

The Impact of Advocacy Groups in Facilitating Policy Diffusion to Pass Paid Sick Leave Laws
in New Jersey

Anne Zobell

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Matthew M. Dull, Chair
Sara R. Jordan
Adrienne T. Edisis
Margaret M. Cowell

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ABSTRACT

This study of the adoption and diffusion of paid sick leave laws in New Jersey has been designed to examine the spread of the policy between local governments and then the subsequent adoption of the policy by the state. In New Jersey, PSL was first adopted by Jersey City in 2013. Following that adoption, 12 other New Jersey municipalities adopted PSL. In 2018, a law was passed by the state that then voided all the municipal laws and replaced them with a statewide policy.

Through a mixed methods research design, this study seeks to better understand the circumstances surrounding PSL. First, a logistic regression model was used to determine the characteristics that are associated with PSL adoption on the local level. Second, case studies were conducted for three adopting cities, Jersey City, Newark, and Morristown to better understand the political forces that facilitated the adoption and diffusion of PSL. Lastly, this study examined the adoption of PSL on the state level to better understand how the actions of governments on the local level affected the actions of the state government.

The logistic regression found that large cities, cities with a higher percentage of minorities, cities with a mayor-council form of government, and cities with a higher Gini coefficient were more likely to adopt PSL. In contrast to the findings of the logistic regression, the case studies revealed that the cities that adopted PSL were heavily Democratic and elected officials identified progressiveness as a motivator for adopting this policy.

This research used qualitative methods to evaluate how policy diffusion occurred and who facilitated this process. Through interviews, this research revealed the influence of policy advocates in helping to spread PSL to many New Jersey municipalities. An advocacy coalition named *New Jersey Time to Care* pursued what they termed *the municipal approach*. The political dynamics in the New Jersey state government prevented a statewide law from being adopted. Given this fact, the coalition pursued multiple municipal laws in order to help New Jerseyans receive paid sick leave benefits and to help build momentum for a statewide law when a change in political dynamics would allow for it.

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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

In recent years, many state and local governments have adopted paid sick leave laws. These laws require private businesses to allow their employees to earn and utilize paid sick days. This dissertation examines the jurisdictions in New Jersey that have adopted paid sick leave. It finds that large cities with a high percentage of minorities, a high level of income inequality, and a mayor-council form of government are more likely to adopt paid sick leave laws. This research also examines how advocacy groups influence elected officials in the policymaking process. Policy advocates built public support for the law and engaged in lobbying activities with elected officials. As they lobbied for the law, they presented city councils pre-drafted legislation that was then adopted by the city councils.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Purpose of the Study

This study of the adoption and diffusion of paid sick leave laws (PSL) is designed to identify how the spread of a policy among local governments can lead to the adoption of that policy by their respective state government. The study focuses on the influence of advocacy coalitions on elected officials and the strategic actions they take to facilitate the adoption of PSL in multiple jurisdictions on both the local and state level. While the effects of paid sick leave laws have been examined in academic health journals and through state-funded reports, the policy process surrounding PSL has not yet been studied. This study will use a diffusion framework in order to better understand the catalysts for policy adoption and policy diffusion.

Diffusion is defined as “the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 2003, p. 5). In the context of public policy, policy diffusion has also been defined as “one government’s policy choices being influenced by the choices of other governments” (Shipan & Volden, 2012, p. 788). Policymakers rely heavily on the examples and insights of past policy experiments. PSL offers a valid case for the study of policy diffusion, specifically an application of Berry and Berry’s Unified Model of Government Innovation. This model posits that policy adoption occurs due to a combination of internal and external determinants; namely, the social, political, and economic standing of a government as well as the influence of external determinants meaning policy diffusion (Berry & Berry, 2014). This study seeks to add to a growing literature that applies the Unified Model using cities as the level of analysis. Since most applications of the Unified Model have studied state-level policy adoptions, there is a demand for this new level of analysis. While the Unified Model has been applied ubiquitously, there are some valid critiques of the model and

its measurement of diffusion which will be further explored in the literature review. This study will use case studies to explore the diffusion of PSL between cities and the state to learn more of the political actors who facilitate diffusion. Specifically, interviews were conducted with public officials, members of legislative bodies, and representatives from advocacy groups who were active in a campaign in favor of PSL.

The analysis of the advocacy groups who were active in the campaign for PSL leads to questions about their motivations, resources, and processes while campaigning for PSL legislation. This analysis also leads to questions about the role that advocacy groups play in the spread of the policy and the relationship that they maintain with elected officials. This study also creates a space to examine how advocacy groups work together through the formation of coalitions. The Advocacy Coalition Framework and scholarship about policy entrepreneurship are used to better understand how coalitions are influential in the policymaking process and more specifically, how advocacy coalitions act as a facilitator of policy diffusion.

This study offers a space to examine the role of cities in American federalism. Traditionally, studies of federalism have focused on the shared sovereignty of the national and state governments. Increasingly, more studies have examined the influence of cities on American public policy and their role as “laboratories of democracy.” This phrase was first popularized by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis to describe states’ role to serve as a laboratory to try “novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country” (*New State Ice Co v. Liebmann*, 1932). In the time since that phrase was first used, cities have taken an increased role in performing policy experiments; such was the case with PSL. Although “The Healthy Families Act,” the first piece of legislation to propose mandatory paid sick leave policies in private businesses was introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2005, it has never been

brought to a vote in either chamber (Appelbaum, 2015). The first instance of a PSL policy being enacted occurred in San Francisco in 2006. Other cities followed suit, passing similar policies and then an increasing number of states began to adopt state-wide laws.

PSL offers a space to study both the diffusion of a policy on a city to city level as well as the scaling up of such a policy to the state level, a process commonly referred to as the “snowball effect” (Shipan & Volden, 2006) meaning that the adoption of local laws increases the likelihood of a statewide adoption. This study aimed to understand the diffusion forces that drove governments to adopt PSL by first, examining the characteristics of adopting cities and their motivations and resources, and second, examining how actors from local governments and their respective state government interact and influence each other in the policymaking process. Lastly, this study sought to understand how nongovernment actors such as advocacy groups are influential on the spread of a policy.

To accomplish this task, this study examined PSL laws in the state of New Jersey. New Jersey offers unique circumstances not seen in other states due to the fact that thirteen cities within the state adopted a PSL law between 2013 and 2016 and the state followed suit by adopting its own PSL law in 2018.

Background on Paid Sick Leave

On April 27, 2005, Representative Rosa DeLauro introduced H.R. 1902, The Healthy Families Act to the United States House of Representatives. The proposed legislation required employers who employ 15 or more employees to provide employees who worked at least 30 hours per week, a minimum of seven days of paid sick leave annually. This legislation was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, but it did not receive a vote in the

Committee. In the 2015 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama called upon Congress to pass the Healthy Families Act. Many advocacy groups including the National Partnership for Women and Families, Moms Rising, The United Steel Workers, and the Human Rights Campaign have expressed support for the Healthy Families Act and have engaged in campaigns to garner support from the general public, encouraging citizens to contact their Senators and Representatives. The Healthy Families Act has been introduced in both the House and the Senate in each subsequent session of Congress but has never proceeded to a vote in either chamber (Appelbaum, 2015). Most recently, this bill was reintroduced in the Senate by Senator Patty Murray and Representative DeLauro on March 14, 2019.

Paid sick leave and the Healthy Families Act have also received opposition that helps explain why no further legislative action has been taken. Senator Lamar Alexander, a Republican and Chairman of the Senate Health Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, has stated that a government mandate would infringe on Americans' freedom and increase the cost of doing business in the United States (Wolfgang, 2015). The National Federation of Independent Businesses opposed this legislation citing that many small businesses would not be able to afford the costs associated with the policy. The Employment Policies Institute also opposed the legislation and argued that it would hurt job creation and reduce the hours of low-wage employees (Hoover, 2015). The dynamics displayed on the national level are similar to the dynamics that were explored in this dissertation. There is competition between groups who advocate for workers' rights and groups who advocate to protect businesses from government overreach.

The first paid sick leave law in the United States was passed in San Francisco in 2006. Since then, 32 other municipalities and 11 states have passed similar policies. A map illustrating

Antonio in Texas; and Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth in Minnesota have all implemented PSL despite not being geographically proximate to other adopting states.

Finally, as this map shows, there is a large gap in the middle of the country where there are no such laws. A number of states including Oklahoma, Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Indiana have passed preemption laws which prohibit any municipality from enacting paid sick leave (“Paid Sick Days Preemption Bills,” 2017). Frequently, preemption laws from state governments preempt paid sick leave as well as other labor-friendly policies such as increased minimum wage.

Paid sick leave laws define the acceptable situations in which employees may use their paid sick leave. In addition to using the benefit when the employee is ill, employees may also use their sick leave to care for a sick family member. Most laws also stipulate that victims of domestic violence are permitted to use the leave to attend to personal and legal matters. Many jurisdictions craft policies that create different standards depending on company size. For example, some of the municipal laws in New Jersey required employers with 10 or more employees to allow their employees to earn up to 5 days of leave per year, while companies with fewer than 10 employees were required to allow employees to earn up to 3 days per year.

On both the state and the local level, interest groups and policy advocates have been active in the policymaking process. In San Francisco, the Young Workers United led a campaign in support of sick leave legislation. Young Workers United led The Coalition for Paid Sick Days, a coalition of community groups, unions, workers, and college students, in an aggressive public outreach and education campaign to garner voter support. The coalition used most of its \$15,000 campaign funds on 100,000 pieces of tri-lingual literature (Young Workers

United, 2007). The ballot initiative was sponsored by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and passed with a 61% voter endorsement.

On the state level, in Massachusetts, Raise Up Massachusetts, a coalition of 250 organizations including labor unions, business leaders, civic leaders and faith groups advocated for a sick leave law that would allow workers to earn up to 40 hours of sick leave per year. This coalition collected signatures so that the measure could appear as a question on the state ballot. Once the signatures were collected, Raise Up Massachusetts engaged in voter outreach and education through canvassing efforts, phone banking, and public advertisements in order to help the measure pass (“Raise Up Massachusetts: About Us,” n.d.).

Recent literature has examined the influence and outcomes of PSL on the economy and workers. Proponents for PSL argue that there are two main positive outcomes of a PSL policy. First, such a policy promotes individual and public health by reducing the spread of disease and length of illness, and second, PSL reduces the probability of job separations. Some research has examined these claims empirically. Asfaw, Pana-cryan, and Rosa (2012) found that workers with access to paid sick leave were 28% less likely than workers without paid sick leave to suffer a workplace injury. There is evidence that access to paid sick leave has broader health implications beyond the employee. The American Public Health Association (2013) found that during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic an additional 7 million people were infected and 1,500 people died because contagious workers did not stay home from work to recover. A national survey of 4,300 restaurant employees found that 88% of respondents did not have access to paid sick leave. As a result, 63% of respondents admitted to cooking and serving food while ill (Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, 2010). Access to paid sick leave gives workers an avenue to recover from illness before returning to work and infecting others. There is also evidence that

access to PSL has a positive effect on people's overall health. In an analysis of the 2008 National Health Interview Survey, Peipins et al. (2012) found that workers with access to paid sick leave were more likely to have at least one visit to a healthcare provider in the preceding year, and U.S. female employees with paid sick leave were more likely to undergo mammography testing at the recommended time intervals than women without such benefits.

Claims that paid sick leave is beneficial to business have also been studied empirically. Hill (2013) examined the relationship between access to paid sick leave and job separation and found that access to PSL decreased the probability of job separation by at least 25% with the association being strongest for people without paid vacation time and for mothers. This finding suggests that workplaces that offer PSL to their employees experience less staff turnover and more stability with their employees. Furthermore, this study found that many policies that workplaces have implemented on their own accord in order to address employee illness such as flextime and telecommuting are not compatible with the service and manufacturing industries. Hill concludes that "paid sick leave might be a tool of flexibility that could be more evenly applied across industries, occupations, and workers" (p. 166).

While PSL benefits individuals, there is also research indicating that PSL is positive for business and the economy as a whole. A study of Connecticut's law found that after the law was implemented, employers reported little effect on their overall expenses. Fifteen percent of employers reported an increase in productivity and 30 percent reported a noticeable improvement in employee morale. This particular study concludes that there is no evidence of this law being a "job killer" (Appelbaum, Milkman, Elliott, & Kroeger, 2014).

Primary Research Questions

The adoption of paid sick leave, its diffusion across cities in New Jersey, and its scaling up to a state law were analyzed in this dissertation. This dissertation examined the following research questions:

1. What factors contributed to the adoption of a paid sick leave law by a municipality in New Jersey between 2013 and 2016?
2. How did advocacy groups facilitate the diffusion of paid sick leave in New Jersey?
3. How did paid sick leave diffuse upward to become a state law in New Jersey?

This study shows the influence of advocacy and interest groups on policy diffusion. This is becoming a more ubiquitous topic in policy diffusion studies. By asking these questions together, this dissertation advances policy diffusion literature by helping identify possible causal mechanisms that have led to the policy's spread. These three questions are best answered by triangulating multiple sources of data and methods. Denzin (1978) defines triangulation as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (p. 291). The research methodology outlined below used multiple methods and sources of data to answer the research questions.

Research Methodology

The objective of this study is to understand how PSL was adopted by so many different governments in New Jersey. Since this research aims to understand the spread of a policy, a policy diffusion framework is the best approach. Roger's wrote in *Diffusion of Innovations*

(2003) that policy innovations often follow an “S-Curve” where adoption is slow at the start, followed by a rapid climb in adoption, followed by a leveling off. Indeed, this pattern of adoption is observed in New Jersey and nationwide. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate this pattern. In both cases, the early period is defined by slow growth, followed by a steep climb, and finishing with a leveling off period.

Figure 2. PSL Adoption and Diffusion from 2006 to 2018 Nationwide





Figure 2 demonstrates the diffusion pattern nationwide. As the previous section discussed, the policy was first introduced in 2006 in San Francisco. The second instance of PSL occurred in Washington, DC in 2008. Over the next few years, there were years where no municipalities adopted PSL as was the case in 2010 and 2012 or there were two municipalities per year that adopted PSL, as was the case in 2011 and 2013. This seven-year timeframe is considered the initial start of the diffusion curve where the adoption of policies is slow to start. In 2014, there is a large increase in the number of adoptions of PSL nationwide when 10

municipalities adopted PSL in the same year. This rapid climb continued in 2015 and 2016 when nine and 10 municipalities adopted in each respective year. Finally, a leveling off period is observed in 2017 and 2018 when the number of PSL adoptions decreased to one and six in each respective year.

This same “s-curve” pattern of diffusion is observed in New Jersey, though on a smaller scale and over a shorter period of time.

Figure 3. PSL Adoption and Diffusion from 2013 to 2016 in New Jersey



As the graph in Figure 3 shows, there was one adoption of PSL in New Jersey in 2013. The following year, seven municipalities adopted PSL. The number of adoptions decreased to three in 2015 and two in 2016.

This research conducted an examination of New Jersey to understand why certain cities participated in this policy experiment. Berry and Berry’s Unified Model of Government Innovation (2014) posits that a government’s adoption of a new innovation is a function of its internal characteristics; namely, political, economic, and social characteristics, and external pressures; namely, diffusion. This dissertation examined the internal characteristics of

municipalities in New Jersey in order to ascertain which characteristics were impactful to the 13 municipalities that adopted PSL. The first research question: *What factors contributed to the adoption of a paid sick leave law by a municipality in New Jersey between 2013 and 2016?* is answered through this inquiry.

The second research question *How did advocacy groups facilitate the diffusion of paid sick leave in New Jersey?* requires background in other theories of the policy process that explain how and why unofficial actors such as interest and advocacy groups play a role in advancing policy. Kingdon's (1984) Multiple Stream Framework (MSF) contends that the policy process includes multiple independent “streams” that include problems, policy proposals, and political events. In this framework, policy is driven by the policy entrepreneur, meaning an individual who creates policy alternatives and presents them to key decisionmakers at the appropriate time. Building on this work, Mintrom (1997) discussed the actions policy entrepreneurs take to form coalitions in order advance their causes. Sabaiter (1988) developed the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to describe the complicated policymaking environments. He posits that advocacy coalitions are comprised of multiple members including elected officials, agency officials, interest group leaders, and researchers who share a belief system and engage in non-trivial coordinated activity over time. The ACF has been updated several times with additional contributing authors (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014).

These frameworks, which will be further described in the literature review in Chapter 2, help explain the actions of advocacy groups. While the details of each of these approaches differ, they all agree that advocacy groups are influential in policymaking due to their relationships with policymakers and their specialized knowledge of issues. This research

contributes to scholarly literature by showing how advocacy groups contributed to the spread or diffusion of a public policy.

The third research question, *How did paid sick leave diffuse upward to become a state law in New Jersey?* draws on literature about bottom-up federalism, or what Shipan and Volden (2006) define as the process where local laws have an influence on state-wide policy adoption. Shipan and Volden (2006) identify ways that localities may have effects on state-level policymaking. First, negative externalities of local laws may lead affected citizens to seek state government action to correct the negative effects of local laws. Second, state politicians may draw from the experiences of localities in order to identify policy ideas that can be implemented at the state level. When using localities in this manner, state policymakers use local adoptions to signal political viability and effectiveness. Third, citizens and interest groups may lobby state policymakers demanding they adopt laws that give the same benefits that are found in surrounding cities.


Research questions two and three were addressed through case studies which examine the adoption of PSL by three New Jersey cities and by the state of New Jersey. Data was triangulated through interviews with elected officials and advocacy group representatives, document analysis, and news article analysis in order to formulate answers to these questions.

Research Design

This research employed a mixed-methods approach and used statistical techniques to answer questions about the internal characteristics of adopting cities and case studies to answer questions about the process and mechanisms of policy diffusion. This combined methodology is equipped to handle the research complexities that have been identified in policy diffusion

literature. Many studies which applied Berry and Berry's Unified Model of Government Innovation have relied solely on statistical models to measure and analyze variables influencing policy innovation and adoption. These studies included quantitative techniques in order to measure diffusion. More recent literature has explored the limitations of such an approach and recommended using qualitative methods to study the facilitators and mechanisms of diffusion (Starke, 2013). This study tested the Unified Model using both quantitative techniques and qualitative techniques. Factors pertaining to a city's internal characteristics were measured quantitatively through a logistic regression. Qualitative techniques including interviews with city council members and advocacy group representatives were used to better understand the process and mechanisms that were associated with policy diffusion in this case. Including qualitative methods in policy diffusion research helps better understand how cities learn from, compete with, or imitate each other and who is driving these actions. The use of mixed-methods was necessary because parts of the Unified Model of Government Innovation are best tested statistically and parts of the Model are best tested through qualitative methods. Figure 4 displays a flowchart that demonstrates the parts of the research that were examined through quantitative methods and the parts of the research that were examined through qualitative methods.

Figure 4. Research Design Flowchart



Research Setting

As shown in the previous section, PSL has been adopted by many cities and states across the country. Earlier iterations of this research have compared the broad scope of adopting cities. While there are insights that can be gained from examining all jurisdictions that adopted PSL, this research narrows the focus to one state. Cities within New Jersey were chosen as the unit of analysis because New Jersey offers a unique situation not seen in other states. Thirteen cities within the state adopted their own PSL ordinance before the state law was passed. By comparison, the next state with the most adopted city PSL ordinances is California with seven. Most other states with adopting cities only have one or two such as Texas, Illinois, and Minnesota. By studying cities within New Jersey, a comparison can be made between adopting and nonadopting cities to better predict why certain cities adopt while others do not.

In addition to providing an example of city to city diffusion, New Jersey offers a context where the same policies were being considered at different levels of government. During the period when New Jersey cities were adopting their PSL ordinances, legislation was being

developed by the state government that would create a state-wide law. The New Jersey Earned Sick Leave Act was first proposed in the New Jersey State Legislature in 2013. This act faced years of political opposition that is discussed in the case studies and was signed into law on May 2, 2018, by Governor Phil Murphy. The law became effective later that year. This situation provides another context to this diffusion study where the mechanisms that influence state adoption of a policy after the municipal adoption of a policy can be examined.

Logistic Regression Model

The first component of this dissertation adapted the Unified Model of Government Innovation and using a logistic regression, compared cities that adopted paid sick leave to cities that did not adopt paid sick leave. The Unified Model calls for an analysis of both internal determinants and external determinants of adoption. In adapting the Unified Model, only internal determinants of policy adoption were included in the regression model. External diffusion pressures were examined qualitatively in the case studies. Variables regarding social, political, and economic conditions were assembled using data from the American Communities Survey and the Rutgers New Jersey Data Book. The American Communities Survey is an ongoing survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that provides information about communities in the United States. The survey includes information regarding population, education attainment, employment, and other socio-economic factors. For this research, the ACS Five Year Estimates provides the most far-reaching data and information since the Five-Year Estimates Survey includes cities with a population of 20,000 and under (United States Census Bureau, 2018). More specific information regarding the logistic regression will be included in Chapter 3.

Case Studies

The second component of this research examined qualitatively the process by which paid sick leave became law in New Jersey municipalities and then the entire state. One of the key components of the case studies was the examination of what Berry and Berry's Unified Model defines as external pressures; that is, policy diffusion. The case studies were conducted in order to understand why so many cities in New Jersey adopted the same policy. This research conducted case studies of three New Jersey cities: Jersey City, Newark, and Morristown as well as the state as a whole. Schramm (1971) writes, "the essence of a case study...is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result" (p. 6). These case studies triangulated data by examining legislative data, public newspaper reports, and data from interviews with both elected officials and advocacy group members who were involved in the policymaking process. The intention of this approach was to understand how policy actors in different cities and at the state level interacted with each other and the decisions that followed. The objective of this part of the research was to better understand the mechanisms of policy diffusion that were present in New Jersey.

This research used a nonrandom small set case study approach. Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) define a case as "a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context" (p. 28). The boundaries of this case are from when Jersey City passed their ordinance in 2013 until the state of New Jersey passed its state law in 2018. This study examined three different cities in order to understand the city to city diffusion process. These cities were selected in order to obtain what Miles, Huberman, and Saldana call maximum variation samples. Jersey City was selected because it was the first city to pass an ordinance in New Jersey. Newark, the second New Jersey city to pass PSL, was selected in order to understand how Newark may have been influenced by the actions of Jersey City. Morristown was selected because it was the last city to

pass an ordinance before the state law was created. Morristown serves as what Miles et al. consider a deviant case because with a population of roughly 18,000 it differs so greatly in size from most adopting cities, not just in New Jersey but countrywide.

Limitations of the Research

The methodological approach using logistic regression and case studies presents some limitations. There were only 13 municipalities of 565 New Jersey municipalities that adopted PSL. With only 2% of New Jersey municipalities adopting PSL, this can be considered a “rare event” (King & Zeng, 2001) Logistic regression in rare events presents the possibility for regression results to be biased. For this reason, the findings from the logistic regression will be compared to the findings from the case study interviews. The case studies will be used to better understand the findings of the logistic regression model. There are also limitations to the regression model and the amount of data collected. As will be shown in Chapter 3, the r-squared scores are in the mid-fifties. This indicates that there are silent explanatory variables that are not considered in the regression model. A lower r-squared was expected since no variable to measure diffusion was included in the quantitative model. There is potential for other unmeasured explanatory variables to have been influential on the adoptions of this policy. There are, however, limitations to the case studies. First, the number of municipality case studies was limited to three since conducting case studies of all 13 adopting municipalities would not be feasible. Second, there were limitations in the interview data that were gathered due to a low response rate. To compensate for the low interview response rate, additional information was gathered from legislative documents and news articles. The legislative documents were gathered through each case city’s archives. This also presented additional limitations as the

amount of information recorded varied by city. News articles were gathered through Factiva and NJ.com, a repository of local newspapers in New Jersey. The data collected here only included only news articles and did not include any social media postings. The news articles are used to gather quotes from elected officials that were involved in the legislative process are used to confirm and clarify the findings from the interviews. Third, the interviews required participants to remember events that occurred up to six years ago, and some recollections may not be correct. This is another reason that the interview data was confirmed and validated using news articles. Lastly, this research limits its scope to the boundaries of New Jersey. Some findings and generalizations may not be applicable to all places that have adopted PSL.

Significance of the Study

Berry and Berry's Unified Model of Government Innovation has been used in the study of government innovations and their diffusion by many scholars. Much of this scholarship has focused on state government innovations and how neighboring states influence each other (Berry & Berry, 1990; Jensen, 2003). This study of the proliferation of city-based paid sick leave policies adds to the limited literature about city to city policy diffusion and the limited literature that focuses on diffusion from local government to state government. The second half of this research makes the most significant contribution as it will study the mechanisms of policy diffusion and the actors that help facilitate diffusion. In previous quantitative studies of city to city policy diffusion, the methods for measuring diffusion are rudimentary and do not fully prove the presence of diffusion. Since quantitative models are unable to capture the mechanisms of policy diffusion, qualitative methods will be used to better understand how policy diffusion occurred between cities in the context of PSL. Specifically, this study adds to scholarly literature by examining the influence of advocacy coalitions on policy diffusion. The analysis of the

findings performs what Patton (2002) calls theory triangulation. Multiple theoretical frameworks including diffusion of innovation, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and Policy Entrepreneurship are discussed to provide explanation for the findings. This dissertation contributes to policy process literature by making new connections between the different schools of thought.

Additionally, this research will add to literature about paid sick leave in general. PSL has been studied from a health, labor, and economic perspective, and scholars have evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of this policy; however, PSL has not yet been studied in terms of how and why it becomes public policy.

Overview of Dissertation

The Introduction of this dissertation has defined paid sick leave laws and given the history and context of these laws. The research related to sick leave and the arguments made in favor of these policies have been discussed. The three research questions have been identified and the research methods for answering those questions have been outlined. The limitations and the significance of this study have also been discussed.

Chapter 2 reviews the scholarly literature related to this topic. First, literature related to diffusion of innovation is presented. The history of the single explanation theories purported by Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) are explained as well as how they lead to the Unified Model posited by Berry and Berry (1990). A brief explanation of Event History Analysis is presented as well as the critiques of how diffusion has been measured in applications of EHA. Theories relating to the influence of interest and advocacy coalitions on policymaking is presented. Additionally, the brief amount of literature that examines the influence of interest groups on diffusion is presented. Chapter 2 concludes with the conceptual framework for this project.

Chapter 3 presents the logistic regression which examines the influence of different social, economic, and political characteristics of New Jersey cities on the adoption of PSL. This chapter puts forth four overarching hypotheses: The Large City Hypothesis, the Government Resources Hypothesis, the Political Motivations Hypothesis, and the Socio-Economic Conditions Hypothesis. Each of these hypotheses is tested through multiple variables.

Chapter 4 is a brief chapter that explains the methods used in the case studies. The interview protocol is outlined as well as the sources of documentation data.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the case studies. Rather than presenting each case city as a separate chapter, Chapter 5 discusses the legislative history of each city and findings from interviews with elected officials from Jersey City, Newark, and Morristown. Comparisons are made between each of the case studies. Chapter 5 discusses the motivations, resources, and opposition that elected officials identified as relevant to PSL. Chapter 5 also discusses how elected officials interacted with advocacy groups and how they considered the policies of previously adopting cities.

Chapter 6 discusses how advocacy groups were involved in the policymaking process at the local level. The findings from the interviews with advocacy group representatives are presented here. In these interviews, the advocacy group representatives did not differentiate their activities in the different case study cities; rather, they spoke more generally about the work that they did all over the state. For this reason, it was best to present the findings from elected officials in one chapter and the findings from the advocacy group representatives in another. This chapter outlines the different advocacy groups that were involved in PSL in New Jersey, and how they coordinated their efforts through an advocacy coalition. This chapter shows that

the advocacy groups purposefully and deliberately pursued what they called “The Municipal Approach” to facilitate PSL in multiple cities in New Jersey.

Chapter 7 discusses the state level case and includes findings from interviews with state legislative staff and the interviews with the advocacy group representatives. This chapter outlines the six-year process from when PSL was first introduced in the New Jersey General Assembly in 2013 to when the bill was signed into law in May 2018. Chapter 7 discusses the motivations, resources, and obstacles that were present on the state level. This chapter also discusses how advocacy groups were involved in the policymaking process on the state level and how the local legislation affected the adoption of state legislation.

Chapter 8 discusses the comparison of the qualitative and quantitative analysis. This chapter discusses the findings of the logistic regression and how those findings are confirmed or refuted through the findings of the qualitative analysis. Chapter 8 concludes by circling back to the research questions and discussing how this dissertation has answered those questions. The chapter then acknowledges the limitations of this study and presents future research that should be undertaken to better understand this topic.

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

This study of the diffusion of paid sick leave (PSL) in New Jersey was designed to help explain which cities adopted PSL, how PSL spread from municipality to municipality, and how PSL scaled up from local government to become law in the entire state of New Jersey. This study sought to identify the relevant internal characteristics of adopting municipalities and the outside forces that facilitated the spread of this policy. This study's objective was to identify what motivates a municipality to adopt PSL and what mechanisms enable the spread of information from municipality to municipality and from multiple municipalities to state government. This literature review will identify and analyze materials relating to this research objective. The literature review begins with an overview of the different theoretical approaches to diffusion studies; namely single explanation theories and the Unified Model of Government Innovation. The literature review then explains the political drivers of policy diffusion and the different explanations for how policy diffusion occurs. Advocacy groups have shown to be an influential component on the spread of PSL laws, and this research is designed to explore their influence. Therefore, literature pertaining to the influence of advocacy groups, namely, the Advocacy Coalition Framework and policy entrepreneurship are explored. Finally, literature pertaining to bottom-up federalism and the role of municipalities in policy diffusion is discussed.

