for them.

The very notion of crisis which forces Earth Firsters, Sea Shepherds, "eco-raiders" and "monkeywrenchers" into provocative direct action that alienates them from much of the mainstream environmental movement, ironically enough, is the foundation for the shared logic of the environmentalism. From Sierra Club through Wilderness Society to Earth First! there is the underlying idea of crisis, of unsustainability. How that crisis is perceived and evaluated is a difference of degree. The deep ecologists wish to place the crisis as one of western civilization. Thus it is, for them, a crisis of ecology and philosophy, as well as a crisis of survivability. Devall and Sessions, in highlighting the "simple in ends, rich in means"<sup>13</sup> lifestyle of the Ohlone people, discovered in the 1770s in California, seek to draw an analogy between their symbolic dancing and our present position:

We are dancing on the brink of our little world of which we know so little; we are dancing the dance of life, of death; dancing the moon up in celebration of dimly remembered connections with our an-

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<sup>13</sup> A common statement of deep ecology philosophy.

cestors; dancing to keep the cold and darkness of a nuclear winter from chilling our bones; dancing on the brink of ecological awareness; dancing for the sake of dancing without analyzing and rationalizing and articulating; without consciously probing for meaning but allowing meaning in being to emerge into our living space. (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p.207)

From the "deep environmentalist" perspective there is crisis on two counts. Firstly there is the moral stand-point of arguing that humankind is continuing to act in a way that it has no right to do. This is the a result of the philosophical crisis. The crisis here is one of justice. The other, more practical argument, is that human activity has upset the "balance of nature", and that we have taken the Earth away from its "natural" ecological path. To continue to do this is to invite disaster. Thus there is an ecological crisis. Social ecologists stress the economic contradictions based on flawed conceptions of technology and needs. Thus their perception of this crisis leans toward a more economic and less moral orientation.

### 3.5.2 Reform Environmentalism and Sustainability

The evidence of reform environmentalism's perception of crisis is less straight forward than with the deep ecology case. On the one hand it is brutally evidenced in the tone of the proselytizing literature put out by the groups, which emphasizes the urgency of the situation and the need for immediate action. However, this does not amount to substantial evidence that reform environmentalism contains a notion of crisis. There can be little doubt that it is in the interests of US lobbying groups to attract large memberships (in order to gain financial resources and representative legitimacy). This being true, then the commitment of the recruiting literature to an idea of crisis may owe more to the desire to recruit than to the desire to promote ideological coherence.

It could be argued that any public interest movement, any political movement that sought change, no matter how minor, is based upon a notion of crisis. The need to attract membership is a priority that is hardly peculiar to the environmental movement. The demand for change always

contains the assumption that the present situation should not be maintained. However, the environmental movement is not merely arguing that there must be change. What characterizes the logic of environmentalism, is a notion of crisis *as ascribed to the present course*. Rather than arguing that we need to change, the logic is that we must change - we have no realistic choice. This sense of the word crisis maintains the credibility of the word and avoids its reduction to a euphemism for the need for change.

As one of the most influential and catalytic writers on the environment, the example of Carson is an instructive one. To the deep ecologists she remains the archetypal reform environmentalist - a birdwatcher, and lover of nature, who worked for the Fish and Wildlife Service and thus who was at ease writing in a technical style which brought her credibility as well as attention. Whilst arguing that there exists a choice in the way man uses the environment, Carson unmistakably paints a doomsday scenario, if the present course is projected into the future. She compares the present to a point where two roads diverge, and only by acceptance of the less easy way, will we avoid ecological destruction. The underlying theme of crisis can be seen in her description of the current path of society: "The road we have been traveling is deceptively easy, a smooth superhighway on which we progress at great speed, *but at its end lies disaster*" (Carson, 1962, p.277, *Italics added*). Whilst the deep ecologists would argue that a divergence in paths has to be created, rather than there already existing a choice, there is a clear consensus with Carson as to the character of the present route.

In its practical incarnation reform environmentalism is often referred to as advocating "soft path" development. In practice this means a commitment to the related concepts of economic growth and development. An example of this is Lester Brown's "sustainable society" model. In common with the "Worldwatch" perspective (Brown, 1988) and with ideas of "ecodevelopment" (Glaeser, 1984), Brown argues that the carrying capacity of the Earth has been exceeded as a result of human activity. Thus there is a need to move toward a "sustainable society" using appropriate intermediate technologies, in order to avoid courting disaster. The argument that we need to move



toward a sustainable society contains within it, the clear implication (for it is often not made explicit) that the present situation is unsustainable. In this case, this means the conceptual presence of the idea of crisis. For Brown, this transformation is envisaged as a process whereby market forces and public policy will play the crucial roles. The commitment to prevailing economic norms of behavior, may be seen in Brown's evaluation of the environmental crises, and the priorities that it entails: "The scale of the transition to a sustainable society is matched by the urgency with which it must occur if major economic disruptions are to be avoided" (Brown, 1981, p.285). However, despite the fact that his vision of change relies upon so much of the present, there is still the clear idea of crisis.

One of the most important theoretical fathers of modern reform environmentalism was E.F. Schumacher who challenged the prevailing orthodoxy that the "problem of production" had been solved. He called for changes that involved a type of economic devolution and for an emphasis on individual needs. His commitment to the idea of crisis and unsustainability is unmistakable: "And what is my case? Simply that our most important task is to get off our present collision course" (Schumacher, 1973, p.19). The "ecodevelopment" school represents an attempt to fuse this Schumacherian idea of a concentration on individual needs rather than on the production of goods as ends in themselves, with the internationalist perspective of the Worldwatchers. For them, just as for Schumacher, the future provides the incentive for implementing their strategy. "Ecodevelopment", they argue, "seeks to improve the relationship between man and his environment. The improvement of this relationship is necessary in order to preserve the basis for human society on a long-term basis" (Glaeser, 1984, p.3). The argument that environmentalism is pragmatism writ large, because it takes a long-term perspective on practicality, is a common one amongst environmentalists.

Barry Commoner provides the environmental movement with one of its more populist characters, and yet his critique of modern industrialism presents lucid and sophisticated reasoning in support of his argument. His work *The Closing Circle*, cites overpopulation, growing affluence, but

most specifically flawed technology as the causes of the "environmental crisis." He clearly states the reform environmentalism view about the apparent choice but the real crisis:

To resolve the environmental crisis, we shall need to forego, at last, the luxury of tolerating poverty, racial discrimination, and war. In our unwitting march toward ecological suicide we have run out of options. Now that the bill for the environmental debt has been presented, our options have become reduced to two: either the rational, social organization of the use and distribution of the earth's resources, or a new barbarism. (Commoner, 1972, p.296)

The theme of crisis is unmistakable in Commoner. The theme of crisis is present in all aspects of environmental ideology. The emphasis, and its priority may vary, but its presence is constant. The notion of crisis represents the logic of environmentalism. It is on this basis that it is justifiable to talk of the environmental movement, encompassing conservationist reform environmentalism through deep ecology, as a unified entity. This is despite the obvious substantial variation in political strategies. The logic of environmentalism is that there is crisis, and therefore that "business as usual" is not a viable option.

The definition of the State being offered in this thesis is an attempt to emphasize the cultural and ideological legitimation of the State. This means that the concept of the DSP represents a useful tool for gauging the efficacy of this legitimation. Some authors have put forward the idea that there is an emergent paradigm that is environment-conscious and rejects the pro-growth themes of the DSP; this is the "New Environmental Paradigm" (Pirages & Ehrlich, 1974; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Milbrath, 1984). Milbrath lists the fundamental themes of this alternative paradigm: (1) high valuation of nature; (2) generalized compassion toward other species, peoples, and generations; (3) careful planning and the avoidance of environmental and technological risks; (4) limits to growth (5) completely new societal paradigm; and (6) new politics (Milbrath, 1984). As a contrast to the DSP the idea of the NEP is an important contribution. However, the fact that these ideas are derivatives of the reform environmentalism position reflects that the popularity of the NEP which Dunlap and Van Liere find so remarkable (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978), is due to the fact that the NEP does not contradict the industrial DSP at a fundamental level. Searching for unity within the environmental movement as manifested through the collective commitment to the NEP would be an analytically-attractive but fundamentally incorrect path.

If the failure of the NEP to define the environmental movement as unified in its antipathy towards State-sanctioned environmental attitudes, is based upon the shared *Weltanschauung* between the NEP and DSP, then the ideological coherence must derive from some other source. Brian Fay comes close to a cogent characterization of what he calls the "ecological ideal," by defining it as based on the notion of interrelatedness in contrast to the ideal of autonomy (Fay, 1987). This concept of autonomy is central, according to Fay, to the perpetuating of earlier means of control into new social contexts. In accord with the assumptions of traditional liberalism, it emphasizes rationality and the freedom of the individual to make those decisions based on that rationality. This legitimated aspect of the idea of autonomy reflects the demands of the capitalist economic system and its attendant concepts of hierarchy and domination. Commitment to the ecological ideal as the philosophical manifestation of the logic of environmentalism, illustrates how it is in conflict with the industrial DSP. Thus, the ecological ideal may go some way towards providing an alternative characterization of the logic of environmentalism from one based upon the shared commitment to the notion of crisis.

### ***3.6 The Notion of Crisis and the State***

From the point of view of the State, it matters little what the underlying logic of movements are *per se*. It is only when ideologies are translated into practical political realities that threaten the accumulative or the legitimated functions of the State, that they become a cause for concern. Although the environmental demands for less pollution are clearly a social cost of production (O'Connor, 1973) this is not the aspect that is most important here. What is important is not so much the "reality" but rather the way that the State mediates that "reality". If the State controls

the regulatory machinery through which demands for environmental care are filtered and the responses supplied, then it has the potential to make environmentalists frame their arguments in such a way so as not to present too much of a challenge to the accumulation of capital. Those that choose not to partake in this form of action are then delegitimized, and will work outside the arenas controlled by the State. As long as these groups remain minorities that cannot mount fundamental threats to the workings of US industry, then their only relevance is insofar as they have public support which might delegitimize the State. Delegitimization is an effective weapon against groups that lack the physical resources to challenge the accumulation of capital.

What this essentially means is that the logic of environmentalism challenges the accumulative and the legitimative functions of the State. It also means that reform environmentalism, in its political incarnation challenges the accumulative function to a limited degree, and the legitimative function not at all; whereas "deep environmentalism", because of its minority status, challenges the legitimative function to a degree, and the accumulative function hardly at all.

The notion of crisis is therefore most relevant to the State as a method of delegitimizing it. If the dominant environmental interests groups argued that it was the workings of the political and economic systems that had led to a fundamental and ecological crisis, as the deep environmentalists do, and if this idea gained widespread public support, then this would amount to the delegitimizing of the American State. Thus it is in the interests of the State, firstly to prevent the major environmental groups from espousing such ideas, and secondly to prevent widespread public support for those ideas where they are espoused. Offe sees the very existence of the environmental movements as the result of the decline in mass loyalty to industrial welfare capitalism (Offe, 1984). This amounts to a loss of legitimacy. He also sees it as a result of the decline of parties as consensus-building machinery. This latter point echoes the Ginsberg and Shefter argument about the emergence of "New Politics". However, Offe clearly sees that this delegitimization is a process that the

State is at pains to prevent.<sup>14</sup> He states that ideologically-orientated, rather than interest-orientated movements, such as the environmental movement,

have defined new concepts of autonomy and collective identity that neither correspond to the categories of the market-place nor to those of institutionalized political conflict, in which they often are left without any formal representation. Such movements, which base themselves on *causes* rather than interests or ideologies,.....play at best a peripheral role in the political process as it is defined by the state structure. Their mobilization is directed against state-initiated or state-supported measures and institutions. (Offe, 1984, p.248)

In his characterization of the way the State is operating, Offe's analysis is fundamentally sound. However, the assertion that something that is not based upon interests is also therefore, not based on ideology, is less useful.

In one sense all ideologies represent the interests of those people who espouse them: an ideology would not be adopted by an individual if it did not serve some purpose for that individual, be it political, personal, pecuniary, or psychological. An ideology, as a set of ideas that contains either the pretense or the reality of coherence, is a possession with a purpose. However, this is not to collapse the idea of interest so that it becomes devoid of analytical utility. Interests should be seen as separate from wants, as the choice that would subsequently be made by an individual who had experienced the results of all possible policy options, as was argued earlier. Whilst this is not a practical reality, it does provide some hypothetical criteria for distinguishing those acts that may be in the someone's interests, and those acts that are not. If an act can, by this criteria, be defined as not in the interests of an individual, it could still be a part of an ideology. Because people do not have access to full information about what is in their interests, it is perfectly possible that they aspire to ideologies that are against their interests. Thus, it may well be against the long-term interests of Earth Firsters to confront the law and face bouts of imprisonment, however, this position is clearly the result of an ideology.

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<sup>14</sup> However, as was noted in the first chapter, this desire to do something does not necessarily amount to having the capacity to do it. Thus it is not as inconsistent as it might appear to argue that the State has partly been delegitimized, and has partly prevented its own delegitimization by these movements.

The environmental movement contains within it a thread of coherence that may be termed ideology. The very premise of the more radical wing, that there needs to be a paradigm shift, amounts to an potent ideology (when combined with the normative prescriptive aspects of radical environmentalism). The novelty of the ideology of environmentalism is something that should not prevent it from being characterized as an ideology. Indeed, Gouldner sees this novelty as the most interesting aspect of environmentalism's impact upon modern industrial society: "the ecological movement has provided a general impetus to the development of an *ideology*, and is producing new types of ideologues, the technologues" (Gouldner, 1976, p.272). This ideology is so potent for Gouldner, that it has forced the society to adopt new modes of behavior, and to create new State agents to counteract it.

Ideology is an important component of the State. It is a useful tool in reconciling disparate interests and "assumes a special importance as a symbolic mechanism through which the interests of these diverse social strata may be integrated" (Gouldner, 1976, p.231). As such it is the concern of the ideological-legitimative components of the State, and is therefore not so much a facet of its bureaucratic component. It serves to lay down the context, the "terrain" of Gramsci, in which the bureaucratic State operates. Thus, the logic of environmentalism comprises a threat to the State when it amounts to an ideology that threatens the hegemony of State ideology. In less abstract terms, this means that as long as the logic of environmentalism does not constitute a part of the DSP, then the State has succeeded in protecting its interests as the promoter of the dominant ideology.

