Growing Migration in an Emigrant State: an Analysis of Migration Policy, Practice, and Ukrainian Immigration in Poland

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ABSTRACT

Poland has long been a country of net emigration, though the country has received backlash in recent years for its xenophobic treatment towards asylum seekers from non-European countries, versus its treatment of Ukrainian asylum seekers. To explore this phenomenon, this research first asks, does Poland have a preferential migration policy? I first look at the restrictiveness and evolution of Poland's migration policy from 2003-2019. I find that the state's migration policies which specifically target EU member and Eastern European states are on average slightly less restrictive than the restrictiveness of the entire population of policies. In the following chapter I ask, how is this policy implemented, and how is it reflected in Poland's migrant workforce? To explore how these policies are implemented, I look at work permit data from 2010-2020, analyzing the differences in the number of work permits granted to each country of origin over time. I find that migrants from Eastern European and Central Asian states receive a disproportionately high number of work permits compared to other regions, and that within the region, Ukrainians receive the highest number of permits each year. Finally, to better understand this inequality, my fourth chapter asks, why Ukraine specifically? In this analysis, I hypothesize that proximity and cultural similarities, Poland's security interests, and both states' economic interests drive this special migration relationship. I find mixed support for this hypothesis, but ultimately find that these factors do play important roles in maintaining the relationship between Poland and Ukraine.

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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

Poland has traditionally been a country where more migrants leave than arrive, but in the past few years, it has faced criticism for its differing attitudes toward asylum seekers based on their country of origin, particularly in its welcoming stance toward Ukrainians as opposed to migrants from non-European countries. In exploring this phenomenon, my research examines whether Poland has a preferential migration policy. I analyze policy to understand this phenomenon of accused hypocrisy in order to understand if these inequalities are built into Poland's legislation, or if there are other factors at play. I first look at the evolution of Polish migration policies from 2003 to 2019 and find that the policies targeting EU and Eastern European countries are generally less strict than those aimed at other regions. However, the differences that I find in strictness are not drastic enough for me to argue that Poland has a discriminatory migration policy. To see how these policies are put into practice, especially in the workforce, I then analyze work permit data from 2010 to 2020. This data shows that Eastern European and Central Asian migrants, particularly Ukrainians, receive significantly more work permits than those from other regions. This trend raises the question: Why is Ukraine a special case? I hypothesize that geographical closeness, cultural similarities, Poland's security concerns, and mutual economic benefits are key factors that influence this unique migration relationship. Although the support I find for this hypothesis varies, I find that ultimately these factors highlight how important aspects of the states' relationship, like geography, culture, security, and economic interests, shape the unique bond between Poland and Ukraine. This study sheds light on the complexities and nuances of national migration policies and their real-world implications, especially in Central European EU member states.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis looks at how Poland's migration policy is formulated and implemented, as reflected in the demographic features of its migrant workforce. This work will contribute to the growing literature on labor migration, focusing in particular on the migrant situation in Poland in terms of the state's differential and unequal treatment of various migrant groups in the country. In particular, this thesis looks into the cultural, political and legal status of the Ukrainian labor migrant population in Poland. This case study is especially pertinent due to the current Russo-Ukrainian war, and the influx of Ukrainian refugees who began to seek refuge in Poland in early 2022. Instead of the status of refugees, however, this thesis focuses on longer-term trends of labor migration into Poland in order to examine patterns of migration which are less influenced by extraordinary events such as the current war. Additionally, as I will argue in my analysis, Polish migration policy is greatly driven by the country's labor market needs, so labor migrants are an arguably important demographic group in the state.

Poland is a particularly interesting country to look at in terms of its migration policy and migrant workforce for several reasons. Firstly, after the fall of communism in 1989, Poland underwent a vigorous economic shock therapy known as the Balcerowicz Plan from 1989-1995, under which the state transitioned rapidly to a market-based, capitalist economy. Through its transition into a capitalist state, Poland experienced a great deal of social issues, including a high unemployment rate.[1] Polish migration policy in the 1980s did not support the entrance of labor migrants or refugees.[2] Additionally, before its economic transition, Poland was not an attractive destination for migrants due to the lack of economic opportunities.[3] As a result, there were

[1] Garland, "Reflections on the Balcerowicz Plan."
[2] Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski, "Influx and Integration of Migrants in Poland in the Early XXI Century."
[3] Brzozowska, "Vietnamese and Chinese Culture and Motives for Being an Entrepreneur Among Immigrants From Vietnam and China Settled in Poland."

extremely minimal migrant inflows in Poland before the fall of communism. For example, only 1,600 migrants entered Poland in 1985, 1,000 of whom were returning Polish emigrants.[4] In 1999, the state became a member of NATO, and in 2004, a member of the European Union (EU). Poland's accession to the EU resulted in a high emigration rate, since they were a newly capitalist country and did not yet possess the infrastructure necessary to attract immigrants.

Due to the effects of its economic transitions, Poland became a state which required a large available workforce, but lost a large amount of its educated young population to Western EU states after 2004. For example, 389,000 Poles were reported to be living abroad in the second quarter of 2006, the majority of whom were younger and more educated than the average population.[5] As a result, in order to maintain what Marx called a "reserve army of labor" necessary to sustain a capitalist economy, Poland turned to emigration and labor migrant policies to bolster its economic growth.[6] Another reason why Poland is an interesting case for this study is that the state has been called out for hypocrisy in its handling of the Ukrainian refugee crisis in 2022, compared to the European refugee crisis in 2015.[7] Although this thesis does not focus on refugees, this phenomenon is important in situating the nature of how different migrant groups are treated in Poland. Due to these instances of media call-out, I find it interesting to explore whether it is the state's policy which allows for this hypocrisy, or if there are other factors at play that complicate the case of how migrants are received in Poland.