Diffusion of Innovation

As discussed in Chapter 1, and as shown in Figure 3, the adoption of PSL by New Jersey cities follows the S-Curve pattern that is identified in diffusion of innovation literature. Rogers (2003) describes three periods of innovation. The first period is defined by experimentation, trial and error, and challenges. This period tends to be slow as initial adopters assume the risks of

innovation. The second period is marked by a steep climb in adoptions as other jurisdictions follow the lead of initial adopters. The third period is described as a leveling off period, resulting in a “S-Curve” pattern. This study focuses on a short, 3-year period; however, the adoption of PSL in New Jersey follows the “S-curve” pattern of adoption described by Roger. In 2013, one city adopted PSL, followed by 8 adoptions in 2014, and 2 adoptions in both 2015 and 2016. Given this characteristic, PSL is an appropriate policy to apply the diffusion of innovation framework.

Single Explanation Theories

A vast amount of literature has been written about diffusion of innovation. This literature review aims to present the key scholarly debates and developments that are relevant to this project. Jack Walker’s work, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States” has largely informed policy diffusion studies for the last 50 years. Walker (1969) asks 1.) why certain states adopt new programs more rapidly than other states, and 2.) whether there are more or less stable patterns of diffusion among the American states? Walker’s research and analysis of states and the programs they adopt led to the conclusion that states can be categorized three different ways: national leaders, regional leaders, or followers. These findings point to a pattern that some states are policy pioneers and other states will emulate and follow their lead. Walker also points to the importance of organizations that increase communications across state lines such as professional organizations, academic experts, administrative consultants, and even journalists. These organizations serve two general purposes: they are “sources of information and policy cues” and “serve as ‘occupational contact networks’ which expedite the interstate movement or transfer of personnel” (Walker, 1969, p. 895). Both purposes serve to rapidly disseminate policy knowledge.

Virginia Gray (1973), another policy diffusion scholar, also studied policy adoptions and reached a somewhat different conclusion than Walker. Her study of the 48 contiguous states found that the early or late adopters of one innovation were not necessarily the early or late adopters of another innovation. Specifically, she found that states that were early adopters of educational innovations were not also early adopters of welfare or civil rights innovations and vice versa. This finding contradicts Walker's claim that some states are leaders while others are followers and suggests that "innovativeness is not a pervasive factor rather, it is issue-and-time specific at best" (Gray, 1973, p. 1185).

Walker and Gray's works hypothesize that policy innovation occurs as a result of external diffusion pressures. During this same time period, Mohr (1969) studied the determinants of innovation in public agencies by studying 93 public health agencies. His study evaluated the influence of an organization's size, resources, and motivation on its likelihood of adopting innovations. His study confirmed his hypothesis that "innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation, and directly related to the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles" (p. 63). Mohr's work indicated that innovations within an organization could be predicted based on the internal characteristics of each individual organization. This theoretical approach to explaining adoption of innovations focuses on the internal characteristics of an organization and does not consider the influence of outside sources and pressures.

Policy Diffusion Models

Policy diffusion literature has identified three models to help explain how policy diffusion occurs: the national interaction model, the regional diffusion model, and the leader-laggard model. The National Interaction Model, developed by Gray (1973) assumes a national

communications network among state officials where state officials interact and learn from their peers about policies. In this model, state officials who have already adopted a policy interact with not-yet-adopting state officials and act as a stimulus to encourage additional state adoptions of a certain policy. This model assumes that state officials interact through professional associations such as the National Governors' Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures (Berry & Berry, 2014). The utility of this model is severely limited as it assumes that all nonadopting states are equally likely to adopt during a time period; the probability of adoption only changes based on the cumulative number of adopters prior to that time period. The model does not account for differences between states.

The regional diffusion model posits that governments are primarily influenced by other governments that are geographically proximate (Walker, 1969). Neighbor models assume that governments are influenced by the governments with which they share a border. Fixed region models divide the United States into multiple regions and assume governments within the same regions tend to emulate each other. While regional clustering was common in policy diffusion research for many decades, it has more recently been critiqued as overly simplistic and sometimes misleading. Shipan and Volden (2012) argue that as technological advances have increased communication, American states look far beyond their own borders when searching for policy solutions. Furthermore, neighboring states tend to have political, economic, and demographic similarities that prompt the adoption of similar policies without being dependent on the policy choices of another government.

The leader-laggard model assumes that certain jurisdictions are pioneers of a policy and other jurisdictions emulate the policy leaders (Walker, 1969). Policy leaders can be found on both the national level and within the regions defined by the regional diffusion model. Berry and

Berry (2014) argue that while it is reasonable to expect some jurisdictions to be the first jurisdiction to adopt a policy, no research has been able to identify the jurisdictions that are expected to be the policy leaders and the jurisdictions that are expected to follow and in what order. Indeed, this observation is consistent with Gray's (1973) finding that policy leaders in one policy field were not necessarily policy leaders in another.

The Unified Model of Government Innovation

Most scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s relied on single-explanation methodologies to explain policy adoptions. Walker's work explained policy adoptions through a system of emulation between states and Mohr's work explained innovation in terms of internal motivations and resources. Although scholars acknowledged that few policies could be explained as solely a function of internal determinants or policy diffusion, the methodologies used to conduct empirical research focused on either one explanation or the other. Berry and Berry (1990) consider the segregation of the two types of explanations a critical conceptual weakness. In 1990, Berry and Berry introduced a new model and methodology that simultaneously considers both internal and external determinants. The Unified Model of Government Innovation posits that the probability of a jurisdiction to adopt a policy in a specific year is a function of its motivation, resources and obstacles, previous adoption of other policies, and the previous behavior of other jurisdictions. To test this proposition, the research used Event History Analysis (EHA) to study state lottery adoptions (Berry & Berry, 1990).

Prior to Berry and Berry's work, event history analysis was seldom used in political science research but frequently found in other social science research and the biological sciences. EHA is a statistical method that is used to predict the occurrences of events at a particular point in time; it has been used to predict occurrences such as births, marriages, divorces, job

terminations, arrests, and death (Allison, 2004). When using EHA, the outcome variable is called the *hazard rate*, and is a dichotomous variable that describes if the event has or has not happened to the individual or organization during the specified period of time. The dichotomous nature of this variables requires probit or logit regression to be used as the estimation technique. As with other regression models, independent variables are used to predict their influence on the likelihood of an event occurring. More discussion of EHA and how it applies to this research will appear in Chapter 3.

Berry and Berry (1990) considered the influence of internal political and economic characteristics of a state and the number of previously adopting neighboring states on the probability of a state establishing a state lottery. Their findings indicate the validity of Mohr's internal determinants hypothesis meaning that factors such as resources, motivations, and obstacles have an influence of the likelihood of a state adopting a lottery. The research also indicates that previously adopting neighboring states have an impact on the likelihood of adoption. Taken together, these findings validate Berry and Berry's assertion that "regional diffusion and internal determinants explanations of state innovation should not be analyzed in isolation; instead, unified models are needed" (p. 411). Berry and Berry's theoretical and methodological contribution to policy diffusion research has resulted in countless applications of this technique to a diverse set of policy contexts including state sentencing laws (Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel, 2004), Mother's Aid programs (Allard, 2004), living wage ordinances (Swarts & Vasi, 2011), and state lotteries (Berry & Berry, 1990; Jensen, 2003).

The Unified Model and the use of event history analysis to study policy adoption and diffusion has been ubiquitous, and its widespread use has facilitated comparability across studies (Karch, 2007). While this model has been a standard approach to diffusion studies, there are

limitations to what EHA can measure and a growing literature has offered critiques and solutions to this problem. Shipan and Volden (2012) specifically critique the way diffusion forces are measured. Diffusion forces are often measured by the number of geographically neighboring states that had also adopted a specific policy. They warn that the view of policy diffusion as “geographic clustering is often overly limiting, sometimes misleading (or even wrong), and increasingly outdated” (p. 789). Karch (2007) notes that while the use of event history analysis has produced valuable contributions by identifying the state-level characteristics associated with the adoption of public policy, it has not successfully identified the political forces that facilitate policy diffusion.

Mechanisms of Diffusion

Berry and Berry (2014) note that their research from 1990 was designed to empirically analyze the question *Does a policy diffuse?* Their research, and research by contemporary scholars, did not ask the question *How does a policy diffuse?* Recent scholarship focuses more on the mechanisms of policy diffusion. Policy diffusion is a multifaceted process and there are different motivations or pressures that may result in a government emulating another government. Shipan and Volden (2008) summarize four mechanisms for policy diffusion: learning, imitation, coercion, and economic competition. Governments can learn from the experiences of other governments “by observing the politics of policy adoption and the impact of those policies” (p. 841). When confronted with a problem, governments will adopt an alternative that has already proven effective in another government. The second mechanism, imitation, is sometimes referred to as emulation. It involves “copying the actions of another government in order to look like that other” (p. 842). Economic competition occurs when there are spillover effects from a previously adopting government. The likelihood of adopting a policy increases

when there are positive spillover effects and decreases when there are negative spillover effects. The last mechanism, coercion, generally occurs in the U.S. context when higher governments influence the policies of lower governments whether through grant funding or preemptive policies.

Political Drivers of Diffusion

Karch (2007) argues that policy diffusion literature has focused on three broad questions. 1.) why does policy diffusion occur? 2.) which political actors facilitate diffusion? and 3.) what is being diffused? Karch critiques the use of quantitative methods in policy diffusion studies and argues that event history analysis has been useful to better understand the state-level characteristics associated with the adoption of a public policy; however, event history analysis “does not help us understand the political processes through which policies diffuse from one state to another” (p. 65). To better understand the three broad questions posed by policy diffusion research, Karch argues that researchers must explore the impact of national organizations, policy entrepreneurs, and national government intervention on policy diffusion. In a similar vein, Starke (2013) argues that qualitative methods are best suited for scholars to address two important questions: 1.) are policy changes indeed the outcome of a diffusion process? and 2.) what are the mechanisms underpinning such a process? Indeed, more recent policy diffusion research has used qualitative methods to better understand how policy diffusion is occurring and who is responsible for the policy diffusion process.

National Organizations and Interest Groups

The extant literature suggests that nonstate actors such as policy advocacy groups and professional associations have an impact on policy diffusion by encouraging the flow of information between governments. Walker’s (1969) foundational research on this topic suggests

that professional associations facilitate the exchange of ideas and knowledge through organized conferences and published documents that raise politicians' and public administrators' awareness of issues and policy solutions. National organizations such as think tanks and policy research groups view the dissemination of policy information as a key part of their organizational mission.

Walker and his contemporaries speak of associations and organizations as facilitators in the policy process who host events and provide resources that allow legislators to communicate and learn from one another. Garrett and Jansa (2015) found that interest groups are more active in the policy process than once thought. In recent years interest groups have contributed to policy diffusion through the dissemination of model legislation. Interest groups formulate policy and provide prewritten bills to legislators while legislators focus on the politics of the legislative process. As interest groups provide identical legislative language to multiple states and municipalities, similar policies become common across states. Their research finds that “interest groups, rather than innovative and early-adopting states, play the most central role in the policy diffusion networks” (p. 388). Collingwood, El-khatib, and Brien (2019) used similar techniques to evaluate the influence of the American Legislative Exchange Council on anti-sanctuary policy and found that ALEC has exerted an overwhelming influence on anti-sanctuary legislative proposals in U.S. states through the dissemination of model legislation. Jansa, Hansen, and Gray (2019) explore the instances of copy and paste legislation where state legislatures pass bills with similar texts as previously adopted bills. Their work finds that citizen legislatures copy more language from previous adopters, while professional legislatures with more resources are more likely to reinvent diffusing policies to cater to their specific constituency.

The extant literature has shown the interest groups play a role in policy diffusion by increasing the communication and flow of information between jurisdictions. Recent literature has begun to explore the expanding role of interest groups and found that they now have more influence and power than once thought.

Policy Entrepreneurs

Policy entrepreneurs, as defined by Mintrom (1997), are “people who seek dynamic policy change” (p. 44). These people may be elected officials, executive agency officials or private citizens. Policy entrepreneurs’ key role is to provide accurate and convincing information to decisionmakers. Policy entrepreneurs often use policy networks as a way to develop their policy ideas and gather technical and political information in order to better communicate their ideas to elected officials and the public. Policy entrepreneurs remain an understudied subject, largely because of the difficulty in constructing measurements of entrepreneurial activity (Karch, 2007). Mintrom’s study of policy entrepreneurs active in school-choice programs measured entrepreneurial activity through survey methods that asked participants to identify policy entrepreneurs in school-choice programs and identify how involved those entrepreneurs were in terms of team-leadership, problem framing, and networking. This study found that the presence of policy entrepreneurs significantly raised the probability of a legislature approving a school-choice program. Karch (2007) writes of the importance of networking for policy entrepreneurs because it allows them to learn the details of public policy across state lines and disseminate that knowledge to politicians and the public. In this way, policy entrepreneurs act as a mechanism of policy diffusion.

National Government Intervention

National government is a force that can simultaneously affect policymaking in multiple states, making diffusion a vertical process rather than a horizontal process as seen in state to state policy diffusion (Karch, 2007). National government can influence states through financial incentives such as grant programs or by threatening to withdraw funds when some type of compliance is not met. National government encourages state officials to focus on certain policies alternatives and provide resources as a way of supporting certain policies. National government can also disseminate policy knowledge by encouraging the formation of policy networks (Mossberger, 2000).

Municipalities

While a large portion of diffusion literature focuses on the diffusion of policies from state to state, there is a growing literature that studies the adoption and diffusion of policies between American cities. American cities often perform policy experiments as is the case with PSL and the city of San Francisco being the first jurisdiction to adopt PSL. Koxi (2010) writes about U.S. cities enduring as relevant policymaking institutions, noting that cities share similar problems, constituent demands, and resource constraints as state and national governments. Similar to higher levels of government, cities are likely to look to fellow local governments as they solve policy problems and rely on the advice of previously adopting cities who can speak to the success or failure of policy experiments.

Similar to state-level policy research, municipal level policy research has fallen into the different schools of thought about what explains policy adoption and diffusion. Some research such as Clingermayer and Feiock's (1990) study of economic development policies has relied on

solely on internal explanations for policy adoption and not considered the role of policy diffusion. As Koski (2010) demonstrates, there is a growing amount of research that considers how cities interact with each other and influence each other. Research on the municipal level has found that the same drivers of diffusion on the state level exist on the local level. For example, Koski discusses three components, popular support, policy advocates, and professional networks, and argues that “some combination of the three is necessary for an idea to truly ‘catch-on’ with other jurisdictions” (p. 95).

Diffusion and Federalism

Policy diffusion literature often focuses on diffusion between equal levels of government (i.e. city to city or state to state). A growing literature has explored instances of vertical diffusion or bottom up federalism where the national government enacts similar policies as those enacted by the states. Dinan and Krane (2006) note that there are many conditions that may spur state policy action instead of federal policy action. First, the difficulty of enacting federal legislation; second, the prevalence of partisan division at the federal level that tempers legislation; and third, the frequent use of veto power that can impede policy action. Frequently, policy action on the state level can lead to policy action at the federal level, a process identified as bottom up federalism. This same effect can take place between local and state governments. Shipan and Volden (2006) theorized that local government action can lead to either a “snowball effect” where the momentum from local government leads to a greater likelihood of state adoption or a “pressure valve effect” where action by local governments makes a state government less likely to act.

Mossberger (1999) studied the influence of the 40 Enterprise Zones enacted in states and the subsequent federal government action on this issue and found little evidence that the national government learned from the actions taken by the states. Instead, the national government took general knowledge from the states' actions and this resulted in a fragmented national policy. Shipan and Volden's (2006) study of anti-smoking policies found that state governments that felt compelled to adopt policy were positively correlated with strong interest groups and heightened state legislature capacity. While this study found the circumstances that made vertical diffusion more likely, it does not address if and how a higher level of government learned from a lower level of government.

Weissert and Scheller (2008) analyzed the vertical diffusion of six health policies where action was taken on the state level first and then the federal government followed suit. Their findings show that the federal actions display little recognition of the experiences at the state level. Similar to Mossberger's findings, there is little evidence of policy learning, but rather actions being taken in the same policy domain. Weissert and Scheller offer some possible explanations for this trend. The first possible reason relates to the politics of credit claiming. Actors in the federal government may want to claim credit for new policies without recognizing the work that had been done at the state level. A second explanation is that actors in the federal government have too much ego to learn from the states. Weissert and Scheller argue that this situation has resulted in the federal government "leading without learning" (p. 172).

Ferraiolo (2008) points to issues where states act because they believe that the federal leadership is either absent or the decisions made are unacceptable. Examples of policy areas where this has occurred include minimum wage, the environment, and same-sex marriage. In these cases, there are many examples of states using direct democracy through initiative and

ballot measures. This mode of creating policy allows voters to act at a state or local level with little legislative input. Some intention of this approach is connected to vertical and horizontal policy diffusion. Ferraiolo writes “Ballot petitioners... often wish to promote the spread of their ideas both horizontally across state lines and vertically to the federal level, particularly when federal officials are amenable to a policy idea but have been slow to act” (p. 491). The use of ballot initiatives demonstrates the influence that citizens may have on vertical policy diffusion.

In the article *The State of American Federalism 2011-2012: A Fend for Yourself and Activist Form of Bottom-Up Federalism*, Gamkhar and Pickerill (2012) offer insights into state and local decision making just prior to the advent of PSL in New Jersey. During this time period the federal government was facing gross concerns about the national debt and legislative gridlock. State and local governments were becoming more active and bolder in the decisions they were making. For example, some states, despite facing budgetary constraints opted to forgo federal funds in order to avoid the associated mandates. Gamkhar and Pickerill differentiate this type of bottom-up federalism from the bottom up federalism defined by Shipan and Volden (2006). Rather than pursuing policies at the state and local level that could be scaled up to the federal level, this time period can be characterized by the states “go it alone” or “pushback” tactics (p. 358). This time period is marked by increased state and local government activity in addressing the social and economic problems that their constituency faced.

Advocacy Coalitions

As this literature review has shown, many scholars have pointed to the influence of advocacy group and coalitions as mechanisms for policy diffusion. This section will review frameworks that have been used to analyze the motivations and actions of such groups.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was initially developed by Paul Sabatier in the early 1980s and has undergone several developments with additional authors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weibel, 2007; Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weibel and Sabatier, 2014). The ACF was developed to understand under what conditions actors form and maintain coalitions in order to achieve their policy goals. The ACF defines an advocacy coalition as people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system – for example, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time. (Sabatier, 1988, p. 139).

Shared core beliefs are considered the glue that hold a coalition together. Members of coalitions may disagree, but that disagreement will be limited due to the core beliefs that members share.

The ACF assumes that advocacy coalitions are part of a policy subsystem. A policy subsystem is defined by a “policy topic, territorial scope, and the actors directly or indirectly influencing policy subsystem affairs” (Jenkins Smith et al, p, 189). Subsystems are simplified by aggregating the actors into coalitions. Frequently, there are two or more opposing coalitions within a policy subsystem.

The ACF offer four conceptual pathways to policy change. First, policy change may occur due to some external source such as change in socioeconomic conditions, regime change, or extreme events. Such events can increase the likelihood of policy change due to increased public and political attention, agenda change, or the redistribution and use of coalition resources. The second path to policy change involves internal events such as crises, scandals, or failures. As with external events, coalitions may use such events to bring attention to issues and their policy implications and use coalition resources to push for change. The third pathway is policy-

oriented learning. The ACF posits that policy-oriented learning is incremental and happens over time. Policy-oriented learning can alter the assumptions and beliefs of subsystem participants and this can in turn influence governmental decisions. The fourth pathway is negotiated agreement between opposing advocacy coalitions which may result in changes in governmental decisions and programs.

The ACF has been applied to many contexts, and there is a growing literature that makes connections between the ACF and policy diffusion. One example is the Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) study of the rapid spread of new renewable energy technologies, namely, wind turbines and solar cells in Germany and found that an advocacy coalition was instrumental in supporting and informing the German parliament about these policies. Another example is Haider-Markel (2001) and his study of same-sex marriage bans in the 1990s. This study found that the diffusion of these policies was best explained by the strength of a national advocacy coalition that engaged in an organized campaign for the bans. This study also found that the adoption of the bans was explained by the presence of local interest groups and internal state characteristics, namely, education levels, and the strength of elite opposition to the bans.

Policy Entrepreneurship

The term policy entrepreneur was coined by Kingdon (1984) and noted that policy entrepreneurs

could be in or out of the government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations. But their defining characteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return. (p. 122)

Mintrom and Norman (2009) explore the elements that are central to policy entrepreneurship; specifically, “social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and leading by example” (p. 651). Policy entrepreneurs display social acuity by making good use of policy networks and by responding effectively to their local policy context. Policy entrepreneurs use effective problem definition to bring attention to an issue and highlight how the current policy context is unresponsive to that problem. Effective policy entrepreneurs present their evidence in a way that suggests that a problem is at hand. Policy entrepreneurs build teams and work with other policy actors because they recognize that policy change is best achieved by combining the knowledge and skills of different individuals. Policy entrepreneurs frequently build advocacy coalitions in order to support their initiatives. Leading by example allows policy entrepreneurs to win credibility with others and build momentum for policy change. Mintrom and Norman (2009) write, “When they lead by example – taking an idea and turning it into action themselves – agents of change signal their genuine commitment to improved social outcomes” (p. 653).

Mintrom and Norman remark that while policy entrepreneurship is not explicitly discussed in the advocacy coalition framework, there are comparisons that can be made between explanations for policy change that are grounded in the ACF and explanations that are grounded in policy entrepreneurship. Mintrom and Vergari (1996) explore some of these comparisons through a study of education policy change in Michigan. They separately analyze the actions of an advocacy coalition through the paradigms of policy entrepreneurs and the ACF. Their analysis found differences between the ACF and policy entrepreneurship. They write,

The AC is useful for guiding us to look at the longer-term factors that created the historical setting in which dynamic policy change could occur. The PE is helpful in

guiding us to look at the details of the process by which such change actually happened, and how behaviors of various actors affected the outcome. (p. 425)

In the case of Michigan education policy, they found the ACF's emphasis on considering long periods of time was most useful for understanding the state's education subsystem. Over two decades of reforms led education policy to where it was and the dominant coalition in the subsystem worked to protect its core interests. Policy entrepreneurship was useful for explaining dynamic policy changes and microlevel political activity. Policy entrepreneurship helps explain how individuals form coalitions and use those coalitions to take advantage of political opportunities in order to advance their policy goals.

Conceptual Framework

As this literature review has shown, there is not one factor, variable or mechanism that will explain the diffusion of paid sick leave laws. This research has been designed in order to evaluate how the policy of PSL spread across New Jersey. The conceptual framework consists of two components: 1) the logistic regression model and 2) case studies which will evaluate in detail the policymaking process in three New Jersey cities and policymaking at the state level.

The decision to use both statistical techniques and qualitative techniques is rooted in policy diffusion literature. The logistic regression evaluated the internal characteristics of New Jersey municipalities to discover what economic, political, and social characteristics help predict policy adoption. Case studies were used to help identify the political drivers of the diffusion of PSL and how they impacted policymakers. The case studies considered the influence of national organizations, interest groups, policy entrepreneurs and advocacy coalitions. This study paid particular attention to the advocacy coalitions and analyzes their formation and actions through

the lenses of the ACF and policy entrepreneurship. This approach allows for connections to be made between different theoretical approaches to explaining policy change. As this literature review has shown, there is a growing scholarship that examines the influence of nonelected officials on policy diffusion. This project contributes to that scholarship by making connections between diffusion of innovation, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and policy entrepreneurship.


Chapter 3 Logistic Regression

Introduction

This chapter will examine the adoption of paid sick leave laws by municipalities in New Jersey from 2013 through 2016 using a logistic regression model. The purpose of this logistic regression is to explore the internal characteristics of adopting cities compared to nonadopting cities. As the literature review has shown, diffusion is a phenomenon that is difficult to accurately measure through statistical models. For this reason, no variable will be included to predict diffusion in this model. This logistic regression is intended to be exploratory in nature, and the findings from this regression will be used to help inform and guide the research in the case studies. Additionally, questions relating to the influence of policy diffusion will be addressed through the case studies.

Between 2013 and 2016, 13 municipal governments in New Jersey adopted a paid sick leave law. The following map illustrates where these cities are located within New Jersey. As the map shows, the majority of the cities that adopted PSL are located in the northeastern part of the state.

Figure 5. New Jersey PSL Adoption Map



Hypotheses

The purpose of the logistic regression model is to evaluate the internal determinants that may lead to policy adoption. As Berry and Berry explain, “Internal determinants explanations posit that the factors leading a jurisdiction to innovate are political, economic, or social characteristics internal to the jurisdiction” (2014, p. 308). Four overarching hypotheses pertaining to the political, economic, and social characteristics of New Jersey municipalities have been developed for this particular logistic model. Multiple variables are used to test each hypothesis and a predicted relationship hypothesis is given for each of these variables.

Large City Hypothesis

Mohr (1969) has argued that larger cities, meaning cities with larger populations, are more likely to produce innovations due to the presence of larger organizations and more resources than smaller cities. Shipan and Volden (2008) argue that large cities are policy leaders and have a stronger role in policy diffusion than smaller cities. In the case of PSL, larger cities will have larger businesses, larger unions, and a larger workforce that in turn increase the demand for PSL legislation. These findings lead to the large city hypothesis:

H1: Large cities are more likely to adopt a paid sick leave law.

Government Resources Hypothesis

The Government Resources Hypothesis will be measured through two variables: form of government and municipal expenditures per capita. Research regarding local elected officials has found that the political institutional arrangements within cities has an effect on policy adoption (Krebs & Pelissero, 2010). Some institutional arrangements promote more cooperation among policy makers while others produce more conflict. Strong mayor systems, where the mayor and the city council are part of a system of checks and balances, are more prone to conflict and thus fewer policy adoptions. Weak mayor or council-manager systems allow the city council to have more influence over policy in the absence of institutional rivalry and thus produce more policy adoptions. In theory, in cities with a council-manager form of government, elected officials rely on objective professional expertise to inform their decisions. This situation stands in contrast to the patronage-style urban machines that are typically associated with the strong-mayor system (Swarts & Vasi, 2011).

Feiock, Lubell, & Lee (2014) have argued that mayor-council forms of government have an incentive to adopt policies that allow for clear credit claiming. The opportunity to claim credit for policies that are beneficial to the general public improve the mayor and the city council's reelection prospects. There are policies that may increase the likelihood that a mayor and a city council cooperate in order to adopt a law. PSL provides clear benefits to the public and an opportunity for credit claiming by elected officials.

These findings lead to the next hypothesis:

H2: Cities with a mayor-council form of government are more likely to adopt PSL.

As identified in the previous section, cities are more likely to adopt policies when they have more fiscal power. Swartz and Vasi (2011) argue, "larger cities, and cities with high purchasing power per capita have more leverage on contracting companies and, because they can spend more on services or subsidies, can impose more restrictions on firms" (p. 753). The influence of government fiscal resources will be captured by evaluating municipal expenditures per capita. The influence of municipal expenditures will be analyzed through the following hypothesis:

H3: Cities with higher municipal expenditures per capita will be more likely to adopt PSL.

Political Motivations Hypothesis

The Political Motivations Hypothesis will be measured through three variables: percentage of Democratic voters, Voter Turnout, and an interacting variable of these two variables. Vasi and Strang (2009) have shown that a favorable political context is associated with the adoption of certain policies. They found an association between cities with strong progressive communities and cities that adopted civil liberty resolutions in the wake of the

Patriot Act. Swarts and Vasi (2011) found that a favorable political context is positively associated with the adoption of living wage ordinances. Rogers (2003) argues that there is a relationship between policy adoption and value compatibility. Rogers defines value compatibility as “the degree to which innovations are perceived as consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters” (p. 240). Policy adoption is more likely to occur when it is compatible with the values of a certain place. In light of these findings, this model will examine the influence of political party membership and voter turnout on the adoption of paid sick leave laws. PSL is considered a more progressive policy that requires private businesses to offer more workplace protections and benefits to workers. The proportion of registered Democrat voters will be used to capture the political climate of each municipality. Municipal residents may be registered for a certain party but not politically active. Voter turnout data will be used to capture the political involvement of municipality residents. An interacting variable called *Democratic Turnout* will also be created using these two variables to measure the effect of registered Democratic voters and voter turnout.

H4: Cities with a higher percentage of registered Democrat voters will be more likely to adopt PSL.

H5: Cities with higher voter turnout will be more likely to adopt PSL.

H6: Cities with higher Democratic Voter Turnout will be more likely to adopt PSL.

Socio-Economic Conditions Hypothesis

Berry and Berry (2014) argue that social conditions and problem severity can increase a jurisdiction’s motivation to adopt a policy. This hypothesis will be measured using each city’s Gini coefficient, percentage of minority population, and percentage of workers in the service

industry. Allard (2004) found that poor economic conditions contributed to the adoption of Mothers' Aid programs due to the increased demand for assistance. Stream (1999) found that the uninsurance rate in a state affects the state's adoption of health insurance reform. While the argument that socio-economic conditions affect policy adoption and diffusion is common in policy literature, there is some evidence that socio-economic conditions do not have an impact on policy adoption. Swartz and Vasi (2011) find that economic conditions and grievances did not have a statistically significant effect on living wage ordinance adoption. Likewise, communities with lower incomes and a higher number of minorities are not more likely than other cities to adopt living wage ordinances.