### 3.6.1 Ecological Crisis and the Accumulation of Capital

Having argued that the notion of crisis is mainly a threat to the legitimative functions of the State, it is necessary to see why this is so. Ironically enough, the reasoning for this lies in the the-

oretical threat that the logic of environmentalism mounts to the accumulation of capital. Economic growth has two features: as has already been noted, as presently defined, economic growth is in contradiction with environmentally-sound management.<sup>15</sup> Secondly, economic growth is often used as a measure of the State's legitimacy. Thus a State that only ensures low rates of economic growth will have to rely upon strengthening other aspects of its hegemonic control. Whilst environmentalism does not have the political means to mount a fundamental challenge to the basis of US economic development, it does have the potential means to question its legitimacy. It can do this through making popular the conception that accumulation cannot be sustained as presently constituted. Thus the theoretical threat that the logic of environmentalism mounts to accumulation, is, in reality, a threat to the legitimacy of the system.

Habermas identifies the ecological crisis as a failure on the part of the essentially anarchistic nature of economic growth (Habermas, 1975). The identification of his "mechanisms of growth" illustrate the dynamic that encourages development in the guise of economic growth. This dynamic causes an ecological crisis because it has not the capacity to incorporate the idea of finite resources and of non-renewable resources. This stems, he argues, from the basic premise of capitalist economies - that products are evaluated in terms of their exchange values. It is only once use values are substituted that "qualitative growth" may be achieved. What underlies Habermas' analysis is an assumption that is well-founded and that gives another reason for the ecological crisis. This is the dynamic of technologization.

The emphasis that the "ecodevelopmentalists" put on "intermediate" and appropriate technologies, is an implicit recognition that the dynamic of technology is at the root of the problem. The need to increase the technological component of production stems from the need to increase the rate of profit. The increasing importance of technology goes against sound environmental management, because the need for technology is measured in terms of economic growth, and

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<sup>15</sup> The phrase "environmentally-sound" will be used to describe policies that would conform to the logic of environmentalism. Thus, the phrase is not being used in a normative sense, and should not be construed as such.

therefore the environment is not a part of the technical equation. It could be argued that technology is not *necessarily* antithetical to the environment. This is to miss the point that the dynamic for technology comes from the same source that defines the environment out of the "economic growth" equation. The valuation of goods is based upon their worth as divisible products compatible and comparable with other goods. We have already seen how the idea of "public goods" marks environmental goods out as non-comparable to many other types of goods. Thus technologization stems from the need to produce analogous goods at cheaper rates to increase the rate of profit, and therefore to ignore non-comparable "public goods", such as the environment represents.

The rate of profit is compromised by the social expenses of production in the short-term, but as long as the State effectively defines the priority of the costs, then in the long term it may be in its interests to meet these expenses. This means that, as long as the State is able to define the environmental externalities as important enough to warrant attention, but not so crucial so as to warrant calling it a crisis, then the State can successfully, and without compromising its fundamental interests, engage in limited environmental protection. The State has to be seen to be responsive to the needs of society in the US, because the principle of representation that is deeply embedded in US culture places a premium upon the responsiveness and accountability of the State. Legitimacy rests on perceived representativeness. The State must be responsive to changes in the DSP, because the DSP comprises an important part of the means of "democratic legitimation". Political power clearly can be shifted to different personnel in parliamentary-democratic regimes such as the US through elections, and so "the institutional *form* of this state is determined through the rules of democratic and representative government" (Offe, 1984, p.121). This form is the basis for legitimacy.



### 3.6.2 Ecological Crisis and the Legitimation of the State

The threat that the notion of crisis mounts to the legitimating function of the State, exists insofar as it undermines the DSP. We have seen how the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) contradicts the DSP. The NEP is an extension of the notion of crisis. Crisis dictates the need for this new agenda, which starts with a new paradigm. The elevation of the status of nature, the anti-speciesism, and the commitment to the need for planning to avoid risk, are all antithetical to the DSP of the US as defined above. They also constitute a crisis-response position. They contradict the commitment to individualism, and to limited government, and the faith in the benevolence and resourcefulness of science and technology. The DSP serves as a method of legitimating the US State.

The emphasis upon individualism and against government in the DSP is line with a free-market philosophy. Anti-collectivism renders union and proletarian movements devoid of social legitimacy. Individualism causes class-consciousness to be kept to the minimum. Thus the market is kept relatively unrestrained on two fronts: firstly there is the lack of organized labor resistance, and secondly, there is an alleged minimum of federal government intervention in the workings of the market. Clearly the DSP is in the interests of the economic system. It is no coincidence that the DSP contains support for free enterprise. The economic system is in the interests of the State, and therefore the maintenance of the DSP is a logical extension of the State's legitimizing function. The market-based economy has given rise to a market-based DSP. Thus, market-based solutions to the ecological crisis do not challenge the most fundamental features of a society which have lead to environmental destruction. By challenging the DSP and the market-based concept of the environment as an externality, the logic of environmentalism, as a response to this crisis, challenges the fundamental legitimacy of the economic system on which the State is based, and therefore of the State itself.

### 3.7 Conclusion

The history of the environmental movement in the US has caused it to have a strongly conservationist tinge to it. Only in the 1960s and the 1970s did the movement lose the unity of perspective that it had previously. The increasingly technical emphasis of the movement, the emergence of New Politics, the changing perception of wilderness, and the impetus given to industrial production and environmental destruction by the Second World War, all caused the emergence of a new strain of environmentalist thought. This was "deep environmentalism", and it amounted to a philosophical rationalization of many of the principles inherent in the conservationist ethos. It drew upon the heritage of the movement, but attempted to present a philosophy suited to the crisis of modern industrialism.

Without experiencing modern industrialism, conservationists were doomed not to fully realize the full logic of their position. Once the post-war boom happened, it was as if a frightening glimpse of the future had been gleaned. As the scale of the destruction increased, although it was a logical extension of previous trends, so did the urgency of the situation. What the post-war years showed, was that there was a crisis. The underlying logic of deep environmentalism represents the logic of environmentalism, and is therefore an implicit part of the reform environmentalist perspective. It is a recognition of this crisis. That it has not been universally adopted by the whole environmental movement is a function of its antipathy to the interests of the State.

The notion of crisis challenges the legitimacy of the US State, and the theoretical position challenges the accumulative function of the State. It is because of this that the State, through its control of the agenda and many of the arenas of politics, only deems as legitimate those groups which deny the very logic of their position by seeing the environmental situation not in terms of crisis, but rather in terms of rectifiable externalities. The way that the State defines environmental

politics and causes the dominant environmental interest groups to assume a fundamentally contradictory position is the subject of the next chapter.

## 4.0 Agenda Setting As the Art of the State

### 4.1 *Introduction*

Who gets what, when and how, is politics. Who decides who gets what, when and how, is the exercise of power. Whoever decides how these decisions are made is therefore the final arbiter of politics. Such is the true nature of the State. The most fundamental interests of the State are threatened by the logic of environmentalism as a crisis-oriented, anti-technological, anti-market concept. Thus, the State, as a rational actor, and as the controller of the agenda, attempts to frame environmental politics in such a way so as to compromise environmentalism's real interests. It does this by determining that the conflicts of politics be resolved in arenas that are intrinsically unsuited to environmental demands and by legitimizing only those demands that it does not perceive as threatening.

The way in which the State acts and exercises influence in environmental interest group politics is the subject of this chapter. This is the "art of the State". It will be argued that the State uses five mechanisms of control to regulate environmental politics. Firstly, the way the bureaucratic facets of the State are organized as well as norms of behavior force interest groups to compromise

their own logic in order to gain access and influence. This is evidenced in the fragmentary territorial basis of US legislative politics. Secondly, the State, through the "marketization" of the environment, has deemed that environmental goods be evaluated according to prevailing market principles, through cost-benefit analyses, and these are unsuited to the phenomenon of collective goods which make up the environment. Thirdly, the control of the cultural and political agenda allows the State to define the terms of environmental political discourse in technological and scientific terms, which are inherently biased towards the prevailing norms of economic behavior and against environmentally-sound policy-making. Fourthly, the State, through defining the basis of its own legitimacy, delegitimizes certain forms of political action that may be appropriate to small ideologically-oriented interest groups. Direct action is defined by the State as less legitimate than legislative lobbying or litigative action. Finally, through cultural means the State promotes the DSP which is antithetical to the logic of environmentalism. Dominant religious, media and family norms of behavior run against the idea of humankind as part of the environment and promote a patriarchal view of our place in nature. These are embedded in religious and educational structures.

## *4.2 Environmental Politics and the Rules of the Legislation Game*

David Mayhew attempted to analyze the behavior of members of Congress in terms of the one over-riding goal of re-election (Mayhew, 1974). He surmised that all legislative behavior could be explained in terms of this goal. Given the tenor of US legislative politics, this approach has much to be said for it. However, Mayhew's conclusion was that, although the process might seem to distort the details of policy-making, in the end it constituted a representative and accountable form of government. His argument is that the US system represents a specific, peculiar form of demo-

cratic accountability. The argument that I shall put forward in this section is that the decentralization, fragmentation, and the territorial basis of US legislative politics, regardless of its suitability for politics with particularized benefits, is inherently unsuited to the provision of collective goods, such as the environment represents.

The behavior of interest groups is contingent upon the behavior of those over whom they attempt to exercise influence. If members of Congress are primarily concerned with gaining reelection, then interest groups need to aid them in this area in order to gain at least a sympathetic hearing. Of all the resources available to interest groups, the ability to deliver votes, the most basic political currency, is perhaps paramount. The provision of financial resources and of specialist information are both of secondary importance to delivering votes, because they are a means to that end. Thus, so democratic logic goes, interest groups will gain influence in direct relation to their ability to deliver votes. Thus the system is representative because the ability to deliver votes is taken as a measure of public support for the interest groups (and therefore for members of Congress).

The difficulty and, therefore, the cue for the concept of the State is the assumption that votes are primary. It assumes a predilection on the part of all US citizens to vote. Given the relatively low turn-out at US national elections, this seems a dubious assumption. The propensity to vote is clearly related to the availability of certain resources and is not some inherent quality. These resources need not be tangible: they may political efficacy, information, and cultural assets. The possession of these assets is mediated through socio-economic status, the behavior of the mass media, and the norms of behavior endorsed by the DSP. All of these mediating influences are under the control, or at least the influence, of the State, and therefore tend to act in concert in the pursuit of certain identifiable ends. These ends are accumulation and legitimation.

By defining US legislative politics in terms of territorial distinctions and particularized benefits, the State has defined an arena of politics that is unsuited to the demands of the logic of environmentalism. The notion of ecological crisis is not a phenomenon confined to a particular

area or to a particular group of citizens. The crisis is, in part, defined by its very universality.<sup>16</sup> That it cannot be packaged up and parcelled out in terms of particular benefits is the fundamental problem facing the environmentalists. However, given the persistence of the basic structures of US legislative politics, the environmentalists have compromised their position to take into account the anomalies of the State rather than vice versa. Harvey Wheeler acknowledges this problem:

But the issues described earlier are not related to any specific territory as such. Nor are they capable of solution through the expression of local interests. On the contrary, the critical problem - the source of our indictment of the old politics - is that its foundation is too restricted and particularistic to cope with the characteristic problems of our times. Technology-related problems know no territorial bounds, and they defy locally based efforts to deal with them. The same is true for science-related issues. Our present political system is unable to bring all such problems together for resolution within an ecological framework. (Wheeler in Foss, 1972)

Wheeler's case is based upon parties as the basis of the territorial bent of US politics. However, the decline in party influence, and the declining partisanship of the electorate does not render the thesis redundant. The territorial basis of the parties stems from the territorial basis of legislative politics. This remains as constant as it ever was.

The territorial emphasis leads to the "de-collectivisation" of collective environmental goods. The opposition of Detroit to proposals to enforce use of the catalytic converters in automobile manufacture was not based on any conceptions of the collective good peculiar to Detroit, but rather to the *territorial* concentration of the automobile industry in that area, with its attendant reluctance to bear the economic costs of such legislation (Dickson, 1984). Once environmental goods or "bads" can be packaged up and dealt with in terms of particularized costs and benefits then they may be incorporated into the political system. Industrial waste is an externality if it is dealt with as particularized "bads". Hence, Steven Cohen's assessment that,

the waste-site issue is tailored to the U.S. federal political system. The effects of dump sites are intense, local, and normally concentrated within single legislative districts. Hazardous waste dumps frequently stimulate citizen activism. Localized controversies can be ignored by other political systems but require rapid response in the United States. (Cohen in Vig & Kraft, 1984, p.276)

This tailoring might suit the State but not the issue itself. It takes an incident as localized and as extreme as the Love Canal crisis where thousands of New York residents had to be evacuated in

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<sup>16</sup> This naturally is not confined to the parameters of the North American continent. It is viewed as a world problem (hence the dependency line of deep ecologists). However, given the scope of this thesis, the problem is only being addressed with regard to the US experience.

response to toxic waste contamination, in order that the political system is induced to introduce legislation such as "Superfund".

#### 4.2.1 Lies, Dams and Statistics

The phrase pork-barrel politicking is hardly a new one, or a sympathetic description of legislative politics in the US. It was first used in the 1880s and 1890s, as a comparison of the behavior of slaves when owners, on special occasions, distributed salted pork, with the behavior of legislators. It quickly entered into the common currency of commentaries on US political life. With regard to environmental politics and the rules of the legislative game, the phenomenon of dams, provides an instructive example.<sup>17</sup> They represent an issue which can be dealt with in terms of particularized benefits. The difficulty is that these particularized benefits only accrue to one side of the equation, and this is not the environmental side. The plethora of dams and reclamation projects that were undertaken since the Depression of the 1930s, through the New Deal and into the 1970s, were approved, constructed and consummated with only the scantest regard for environmental and ecological considerations. The very principle of transforming a free-flowing river, often itself representing a fragile eco-system, so that it can be made to produce cheap electricity and irrigation, is an ecologically-dubious one. However, if we momentarily disregard the fundamental ethical-ecological considerations, then it can still be shown how territoriality stifles the environmental case at birth.