This research asks the following questions: (1) *Does Poland have a preferential immigration policy?* (2) *Does the policy trend restrictively or not, and does this restrictiveness differ for different migrant groups?* (3) *What are the implications of this policy, and why was it*

[4] Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski, "Influx and Integration of Migrants in Poland in the Early XXI Century."
[5] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2007.
[6] Marx, *Capital*.
[7] Bellamy, "Poland's Opposition Accuses Government of Migration Policy Hypocrisy."; Osuki, "Refugee Hypocrisy: Poland Embraces Ukrainians, Shuns All Others."

developed? I explore these questions in Chapter 2, conducting a policy analysis and looking quantitatively at the restrictive nature of this policy. Further, I ask (4) *how does the enforcement of this policy, its overall goals, and the changes in the mean restrictiveness of the state's migration policy over time effect changes in trends of work permits granted to foreigners?* (5) *Which group or groups of foreigners are granted the highest amount of work permits, and why is this the case?* I explore these questions in Chapter 3, looking at work permit data. I find that Ukrainians consistently receive the highest amount of work permits of any migrant group. Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider (6) *what factors influence such a high labor migration flow from Ukraine into Poland?* By attempting to answer each of these questions, I aim to draw conclusions about the reality of migration in Poland, and whether the state's official policy lines up with its implementation. I argue in Chapter 3 that it is not the policy which necessarily induces inequality in migration flows to Poland, but instead other factors such as the influence of geographical proximity on decisions to migrate, network migration, and political factors such as populism.

Methods and Outline

The thesis is organized into five chapters, with three body chapters. In Chapter 2, I seek to answer the question, does Poland have a preferential or discriminatory migration policy? I hypothesize that, while its overall policy does not directly discriminate against specific groups, Polish policy shows strong preference toward migrants from Eastern European countries. To investigate this question, I first look at the evolution of Poland's migration policy from 2003-2019. I chose this timeframe in order to look at all the legislation passed since Poland joined the EU in 2004, a change which required them to update many aspects of state policies. Coincidentally, the dataset used in this chapter only includes data until 2019, which almost

perfectly aligns with my intention to study these changes until 2020, due to COVID-related anomalies.

The policies examined in this chapter are those taken from the DEMIG POLICY and POLMIG databases. The DEMIG POLICY database, an initiative of the International Migration Institute, tracks migration policy changes across 45 different countries from 1945-2013.[8] It assesses the restrictiveness of each policy in an additive nature. The POLMIG database, an initiative of the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, continues DEMIG's work, using the same methodology to track policy changes in 23 of the 28 EU states from 2013-2019.[9] By combining these two datasets in R, we are left with a comprehensive look into the evolution of Poland's migration policy from the period right before the state entered the EU through 2019.

To better understand the trends of these policies, I conduct a policy analysis, which looks at the disaggregated legislation found in the DEMIG and POLMIG datasets. These policies are organized by theme, and discussed chronologically within each theme. I pull the descriptions and functions of each policy from the datasets and from the OECD's yearly International Migration Outlook publications.[10] I then use newspaper articles from various international publications, as sourced from the NewsBank[11] database, academic journal articles, and publications from International Organizations, specifically the OECD, to supplement the information provided by the dataset and provide context to the policy changes. Through my analysis, I argue that labor migration and the state's economic interests drive Poland's migration policy.

The remainder of Chapter 2 consists of a high-level statistical analysis of this data, performed in R. Understanding the reality of the restrictiveness of Polish migration policy is

[8] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[9] Mara and Kovacevic, "Wiiw - POLMIG Database: An Inventory of Migration Policy Changes in Europe, 2013-2019."
[10] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."; Mara and Kovacevic, "Wiiw - POLMIG Database: An Inventory of Migration Policy Changes in Europe, 2013-2019."; OECD, *International Migration Outlook*.
[11] "Access World News - NewsBank."

important in answering my first research question, "does Poland have a preferential migration policy?" To explore this question, I use data from the DEMIG and POLMIG datasets to analyze trends of restrictiveness and preference within Poland's migration policy. I ultimately find that while Polish migration policy is slightly preferential towards migrants from Eastern European countries, the statistical contrast between the restrictiveness of policies targeted towards Eastern Europeans versus the entire dataset is not large enough to indicate a necessarily biased migration policy.

In Chapter 3, I look at work permit data for foreigners working in Poland. As a result of my findings in Chapter 2, that Poland's migrant workforce needs greatly drive the state's migration policy, this chapter seeks to understand how Poland's labor migration policy is implemented, by looking at how it is reflected in the migrant workforce. I hypothesize that the amount of labor migrants will increase each year, that there will be no stagnation or decline visible in 2015, and that preference will be given to those from Eastern European countries, despite the lack of stark discrimination found in the state's migration policy. To better understand how this policy is implemented, I look at labor migration trends in Poland from 2010-2020. Due to issues accessing state statistical archives, I was not able to analyze work permit trends spanning the length of my case study. However, with the help of academic articles, I am able to discuss trends in the data for time periods which I was unable to find.[12]

Before analyzing the state's migrant workforce, I begin with a discussion of the importance of labor migration to a capitalist economy, largely relying on Marx's theory of the reserve army of labor.[13] I then discuss the different aspects of labor migration in Poland,

[12] Sterniński, "Economic Migrations to Poland in 2008-2018."
[13] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works*; Piore, *Birds of Passage*; Wright, "Immigration Policy and Market Institutions in Liberal Market Economies"; Lever-Tracy, "Immigrant Workers and Postwar Capitalism."; Menz, *The Political Economy of Managed Migration*.; Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?"; Ribas, *On the Line*; Waters, *Black Identities*; Caviedes, *Prying Open Fortress Europe*; Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital.*

including short term and illegal work.[14] It is important to understand the labor market for migrants and the different forms of work available to them before analyzing work permit data in order to convey that while Poland grants a good amount of work permits each year, this data does not reflect the entirety of the migrant worker population in the state. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, Poland has a short term work agreement with several neighboring countries, and participants in this program do not require work permits. This means that the data analyzed in this chapter does not fully reflect the amount of labor migrants working in Poland during any given year, but only those who work in the state for a full year or longer, therefore requiring a work permit.

The next section of the chapter looks at "Work permits granted to foreigners by citizenship" from 2010-2020, as retrieved from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics (Rocznik Statystyczny Pracy),[15] which is published biennially by Statistics Poland. The yearbooks provide data on many aspects of labor in Poland, though the data in this research concerns the number of work permits granted to citizens of each country by year. Looking at this data, I aim to understand how labor migration trends in Poland have changed over time. Additionally, I seek to understand the demographic makeup of that migration. In this analysis, I find that Ukraine is the largest sending country of labor migrants to Poland.