DeRigne, Stoddard-Dare, & Quinn (2016) wrote a study titled "Workers without Paid Sick Leave are Less Likely to Take Time Off for Illness or Injury Compared to those with Paid Sick Leave." This research uses data from the 2013 National Health Interview Survey and collects an analytic sample that included 18,655 working adults ages 18-64. While purpose of this particular study was to learn if people without paid sick leave forgo or delay medical care, there were other findings from this article that are relevant to this study. The demographic profile developed in DeRigne's study shows that those without paid sick leave were "more likely to be male, unmarried, less educated, and Hispanic; hold service occupations; work part-time, be uninsured; have fair or poor health; have a limiting health condition; and have lower incomes" (p. 522). Other findings have indicated that there is a disparity between higher wage earners and lower wage earners with higher wage private employees being four times more likely to have paid sick leave than lower wage private employees (Ingraham, 2015).

These findings indicate that socio-economic conditions are correlated with whether or not a person has PSL as a benefit of their employment. The logistic regression model will test if the

socio-economic conditions of a municipality have an effect on the adoption of PSL. As discussed here, research findings regarding the impact of socio-economic conditions on policy adoption has been divided. This project hypothesizes that socio-economic conditions will be positively associated with policy adoption. To test these conditions, the model will examine the effects of the percentage of minorities, the percentage of service industry workers, and income inequality. The Gini Index is a summary measure of income inequality which summarizes the dispersion of income across the entire income distribution. The measure of inequality in each municipality is represented through a Gini coefficient. The Gini Index will be more fully explained in the next section.

H7: Cities with higher Gini coefficient will be more likely to adopt PSL.

H8: Cities with a higher percentage of minorities will be more likely to adopt PSL.

H9: Cities with a higher percentage of people working in the service industry will be more likely to adopt PSL.

Description of Data

The logistic regression model examines the adoption of a paid sick leave by municipalities in New Jersey from 2013 to 2016. There are 565 municipalities in New Jersey. 562 of the municipalities will be used in the model due to missing data points. The three municipalities that were dropped from the model have populations under 20. There are 13 positive observations and 549 negative observations.

The Dependent Variable (D.V.) for the logistic regression model is Adopt PSL (y). The Independent Variables (I.V.) are Large City, Form of Government, Municipal Budget per Capita,

Percentage Minority Population, Percentage of Workers in Service Occupation, Gini Coefficient, Percentage Registered Democrats, Voter Turnout, Democratic Turnout (an interacting variable).

The Dependent Variable is defined as the adoption of a paid sick leave law which require private sector employers to allow employees to earn paid sick days based on the amount of time they have worked. The New Jersey Time to Care Coalition has identified 13 municipalities that fit these criteria. Table 1 lists these municipalities and the year that they adopted their law.

Table 1. New Jersey Municipal PSL Adoptions and Date of Adoption

Jersey City	2013
Newark	2014
Passaic	2014
East Orange	2014
Paterson	2014
Montclair	2014
Bloomfield	2014
Trenton	2014
Irvington	2014
New Brunswick	2015
Elizabeth	2015
Plainfield	2016
Morristown	2016

The data used for the logistic regression model was assembled from the American Communities Survey (ACS) and from the Rutgers New Jersey Data Book. The ACS is an ongoing survey conducted by the United States Census Bureau that contains information regarding educational attainment, income, employment, and housing characteristics. For this research, the 2011-2015 Five-Year Estimates provide the most far-reaching data and information since the Five-Year Estimates Survey includes cities with a population under 20,000. The Rutgers New Jersey Data Book compiles data from official, verified sources and the data are reviewed for accuracy using rigorous protocols developed by the Rutgers Center for Government Services.

The variable *Large City* is a binary variable that is formulated based on a municipality's population. Data regarding the population of every municipality was drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau. There is a large range of municipality size. The smallest municipality included in the analysis has a population of 67 and the largest municipality has a population of 277,140. A threshold of 75,000 is used to identify a city as a large city. Using this threshold, there are 13 cities that are considered large.

The *Form of Government* variable is formulated with data from the New Jersey Data Book. The objective of this variable is to discover the different impacts of a weak mayor or a strong mayor form of government. The following discussion of the different types of municipal governments in New Jersey explains the rationale for the notation of this variable.

The Walsh Act of 1911 permits New Jersey municipalities to adopt a non-partisan commission form of government. The commissions include either three or five members who serve as department heads and in legislative capacities. The commissioners elect one commissioner as mayor and chair of the commission, but this mayor does not have additional power over the other commissioners. This is considered a weak mayor form of government

The 1923 Municipal Manager Law introduced the council-manager form of government to New Jersey. Under this form of government, the council is elected on a nonpartisan basis and the council elects one member of the council to serve as mayor. The mayor appoints representatives of commissions and boards and presides over council meetings but does not have any additional executive responsibility. This is considered a weak mayor form of government.

The New Jersey Optional Municipal Charter Law, also known as the Faulkner Act was passed in 1950 and provides New Jersey municipalities with different options for structuring their local government. The Act allows three different forms of government: mayor-council,

council-manager, and small municipality. The mayor-council form of government allows a city mayor to be elected by the general electorate and is considered a strong mayor form of government. The council-manager form of government requires the council to have complete responsibility for municipal affairs, and the council appoints a municipal manager as their chief executive. This is a weak mayor form of government. A 1981 amendment to the Faulkner Act created a fourth form of government: mayor-council-administrator. This form is similar to the council-manager form of government but requires the appointment of a professional city administrator. This is considered a weak mayor form of government as the mayor only votes in the event of a tie. Twenty-one percent of municipal governments in New Jersey have Faulkner Act charters.

The form of government variable is measured as a binary variable. Mayor-Council forms of government are notated with a 1. Council-Manager, Council-Manager-Administrator, and Commission forms of government are notated with a 0.

The *Municipal Expenditures per Capita* is taken from the New Jersey Data Book. This data was calculated through information derived from the New Jersey Division of Local Government Services. The Data Book explains that this data was constructed by adding the tax levies shown in the county abstract of ratables for municipal budget, municipal open space budget, municipal library budget, and the total of all miscellaneous revenues. That number was then divided by the most recent population number to achieve the per capita number. This model uses the data from 2012.

The *Democratic Voters* variable measures the percentage of voters who were registered as a Democrat in the 2012 election year. The *Voter Turnout* variable measures the percentage of the population who voted in the 2012 election. This data was accessed through the Rutgers New

Jersey Data Book. The information was gathered from reports of the Elections Division of the New Jersey Department of States and from registration information provided by county superintendents of elections or boards of election. The interacting variable Democratic Turnout was formulated using Democratic Voters and Voter Turnout. This variable measured how many Democratic voters were active in the 2012 Presidential election. While not a perfect measure, it can give an idea of how politically active left-wing people are in each municipality.

The Gini coefficient or the Gini Index is a statistical measure of income distribution. It is typically used as a gauge of economic inequality among a population. The coefficient ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality. The data for this variable was taken from the 2011-2015 ACS.

The variables to measure the percentage of minorities in the population were constructed from the New Jersey Data Book. The Data Book lists separately the percentage of each municipality's population that is African American, Hispanic, or Asian. The percentage minority variable is constructed by combining each of these percentages.

The percentage of people in service occupations is taken from the 2011-2015 ACS. The survey reported the percentage of municipality residents over the age of 16 who are employed. The survey then identified the percentage of those employed resident who are in service industry occupations.

Description of the model

The logistic regression model will compare the 13 adopting municipalities to 549 nonadopting municipalities. STATA statistical software was used to perform the regression. There are 565 total municipalities in New Jersey; however due to insufficient data, three

municipalities were dropped from the analysis. The municipalities included in the analysis range in population size from 277,140 to 67. The three municipalities that were dropped had populations under 20. The Gini Index variable was transformed by multiplying the data by 100. This was done so that the odds ratio for that variable would be comparable to the other variables. A description of the variables is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

	Mean	S.D.
Population	15,614	23,606
Municipal budget per capita	\$1,754	\$3,368
% Registered Democrats	28.32	11.14
% Voter Turnout	68.26	5.91
Gini Index	.42	.05
% Minority	24.53	21.29
% Service Industry	15.97	6.37

The binary variables are presented in Table 3. This table explains the breakdown of the dichotomous variables. The cities with a population above 75,000 are notated with a 1. Cities that have a Mayor-Council form of government are notated with a 1. All other forms of municipal government are notated with a 0. The point of this notation is to examine the difference between cities with a “strong mayor” and cities with a “weak mayor.”

Table 3. Binary Variables

	1	0
Large City Above 75,000=1	13	549
Form of Government Council Manager = 1	96	466

A collinearity test shows high collinearity between the variables *percentage minorities* and *percentage registered Democrats*; there is a Pearson score of .65. The collinearity test also showed high collinearity between the variables *percentage minorities* and the interacting variable *Democratic Turnout*; there is a Pearson score of .55. Given this finding, two models were run. The first model included the variable *percentage registered Democrats* as well as the interacting variable *Democratic Turnout*. The second model included the *percentage minorities* variable. A test for heteroscedasticity did not reveal any issues; therefore, standard errors were used in these models. The following results were produced:

Table 4. Likelihood of PSL Adoption in New Jersey Municipalities: Logistic Regression Analysis (Odds Ratio)

	Model 1	Model 2
Large City	7.57** (7.22)	4.58 (4.68)
Form of Government	9.70** (8.75)	5.15* (4.84)
Municipal Expenditures	.99 (.00)	.99 (.00)
% Service Industry	.96 (.04)	.92 (.04)
% Minority	-	1.07*** (.02)
% Registered Dems	.80 (.18)	-
Voter Turnout	.73** (.11)	.99 (.00)
Dem Turn	1.0 (.00)	-
Gini Coefficient	1.17* (.10)	1.15 (.11)
N	562	562
Pseudo-R ²	.54	.57

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Model 1 shows four statistically significant variables: *Large City*, *Form of Government*, and *Voter Turnout* are all significant at the p < .05 level. The variable *Gini Coefficient* is significant at the p < .10 level. In this model a large city, meaning a city with a population above 75,000 is 7.57 times more likely to adopt PSL than a city with a population below 75,000. A city with a mayor council form of government is 9.7 times more likely to adopt PSL than a city without a mayor-council form of government. The variable *Gini Coefficient* is significant at the

$p < .10$ level. For every one unit increase in the Gini coefficient, municipalities are 1.17 times more likely to adopt PSL.

The variable *Voter Turnout* has an odds ratio of less than one, implying a negative relationship between the variable and the adoption of PSL. Cities with a higher voter turnout are less likely to adopt PSL.

Model 2 shows two statistically significant variables: *percentage minorities* and *form of government*. The percentage minorities variable is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. For every one unit increase in the percentage minorities variable, municipalities are 1.07 times more likely to adopt PSL. The form of government variable is statistically significant at the .10 level. Municipalities with a mayor-council form of government are 5.15 times more likely to adopt PSL than municipalities without a mayor-council form government.

The variables *Large City*, and *Gini Coefficient* though significant in the first model, fall just short of the .10 level of statistical significance in the second model. They both have p-values of .13 in the second model. The variable *Democratic Turnout* also falls short of statistical significance in Model 1 where it has a p-value of .15. The variable *Voter Turnout* was significant in the first model; however, it does not show any significance in the second model where it has a p-value of .96.

The results of municipal expenditures per capita, and percentage of workers in service industry do not demonstrate statistical significance in either model.

Discussion

The results of this logistic regression model offer insights into the internal characteristics of municipalities that have adopted PSL in New Jersey. The Large City Hypothesis was

developed based on findings of other studies and theories that hypothesize that large cities are more likely to adopt innovations. In this study, there is an indication that city size influences the adoption of PSL. The four largest cities in the state, Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, and Elizabeth all are adopting cities with Jersey City and Newark being the first cities to adopt. In many ways, they can be viewed as the leaders of this policy innovation in New Jersey. However, there are a number of adopting cities within New Jersey that are considered small especially when compared to cities adopting PSL nationwide. In fact, Morristown with a population of 18,000 is the second smallest adopting city in the nation.

The Government Resources Hypothesis predicted that the form of government and balance of power as well as the purchasing power of each municipality would influence adoption. Both models indicate that a strong mayor form of government rather than a weak mayor form of government is statistically influential on the adoption of PSL. Two adopting cities were cities with a council-manager form of government and 11 were cities with strong mayors. There are conflicting theoretical arguments regarding the circumstances where mayor-council forms of government and council-manager forms of government are likely to produce policy change. This finding suggests that the professional acumen displayed in council-manager did not influence adoption, but rather that there are policy areas where the political strength of strong mayor systems facilitate policy adoption. The municipal expenditures per capita variable was not statistically significant. While PSL is a fiscal issue, the fiscal responsibility of the issue rests with employers and not the local government. This could explain why municipal expenditures were not influential on the adoption of PSL.

The Political Motivations Hypothesis as measured through the percentage of registered Democratic voters and voter turnout displays limited findings. The worker protections offered

through PSL is aligned with the values typically espoused to Democratic voters; however, the percentage of democratic voters in a municipality did display influence on the adoption of PSL. The voter turnout variable displayed a negative relationship between voter turnout and policy adoption in Model 1, but it did not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship in Model 2. This finding especially runs contrary to expectations when considering the fact that some municipalities including Trenton and Montclair, PSL law was passed through voter referendum.

The Socio-Economic Conditions Hypothesis as measured through the Gini coefficient, racial demographics, and percentage of workers in the service industry displayed some meaningful insights, especially when considering the percentage of minorities in each municipality. The Gini coefficient was statistically significant in Model 1 and then fell just short of statistical significance in Model 2. Including the Gini coefficient rather than a more standard measure such as median income was intentional. This variable was intended to measure the difference between the proverbial haves and have nots. An increased amount of inequality increased the likelihood of adoption. However, the presence of a grievance such as a high number of people in service industry occupations did not result increase likelihood of adoption. The Gini coefficient finding indicates that the dual presence people without means and likely without employment providing PSL and people with means and likely with employment providing PSL are influential on PSL. This finding is worthy of further exploration. It may be the case that the higher presence of people who support the adoption of a PSL law though such a law would not directly impact them due to the fact that they are already in employment which offers such benefits. Such people may help advocate for others.

The variable *percentage minorities* was included in Model 2 and displayed the highest level of statistical significance at the $p < .001$ level. This finding suggests that a high presence of non-whites is associated with a higher likelihood of the adoption of PSL. Studies have found that access to paid sick leave varies by race (Institute for Women's Policy Research, 2014) and this model demonstrates that a higher percentage of minorities in a city is associated with an higher likelihood of the adoption of PSL.

Summary

The purpose of the logistic regression in this study was to gain insight about the types of cities that pass PSL in New Jersey. The findings from this study were limited due to the limited number of positive observations. However, this study does identify variables that may be used in future studies of PSL. The percentage of minorities in a city, and the form of government, the size of the city and the Gini coefficient of a city are variables which this model demonstrates to be statistically significant and influential on the adoption of PSL.

This regression only intended to study the internal characteristics of each municipality and it did not measure for the influence of policy diffusion. The influence of policy diffusion will be explored qualitatively in the following case studies. The findings from this logistic regression model will continue to be explored through the case studies so as to ascertain if qualitative methods confirm, deny, or further explain these findings.

Chapter 4 Case Study Methods

Introduction

The case studies assemble multiple sources of evidence. Yin (2014) identifies six sources of evidence that may be used in case studies: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. These case studies are conducted using documentation and interviews. Yin defines documentation evidence as agendas, announcements, and minutes of meetings and other written reports; formal studies and evaluations; administrative documents and internal records; and news clippings and other articles that appear in mass media or community newspapers.

Documentation evidence was collected first through searches of internet newspaper articles. NJ.com is a digital news content provider that assembles digital content from multiple New Jersey newspapers including The Star-Ledger, The Jersey Journal, The Star-Gazette and other local newspapers. This site was used to gather newspaper evidence about Newark, Jersey City, and the state law. The website Patch.com was used to assemble information about Morristown since this is where Morristown's local news is assembled. The online source The Record, a division of USA Today was searched for additional information. Search functions on each of these online sources were used to assemble newspaper reports regarding paid sick leave. The newspaper articles helped give a general sense of the timeline of each of the cities studied as well as the state. The review of news articles also helped assemble statements made and actions taken by elected officials in regard to the PSL law in their jurisdiction. These statements helped provide additional evidence in light of the low interview response rate. In addition to newspaper articles, documents relating to the legislative process were assembled through searches of each city's archives. The documents retrieved include meeting agendas, meeting minutes, and public

statements made in city council meetings. The resources available varied by city. Meeting minutes were available for Jersey City and Morristown but not Newark. Meeting agendas were available for all three cities. Detailed public statements made by advocates at city council meetings were available in Jersey City and short summaries of statements made by advocates and detractors were available in Morristown.

Interviews

Yin (2014) states that interviews are one of the most important components of case study evidence. This research employs what Yin defines as shorter case study interviews that are used to corroborate findings from other sources of evidence. In my approach to these case studies, I began by conducting broad research of documentation including newspaper reports and public documents. This research revealed that in addition to elected officials, interest and advocacy groups were heavily involved in the policy process. This finding led to the decision to interview elected officials or their staff representative and advocacy group members.

The interviews used a semi-structured approach in order to keep the interviews conversational and exploratory. The goal was for the interviews to resemble guided conversations rather than structured queries; for that reason, the questions were designed to be fluid rather than rigid. The questions were also designed to be open-ended so that as the interviewer, I appeared naïve about the subject and allowed the interviewee to provide free commentary. Interviews allowed me to ask interviewees about their “interpretations and opinions about people and events or their insights, explanations, and meanings related to certain occurrences” (Yin, 2009, p. 111). The interviews helped corroborate the findings of the documentation and gain insight from the people who were directly involved in the policy process.

Three sets of interview questions were developed: one for policy advocates, one for city council members or their staff, and one for state elected officials or their staff (See Appendix C). The wording of the questions was formatted to the different roles that each type of interviewee played. The purpose of the interview questions are as follows:

1. Understand the process by which paid sick leave became a law in each respective city and the state.
2. Understand the motivations for PSL in each city and the state
3. Understand the opposition the policies faced
4. Discover if elected officials communicated with previously adopting cities during the policymaking process.
5. Understand the influence of policy advocates in the policymaking process.

The subjects that took part in the interview process were identified through public records and newspaper articles. Elected officials from city councils and the state assembly were identified through public documents that indicate that they were a part of the governing body that passed paid sick leave in each locality. Policy advocates were identified through an analysis of newspaper articles that report the activity of policy advocate groups.

The interviews were conducted using either Zoom Video Conferencing or through a telephone call, depending on the preference of the participant. With the consent of the participant, the interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.

Interview Invitation Process

This research was approved by the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board and is filed as IRB Number 19-205. Study participants were invited to participate in an interview using the

IRB approved email invitation is found in Appendix A. The email invitation contained information instructing the possible interview participants that their participation was voluntary and their identities would remain anonymous. At the beginning of every interview, I read the IRB-approved verbal consent script which reminded participants that their participation was voluntary and they could terminate the interview at any time. The consent script is found in Appendix C.

City Council Invitations

Using public records, the members of each city council during the time period that the city's PSL law was passed were identified. Using each member's official email, invitations were sent to ask the councilmember to participate in the interview. After one week of nonresponse, a follow up email was sent. In the case of Newark, no councilmember made a response so I contacted their office using the phone number listed on the Newark City Council webpage to extend the invitation. Most councilmembers at the time of PSL adoption were still sitting on the city council. Individuals who had moved to a position with a public email address were contacted with that email address. Table 5 describes the number of interview invitations that were sent to each city and the number of interviews that were conducted. In Morristown, one interview was conducted with a representative of Morristown Partnership, the town's business improvement district. During an interview, a Morristown councilmember recommended speaking with this person due to her involvement in the process.

Table 5. Interview Invitation Responses

City	# of Invitations	# of Interviews
Jersey City	7	2
Newark	7	1
Morristown	7	3

Advocacy Group Invitations

The same research protocol was implemented to invite representatives of advocacy groups to participate in an interview. To identify the policy advocacy groups, the following research protocol was followed. Using the Factiva database, I searched the terms “Paid Sick Leave” with the search refined to the New Jersey region and the dates confined to 1/1/2012-1/1/2019. This search resulted in 477 articles with 31 duplicates. I used these articles to identify policy advocate groups that were reported to be influential in the policymaking process at the city and state levels. In addition to the groups identified through the analysis, part of the interview with elected officials allows participants to identify influential groups during the policymaking process; however, all groups identified through this question were already identified in the news article search. Seven advocacy groups were identified through the newspaper search and three interviews were conducted with representatives from those advocacy groups.

State Invitation

Using the New Jersey Earned Sick Leave law that passed in 2018, the legislation’s sponsors in both the Assembly and the Senate were identified, contacted, and invited to an interview. In these instances, legislative staffers were also invited to participate in the stead of

the legislator. Ten legislative offices were contacted but only one legislative staffer participated in an interview. This extremely low response rate is a limitation of this research project. One possible explanation for the low response rate is the fact that I am not a New Jersey resident. In one instance, I sent an email to an elected official's office email and received an email in return that asked for me to supply my phone number in order to get a response. Based on my experience with Congressional correspondence, possibly since I do not have a New Jersey area code, they deduced that I was not a New Jersey resident and therefore, not one of their constituents. The office did not respond to my email. Additionally, the New Jersey State Assembly is holding elections this year as are some city governments. This constraint on people's time could have contributed to the low response rate.

Elite Interviews and Limitations

The interviews conducted with elected officials can be considered elite interviews. While there is not one simple definition of the term *elite*, this research will use Richards (1996) observation that an elite "implies a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as a political scientist is concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public" (p. 199). Elite interviews are performed because the individuals used for such interviews may have special insight into the political and causal processes involved in certain issues (Beamer, 2002). Elite interviews do present some challenges in research. Elites are often less accessible than the general public and are more conscious of their own importance; political elites may refuse interviews and this can lead to smaller response rates (Richards, 1996). This is a limitation that researchers must note in their work, as I have done here.

When interviewing elites Harvey (2011) recommends being as transparent as possible and providing participants with as much information as possible including how long the interview will take, how the data will be used, and the nature of the research in nonacademic terms. In this research, the IRB approved invitation included all this information (See appendix #). Additionally, some interview participants were given the interview questions in advance per their request. All interviews took place over the phone or through Zoom, depending on the preference of the participant. Stephens (2007) claims telephone interviews can be more time efficient for both parties particularly when they are located in different regions. However, Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) maintain telephone interview provide a less detailed response than face to face interviews. Harvey (2011) found that elite respondents seem to appreciate the flexibility that phone interviews provide. In this research, geographic constraints necessitated the use of phone interviews and allowed the interviewees to schedule the interviews according to their schedules.

In this research project, interviews with elites, meaning elected officials, were significantly shorter than interviews with nonelites, meaning advocacy group members. Ostrander (1993) and Stephens (2007) found that interviews lasted between one and three hours when interviewing non-elite subjects. By contrast, Harvey's (2011) experience interviewing elites found that interviews were around 45 minutes. In my own research I found a difference between the elected officials and the advocacy group representatives. I also found a time difference between genders. All advocacy group members were female and those interviews lasted between 35 and 45 minutes. Meanwhile the elected officials who were interviewed were all men and the interviews lasted 20-30 minutes on average.

Interpretation and Analysis

The case studies are presented in the following chapters. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the three adopting municipalities and the findings from the interviews with elected officials. Chapter 6 discusses the findings from interviews with the advocacy groups and other applicable documentation. Chapter 7 discusses how PSL was adopted at the state level.

The seven interviews with elected and agency officials were transcribed and imported into ATLAS-ti. From there, the interview data was coded using the methods prescribed by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) to aid in the interpretation of the interviews. I used an open-code method while coding the data. The codes that emerged through that process are listed in Appendix X. I expected some codes to appear in the data based on the questions that I asked. The open-code approach to coding the data allowed for other topics and themes to emerge through the process. The purpose of this process was to take the three case cities and accurately compare and contrast how these various themes present in the different cases. Due to the low response rate, the information gathered through the interviews was discussed in detail. Rather than discussing trends or the number of times that a certain subject was discussed, the relevant information from each interview will be portrayed in detail.

Chapter 5 Case Studies

Introduction

The case studies were designed to more fully examine the adoption of paid sick leave in three New Jersey cities: Jersey City, Newark, and Morristown. This study also examined the subsequent adoption of PSL by the state of New Jersey. The case studies were designed to build on the findings from the logistic regression conducted in Chapter 3. One of the main purposes of the case studies was to examine if and how policy diffusion occurred in this context. To accomplish this, interviews were conducted with elected officials and representatives from advocacy groups. The findings of the case studies are presented in three chapters. Chapter 5 reports and analyzes the findings from the elected officials in each city. Chapter 6 reports and analyzes the findings from representatives of advocacy groups, and Chapter 7 presents findings of the actions that occurred at the state level.

Jersey City

Jersey City is the second most populous city in New Jersey. Its 2010 population according to the U.S. Census was 247,597. Jersey City is considered one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the country (McCann, 2019). According to the ACS estimates, 25.8 percent of the population identifies as Black or African American, 23.7 percent identifies as Asian, and 27.6 percent identifies as Hispanic or Latino. Jersey City is considered part of the New York metropolitan area and is part of the New York media market. The city is extensively connected to New York City through rail infrastructure. In the 1980s, some financial companies began operations in the waterfront Area of Jersey City, giving Jersey City the moniker “Wall Street

West” (Williams, 1988). Currently, financial services accounts for one third of the city’s private sector jobs. The mean income between the years 2013 and 2017 was \$92,954.

Jersey City is governed under the Faulkner Act with a mayor-council form of government. The city council consists of six members who are elected from wards and three members who are elected at large. Their elections are non-partisan meaning that councilmembers do not run as part of a political party. Table 6 lists the members of the council at the time PSL was adopted as well as information about their position, gender, and terms.

Table 6. Jersey City City Council

Name	Position	Gender	Term Dates
Rolando R. Lavarro, Jr.	Council President	Male	2011-2021
Daniel Rivera	Council Person-at-Large	Male	2013-2021
Joyce E. Watterman	Councilperson-at-Large	Female	2013-2021
Frank Gajewski	Ward A	Male	2013-2017
Khemraj Ramchal	Ward B	Male	2013-2016
Richard Boggiano	Ward C	Male	2013-2021
Michael Yun	Ward D	Male	2013-2021
Candice Osborne	Ward E	Female	2013-2017
Diane Coleman	Ward F	Female	2012-2016

On September 25, 2013, the Jersey City Council adopted the Jersey City, New Jersey Earned Sick Leave Ordinance. This law required that individuals who are employed within Jersey City to accrue either paid or unpaid sick time. Individuals who worked for employers with 10 or more employees would accrue compensated sick time and individuals who work for

employers with less than 10 employees would accrue sick time, but that time did not need to be compensated. The ordinance stipulated that employees were to earn 1 hour of paid sick time for every 30 hours worked. Employees began earning sick time from the beginning of their employment, and they are entitled to use the paid sick time beginning of the 90th calendar day of their employment. Employees are entitled to use up to 40 hours of paid sick time in a calendar year. The regulations regarding unpaid sick leave followed the same guidelines as paid sick leave regarding when and how the leave would accrue; the only difference is that the leave was not paid. Sick time could be taken for an employee's own mental or physical illness, injury or health condition, and for preventative medical care. Sick time could also be used for the care of a family member's medical needs. For sick time of more than three consecutive days, an employer could request reasonable documentation to demonstrate the necessity of the paid sick time; however, that documentation could not require an explanation of the nature of the illness. The ordinance called for a research study to be conducted to measure and evaluate the economic impact on Jersey City businesses and the health impact on residents as a result of the ordinance.

Rutgers Center for Women and Work conducted this study titled *Earned Sick Days in Jersey City: A Study of Employers and Employees at Year One*. The study surveyed 289 Jersey City employers and 198 employees to assess the impact of the ordinance. The study found that after one year of implementation, the majority of the employers surveyed were complying with the law and that the majority of employers surveyed had not changed their policies because they were already providing sick leave. The study found that employers reported an increase in productivity, a reduction in turnover, and a reduction in the number of employees who were coming to work while ill. Interestingly, 92.4% of employers surveyed stated that they saw no

change in their employees' use of sick days. Only 3.4% of employers observed that their workers were taking more sick days than before the policy was implemented.

In December 2015, the city council adopted Ordinance 15.145 that amended the original law and expanded the number of employees who were covered by the law. The amended law required businesses with fewer than ten employees to allow employees to accrue a maximum of 24 hours of compensated sick time a year and 16 hours of unpaid sick time a year. However, employers with fewer than ten employees who are child care workers, home health care workers, and food service workers must provide up to 40 hours of paid sick time. In addition, the amended ordinance expanded the definition of "employee" to include both part time and temporary employees. This new definition required employers to use part time and temporary employees when calculating the number of employees within the business and the sick leave benefits were also expanded to include these types of employees. The new law stated that these benefits do not apply to employees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.

Newark

Newark, New Jersey is the largest city in New Jersey with a population of 277,140 according to the 2010 U.S. Census. It is ethnically diverse; 52% of residents identify as Black or African American and 33% identify as Hispanic or Latino. The mean income is \$49,984 according to the American Communities Survey. Poverty is a consistent problem in Newark with an estimated one-third of Newark's residents living in poverty (Wilwohl, 2011).