The construction of a dam represents a lucrative source of income for local industries, employment for local labor, and investment for local financiers and land speculators, and therefore represents a valuable source of electoral resources for members of Congress. "It is understandable

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<sup>17</sup> The material, ideas and cases regarding water projects and their politics, in this section draw heavily on Reisner's work (Reisner, 1986).



that legislators, anxious to discover and maintain projects in their districts for which pork-barrel appropriations can be made, should look toward flood control, water recreation development, hydroelectric sites, reservoirs, canals and other projects under the authority of water resource agencies" (Rosenbaum, 1973, p.173). These resources all represent variations upon the theme of capital accumulation, and thus are in the interests of the State.<sup>18</sup> Reisner describes these water projects as "the grease gun that lubricates the nation's legislative machinery" (Reisner, 1986, p.319). To bring a water project to one's district is to bring electoral credibility and popular favor amongst those who benefit. To use Mayhew's terminology, it allows credit-claiming of the first order. The negative side of the equation is represented in the environmental damage that dams perpetrate. Whose interests are compromised in these cases is less easy to discern. In the case of an area of specific natural beauty, the environmentalist case is that a natural resource has been lost to everyone. Thus, it is classic collective good, with no natural constituency, other than the organized interest groups. Thus, when the plan to dam the Grand Canyon in two places was proposed, it was the Sierra Club who took up the case on the side of the environmentalists.

The success of the Sierra Club's campaign to stop the proposed Marble Gorge and Bridge Canyon dams was largely due to the public response to the publicity put out by Jerry Mander and Howard Gossage on behalf of the Sierra Club. These advertisements played upon the public's recognition of the Grand Canyon as a unique and irreplaceable part of America's natural heritage. The important fact to note is that the public response was strong because of the recognition of a threat to a *particular* area that was well-known and valued. In the earlier case of the Echo Park proposed dam, the environmentalist case prevailed only at the expense of allowing the Glen Canyon dam to be built. The resource of strong public sympathy for the Glen Canyon area was not at the disposal of the environmentalists, because it did not exist. In other words, the environmentalist case had a greater likelihood of prevailing when the case could be presented in terms of particularized benefits.

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<sup>18</sup> In identifying the water projects as the first manifestation of the US Welfare State, Reisner is inadvertently pointing toward the legitimative function, as a result of their accumulative function (Reisner, 1986).

It is often taken as an indication of Jimmy Carter's legislative ineptitude that one of his first acts as president was to attempt to cut down on what he saw as excessive pork-barreling through the welter of water projects. To him, the eighteen projects represented the worst excesses of a legislative system that placed the particular local benefits before notions of the national good. To the members of Congress they represented Reisner's necessary legislative lubricant. Interestingly, there is a remarkable degree of consensus that Carter may have identified excessively wasteful projects at a time of large budget deficits but as Charles Jones remarks "[t]hose on Capitol Hill find it difficult to make specific cuts, whilst acknowledging the need to reduce deficits" (Jones, 1984). The logic of a national position may well not coincide with the needs of a particular electorate. This is why the ideological stance of members of Congress is often such a poor indicator of their attitudes towards local lucrative water projects. Even if the member of Congress has no stake in the specific project being proposed, he does have an interest in building himself up an account of legislative good-will that he may tap at a later date when there is some benefit for his district, and he needs to garner the requisite number of votes.

The failure to stop the construction of the Tellico dam in Tennessee that destroyed the habitat of the endangered snail darter fish, which was protected under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, represents the other side of the Grand Canyon coin. The Environmental Defense Fund did manage to halt its construction temporarily through the courts. Here is an example of a collective good (the snail darter) whose estimable benefit to a population is so infinitesimal that, as far as the legislative process is concerned, it is non-existent. Thus it was that local interests managed to get a bill through Congress exempting the Tellico dam from all laws. There was to be no large scale public outcry on behalf of this fish, as there was for the Grand Canyon. The Grand Canyon could be seen as a resource (as wilderness) that could be exploited by man. Thus there was an interest in its preservation. This was not true for the snail darter. Despite the best efforts of the environmentalists, the statistical case for stopping the destruction of this natural phenomenon lacked the efficacy it had had when James Ingram had turned the Bureau of Reclamation's own

rationale and methods against it to expose the deception inherent in the Grand Canyon dams proposal (Reisner, 1986). The fragmentation, incrementalism, and territoriality of US legislative politics does not augur well for the logic of environmentalism, which perceives the ecological crisis as overwhelming, immediate and universal.

#### 4.2.2 Environmental Federalism

An aspect of modern environmental politics in the US that is frequently cited as the direction of the future is the tendency for the environment to become a state concern. There has been a devolution in environmental responsibility toward the local level. Norman Vig and Michael Kraft call this "environmental federalism" (Vig & Kraft, 1984), and identify it as a central theme in Reagan's reorientation of environmental politics in the 1980s. Such a policy is a logical extension of the territorial basis of legislative politics at a national level. It is also a result of a combination of two other institutional factors. The first of these is that the environment is conceived of in terms of externalities; the second is that the regulation of externalities tends towards a much more administrative-type policy process. Administrative politics will always tend towards being localized, because it sees itself (and legitimizes itself through this view) as the antithesis of partisan politics, which is directed towards the addressing of the "big" issues. "Big" issues are best dealt with in the "macro-arenas" of conflict. This means the identification of national legislatures with non-administrative politicking.

Once again, the tendency toward environmental federalism further exacerbates the difficulties of incorporating environmental issues into the political arena. Whilst it is not true of all environmental issues that they represent collective goods (pollution and toxic wastes are essentially localized in their effects), and whilst it is true that some areas have more of a stake in certain policy outcomes where there are collective goods involved (industrial areas have an greater interest in acid

rain legislation than do non-industrial areas), it is true that the environmental sphere is unique in the extent to which it is characterized by collective goods. If the territorial basis of US politics is reaching its logical extension in the decentralization of power to the local level, and if the environment is generally characterized as a collective good, then this tendency means that the political context is becoming less suited to environmental claims. This conclusion seems to stand at odds with the generally positive picture that leading environmentalists have painted of their growth in influence over the last few years. William Symonds goes so far as to track the rise of the environmental lobby into, what he calls, a "superlobby" by the beginning of Reagan's administration (Symonds, 1982). This "superlobby" status is a reflection of the inherent organizational and institutional compatibility of many of the large environmental groups with the structures of the State. The fact that many environmental groups are based on a localized federal system with local chapters and central management (e.g., the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club), may be a result of the traditional emphasis upon the grass-roots elements of environmental politics, but it is surely too happy of a coincidence that the "big guns" of the movement just happen to have structures that are State-compatible. This compatibility is what has allowed them to emerge as the dominant groups.

The delegation of responsibility to a local level often runs in tandem with increased administrative discretion. The logic for an agency to resort to a tactic of "federalizing" rests on the desire to be seen as devoid of political intent. This is easier to portray if the policies are justified on local criteria. Thus it is that environmental legislation tends to be administered at local level agencies; twenty-seven states operate their own water permit systems under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act is almost universally administered by states (Rosenbaum, 1985). The act, which is often seen as the legislative *coup de grace* from the environmental era of the seventies, is the Clean Air Act. This operates through setting standards of air quality that states are then required to meet. Often, even simple criteria for policy implementation are missing from congressional acts, and frequently these acts have to be clarified through the use of the courts. Such omissions are not unintentional; they are reflections of the Congress' desire to avoid hard political

choices, through the extended uses of such devices as the legislative veto, and the increased emphasis upon the oversight functions. The need to do this derives from the territorial basis of legislative politics, which mitigates against the resolution of non-zero-sum conflicts at this level. This enhances the role of the bureaucrats and of the technologists at the devolved level. However, even though the Clean Air Act sets these standards, there is still vast scope for interpretation in the implementation of these standards. This is why the states have such an important role in this type of legislation. Perhaps the most striking example of the combination of the tendency toward federalism and toward territoriality, may be seen in the Colorado River Basin which, although, in many ways a functional bio-region, is under the jurisdiction of seven states. Clearly the geographical divisions of legislative and administrative politics do not conform to any divisions that might be suited to the ecological environment.

The argument that there has been a trend toward environmental federalism, with the state level taking on a new significance, should not be confused with the argument that the states have become the central arena of environmental interest group politics. The devolution is a trend that does not significantly decrease the role of central government. The difficulties of reducing government are greater than those involved in increasing it. National government structures remain despite the proliferation of similar structures at local levels. The creation of a bureaucracy, forms a set of bureaucratic interests dedicated to the goal of self-preservation. Such a tendency is a direct function of the State's function of legitimation. In legitimating itself, an agency is inherently providing and enforcing a rationale for its continued existence. This is why Gale, in demarking the stages of the State-social movement relationship does not describe the deconstruction of an agency once it is deemed ineffective and redundant by its clientele (Gale, 1986). Rather, he argues that the social movement-countermovement struggle manifests itself in the creation of a new agency. In concrete environmental terms, this means the EPA will continue to exist, even if a burgeoning of environmental agencies at the state level emerges.

It could be argued that the Reagan experience is the result of a particular historic moment, with unique characters taking center stage in a unique context, and therefore should not be construed as indicative of any lasting trends in the orientation of the State. It is true that Reagan came into office committed to the idea that he could get "government off the backs of the people". It is also true that Reagan's antipathy toward the environmentalist position<sup>19</sup> may well have been manifested in his environmental policy stance, most notably the appointment of James Watt as Secretary of the Interior, much to the chagrin of nearly every environmental group. However, all these facts notwithstanding, it can still be argued that the State is acting to protect its interests. The emergence of the New Right and the Reagan phenomenon, may represent the knee-jerk reaction of a State, whose legitimation was becoming so costly, so as to seriously impinge upon the accumulative abilities of the market. Put another way, this is the argument that Reaganomics represents a rational reaction by the State to the increasing social expenses of welfare capitalism (and their contradiction with accumulation), which are becoming too costly for the productive process. Hence Reagan's efforts to reduce the tax burden on industry may be seen as an effort to give the "free market" a free rein.

The logic of environmentalism, as representative of the forces of the new social movements presenting a new challenge to the traditional political cleavages, has caused an unprecedented undermining of the orthodox modes of legitimating those social cleavages. The fact that Reaganism, and the New Right generally, has taken an avowedly anti-State stance is an implicit recognition of the unsuitability of the modern milieu of State organization, to the function of legitimation in contemporary post-industrial society. It demonstrates the contradictory nature of the modern US State. Once again, only a duality of approach fully draws out the dynamics of the current context: Reaganism represents the logical extension of the libertarian thread of rightist thinking; and the recent emergence of this libertarian strain, as opposed to the patrician strain inherent in New Deal politics, represents a logical reorientation of a State that finds its previous mode

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<sup>19</sup> "I do not think they will be happy until the White House looks like a bird's nest." Reagan, March 11, 1983 (Quoted in Vig & Kraft, 1984, p.3)

of operation too costly (because it is inherently contradictory). Anti-Statism derives from the philosophy of the New Right and the philosophy of the New Right derives from the contradictions of the State.

To argue that the decentralization and fragmentation is unsuited to the demands of the logic of environmentalism should not be construed as the same as arguing that the environmental interest groups did not welcome this move. Many leading environmentalists welcomed the move to decentralization. It represented a rare opportunity to build up strong close-knit clientele networks and to have a hands-on opportunity to direct environmental policy. A more localized environmental emphasis allows for a smaller area that needs servicing. This cuts down on costs and the need for resources. For interest groups this may have served as a welcome contrast to the decentralizing and fragmenting Congress of the last two decades, which presented them with a profusion of contacts to be nurtured (Price, in Dodd & Oppenheimer, 1985).

The cultivating of clientele relationships remains an integral part of modern lobbying techniques. To have a good relationship with chairmen of key committees, can provide interest groups with great access to otherwise inaccessible points of influence. Given the proliferation of committees and sub-committees, this type of clientele relationship is of heightened importance. The fragmentation *within* the executive and legislative branches of government has brought the phenomena of "issue networks" and "iron triangles" to the fore (Heclo, 1978). These are conceived of as corporatist-type arrangements that are based upon a mutual interdependency between congressional committees, executive agencies and organized interest. The "network" idea portrays a much less rigid type of relationship. However, whatever the analytical validity of these typologies, they are useful in suggesting the importance of clientele relationships. No longer are interest groups merely actors with information. They have become an integral part of the very process that they seek to influence. They have become inextricably bound up with the fortunes of the structures set up and serviced by the State. This is not to say that the logic of environmentalism has become part of the State. These groups can only be integrated as part of the State if they reject that logic, because, as

has been shown in the previous chapters, this logic is antithetical to the fundamental interests of the State.

The closing of ranks between interest groups and agencies has been construed by some, as constituting some sort of "capture". Thus, Capture Theory speculates that the bonding has become so close that the clientele groups have ended up controlling the agencies. The regulatory functions of the State are coveted by those they seek to regulate, and who have the resources to take control of those functions. This means that "regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit" (Stigler, 1971). The difficulties that dog Capture Theory are the same as those that dogged Marxist instrumentalist conceptions of the State. To argue the "sociology of management" approach, that there are shared cultural characteristics and perhaps even shared personnel, is not to demonstrate any reason why there should be any logical congruence of interests. Just as the US State is not "but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole US bourgeoisie", so regulatory agencies are not merely the tools of those that they are designed to regulate. To speculate that this is a possibility is to portray the State as a neutral arena open to manipulation and devoid of specific interests. This is to fall into the pluralist trap of mischaracterizing the most important actor in the process.