The remainder of this chapter seeks to understand why there are so many more Eastern European labor migrants in Poland than those from any other region. I first discuss various

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[14] Kindler and Szulecka, "Messy Arrangements?"; Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works;* Górny and Kaczmarczyk, "Temporary Farmworkers and Migration Transition: On a Changing Role of the Agricultural Sector in International Labour Migration to Poland."; Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."; Yaroshenko et al., "Combating the Illegal Employment of Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the European Union."; Burgess and Connell, "Vulnerable Work and Strategies for Inclusion: An Introduction."; Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital*.; Krivonos, "Carrying Europe's 'White Burden', Sustaining Racial Capitalism."; Boulhol, "Making the Labour Market Work Better in Poland."; European Commission, "Factsheet on Undeclared Work - POLAND."

[15] Statistics Poland, "Yearbook of Labour Statistics."

theories in order to better understand why policy goals and their outcomes may not line up.[16] Based on these theories, I then discuss the two aspects of my argument as to why the results found in Chapters 2 and 3 do not tell a cohesive story. First, I argue based on migrant preferences and the impact of available opportunities, distance, and existing communities on migrant flows.[17] Second, I argue that rising populism and xenophobia amongst citizens and politicians during this time deterred non-European migrants from settling in Poland.[18]

As I establish in Chapter 3, Ukrainians make up the largest migrant group in Poland. In the third and final chapter, I seek to understand why this is the case. In Chapter 4, I hypothesize that due to the states' geographical proximity and shared cultural values, Poland's security goals, and both state's economic goals, both Poland and Ukraine have incentives to encourage this migration flow. This argument is driven in part by the theory by Myron Weiner that the nature of migration flows between countries largely influence their bilateral relationship.[19] I conduct this research using academic journal articles from various disciplines, and ultimately find mixed support for my hypothesis. I highlight several important findings in this chapter, which make up this mixed support. First, I find that Poles and Ukrainian labor migrants have in common the three main identity factors which influence xenophobic sentiments: race, ethnicity, and religion. As a result, I argue that Ukrainians are seen as a "preferred" migrant group in Poland. Secondly, I find that Poland has a fear of Russian aggression, and having positive relations with Ukraine in order to facilitate Ukrainian Westernization is at the forefront of their security goals. Using Weiner's theory as a framework, I argue that Poland has an incentive to maintain a positive

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[16] Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius, *Controlling Immigration*; Lutz, "Reassessing the Gap-Hypothesis."
[17] Fańczak, "Why Do Poles Oppose Immigrants?"; Iglicka, *Poland's Post-War Dynamic of Migration*; Vanderkamp, "Migration Flows, Their Determinants and the Effects of Return Migration."
[18] Hauser, "Polish President Lech Kaczynski (1949–2010)—from Solidarity Advisor to Right-Wing Politician."; Waszak, "New President Says Poland Must Be 'Rebuilt and Purified.'"; Ociepka, "Populism and National Identity."; Stepinska et al., *Populist Political Communication in Poland*; Fańczak, "Why Do Poles Oppose Immigrants?"
[19] Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations."

migration relationship with Ukraine in order to support its security goals.[20] Finally, I find that while Ukraine's GDP greatly benefits from the remittances sent home by Ukrainian labor migrants in Poland, the state has made efforts to re-attract its labor emigrants, although it currently lacks the infrastructure to do so. Lastly, in my conclusion (Chapter 5), I discuss my final findings and arguments, the limitations of this research, its broader implications and significance, and areas in which this thesis could be extended in future research.

[20] Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations."

Chapter 2: Policy Analysis - Poland's Migration Policy from 2003-2019

This chapter looks at the evolution of Poland's migration policy from 2003-2019 to understand the state's motives in this field, and to see if its policies show a clear pattern of bias toward or against any country or region in particular to answer the question, does Poland have a preferential migration policy? I hypothesize that Poland will not have a necessarily discriminatory policy, but that it will show preference to nearby Eastern European states throughout its policies. This chapter begins with a qualitative policy analysis to understand in-depth the evolution of Poland's migration policy. Throughout this analysis, I define policy as the overall collection of adopted legislation which makes up the general system of the Polish government for accepting migrants and ensuring things like their legality and ability to work. I define laws and legislation as pieces of the greater policy goals. Pieces of legislation are often titled as Acts in the Polish government, such as the Aliens Act. Finally, amendments to the law are defined as updates to pre-existing pieces of legislation, and will be referred to as amendments. This qualitative analysis is followed by a brief high-level statistical analysis of the policies to better understand how they trend overall. In the end, this initial analysis shows that firstly, Poland's migration policy does not trend restrictively, but that the amount of restrictive migration policies increased slightly following the 2015 European Migration Crisis. Secondly, Poland's migration policy is greatly driven by labor market needs.

Policy Analysis

EU Accession

Poland became an EU member on May 1, 2004. In anticipation of its membership, the state had to make reforms in many different sectors to align with EU policy requirements. These changes included those necessary in the state's migration policy. Before joining the EU,

migration in Poland was not a large enough phenomenon to warrant a comprehensive migration policy. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the state experienced its first wave of migration since the beginning of the postwar era, but did not pass its initial piece of migration legislation, the Aliens Act, until 1997. Still, this Act was mostly concerned with enabling state authorities to maintain security in regard to the new influx of migrants.[21]

On January 1, 2004, Poland enacted the Dublin Convention, which determines which EU member state is responsible for processing the application of an asylum seeker.[22] On May 1, 2004, Poland officially became an EU member, thus gaining gradual access to the European labor market. This is when the mass emigration of Polish citizens began, as many moved to Western European countries, such as the UK, in search of economic opportunities. Notably, Poland had an unemployment rate of 20% in 2003, which incentivized many Poles to seek out work abroad once given the opportunity.[23] At this time, the Act of 27 July 2002 also went into effect, establishing a "reciprocity principle" so that any benefits or restrictions in employment granted to Polish workers abroad were also granted to migrants from said country in Poland. In 2004, this reciprocity was only granted to citizens of Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden, and the other new member states, as those were the only EU states to which Polish citizens had labor market access at this time. The Act of July 27, 2002 was officially replaced by the Legislation Governing Entry, Stay, and Exit of EU Citizens and their Family Members in August 2006. The new legislation fully aligned Polish law with that of the EU, granting Polish citizens free access to the EU labor market and vice versa, and introduced a new permanent stay permit for EU citizens.