Newark is governed under the Faulkner Act and has a mayor-council form of government. The city council consists of nine members who are elected on a nonpartisan basis. Five council members are elected from each of Newark's five wards, and four council members

are elected on an at-large basis. Table 7 lists the members of the Newark City Council at the time PSL was passed, as well information about each member.

Table 7. Newark City Council

Name	Position	Gender	Term Dates
Luis A. Quintana	Council President; East Ward	Male	1994-2022
Augusto Amador	East Ward	Male	1998-2022
Ras J. Baraka	South Ward	Male	2005-2014
Mildred C. Crump	Member-at-Large	Female	1994-2022
Carlos M. Gonzalez	Member-at-Large	Male	2006-2022
Anibal Ramos, Jr.	Vice President; North Ward	Male	2006-2022
Ronald C. Rice	West Ward	Male	2006-2014
Darrin S. Sharif	Central Ward	Male	2010-2014

On January 28, 2014, the Newark City Council unanimously passed their own ordinance mandating sick leave for private employees within the city of Newark. Sponsored by North Ward Councilman Anibal Ramos, the bill mandated that full- and part-time workers in businesses with 10 or more employees earn one hour of sick time for every 30 hours worked, up to 40 hours per year, while workers in smaller business would earn one hour for every 30 hours worked, up to 24 hours annually (Strunsky, 2013a). Like the Jersey City predecessor, this ordinance allowed employees to use their sick time to tend to the needs of family members. One key component of this policy was broadening the definition of family and adding enforcement mechanisms. Under Newark’s law, employees could care for siblings as well as their children and parents. Additionally, during the policymaking process, the city council changed the

legislation’s original language and placed the burden of enforcement on municipal courts rather than the health department (Giambusso, 2013b).

Morristown

Morristown, New Jersey has the smallest population of any adopting city in New Jersey: 18,411 in the 2010 U.S. Census. It is considered ethnically diverse as 14% of residents are Black or African American and 34% are Hispanic or Latino according to the American Communities Survey 2011-2015 5-year estimates. The mean household income is \$120,312 according to the ACS 2011-2015 5-year estimates.

Morristown is governed with a mayor-council system under the Faulkner Act. The Morristown Town Council is comprised of seven members: four are elected from the town’s four wards and three are elected at large. Table 8 lists the people who were members of the Morristown Town Council in 2016 when PSL was adopted.

Table 8. Morristown Town Council

Name	Position	Gender	Term Dates
Stefan Armington	Council President	Male	2012-2021
Toshiba Foster	Council Member-At Large	Female	2012-2021
Robert Iannaccone	Ward I	Male	2015-2021
Hiliari Davis	Ward II	Female	2015-2019
Alison Deeb	Ward IV	Female	2007-2019
Michelle Harris	Councilmember-at-Large	Female	1998-2018
Michael Elms	Councilmember-at-Large	Male	2013-2021

The Morristown push for paid sick leave followed a different legislative process than was observed in Jersey City and Newark. Initial attempts were made to place the paid sick leave ordinance on a ballot initiative. In July 2016, the advocacy group *New Jersey Working Families* approached the council with the requisite number of signatures to have the ordinance placed on Morristown's ballot in the November 8, 2016, election. The town council opted to introduce the measure in August so that the subject could be openly discussed and debated. Morristown Partnership, the town's business improvement district, communicated with local businesses about the proposal so that the business community could be informed and participate in the public hearings regarding the proposed legislation. The group emailed copies of the ordinance as well as a summary document to more than 500 businesses in Morristown (Wright, 2016).

At the September 13, 2016, town council meeting a public hearing was held and members of the Morristown community and the larger New Jersey community spoke regarding the proposed paid sick leave ordinance. The people who testified included the CEO of United Way of Northern New Jersey, The Associate State Director of AARP, representatives of AFT Local 1766, Jerome Montes of New Jersey Main Street Alliance, and Analilia Mejia, the executive director of New Jersey Working Families.

In September 2016, the town council of Morristown passed a paid sick leave measure in a 6-1 vote. The ordinance required employers to provide three to five paid sick days to their employees depending on the company size. Morristown was the last New Jersey city to enact paid sick leave before the state created its own legislation. Morristown is the smallest of the New Jersey cities to have passed a paid sick leave law, and with a population of 18,000, it is the second smallest city in the nation to have passed a law. While Newark and Jersey City can be

considered typical cases, Morristown is included as a “deviant case” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) because its small size stands in contrast to other adopting cities.

On November 21, 2017, the Morristown Town Council considered O-29-2017. This legislation intended to replace the original law passed in 2016. According to the minutes from this meeting, Council President Armington explained that a subcommittee consisting of himself, Councilwoman Deeb, Councilman Iannaccone, and Jennifer Whering of the Morristown Partnership convened to discuss possible improvements or modifications to the original ordinance. Specifically, this iteration of the legislation was to address per-diem workers and how they were considered in the original legislation. The subcommittee wanted per-diem workers to be exempted from the ordinance for the following three reasons:

1. Per diem employees make higher wages than full or part time employees because they get benefits and do not have a set schedule.
2. They can pick and choose which days they want to work. If they are sick they do not have to work and can take a day off without affecting their employment.
3. The majority of per diem workers have other jobs and their per diem employment supplements their regular income.

As with the original ordinance, a number of people expressed support or opposition to this new proposed legislation and these viewpoints will be discussed in the subsequent analysis. The measure ultimately failed in a 4-3 vote and the original 2016 ordinance remained in place until 2018 when the state law was implemented.

Interview and News Report Findings

As was explained in Chapter 4, I conducted interviews with members of the city councils in each of the case cities. Additionally, one interview was conducted with a representative from Morristown Partnership at the recommendation of one of the Morristown Councilmembers. These interviews were transcribed and coded using Atlas-ti.

The codes I expected to emerge through the coding were based on Berry and Berry's Unified Model of Government Innovation. The Unified Model proposes the following equation:

$$Adopt_{i,t} = f(Motivation_{i,t}, Resources/Obstacles_{i,t}, OtherPolicies_{i,t}, External)$$

The dependent variable in this equation is the probability that a jurisdiction i will adopt a policy in year t . This model will be somewhat adapted in its application here. Rather than creating a statistical model to predict how likely a jurisdiction is to adopt a law, I used the five factors identified in this equation and evaluated how those factors were present in this case. This model is also adapted since time of adoption will not be considered because all of the policies were adopted in a relatively short timeframe. Generally, when this model has been applied to state level research a period of at least 10 years is being considered. In this application, only a three-year timeframe is considered.

The factors affecting policy adoption are defined in the following ways. *Motivation* refers to the motivation of public officials to adopt the policy. Berry and Berry (2014) write that this would include “the severity of the problem motivation consideration of the policy, the character of public opinion and the electoral competition in the jurisdiction” (p. 326). To decipher the motivation present in these cases I asked policymakers why they thought their city adopted PSL. I also reviewed statements from the public in council meetings and statements made by citizens to the press.

Resources/Obstacles refers to the obstacles to policy innovation and adoption and the resources that are used to overcome those obstacles. This may include the economic development of a jurisdiction or the professionalization of its legislature. Additionally, Berry and Berry include, “factors indicating the presence (and skill) of interested policy entrepreneurs or the strength of advocacy coalitions in a jurisdiction (p. 326). To understand this, I asked policymakers about the obstacles and opposition they faced while pursuing PSL in their city. I also gathered statements and actions taken by people who opposed PSL. *Other Policies* refer to previously adopted policies within a jurisdiction that may have implications for the likelihood that a jurisdiction will adopt a policy. While I did not ask any questions specifically about this factor, some respondents discussed this on their own when describing their motivations for pursuing PSL. Lastly, *External* refers to the influence of diffusion of the adoption of a policy. As was discussed in the literature review, there are many ways that scholars have measured diffusion quantitatively. In most applications of the Unified Model diffusion has been measured as some type of geographic distance from a previously adopting jurisdiction. This study aimed to explore diffusion through qualitative means. These interviews asked the elected officials when they first became aware of paid sick leave policies and if they had contacted previously adopting municipalities or examined their legislation as they were considering the legislation in their own municipality.

The findings presented here are organized according to the variables of motivation, obstacles, resources, and diffusion. The resources variable includes answers about how advocacy groups were used as a resource in the policymaking process. The following analysis will list each of the variables and then discuss how these variables were present in each of the case cities.

Because of the low response rate, the interview findings were triangulated with findings from news documents. Through the methods identified in Chapter 4, I found articles reporting when the legislation was adopted in each city. From these articles I pulled quotes and other documentation including opinion pieces from elected officials regarding the adoption of PSL. This was done to help show the opinions and motivations of additional elected officials.

Motivation

Each of the city officials were asked to discuss why they thought the PSL legislation was considered in their city and why the legislation was successful. These questions were asked to ascertain the motivations for adopting PSL. In their answers, the elected officials discussed some of the political and socio-economic conditions of their respective cities and how these conditions related to the motivations to adopt.

Jersey City.

In Jersey City, a councilmember identified Jersey City's progressiveness and history of protecting workers as the reason for the policy's success. In relation to protecting workers, he stated that Jersey City has historically been labor and union friendly. He stated that there was an openness among elected officials and the mayor to advance progressive legislation.

The second councilmember identified the policy's popularity as a reason for its adoption as well as a the strong left-wing slant in the city council. The council member also discussed the dynamics between the mayor and the city council. He stated that this was a policy that the mayor was pushing for, and the city council acted as a "rubber stamp."

A review of news articles revealed statements in support of the ordinance made by Mayor Steve Fulop. In regards to the ordinance, he stated to the New York Times "It's an opportunity

to make sure that employers who move here are conscious of this basic dignity for working families” (as quoted in Zernike, 2013).

Newark.

In Newark, the councilmember identified Newark as a progressive city and stated that the city council recognized that being progressive is good for Newark. The councilmember discussed other policies that Newark has passed as evidence of Newark’s progressiveness. Newark maintains status as a sanctuary city and has a civilian complaint review board in the police department.

In statements to the press, some councilmembers expressed their reasons for supporting the legislation. Councilman Anibal Ramos who sponsored the bill stated, “This legislation is a significant step in providing sick leave benefits to those who need it most. Child-care workers and healthcare workers are covered by the legislation, so our most vulnerable – children and elderly – will be protected” (as quoted in Giambusso, 2013a). Councilman Darrin Sharif who was a mayoral candidate said, “This is one of those pieces of legislation that when you leave elected office and you say what are the most significant things I’ve done. On the top of my list will be paid sick leave” (as quoted in Giambusso, 2013a). Ras Baraka, who was then a mayoral candidate, but is now Mayor of Newark, stated, “I believe it is an important human rights issue, and I am also asking our state legislators to make paid sick leave universal throughout the entire state of New Jersey” (as quoted in Giambusso, 2013a).

Councilman Carlos Gonzalez wrote a guest column that appeared in the Star-Ledger that explained his support for the ordinance. He cited the statistic that in Newark, 38,000 workers do not have paid sick leave and continue to work while ill because they cannot afford to lose pay. Gonzalez also referenced demographic groups that are disproportionately affected by lack of

paid sick time writing, “More than half of Newark residents are African-American, 44 percent of whom don’t have paid sick kays. Among Latinos – one third of Newark’s population – a full 55 percent lack paid sick days” (Gonzalez, 2013). Using the stories of people who have been negatively affected from a lack of paid sick time, Gonzalez articulated the effects the law could have for New Jersey families while also explaining the details of the policy.

While many members of the business community opposed this legislation, there was evidence that some business owners were supportive. The New Jersey Main Street Alliance is a coalition of statewide small businesses. Prior to the city council vote, they released a report that claimed the paid sick leave law in Newark could boost the bottom line of city small business by about \$4.2 million (Giambusso, 2014). Mikali Harris, owner of a cupcake business in Newark, stated, “To us, the benefits of sick days are pretty simple. When your employees are healthy they will be more productive and provide better customer service. Providing sick days will increase morale, increase loyalty, and provide a much safer work environment” (Giambusso, 2014).

Morristown.

In Morristown, both city council members interviewed characterized Morristown as a Democratic community that typically supports initiatives such as paid sick leave. One council member described Morristown as a relatively small community that is also very liberal. Both council members pointed to the socio-economic makeup of Morristown. One stated that Morris County where Morristown resides, is a relatively wealthy county but it is also a very diverse community with a broad range of socioeconomic backgrounds. The city council itself is socio-economically diverse with people who have lived in public housing, people who are pastors, people who are Hispanic, and people who are healthcare executives. Morristown’s population is

about 30% Latino, and one council member pointed to this statistic as a motivation for this policy. PSL applied to people who did not have other paid time off whether for sick time or vacation time. The facts that were presented to this councilmember showed that the policy would primarily affect the service industry, which is primarily comprised of African Americans and Hispanics. He stated that the city council “was well aware of our need for equal treatment and assisting those communities...they don’t have something that the rest of the work population has and it really pushed the council to think favorably about the policy.”

Morristown framed PSL as a broad social welfare issue rather than a public benefit. They identified a motivation to address health care workers and restaurant workers. One city council member stated that he believed PSL passed because the city council was supportive of public health benefits and protections. He stated, “people with low incomes, they need protections and they need, sometimes, to take time off; especially for emergencies, especially for caring for children or parents. They need that flexibility without the risk of losing income they so desperately need.”

In reviewing news articles published when the ordinance passed in 2016, Councilwoman Michelle Dupre spoke of her support for the ordinance saying, “This is something that’s a human need right now” (as quoted in Wright, 2016). She also noted that she believed that the mandate would eventually become a state law and all flaws in the ordinance could be tweaked at that time. Councilwoman Hiliari Davis voiced her support for the measure saying, “There’s nothing like a sick baby at school and a mother who can’t go and get her” (as quoted in Wright, 2016).

In Morristown, detailed meeting minutes of the town council meetings were available. These minutes include summaries of statements made by council members as well as by citizens who spoke regarding the ordinance. Most council members expressed support for the ordinance

and outlined the reasons for their support. Councilmember Harris, a school teacher, encouraged sick students to stay home. She also discussed being her father's caregiver and using home health aides who sometimes come to work sick. Councilmember Foster voiced support for the ordinance because employees need the opportunity to stay home and take care of themselves or their loved ones.

Community members addressed the city council outlining their support for the ordinance. One Morristown business owner who testified expressed support for the ordinance and stated that it was a policy that she already implemented on her own accord. One person spoke about home health aides who do not have paid sick days. They stated that without paid sick time, they come to work and pass on their illness. This could lead to a pandemic.

This process was repeated a second time in 2017 when the Morristown ordinance was reconsidered and a proposal was made to exclude per-diem workers from the policy. Again, meeting minutes outlined the positions of elected officials as well as community members. The majority of the community members who appeared before the town council asked for the legislation to remain as it was with per-diem workers still earning PSL.

When the details of the ordinance were reconsidered, Morristown Mayor Tim Dougherty expressed his support of the actions taken by the council. He said, "Morristown has always prioritized the rights of working families and we don't plan on turning our backs. I am proud with the council's decision to hold firm on the current measure. Earned sick days is one of the most important public health issues in the state and every worker in Morristown deserves paid sick days" (as quoted in Kausch, 2017).

Obstacles

The interviewees were asked about any opposition that they faced when considering the legislation. For the most part, they discussed the opposition that was voiced by the business community. Interviewees were asked a follow-up question about how they overcame that opposition. Included in this section are statements made by elected officials against the ordinances considered in their cities.

Jersey City.

One councilmember from Jersey City recalled opposition to the ordinance from Dunkin' Donuts, both from local managers as well as a corporate lobbyist. He recalled that prior to his meeting with Dunkin' Donut officials, he had been in a Dunkin' Donuts and saw an employee cough into his hand and then continue to serve food. He recalled thinking that this establishment needed paid sick days and remarked on the irony of the situation.

One interview was conducted with a councilmember from Jersey City who voted against the legislation. Many of his answers to the questions circled back to the reasons that he opposed the legislation. His opposition centered on the impact that the legislation could have for small businesses. He was concerned that small mom and pop type shops would be negatively affected when an employee called in sick, especially if there are already so few employees. Furthermore, this councilmember expressed concern about how the legislation affects the manufacturing industry. He was concerned that the absence of employees in a manufacturing plant could negatively impact the plant's output. The councilmember discussed the possibility of abuse of the policy, for example, if employees used their sick time to extend a vacation or if the sick time was used on a holiday.

News articles recounted opposition from some businesses. When the first iteration of the law passed in 2013, opposition came from the business community. Michael Egerton, a senior vice president at the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce expressed his fear that the new legislation could convince businesses to relocate. He also stated that choice to award PSL should be up to the employers without mandates from the government. He stated “Whatever happened to the freedom of enterprise? If you’re a good worker, your boss will give you sick time” (as quoted in McDonald, 2015). In an article that discussed the amended ordinance that was passed in 2015, an attorney from a firm that represents some businesses that were then required to provide paid sick leave spoke of the challenges of the law. Specifically, she spoke of the requirement of some businesses outside Jersey City to comply with the law if they had employees working in Jersey City. For example, a trucking company would have to keep track of how much time their drivers spent in Jersey City. She stated “As the law’s being revisited by the city there hasn’t necessarily been some very real logistic problems of tracking and accruing sick leave” (as quoted in McDonald, 2015).

Newark

The councilmember from Newark did not recall much opposition to the ordinance. He stated that the community was happy to see the ordinance and indicated that although the community was supportive of the ordinance, they were not actively involved in the process. According to the councilmember, this was not a grassroots effort, but an effort that was led by the city council and interest groups.

While this councilmember did not recall opposition to the ordinance, there was evidence in news articles of business groups that opposed the legislation. Both the New Jersey Business & Industry Association and the state Chamber of Commerce opposed mandatory sick pay

because it would place more burdens on businesses in addition to the burdens New Jersey businesses were already facing. These groups referenced rising taxes and potential minimum wage increases that were being considered at the time as evidence that too much was being asked of small businesses. Michael Egenton, senior vice president for government relations at the state Chamber of Commerce stated “Nobody can tell me what the cost of Obamacare will be. You’ve got minimum wage, you’ve got mandatory sick leave, you’ve got the Affordable Care Act, you’ve got higher payroll taxes. You’ve got all these issues that are piled on top of one another that impacts our members” (as quoted in Strunsky, 2013b).

Morristown.

One councilmember from Morristown stated that opposition to the ordinance came after the fact. Because the ordinance was on public referendum, the city council had approximately one month to pass it on their own before the decision would go to the general public. The councilmember asserted that if the city council had taken the initiative up on their own, they would have spent more time doing public outreach to the business community and the healthcare community. During the one month that the city council was considering the ordinance, one or two businesses did voice disapproval, and there was disapproval from the hospitals. The councilmember asserted that the hospitals were dissatisfied with some of the details of the policy, specifically in the way that the policy applied to per diem workers. The hospitals’ argument was that many per diem workers already had these benefits as they were full time employees in other capacities. Many of the workers took on per diem work in addition to their other employment. The hospital argued that these workers were getting double benefits.

Another councilmember stated that there was not strong opposition, but there was concern from one of the largest employers in town, Morristown Memorial Hospital. Like the

other councilmember, this councilmember reaffirmed that the hospital's concern revolved around per diem employees.

The representative from Morristown Partnership discussed some of the opposition she heard from the business community. She found that many of the people who were speaking out against the policy were running small businesses. She found that many businesses were, indeed, giving their employees PSL but in an informal way. There was a handshake agreement between employers and employees, but there were not official policies. One example she gave was of a small comic book store with two employees. The owner had agreements with his employee to cover each other as needed but the law required them to implement formal processes regarding PSL. Many small businesses like this one found the implementation cumbersome. She also discussed the opinions of the business community regarding the language of the proposed legislation. Some business community members thought the legislation was not customized for the Morristown community and did not account for the nuance of Morristown's businesses, specifically their micro businesses.

A week prior to the city council vote, Councilwoman Alison Deeb published an opinion piece outlining her opposition to the ordinance. She addressed ideological problems she had with the ordinance. Specifically, she addressed her opinion that the paid sick leave is an issue that should be addressed by the state or federal level of government and not the local government. She discussed issues such as enforcement that would create an additional burden on Morristown's small government, which was already outsourcing much of its work to the county government. Deeb criticized what she called the town's lack of research and preparation for the ordinance stating "the town did not research test cases and did not know the number of Morristown businesses who would be impacted before the ordinance was adopted" (Deeb, 2016)

A review of newspaper articles revealed some of the concerns of city councilmembers. Though he voted in favor of the ordinance, Robert Iannaccone expressed, “I’m actually quite disappointed, and I’m going to point it out, that the business community in Morristown is woefully underrepresented this evening”(as quoted in Wright, 2016). Alison Deeb, who voted against the measure, said “I’m concerned about the impact on businesses” and called it “an unfunded mandate” (as quoted in Wright, 2016).

As with the other cities, businesses were vocal in their opposition. One small business owner stated to a newspaper, “We love our employees, treat them like gold and work with them with their schedules, need for time off etcetera, but this ordinance is very costly and may cause us to re-evaluate this location, would break my heart, when our lease is up” (as quoted in Agnes, 2017).

Ben Fleisher who is a town businessman testified to the city council and said that the idea was good in theory but was an example of government intrusion into private business. He stated that pay and benefit decisions should be left to private employers as a reward to employees who excel.

Marilyn Sealy who was another businessowner who spoke to the city council expressed her full support for the measure. She already offered the benefit to her employees and believed her decision led to a more loyal relationship between employer and employee.

Resources - Advocacy Groups

Interviewees were asked to discuss the interactions that they had with advocacy groups and how advocacy groups were involved in the policymaking process. The purpose of these questions was to gauge the involvement that advocacy groups claimed with the experiences of elected officials.

Jersey City.

Regarding the involvement of the advocacy groups, one councilmember stated that the *Time to Care Coalition* drafted the initial proposal and took it to Mayor Steve Fulop and from there, the mayor introduced the idea to the city council. The city council debated the initial proposal with regards to the size of businesses that would be required to comply with the law. They eventually settled that businesses with 10 employees or more would be subject to the law. The councilmember identified this agreement as part of a settlement to get the law passed. The law passed with a requirement for a study to be conducted to measure the economic impacts of the law on Jersey City. This study was conducted by the *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* who were members of the *Time to Care Coalition*. After that study was conducted, the legislation was amended that dropped the minimum of 10 employee threshold and made the law applicable to all businesses in Jersey City.

The second city councilmember from Jersey City discussed the influence of *New Jersey Citizen Action*. This councilmember recalled that the group brought model legislation to the mayor and the city council. The councilmember asserted that *New Jersey Citizen Action* had a significant influence in the process.

Newark.

In Newark, the councilmember identified *New Jersey Working Families* as the advocacy group that was influential in the policymaking process. He indicated that this group met with every member of the city council to discuss the policy.

A review of news articles confirms that *New Jersey Working Families* was involved in Newark's campaign for PSL. The *New Jersey Working Families Alliance* delivered 10,000 postcards to the city council from Newark voters supporting the ordinance. Regarding these

postcards, the then executive director Bill Holland stated “The reason we’re delivering these post cards is to make clear to the municipal council and the mayor that this makes common sense” (Giambusso, 2013a). They also held a rally where both advocates and city council members voiced their support for PSL. Analilia Mejia, who was then the state political director for Service Employees International, Local 32BF stated, “We believe this is the best ordinance in the country” (Giambusso, 2013b).

Morristown.

In Morristown, the voter referendum was supported by advocacy groups. One councilmember specified that a group of service union members facilitated the referendum petition and got enough signatures to take the referendum to ballot. The other councilmember identified *New Jersey Working Families* as the organization that facilitated the referendum. After the groups certified the petitions, they met with the mayor, the council president, and some members of the city council to discuss advancing an ordinance by the council rather than the referendum. This councilmember indicated that *New Jersey Working Families* attended all public meetings and brought out people to show their support for the ordinance. The councilmember also identified Winds of the Spirit, an organization in Morristown that advocates for the Hispanic immigrant community, as an organization that lobbied in favor of the ordinance. The representative from Morristown Partnership identified *Blue Wave, New Jersey* and *New Jersey Mainstreet Alliance* as two groups that met with Morristown Partnership to discuss the ordinance. These groups also engaged in activities to help inform the business community about the ordinance and garner support.

Diffusion

Interviewees were asked if they had reviewed any other paid sick leave legislation as they were considering their own ordinance. They were also asked if they had ever been in contact with elected officials from other cities when they were considering their ordinance.

Jersey City.

Neither councilmember recalled examining legislation from a previously adopting city nor did they recall communicating with other cities. One councilmember did clarify that the advocacy group *New Jersey Citizen Action* that was involved in the process is a nationwide organization that had passed similar policies across the country. One councilmember stated that Jersey City was the first place to adopt PSL in New Jersey and then it took hold in other cities.

In statements to the New York Times, Mayor Fulop highlighted the major difference between the policy proposed in Jersey City and the policies that had been enacted in neighboring New York City or the Connecticut law. The first iteration of the Jersey City law required businesses with 10 or more employees to provide PSL. In New York City the law applied to businesses with more than 20 employees and in Connecticut the law applied to businesses with more than 50 employees.

Newark.

The councilmember from Newark did not recall examining other previously adopting cities' legislation. He did state that another councilmember who was more active in bringing this issue to the table may have done so.

Morristown.

Both councilmembers from Morristown stated that they examined ordinances that had been passed before them. They looked at the ordinances, but they did not communicate with

other towns. One councilmember stated that there had been a lot of news coverage about previous ordinances so they did not feel the need to communicate with other cities. They knew what they needed to do. The other councilmember acknowledged even after examining previously adopted ordinances, they were somewhat constrained by the language that was in the ballot initiative and could not vary too much from what was proposed there.

The representative from Morristown Partnership indicated that she reviewed the actual ordinances from previously adopting cities and then spoke with businesses from previously adopting cities.

Summary and Findings

This chapter has used qualitative methods to explore Berry and Berry's Unified Model of Government Innovation. Data was assembled through interviews with city officials in three municipalities that have adopted paid sick leave as well as public documents and news articles. The findings from these interviews are in keeping with the components of this model but also led to additional questions and areas of inquiry.

The variable *motivation* showed consistency across all three cities. All respondents identified progressiveness, liberalness or a left-wing slant in the city council as reasons that the policy was successful in their city. In Morristown and in Newark, the socioeconomic conditions and racial makeup of the city were discussed as motivations for adoption. In Jersey City, political motivations were discussed by a councilmember who opposed the ordinance. The dynamic between the mayor and the city council helped the policy advance in his view. Progressiveness and previously adopted progressive legislation were discussed as a motivation in

Newark and Jersey City. Both cities have a history of adopting legislation that is considered progressive and labor friendly.

The variable *obstacles* showed consistency across Jersey City and Morristown. The respondent from Newark did not remember or discuss any opposition to the policy, however, the small sample in Newark may account for this discrepancy. The obstacles and opposition to PSL in Jersey City and Morristown came from business community. The Jersey City councilmember who opposed the legislation and some of the businesses who opposed the legislation in Morristown shared the same concerns; that is, the effect that the legislation would have on small businesses with few employees. In Morristown, some opposition to the ordinance concerned the policy process as the business community expressed feeling left out of the process. There was little that the city council could do to combat this obstacle. If they did not pass their proposed ordinance in the required timeframe, it would be put to a ballot vote and the city council would have no input on the legislation. In the case of PSL at the municipal level, the legislatures did not present much opposition as all three ordinances studied here were widely supported by the legislators.

The Unified Model of Government Innovation discusses the influence of advocacy coalitions and policy entrepreneurs as resources that help overcome obstacles. While the advocacy groups performed traditional advocacy activities such as lobbying the members of the respective legislative bodies, gathering support from constituents, and attending city council meetings, they were also instrumental in the policymaking process. In Jersey City, they presented model legislation to the mayor and city council. In Morristown, they were involved in organizing the petition that put the ordinance on the ballot. The research and evaluation work done in Jersey City by the *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* was instrumental in this process.

The information gathered through that process provided evidence to the business communities that PSL would not negatively affect their businesses.

The diffusion variable displays mixed results. In Jersey City and Newark, there is no evidence that the city council engaged in any activity that could be described as learning or emulation. The interview participants did not recall examining any previous forms of PSL legislation nor did they have contact with previously adopting cities. There is also no evidence of economic competition being a driving force for adoption. Morristown, however, tells a different story. The interviewees indicated that they examined the previous laws that had been passed by New Jersey municipalities. The representative from Morristown Partnership also stated that they examined previously adopted laws.

These findings suggest that at the municipal level, the diffusion pressures remained within boundaries of New Jersey. The policymakers in the first adopting cities, Jersey City and Newark, were not actively comparing themselves to other adopting cities. Morristown, as the last municipality in New Jersey before the state adoption, did exhibit signs that the diffusion mechanisms of learning and emulation possibly took place.

Councilmembers discussed how the advocacy groups were involved in the development of the legislative language. In Jersey City, the *Time to Care Coalition* came to the mayor and city council with model legislation. Interviews with advocacy group representatives discussed in Chapter 6 revealed that the model legislation was written by people from a group called *A Better Balance*. Advocacy groups were also involved in Morristown in the referendum process and used their own drafted language for the proposed ballot measure. This legislation constricted what the city council could do when they took the issue up themselves. Recent literature has documented the increase of model legislation and the influence of interest and advocacy groups

in policymaking. Garrett and Jansa (2015) write, “This development challenges the idea that policy diffusion is driven by the state and, instead, indicates a prominent role for interest groups” (p. 388).