The relationship between interest groups and State agencies is the most important one for the environmental interest groups. The creation of the EPA in 1970 was seen as a massive victory for the environmentalists. Indeed, Gale defines these relationships as constituting the sum total of State-interest group relationships, because these agencies *are* the State for him (Gale, 1986). Gale attempts to plot the dynamics by which agencies come under the influence of social movements and then of their counter movements, leading to the creation of a new agency to break out of the *melée* ensuing from the conflict between the differing clienteles. This essentially classifies Gale's analysis as a variant on Capture Theory, and therefore subject to the same criticism. A one-dimensional analysis could easily construe the "capture" of agencies by environmental or industrial interests as marking a substantive shift in the ideological orientation of that agency. This is to miss



the crucial point that the context of the relationship and of the eventual "capture" is defined by the State, and so, what appears as apparent changes actually marks a fundamental underlying unity.

The federal-state axis in environmental politics is pushing towards the proliferation of state-level environmental agencies to deal with the issues raised at the national level. The importance of administrative dynamics enhances this trend. The very existence of this axis is testimony to the territorial basis of US legislative politics. When environmental issues are dealt with at the federal level, they are dealt with in an context which is fragmentary and decentralized, and which therefore favors those who can present their cases in terms of particularized benefits. This fragmentation, territoriality, and federal devolution all amounts to an arena of conflict inherently unsuited to the representation of interests whose beneficiaries are collective, and which take as their basis the specifically non-territorial imperative of the ecological crisis. The similarity of consequence that can be sketched in these trends in US legislative politics, can be extended to other aspects of environmental politics. The context in which an environmental Act is framed is that of US legislative politics. The context of environmental legislative politics is the society, its norms and values, and the way in which that society perceives the issues involved. At both levels the constancy of effect represents the influence and the dynamics of the State.

### 4.3 *The Marketization of the Environment*

The *Weltanschauung* inherent within the dominant economic and political structures exercises a unique impact upon societal norms and values. Just as these structures provide the functional unity for the society, so it is logical to assume that they will contribute to the cultural unity that defines national identities. Admittedly, the importance of nation-state boundaries is decaying with the transnationalization of capital (Evans, in Evans et al., 1985) and the resultant transnationaliza-

tion of the State. However, questions of identity are, at root, questions of perception. The perception of reality is not the definition of that reality. The unity expressed in the dominant modes of economic and political thought is therefore not necessarily a reflection of any profound societal unity of interests. It represents the unity of interests of the productive and political processes. In the case of corporate capitalism, the unity lies in the conception of the market. Thus, in the US, market values are infused into the DSP. In the economic sphere, there is a commitment to a free-market ideology. In the political sphere, the ideas of free competition and exchange values, become translated into liberal theory, which portrays politics as a free-market of ideas, with primacy being ascribed to those ideas which can muster the greatest resources (i.e. electoral credibility). Thus environmental politics becomes marketized in the US.

State organization both reflects and endorses the marketization of environmental politics. In the bureaucratic arenas of the State the propensity towards creating a rationale for their own existence has the side effect that State agencies and bureaus will promote an organizational rationality. When it comes to defending their legitimacy, if the agency is seen to be conforming to set norms of behavior and is using objective criteria, then there is an apparently objective case for their institutional maintenance. This "objectivity" stems usually from the implementation of cost-benefit analyses. Whilst these are a reflection of the dominant hegemonic conception of free-market economics and therefore may be suited to the regulation of corporate capitalism in its overtly economic workings, this approach is inherently unsuited to the evaluation of the environment in public policy evaluations. This is to assert little more than that, cost-benefit analysis is a reflection of the dominant economic norms. The State as a function of that economy cannot use cost-benefit analyses, because the economy is in contradiction with environmentally-sound management. Thus State rejection of environmentally-sound management is therefore a reflection of profound economic contradictions. Richard Andrews, in his conclusion about the effectiveness of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, observes that, "While major battles are fought between opposing interest groups over particular issues, major policy decisions continue to be made with only limited understanding or concern for long-term man-environment relationships" (Andrews, 1976,

pp.160-161). He goes on to define the use of predecision statements of impact as offering valuable potential for fully taking into account the "man-environment" relationship. However, this amounts to advocating a more effective use of cost benefit analysis, and as Michael Baram warns,

Cost benefit analysis is an unacceptable basis for governmental decisionmaking on persistent health, safety, and environmental problems. It is a simplistic tool that reduces concern for the individual to a monetized balancing. Worse, it has become a self-serving numbers game obscuring arbitrary and subjective values and assumptions, while impeding real progress toward our espoused health, safety, and environmental objectives. (Baram, 1980, p.524)

### 4.3.1 The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analyses

The inapplicability of cost-benefit analyses to environmental policy-making manifests itself in many forms. However, the underlying reasons are basically twofold. Firstly, there is the problem of time. Considerations involved in cost-benefit analyses, intrinsically place greater value on the more present-oriented costs and benefits, than on future-oriented ones. As Ophuls is at pains to point out, the necessity of change deriving from the ecological crisis merely means the extension of pragmatism into a larger time-frame, so that the demands of future generations assume as much importance as our own demands, because they will be shaped by the demands that we make upon our environment (Ophuls, 1977). Despite the fact that we are shaping the future, we cannot predict the result of our actions. The basic assumptions of cost-benefit analyses rest on the notion of the exchange valuation of goods. The criteria and the methods of evaluation are relative and culture-specific (a Southern Californian would place greater value on air-conditioning than would an Eskimo). Thus, even without taking into account the more orthodox unpredictabilities, such as inflation, it is impossible to project with confidence the future value of goods. As environmental policy-making, within the logic of environmentalism, is specifically future-oriented, this means that cost-benefit analyses are inherently unsuited to the valuation of environmental goods.

The second reason for this inapplicability, derives from the difficulty not in the practice, but in the theory of valuation. The demands of environmental interest groups place a heavy emphasis upon the qualitative aspects of life, rather than upon the quantitative. The aesthetic benefits of the preservation of wilderness are harder to incorporate into cost-benefit analyses than are the materialistic benefits of obtaining private health insurance or domestic appliances. The latter can be seen in terms of "more" or "less", whilst the existence of environmentally-desirable existence is more in terms of "either/or". Perhaps the most graphic example of this difficulty is in the practical problems that have occurred in the attempts to place a value on human life. The Nuclear Regulatory Agency uses the figure of \$1000 per human life, whilst the EPA's Office of Radiation Programs uses the figure of \$500,000 (Baram, 1980). The problems are obviously not confined to just the moral or ethical considerations in this sphere. David Doniger of the Natural Resources Defense Council put the moral perspective of the environmental movement when he said that "there is simply no morally and socially acceptable way to trade human life and such things as the survival of other species to conventional economic products" (Quoted in Dickson, 1984, p.285).

#### **4.3.2 The Implementation of Cost-Benefit Analyses**

The EPA through its duties with regard to the major environmental pieces of legislation promotes consistently, if not "intentionally", the use of cost-benefit analyses. This is often due to the bringing of lawsuits by affected industries who use, as their argument, the case that preliminary policy evaluations did not measure up to the formalized criteria of objective cost-benefit analyses (Baram, 1980). In other cases it is the result of legislative imprecision. In many cases it is written into the legislation. The end result is that cost-benefit analyses are consistently used in the interpretation of environmental law by the relevant State agencies. This is the case with the Clean Air Act, the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Noise Control Act of 1972.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was introduced as an attempt to counter the fragmentation that had so obviously characterized the implementation of environmental policy, and to initiate a truly national and truly comprehensive environmental policy (Andrews, 1976). In appearance such aspirations seem to play to the holism inherent in the logic of environmentalism, and to its attendant sense of urgency. Indeed the innovative proposal of requiring Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) from all federal agencies was hailed as a breakthrough for the environmental movement. However, the very concept of EISs reflects the tacit adherence to the cost-benefit mode of policy evaluation. An EIS gives additional information for making decisions but it provides no criteria for the actual making of those decisions. To approach this the EISs would need to be framed in "objective" quantifiable terms: this means in effect, market evaluations of environmental impacts. Once again, this places the environment in the position of a market externality, and not as an end in itself. The role of the courts in judicial review of the implementational procedures of this act is testimony to this fact. The courts as severely limited in the scope that can be applied to evaluation of legislation, reduce the role of interests groups even further in legislative oversight. In connection to the NEPA Richard Andrews writes:

Environmental interest groups can derive little satisfaction from delaying strip mining proposals on a few tracts in Montana on procedural grounds, until they are able to effectively challenge the policies upon which those proposals are based, such as the "Project Independence Blueprint." The delays may be useful or even necessary as tactics, but they are doomed to eventual frustration unless they are embedded in broader strategies of effective challenge to basic policy directions. (Andrews, 1976, p.159)

The promise of a national non-fragmentary environmental policy was doomed not to meet the criteria of real environmentalism, as long as it was formulated in a territorially-based, fragmented, State-regulated context.

Clearly the environmental legislation of the seventies resulted in the extensive use of cost-benefit analyses. This was true even in cases where there were specific commitments to decrease the importance of purely economic criteria. In the 1970s, Samuel Hays argues that even, "the EPA was sufficiently sensitive to the costs of implementing its programs that at times it softened its reg-

ulations even though the law was explicit that economic factors were not to be the basis of decisions" (Hays, 1987, p.371). The administration of Ronald Reagan did not however, mark a shift away from this. Indeed, the trend of the present administration has been toward this style of policy evaluation. One of the fundamental principles has been a commitment to "regulatory reform, including extensive use of cost-benefit analysis in determining the value of environmental regulations and programs" (Vig & Kraft, 1984, p.4). Once again, the Reagan administration marks an increase in a State trend that is contrary to the interests of environmentally-sound management.

The extensive use and reliance upon cost-benefit-analyses is a logical function of the need of State agencies to legitimate themselves (as a function of the State's need to legitimate itself on a macro-level). Apart from providing themselves with a rationale for their own continued existence, it also serves to enhance the tendency toward professionalization and "scientization". The deference towards science and technology in the DSP, manifests itself in bureaucracies through a deference towards the "technologues" (Gouldner, 1976) of the agencies. The more that they operate as "experts" divorced from the normality of everyday existence, the more they inspire deference. This means that the more they move toward a marketization of their roles, then the more that the alienation of most of the citizenry, resulting from their relations to the means of production, manifests itself in deference toward them. Thus this is a reflection of the DSP's elevation of the status of the free-market and the principles of economic growth. "Agency uses of cost-benefit analysis tend to promote the role of experts and diminish the participatory and review roles of nonexperts" (Baram, 1980, p.490). Just as the tendency towards a territorial, a parochial, and a marketized perception of environmental politics fragments what is essentially a universal demand, so as to mitigate its effects, so the effect of professionalizing and "scientizing" the environment divides the environment along social as well as geographical lines. Thus the fragmentation is that much more deeply entrenched. Also the fragment that is given the most productive access to the State, is that fragment that is predisposed to the State's interests. Science, in corporate capitalism, is corporate capitalist science.

## 4.4 *The Scientization of the Environment*

The pursuit of science tends to mean the search for truth through the discovery of "universal laws of nature". This might not be an accurate description of what actually occurs, but it does highlight a generalization about a field in which it is very dangerous to generalize. That it is concerned with universalizing nature might lead to the conclusion that it must therefore be in the interests of environmentalists to engage in scientific activity. However, "the sciences eventually established a monopoly on the interpretation of outer nature; they devalued inherited global interpretations and transformed the mode of faith into a scientistic attitude that permits only faith in the objectivating sciences" (Habermas, 1975, p.119). They have sought to make religion redundant, by defining a new reality. In the all-engulfing nature of science's hold on the norms and values of society, it has aligned itself with the technologization of society.

In the espoused neutrality and objectivity of the sciences, the State finds the ultimate agent of legitimation. In parading the norms and behavior of science as value-free, it becomes a short step to the intrinsic valuation of progress (i.e., technological, scientific progress) as worthwhile. Standing in the path of progress does not become undesirable: it becomes unthinkable. Thus, science has succeeded in its quest to replace religion: it has become an article of faith. "Scientific and technological power serve, in part, as the secularized symbol of the unlimited potency and cosmic unification once provided by religion. Science and technology assume a panacea-type character; given only time, the fantasy is that all problems will capitulate to it. Man is really Promethean and there is presumably nothing he cannot accomplish" (Gouldner, 1976, pp.260-261). The most logical consequence of this is that the Earth should be seen as a resource to be tapped by man. The idea of "can" leading inevitably to the idea of "will". Thus, the State has not only an effective tool of legitimation, but also it has further entrenched the patriarchal perception of the human-nature relationship. This perception is in direct contradiction to the logic of environmentalism.

With the elevation in status of science, the State not only finds a powerful agent of legitimation, it also uses science as a masquerade for a solution to traditional conflicts and the reconciling of entrenched cleavages. However, it cannot hide them entirely. The lure of science is that it provides increased data on which to base decisions. However, the limitation of science is that it does not provide new criteria for the *evaluation* of that data, and the making of those decisions. The new class of technologists becomes of increased importance, although they contribute little to the resolution of societal conflicts. Indeed, in the case of the environment, they hinder the resolution of conflicts. Much as the federalizing of the environment represented the tendency of the national legislature to avoiding making hard political choices, so the kudos of science represents the broader tendency of the State to legitimize itself by disguising profound societal and State-civil society conflicts. The federalizing represents a practical incarnation of the State's broadest functional requirements, and thus illustrates, once again how the State represents a duality of functioning to be analyzed.

The crisis in the environment is a direct function of the crisis inherent within the productive processes. It is the commitment to economic growth that is contradiction with the logic of environmentalism. The scientization of the environment finds its roots therefore, in the scientization of the productive processes. The "Taylorization" of production involves the intrusion of scientific norms of behavior and organization into the productive process, in order to exercise control over the processes more effectively (Braverman, 1974; Luke, 1987a). According to Harry Braverman its nature is not truly scientific. Its function is geared more towards the process of legitimation than accumulation. Although it organizes the processes of accumulation, it also presents a rationale (i.e. a legitimator) of that same organization.