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[21] Kicinger, "Beyond the Focus on Europeanisation."
[22] Ericsson, "Asylum in the EU Member States."
[23] Scally, "Poles Apart."

Directly after joining the EU, Poland saw a 20% increase in the total amount of permits granted to foreigners. In 2004, the country issued about 10,000 permanent residence permits, over half of which were EU residence permits, and about 25,000 temporary residence permits. Notably, about one third of the permits issued went to Ukrainian citizens. The OECD notes that despite this increase, migration into Poland remained limited. While net migration increased from -0.4/1000 in 2003 to -0.2/1000 in 2004, Poland remained a country of net emigration, as its net migration rate remained slightly negative.[24]

On December 21, 2007, Poland acceded to the Schengen Zone, abolishing border control between Poland and other EU member states. In anticipation of stricter criteria to be granted refugee status following the accession, Poland received an influx of asylum applications in the final two months of 2007, mostly from Russians from the Chechen region.[25] As a result of joining the Schengen Zone, citizens from neighboring non-EU countries were now required to have a Schengen visa or a long-term national visa to enter Poland, and the criteria to obtain such visas became increasingly strict. Due to these stricter requirements and an increase in fees to obtain a visa, Poland experienced a drop in migration from its neighboring states. In Ukraine, there was a 40% decrease in the amount of Polish visas issued in 2008.[26]

Aliens Act

In September 2003, Poland passed the new Aliens Act (updated from 1997) to better align with EU policy. This law created a Tolerated Residence status for asylum seekers who were denied refugee status, but could not be sent home. The bill addressed a previous issue in Poland's migration policy, in which rejected asylum seekers were left completely unsupported by the

[24] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2006.
[25] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2008.
[26] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine.*

state. It introduced the state's first regularization program, made available to migrants who entered Poland after 1997 and were living in the country illegally. The bill grants those with Tolerated Residence the right to work without a work permit, and access to social services such as medical care and public schooling. It also states that rejected asylum seekers who stay in the country illegally without a visa will be sent to detention or deportation centers. A later amendment to this law established that those who had been living in Poland illegally for at least six years, who could prove that they had a place to live and financial means, could apply for a one-year residence permit to legalize their stay in Poland. At the time of this amendment, the government estimated that around 45,000-50,000 people lived in Poland illegally.[27]

While this new law seemed like a positive direction for the future of migrants in Poland, critics of the law worried that it was simply a quick fix to catch up with EU policy. Edward Osiecki, who was at the time responsible for evaluating the impact of the law on Poland's Vietnamese community, noted that the Act seemed to create "an impression of administrative arrogance."[28] Despite this new legislation, a survey conducted in 2004 found that 74% of Poles believed that Poland was not doing enough to curb illegal immigration, and 71% believed that the number of illegal immigrants in the country had increased in recent years.[29]

Several amendments to the Aliens Act followed throughout the decade as immigration to Poland increased. An October 2005 amendment simplified labor market access for asylum applicants whose applications took one year or more to process. Further, as of 2006, citizens of the EU, EEA, and Switzerland who served on an executive board, taught a foreign language, or

[27] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[28] Warsaw Voice, "In Alien(Able) Rights."
[29] BBC, "Polish Government Negligent towards Illegal Migrants, Opinion Survey Suggests."

worked as a medical professional were no longer required to have a work permit to enter the Polish workforce.[30]

On May 29, 2008, a new amendment came into force as a result of EU directives. This amendment created a new category of humanitarian protection, known as subsidiary protection, which can be granted to those at risk in their home country who were not granted refugee status. Further, it states that those under subsidiary protection are eligible for support under the integration program. Another amendment to the Act came on January 1, 2009. This amendment streamlined the process of migrants' entry into the Polish labor market by establishing a new system to issue work permits, including five different types of permits, lowered fees, and a simplified one-step procedure to obtain a permit. It also changed the minimum required income for migrants applying for a residence permit. Lastly, the amendment altered the admission of student visas, introducing I, II, and III grade visas for different types of study, and for the first time, allowed full-time students to work with their student visa.

A draft amendment to the law was enforced in 2019 in an effort to reduce abuses of the asylum system. Under this amendment, asylum seekers without proper documentation from "safe countries of origin" or with inconsistent claims will not be allowed to enter the country, but instead will be sent to a detention facility to await a decision from the state. If no decision is made within 28 days, they will be released into Poland, where their application for asylum will be evaluated via "normal asylum procedure."[31] In the evolution of the Aliens Act through the amendments passed over the years, we can see that while its main purpose is to serve and help assimilate asylum seekers, its amendments in 2005 and 2009 aimed to make it easier for asylum seekers to enter the workforce in Poland.

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[30] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2007.
[31] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2020.

Labor Migration Policy

As we can see through later amendments to the Aliens Act, and through the passed laws to follow, as the migration situation in Poland evolved after their accession to the EU, Poland's migration policy increasingly focused on labor market needs. This prevalent theme in the policies outlined below illustrates that adding to the available workforce is the most important goal of Polish migration policy. While not every piece of migration legislation passed during this timeframe includes a labor-focused component, this is the most prevalent issue throughout the chronology of Poland's migration policy. This theme is supported in the literature, as scholars argue that labor migration needs are one of the most important determining factors of general immigration policy. [32]

Following its accession to the EU, Poland experienced high levels of emigration, mostly to Ireland, the UK, and Germany. While the majority of this migration was short term, the OECD notes that by 2005, long-term migration was becoming an increasingly prevalent trend. In the second quarter of 2006, about 389,000 Poles reported living abroad for more than two months of the year, an increase from 2005 of 125,000 people.[33] It is important to note that those surveyed in 2006 tended to be younger and better educated than previous emigrants, indicating a brain drain in Poland. As a result, Poland needed to pass legislation to supplement its workforce. The Act of 20 April 2004 on Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions allowed the following groups of people to work without a permit: refugees, those with a tolerated stay permit, those under temporary protection, foreign spouses of Polish citizens, and those with a residence permit in the Republic of Poland due to marriage.[34]

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[32] Caviedes, *Prying Open Fortress Europe.*
[33] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2007.
[34] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."