The influence and role of advocacy groups in diffusion PSL in New Jersey will be further explored in the next chapter. The findings from interviews with elected officials suggest that the official legislators played a limited role in the diffusion of the policy. The best evidence that interest groups play a stronger role in policy diffusion than elected officials in this case is the situation observed in Morristown. In their interviews, the town council members indicated that they considered some previously adopted legislation and were engaging in some forms of policy learning. Their efforts could only go so far in the face of the work that had been done by members of the *Time to Care Coalition*. Since the coalition had put its drafted legislation on a ballot initiative, the town council needed to pass a law that was similar to the legislation proposed in the referendum. If the public was not satisfied with the legislation passed by the town council, the legislation proposed by the *Time to Care Coalition* would be voted on by the general public. In some ways, the advocacy groups had more control over the legislation that could be adopted in Morristown than the town council did.

Chapter 6 Advocacy Groups

Introduction

The findings from Chapter 3 help explain why certain municipalities in New Jersey adopted paid sick leave but give limited evidence about the diffusion of paid sick leave. The actions of early adopters, Newark and Jersey City, do not suggest that mechanisms of diffusion were present. The findings from Morristown suggest that policy learning occurred through officials' examination of previously adopted PSL legislation. One councilmember from Jersey City made a statement that possibly points to the actors that are driving the diffusion of the policies. He stated that the advocacy group *New Jersey Citizen Action* was part of a national organization that had worked on paid sick leave in other places. This statement suggests that advocacy groups were involved in multiple places and were a possible explanatory variable for how diffusion occurred.

This chapter will explore how advocacy groups were involved in the diffusion of PSL in New Jersey. This chapter will discuss the history, missions, and organization of these groups to show how they have been influential on the policymaking process in New Jersey. Interviews were conducted with representatives of three advocacy groups that were active in campaigns supporting PSL in New Jersey. In addition to these interviews, the testimony given by PSL advocates to the Jersey City Council were gathered and news articles detailing the actions of certain groups during the policymaking process were assembled. Additionally, quotes from advocacy group members were assembled. Using multiple sources of data helps triangulate the findings to give a clearer understanding of how involved advocacy groups were in the policymaking process.

Seven interview invitations were sent to members of advocacy groups and three interviews were conducted with representatives from *The Rutgers Center for Women and Work*, *New Jersey Citizen Action*, and *A Better Balance*. The representatives who testified in front of the Jersey City Council on September 25, 2013, are Yarrow Willman-Cole from the *New Jersey Time to Care Coalition*, Bill Holland from the *New Jersey Working Families Alliance*, Okenfe Lebarty from *New Jersey Citizen Action*, and Ady Barkan from the *Center for Popular Democracy*.

Advocacy Group Summaries

A Better Balance

A Better Balance: The Work and Family Legal Center is a legal organization whose mission revolved around enabling families to both work and care for each other without risking their economic security. They have worked on issues relating to paid family leave, paid sick leave, and pregnancy discrimination. They are mostly involved in the legislative drafting and policy development of those issues. *A Better Balance* also litigates cases relating to these issues when necessary. *A Better Balance* was founded in 2005 and was involved in the nation's first paid sick leave law which was passed in San Francisco in 2006. In New Jersey, *A Better Balance* gave technical assistance and worked on the regulations around these laws. One interview was conducted with a representative from *A Better Balance* and testimony by the executive director, Sherry Leiwant was analyzed.

New Jersey Working Families Alliance

The New Jersey Working Families Alliance is a grassroots independent political organization that organizes campaigns to advance progressive policies and endorses political

candidates who will represent their values. *The Working Families Alliance* is part of a larger organization: The Working Families Party. The Working Families Party claims to be building their own party on top of the United States' two-party system. They recruit candidates who share their vision and then help them run, often inside Democratic Party primaries. The Working Families Party has been active in advocating for the \$15 Minimum Wage Bill, as well as the paid sick days campaigns. The former executive director of this group, Analilia Mejia was identified by many interviewees as playing a strong role in the campaign and policymaking process. Unfortunately, no representative from this group was available to participate in an interview.

New Jersey Citizen Action

New Jersey Citizen Action is a statewide grassroots organization that is active in issues relating to social, racial, and economic justice. Its purpose is to engage in community organizing, legislative advocacy, and electoral campaigns. *New Jersey Citizen Action* offers services to low-and moderate- income individuals such as foreclosure prevention counseling, healthcare enrollment assistance, and free tax preparation. The organization is also active in campaigns supporting paid sick leave, \$15 minimum wage, and legislation called the New Jersey Secure Choice Savings Program Act which helps provide retirement savings tools for New Jerseyans.

Rutgers Center for Women and Work

The *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* is housed in the Rutgers School of Management and Labor Relations. Its mission is to provide research and policy work that promote economic and social equity for women workers, their families, and their communities. Specifically, some of their research focuses on “the structural barriers to women workers’ full and equal participation in the workforce and their ability to provide for and invest in the health

and well-being of their families and communities”(“CWW Areas of Expertise,” n.d.). They have provided research and policy analysis for issues in New Jersey including paid family leave, earned sick days, wage theft, fair schedules, and equal pay.

The New Jersey Time To Care Coalition

The New Jersey Time to Care Coalition is comprised of over 100 advocacy, union, research and other community-based organizations who support initiatives that improve workplaces. In 2003 it was co-convened by *New Jersey Citizen Action* and the *Rutgers Center for Women and Work*. The coalition is considered informal with neither an official steering committee nor nonprofit status.

The *Time to Care Coalition* statement of purpose is as follows:

When illness or a family emergency arises, many workers face a painful choice between caring for children, parents, spouses and partners or showing up for work and earning a day’s pay. The inability to provide nurturing support and compassion to those close to us hurts our families and weakens our communities. Everyone benefits when workers are able to balance job obligations and family needs. Giving workers financial security by allowing them to take paid leave to deal with a child’s illness or a parent’s recovery from a stroke not only improves outcomes for children and families, but also raises worker morale and productivity. Paid “time to care” means strong families, strong workplaces, and strong communities. The New Jersey Time to Care Coalition supports initiatives that make sure working families have paid time to care. (“About NJ Time to Care Coalition,” n.d.)

The *Time to Care Coalition* was first organized in support of the New Jersey Paid Family Leave Insurance Act which allows for the long-term care of sick family members. New Jersey was the second state in the country to pass paid family leave. After that legislative success, the *Time to Care Coalition* took paid sick leave as their next issue. They have also worked on issues including fair scheduling and equal pay.

History of Advocacy Group Involvement in PSL Campaign

In 2011, prior to any action by policymakers, *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* and the *Human Impact Partners*, funded by the *National Partnership for Women and Families*, wrote the Health Impact Assessment of Paid Sick Days in New Jersey. This article helped elevate and bring attention to the policy problem. One purpose of this document was to clarify the mission of the paid sick leave campaign. During the same time period, there was also a conversation happening at the state level about public workers and their paid sick time. There was legislation being considered about removing some workers paid sick time in order to address public workers such as police and firefighters who were retiring with years of paid sick time built up. The paid sick leave legislation that the coalition was pursuing was, of course, very different than this issue. The publicity given to the public workers' paid sick leave helped the coalition reframe their objectives in a way that made sense to people. In the beginning, the coalition began collecting stories and experiences from workers, doctors, and business owners and publishing opinion pieces in local newspapers. This research was done in order to make the issue salient to policymakers, legislators, and the public at-large.

Interview and Legislative Document Analysis

This section of analysis will follow the same procedure used in Chapter 5. I have organized the findings from the interviews and the legislative documents according to the concepts discussed in the theoretical arguments proposed by Berry and Berry's Unified Model of Government Innovation, specifically *motivation*, *opposition*, and *diffusion*. To better understand the mechanisms underpinning diffusion; the actions taken by the advocacy groups will be analyzed according to Karch's (2007) political drivers of diffusion: *national organizations* and *policy entrepreneurs*. Karch also identifies national government intervention as a driver of diffusion, however, there was no evidence of that concept here, and it will not be included in the analysis. This analysis will discuss findings related to the influence of model legislation that was developed by advocacy groups. The influence of model legislation distributed by interest groups is a growing subject in policy diffusion literature (Garrett & Jansa, 2015; Jansa et al., 2019). Lastly, this analysis will discuss a theme that emerged from the interview data: "The Municipal Approach." This approach was a strategy developed by the *Time to Care Coalition* members that purposely sought legislation in multiple municipalities due to the political dynamics at the state level.

Motivations

The testimony given by advocacy group members to the Jersey City Council outlines the motivations and justifications for pursuing this policy.

Yarrow Willman-Cole from the New Jersey Time to Care Coalition presented findings from the study "A Health Impact Assessment of Paid Sick Days Politics in New Jersey" which was sponsored by her organization as well as *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* and *Human Impact Partners*. Her testimony outlined some of the motivations for paid sick leave in Jersey

City. At the time of her testimony, almost 40% or 1.2 million private sector workers in New Jersey did not have access to paid sick leave. She stated the importance of this law for working families with children and cited that nationally, one in four workers say they have lost a job or have been threatened with the loss of a job because they were sick or they were attending to the needs of a sick family member. In addition to helping working families, she reiterated that the policies are beneficial to public health. She stated that 76% of food preparation and service workers do not have access to earned sick leave and referenced a recent mumps outbreak in Belmar, New Jersey that the Monmouth County Health Department traced back to a bar. Lastly, this testimony refers to the impact that the lack of PSL has on low income people and communities of color. She states, “Not surprisingly, low-wage earners are less likely to be offered paid sick days, and because of their income, are less likely to be able to afford to take the unpaid days off. So this is not just an issue of good public health practices – it is an issue of health equity.”

Okenfe A. Lebarty from *New Jersey Citizen Action* testified and also spoke to the motivations present in New Jersey for PSL. She stated that in her work, she has met with retail and fast food workers in Jersey City who were relieved to hear the possibility of the law because “they will no longer be at risk of losing their jobs next time they get sick.” She told a story of a Dunkin Donuts employee who was told by a manager to come in to work despite trying to call in sick.

Lebarty referenced the economic impact of the proposed policy in Jersey City. Speaking specifically of low wage earners and minorities, she stated, “When working families have enough money in their pockets to cover the basics, it helps the whole economy. Losing even a

day's wages – or worse, a job – undermines families' ability to contribute to the economy and forces many to rely on public programs to keep their families afloat.”

Ady Barkan referred to research and findings that support PSL including the increased likelihood of spreading contagious illness when people go to work sick, delayed or forgone needed medical care among people who lack access to PSL, and an estimated 1.3 million emergency department visits in the United States that could have been avoided if workers had access to PSL.

Opposition

Testimony to the Jersey City Council also addressed some of the opposition and obstacles that advocates encountered to this policy.

Barkan addressed the argument that was being made by opponents that the legislation would cost jobs. He discussed some historical context to this argument stating that the same argument had been made for over 100 years. He referenced the end to child labor, the calls for safer working environments, the end to racial discrimination in employment, and the demand by women for equal pay for equal work. In each of these situations, business lobbyists said PSL would cost jobs. Barkan stated, “We know that their rhetoric is wrong. We know that creating good jobs and strong middle class is the key to a vibrant economy and a healthy population.”

Diffusion

Findings related to diffusion were included with this concept if they revealed that an advocacy group was involved in campaigns prior to being involved in New Jersey and brought that knowledge into their work in New Jersey.

Testimony and interview data revealed that the advocacy groups were involved in multiple cities, both within New Jersey and beyond. Ady Barkan of the *Center for Popular*

Democracy testified that they provided support to coalitions in New Jersey as well as in New York City and Vermont. Lebarty's testimony referenced previously adopting cities including New York City, San Francisco, Washington DC, Seattle, and Portland and stated that by passing the proposed ordinance, Jersey City would join these cities in passing common sense legislation.

Sherry Leiwant, the executive director of *A Better Balance* gave testimony which outlined an argument in favor of the policy and explained many of the legal aspects of the law. Leiwant's testimony referenced the paid sick leave laws around the country noting that the laws which had already passed are very similar to the law which was before the Jersey City Council. She states that all the legislation around the country is based on the same model legislation that was drafted by the *National Partnership of Women and Families* and *A Better Balance*.

Leiwant's testimony referenced the San Francisco legislation which was adopted in 2006 and points to evidence that shows there were no adverse effects on San Francisco's business community. She made particular note of the effects in San Francisco's restaurant industry which was most heavily affected by the new law since most restaurants did not provide PSL benefits until required by law. Data shows that employment increased by 3.9 percent between the 4th quarter of 2006 and the 4th quarter of 2007 which was a higher growth rate than the previous year before the implementation of San Francisco's laws. Leiwant also referenced studies of the implementation of PSL in San Francisco which surveyed leaders of the business community. These studies showed that PSL had not been a major issue for employers. She quoted Donna Leavitt, Manager of the Office of Labor Standards Enforcement in San Francisco who said, "We haven't heard of any rampant paid sick leave abuse. We also haven't heard that the costs of paid sick leave have ended up being anything employers couldn't manage." Leiwant concludes her testimony saying, "There is a clear public health need for workers in Jersey City to have sick

time they have earned. There has been successful implementation of laws like this around the country. There is no need for further study. This bill should be passed now.”

National Organizations

Karch’s (2007) discussion of the national organizations as a political driver of diffusion is based on the fact that various national organization have incorporated the dissemination of policy-relevant information as part of their organizational missions. Interest groups on the local level have long been recognized for this sort of activity. Karch has argued that interest groups are more likely to cause diffusion “because of the increasingly tight links between their national offices and their state and local affiliates” (p. 66).

The interviews with the advocacy group representatives revealed that the local advocacy groups received funding and resources from national organizations that were also working on campaigns across the country. This section summarizes the interview findings related to national organizations and their influence in New Jersey.

Much of the work done by advocacy groups within New Jersey was supported by national organizations. The representative from *A Better Balance* stated that a great deal of their funding came from the Ford Foundation. This funding started with a project grant that was specifically related to their work in paid sick leave and paid family leave. After several years of project grants, they began to receive general funding support from the Ford Foundation.

The representative from *New Jersey Citizen Action* discussed their membership in the Family Values at Work Network which is a national organization that helped provide funding for the *Time to Care Coalition* as well as 20 other state coalitions. Additional funding was provided by the Rockefeller Family Foundation. She stated that this funding was crucial to their work,

especially in municipalities using Ballot Initiative/Referendum processes because there is a large cost associated with canvassing and publicity materials.

Model Legislation

This section summarizes findings related to how model legislation was developed and how that legislation was disseminated. As the literature review discussed, Garrett and Jansa (2015) found that interest groups have been active in diffusing policies through the dissemination of model legislation.

Interviews revealed that *A Better Balance* had a strong working relationship with other national groups including Family Benefit Work, the Working Families Party, the local labor unions and Rutgers. *A Better Balance* was called upon to draft the law and coordinate the initial meetings with elected officials.

One of the initial legalities that had to be addressed was the power of the municipalities to implement PSL. *A Better Balance* stated that they conducted the legal research and showed that there was no real problem with municipalities enacting such laws. They were then involved in drafting the legislation. They stated that they worked with the National Partnership for Women and Families, based in Washington D.C., as well as a person who was involved in the enforcement agency in San Francisco to develop a model law. This model law developed a baseline that was introduced to municipalities nationwide where *A Better Balance* was involved.

The representative reiterated the importance of the technical support that they supplied. Without technical and legal drafting support that they offer, bills drafted solely by legislators who do not understand the ins and outs of what a good law should include may get passed. She believes that *A Better Balance* plays an essential role in making sure that good policy is passed

but also noted the need to be diplomatic and political when intervening and offering their services.

The representative from *A Better Balance* stated that they were involved in the legal matters related to passing the law. They were involved early in the process in Jersey City as well as Newark in terms of talking to council members but this advocacy did not continue with all municipalities, although the legislation that they had written was used by the local advocacy groups.

The Municipal Approach

The interview participant representing *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* discussed what the coalition called *the municipal approach*. This approach was a strategy to pursue legislation in multiple cities at the municipal level before taking the legislation to the state level. Part of the motivation of this approach was the consensus that any state legislation would be vetoed by then Governor Chris Christie. This interviewee recalled that the municipal approach was debated and not all members of the coalition completely agreed with the approach. Some members thought it would be better to take the policy only to the state level. She stated that some of this strategy was developed in response to Governor Chris Christie. There was talk of his possibly running for President in 2016. Strategically, they considered bringing the policy to the state level with the intention of his vetoing it. Then, if he ran for President, they could frame the policy as a widely supported policy that Republicans opposed. This strategy would help raise the awareness of the policy to the national stage. The strategy of the municipal approach identified by this interviewee was confirmed in an analysis of news articles. In an Associated Press article, Rob Duffey, a spokesman for the *New Jersey Working Families Alliance* explained that the municipal approach emerged because advocates could not get a statewide bill around

Christie since he has long been hostile to this type of legislation. Duffey stated that the committee decided to build momentum by passing local ordinances in New Jersey municipalities. This article also confirmed that Christie's 2016 presidential ambitions were taken into consideration when they designed this approach. Advocates hoped "his 2016 presidential ambitions might increase the pressure to pass popular bipartisan legislation that polls especially well with women" (Colvin, 2014).

The representative from *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* identified the motivations for the municipal approach. First, the municipal approach allowed for employees to start getting covered. Bigger cities have low-wage workers such as retail and restaurant workers that are often not offered adequate workplace protections and benefits. By first implementing in cities, the coalition was able to make the case that the policy works and does not harm businesses. This representative identified the study in Jersey City as useful to showing that implementing the policy was not convoluted and that employers could handle it. She stated, "in a way it is like laboratories of democracy on the state; it is laboratories of democracy on the municipal level. This is all about expanding to cover more people, but sometimes you have to start small."

This representative also identified some of the drawbacks to the municipal approach. First, the municipal approach took an incredible amount of resources to talk with council members and to testify in council meetings. Second, many resources were required to get the legislation on a ballot should a referendum approach be taken. She also stated that there were issues from a community organizing perspective. While workers were supportive of the policy and would show up to events when invited, this was not a worker-driven movement. The brunt of the work came from the community organizers.

She said that the executive director of *New Jersey Working Families* had a good relationship with the mayor of Jersey City, and this relation helped bring things to fruition. The coalition went into Jersey City with the idea of passing a light bill, meaning a bill that had carve outs for smaller businesses, and then conducting an implementation study. While this process was occurring in Jersey City, Newark also passed its own legislation and then Jersey City amended its legislation to match Newark's.

The representative from *New Jersey Citizen Action* also discussed how the coalition organized the municipal approach. She stated that the coalition divvied up the cities because there was so much work to be done. The strategy was to first try to pass legislation by the city councils. If the members of the coalition felt that the legislation passed by a city council would be weak, they would then push for a ballot initiative where they used pre-drafted legislation. The overall goal was to ensure that a strong bill got passed. Taking the legislation to ballot meant that there was no negotiation on the terms of the policy and the city council could not change the language of the initiatives.

This representative also stated that the municipal approach was not embraced by the entire coalition. The municipal approach was considered a slow path to progress and the question arose if the amount of effort required was worth the end result. She stated that there were two reasons why the municipal approach was beneficial. First, that the coalition could start getting people paid sick time without waiting for Christie to not be governor. Second, the municipal approach allowed the coalition to set a standard for how strong the state legislation would be.

Summary and Findings

The interviews and analysis of testimony presented in this chapter show that the motivations and obstacles identified by advocacy groups are almost identical to those identified by elected officials. The needs of low-wage earners and their dual responsibilities at work and at home were identified as a motivation for the policy. Furthermore, the public health benefits were identified as a reason for people who are not affected by the law to be supportive of the law. Advocacy group representatives also identified parts of the business community as being vocal against the policy. This observation is in keeping with the findings from the elected officials.

The previous chapter discussed diffusion in terms of elected officials examining prior legislation or being in contact with previously adopting municipalities. Using that same operationalization, there is evidence of the advocacy groups being involved in the legislation of many different municipalities. *A Better Balance*, in particular, was involved in legislation at the municipal level since the first instance of PSL. The advocacy groups then used the outcomes and findings from these past policy experiments as evidence when lobbying other municipalities. This operationalization of diffusion only gives evidence that groups were involved in multiple municipalities. An application of Karch's political drivers of diffusion help better explain exactly how the policy was diffused.

National organizations are shown to play a supportive role in the diffusion of PSL in New Jersey and likely elsewhere. Large and wealthy private foundations provided funding to the more local interest groups for the purpose of pursuing campaigns relating to paid sick leave. The Family Values at Work network was identified as a national organization that helped numerous coalitions across the country in related campaigns. This finding is in keeping with

Karch's argument that national organizations can act as a conduit through which information is shared from place to place. A review of the Family Values at Work's website shows evidence of their work for paid sick leave among other similar policies in multiple states. The website also includes toolkits for coalitions and legislators with information about legislation, messaging, and research. The website maintains a story bank that shares user-submitted stories to illustrate how individuals' lives were impacted through family friendly policies. The board of the Family Values at Work is comprised of eight people from state coalitions and two national allies including Dena Mottola Jaborska from New Jersey Citizen Action ("Family Values at Work Board," n.d.).

The influence of model legislation may perhaps be one of the most definite instances of policy diffusion in the case of PSL in New Jersey. *A Better Balance* claimed to be involved in the development of this model legislation. The model legislation was used across New Jersey, and according to the representative from *A Better Balance*, the legislation has been used as the model for all municipal laws across the country. Model legislation is useful to advocacy groups as they engage in lobbying activities with elected officials. As was done in Jersey City, the advocacy group can present a fully formed document to the elected officials and relieve some of the burden from the work they need to do.

Policy Entrepreneurship versus Advocacy Coalition Framework

A discussion about advocacy coalitions necessitates an application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF posits that interested parties form coalitions based on shared core beliefs and engage in non-trivial coordinated efforts. The formation based on shared beliefs calls for analysis based on long-term efforts, not single issues. *The Time to Care Coalition* has been in existence for over 15 years and was assembled based on core beliefs about

women and the workplace and worker's rights. The ACF gives a good framework for explaining how the coalition was formed and maintains its members. The coalition includes over 100 different members from a variety of different industries and interests including ACLU New Jersey, the New Jersey Education Association, the New Jersey League of Women Voters, the New Jersey Tenants Association, the Restaurant Opportunities Center and the Planned Parenthood Action Fund of New Jersey.

The policy entrepreneurship literature discusses the formation of coalitions as an action taken by policy entrepreneurs. According to interview data the *Time to Care Coalition* was convened by *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* and *New Jersey Citizen Action*. This study did not attempt to identify any one policy entrepreneur by name, nor did such information come out in the interviews. Policy entrepreneurship discusses coalitions in terms of a resource that the policy entrepreneur develops in order to support certain policy innovations. The findings of this study do not indicate that the coalition was formed by one policy entrepreneur but rather by multiple interest and research groups.

While the ACF offers possible explanation of how and why the coalition was formed, it does not offer much explanation or theory for the work that the coalition performs. Policy entrepreneurship literature does not accurately explain how the coalition was formed, but it does explain the activities that the coalition carried out. Mintrom's (1997) discussion of policy entrepreneurship is suited to explain the actions pursued by the coalition, and how those actions led to policy change. More importantly for this context, policy entrepreneurship better explains how these actions are related to policy diffusion. While the coalition may not have been formed by a policy entrepreneur, the actions of the coalition were entrepreneurial in nature.

First, Mintrom discusses the importance of policy entrepreneurs networking across state lines. He writes, “through these contacts, they learn more about the details of policy innovations elsewhere. Knowing these details can increase the credibility of policy entrepreneurs, because they can then more readily give authoritative-sounding responses to questions or objections raised concerning a proposed policy innovation” (p. 739). This was the case with the executive director of *A Better Balance*. Her involvement in the legislation in San Francisco and other previously adopting cities allowed her to speak from experience when testifying to the Jersey City Council. She could draw on the experiences from drafting the San Francisco legislation as well as the findings from the implementation of the legislation.

Second, Mintrom discusses the role that policy entrepreneurs play in identifying problems “in ways that attract the attention of decision makers and indicate appropriate policy responses” (p. 739). One of the co-conveners of the advocacy coalition, *Rutgers Center for Women and Work*, was instrumental in identifying the problem the coalition was seeking to rectify. Their report written in conjunction with the *Human Impact Partners* revealed evidence on which the campaigns were based. Specific numbers that were cited repeatedly by coalition members and elected officials alike came from this report. The report identified that 1.2 million workers in the state do not have paid sick leave. The testimony given by coalition members spoke to the many public problems that are associated with a lack of paid sick leave and presented the proposed policy solutions as common-sense legislation.

Third, Mintrom discusses policy entrepreneurs as people who spot problems and “are prepared to take risks to promote innovative approaches to problem solving, and they have the ability to organize others to help turn policy ideas into government policies.” (p. 740). This aspect of policy entrepreneurship was evident in the way that the coalition perused the municipal

approach. The coalition recognized the political problems that were hindering the likelihood of a state-level adoption. Their decision to pursue multiple municipal level laws was a solution to this problem. The proliferation of the municipal laws increased the likelihood of the state adoption or what Shipan and Volden (2006) consider the snowball effect.

Advocacy Coalitions and Diffusion

The information gathered from the interviews with advocacy group representatives suggests ways that the advocacy coalition was a driver of policy diffusion. Policy diffusion literature has considered the role of national organizations, interest groups, and professional associations and found that they are often active in disseminating policy knowledge or creating networks through which elected officials can meet and learn from one another and this contributes to the spread of a policy (Karch, 2007). The findings here suggest that the advocacy coalition in New Jersey was very deliberate and methodical in their approach. As the discussion in Chapter 5 demonstrates, there was a limited amount of consideration of previous policies by the elected officials. Some member of the coalition was involved in each of the municipal level campaigns. The advocacy group facilitated the diffusion of PSL in New Jersey. In fact, some of the advocacy group members claimed to have better policy knowledge than the elected officials who would be voting the policy into law. Their intention was to guide the policymakers into passing a law that would effectively address the problem that New Jersey workers were facing.

Chapter 7 New Jersey State Law

The last two chapters focused on how paid sick leave diffused to thirteen municipalities in the state of New Jersey. This chapter will examine the process by which paid sick leave became a statewide law in the state of New Jersey and follows a similar format that was presented in Chapters 5 and 6. This chapter examines the political dynamics that were present in the state legislature and Governor's office and explores how advocacy groups were involved in policymaking at the state level. This chapter answers the third research question posed in this dissertation: How did PSL diffuse upward to become a state law?

Legislative History

On May 20, 2013, Assemblywoman Lampitt and Assemblyman Giblin introduced A4125, *An Act mandating certain employers provide earned sick leave to employees*. The bill introduction in the state legislature predates the first adoption of PSL in New Jersey which was Jersey City on September 25, 2013. Table 9 demonstrates a timeline of PSL laws in the state of New Jersey. This table includes state legislature efforts and shows how legislation was concurrently being considered at the local and state level.

Table 9. Timeline of Bill Introductions and Adoptions (State and Local)

May 20, 2013	A4125 Introduced
June 13, 2013	S2866 Introduced
September 25, 2013	Jersey City adopted
January 14, 2014	S785 Introduced
January 28, 2014	Newark adopted
February 6, 2014	A2354 Introduced
September 8, 2014	East Orange adopted
September 9, 2014	Passaic adopted
September 9, 2014	Paterson adopted
September 9, 2014	Irvington adopted
November 4, 2014	Montclair adopted
November 4, 2014	Trenton adopted
March 3, 2015	Bloomfield adopted
December 17, 2015	New Brunswick adopted
November 3, 2015	Elizabeth adopted
December 17, 2015	S785 passed by Senate
March 14, 2016	Plainfield adopted
September 13, 2016	Morristown adopted
January 9, 2018	A1827 Introduced
March 5, 2018	S2171 Introduced
March 26, 2018	A1827 passed by Assembly
April 12, 2018	S2171 passed by Senate
May 2, 2018	P.L. 2018, c10 signed by Governor Murphy

This bill allowed employees to accrue up to 40 hours of earned sick time per year if employed by a company with fewer than 10 employees or to accrue up to 72 hours of earned sick time per year if employed by a company with 10 employees or more. The identical bill S2866

was introduced in the New Jersey Senate by Senator Loretta Weinberg on June 13, 2013. In the 2014-2015 legislative session, the bill was reintroduced as A2354 on February 6, 2014, and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. The Labor Committee amended the legislation and, after a 6-3 vote, sent the legislation to the Assembly Budget Committee. The Budget Committee performed a fiscal analysis of the Bill and had a 6-4 Committee vote on the bill. The identical Senate bill S785 was introduced in the Senate on January 14, 2014, and referred to the Senate Labor Committee where it was amended and sent back to the Senate. On December 17, 2015, the bill was passed by the Senate in a 22-17 vote and sent to the Assembly on December 21, 2015. On January 27, 2016, the Senate-negotiated language was introduced in the Assembly and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee.

While Democratic members of the legislature were working to advance these bills, there were bills being introduced to counter these efforts. Assemblyman Gregory McGuckin introduced A3702 which would prohibit local governments from requiring private employers to provide paid sick leave. He also introduced A2875 to prohibit local units of government from adopting increased minimum wage and mandatory paid sick leave for private employers. These bills were referred to the Assembly Labor Committee but did not receive further action.