#### 4.4.1 The Rise of the Technologue and the Language of the State

The temptation in charting the rise of science and tying it into the dynamic of technology is to see this as a new phenomenon to be taken on board by the State in a new way. Thus, for Block, there emerges a third class, of State managers, who expand class conflict into a triadic relationship (Block, 1977). For Gouldner there emerges a new class of "technologues" discernible and distinct from the bureaucrats. However, the "heightened internal differentiation" that Gouldner sees between the bureaucrats and the technologues is not due to any fundamental dissimilarity between the two groups. It stems from the dynamic of change inherent within a State propelled by contradictory functions. In fact, what is notable is the similarity between these two groups. The stress on organizational rationality in the behavior of bureaucrats and State agents is paralleled by the stress on methodological rationality by the technologues and scientists. The cost-benefit method of policy evaluation becomes transposed to a sphere where only the "experts" can properly evaluate the costs and benefits. This allows the obfuscation of responsibility for public policy through a two-stage devolution. The decisions can be devolved to a lower level, and then the justifications for these decisions draw on the arguments of technical experts, which are perceived as "objective" and non-disputable by nonexperts. However, the underlying rationale remains intact. This means that the representation of environmental interests will succeed best where it is carried out in a manner that appeals to the State. Environmentalism, in its organized interest form, has dressed itself in the garb of the technologues.

The argument in chapter 2 highlighted the importance of Carson's *Silent Spring* in marking a transition in the environmental movement from ethically-centered arguments to technically-centered ones. It was not only the arguments that changed, it was also the people who put the arguments. Carson represented a new breed of environmentalist, armed with the technical knowledge to take on the State. With her stood other scientists like Paul Ehrlich, Commoner, Charles Wurster and Brower. Brower, however, was not a technical specialist, in the sense of Carson or

Ehrlich. Nevertheless, the contribution that he made to the environmental movement was to bring a professional, managerial style to the organizational aspects. His use of professional ad-men in the Grand Canyon dam campaign has already been mentioned. In his time as head of the Sierra Club he established a firm tradition of publishing books and articles designed to attract public attention, most notably the work of Ansel Adams. These were used to exploit the natural pictorial qualities of the environmental case. What Carson and Brower recognized was the need to talk in the language of the State. To Brower this was in no way a repudiation of principle for pragmatism's sake. It was the most effective way he knew of bringing his case home. However, even someone as obviously committed as Brower did not match up to the demands of a group that had learned the language of the State so well that it eventually ousted Brower, citing failure in managing the Club's funds. The Sierra Club, as the archetypal State-orientated group, was demanding someone who could balance an environmentalist cause with an ability to balance books.

In learning to talk the language of the State, environmental interest groups have had to inculcate themselves in this new milieu. If the terms of debate are technical and scientific, then the groups have needed to assimilate technologists and scientists in their ranks. Not only was the amateur tradition of leadership in environmental politics being displaced by this new breed of technologists (Fox, 1985), but they also becoming an integral part of the movement as advisors and staff. Thus, in 1984 nearly fifty per cent of the Environmental Defense Fund's staff were scientifically or technically trained. The same applied to the Natural Resources Defense Council, with the Conservation Foundation establishing a permanent economics staff to supplement its other activities (Rosenbaum, 1985). This has repercussions for a movement that is claiming to represent a popular vein of sentiment. These technologists can hardly be counted as populists. They added fuel to the traditional fire that raged in the debate between those who consider environmentalism as inherently elitist (Morrison & Dunlap, 1986, and Andrews, 1980) and devoid of considerations of social justice (Barbour, 1980), and those who defend the movement as hailing a more pertinent perspective than orthodox perceptions of social conflicts. It therefore comes as no surprise to find that "private interests" have impinged upon this sphere of public interest representation. Groups

such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Center for Science in the Public Interest, represent a new breed of environmental interest groups based on an overtly and ostensibly scientific constituency, who see, in the environmental ethos, an opportunity to utilize their technological and scientific capacities to aid the "public interest". That they are suited to this type of activity demonstrates admirably how the debate has become one dominated by those already pre-disposed to the State's interests. The bulk of scientific research is done under the State's auspices (whether directly or indirectly), as this research requires capital. Such infusions of capital may well represent an investment, but they still represent integral parts of the accumulative process, and therefore are areas of interest (in both senses of the word) for the State.

The environmental movement's antagonism towards the principle of nuclear power, illustrates, through its practical manifestation, the basis of the arguments used by the groups. Arguments put by the Sierra Club and by the representatives of the twelve leading environmental groups both illustrate that the argument is framed in such a way so as to propose alternatives that would be acceptable to modern corporate capitalism (Cahn, 1985). Thus the emphasis is upon research into "geothermal, solar, and fusion power; energy conservation and more efficient utilization of energy; hydrocarbon extraction and conversion problems; stripmining reclamation; nuclear safety; nuclear waste management; biological and medical research related to energy sources; and instrumentation for monitoring pollution" (Sierra Club Energy Policy, in McFarland, 1976, p.134). However, the logic of environmentalism dictates that it is not energy *per se* that is the problem: it is the demand for energy created by an advanced industrialized country. What these groups are proposing amounts to a trading off of various energy-related externalities (acid-rain for radio-active waste). As long as the debate is in terms of externalities, then this gives the State the capacity to define the priority, and this works against the logic of environmentalism. The underlying logic may be seen in the peace movement, which protests the inapplicability of nuclear technology *as a manifestation of the real problem* of inappropriate corporate capitalist definitions of the agenda (of defense in this case). The categorizing of the peace movement with the environmental movement is not a mere analytical simplification: it represents the fact that the environmental movement shares the same

logic as the peace movement and the womens' movement. This underlying logic of the new social movements is in the critique of corporate capitalism's definition of the political agenda and of the language of the State (be it in patriarchal, militaristic, or technological grammar).

#### 4.4.2 Environmentalism and the Law

As well as lobbying and marketing skills, the relaxation of the rules of standing in the 1960s opened up the courts as a new channel for the presentation of the environmentalist case. No longer did litigants have to demonstrate evidence of actual harm received in order to be able to bring a case. This aided considerably those interest groups that concentrated on collective goods, and so it helped the environmentalist cause. The use of *amicus curiae* briefs, and of class actions, allowed groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to specialize in litigation and to shift some of the emphasis of the environmental movement away from the traditional lobbying techniques. Even those groups whose traditional arena has been lobbying have felt the need to supplement these activities with semi-autonomous legal sections. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund represents this trend. With this comes an increasing emphasis upon professionalization and upon the role of experts. To write a letter to a congressman requires no skill other than literary ones. To write an effective *amicus curiae* brief requires an in-depth technical knowledge both of the law and of the issues involved. Thus, the opening up of the courts to environmental interest group activity had the effect of excluding non-experts. Professionals in terms of law, or "experts" in terms of environmental issues are the exclusive personnel of environmental judicial politics.

The opening up of the courts as a new arena for environmental politics does not represent some timely, arbitrary action. It is the logical strategy for a State that perceives the declining legitimacy of the traditional arenas of conflict resolution (witness the general sympathy for the sen-

timent behind Carter's attempt to curb the worst excesses of water project pork-barrelling in Congress). By moving some of the action to the courts, the State has shifted aspects the debate to a forum suited to the needs of the State. Here policy is not formulated, it is assessed. Here the rules are the institutionalized embodiment of the "rules of the society" (and therefore of the DSP). Here the professionals rule. Success by the environmental groups means success within the limits set by the State. A judicial success may mean the obstruction of some part of the accumulation process, but it also means the increased legitimacy of that process, because it is *seen to be* responsive to non-State pressures. However, those pressures are very much a reflection of the State's own agenda and rules of engagement. The *Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus* decision in 1972 illustrates this point. It appears as a victory for the environmentalist case, because it forced Congress and the EPA to specify actual air standards in the implementation of the Clean Air Act. In reality, it clarified and refined an act passed in an arena that, as has been shown in the previous section, is inherently unsuited to the consideration of environmental problems. Similarly, the success of environmentalists at using the courts with regard to the Toxic Substances Control Act amounts to a speeding up of the implementation of that act. It cannot be considered as a fundamental challenge to the notion of pollution as an externality that is inherent in an act such as this.

#### **4.4.2.1 Law as Structure**

With regard to the State, the area of legal activity demonstrates the ability of the State to define the rules of engagement and the issues to be engaged. Whilst public policy is intended to be at least partially representative of the collective will, the interpretation and the formulation of statute is a sphere that is the undoubted domain of professionals and technologists, whose work must remain an inevitable addenda to the functioning of a fractious, territorial legislature.

The emphasis that nearly all environmentalists place upon grass roots participation is a reflection of the strongly decentralized nature of environmental politics. However, the definition of the language of debate as legalistic and technocratic may be an effective means by which the State can mitigate the damaging effects of a powerful grass-roots lobbying movement. Putting the case on a legal footing is an effective method of pre-empting populist actions, because the law is dominated by specialists not populists. The traditions of environmental action have always been at a local level, in that it has often been parochialized concern with the effect of industrialization. A campaign to prevent the siting of a nuclear waste dump in the locality is an example of environmental politics translated into conflicts over particularized "bads". Such are the concerns of mainstream environmental interest groups. The aim is not to challenge the fundamental logic that initially lead to the proposals to site the dump at all. The exasperation that deep ecologists feel with this approach is illustrated by Lorna Salzman, a former Friends of the Earth activist:

A so-called mediation project was set up some years ago that involved the nuclear power industry and some environmental lobbies - FOE was a part, they had meetings in Colorado - on how to dispose of nuclear wastes. But they refused to start off with the assumption that you stop making the wastes, *now*, until you have a solution as to how to dispose of them. Had I been on that panel, I would have said, "Stop, stop. We're not going past this, not going to day two until we agree to shut down the reactors that are producing the waste." They never said that; they never raised the real issues. (Quoted in Sale, 1986, p.28)

What this shows is that issues are professionalized and discussed in technical terms even when they are devolved to a local level. This tendency is enhanced when the forums of debate (be they local or federal) are legalistic and rely upon the testimony of specialists and experts.

The agenda setting ability of the State is the focus of this chapter. In legislative politics, the theoretical limits of debate are non-existent. The corollary of the DSP's commitment to the free-market carries with in, and in it, the attendant definition of "free" (and therefore of "freedom") in market terms. The free competition for goods, is translated, in the political sense, to the free competition of ideas and opinions. This sense of "free" assumes initial equality of access to resources, and thus does not take into account the existence of actors, such as the State, that largely

determine this access to resources.<sup>20</sup> Thus, whilst the Congress provides the theoretical potential to raise any topic, the activities of the State, place practical restrictions on this potential. The case is different with the judicial sphere of politics. The courts cannot act as initiators of legislation (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986). Their agenda is effectively defined for them. That environmental interest groups have moved toward the judicial sphere amounts to a tacit acceptance of the agenda dictated for them by the State. The agenda is a function of the State covertly in the case of the legislative branch and overtly in the case of the judicial branch.

#### **4.4.2.2 *Law as Ideology***

For Poulantzas the structural and the ideological components of capitalist law should not be seen as separate. For Gramsci, the law was an essential component of ideological hegemony. "The Law is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilizing activity undertaken by the State" (Gramsci, [1933-4], 1971, p.247). To argue that law represents State intervention in environmental interest group politics, because it restricts access of personnel, is clearly insufficient. It does this, but it does more. Its ideological component is important. An emphasis upon law aids the State because it buttresses aspects of the DSP. It can be argued that the courts provide a unique testing ground for theories of the State that incorporate the idea of cultural and ideological legitimation. The courts, by liberal standards, are "relatively autonomous" from the other components of government. Thus, if the outcomes of judicial environmental politics reflect the outcomes of legislative and executive environmental politics then, because there is no institutionalized linkage between these components, the correlation must be due to shared ideological features. This amounts to saying that the DSP is an effective means of promoting the State's interests even in those cases where there is no official structural or institutional linkage.

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<sup>20</sup> In this sense it can be seen how the tendency of political science in the US to devalue, or to ignore the concept of the State, is a reflection of the DSP, and therefore undercuts any claims to scientific objectivity.

In treating citizens as individuals equal before the law, it promotes individualism (Poulantzas, 1973). Once again, the theoretical tenets of individual equality become compromised due to the practical structural inequalities in resources. Offe finds the realization of this in the "two logics of collective action" which dictates that apparently objective structures of organization inherently favor business interests against labor interests (Offe, 1985a). With regard to the legal structures of the US this means that the resource of access to professionals and technologists is inherently unequal, because professionals are part of the bourgeoisie. In environmental politics, the middle-class bias might seem to counteract this inequality giving the "non-State" interests as much access as the State interests. However, the fact that environmental politics are characterized by a middle-class bias, for whatever reasons, means that the universality of the logic of environmentalism has been compromised. In effect, the environment has been particularized along class lines as well as along territorial and ideological lines.

The deference of nonexperts to experts represents the exercise of power and the enforcement of the DSP. The interpretation of statute and the personnel and their rules of the game for the interpretation of statute both represent aspects of the State's influence through law. The statutes are debated by the technologists in the language of the technologists. This not only excludes the nonexpert, but also infers legitimacy on the process. To have the debate in lay terms would amount to delegitimacy. The faith in science in the DSP means an effective abdication of responsibility by society. It means the legitimacy of a process run by and presided over by technologists. The argument put by Stewart is that, with regards to the Clean Air Act, the courts imbue legislation with a greater legitimacy because the consideration of law involves the negating of the parochial concerns of a legislative process based on the principle of territorial representation (Stewart, in Friedlander, 1978). However, this fundamentally misses the unity that pervades the legislative and judicial processes in the primacy that they both ascribe to technologists. The proliferation of committees and sub-committees in the House means that, increasingly, environmental interest groups are involved in the presentation of material and information in a manner that is not dissimilar to the



behavior in a court of law. That the legislative branch has taken on some of the trappings of the judicial branch may be due to more than just the legalistic bias of those who framed the Constitution. Its contemporary continuation may be indicative of the fact that, in the courts, the state is in more direct control of the agenda, and more direct control is needed, as the contradictions of the State make themselves evident.

## ***4.5 The Legitimacy of Political Action***

If what is political is what is legitimate, and the State defines legitimacy, then the State defines what is political. This is what the State often attempts to do. However, political analysis is not an acceptance of the agenda of the State. Thus what constitutes the political for a political analyst is not necessarily what the State deems it to be. With regard to the environmental movement, political action is here taken to be threefold: institutional, direct, and deconstructivist or "eco-anarchist". The argument I shall put is that the State deems the first legitimate, the second illegitimate, and the third irrelevant. Thus it has works against direct action. However, this form of political action is usually the most consistent with the logic of environmentalism. Deconstructionism, as an individualist philosophy is not fundamentally concerned with existing power structures and therefore is here treated as personal rather than political.