In October 2008, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy proposed an amendment to the 2004 Act on Promotion of Employment and the Institutions of the Labour Market to simplify the process of granting work permits to foreigners, but trade unions protested this proposal. They called for restrictions on third-party workers to make room in the economy for Polish emigrants returning as a result of the Great Recession.

In 2010, the Working Group on Migration Strategy, made up of teams within several governmental departments, adopted the "Polish Migration Policy - Current State and Prospects," which outlined recommendations for a new official state migration policy. It is important to note that the Polish government does not have one entity overseeing the organization and implementation of its migration policy. Instead, duties related to the migrant population are distributed amongst many different ministries within the government.[35] This new proposal recommended a migration policy based on labor market needs with specific categories, such as high-skilled, self-employed, and students. It also set forth a streamlined regularization process and a new integration strategy, including an effort to integrate migrant children into the public school system.

Notably, Poland does not have any stand-alone legislation discussing integration. However, in a 2010 report, the EU notes that since Poland has a small foreign population, the state has had very few issues with migrant integration.[36] Only a chapter of the Act on Social Assistance, which was adopted in March 2004, discusses the integration of foreigners in Poland, and until it was amended with this new integration strategy in 2010, its terms only applied to those under international protection.[37] The school integration initiative began in January 2010,

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[35]Duszczyk, Pachocka, and Pszczółkowska, *Relations between Immigration and Integration Policies in Europe: Challenges, Opportunities and Perspectives in Selected EU Member States.*
[36] European Union, "Polish Immigration Policy – Opportunities and Challenges for the Labour Market."
[37] European Commission, "Governance of Migrant Integration in Poland."

and provided a year-long language assistance program to those still learning Polish, and tuition-free education for students of all levels. Before this provision, only students in primary and lower secondary school level could access free schooling.

Although in and outflows of migrants had both fallen in Poland (12% and 6%, respectively) from 2009 to 2010, both flows had risen again in 2011. Due to high unemployment rates, of which younger Poles were the most heavily affected, the emigration rate in Poland rose by 14%. Interestingly, the issuance of work permits also rose 11% between 2010 and 2011, 89% of which were intended for foreigners. There was also a 44% increase in the amount of temporary migrant workers from nearby countries in 2011, 92% of whom were Ukrainian citizens.[38] This illustrated preference for migrant workers is supported in the literature, as scholars agree that migrant workers are the preferred employee demographic in second-sector industries because they are seen by employers as "good" workers.[39] This means that they display a willingness to work (and to do whatever task is required of them with little to no complaints), open availability, and the ability to work long hours. With little knowledge of the economic landscape of their new home, many migrant workers accept and work diligently at low-paying jobs because the pay is far higher than they would make in their home country. In a capitalist economy where profit is the main goal, this makes migrant workers attractive candidates.

In July 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted a new plan for a comprehensive migration policy, called the "Migration Policy Poland - the current state of play and further actions." This document outlines specific changes in policy goals and administrative duties. Its main objective is to align migration policy with labor market needs and the need to maintain competitiveness in the labor market. The document sets forth goals such as cracking down on illegal immigration,

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[38] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013.

[39] Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?"; Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works*; Piore, *Birds of Passage*; Ribas, *On the Line*; Waters, *Black Identities.*

creating an efficient system to monitor the migration process, citizenship, and international protection, and improving migrant integration.[40]

In 2018, Poland further improved its integration program, offering "comprehensive integration support" and free language and cultural education courses for everyone enrolled in Polish schools, both children and adults.[41] Migrants eligible for the workforce were also eligible for an allowance to cover school-related expenses for their children. In 2019, the migrant workforce was also made eligible for government housing, known as the "Flat for Start" program.

While the policies discussed in this section do not all pertain to labor migration specifically, we can see in the "Polish Migration Policy - Current State and Prospects," adopted in 2010, that Polish officials emphasized that the state's migration policy should be guided by labor market needs. The subsequent integration focuses within these policies and recommendations are important to ensuring migrant success once they settle in Poland. Migrant happiness and success is vital so that they will stay in Poland and not return home or migrate elsewhere.

Illegal Migration, Work, and Regularization Policy

As previously noted, in 2004, 74% of Poles felt that Poland was not doing enough to curb illegal immigration.[42] In the years following this survey, Poland passed several policies in addition to the Aliens Act to encourage regularization and crack down on illegal migrant work. In 2006, unpaid taxes due to illegal employment in Poland were estimated to be about €4.75

[40] European Commission, "Polish Migration Policy – the Current State of Play and Proposed Actions."
[41] Mara and Kovacevic, "Wiiw - POLMIG Database: An Inventory of Migration Policy Changes in Europe, 2013-2019."
[42] BBC, *"Polish Government Negligent towards Illegal Migrants, Opinion Survey Suggests."*

billion.[43] Therefore, to combat illegal work, labor inspectors were granted the authority to check workers' migration status in July 2007. During legality checks, about one-third of workers found to be working illegally were foreigners.[44] The expansion of the state's short-term work program around this time, which will be discussed shortly, also worked to encourage employers to legally hire their employees in order to combat visa overstay and illegal employment practices.