On January 9, 2018, A1827 *Concerns earned sick leave to employees* was introduced in the General Assembly and referred to the Labor Committee. The identical bill S2171 was introduced in the Senate on March 5, 2018. The bill was passed by the Assembly on March 26, 2018, through a 50-24 vote and was passed by the Senate on April 12, 2018, through a 24-12 vote. The bill was signed into law by Governor Murphy on May 2, 2018 as P.L. 2018, c10.

The parameters of the state law differed in some ways from many of the municipal policies. Like the municipal laws, the state law stipulated that employees would earn one hour of

sick leave for every 30 hours work. The state law stipulated that employees are guaranteed up to 40 hours of sick leave per year, regardless of company size. This law was different from some of the municipal laws which had different requirements based on business size.

The state law also dealt with issues that were discussed in the Morristown case study. In Morristown and in most other municipalities, the law applied to per diem hospital health care workers. However, the state law stipulated that the law did not apply to per diem hospital health care workers. The law defined such employees as “any individual performing work for a hospital system on an as needed basis to replace or substitute for a temporarily absent hospital employee and who works on a flexible or non-fixed schedule.”

Lastly, the state law preempted all municipal laws that had already been enacted and prohibited municipalities from taking any further action on the matter. The legislation states:

the governing body of a county or municipality shall not, after the effective date of the act, adopt any ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation regarding earned sick leave. The provisions of this act shall preempt any ordinance, resolution, law, rule or regulation regarding earned sick leave adopted by the governing body of a county or municipality.

When the law went into effect 120 days after it was passed, all of municipal laws were voided and municipal governments were forbidden from taking any legislative action regarding the matter. In the case of per-diem hospital workers in Morristown, these employees lost their paid sick benefits with the implementation of the state law.

During this legislative process, many interest groups engaged in lobbying activities at the state level. A report from the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission revealed that in 2014, paid sick leave was the most lobbied issue that year. Sixty-nine entities made 294

official contacts with state legislators. These groups included 21 businesses, 21 business associations, 9 ideological groups, 6 unions, 7 associations representing various interest, 4 hospitals and one public agency. Of these groups, 27 indicated they opposed the legislation, 19 supported the legislation and 34 indicated they were monitoring the legislation but did not hold a position at the time (New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, 2015).

Interviews

The interview invitation process followed the same protocols that are outlined in Chapter 4. Interview invitations were sent to the office of every Sponsor of the bill in the Assembly and the Senate. Ten interview invitations were sent, along with follow up invitations; however, only one office responded. This low-response rate is a limitation to this research and places a constraint on the conclusions that can be made from this data. Interviews were conducted with one staff member from Assemblywoman Lampitt's office. The purpose of this interview was to learn more about this legislative process. The questions asked centered on how the bill became law and who was involved in this process. The interview included questions about how the municipal laws were influential on the state level and the influence of advocacy groups on the process. The interviews conducted with advocacy group representatives included questions about how they were involved in the policy process at the state level. The findings from these interviews are summarized separately to follow the pattern established in the previous two chapters. First, the interview with the Lampitt staffer will be summarized according to the concepts of process, motivations, opposition, diffusion, and advocacy group influence. Process was added as a concept to help interpret the interview findings from the legislative staffer. As

the following analysis will show, the legislative process was more complicated than the processes described at the municipal level and process warrants a stand-alone examination.

Process

The legislative staffer was asked to describe how PSL became a state law. He discussed the policy process at the state level from his perspective. As shown in the Legislative History section above, the state law was first introduced in 2013 and signed into law in 2018. The staffer identified the reasons for the length of time between the first introduction and the adoption of the law. He stated that the legislators knew that if Governor Christie was in office, even if the policy passed both chambers, it would likely have ended in a conditional veto or an overall veto. A conditional veto is where the governor rejects a part of a bill and proposes amendments for the legislature while an overall veto is where the entire bill is rejected. The staffer also discussed some of the conflict between supporters of the bill about some of the fine details such as industry-specific exceptions to the law. The bill was introduced several times between 2013 and 2018 and was voted on by the entire Senate at one point, but the bill was never voted on by the entire Assembly. The staffer stated that part of the motivation to not take the bill to an Assembly vote was due to the knowledge that it would be vetoed by Christie. Legislators did not want to take political risks for legislation that they knew would be vetoed.

A review of news articles clarified some of the issues that this staffer discussed. As the staffer mentioned, there were issues within the legislature that stalled the bills and no bill was passed during the time Chris Christie was governor. One of the issues that caused disagreement between members of the Assembly and the Senate was the issue of what should be done with the municipal laws. The Senate version of the bill would set a statewide standard and prevent municipalities from enacting stricter standards. The Assembly version and Assembly Speaker

Vincent Prieto would not agree to these changes and supported a version of the bill that allowed municipalities to keep what they had already passed or to pass stricter standards than the statewide bill. In 2015, State Senate President Stephen Sweeney stated, “I feel strongly about having a statewide standard. I’m not looking to repeal what any community did, but I will not support 565 different standards. It’s bad for business” (as quoted in Livio, 2015).

In 2017, Phil Murphy ran for Governor of New Jersey and expressed support for the policy throughout his campaign. When Murphy became the New Jersey Governor, Lampitt’s office began to meet with various interest groups to fine tune the legislation. The goal of these meetings was to create a policy that accounted for the many sectors of the workforce that it affected.

Motivations

The Lampitt staffer stated that one of the goals of passing a state law was to remove some of the patchwork of the local laws. The presence of 13 different municipal laws can be a burden on employers and employees, especially for employers who operate businesses in multiple cities or for employees who work in multiple cities. By passing a state law, there would be one uniform law for everyone. The position of the Lampitt office regarding municipal and state laws was different from the position Speaker Prieto took a few years prior.

The Lampitt staffer discussed some of the political motivations for PSL. First, he stated that the policy was a very Democratic policy and that New Jersey has become more and more Democratic over the years. Second, he stated that a large part of the law’s success was owed to the election of a Democratic governor. The change in leadership in the executive branch allowed the bill to move forward. He characterized the previous governor, Chris Christie, as a block to

the policy. He stated that even though this was a bill that had support in the legislature, there was no question that a change in the governor was necessary for the bill to become law.

Opposition

The Lampitt staffer identified representatives of the service industry as the most vocal opponents against the law. They argued that the service industry needed day to day flexibility so that they could cover shifts. People from the service industry stated that they were having problems with people calling in sick on the day they were scheduled to work, leaving businesses understaffed. The Lampitt staffer stated that they worked to write a law that would provide the benefit to employees but be the least impactful to the industry. The end result was that the legislation allowed industries to have certain dates of the year that would necessitate a doctor's note if employees needed to take the day off. This part of the legislation was industry specific. Airlines, hotels and restaurants each had different days that they needed covered. The legislation allowed the industries to determine which dates worked for them but the legislation capped how many days that could be set aside.

Diffusion

The Lampitt staffer was asked about how the 13 municipalities that already had PSL legislation and if his office considered that legislation when crafting the state law. The Lampitt staffer stated that they tried to pass a law that was as generous if not more generous than the municipalities' laws. He also stated that the fact that there were so many municipal laws in place helped state legislators negotiate with the business community. The business community wanted to see a state law that preempted the local laws so that they only had to follow one law. For example, business owners who owned chains in multiple municipalities may have had different rules at their different locations. In addition, they may have had employees who worked at

multiple locations. This circumstance created multiple rules that business owners needed to follow. A state law created one policy that applied to all employees and businesses. The Lampitt staffer stated that for the business community, the state law may have been viewed as the “lesser than two evils.”

The staffer also discussed the evidence that the municipal laws provided. In conversations with the business community, he could point to evidence that the business community was not being harmed in the adopting cities. The staffer recognized that there were limitations to point to that evidence and said, “the business community, regardless of what we said, was going to cry wolf and say that this was going to be harmful to their members.”

Advocacy Group Influence

The staffer was asked about lobbying and advocacy groups. His answer centered around interest groups that advocated around specific industries. He stated that people representing the interests of the service industry, retail industry, construction industry, and hospital and health groups were active in advocating for the interests of their clients. The staffer did not name any of the advocacy groups that have been identified in this study such as *New Jersey Citizen Action* or *A Better Balance*. However, in their interviews, the representatives of the advocacy groups did discuss their involvement at the state level.

Interviews with Advocacy Groups

The interviews conducted with representatives of the three advocacy groups included questions about their involvement in the state law. The findings of these interviews will be presented using the following themes: process, motivation, and diffusion.

Process

The state bill was introduced in 2013 and advocacy groups were involved early in the process. The representative from *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* discussed some of the reasons for the long span of time between its introduction and final passage in 2018. Some of the delay was due to Chris Christie's threat of vetoing the bill. She also discussed some of the political hindrances in the legislature that extended the time it took to pass the bill.

She stated that they had a good relationship with Speaker Prieto. He wanted to pass a strong bill earlier in the process. As the news articles analysis revealed, Prieto wanted to pass a bill that would allow municipalities to continue to implement their own policies so long as they provided at least as many days of leave as the state law. This representative recalled that the bill got mixed up in the "messiness of politics" and Prieto started to lose support. Prieto wanted a strong bill and was willing to fight for it and then started to lose support. There was a whole year or two that no state level progress was made. This delay was part of the reason the municipal approach was continued.

The representative from *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* stated that when the coalition realized that progress was going to be made on the bill at the state level with the election of a new governor, members of the *Time to Care Coalition* had discussions with legislative staffers about the coalition's goal to have full coverage without carveouts, meaning industries where the law did not apply. As the meetings and time progressed, the coalition began to bring people to committee meetings to tell their stories of how paid sick leave had benefitted them. The coalition also ran opinion pieces and letters to the editor to express support for the policy.

The representative from *New Jersey Citizen Action* discussed making PSL an election issue. They did an endorsement interview when Governor Murphy was a candidate for governor and held press conferences to garner support for the bill. In addition, they brought people out to speak at hearings. The representative also stated that they relied on accurate data in their advocacy work. They knew there were one million people in New Jersey without paid sick time, and many of these affected people were minorities and low-income people, so they brought attention to that fact. They also had data about the projected economic effects of PSL in New Jersey and used that information in their work.

The representative from *A Better Balance* stated that the same people pushing for the laws on the local level were involved on the state level as well. She stated that *A Better Balance* gave legal and technical assistance regarding the legislative language. She discussed the importance of their role in the process saying:

We see that if the governor is sitting in the library writing the law, we can come back and say that's great. You have to be very diplomatic and political, you can say great idea but this part really won't work. I think we played an essential role. Whether it could happen or not, [without us] probably something could happen but I think we do play an essential role in making sure there's good policy.

Both representatives from *Rutgers Center for Women and Work* and *New Jersey Citizen Action* stated that they were involved in the final negotiations regarding the bill before it was passed by the legislature.

Diffusion – The Municipal Approach

The representative from *A Better Balance* stated that passing PSL in multiple municipalities and working up to the state was a strategic decision that worked particularly well

in New Jersey. She stated that similar approaches have been tried in other states such as Minnesota without the same success. She stated that New Jersey is a model for how to get a statewide law. She reiterated that she believed that the state law was a good law. She clarified that this law did not allow for carve outs based on business size. All employees were guaranteed the same amount of sick time regardless of their company's size. She stated that this change was the most important change in the state law compared to the local laws since many if not all of the local laws created different standards based on business size.

The representative from *New Jersey Citizen Action* offered a different viewpoint on the effectiveness of the municipal approach. Some members of the *Time to Care Coalition* thought it would be good for setting a floor for how strong the state legislation would be, meaning that whatever passed locally would be the starting point for the state law. The representative discussed the differing opinions on this matter and stated, "Not everybody believed that would necessarily be true for New Jersey. What mayors do and what towns do doesn't necessarily inform the state legislature." She discussed how the strategy went awry in New Brunswick and the effect on the state law. In New Brunswick, the law was passed with a series of problems including the carve out for per diem hospital workers. The state law followed the New Brunswick law and created a carve out for per diem hospital workers. Another problem with the state law was the number of sick days that the law required. For some technical reasons on the local level, the laws could only contain five days of earned sick leave. On the state level, policy advocates wanted to pass a bill that allowed for nine days. This representative believed the law could have been better if the coalition had waited and only pursued the state bill with nine days of earned leave and no industry carve outs.

News Article Findings

A review of news articles confirms many of the points that were made in the interview process. First, there is a remarkable difference in the public statements that were made by Chris Christie and Phil Murphy regarding the issue. Christie voiced his views against PSL stating, “These towns that are doing it just continue to make New Jersey less and less competitive. And then when businesses leave the state, they want to know why” (as quoted in Colvin, 2014). During the ceremony where Governor Murphy signed the legislation into law, he stated “This is not just about doing what’s right for workers and their families. This is about doing the right thing for our economy and protecting more New Jerseyans’ place in that economy” (as quoted in Racioppi, 2018).

Furthermore, the actions and motivations of advocacy groups were confirmed through an analysis of news articles. Additionally, news articles revealed that the advocacy group and *Time to Care Coalition* member *New Jersey Working Families Alliance* organized a press conference with eight New Jersey mayors from municipalities that had adopted PSL in support of the state law. In that press conference, the mayors spoke of how PSL had benefitted their cities and why they wanted PSL to become state law. Mayor of Newark, Ras Baraka stated, “When we passed earned sick days in 2013, we took an aggressive stance in support of workers’ rights. Since then we’ve seen how well the legislation has worked in Newark – for businesses and workers alike – and today I urge state lawmakers to do the same for all workers” (as quoted in Insider NJ, 2018). The Mayor of Plainfield, Adrian Mapp voiced similar sentiments saying, “As Mayors, we’re at the forefront of innovative policies that meet the needs of residents, local economies and visitors. Our common sense action on Earned Sick should not be limited to the fortunate residents of our municipalities and should be expanded to protect all those who call the Garden State Home” (as

quoted in Insider NJ, 2018). Mayor of Montclair Robert Jackson stated, “Montclair is proof that earned sick days keeps our families, communities, and local economies healthy. A statewide bill that provides earned sick time to all workers will make New Jersey an even healthier place to live and work, while setting an example for states around the country to follow” (as quoted in Insider NJ, 2018).

At this press conference, Analilia Mejia, executive director of *New Jersey Working Families Alliance* voiced support for the statewide law by saying, “Passing earned sick days locally isn’t enough for members of the community outside the 12 forward thinking municipalities that protect the public health by removing the economic incentive to show up to work sick. This is even more important as the country experiences one of the worst flu seasons in recent history” (as quoted in Insider NJ, 2018).

Summary and Findings

This chapter has explored the adoption of the statewide paid sick leave law in New Jersey. Using data gathered through interviews and new articles, this chapter outlined how the law was passed and who was involved in the process. The following discussion will address how the circumstances observed in New Jersey align with current diffusion literature.

Political Dynamics

Perhaps the clearest reason that paid sick leave was able to come to fruition on the state level in New Jersey was the change in political dynamics with the election of a Democratic governor. The statements made by Governor Murphy and the statements made by former Governor Christie clearly illustrate that the two leaders were diverged in their opinions about the law. These political dynamics were not the only dynamics at play. As was discussed by the

Lampitt staffer, there were complications with the bill during its progress through the legislative body. Even though there was a Democratic majority in the Assembly and in the Senate, there were still conflicts about the details of the bill and what was to be done with the existing municipal ordinances. The threat of Christie's veto has been frequently cited as the reason for the bill not being passed through the legislature; however, the legislation never progressed to a full vote in the General Assembly, and the Assembly and the Senate were not able to work out their differences regarding the legislation during the time Christie was in office.

From the first introduction of the state law in 2013 to the adoption of the law in 2018, a number of changes were made in the details of the law. The first iteration created different standards for companies based on size where employees of larger businesses could earn up to 72 hours of paid sick leave per year and employees of smaller businesses could earn up to 40 hours per year. By the time final bill was passed, this differentiation was no longer in the legislative language and all employers regardless of business size could earn up to 40 hours of paid sick leave per year. There are many possible explanations for this outcome. First, this could have been the result of negotiations between legislators; second, this could have been the result of advocacy group demands; and third, this could have occurred in reaction to the policies that were included in the municipal laws. The Lampitt staffer stated that they wanted to be sure the State policy was at least as generous as the municipal laws, if not more generous. The state law was more generous than municipal laws in terms of the number of days that employees at small businesses could earn. However, the law did not offer additional leave time to employees of larger businesses. Interviews with advocacy group representatives revealed that they were lobbying for the leave standard in the earlier versions of the bill where 72 hours of leave were available to employees at larger businesses. Some concessions were evidently made that created

one standard for all employees. The state law is less generous in terms of applications across industries due to the carve out that exempted per-diem hospital workers from the policy. As was discussed in the case of Morristown, per-diem workers have been an issue with PSL legislation. Morristown did not exempt per-diem workers from their legislation, but the ordinance that was passed in New Brunswick did exempt per diem workers.

The Municipal Approach and Bottom-Up Federalism

The proliferation of many municipal laws followed by the adoption of a state law warrants a discussion of Shipan and Volden's (2006) work regarding bottom-up federalism and the snowball effect. The snowball effect is a hypothesis that the adoption of local laws increases the likelihood of statewide adoption. Its counterpart is the pressure valve effect which is the hypothesis that the adoption of local laws decreases the likelihood of state adoption. Shipan and Volden theorize that professional legislatures and active interest group communities are instrumental in facilitating a snowball effect. Professional legislatures, supported by full-time legislators and active staffs, have the time and resources to engage in policy learning by using local policies as models for state policies. Less professional legislatures with limited time and resources might not see the need to dedicate themselves to issues that have already been resolved on the local level. Shipan and Volden also hypothesize that strong policy advocates and interest groups on the state level make the adoption of statewide laws more likely, particularly if they can point to successful local adoptions.

The New Jersey Legislature is considered a part-time legislature since they do not meet for the entirety of the calendar year, and most legislators also hold other employment. The legislature does employ full-time staff. Each party in both chambers employ full-time, partisan staff to provide policy research, public relations, and administrative services for members of

their respective parties. Additionally, each legislator maintains a professional staff in their district office. According to Shipan and Volden, the professionalization of a legislature can help facilitate the snowball effect. Due to the limited number of interviews conducted with this case study, it is not possible to estimate the degree that the professionalization of the legislature influenced the adoption of a state PSL law. This is a factor that could be explored in future research.

The advocacy groups studied in this case were involved at both the local and the state level. They made a strategic decision to pursue local action because of the political blockade of the policy on the state level. Once that blockade was removed and a new governor was inaugurated, advocacy groups were able to continue their work on the state level. As they pursued their agenda in this new environment, the previously adopted municipal laws provided evidence of how PSL would work and how it would affect New Jersey. In addition to providing evidence, Shipan and Volden hypothesize that strong advocacy groups are necessary on the state level in order to help local policies “snowball.” There is evidence from this case study that advocacy groups were involved and campaigned strongly in favor of PSL for the entire state of New Jersey.

There is a discrepancy, however, in these findings between the information given by the Lampitt staffer and the advocacy groups regarding the influence of advocacy groups in the writing and the negotiation of the bill. Some of this discrepancy could be explained by the small sample size of respondents from the legislative side. The advocacy groups, and specifically *A Better Balance*, discussed their involvement in the drafting and negotiation of the bill. What is clear in this picture is that the language of the final bill is similar to the municipal laws that were modeled after the language written by *A Better Balance*. A plausible explanation to this

discrepancy in findings is that the advocacy groups were involved but this particular staffer was not involved in those specific meetings.

Shipan and Volden (2006) have also hypothesized that economic spillover effects can lead to a greater likelihood of a state adopting a policy following local adoptions. They write, “the adoption of a policy in one locality may lead affected citizens in that community or nearby cities to seek state government action to combat negative externalities of the newly adopted policy” (p. 826). In some ways the numerous municipal laws created a demand from the business community for the state laws. Findings from the interviews discuss businesses owners who expressed that they would prefer a state law rather than multiple municipal laws. Multiple municipal laws proved to be a burden on some businesses that operated in multiple cities with different implementation and enforcement strategies and perhaps even different rules. The negative externalities created through multiple laws created a motivation to pass a state law that would create one PSL standard for all of New Jersey. The multiple municipal laws created a problem that could be fixed through the state law. This is in keeping with the arguments Shipan and Volden (2006) have made.

State to State Diffusion

An alternative explanation for how PSL was passed on the state level is the influence of state to state policy diffusion. New Jersey is geographically proximate to other states that have passed PSL including Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island. A plausible explanation that is rooted in policy diffusion theory is that these geographically proximate states engaged in some form of policy learning, emulation, or economic competition. None of the interview participants, including the state legislative staffer, discussed the influence of these adopting states. However, this study has a small sample size so the influence of state to

state policy diffusion cannot be ruled out. Discussions with additional state-level actors could reveal that New Jersey was influenced by other states in addition to the New Jersey municipalities.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

This dissertation has used a mixed-methods approach to better understand the adoption and diffusion of paid sick leave laws in New Jersey. The quantitative analysis used logistic regression analysis to identify the internal variables of a city that helps predict the adoption of paid sick leave. The qualitative analysis used case studies to further expound on the findings of the quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis was used to explore how policy diffusion played a role in this case. Through interviews with elected officials and policy advocates, this research explored how a policy traveled from one city to another. This research found that the influence of policy advocates working through a highly coordinated coalition were instrumental in the policymaking process. The circumstances observed in New Jersey lead to a greater discussion of the role that cities play in American federalism and how cities may influence upper levels of government. This chapter will discuss the findings that came from the quantitative approach and the qualitative approach and identify connections between the two approaches. The chapter will also discuss the answers to the three research questions and propose topics for future research.

Factors Predicting Adoption

The logistic regression performed in Chapter 3 identified four statistically significant variables that help predict the adoption of PSL by cities in New Jersey. In one model, a mayor-council form of government, large city size, and a higher Gini coefficient, meaning that income inequality is higher in a city, all indicate that a city is more likely to adopt PSL. In a second model, a higher percentage of minorities residing in a city and a mayor-council form of government indicate that a city is more likely to adopt PSL. This section will discuss how the

case studies offer additional insights to the variables found to be significant through the regression model.

Racial Demographics

Some of the interview participants discussed racial demographics as a motivator for this policy. Specifically, in Morristown, a councilmember referenced the large African American and Hispanic communities in Morristown that would benefit from the policy. The policy advocates examined through the case studies also referenced race as a motivation for PSL. In official testimony, advocacy group representatives highlighted the fact that a lack of paid sick leave disproportionately affects low-income people and communities of color. *New Jersey Citizen Action* identifies social, racial, and economic justice as the motivators for the types of policy changes they pursue. The *Time to Care Coalition* includes a number of minority-based organizations including the Latino Action Network, Migrante New Jersey, the New Jersey NAACP, and NOW Women of Color and Allies. The advocacy groups were invested in policies that benefitted minorities. The advocacy groups that were active in lobbying and messaging activities used data that represented the needs of the minority communities. The regression model has shown that a higher percentage of minorities is a predictor of policy adoption. The findings from the case studies explain the motivations of advocacy groups to rectify this identified problem.

Form of Government

The second statistically significant variable in the regression model is *form of government*. This variable was measured as a binary and examined the influence of a mayor-council form of government against all other forms of government. The purpose of this measurement was to examine the influence of a “strong-mayor” system where the mayor holds

executive veto powers. A mayor council form of government was positively associated with PSL adoption. The case studies reveal possible explanations for this relationship. One explanation is that the advocacy groups leveraged their relationships with mayors in order to put the policy on the city council's agenda. Interview data revealed that this was the case in Jersey City. Analilia Mejia was said to have had a strong relationship with Mayor Fulop, and she brought the legislation to him and encouraged its adoption. The dynamics of this situation were further confirmed through interviews with council members in Jersey City. One stated that the mayor was given model legislation and he strongly encouraged the council to consider it.

The form of government variable intended to explore the differences between the action taken by strong mayor systems and weak mayor systems. Some literature has shown that mayor-council forms of government operate through politically motivated incentives. Members of such governments are likely to adopt policies that help them gain favor with their electorate (Feiock et al., 2014). Other theoretical ideas purport that in cities with a council-manager form of government, elected officials rely on objective professional expertise to inform their decisions (Swarts & Vasi, 2011). In the case of PSL, the policy was mostly adopted by cities with a mayor-council form of government. The use of model legislation overrode the need for professional expertise to develop policy ideas. The less professional city councils had the policy development work done for them by advocacy groups.

A discussion of the influence of model legislation and city councils leads to another possible explanation for the wide-spread adoption of PSL by municipalities. City council members usually hold other professional obligations on top of their positions in the city council. Additionally, they have limited resources in terms of their professional staff. At the time PSL was passed in Jersey City, for example, city council aides worked part-time for a salary of

\$14,999 a year (Bussanich, 2018). Jansa, Hansen and Gray's (2019) study of policy reinvention and state legislatures found that less professional state legislatures were more likely to copy from legislative language developed in other states while more professional state legislatures were more likely to develop their own legislative language that catered to the unique needs of their states. One likely culprit for the “copy and paste” legislating was a lack of funding for staff assistants.

On the local level, there may be reason to believe that city councils are likely to adopt pieces of model legislation regardless of their institutional arrangements. City council members are often trained in disciplines outside of public policy and law. An interview with a Morristown city council member discussed the varied experiences of members of the city council, specifically in terms of occupations. Some were health care executives and some had been pastors. Elected officials without training in drafting legislation may be likely to rely on the technical expertise of advocacy groups and the pre-drafted legislation they provide. Additionally, though city council members may employ staff with more expertise in law and policy, at least in most cases in New Jersey, those positions are part-time and low paid. A lack of sufficient resources may make a city council more susceptible to the lobbying activities performed by advocacy groups.

Economic Conditions

The Gini Index is a measure of the distribution of income. A higher Gini coefficient indicates that there is greater inequality within a population. The logistic regression indicated that a higher Gini coefficient increased the likelihood that a city would adopt PSL. Statements made by an elected official in Morristown revealed why greater income inequality may have led to policy adoption of this issue. The town council member stated that Morristown is a very

wealthy city, but it is also a city with a high percentage of Latinos who work in the service industry. The social movement literature has discussed reasons that a high grievance level is not always associated with changes in policy. Swarts & Vasi (2009) write, “unless a group experiences a sudden dramatic threat, its members may experience very oppressive conditions but lack hope for change” (p. 760). In Morristown, there was a segment of the population with a high grievance level and a segment of the population with a low grievance level. It is possible that members of the Morristown community who enjoyed employee benefits without any government intervention recognized that such benefits should be afforded to all members of their community. The fact that policy advocates had assembled enough signatures to pursue a referendum vote should the town council not be able to pass the law indicates that the policy was supported by the people of Morristown.

Discrepancies between Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches

There is a discrepancy between the findings of the logistic regression and the findings of the case studies. The logistic regression found that the percentage of Democratic voters in each city did not predict adoption. However, in interviews, “progressiveness” was identified as a motivation for adoption in each case city. Additionally, on the state level, the legislative staffer interview characterized the policy as a “Democratic policy.” The progressiveness of the policy was considered a reason for its adoption. There may be some explanation for this difference in findings. First, there is most likely a sample bias in the interview participants. The people interviewed and asked to identify the motivations for adopting the policy were political actors. Asking political actors questions about policies will likely lead to political answers. Credit claiming (Weaver, 1986) for the policy might be part of the reason for these answers. Credit

claiming also leads to the second possible reason for these answers. Most of the interview participants were Democrats. By credit claiming, they are signaling to their constituency that they and their party have taken actions in the best interest of their constituency.

One interview participant who opposed the legislation identified politics as the reason for the policy's adoption, but this was not said in a good light. The person stated that the policy was adopted due to "left-winged socialists." This participant also identified the city council's relationship with the mayor as a reason for the policy's adoption, calling the city council a "rubber-stamp" for the mayor. While the logistic regression did not indicate that political conditions in a city increased the likelihood of policy adoption, the case studies clearly indicated that politics were a part of this process.

Policy Advocates, Diffusion, and Bottom-Up Federalism

One objective of this research was to create connections between different parts of the policy process literature. This research has revealed the power that policy advocates and advocacy coalitions have in the policymaking process. Diffusion of innovation literature recognized policy advocates, advocacy coalitions, and policy entrepreneurs as part of the diffusion process; however, most of this literature seems to view these actors as ancillary in the diffusion process. This dissertation has analyzed a situation where such actors are at the forefront of the diffusion process. Rather than official government actors engaging in learning or emulation in order to follow the example set by another government, or government actors being compelled to adopt policies because of economic competition or economic spillover effects of another government's policies, this study has shown policy advocates as the drivers of policy in multiple jurisdictions.

By working collaboratively through an advocacy coalition, multiple advocacy groups in New Jersey were able to accomplish the same objective; that is, to see that paid sick leave became a law in New Jersey. The coalition worked on multiple parts of the policymaking process. They were involved in the drafting of the legislation. Building on the lessons learned from previous adoptions of PSL around the nation. *A Better Balance* drafted legislation that dictated how they wanted this policy to apply. Members of the coalition then engaged in lobbying activities to bring this legislation to the attention of elected officials in multiple jurisdictions. The coalition engaged in advocacy work to draw up public support of the policy. In some cases, the coalition worked to place the legislation on a ballot initiative that was voted on and approved by the general public.

Building on the momentum that was gained as multiple local governments adopted PSL, the *Time to Care Coalition* continued their work on the state level. A change in political dynamics created an avenue that allowed PSL to be adopted on the state level. The successful implementation of the local laws were used as evidence for the feasibility of a state law. This situation raises questions about the role of cities in American federalism. Much of the literature about bottom-up federalism has discussed the influence that states have on the federal government. This research has demonstrated the influence that cities have on the state. Again, policy advocates were heavily involved in the process that helped local policies become state policies. What is left to be seen is if the momentum that has been gained through multiple state adoptions of PSL will continue to the federal level with the adoption of the Healthy Families Act.