### **4.5.1 The Logics of Representation and Environmentalism**

The idea of "representation" so firmly embedded in the US DSP and in the constitution represent one concept of "representation". A crude characterization of this concept might be that the

stronger people believe something, and the more people that believe it, the greater is the case that it should become law. Concepts such as the protection of minority rights, although fundamental components of this logic of representation, are nevertheless subordinate to the basic majoritarian notions. Such notions form the basis of the logic of interest group representation. As the earlier discussion about the legislative resources of interest groups makes clear, the ability to deliver votes becomes the indicator of the numerical strength of opinion. The numerical strength of an interest group becomes therefore a measure of its political legitimacy. Whilst this might seem an intuitively-justifiable criterion, it should be remembered that there are others. Thus it could be argued that groups should achieve legitimacy to the extent that they adhere to a coherent and cogent ideology. This would, according to the argument of this thesis, give greater legitimacy to groups such as Earth First!, that adhere more closely to the logic of environmentalism, than to groups such as the National Wildlife Federation that do not. I am attempting to illustrate that the logic of representation that dominates in the US is one of many. The fact that it dominates, and is in contradiction with the logic of environmentalism, further adds to the case that the State has acted as an actor with an interest in setting the ground for environmental politics, and that terrain is unsuited to the environmentalist case.

Gary Downey highlights the importance of ideology to group maintenance. With regard to the Clamshell Alliance that attempted to stop the building of Nuclear power plants in the late 1970s, he argues that ideology played an important role in determining its success or failure. "By establishing organizational identities and adjudging the legitimacy of means to realize them, ideologies always contribute to the definition of organizational resources and strategies" (Downey, 1986, p.371). His analysis offers an attempt to fuse resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) with a realistic view of the role of ideology. The Clamshell Alliance saw the consensus-method of decision-making as an integral part of its overall strategy to stop the nuclear power plants. Thus, direct action for this group was another side of the same coin that gave rise to their ethos of non-violent direct action. Once the decision-making principle was sacrificed, it spelled the end of the group as an organization. Thus it is that ideology, for Downey, is relevant insofar as it

translates into resources. What this illustrates is that ideological coherence may be easier to obtain in a small interest group than in a large one. However, since the DSP does not value ideological coherence as much as it values size, there exists an inherent cultural bias against small ideologically-coherent groups. The logic of environmentalism, therefore, is in contradiction to the dominant logic of representation.

#### 4.5.2 Direct Action and Delegitimacy

Milbrath identifies a higher propensity for environmentalists to have sympathy with using direct action, than among general populations (Milbrath, 1984). He goes on to argue that the sympathy with direct action increases in correlation with how seriously the problem of the environment is perceived: "The strongest predictor in our study of a propensity to support direct action was a perception that man's activities were *severely* damaging nature" (Milbrath, 1984, p.90). It appears then, that adherence to the logic of environmentalism will cause a greater willingness to use direct action. This is identifiable in the deep ecology tradition of direct action. The use of "ecotage" and "monkeywrenching" by Earth First!, and of civil disobedience by the anti-nuclear power movement, is testimony to their belief in the legitimacy of direct action as a political strategy.

Direct action is here defined as activity that is directly destructive toward the manifestations of political grievances, as opposed to the use of institutional means to redress grievances. The key lies in the fact that it is *direct*, whereas the use of institutional means is inherently indirect. By definition, this activity is legitimate to the extent that it is representative. Thus, groups with small memberships and with a low level of societal support are perceived as less justified in the use of direct action. This is a function of the concept of representation inherent in the DSP. Movements, such as the Civil Rights movement, because they have subsequently gained general acceptance, have acquired retrospective legitimacy. This is not true of environmentalist direct action groups. As a

strategy for affecting political change, direct action by minority groups is bound to be less than effective. It is not however seen as focused towards such ends. It stems from a sense of frustration and desperation that many deep ecologists feel towards the environmental devastation effected by industrialization. It also is geared towards attracting publicity.

As strategies to bring corporate capitalism to its knees, "ecotage" and "monkeywrenching" are ineffective. Small-scale prevention of some of the finer points of capital accumulation through environmental devastation, is hardly a profound challenge to the workings of the US State. This is why the most effective State strategy to prevent it is to delegitimize it as a form of political action. That it has been classed along with terrorism, shows the extent to which it is deemed illegitimate. The position of the dominant environmental interest groups supports this delegitimization. The president of the National Wildlife Federation, Jay Hair's description of the proponents of "ecotage" illustrates this: "They are outlaws; they are terrorists; and they have no right being considered environmentalists" (Quoted in Malanowski, 1987, p.569). However, what is notable is that legitimacy appears to be an important consideration to the proponents of environmental direct action. If this were not true then it might perhaps result in a real challenge to the State: the use of effective direct action is a possibility: sabotaging nuclear-power stations or hydro-electric dams provide the short-term potential for the disruption of State accumulative activity.

Although the State defines certain forms of action as less legitimate, it also acts to influence the choice of strategies of groups. Those groups who engage in direct action have already defined themselves as extra-State, and therefore as beyond the influence of institutional inducements. However, this does not apply to the dominant interest groups. As financial resources play such an important role in contemporary legislative politics (witness the emergence of Political Action Committees), the ability to define access to this resource gives much potential influence. The State cannot define absolutely this access. However, in the granting of the vaunted tax-exempt status, the State holds a powerful weapon.

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, by granting the organization the right not to pay taxes, allows the groups to reap the full benefit of membership and other contributions. The fact that section 501(c)(3) is designed to benefit charities and philanthropic institutions, is indicative of how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), by granting tax-exempt status to such groups is aiding the State process of accumulation and legitimation. The role of charities, in a domestic sense, serves as a supplement to State-sponsored measures (the Welfare State) to ameliorate the social costs of production. Finances from charities do not draw directly on State resources, as they are essentially private contributions, and thus are not a burden to accumulation. As a legitimating function they perpetuate the notion of private responsibility for State-induced or State-aided processes, and furthermore enable private individuals with the resources to discharge their sense of responsibility. The categorization by the IRS of environmental interest groups with such institutions is indicative of the way the State perceives them. Given the importance of providing informational goods for most groups (especially expensive magazines such as *National Wildlife*), this increased revenue can be used to collect more members, and thus to gain evermore potential sources of income. However, the granting of this status puts restrictions on the groups' activities; most notably on their lobbying activity.

The regulation of the types of political action that are allowed by tax-exempt groups acts as an important method of defining the rules of engagement in conflicts over the environment. The emphasis is often placed on the fact that no more than twenty per cent of the groups' resources be devoted to lobbying activities, and this has led to an increase in the attention to judicial and executive politics by the larger groups. However, it should also be borne in mind that this rule contains the explicit assumption that all forms of political action that the groups engage in are politically-legitimate. Those groups that engage in direct action are ruled out from the start as candidates for tax-exempt status. The revocation of the Sierra Club's 501(c)(3) status was due to the extensive use of advertising in the campaign to prevent the Grand Canyon dam projects being built. Thus, if this is deemed illegitimate, then "ecotage" and "monkeywrenching" are hardly likely to be candidates for legitimacy on this scale.

The status of the groups is decided by the IRS, although it seems clear that this has not prevented this from being used in an overtly political manner. It acts as the classic bureaucratic agency of the State. The revocation of Sierra Club's tax-exempt status whilst other groups followed similar lobbying tactics whilst their 501(c)(3) status remained intact (Reisner, 1986), demonstrates that it may have been the efficacy of the campaign, rather than the strategy, that sealed their fate in this regard. In an attempt to counteract this loss, the Sierra Club has utilized the tactic of setting up various sister organizations, some with tax-exempt status, others without. Clearly, this amounts to interest groups conforming to the same institutional criteria that they should, by the logic of their own position, be attacking.

#### 4.5.3 Deconstructionism and the Anarchist Tradition

In the paradigmatic challenges that environmentalism potentially offers, time after time the issue of State antagonism is confronted. The bases and manifestations of State power seem to mitigate against a restructuring of power structures in ways suited to environmentally-sound management. To move to an "eco-anarchist" rejection of all State-sanctioned power structures, in favor of a strategy of personal liberation seems a natural step. The abrogation of conventional politics means that "daily life itself must be viewed as a calling in which we have an ethical responsibility to function in a state of unrelieved opposition to its prevailing norms" (Bookchin, 1982, p.335). It is the recognition that no longer are the traditional structures, even the traditional conceptions of politics, relevant to the demands of environmentalism. Personal liberation replaces political emancipation as the ultimate objective. The "do-it-yourself" form of political action replaces more collectivist strategies because that collectivity is perceived as State-sanctioned. Such an ideology

draws upon the anarchist tradition inherent in the environmental movement.<sup>21</sup> This tradition has blended easily with the "community-orientated", grass-roots "simplism" that can be seen even in reform environmentalism.

The argument is made that, on a decentralized local level, the dominant paradigms can effectively be challenged. Here the outmoded technological norms of corporate capitalism can be replaced through a "deconstructionist" strategy, with "ecotechnics" that would "produce goods to satisfy the human needs of an ecologically reasonable culture on a materially comfortable level of subsistence - habitat-centered shelter, biome-based nutrition, environmentally-suitable apparel, climatically grounded weather protection, renewable resource use, and durably reusable artifacts" (Luke, 1983b, p.27). Such a strategy would, it is argued, establish new norms creating a counter-culture, and would be a Gramscian "war of position". However, despite the theoretical ideological challenge to the hegemony of the State, such strategies can be of little concern to the State, as long as they remain locked into the minority tradition. A policy of deconstructionism may well be in line with the logic of environmentalism, but the fact that it is not an attempt to challenge the existing power structures, means that the issue is not relevant to the argument because it is irrelevant to the State. Once it becomes aggregated to a level that does challenge State functioning, then it succeeds in becoming less relevant as a strategy for personal liberation, and more important as a political strategy, and therefore subject to State-sanctioned power structures.

The previous section demonstrated that it is not by the coherence of the counter-ideas, but rather by their political power, that determines their priority on the State agenda. The deconstructionist ideology does not seek to confront existing power structures, but instead it seeks to bypass them, and prove its legitimacy on its own turf. Bookchin is admitting this in saying, "[t]oday, a food cooperative is unlikely to replace a supermarket; a French-intensive garden to replace agri-business; barter and mutual aid to replace our banking system; personal intercourse to

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<sup>21</sup> Bookchin traces this back as far as Fourier.

replace the electronic paraphernalia by which the world 'communicates' with itself' (Bookchin, 1982, p.335). Thus the accumulating function of the State is not threatened in the short-term. The only delegitimizing that needs to be affected by the state is the classifying of proponents of such strategies as "freak" or "cranks". Unless transformed into a mass-movement, deconstructionism remains, whatever its personal validity, an extra-political activity that presents no threat to the hegemony of the State. Thus it may be seen as a personal rather than a political strategy, and this places it outside the realm of State's self-imposed jurisdiction.

## ***4.6 Cultural Legitimation***

The formulation of the concept of the State used in this thesis is an attempt to lay great stress upon the cultural and legitimative components of the modern State. This is the aspect that has been neglected by the bulk of US political analysis (e.g., Evans et al., 1985). To only look at the institutional-bureaucratic components of the State is to ignore a pervasive exercise of power. With regard to environmental politics in the US, the educational system, and the religious institutions and attitudes, promote a perspective of the environment that contradicts the NEP, and underlays the DSP. In some cases this section illustrates tendencies that enhance or support State tendencies already mentioned. The cultural legitimation of the US State again illustrates the formulation of a political context that is unsuited to the logic of environmentalism. The coincidence of all these factors having the same effect is another justification for bringing the State back into environmental interest group politics.



#### 4.6.1 Religion and Legitimation

The link between religion and science is not confined to a view whereby, in modern industrial society, religion relinquishes the baton of spiritual hegemony to the new Gods of science and progress. The influence of religion is not negated by the new "faith" in science and technology. Religion continues on as a profound and lasting influence on the norms and values of modern industrial society. As such, it serves as an important buttress to the corporate capital perception of the environment. Lynn White addressed this issue when he first identified the logical connection between the Judeo-Christian tradition and the notion of modern science (White, 1967). This linkage serves as the implicit basis for deep ecology's espoused adherence to the eastern religious tradition (Devall & Sessions, 1985). Arnold Toynbee finds the basis for the Judeo-Christian view of the environment in Genesis 1:28 (Toynbee, 1973): "And God blessed them, and said unto them, be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it and have domination over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth on the earth." Although the dichotomy may not be as straight-forward as White suggests between mastery-over-nature and unity-with-nature, even the added distinction of the notion of stewardship (Shaiko, 1987; Barbour, 1980) does not discount the essential distinction between the perception of man as part of nature, and man as having dominion over nature (whether that dominion is short-term domination, or long-term stewardship is irrelevant).

In an even broader sense, the basic premise of Judeo-Christian religion challenges the logic of environmentalism. The conception of God-as-father and men-as-sons reinforces the notion of equality and therefore of individualism (Gramsci, 1971). This is the same way that US conceptions of law operate. This challenges the logic of environmentalism's holistic perception of man as part of the environment, and therefore as indivisible from it. The individualism and the uniqueness of man in religion is at odds with the "plain citizens" of nature view inherent in the NEP.

Divisions within humankind are not only along the lines of social status and access to resources. Another access of delineation is between the sexes. This is an inherent component of the God-as-father tradition of Judeo-Christian thought. Thus authority is inextricably bound up with notions of maleness. Masculinity becomes an important component of domination. The point is that not only does this tradition reinforce the concepts of domination over nature, but it specifically reinforces ideas of masculine domination over nature. If within the human species there is a fundamental schism based on genetic criteria then this lays the seeds for speciesism and exceptionalism, with regard to the rest of nature. Thus, it contradicts the holism inherent in deep environmentalism and the fundamental commitment to biological egalitarianism. The tendency to class incongruous radical ideologies together and to pass them off as part and parcel of one over-riding basic set of truths merely because they all happen to critique the same status quo is all too common. This is what may be seen in Carolyn Merchant's assertion that, "[e]cology and feminism have interacting languages that imply certain common policy goals" (in Devall & Sessions, 1985, p.229). However, in terms of *results* the patriarchal perception of domination inherent in the Judeo-Christian tradition do enforce conditions that are antipathetic to both environmentalism and feminism. In two different sphere we can see the influence of religion as a way of enforcing ideals contained in the DSP.