To further combat illegal immigration, the Border Guard Development Strategy was expanded in 2009 to strengthen the Polish Border Guard, although the strategy was only created to be in effect until 2015 and was not extended. Among other duties, border guards were now able to check if migrants were working legally, alongside the National Labor Inspection. As an outermost state of the Schengen Zone, Poland has a special duty to take strict precautions against illegal immigration at its outer border. News articles published in the months leading up to the Strategy's expansion recount illegal immigrants from China and Vietnam having been arrested and detained during police sweeps.[45] After the border strategy was abandoned in 2015, Poland failed to implement a new border guard procedure, and as of 2023, the state still does not have an updated border strategy. A proposed draft to the Law on Protection was introduced in January 2017 and further amended in 2019, but has not been passed. The Commissioner for Human Rights has openly criticized the drafts for not providing sufficient safeguards to asylum seekers and for mandating detention for migrants awaiting a decision.[46]

In July 2012, the Act on the Effects of Hiring Foreigners Unlawfully Present in Polish Territory of 15 June 2012 went into effect. This Act cracked down on illegal hiring practices in Poland, instating sanctions for employers who hired migrants living in the country illegally, and

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[43] Bojarski, "Problems of Black Labour, Illegal Immigration and Money Laundering in Poland."
[44] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2008.
[45] Agence France-Presse, "Poland Arrests Dozens of Vietnamese, Chinese Illegal Migrants."; Agence France-Presse, "Poland Busts Gang Smuggling Vietnamese Migrants."
[46] European Council on Refugees and Exiles, "Border Procedure (Border and Transit Zones)."

better enabling the authorities to monitor the hiring of those migrants. To do so, before being able to start work, the Act requires that migrant workers provide their employer with proper documentation proving their legal right to stay in the country. It mandates that employers who hire either a migrant worker with illegal status who is a minor, or several adults with said status, will be subject to fine or probation. The Act also protects the rights of migrant workers, by stating that if a worker seeks missed payment or benefits from their employer, there is a legal assumption that the worker has been employed for three months. Likewise, if a migrant seeks compensation under a legal basis other than work, the law assumes that the payment owed amounts to PLN 4,500, three times the minimum wage.[47] The Act was enacted to comply with the EU Employer's Sanctions Directive, which was passed in July 2009 to combat illegal hiring practices across the EU.[48]

That same year, Poland implemented the Act on Legalization of Stay of Foreigners. This Act opened the opportunity for regularization to migrants who had been living in Poland illegally since at least 2007, when the last regularization law was passed. This was Poland's largest regularization legislation to date, as it did not have any kind of economic requirement for applicants to meet. Those granted the right to regularize would be allowed a two-year stay permit with the right to work without a work permit, on the condition that they already had an employment contract. Under this wave of regularization, residence permits were mainly granted to migrants from Ukraine, Vietnam, and Armenia.

The state also introduced a new road to naturalization for foreigners with the 2009 Citizenship Act, which was enacted in August 2012. In the most general sense, this law allows the Polish President to grant citizenship to any foreigner, regardless of how long they have lived

[47] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[48] Yaroshenko et al., "Combating the Illegal Employment of Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the European Union."

in Poland.[49] The Act outlines five different paths that migrants can take to gain citizenship, with varying lengths of time having lived in the country. For example, those who have legally and uninterruptedly lived in Poland for ten years, have a permanent residence permit, a stable income, place of residence, and know Polish are eligible to apply for citizenship. Likewise, those who have lived in Poland legally and uninterruptedly for at least three years, have a residence permit, have been married to a Polish citizen for at least three years, and know Polish are also eligible to apply. In 2012, about 3,800 foreigners gained citizenship in Poland.[50] To further encourage naturalization, an amendment to the Act on Polish Language was put into effect in November 2014, which lowered the level of proficiency in the Polish language necessary for naturalization.[51]

The Act on Foreigners was adopted in May 2014, which acted to relax the conditions of stay for migrants, predominantly in a work-centric context. This Act increased the length of a temporary residence permit from two to three years, extended the length of stay under student visas, allowed for recent graduates of Polish high schools to stay in the country for up to one year to search for work, granted a one-month grace period for migrant workers to find new employment after losing their job, allowed migrants to apply for a temporary residence permit and work permit in one procedure, and extended unemployment benefits to some migrant workers. The bill also enabled migrants who planned to study the Polish language to obtain a temporary residence permit as a student, which extends the initial duration of the permit from the typical 12 months to 15, which is the length of the student permit.[52] Thanks to the changes from this Act, amendments to the regularization process in 2012, and the conflict in Ukraine at the

[49] Chłoń-Domińczak, Matysiak, and Kotowska, "Act from 2 April 2009 on Polish Citizenship."
[50] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2014.
[51] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[52] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."

time, in 2014 Poland saw a 32% increase in the number of temporary residence permits issued, and an 82% increase in the number of permanent residence permits from 2013. Ukrainians accounted for 37% of the permanent and 39% of the temporary residence permits.[53]

Amendments to the Act on foreigners were enacted on February 12, 2018. The updated Act requires applicants to have proficiency in the Polish language at least at a B1 level in order to qualify for permanent residence, excluding children, asylum seekers, and Card of the Pole holders, an ethnic immigration path which I will discuss shortly. To further attract migrant workers, Poland also passed a new type of temporary residence permit this year, meant for workers with in-demand skills. This new permit granted a shorter path to permanent residence, at four years instead of the typical 5-10. Additionally, workers in in-demand fields were exempt from labor market tests. The amendment proposed instating quotas on the amount of work permits issued, but this never actually became practiced.[54]

In these policies, we can see how Poland addressed illegal immigration and regularization, two important aspects of migration with which every government must deal. Even within these routine policies, there are aspects specifically geared towards labor migrants and with a goal of making it easier for migrants to enter the workforce. For example, policies on illegal immigration include aspects which protect migrant workers' rights and crack down on illegal hiring practices of migrants. Regulating illegal hiring can actually help protect migrants, since illegally hired migrant workers are an incredibly vulnerable group susceptible to manipulation in the workplace.[55]

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[53] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2016.
[54] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2019.
[55] Yaroshenko et al., "Combating the Illegal Employment of Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the European Union."