Research Questions

This dissertation asked three research questions. 1.) What factors contributed to the adoption of a paid sick leave law by a municipality in New Jersey between 2013 and 2016; 2.) How did advocacy groups facilitate the diffusion of paid sick leave in New Jersey?; and, 3.) How did paid sick leave diffuse upward to become a state law in New Jersey?

The first question was answered through the logistic regression and it revealed that large cities with a mayor-council form of government, a higher percentage of minorities, and a high Gini coefficient were more likely to pass PSL.

The second and third questions were answered through the case studies. This study suggests that advocacy groups were highly influential in the diffusion of PSL in New Jersey both on a city to city level and from the cities to the state. The case studies revealed that elected officials engaged in very few activities such as policy emulation or policy learning. In fact, there is little evidence that elected officials wrote their own legislation on this issue; rather, they relied on the legislation that was brought to them by the advocacy groups.

The advocacy groups drafted the initial legislation and engaged in lobbying activities to disseminate information about the policy. The advocacy groups helped fund ballot initiatives when necessary and assembled materials such as petitions and postcards from constituents for legislators. In many ways, rather than policymakers engaging in policy learning, the advocacy groups engaged in policy teaching.

Paid sick leave became a state law when Governor Chris Christie was no longer in office and could not use the threat of his veto power to keep the legislation from progressing. The change in political dynamics is perhaps the strongest reason that paid sick leave became a state law. The momentum created through the implementation of many local laws acted as evidence

that paid sick leave would be beneficial to New Jersey. The local laws were used as a policy experiment. Starting with the first iteration of the law adopted in Jersey City that differentiated the application of the law based on business size and ending with a state law that applied to all business sizes and industries, this legislation grew into a law that has been sustainable in New Jersey.

Future Research

This research has answered many questions and also revealed possibilities for future research. First, the Time to Care Coalition merits additional research. This dissertation considered how the coalition was involved in one specific issue. The coalition was active in many different campaigns issues and was connected to similar coalitions in other states as well as national organizations. An in-depth network analysis of the coalition is warranted. Understanding how coalitions such as these function and how they use their resources could provide more understanding to how they diffuse policies.

Second, this research as focused on the advocacy coalitions who were supportive of PSL laws. As this research has shown, there has been considerable opposition of these laws from the business community. There is a need for better understanding of the interest groups that oppose worker friendly legislation and the actions they take. Furthermore, there is a need for better understanding of groups that oppose local governments setting their own standards for issues such as paid sick leave, minimum wages, and smoking bans. Just as *A Better Balance* drafted model legislation that municipalities have used to pass PSL, the American Legislative Exchange Council developed and disseminated model legislation used by states to create a preemption law prohibiting municipalities from passing PSL (Mason, 2015).

Third, this research raises questions about how influential policy advocates are in the policymaking process. In the case of paid sick leave in New Jersey, policy advocates claimed to have a heavy influence and, in some ways, claimed to have been more influential than elected policymakers. This finding raises questions about the democratic policymaking process. Citizens elect officials to act as policymakers, but this research has shown that nonelected officials have a strong influence on the policymaking process. Additional research should examine the motivation of policy advocates, what they need to do to be successful in their work, and how their work affects the public. In the case of paid sick leave, the new laws were beneficial to a large segment of the population. Future research should consider situations where policy advocates are successful in advocating for legislation that may hurt vulnerable people.

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Appendix A: Invitational e-mail to participate in a research study

IRB #19-205

Dear _____:

I am a current doctoral student at Virginia Tech, and as part of my dissertation, I am conducting a research study to understand the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance that was enacted in [*Jersey City, Newark, Morristown, or State of New Jersey*]. I am contacting you to ask if you would be willing to participate in this research by taking part in an interview with me. I am looking to interview people who were involved in the policymaking process and activists who advocated for paid sick leave to become law in New Jersey. The interview should take no more than 60 minutes to complete. If you agree to participate, the interviews may be audio and video recorded for accuracy and will take place using Zoom Video Conferencing Technology. Your input is valuable to my research and will help me understand the process for paid sick leave becoming law. This research follows the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board. Therefore, your participation in this research will remain confidential with respect to the data I collect from participants. Names and other identifying information will be strictly confidential.

Your participation is voluntary, and you have an opportunity to withdraw at any time.

If you are interested in participating, please fill out the doodle poll to confirm a date and time. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at ###-###-####. Thank you for your assistance at this important state of my dissertation.

Sincerely,

Anne Zobell Walters, PhD Student
Center for Public Administration and Policy
Virginia Tech School of Public and International Affairs
901-484-7850
zobella8@vt.edu

Matt Dull, PhD
Dissertation Chair
Center for Public Administration and Policy
Virginia Tech School of Public and International Affairs
MDull@vt.edu

Appendix B: Verbal Consent Script

IRB #19-205

Thank you for agreeing to talk with me. This interview is being conducted for research purposes. I am studying how paid sick leave laws became so common in New Jersey cities. You were invited to participate in this study because of your position as a policymaker or an advocacy group member. Your interview data will help me understand how the policy process took place. I want to remind you that your participation is voluntary and you can terminate this interview at any time without any penalty or loss of benefits. As part of your participation I will ask several questions and I expect this interview to last for about an hour. I want to remind you that our conversation is confidential and that your responses will not be connected with your name in any way. I am recording this interview. The recording data will be kept confidential and only used for this project and the recording will be deleted once this project is finished. Do you understand and agree to continue this interview? Thank you for agreeing to talk with me.

Appendix C: Interview Questions

IRB #19-205

Interview Questions for City Council members or staff

1. When did you first become aware of a paid sick leave ordinance?
2. Will you walk me through the timeline of how this became a law in your city?
3. Did you communicate with individuals in other cities that had passed or were trying to pass PSL?
4. Was there opposition to the ordinance? Could you describe it?
5. In my research I've found that there are a number of organizations that have voiced support for PSL and claimed to have been involved in getting this law passed. One example is New Jersey Time to Care. Can you name any other organizations that were involved?

Some other organizations that I know of were

New Jersey Working Families

The Center for Popular Democracy

A Better Balance

New Jersey Citizen Actions

I am going to reread the names of each of these groups. Will you please rate each of these groups as either very influential, somewhat influential, not influential.*¹

6. Did you ever have contact with any of these groups? Could you describe the interaction.

*In question five, I will include my identified advocacy groups as well as the groups that the participant identifies.

Interview Questions for State policymakers

1. When did you first become aware of paid sick leave in New Jersey?
2. Will you walk me through the timeline of paid sick leave becoming a state law.
3. Did you communicate with officials from any cities as the state was considering a paid sick leave law?
4. Could you describe the opposition to the law?
5. Did you have contact with lobbying groups? Could you describe the interaction.

Interview Question for Policy Advocates

1. Why was your organization interested in paid sick leave laws?
2. Could you describe how your organization was involved in making paid sick leave a law in your city?
3. Did you work with other community or labor organizations? How did you work together?
4. Did your organization advocated for paid sick leave in other cities as well? Did you advocate to the New Jersey state government?
5. How influential do you think your organization was?

¹ This question was eliminated from the interviews. The interviews revealed that the advocacy groups were working together in a coalition and divided the cities among them.

Appendix D: Logistic Regression Data

Municipality	Adoption	Census Population	%Minority	Voter Turn-out (%)	% Democrats	Municipal Budget per Capita (\$)	Mayor	GINI Index	%Service Industry
Aberdeen	0	18,210	28.73	62.9	27.39	856	1	0.3811	15.1
Absecon	0	8,411	25.32	72.23	23.49	1187	0	0.3821	23.7
Alexandria	0	4,938	7.04	74.24	15.1	595	1	0.4069	14.4
Allamuchy	0	4,323	9	73.05	16.57	769	1	0.3867	13.5
Allendale	0	6,505	14.82	70.6	17.6	1901	1	0.4559	10.7
Allenhurst	0	496	6.46	69.65	17.41	9186	1	0.5418	13
Allentown	0	1,828	9.52	73.48	25.84	1256	1	0.3652	12.7
Alloway	0	3,467	7.93	72.72	21.19	584	1	0.3508	19
Alpha	0	2,369	9.21	66.78	36.79	1180	1	0.4097	16
Alpine	0	1,849	33.26	62.5	24.63	2933	1	0.587	8
Andover	0	606	10.9	70.25	23.5	1404	1	0.3649	18.7
Andover Twp	0	6,319	11.11	68.9	15.17	1209	1	0.396	13.3
Asbury Park	0	16,116	77.36	57.7	40.5	2517	1	0.5193	30.8
Atlantic City	0	39,558	84.29	53.49	55.98	5942	0	0.5462	46.6
Atlantic Highlands	0	4,385	8.74	70.35	25.68	1783	1	0.4173	8.9
Audubon	0	8,819	5.86	68.4	37.08	1010	1	0.3939	13.5
Audubon Park	0	1,023	2.63	65.14	64.53	873	1	0.3517	9.2
Avalon	0	1,334	2.69	70.85	15.12	17888	0	0.4972	8.4
Avon By The Sea	0	1,901	4.68	68.82	23.14	2730	1	0.5367	14.4
Barnegat Light	0	574	2.97	57.73	15.76	5497	1	0.3884	20.4
Barnegat Twp	0	20,936	11.76	69.22	20.74	958	1	0.427	5.6
Barrington	0	6,983	12.26	65.92	36.67	955	1	0.4247	15
Bass River	0	1,443	4.16	66.56	19.02	862	1	0.4293	18.7
Bay Head	0	968	2.27	66.78	12.91	4897	1	0.4931	13
Bayonne	0	63,024	42.36	59.42	52.5	1810	0	0.4456	19.5
Beach Haven	0	1,170	11.02	54.83	17.95	7970	1	0.4886	14.1
Beachwood	0	11,045	11.42	63	18.64	867	1	0.3759	22.3
Bedminster	0	8,165	17.1	67.64	19.65	1300	1	0.4791	7
Belleville	0	35,926	60.46	62.83	36.08	1550	1	0.386	17.9
Bellmawr	0	11,583	16	63.28	46.19	1077	1	0.3923	15.9
Belmar	0	5,794	21.16	64.42	26.73	2391	1	0.4347	19.8
Belvidere	0	2,681	5.97	70.77	23.51	1346	1	0.3887	20.4

Bergenfield	0	26,764	59.82	69.51	35.84	1267	1	0.4217	19
Berkeley Heights	0	13,183	17.04	72.36	21.96	1266	1	0.4445	11.5
Berkeley Twp	0	41,255	7.8	67.47	26.27	967	0	0.4472	21.3
Berlin	0	7,588	10.09	66.36	31.51	913	1	0.4305	12.7
Berlin Twp	0	5,357	24.99	63.78	42.59	1405	1	0.4192	22.6
Bernards Twp	0	26,652	19.64	68.44	18.63	1401	1	0.4712	7.2
Bernardsville	0	7,707	15.87	66.77	17.56	1698	1	0.5395	13.6
Bethlehem	0	3,979	6.88	73.53	17.28	725	1	0.3657	13.6
Beverly	0	2,577	39.82	70.71	44.2	1157	0	0.4412	21.7
Blairstown	0	5,967	6.05	60.47	16.48	723	1	0.3784	15.6
Bloomfield	1	47,315	51.26	64.31	41.46	1531	1	0.4043	15.8
Bloomington	0	7,656	12.93	69.19	25.81	1257	1	0.367	12.1
Bloomsbury	0	870	6.89	72.01	21.96	1039	1	0.4295	24.5
Bogota	0	8,187	57.94	72.1	37.8	988	1	0.3976	22.1
Boonton	0	8,347	25.89	69.1	19.92	1647	0	0.4003	15.4
Boonton Twp	0	4,263	9.72	73.5	17.46	1439	1	0.4966	10.4
Bordentown	0	3,924	18.66	74.18	35.15	1329	1	0.4018	19.3
Bordentown Twp	0	11,367	27.29	75.1	28.42	946	1	0.3661	12.7
Bound Brook	0	10,402	56.97	63.31	27.21	1172	1	0.4448	23.1
Bradley Beach	0	4,298	26.31	69.23	28.72	1927	1	0.4888	19.7
Branchburg	0	14,459	15.1	72.08	17.53	1233	1	0.3796	11.5
Branchville	0	841	5.35	72.38	13.89	1652	1	0.3315	19.1
Brick	0	75,072	10.62	65.2	19.56	1168	0	0.4263	16.8
Bridgeton	0	25,349	79.67	56.32	31.74	880	0	0.4549	27
Bridgewater	0	44,464	26.97	69.78	22.24	855	0	0.4209	10.4
Brielle	0	4,774	6.65	74.65	16.34	1702	1	0.412	10.7
Brigantine	0	9,450	14.51	66.32	18.45	2816	1	0.477	30.6
Brooklawn	0	1,955	13.81	62.07	40.26	1506	1	0.3885	20.6
Buena	0	4,603	40.63	65.06	21.21	860	1	0.4922	19
Buena Vista	0	7,570	25.99	68.49	29.7	598	1	0.4236	19
Burlington	0	9,920	41.51	71.44	47.61	1639	0	0.4247	21.3
Burlington Twp	0	22,594	42.07	75.95	40.28	1038	0	0.3624	15.5
Butler	0	7,539	15.54	69.17	18.01	1829	1	0.3506	16.9
Byram	0	8,350	8.6	66.68	18.82	1289	1	0.3404	14.5
Caldwell	0	7,822	18.09	69.53	30.73	1529	1	0.4356	12.3
Califon	0	1,076	2.42	74.13	28.98	941	1	0.4022	10.2
Camden	0	77,344	97.23	48.78	38.87	2175	0	0.504	33.5

Cape May	0	3,607	14.14	74.91	22.78	4366	1	0.5334	20.1
Cape May Point	0	291	3.43	78.22	28.5	5876	1	0.4013	10.7
Carlstadt	0	6,127	28.63	72.24	26	3182	1	0.4005	17.2
Carneys Point	0	8,049	28.9	63.54	30.16	1107	1	0.4253	16
Carteret	0	22,844	64.82	62.34	40.42	1616	1	0.3914	17.9
Cedar Grove	0	12,411	14.86	69.95	25.46	999	1	0.4145	11
Chatham	0	8,962	10.94	75.03	22.64	1860	1	0.4935	11.2
Chatham Twp	0	10,452	10.45	70.69	19.73	1539	1	0.502	6.2
Cherry Hill	0	71,045	23.47	68.2	38.55	911	0	0.4377	11.6
Chesilhurst	0	1,634	58.82	61.36	57.2	1534	1	0.3661	21.3
Chester	0	1,649	16.79	72.25	15.75	3004	1	0.5131	16.4
Chester Twp	0	7,838	8.9	66.94	14.59	1865	1	0.424	8
Chesterfield	0	7,699	50.55	77.85	23.4	531	1	0.3495	12.4
Cinnaminson	0	15,569	10.94	78.21	29.06	806	1	0.3957	11.6
Clark	0	14,756	12.05	72.93	26.17	1351	0	0.4104	14.5
Clayton	0	8,179	25.76	68.18	35.3	880	1	0.4262	21.6
Clementon	0	5,000	31.52	59.9	35.15	1037	1	0.3756	18.9
Cliffside Park	0	23,594	45.48	69.11	41.42	1373	1	0.5036	19.9
Clifton	0	84,136	45.74	63.13	33.23	1249	1	0.428	15
Clinton	0	2,719	14.2	75.9	24.73	1355	1	0.4037	16
Clinton Twp	0	13,478	15.51	75.53	15.79	924	0	0.3691	11.2
Closter	0	8,373	38.94	69.12	26.1	1709	1	0.4484	7.3
Collingswood	0	13,926	20.98	66.19	42.37	1094	1	0.4322	14.3
Colts Neck	0	10,142	9.79	71.04	12.48	1027	1	0.488	9.3
Commercial	0	5,178	16.86	52.78	30.73	760	1	0.4463	22.9
Corbin City	0	492	5.09	75.56	17.46	865	0	0.4227	22.6
Cranbury	0	3,857	19.76	73.34	30.15	2864	1	0.4511	10.8
Cranford	0	22,625	11.97	74.84	29.86	1476	1	0.3871	11.7
Cresskill	0	8,573	34.63	70.39	25.72	1962	1	0.5258	6.2
Deal	0	750	12.4	52.49	17.11	12251	1	0.619	13.8
Deerfield	0	3,119	27.49	62.35	26.12	602	1	0.3332	22.1
Delanco	0	4,283	16.39	75.33	34.22	1171	1	0.3925	14.6
Delaware	0	4,563	4.03	76.26	21.97	948	1	0.469	14.3
Delran	0	16,896	18.21	76.37	33.91	946	0	0.3775	14.2
Demarest	0	4,881	31.48	70.98	30.4	1616	1	0.5021	7.9
Dennis	0	6,467	3.16	71.28	23.26	726	1	0.3667	13.5
Denville	0	16,635	13.25	73.08	18.68	1543	0	0.4277	10.5
Deptford	0	30,561	22.6	66.57	40.58	1012	1	0.3989	16.6

Dover	0	18,157	78.02	62.45	40.22	1477	0	0.3759	26.9
Downe	0	1,585	6.69	61.01	22.01	753	1	0.3987	25.4
Dumont	0	17,479	32.3	72.47	27.47	1174	1	0.3898	15.4
Dunellen	0	7,227	39.88	64.76	27.36	950	1	0.4033	21.2
Eagleswood	0	1,603	4.86	62.88	15.08	1235	1	0.3725	19.3
East Amwell	0	4,013	5.49	75.41	27.93	694	1	0.4171	14.7
East Brunswick	0	47,512	33.48	66.93	30.87	1175	0	0.4271	9.6
East Greenwich	0	9,555	12.49	73.87	31.06	749	1	0.3751	11.4
East Hanover	0	11,157	18.13	73.3	24.17	2341	1	0.4197	15.9
East Newark	0	2,406	71.11	58.29	55.5	1464	1	0.4348	25.7
East Orange	1	64,270	97.16	63.97	58.47	2090	0	0.4765	27.8
East Rutherford	0	8,913	35.97	64.29	26.27	2659	1	0.425	13.3
East Windsor	0	27,190	45.92	69.35	34.61	739	1	0.4058	11.3
Eastampton	0	6,069	29.74	72.75	32.16	835	1	0.3961	10.4
Eatontown	0	12,709	33.44	65.36	25.31	1818	1	0.4718	21.2
Edgewater	0	11,513	51.52	59.74	41.96	2003	1	0.4858	6.1
Edgewater Park	0	8,881	41.43	74.78	43.81	639	1	0.3639	26.3
Edison	0	99,967	58.35	64.8	45.16	1160	0	0.4108	12
Egg Harbor	0	4,243	46.44	67.47	32.6	1373	0	0.393	27.8
Egg Harbor Twp	0	43,323	34.34	66.87	22.78	810	1	0.3887	25.4
Elizabeth	1	124,969	82.66	60.42	55.31	1683	0	0.4262	23.7
Elk	0	4,216	20.52	68.61	34.01	1084	1	0.4251	18.1
Elmer	0	1,395	6.09	67.77	22.63	739	1	0.3415	22.1
Elmwood Park	0	19,403	37.19	66.01	30.77	1336	1	0.4221	14.8
Elsinboro	0	1,036	6.08	72.94	25.69	772	1	0.367	16.2
Emerson	0	7,401	17.99	73.95	18.65	1446	1	0.3599	10.9
Englewood	0	27,147	68.16	69.53	55.04	2166	0	0.5214	15.8
Englewood Cliffs	0	5,281	46.58	67.78	29.72	2526	1	0.4737	7.7
Englishtown	0	1,847	17.43	61.98	19.2	1023	1	0.3559	12.3
Essex Fells	0	2,113	5.26	68.44	19.31	2199	1	0.4658	29
Estell Manor	0	1,735	3.57	73.26	21.06	616	1	0.3192	16
Evesham	0	45,538	13.74	73.48	28.16	752	1	0.3983	12.9
Ewing	0	35,790	39.54	71.56	42.54	1163	0	0.3955	17.5
Fair Haven	0	6,121	6.28	71.73	24.46	1341	1	0.3973	8.3
Fair Lawn	0	32,457	21.62	71.76	33.32	1419	1	0.3937	11.5
Fairfield	0	7,466	8.35	66.4	18.23	2820	1	0.42	26.4

Fairfield	0	6,295	60.81	64.32	43.7	429	1	0.4645	7
Fairview	0	13,835	62.2	65.29	46.86	1178	1	0.4678	24.2
Fanwood	0	7,318	18.31	75.34	31.3	1199	1	0.3627	10.7
Far Hills	0	919	12.08	62.17	13.37	2998	1	0.5999	14.9
Farmingdale	0	1,329	12.94	73.4	17.7	606	1	0.3962	20.2
Fieldsboro	0	540	17.41	73.26	50.29	1394	1	0.3743	21.6
Flemington	0	4,581	35.89	68.01	24.63	1064	1	0.4616	26.1
Florence	0	12,109	22.03	75.54	29.06	881	0	0.3867	15.6
Florham Park	0	11,696	15.8	70.56	18.36	1835	1	0.4825	11.7
Folsom	0	1,885	11.78	70.49	20.05	628	1	0.3784	15.3
Fort Lee	0	35,345	52.16	65.61	39.75	1942	1	0.4842	13.6
Frankford	0	5,565	5.03	71.85	12.64	657	1	0.3707	17.5
Franklin	0	5,045	11.75	63.3	14.6	1182	1	0.388	19
Franklin Lakes	0	10,590	13.71	71.23	14.94	1539	1	0.5141	7.7
Franklin Twp	0	62,300	59.45	70.55	37.2	940	1	0.3813	16.7
Franklin Twp	0	16,820	12.94	67.01	25.89	647	1	0.4335	8.6
Franklin Twp	0	3,195	5.38	75.4	16.17	1075	1	0.3955	13.6
Franklin Twp	0	3,176	7.65	69.69	18.93	800	1	0.3561	12.4
Fredon	0	3,437	5.91	76.15	12.55	755	1	0.3729	10.4
Freehold	0	12,052	58.33	68.14	29.24	1206	1	0.4381	32.6
Freehold Twp	0	36,184	20.13	69.72	20.68	1089	1	0.4044	12.1
Frelinghuysen	0	2,230	3.73	73.14	15.03	634	1	0.3639	12.8
Frenchtown	0	1,373	6.85	71.79	29.87	1236	1	0.4207	20.4
Galloway	0	37,349	31.51	67.99	26.09	651	1	0.4175	29
Garfield	0	30,487	40.96	62.63	32.32	1044	1	0.4618	20.2
Garwood	0	4,226	11.93	70.59	27.99	1584	1	0.4369	19.4
Gibbsboro	0	2,274	8.57	69.95	36.98	1345	1	0.4069	13.2
Glassboro	0	18,579	28.96	67.12	36.13	1234	1	0.4573	16.6
Glen Gardner	0	1,704	8.86	70.8	20.93	749	1	0.4784	22.7
Glen Ridge	0	7,527	14.7	71.95	41.26	1583	1	0.3999	13.5
Glen Rock	0	11,601	15	74.55	29.58	1443	1	0.4286	6.2
Gloucester City	0	11,456	12.45	56.54	46.85	1501	1	0.3944	16.1
Gloucester Twp	0	64,634	25.51	63.48	38.44	815	0	0.4096	21.9
Green	0	3,601	7.77	70.28	13.12	994	1	0.4584	11.3
Green Brook	0	7,203	30.44	65.14	19.82	1154	1	0.3571	15.8
Greenwich	0	5,712	18.89	69.45	18.38	774	1	0.4228	23.1
Greenwich	0	4,899	7.11	73.08	57.94	2245	1	0.3906	14.1

Greenwich	0	804	6.84	72.42	28.23	943	1	0.3533	9
Guttenberg	0	11,176	76.95	59.51	56.41	1515	0	0.5057	25
Hackensack	0	43,010	70.05	68.8	43.42	2039	1	0.4448	20.9
Hackettstown	0	9,724	22.59	68.47	21.65	1015	1	0.4215	22.6
Haddon Heights	0	7,473	5.08	71.87	36.06	940	1	0.3892	13.7
Haddon Twp	0	14,707	8.16	71.05	39.39	777	1	0.4763	7.6
Haddonfield	0	11,593	5.1	69.47	34.8	1330	1	0.4151	12
Hainesport	0	6,110	16.65	76.81	26.46	676	1	0.407	17.8
Haledon	0	8,318	59.72	62.59	41.1	1061	1	0.4278	15.7
Hamburg	0	3,277	10.92	64.97	16.16	868	1	0.3987	13
Hamilton	0	88,464	25.94	70.5	31.4	1105	0	0.3985	23.8
Hamilton	0	26,503	36.75	67.43	26.9	948	1	0.391	18.2
Hammonton	0	14,791	25.3	70.27	21.18	787	1	0.418	25.2
Hampton Boro	0	1,401	9.71	66.89	19.98	780	1	0.3949	18.3
Hampton Twp	0	5,196	5.87	68.96	16.51	701	1	0.3607	14.4
Hanover	0	13,712	16.4	74.04	16.99	1974	1	0.4056	10.6
Harding	0	3,838	7.14	71.83	14.74	2737	1	0.5423	7.4
Hardwick	0	1,696	5.54	66.34	18.47	600	1	0.3891	14.5
Hardyston	0	8,213	11.18	66.84	16.01	1248	1	0.3399	13.4
Harmony	0	2,667	2.17	65.28	18.59	1108	1	0.356	13
Harrington Park	0	4,664	21.61	75.95	23.81	1247	1	0.4513	6.9
Harrison	0	13,620	62.64	58.47	54.97	2773	0	0.4219	19.1
Harrison Twp	0	12,417	10.22	74.56	23.04	838	1	0.3824	11.5
Harvey Cedars	0	337	1.78	63.59	21.12	13578	1	0.5556	14.5
Hasbrouck Heights	0	11,842	27.71	74.62	22.18	1532	1	0.4255	14.2
Haworth	0	3,382	17.42	75.93	32	2242	1	0.3691	10.2
Hawthorne	0	18,791	20.51	66.88	24.92	1012	0	0.4044	18.3
Hazlet	0	20,334	12.75	68.08	25.9	1002	1	0.3899	15.2
Helmetta	0	2,178	16.35	67.42	28.06	1010	1	0.3321	13.4
Hi-Nella	0	870	29.65	50.54	39.38	1033	1	0.3392	20.2
High Bridge	0	3,648	10.5	71.61	20.88	1718	1	0.406	17.4
Highland Park	0	13,982	34.62	68.39	56	923	1	0.4927	9.8
Highlands	0	5,005	9.39	58.59	27.35	1671	1	0.4424	11.3
Hightstown	0	5,494	42.42	70.44	36.41	1208	1	0.4182	21.1
Hillsborough	0	38,303	24.52	68.95	21.52	722	1	0.3878	9.1
Hillsdale	0	10,219	15.04	75.35	23.45	1244	1	0.4245	10.9
Hillside	0	21,404	73.55	71.81	50.99	2021	0	0.4336	20.8

Ho-Ho-Kus	0	4,078	10.13	73.91	17.2	1911	1	0.4526	6.4
Hoboken	0	50,005	25.85	54.76	37.87	1989	0	0.4641	5.4
Holland	0	5,291	4.17	72.02	17.4	1022	1	0.4165	14.2
Holmdel	0	16,773	23.72	66.49	16.07	1322	1	0.4841	5.4
Hopatcong	0	15,147	16.48	61.88	19.49	1085	1	0.3783	14.5
Hope	0	1,952	6.87	70.86	18.75	666	1	0.3687	14.1
Hopewell	0	4,571	14.48	65.33	23.99	484	1	0.3927	14.2
Hopewell	0	1,922	5.88	75.23	46.17	1588	1	0.4202	21.7
Hopewell Twp	0	17,304	14.3	74.04	31.57	1232	1	0.4459	10.5
Howell	0	51,075	16.3	65.56	19.16	888	1	0.3936	15.9
Independence	0	5,662	8.87	66.48	18.01	739	1	0.3557	13.8
Interlaken	0	820	2.2	76.18	23.82	2846	1	0.3748	11
Irvington	1	53,926	96.88	61.92	51.3	1814	0	0.4462	6.7
Island Heights	0	1,673	4	73.37	20.93	1385	1	0.4235	20.9
Jackson	0	54,856	15.64	68.39	20.16	711	0	0.3809	16.4
Jamesburg	0	5,915	35.75	63.58	32.99	840	1	0.4054	12.4
Jefferson	0	21,314	12.64	67.52	17.59	1341	0	0.3637	13.9
Jersey City	1	247,597	77.09	56.69	46.61	1881	0	0.4993	17.5
Keansburg	0	10,105	23.04	48.18	25.24	1477	1	0.4983	16.7
Kearny	0	40,684	49.73	62.93	40.7	1802	0	0.4123	18.8
Kenilworth	0	7,914	22.27	65.34	28.47	1830	1	0.4353	16.9
Keyport	0	7,240	27.84	64.57	27.07	1194	1	0.4464	15.6
Kingwood	0	3,845	4.13	73.86	13.47	795	1	0.3594	22.3
Kinnelon	0	10,248	9.25	71.74	14.73	1360	1	0.4347	11.9
Knowlton	0	3,055	5.47	65.12	20.61	965	1	0.4051	11.9
Lacey	0	27,644	6.14	66.19	16.34	953	1	0.401	17.7
Lafayette	0	2,538	7.41	72.67	12.95	839	1	0.455	17.2
Lake Como	0	1,759	25.64	66.79	28.67	1951	1	0.4192	14.5
Lakehurst	0	2,654	25.99	58.92	17.57	1345	1	0.3837	23.7
Lakewood	0	92,843	24.49	64.49	15.51	745	1	0.459	20.7
Lambertville	0	3,906	13.01	71.63	44.21	1276	1	0.4316	9.8
Laurel Springs	0	1,908	8.34	67.65	35.46	1404	1	0.3825	13.8
Lavallette	0	1,875	3.63	55.75	13.94	4014	1	0.4653	12.1
Lawnside	0	2,945	94.64	70.72	62.97	1475	1	0.4487	24.8
Lawrence	0	33,472	32.34	71.25	39.38	1348	1	0.4097	22.6
Lawrence	0	3,290	21.01	60.19	29.82	563	1	0.4056	13.6
Lebanon	0	1,358	12.01	73.88	19.44	1355	1	0.5065	9
Lebanon Twp	0	6,588	6.26	71.54	15.97	784	1	0.4095	10.2