#### 4.6.2 Education and Legitimation

The most overt attempts to impart norms and morals is evident in the functioning of the US education system. The legitimating functions of education that contradict the logic of environmentalism are twofold. They are based upon notions of domination, and science. Once again, there is the promotion of the idea of equality and individualism in educational structures. This occurs through the allocation of incentives on an individualistic basis. As has already been pointed out, this individualism contradicts the holistic emphasis of the logic of environmentalism.

The emphasis upon individualistic competition is a reflection of the skills that are appropriate to a market-place based upon the principle of competition. Hence Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis see a direct linkage between the evolution of the economy and the evolution of educational structures (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). With the demand for a mass industrial workforce comes the expansion of mass public education. However, with the informational revolution and the increased demands of technologization comes the need for a specialist vocationally-based education system.<sup>22</sup> The beginnings of this may be seen in the shift away from liberal arts subjects in US universities, and the emphasis upon sources of funding (private, industrial, and corporate) that are easier for the sciences to find. Access to the traditional institutions becomes harder, and the development of the more "economically-relevant" is encouraged. This means that the educational system has become more orientated towards producing specialists and technologists who, by their very nature must be antipathetic to the demands of environmentalism.

The other way that the educational system fosters an ethos antithetical to the logic of environmentalism is through the increasingly scientific emphasis of the educational structures. The emphasis upon positivistic empirical science is growing in educational establishments. In his characterization of higher education in the US David Ricci declares; "An academic culture based on science: that is what modern universities are really about" (Ricci, 1984, p.36). In defining the commitment to science as the unifying force in recent academic development, Ricci is illustrating the depths to which scientific norms are becoming established in society at large. This enhances the role of the technologist, and promotes the notion of the environment as a resource to be tapped by man.

David Dickson ties this emphasis on science in with the demands of the economy (Dickson, 1984). He sees the universities becoming an extension of the economy through this scientization.

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<sup>22</sup> Perhaps the best example of this may be seen in the educational policies of the Thatcher government in Britain, where, through the reducing of levels of student-assistance and the selective funding policies of the University Grants Commission based on the criteria of value to the economy, means that access to higher education is being reduced both numerically and in scope.

Research laboratories in universities become important sources of research and development, and this blurs the distinction between theoretical and applied science which helps the latter at the expense of the former. As the logical extension of this situation universities place themselves in the corporate market-place as participants. Thus Stanford, UC Berkeley, and the University of Michigan have set up their own corporations to enable them to exploit the new found commodity-value of scientific knowledge. Dickson sees this as a result of State influence and not as a result of academic-based initiatives: "Close links between universities and industry are merely the reflection within the research community of a broad strategy adopted by U.S. capital, namely its effort to tighten control over access to the results of scientific research" (Dickson, 1984, p.104).

## **4.7 Conclusion**

American political science has tended to define the State in terms of arenas of conflict. However, the State plays a crucial role in determining those arena of conflict. In setting the ground and the "rules of the game" it decides which game is to be played and how. With regard to environmental interest group politics, the State exerts an important influence in a number of differing ways. It has a powerful array of resources at its disposal. In the broadest sense, through supporting and enhancing the DSP, the State is attempting the influence the norms and values of all of society. Thus environmentalists, as members of that society even before the issue of the environment is addressed, have had power exercised over them. In deciding what political strategies are legitimate and which are not, the State sets the debate up to favor those groups which can attract a numerically large membership and which attempt to influence power through the established and institutionalized channels. These channels are the State's jurisdiction.

In defining the basis of legislative politics in the US as territorial, the State is undermining any strategy that seeks to take a holistic approach. In marketizing the environment, the State is casting the environment in terms of market externalities, and as such it is the State that determines their priority. Through scientizing the language and the personnel involved in the debate and through promoting the role of professionals, experts and technologists, the State is downgrading the ability of environmentalists to put the debate in their terms and to use the personnel best suited to their case. Through designating direct action as less legitimate than lobbying, the State is undermining the legitimacy of those groups that, through the logic of their own position, feel compelled to engage in direct action as a strategy. In the broader enforcement of religious and educational norms of individualism and dominance, the State has set the odds against the new environmental paradigm. All this is not to say that the State is entirely successful in all these endeavors: these are State strategies, not State successes. The unity in purpose that is clearly visible justifies the argument that, in environmental interest group politics, the State is a significant actor. Through the actions of the State, the environment has become territorialized, marketized, scientized and the domain of the technologists. All these tendencies are in direct contradiction with the inherent logic of environmentalism that seeks a comprehensive, non-technological, urgent response to the ecological crisis.

## 5.0 Conclusion

Environmental interest group politics is one of many spheres affected by the activities of the US State. State influence exists in every aspect of political life. To take one such sphere and to argue why and how the State acts in a certain way is an incomplete case in many ways. I have argued that the State should not be analyzed in purely functionalist terms; like all other political actors, it is not always successful in what it aims to do. Indeed, the argument that the State is attempting mutually the contradictory strategies of accumulation and legitimation, predisposes the State to failure. Aside from this consideration, success rests on the availability of resources and their effective use, as well as on a coherent strategy. The will or the need of the State to achieve something does not necessarily mean that it has the resources or the capacity to do so. To hold this position gives an apparent methodological loop-hole allowing a logical but not particularly fruitful method of rebutting claims that the State is not unified. This can be done by simply asserting that the State is often unsuccessful in its aim to bring about certain ends, and so many apparent examples of the State failing to accumulate or legitimate are only illustrations of a failure in capacity but not in will. This position then contains many seeds of self-criticism. However, many of the justifications *for* such a view of the State are so intuitive that they are often overlooked.

## 5.1 *Reification or Realism?*

What we believe, the way we feel, and the way we act, provide illustrations and example of a commonality that derives not from genetic similarity, but from a similarity of spatial-temporal relations. The greatest similarity is between those of the same period in the same location. The case of the contemporary US is most relevant here, although this is only one of many concentric and overlapping conceptual spheres of reference.<sup>23</sup> Certain generalizations can confidently be made about the collective values and norms of US society. That these generalizations can be made, is evidence not of genetic similarity but of spatial-temporal similarity. The extent to which cultural generalizations are valid for a nation as geographically large and as culturally-diverse in its origins as the US is another intuitive vindication of the argument for the existence of a powerful US State. This similarity underlays the basis for defining certain "constituencies" of State influence. These "constituencies" reflect the multiplicity of conceptual spheres. Generalities about US behavior and attitudes are thus, in effect, statements about the true nature of the US State. If that behavior reflects the ideas contained within the DSP, and if the State has many resources available to it to influence that DSP, then the link between behavior and the State is a real one.

Why is there pride at the raising of a national flag or at the playing of a national anthem? Why is physical violence conceived of as inherently justifiable in the defense of self? Why is success defined in terms of male criteria, with strength as superiority (and usually *physical* strength at that), and with superiority as patriarchal domination? Why is the exploitation and expropriation of natural resources seen as a right for humankind, but not for other species? The answer to all these questions lies in the complex inter-relationship between culture, economics and the State. That these tendencies all serve the ends of corporate industrial capitalism is not coincidence. That they

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<sup>23</sup> As we may generalize more specifically about white male Texans, so we may make less specific, but still applicable, generalizations about the populations of the US and Western Europe.

are perpetuated when they may be counter to the interests of large sections of society is testimony to the power of the State in that relationship.

Nationalism distorts class-consciousness. Militarism and aggression support conceptions of domination that suit an economy based on the hierarchical exercise of power.<sup>24</sup> Sexism entrenches a division of labor suited to a system of incentives and rewards that legitimizes itself through reference to social status as much as needs. Speciesism represents potent justifications for ecologically-disastrous industrialism. The nature of all these trends is culture-specific. It would be hard for most people to name the person who made them feel pride in their nation or think of their political system as democratic. Whatever has been asserted popularly, these are not inalienable truths that just happen to be held true. They are culture-specific features whose commonality can only be adequately explained through the influence of a common power - the State. Admittedly, they are not held universally and uniformly, but this is because the power of the State is not always exercised coherently, nor is it ubiquitous, super-natural or absolute. It is an imperfect, contradictory phenomenon working within a complex and subtle cultural, economic, and social context.

To tie the State in as the supreme influence and the creator of cultural identity in society is both to elevate and to devalue the concept. Thus, for political analysis there is the need to, as Alan Wolfe puts it, "develop a theory of the state that neither sublimates politics into nothingness nor places it on a pedestal beyond analytic reach. The state must be withered back into the consciousness of political theory and the reality of political action" (Wolfe, 1977, p.xiv). To fail to do this is to paint the State as a mere set of social relations. However, to present the economy as the basis for the State is to portray an actor with an identifiable set of interests. The State as the set of social relations is to present the "how", but to present the economic basis of the State is to present the "why." To show that certain generic traits exists is not to show that they have been caused. To show that these traits have a commonality, is to present a more tenable case for the

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<sup>24</sup> This is to say nothing of the military-industrial complex that it engenders, legitimizes and supports.



State as an actor influencing, directing, and mediating politics. To recognize the validity of this is not to reify the State so that it becomes the committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie, nor is it to sublimate the State into irrelevance.

The very idea of the State as the "sleeping giant" of American political science leads easily in the direction of arguing for a sentient, conscious, reasoning entity. The ease of holding such a position is no reflection of its value. The definition of the State offered at the start of this thesis did lead to a somewhat deterministic reification of the concept, when put into the reality of environmental interest group politics. However, I do feel this has not undermined the basic validity of the project. Two reasons are offered in its defense. Firstly, the power of the State as a political concept derives from the very complexity and subtlety that so easily leads to undue reification. The value of a concept is not estimable by the inadequacy of its application. If it has not been effectively applied this does not dictate that it cannot be effectively applied.

The second justification stems from the extent and scope of this project. Arguing that American political science has been misdirected is no minor case to make. It cannot be made through an attention to flawed detail or an over-concern with ephemeral inconsistency. The extreme failure of political science demands an extreme response. Much has been made of the concepts of paradigms in this thesis. This thesis is hardly an attempt at paradigm-shifting; its roots lie firmly embedded in the prevailing neo-Marxist orthodoxies concerning the State. However, the concept of paradigm-shifts does illustrate that the extremism of one paradigm may be the orthodoxy of the next, for it is that very extremism that has a role to play in the shifting of paradigms.

## 5.2 *Contradiction and Commonality in Environmentalism*

In showing the role of the State in US environmental interest group politics, I am only pointing at one of many potential spheres of analysis where the concept of the State provides a useful tool. However, this area does show some traits of the State that are not so apparent in other spheres. One of the reasons for this stems from the underlying logic inherent in the environmentalist position. The theme of crisis that is apparent in the philosophical positions of reform environmentalism, social ecology and deep ecology, gives the environmental movement a point of commonality. However, the difference may be seen in whether the groups are prepared to forsake this notion in *practice* whilst retaining it in theory, or whether they value ideological coherence above political legitimacy. For, only through forsaking, the logic of theory and practice inherent in the notion of crisis, can these groups acquire political legitimacy. Environmental interest groups have had to forsake ideological coherence in order to become interest groups. Those groups that retain their ideological coherence thus, by (Statist) definition are not interest groups; therefore, political analysts have tended to class them as social movements.

The commitment of the environmental movement to the notion of crisis is not something that has consistently threaded its way through the movement's historical development. This is because the situation has only recently become one of crisis. The Second World War brought the contradiction of capitalist development and environmentally-sound management to the fore. The technological and industrial pace of development was artificially stimulated by the dynamics of militaristic imperatives, so that latent contradictions soon became apparent as very real crises of pollution and environmental destruction. This is why the war is often cited as the crucial catalyst in the development of the modern environmental movement (Commoner, 1972; Hays, 1987).

The crisis idea represents no mere coincidence of rhetorical vocabulary within the environmental movement; it marks a common reaction to the failures of the structures of accumulation

and allocation. The anti-regulatory market has an interest in defining the environment as an externality. This removes it from the context of primary economic consideration and pushes it in the direction of the State, thus allowing the priority of environmental considerations to be determined by an actor antithetical to environmentalism's real interests. The result of an ideology based on the notion of crisis is that "business as usual" is not seen as a viable option and this, in practice, means a regulatory, interventionist, centralist State. This characterizes environmentalism as an anti-market ideology. If such an ideology were to be translated into policy it would place unprecedented burdens on the accumulative process, because it would draw down the rate of profit based on short-term purely economic criteria. Thus the notion of crisis, if accepted by the State as a viable policy option would contradict its function to protect the conditions for successful capital accumulation.

The demands of the accumulation process are not the only input to the State. The need to ensure legitimacy is also a priority. The area of environmental politics illustrates how these two functions are often contradictory. I have argued that regulatory interventionist State action to avoid ecological crisis by regulating the excesses of industrialism would, if implemented, draw down the rate of profit. However, in the environmental legislation of the 1970s we may see exactly that type of policy.

the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 and the Clean Air and Water Act of 1971....appear to have been costly to capital. By inhibiting capital's attempts to transfer the costs of production to workers and others, these acts have almost certainly had a significant effect on the over-all rate of profit and economic growth....We do not wish to argue that these regulatory programs, and the redistributive programs described above, are the sole or even primary cause of the slowdown in the capitalist growth process, experienced not only in the U.S. but also in most advanced capitalist countries. But we believe that they have made a significant contribution to the slowdown. (Bowles & Gintis, 1982, p.75)

The need to implement these strategies stems from the ideological commitment to a type of "interest-group pluralism". Thus, the State must be seen to be responsive to the demands of those interests groups. There is also the consideration that when environmental degradation is excessive, expectations about the standard of living are undermined thereby causing the delegitimization of the State in localized spheres.