Emigration and Ethnic Migration

In September 2007, the Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card was passed. The card, called the Card of the Pole (Karta Polaka), could be granted to ethnic Poles living in former Soviet states. In order to be eligible for a card, applicants must be able to prove that they are of Polish descent, have basic Polish language skills, and/or have grown an understanding of or attachment to Polish culture. The conception of and political goals behind the Card of the Pole has changed over the years as Poland's migration situation has changed. The card began simply as a way to facilitate the return of ethnic Poles from around the former Soviet states. However, as Poland began to experience increasing labor market and demographic strains, the card became a part of Poland's migration policy. Amid the mass emigration that Poland experienced in the 2000s, politicians began to see ethnic Polish populations abroad as a desirable migrant demographic who could easily integrate into Polish society. Politicians argued that having a migrant population who could easily and quickly integrate into society would be crucial for uninterrupted economic development.[56]

This 2007 Act replaced the Repatriation Act of 9 November 2000, which allowed ethnic Poles living in "Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Asian part of the Russian Federation," to settle in Poland and gain citizenship. This legislation proved to be poorly planned, though, as there was no system to facilitate the arrivals of these migrants, and only a few hundred people took advantage of the program each year.[57] Cardholders are not entitled to settle in Poland, and the card does not equate to citizenship, but are allowed legal occupation without a work permit in Poland, and can use the

[56] Gońda and Lesińska, "The Pole's Card as an Instrument of Migration Policy.".
[57] Gońda and Lesińska, "The Pole's Card as an Instrument of Migration Policy.".

Card as a visa for entry. Cardholders are entitled to free access to education, emergency healthcare, entry to state museums, and a reduced price of railway tickets within Poland.

The government made several changes in 2017 to encourage more ethnic Poles abroad to move to Poland. The Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card was amended so that cardholders who apply for permanent residence were entitled to a nine-month allowance. Additionally, the waiting period for naturalization was shortened to one year for cardholders. In July 2019, eligibility to obtain the Card of the Pole was extended to Poles all over the world. The Act on Repatriation was amended to improve opportunities and assistance for ethnic Poles living in former USSR Asian countries, so that ethnic Poles from these countries need only present a certificate proving knowledge of the Polish language when applying for either permanent residence or an EU long-term residence permit. These policy changes are in large part a result of the right-populist Law and Justice party (PiS) coming to power in 2015. The populist party painted a picture of Poland as an "ethnic and cultural community," and noted the state's duty to look out for ethnic Poles abroad.[58] Additionally, these amendments were a result of the migration crisis of 2015. Populist politicians stressed the need to prioritize the return of ethnic Poles in light of the "threat" of migrants from different cultures.[59]

In a unique effort to attract Polish emigrants living abroad, Prime Minister Donald Tusk started a campaign called "Do You Have a Return Plan?" to encourage and facilitate easy returns home in November 2008 in response to the global financial crisis. The government spent about €1 million on the campaign, which included a website and guide book to help those who chose to return to Poland with information on paperwork needed and the current job market in the state. The Irish Times noted the importance of this campaign, since before its launch, Poles living

[58] Gońda and Lesińska, "The Pole's Card as an Instrument of Migration Policy," 5.
[59] Gońda and Lesińska, "The Pole's Card as an Instrument of Migration Policy," 5.

abroad had to rely on word of mouth from friends who had previously returned home to know about the legal intricacies of the process.[60] This program proved to be successful, as from the second quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009, the number of Polish citizens living abroad was reduced by over 21%.[61] This wave of returned emigrants was thanks in large part to Poland's resilience during the recession, as opposed to Western European countries such as Great Britain, where many Polish emigrants lived and worked.[62]

The Card of the Pole and Poland's additional efforts to attract emigrants reflects changes in the state's politics as immigration became more prevalent over time. The Card's amendments after 2015 reflect a theme of xenophobia in Polish politics, which are not explicitly translated into its policy. Poland relies on labor migration to support its economy amid the mass emigration and brain drain of the early 2000s, but these ethnic policies illustrate a specific desire to attract ethnically Polish migrants, more so than those of a different ethnicity. While policies like these do not show a necessarily discriminatory policy, they do signal a preference for ethnically similar migrants.

Combating Brain Drain

As previously noted, the population of Polish emigrants living abroad in the EU tend to be younger and more educated than the state's general population. As a result, Poland needed to not only attract second-sector migrant workers, which is the most common archetype of migrant worker, but also highly skilled and educated migrants. In response to this issue, Poland enacted a series of policies aimed at attracting foreign university students by making it easier to obtain a student visa, and allowing student visa holders to work with said visa. In 2010, the OECD noted

[60] Irish Times, "Your Country Needs You: Poland Reaches out to Its Emigrants."
[61] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2010.
[62] Seager, "Emigration: It's the Economy: How Poland Brought Its People Home."

that Poland had experienced the largest increase in the inflow of foreign students out of any OECD country since 2004, with a 20% increase in student visas issued between 2006-2007.[63]

One of the main goals of the 2014 Act on Foreigners was to increase the number of international students at the university level to 5% by 2020. The number of international students in Poland, the majority of whom came from Ukraine, rose from 26,000 in the 2012 academic year to 57,100 in the 2015 academic year.[64] In 2012, international students made up only 1.3% of the total student population at this education level.[65] In 2013, Poland saw a nearly 30% increase in the number of international students from the previous year.

In a further effort to attract highly educated foreigners, In 2018, the government created an initiative to attract foreign start-ups and emerging businesses. The Poland Prize would be appointed to promising applicants who were scouted by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development. Prize winners were put on a special visa path with personal support, networking assistance, and a grant amounting to PLN 250,000. This program was implemented in an effort to counter the brain drain that Poland continues to experience due to Westward emigration. The state even eradicated income tax for people under the age of 26 making up to €18,200 per year in 2019. That year, there were about 580,000 degree-holding Poles (1.7 million in total) working abroad within the EU.[66]

Increasing opportunities for students, including allowing them to work with their student visa, helps educated foreigners establish connections in their high-skilled field. The goal of these policies in combating brain drain is that once international students graduate from university,

[63] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2010.
[64] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2015; OECD, International Migration Outlook 2017.
[65] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2015.
[66] Oliver, "Poland Scraps Income Tax for Young People to Halt Brain Drain."

they will be more likely to stay and work in Poland, contributing to the primary-sector industries in ways that the general population of labor migrants cannot.

Regional Migration Policy

As an EU border state, Poland has worked to keep positive relations with its Eastern European neighbors. The two main reasons for this are security, which will be discussed later, and economic. Poland is viewed by its Eastern neighbors as a gateway to the West, therefore many Eastern Europeans will try to enter and work in Poland for a short period of time before moving Westward within the EU. However, many of these migrant workers take advantage of Poland's regional short-term work programs, working in Poland for several months, and then returning home for the remainder of the year.