Leonia	0	8,937	54.12	72.42	51.47	1475	1	0.4764	11
Liberty	0	2,942	6.67	62.99	20.05	677	1	0.3472	16.8
Lincoln Park	0	10,521	18.8	64.44	20.19	2098	0	0.3304	11.9
Linden	0	40,499	54.52	67.26	53.11	2339	0	0.3925	18.6
Lindenwold	0	17,613	58.31	56.46	43.83	724	1	0.4055	23.2
Linwood	0	7,092	7.72	71.04	20.93	1566	0	0.4112	16.7
Little Egg Harbor	0	20,065	7.81	63.8	18.47	946	1	0.3981	20.9
Little Falls	0	14,432	18.56	66.75	24.12	1087	0	0.417	20.1
Little Ferry	0	10,626	51.16	59.11	29.66	1319	1	0.4267	17.9
Little Silver	0	5,950	5.05	72.89	21.82	1668	1	0.45	3.4
Livingston	0	29,366	25.53	67.71	35.72	1511	1	0.4387	28.4
Loch Arbour	0	194	6.71	73.78	38.41	5966	1	0.4768	12.6
Lodi	0	24,136	46.58	65.58	34.06	1009	1	0.4325	16.4
Logan	0	6,042	19.02	71.12	39.23	1593	1	0.3705	7.6
Long Beach	0	3,051	4.88	60.92	18.1	7455	1	0.5602	6.2
Long Branch	0	30,719	44.41	59.28	30.67	1645	0	0.507	28.8
Long Hill	0	8,702	13.66	70.26	18.54	2209	1	0.4526	11.1
Longport	0	895	1.91	64.1	19.97	8238	1	0.5352	10.9
Lopatcong	0	8,014	16.2	69.07	26.66	902	1	0.4214	12.7
Lower Alloways Creek	0	1,770	3.06	87.81	38	5532	1	0.3966	20.5
Lower Township	0	22,866	6.85	69.23	20.19	1087	1	0.4035	23.3
Lumberton	0	12,559	29.5	76.77	31.95	688	1	0.4265	13.8
Lyndhurst	0	20,554	26.91	69.35	28.07	1682	1	0.4358	14.2
Madison	0	15,845	17.34	71.05	25.73	2138	1	0.5027	11.3
Magnolia	0	4,341	27.99	63.31	39.74	1005	1	0.3817	20.7
Mahwah	0	25,890	16.69	74.6	21.63	1343	0	0.4372	11.7
Manalapan	0	38,872	14.94	66.52	24.78	811	1	0.4346	11.6
Manasquan	0	5,897	7.94	70.8	21.61	1501	1	0.4363	18.6
Manchester	0	43,070	10.41	72.09	25.25	626	0	0.4254	20.2
Mannington	0	1,806	29.73	70.85	22.39	729	1	0.4166	14.3
Mansfield	0	8,544	23.12	78.57	29.43	788	1	0.3918	8.5
Mansfield	0	7,725	19.04	67.56	17.23	773	1	0.411	16.7
Mantoloking	0	296	4.39	66.57	7.16	13585	1	0.5109	3.7
Mantua	0	15,217	6.55	72.12	32.75	824	1	0.3822	15.9
Manville	0	10,344	23.69	63.3	24.9	1244	1	0.3846	24
Maple Shade	0	19,131	23.51	67.17	37.92	783	1	0.403	16.5
Maplewood	0	23,867	45.02	68.56	55.99	1626	1	0.45	7.8

Margate	0	6,354	4.44	68.1	22.86	4472	1	0.5072	17.9
Marlboro	0	40,191	23.39	66.99	25.53	828	0	0.4267	9.1
Matawan	0	8,810	24.22	66.23	25.15	1214	1	0.3861	13
Maurice River	0	7,976	47.9	61.9	23.56	551	1	0.364	17.7
Maywood	0	9,555	35	73.79	31.33	1681	1	0.4039	14.4
Medford	0	23,033	6.16	76.54	22.55	983	1	0.416	9.6
Medford Lakes	0	4,146	3.11	77.31	23.52	1005	1	0.3547	11
Mendham	0	4,981	5.78	66.8	19.18	1726	1	0.449	7.6
Mendham Twp	0	5,869	8.3	69.9	16.31	1839	1	0.5216	9.5
Merchantville	0	3,821	26.91	92.49	37.79	1160	1	0.4332	15.3
Metuchen	0	13,574	24.73	72.08	42.18	1121	1	0.4162	9.5
Middle Township	0	18,911	17.29	69.17	24.6	1062	1	0.4354	24.1
Middlesex Borough	0	13,635	27.6	65.88	24.94	1194	1	0.3793	18
Middletown	0	66,522	9.28	78.61	21.11	989	1	0.4452	12.7
Midland Park	0	7,128	10.18	74.85	17.87	1405	1	0.4205	16.5
Milford	0	1,233	3.4	74.27	24.24	1293	1	0.3973	12.1
Millburn	0	20,149	20.78	79.4	31.71	2499	1	0.4625	12.5
Millstone	0	418	6.46	73.85	35.08	1280	1	0.3507	15
Millstone Twp	0	10,566	13.58	69.91	16.16	654	1	0.3934	9.6
Milltown	0	6,893	11.06	71.84	31.58	1150	1	0.3814	9.5
Millville	0	28,400	35.95	58.84	26.22	1101	1	0.4379	25.2
Mine Hill	0	3,651	32.57	70.09	22.76	1458	0	0.367	15.9
Monmouth Beach	0	3,279	2.96	69.69	21.87	2097	1	0.4525	12
Monroe	0	39,132	20.8	72.98	37.12	1294	0	0.389	15.1
Monroe	0	36,129	21.4	66.93	42.36	916	0	0.483	10.1
Montague	0	3,847	10.03	64.92	12.9	530	1	0.3761	17.8
Montclair	1	37,669	38.43	66.44	52.82	1818	1	0.5011	6.8
Montgomery	0	22,254	33.02	69.38	26.1	1572	1	0.4189	5
Montvale	0	7,844	17.41	73.84	20.63	1935	1	0.4543	10.2
Montville	0	21,528	23.53	71.66	18.01	1794	1	0.4418	8.2
Moonachie	0	2,708	35.81	60.78	39.91	3152	1	0.4311	17.8
Moorestown	0	20,726	15.9	78.53	27.38	1107	1	0.5152	10.5
Morris Plains	0	5,532	13.38	75.89	21.4	2485	1	0.461	8.3
Morris Twp	0	22,306	18.32	72.68	26.62	1807	1	0.4079	13.4
Morristown	1	18,411	52.4	65.87	39.79	2625	0	0.4518	25.8
Mount Arlington	0	5,050	14.12	64.68	18.78	2285	1	0.4682	10.7

Mount Ephraim	0	4,676	8.15	64.19	43.63	1026	1	0.4286	15.8
Mount Holly	0	9,536	37.26	69.38	33.2	866	1	0.4682	22.1
Mount Laurel	0	41,864	21.52	76.4	31.1	913	1	0.4287	9.4
Mount Olive	0	28,117	25.48	65.06	19.09	1175	0	0.4191	9.5
Mountain Lakes	0	4,160	10.55	69.89	22.59	2583	1	0.4383	11.7
Mountainside	0	6,685	13	71.82	24.19	1691	1	0.495	7.9
Mullica	0	6,147	23.38	69.03	22.03	869	1	0.3749	18.8
National Park	0	3,036	3.98	63.03	47.53	798	1	0.3731	16.5
Neptune City	0	4,869	25.16	66.86	23.2	1333	1	0.4422	18.4
Neptune Twp	0	27,935	50.15	69.25	35.72	1383	1	0.4237	13.6
Netcong	0	3,232	24.38	63.37	20.86	1294	1	0.3888	23.1
New Brunswick	1	55,181	73.57	47.19	36.37	1328	0	0.4658	25.3
New Hanover	0	7,385	56.57	60.11	22.37	236	1	0.3646	30.3
New Milford	0	16,341	36.74	70.08	28.17	1124	1	0.4069	15.5
New Providence	0	12,171	17.48	71.59	21.44	1425	1	0.4334	7.9
Newark	1	277,140	87.8	56.55	49.95	2193	0	0.5385	10.4
Newfield	0	1,553	9.08	70.28	43.85	880	1	0.4009	19.5
Newton	0	7,997	20.2	65.4	19.83	1454	1	0.4724	22.1
North Arlington	0	15,392	30.16	71.58	32.91	1343	1	0.4195	16
North Bergen	0	60,773	78.99	61.71	60.05	1345	1	0.451	21.4
North Brunswick	0	40,742	59.47	65.87	36.32	1055	1	0.3978	14.3
North Caldwell	0	6,183	10.67	69.21	23.48	1351	1	0.4764	27.3
North Haledon	0	8,417	13	72.03	18.86	1367	1	0.4055	12.9
North Hanover	0	7,678	21.65	63.19	22.9	433	1	0.3767	22.5
North Plainfield	0	21,936	68.87	61.59	34.95	1001	0	0.3896	17.7
North Wildwood	0	4,041	5.52	65.39	15.72	6296	0	0.4296	22.2
Northfield	0	8,624	15.74	71.15	23.16	1447	0	0.4425	26.8
Northvale	0	4,640	33.22	73.06	25.13	1590	1	0.4003	10.4
Norwood	0	5,711	33.1	70.7	26.25	1638	1	0.5263	11.3
Nutley	0	28,370	23.98	66.52	29.46	1724	1	0.4296	5.3
Oakland	0	12,754	10.4	73.22	19.48	1442	1	0.3876	11.5
Oaklyn	0	4,038	9.66	65.9	40.72	1149	1	0.36	19.2
Ocean City	0	11,701	9.71	71.81	19.92	5901	0	0.4853	19.1
Ocean Gate	0	2,011	7.9	62.55	25.69	1350	1	0.4033	15.4

Ocean Twp	0	27,291	23.51	69.22	25.94	1188	1	0.443	20.1
Ocean Twp	0	8,332	4.43	70.59	15.54	1306	1	0.432	22.8
Oceanport	0	5,832	8.64	70.5	21.97	1232	1	0.4744	10.5
Ogdensburg	0	2,410	8.43	69.74	19.18	1160	1	0.3613	17.8
Old Bridge	0	65,375	31.36	61.09	27.32	794	0	0.3907	13.9
Old Tappan	0	5,750	27.98	71.73	19.07	1477	1	0.5573	6.7
Oldmans	0	1,773	15.62	71.29	26.67	653	1	0.4485	8.5
Oradell	0	7,978	16.92	74.9	22.29	1675	1	0.4547	5.5
Orange	0	30,134	95.01	62.98	55.41	1831	0	0.4177	12.4
Oxford	0	2,514	6.92	68.9	22.58	911	1	0.3743	20.3
Palisades Park	0	19,622	78.02	53.49	29.15	1009	1	0.4272	20.8
Palmyra	0	7,398	21.75	74.49	38.56	1038	1	0.3846	11.8
Paramus	0	26,342	30.96	69.44	25.67	2139	1	0.4361	13.3
Park Ridge	0	8,645	14.85	77.43	24.18	1371	1	0.4404	12.7
Parsippany-Troy Hills	0	53,238	40.93	67.33	22.34	1721	0	0.4134	11.8
Passaic	1	69,781	86.02	57.43	38.41	1190	0	0.5015	20.1
Paterson	1	146,199	92.65	57.61	43.85	1669	0	0.4931	24.2
Paulsboro	0	6,097	46.32	65.21	54	1262	1	0.4561	13.2
Peapack Gladstone	0	2,582	16.89	68.58	16.3	2502	1	0.5259	14.3
Pemberton	0	1,409	31.22	72.59	26.98	895	1	0.3769	17.7
Pemberton Twp	0	27,912	35.3	65.51	32.89	834	0	0.3823	25.3
Pennington	0	2,585	5.03	71.25	40.31	1238	1	0.4844	8.2
Penns Grove	0	5,147	68.53	52.52	53.72	1182	1	0.4365	31.5
Pennsauken	0	35,885	61.5	64.66	42.86	1025	1	0.402	18.8
Pennsville	0	13,409	6.03	64.61	27.07	1143	1	0.4459	14.4
Pequannock	0	15,540	6.94	72.99	19.53	1344	1	0.4183	15
Perth Amboy	0	50,814	90.33	57.18	38.77	1394	0	0.4642	21.1
Phillipsburg	0	14,950	20.84	56.84	31.79	1142	0	0.4285	26.5
Pilesgrove	0	4,016	9.44	76.19	23.31	705	1	0.3867	15.3
Pine Beach	0	2,127	5.5	73.75	22.64	1073	1	0.3594	13.9
Pine Hill	0	10,233	32.93	59.76	39.1	761	1	0.4162	19.4
Piscataway	0	56,044	65.36	63.18	35.76	960	0	0.389	13.1
Pitman	0	9,011	4.22	71.59	29.27	889	1	0.3527	13
Pittsgrove	0	9,393	12.71	68.99	25.92	417	1	0.3886	17.9
Plainfield	1	49,808	91.52	69.53	57.06	1440	0	0.4681	27
Plainsboro	0	22,999	60.46	65.09	32.64	1106	1	0.4222	5.9
Pleasantville	0	20,249	89.42	61.27	48.11	1398	0	0.424	49.7

Plumsted	0	8,421	8.59	70.49	15.43	394	1	0.3592	17.3
Pohatcong	0	3,339	5.96	68.67	26.61	1908	1	0.3687	25.5
Point Pleasant	0	18,392	6.21	69.17	17.56	995	1	0.4032	15.9
Point Pleasant Beach	0	4,665	10.7	64.6	17.17	2869	1	0.4543	18.5
Pompton Lakes	0	11,097	17.69	65.33	22.16	1135	1	0.3554	19.6
Port Republic	0	1,115	4.49	75.67	19.08	882	0	0.4285	15.2
Princeton (prior to 2013)	0	12,307	30.25	62.66	49.3	2165	1	0.5369	13.1
Prospect Park	0	5,865	75.16	62.61	53.62	963	1	0.4309	22.8
Quinton	0	2,666	17.29	68.92	29.67	557	1	0.3879	19.7
Rahway	0	27,346	58.75	67.36	44.48	1772	0	0.4227	16.5
Ramsey	0	14,473	13.29	73.47	20.94	1610	1	0.4375	9.1
Randolph	0	25,734	23.31	71.7	22.23	1883	1	0.4257	9
Raritan	0	6,881	32.77	66.34	26.67	1375	1	0.4395	17.4
Raritan Twp	0	22,185	13.15	73.74	19.44	799	1	0.4142	10.9
Readington	0	16,126	8.86	74.62	15.2	1143	1	0.4674	12.4
Red Bank	0	12,206	48.66	67.69	33.26	1692	1	0.4851	25.3
Ridgefield	0	11,032	51.67	68.06	31.53	1791	1	0.4174	16.7
Ridgefield Park	0	12,729	54.06	67.78	33.19	1624	1	0.4375	16.9
Ridgewood	0	24,958	19.85	71.43	28.06	1808	1	0.4794	6.2
Ringwood	0	12,228	8.88	71.16	19.77	1202	1	0.3692	12
River Edge	0	11,340	31.37	72.67	27.68	1244	1	0.3879	15.3
River Vale	0	9,659	14.1	74.14	22.39	1318	0	0.4303	6.1
Riverdale	0	3,559	13.71	72.66	17.07	1863	1	0.3669	7.8
Riverside	0	8,079	18.68	67.94	34.32	801	1	0.3625	25.4
Riverton	0	2,779	6.09	77.34	29.48	1161	1	0.4101	14.6
Robbinsville	0	13,642	19.92	74.72	25.42	1693	0	0.4101	8.8
Rochelle Park	0	5,530	27.96	73.22	25.32	2072	1	0.3681	16.5
Rockaway	0	6,438	25.95	70	20.42	1374	1	0.3632	14.5
Rockaway Twp	0	24,156	20.42	72.33	23.05	1703	0	0.3816	11.7
Rockleigh	0	531	7.35	63.85	24.71	2413	1	0.4826	14.7
Rocky Hill	0	682	8.66	74.62	34.21	1741	1	0.4102	10.1
Roosevelt	0	882	9.98	73.16	55.11	1099	1	0.3868	18.6
Roseland	0	5,819	12.11	70.88	29.94	2259	1	0.4704	9.7
Roselle	0	21,085	84.06	71.24	59.72	1805	1	0.4486	19.9
Roselle Park	0	13,297	44.72	65.26	30.01	1130	1	0.4158	11
Roxbury	0	23,324	17.04	67.62	18.8	1459	1	0.3796	13.4
Rumson	0	7,122	3.94	67.05	17.16	2120	1	0.5409	11.4

Runnemede	0	8,468	13.44	62.42	52.11	881	1	0.3727	16.3
Rutherford	0	18,061	30.08	73.61	31.81	1541	1	0.4147	14.6
Saddle Brook	0	13,659	22.72	72.07	32.67	1390	0	0.4093	11.1
Saddle River	0	3,152	16.65	69.08	11.86	4062	1	0.6004	14.1
Salem	0	5,146	69.2	60.87	49.07	1709	0	0.5223	30.8
Sandyston	0	1,998	4.35	72.92	13.79	620	1	0.3614	14.4
Sayreville	0	42,704	39.14	64.67	37.26	1200	1	0.3911	14.2
Scotch Plains	0	23,510	25.46	73.76	30.57	1000	1	0.4397	10.2
Sea Bright	0	1,412	8.57	55.8	22.18	3833	1	0.5374	16.7
Sea Girt	0	1,828	1.86	70.57	11.58	3458	1	0.5399	13.2
Sea Isle City	0	2,114	2.69	73.58	16.97	9112	0	0.4375	11.2
Seaside Heights	0	2,887	26.08	30.72	13.38	4127	1	0.4174	41.2
Seaside Park	0	1,579	4.75	54.33	16.87	6002	1	0.4562	14.7
Secaucus	0	16,264	43.11	63.71	54.63	2547	1	0.413	12.2
Shamong	0	6,490	3.81	73.89	17.43	442	1	0.3545	15.6
Shiloh	0	516	6	67.95	20.82	606	1	0.335	16.2
Ship Bottom	0	1,156	10.9	59.12	14.63	5376	1	0.4545	13.1
Shrewsbury	0	3,809	5.28	72.23	21.26	2304	1	0.407	11.5
Shrewsbury Twp	0	1,141	34.97	66.87	34.81	815	1	0.4582	22.5
Somerdale	0	5,151	33.18	63.6	53.11	1079	1	0.4154	22.3
Somers Point	0	10,795	23.25	66.16	23.87	1247	0	0.4242	29.5
Somerville	0	12,098	47.27	64.96	28.09	1378	1	0.3884	20
South Amboy	0	8,631	21.88	59.53	39.57	1713	0	0.4202	12.4
South Bound Brook	0	4,563	43.52	65.74	27.46	1181	1	0.38	24.1
South Brunswick	0	43,417	49.66	69.92	32.67	1117	1	0.4036	10.4
South Hackensack	0	2,378	43.95	70.39	24.05	3246	1	0.4594	23
South Harrison	0	3,162	9.36	74.44	31.19	610	1	0.4025	10.1
South Orange	0	16,198	39.95	63.08	54.63	2056	0	0.4815	10.7
South Plainfield	0	23,385	38.02	69.15	30.59	1123	1	0.399	13.7
South River	0	16,008	30.17	64.64	30.93	1006	1	0.39	20.4
South Toms River	0	3,684	39.44	58.49	25.36	1058	1	0.3751	22.3
Southampton	0	10,464	5.69	74.94	23.79	562	1	0.4684	13.9
Sparta	0	19,722	8.83	72.9	17.13	1214	1	0.4279	12.2
Spotswood	0	8,257	16.44	68.71	27.89	1166	0	0.4175	14.5
Spring Lake	0	2,993	3.17	70.91	17.65	3361	1	0.4919	5.3

Spring Lake Heights	0	4,713	5.01	69.64	26	1224	1	0.4219	13.9
Springfield	0	15,817	23.45	68.59	31.51	1739	1	0.3477	14.3
Springfield	0	3,414	10.08	75.99	16.81	999	1	0.4199	9
Stafford	0	26,535	7.84	65.81	18.16	1489	1	0.422	21.4
Stanhope	0	3,610	12.41	65.66	19.69	1267	1	0.3451	20.6
Stillwater	0	4,099	3.57	67.33	15.33	881	1	0.3665	21
Stockton	0	538	1.49	75.19	41.35	1125	1	0.4378	16.4
Stone Harbor	0	866	5.09	81.84	8.78	15666	1	0.5873	19.9
Stow Creek	0	1,431	9.15	70.98	18.84	426	1	0.369	14.8
Stratford	0	7,040	18.95	66.42	35.89	850	1	0.3745	20.6
Summit	0	21,457	24.19	69.08	27.35	1972	0	0.5311	11.7
Surf City	0	1,205	6.97	59.12	15.07	4903	1	0.5062	13.1
Sussex	0	2,130	12.15	59.08	16.32	605	1	0.4389	27.2
Swedesboro	0	2,584	33.44	66.5	29.6	860	1	0.3628	16
Tabernacle	0	6,949	4.83	73.97	18.85	485	1	0.323	18.7
Teaneck	0	39,776	53.33	71.45	49.67	1671	1	0.4378	12.6
Tenafly	0	14,488	32.46	67.38	35.03	1827	1	0.5164	7.9
Teterboro	0	67	43.29	55.81	32.56	71022	1	0.4315	6.1
Tewksbury	0	5,993	7.24	75.15	15.37	1694	1	0.4598	13
Tinton Falls	0	17,892	20.26	73.04	26.85	1315	0	0.4628	16.5
Toms River	0	91,239	14.21	64.26	18.57	1120	0	0.4287	17.2
Totowa	0	10,804	22.57	68.88	18.5	1507	1	0.4031	12.2
Trenton	1	84,913	86.91	62.61	46.6	2176	0	0.4852	34.5
Tuckerton	0	3,347	7.87	56.74	15.26	1166	1	0.3866	19.5
Union Beach	0	6,245	14.33	54.94	22.5	1399	1	0.365	17.1
Union City	0	66,455	92.35	58.02	65.86	1569	1	0.4556	26
Union Twp	0	56,642	54.52	69.17	38.21	1531	1	0.4224	11.3
Union Twp	0	5,908	19.27	74.94	17.28	626	1	0.4234	15.4
Upper Deerfield	0	7,660	25.04	65.53	24.36	695	1	0.3915	16.5
Upper Freehold	0	6,902	10.04	77.27	15.67	834	1	0.3733	14.4
Upper Pittsgrove	0	3,505	5.42	70.94	18	561	1	0.3058	15
Upper Saddle River	0	8,208	15.86	69.72	16.42	1272	1	0.4972	3.8
Upper Township	0	12,373	3.68	73.76	15.12	936	1	0.3922	22.7
Ventnor	0	10,650	30.98	61.1	24.92	2394	1	0.482	27.9
Vernon	0	23,943	8.58	68.36	15.39	978	0	0.3645	19.5
Verona	0	13,332	11.96	70.85	31.79	1668	1	0.4702	7.2

Victory Gardens	0	1,520	81.64	65.84	42.65	1079	1	0.4096	37.8
Vineland	0	60,724	53.9	60.3	26.74	949	0	0.4501	23.3
Voorhees	0	29,131	28.26	65.88	36.41	893	1	0.471	9.7
Waldwick	0	9,625	14.69	74.29	21.74	1391	1	0.3796	13.3
Wall	0	26,164	7.52	71.73	16.59	1335	1	0.4497	15.9
Wallington	0	11,335	19.61	67.14	28.7	992	1	0.4412	14.9
Wanaque	0	11,116	17.39	68.68	22.27	1055	1	0.3689	13.4
Wantage	0	11,358	7.43	69.68	12.71	562	1	0.3709	14.1
Warren	0	15,311	21.95	65.13	17.37	1104	1	0.4775	9.5
Washington	0	6,461	17.93	61.89	19.76	1122	1	0.401	16.3
Washington Twp	0	48,559	13.25	69.81	33.32	738	1	0.3787	9
Washington Twp	0	18,533	9.26	70.67	15.24	1045	0	0.337	19.9
Washington Twp	0	9,102	12.99	74.65	20.57	1337	0	0.392	12.9
Washington Twp	0	6,651	8.8	69.33	16.45	1457	1	0.4014	10.2
Washington Twp	0	687	11.06	69.98	14.43	2052	1	0.3712	16.1
Watchung	0	5,801	21.43	66.67	19.75	2244	1	0.5296	8.6
Waterford	0	10,649	10.38	64.4	34.79	910	1	0.3415	14.6
Wayne	0	54,717	18.38	68.68	23.21	1162	0	0.4247	11.9
Weehawken	0	12,554	53.26	62.15	47.6	2622	1	0.5211	13.5
Wenonah	0	2,278	3.33	77.7	32.36	1110	1	0.3692	13.5
West Amwell	0	3,840	19.69	72.87	22.88	934	1	0.4436	15.7
West Caldwell	0	10,759	10.03	71.16	27.62	1732	1	0.4326	15.3
West Cape May	0	1,024	13.87	77.11	31.42	2138	1	0.4568	28.4
West Deptford	0	21,677	11.8	70.16	37	1539	1	0.4072	16.4
West Long Branch	0	8,097	8.43	69.86	23.37	1196	1	0.4399	17.2
West Milford	0	25,850	8.54	66.09	18.78	1250	1	0.3663	11.9
West New York	0	49,708	88.69	59.27	52.66	1356	1	0.5005	26
West Orange	0	46,207	50.74	67.03	45.59	1514	0	0.4731	15.3
West Wildwood	0	603	4.14	70.37	26.94	3477	1	0.4064	16
West Windsor	0	27,165	45.85	70.16	32.2	1387	0	0.4277	4.2
Westampton	0	8,813	41.19	77.1	39.07	1145	1	0.3532	10.3
Westfield	0	30,316	13.84	72.79	29.95	1285	0	0.4464	9.9
Westville	0	4,288	12.41	63.02	32.38	1368	1	0.3802	19.4
Westwood	0	10,908	23.58	74.88	25.38	1499	1	0.4378	10.2
Weymouth	0	2,715	10.2	73.87	25.7	694	1	0.3848	21.8

Wharton	0	6,522	50.57	68.28	26.98	1613	1	0.3708	25.5
White	0	4,882	5.53	69.17	15.32	588	1	0.4366	16.8
Wildwood	0	5,325	43.15	54.88	22.41	5195	1	0.5292	32.3
Wildwood Crest	0	3,270	8.32	71.27	18.47	6450	1	0.4021	19.5
Willingboro	0	31,629	83.4	77.62	58.24	1207	1	0.3648	22.1
Winfield	0	1,471	7.48	68.57	36.37	1085	1	0.3832	18.6
Winslow	0	39,499	47.37	64.62	43.11	741	1	0.4168	15
Wood-Ridge	0	7,626	21.67	76.03	30.26	1570	1	0.4791	7.4
Woodbine	0	2,472	48.67	65.04	21.06	903	1	0.4758	33.8
Woodbridge	0	99,585	47.9	65.69	37.73	1275	0	0.3861	14.1
Woodbury	0	10,174	36.85	66.89	35.15	1360	0	0.4413	17.3
Woodbury Heights	0	3,055	7.46	73.54	37.49	1228	1	0.3473	14.9
Woodcliff Lake	0	5,730	12.7	71.44	25.17	2008	1	0.384	12.1
Woodland	0	1,788	13.76	69.13	15.83	907	1	0.3964	16.9
Woodland Park	0	11,819	29.09	67.31	29.59	1229	1	0.3299	21.7
Woodlynne	0	2,978	81.53	55.95	45.07	972	1	0.424	41.1
Woodstown	0	3,505	18.17	69.2	26.79	947	1	0.4119	18.7
Woolwich	0	10,200	19.57	73.29	26.77	834	1	0.3734	9.9
Wrightstown	0	802	55.11	66.77	24.01	1546	1	0.3864	34.9
Wyckoff	0	16,696	9.2	73.76	18.15	1037	1	0.4785	9.9

Appendix E: Codes for Qualitative Analysis

1. Motivation
2. Resource
3. National Organization
4. Model Legislation
5. Funding
6. Learning
7. Legal
8. Local Interest Group
9. Strategy
10. Grassroots
11. Imitation
12. Relationship
13. Prior Legislation
14. Bottom Up Federalism