The State is clearly challenged in its other functional domain by the notion of crisis. The claim that a State is legitimate is difficult to make if the situation that it attempts to sustain is seen as unsustainable. This is what a notion of crisis amounts to, when applied to the State's legitimative function. Crisis implies failure, and failure implies delegitimacy. A crisis of success is merely a euphemism for the projected unsustainability of success. This is not to talk of the realities of the situation, but rather to talk of perceptions. It is possible for a State that is "failing" (say, in purely economic terms) to remain legitimate, if it is able to disguise those failings or to define the political agenda away from them. State control of the agenda allows this as a very real possibility. However, if the State fails to do this and the notion of crisis permeates social consciousness, then this represents a crisis of legitimacy. It represents a breakdown of the politico-economic motivation structures, and this is a characteristic of a legitimization crisis. As Habermas notes:

A legitimization crisis, then, must be based on a motivation crisis - that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state, the educational system and the occupational system on the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the socio-cultural system on the other. (Habermas, 1975, p.75)

The incorporation of the notion of crisis into the political agenda would amount to a repudiation of the economic basis on which that agenda is founded.

As of the present, the State has avoided the incorporation of this notion of crisis into its political agenda. Through defining the language, forums and tenor of the debate over the policy implications of environmental concern, the State has avoided embroiling itself in a spiral of crises of legitimization. The basis for such a crisis exists in the contradiction of economic growth with environmentally-sound management, but, as of yet, it has not manifested itself as a crisis. In contrast the contradiction of the Welfare State and accumulation has manifested itself, and the State has recognized this crisis through adopting a new ideology that repudiates the very concept of welfare that seemed so entrenched in New Deal politics. The New Right represents a response of the State to the contradictions of the Welfare State. Thus, environmentalism may be the next legitimization crisis waiting in the wings, to follow on from the crisis of Welfare capitalism.

Just as the State represents a duality of functions, so the challenge of environmentalism to the State represents such a duality. The anti-market tenet of the logic of environmentalism challenges the accumulative functions of the State. The notion of crisis in environmentalism amounts to a challenge to the legitimacy of the marketized economic structure, and therefore challenges the efficacy of the legitimated functioning of the State. The logic of environmentalism, as anti-market and as involving a notion of crisis, amounts to a threat to the workings and basis of the State. This gives the "reason" why the State should intervene in environmental politics. How this intervention takes place is a different matter, which illustrates the true nature of the State as agenda-setter.

### ***5.3 Learning the Steps: Environmental Interest Group Politics***

A second reason why environmental interest group politics represents an interesting case-study of the true nature of the modern State derives from the unique characteristics of incorporation that has occurred with environmentalism as a political issue. Environmentalism, as indicative of a whole genre of new social movements, offers a profound challenge to the milieu of existing structures and modes of political action. The new social movements show clearly how the contradictions of the corporate capitalist State render it obsolete as a forum for conflict resolution. The traditional modes of political action are challenged at root by the new social movements: they are demonstrating that, "[t]he conflicts and contradictions of advanced industrial society can no longer be resolved in meaningful and promising ways through etatism, political regulation, and the proliferating inclusion of ever more claims and issues on the agenda of bureaucratic authorities" (Offe, 1985b, p.819). An analysis of trade union politics, for example, would not fully draw out the novelty of

the current character of the US State because trade union politics have become incorporated into State structures in a semi-corporatist manner.

Insofar as environmentalism has become incorporated into the State, it has had to deny the logic of its own position. Thus, whilst the emergence of a movement based on the novelty of the ecological crisis represents a theme that is new and forward-looking, the incorporation of the political arm of that movement into the State (i.e., interest group politics) represents a regressive step away from the the logic of environmental crisis. In this way it is not only a side-step from its old logic, but it is also a backward step into the arms of a State that has not the capacity to incorporate such logical positions.

The State rests upon the workings of the economic system. In the US, this means that the State has a vested interest in the maintenance of market mechanisms. More than being merely a structure relevant to the State, the market becomes entrenched in the culture and the politics, as ideology or as the norms of legitimation. The logic of environmentalism is in contradiction with this tendency towards marketization. This is because environmentalism challenges the allocative, accumulative strategies, and the patriarchal, hierarchical structures of legitimation that are the most fundamental basis of the US State.

Environmentalism challenges the DSP, because it contradicts a materialist, scientific-technical approach to problem solving, by articulating a more holistic perception of humankind's relationship to the environment. Ecology, even in its earliest forms, has represented an attempt to consider the whole picture, to incorporate all the sciences in one, and thereby to pay homage to the notion of the interdependency of Life. The roots of this ecological perspective lie in Darwinian theorizing, where Nature is "a web of complex relations" (Darwin in Worster, 1977, p.156), with no one species having the capacity to live independently of that web (Worster, 1977). This holism translated into the political sphere comes into contradiction with hierarchical fragmentary patterns of social

structure and also challenges the hegemonic position of technologists, scientists and experts as a new form of political elite.

Through setting the agenda the State gives access to only those groups that do not fundamentally challenge the basis of its existence (the market). Through the DSP, through structural means, and through the pursuing of its own interests, the State defines the realm of legitimate politics. These politics are unsuited to the presentation of the environmental case. In a sense, this is true by definition - the State is manifested through political structures, and thus environmentalism, because it challenges another manifestation of the State (the market), which derives from the same basis, is bound to be in contradiction with those political structures. The unsuitability of legislative politics for the logic of environmentalism is both a manifestation of a deeper contradiction and the means by which the State attempts to overcome this contradiction.

The terms of environmental political discourse become the realm of the State. Defining language becomes one of the most potent ways in which access to arenas may be controlled. The scientization of environmental politics thus begins to push environmental politics towards the position whereby it is the exclusive domain of the technologists and the experts. This is not a trend confined to environmental politics. However, it is one that is particularly damaging to the environmental case. Framing the language of environmentalism as the language of the State allows the State to hold sway in a unique way. It restricts the personnel, the language and the resources that environmentalists may use in the representation of their interests. This control of politics through the use of mainly cultural means demonstrates how any analysis that defines the State exclusively in terms of its bureaucratic-administrative facets (Skocpol, 1980; Evans et al., 1985; Gale, 1986) has neglected the network of normative and ideological legitimating structures that comprise the other facet of the modern State.

Aside from the cultural cards that are stacked against the environmental case, there are also structural limitations that add to the strength of the State's anti-environmental hand. The territorial

basis of US legislative politics, and the resulting fragmentation, decentralization and devolution in the institutions that frame legislation, mitigate against a case that stresses a universal collective case whose priority is determined by the perceived urgency of the ecological crisis. Even the intrusion of the State against its accumulative interests and for its legitimative interests into the realm of regulatory environmental politics represents the creation of machinery instigated, funded and acting in abeyance to the interests of a State that remains fundamentally opposed to the logic of environmentalism. As long as the EPA remains tied to the vicissitudes and vacillations of the legislative, executive and judicial processes, it can be nothing other than antipathetic to environmentalism. Structures created by the State can not help but reflect the characteristics of their creator. The autonomy of structures and agencies like the EPA is, like the autonomy of the State, relative. It has a degree of autonomy and independence, but that degree is determined by the State, and so any autonomy has to be relative.

## *5.4 Ideology and the US State*

The theory of representation in the US does not stress ideological coherence of political groupings. It cannot do this. Often logical coherence may represent class-consciousness, and such a trend would undermine the ethos of individualism that so efficiently underlays the workings of the economic sphere (and thus is translated into the political sphere through the "personalization" of US electoral politics). If coherence is not valued, then this means that the "worth" of an idea does not dictate its penetration of the political agenda, but rather the numerical support dictates this. This would amount to representation, if there were no mediating force that played a crucial role in the determining of this level of numerical support. Thus, such a logic of representation works well if the State is ignored. This accounts for the liberal-pluralist neglect of the State in their analytical interpretations of politics because it suits the normative agenda of liberal political theory which



purports to build democracy as representative. The inadequacy of such a view is noted in the Trilateral Commission's Report which asserts that democracy is in conflict with governability: "in recent years, the operations of the democratic process do indeed appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to respond" (Crozier et al., 1975, p.8). From all sides there comes the charge that things are cracking apart at the seams.

If the US has its ideological roots in the liberal democratic tradition, then this denigration of the ideological coherence of interests represented in favor of the legitimated qualities of that representation means the abandonment of the liberalism in favor of democracy. The liberalism of the Mills and of Bentham, and more recently of Dahl, places an emphasis upon the limits within which freedom may be exercised. Thus, plurality is only valued when it is within limits. Implicit in this is the theme that some ideas are of inherently more value than others. For John Stuart Mill it was the ideas of the "civilized" world against the ideas of the "barbarian" world. Whatever the validity of such distinctions, the principle of the primacy of rational actions has remained consistent through liberalism, and the abandonment of it at this stage can amount to nothing else than a repudiation of the consistency of the ideas of "democracy" and "liberalism". To counter this, liberal theory moved towards a position that asserted the new-found irrelevance of ideology in an age dominated by technocratic solutions to traditional problems.

The "end of ideology" thesis put forward in the 1950s speculated that the primacy of the technologists, of new modes of political rationality, rendered the old vestiges of ideological politics obsolete. Such a view was premised on the optimistic perception of technologists as offering new solutions to new problems, rather than seeing them as they truly are - as new responses to old problems. Technological consciousness represents an attempt by the State to move away from the failing modes of legitimation as inherent in the parliamentary-electoral processes. "The end of ideology thesis correctly defined the ideological incapacitation of the hegemonic classes in industrial society, but made the gross error of supposing it to be the sign of new strength, rather than the

symptom of an impending crisis of legitimacy" (Gouldner, 1976, p.247). The experience of environmentalism in the US shows how that crisis of legitimacy has demonstrated how fragile was the State's commitment to legitimation based upon the traditional concepts of equality and fraternity. By moving towards politics as the domain of technologists, specialists, professionals and experts, the State has abandoned any rhetorical commitment that it had to the principle of participatory democracy.

What the case of environmentalism in the US shows is that incoherent State-compatible ideologies are afforded more importance by the State than coherent State-non-compatible ideologies. This has repercussions for theories of representation that are based upon notions of rationality. If the rationality of ideology becomes a virtue to be sacrificed for State-related expediency, then representation becomes merely a legitimated tool of the State. Notions of what is "popular" become merely what the State defines it to be. The State has the means to affect the numerical support and this is what is usually taken as being "popular". The State, as the ultimate controller of the agenda defines what can even enter the contest to be "popular". In this sense then, the marketization, scientization and technologization of the environment does represent an "end of ideology". It marks the end of environmentalist ideology as a potential coherent input in the political process.

## *5.5 Smokestacks, Solutions and the State*

The State has reason to define certain forms of organized interest representation out of the realm of legitimate politics. In so doing it is capable of depriving these groups of the opportunity to represent their interests in the dominant forums of political activity. By defining social movements as, for all intents and purposes, outside the sphere of politics, the State attempts to preserve its interests. However, these groups are concerned with the representation of their interests in the

way that they see fit. These interests are not the State's, and neither are the modes of political activity. Thus, if on analytical level, we drive a fundamental distinction between interest groups and social movements, and make no mention that this is a State-induced distinction then we may be in danger of an unquestioning acceptance of the State's agenda. This is *one* path for political analysis. There are others, more fruitful, ways to address questions of the representation of interests. As Ricci notes, "[m]odern man must refuse to let organizations sell us the idea that what they do constitutes the sum total of what makes life worth living, and one must continually try to modify their product by paying attention to ideas and values that arise only outside their bounds" (Ricci, 1984, p.317). The re-awakening of US political science to the importance of the State in the movement to "bring the State back in" clearly illustrates that an acceptance of the State's agenda can result in the most important actor being left out of political analysis for an extended period of time. The agenda of the State is one of many. In this thesis I have attempted to begin to show how, in one particular area, the analysis of the State can yield more than a one-dimensional analysis.

The example of environmental interest group politics in the US illustrates how the State, through the use of its extensive armory of weapons of legitimation and accumulation, exerts a crucial influence on the tenor and conduct of those politics. It also illustrates that the neglect that political science in the US has associated with the concept of the State amounts to a part of the legitimation functions of the State. As Wolfe notes, "[t]hose who were denying the reality of the state, on the one hand, were contributing to its power, on the other" (Wolfe, 1977, p.xiv). It reinforces the myths of equality of access and resources that underlie the principles of participatory democratic politics. If there is no actor that can restrict or enable access to power, then this allows the potential to all. This potential does not exist to all in equal proportions. Class characteristics ensure the unequal distribution of resources. That environmental politics have so often been dismissed as the politics of the leisured middle-classes, when the logic of their own position dictates that the ideology is universal and not class-specific, demonstrates that the State can profoundly dictate the terms of discourse, the arenas of conflict, and the personnel granted access to the power

structures. The State therefore, can exercise a profound influence upon the outcomes of politics in all domains, even when those politics are unsuited to the structures of the State. It is a telling fact that environmentalism has compromised itself so that it can be incorporated into the State structures, whilst that very same movement is an indication of the contradictions inherent within those structures.

In late 1970, the US Congress passed the most comprehensive piece of environmental legislation to date. The Clean Air Act was an attempt to rectify the environmental damage done by hazardous automobile emissions, and by sulphur dioxide emissions from industry, that resulted in acid precipitation in Northern regions and in Canada. Cutting down on sulphur dioxide emissions is a possibility, but an expensive one for US industry. The way in which the Act was written meant that clean air standards had to be met in relatively localized regions. This allowed industry to put its energies into constructing taller smokestacks, that would disperse the gases into the upper atmosphere, allowing the local air standards to be met, the acid rain to be exported to other regions, and the economic costs to industry to be kept down to a minimum. The structures designed to change the situation remained essentially the same (if taller), and the results therefore remained the same. Unless the analysis of environmental interest group politics fully embraces the concept of the State as a crucial actor, it is destined to be like the smokestacks. Extending the flawed structures of the past, without re-evaluating fundamental premises, can only lead to drawing the same flawed conclusions of the past.

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