Before joining the EU, travel amongst Eastern European citizens into Poland was relatively unregulated. However, in anticipation of its accession into the EU, Poland changed its policy regarding travel between Eastern European countries so that in 2003, citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia now needed a tourist visa to enter the country.[67] Prior to this, from 1996-2003, citizens of these countries could enter Poland without a visa for up to 90 days, but were unable to legally work during that time. After this policy change, Poland allowed Ukrainians to obtain a Polish visa for free. The rate of migration from Ukraine to Poland decreased for a time because the Polish consulates in Ukraine simply could not keep up with the demand for visas.[68]

Poland introduced a new program in 2006 to facilitate temporary and seasonal work from citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia for two main reasons: to address labor shortages in the

[67] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[68] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine.*

agriculture sector, and to minimize illegal employment. Firstly, Poland is amongst the leading agriculture producers in the EU, and their food exports grew exponentially after joining the Union.[69] As a result, the government needed to bring in extra labor to keep up with this new demand. This program allowed citizens of these countries to work in the agricultural sector for three out of six months without a work permit.[70] Secondly, illegal work is most common in second-sector jobs, which are the most common professions for labor migrants. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, thousands of migrants were found by police to be working illegally each year.[71]

To obtain the special visa required for this program, employers were required to provide employees with formal documentation and to have been recognized by local authorities as a genuine farmer. In light of these policies, in order to limit the amount of work permits needed by migrant groups, in 2006 Polish employers were generally not allowed to hire a foreigner requiring a work permit if they had not hired at least two employees who did not require a work permit in the year prior.[72]

To further encourage regional migration, Poland again amended its short-term work program for regional migrants in 2007 so that the fees required for employers to hire foreign workers were significantly reduced, and this program was extended from just agriculture to include other work sectors. As a result, about 24,500 migrant workers took up seasonal work under this program in Poland at the end of 2007, most of whom came from Ukraine.[73] In February 2008, Poland increased the amount of time that citizens of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine could work without a work permit to six out of every twelve months (raised from three out of every six months in 2006). This extension resulted in an inflow of over 95,000 short-term

[69] Warsaw Voice, "Growing Opportunities."
[70] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[71] Bojarski, "Problems of Black Labour, Illegal Immigration and Money Laundering in Poland."
[72] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2007.
[73] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2008.

migrant workers in 2008, 96% of whom came from Ukraine.[74] This temporary work program was extended to include citizens of Moldova in June 2008, and Georgia in November 2009.[75] In 2010, the program was extended indefinitely and further simplified, though it now requires employers to declare their foreign hires at the local labor office.

In 2016, Poland saw a 94% increase over 2015 in the number of work permits issued, as well as a 68% increase in the number of employer declarations to hire a foreigner, as required by the state's seasonal work program with nearby countries.[76] These figures continued to grow rapidly, and in the first half of 2017, the number of work permits issued had increased by 100%, and the number of employer declarations of temporary work increased by 40%. Of these seasonal workers, 94% were Ukrainian.[77] The following year, in 2017, the government designed a new kind of work permit for seasonal work. This permit allowed migrant workers to work in Poland in the agriculture, horticulture, and tourism sectors for nine months of the year. Additionally, citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine were not required to meet labor market test requirements to obtain this permit.

As we will see in the following chapter, migrants from Eastern European countries are the most common migrant groups in Poland. While I more closely explore the nuances of this phenomenon in that chapter, we can see through this successful short term work program that labor migrants from Eastern European countries serve as a vital workforce for Poland's largest second-sector industries. This and the following regional migration policies illustrate that positive relations with neighboring states is a priority of Poland's, and a migration program which facilitates short-term migration with low barriers to entry helps them achieve this goal.

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[74] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2010.
[75] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[76] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2017.
[77] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2018.

Further Regional Migration Policy

Poland has passed several other non-labor related migration policies with its neighbor states, most notably to this research, in bilateral agreements with Ukraine. In July 2009, Poland and Ukraine implemented a bilateral border traffic agreement. The agreement granted special permits for residents living within a distance of 50 km of the Polish-Ukrainian border, allowing them to stay across the border for a maximum of 90 days at a time.[78] It took several months of negotiation for the agreement to be passed, since the EU dictates that border agreements should only include land up to 30 km inside the border.[79] In 2011 Poland and Belarus established a similar local border traffic agreement, under which residents living within the 30 km border region could also stay across the border for up to 60 days without a visa. Poland made a similar border deal with Russia's Kaliningrad District in 2012, allowing citizens living near the border visa-free entry for up to 30 days.[80] In all three cases, residents had to be able to prove that they had lived in the borderland region for a minimum of three years.

Poland has long made it a priority to advocate for the Europeanization of its neighbor state, Ukraine. In multiple instances since they joined the EU in 2004, Poland has advocated for Ukraine to become an EU member, though to no avail. However, the state has successfully negotiated for Ukraine to participate in several programs with the EU. For instance, on May 18, 2012, Poland and Ukraine contracted a bilateral agreement to harmonize their social security systems. This agreement, which came into effect in 2013, was meant to alleviate any negative impacts for Ukrainians working in Poland and Poles working in Ukraine. Under the agreement, businesses operating in both Poland and Ukraine no longer have to pay into social security in both countries. Additionally, the same workers benefits such as disability, pensions, and

[78] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013.
[79] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine.*
[80] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013.

unemployment are now available for both Poles and Ukrainians.[81] This harmonization legislation not only aimed to increase bilateral economic cooperation, but also acted as another of Poland's many efforts to support Ukrainian Europeanization. It is important to note that at this time, Ukraine had already signed similar agreements with other EU countries, such as Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Portugal.[82]

High Level Statistical Summary

To gain a better understanding of how these policies trend overall, I next conduct a high-level statistical analysis of Polish migration policy. It is important to understand the reality of the restrictiveness of Polish migration policy, given that the general story in the media, which is greatly driven by Polish politicians' rhetoric, is that Poland has a restrictive and even racist migration policy.[83] I utilize the DEMIG and POLMIG databases for this analysis. In these databases, which use the same methodology, restrictiveness is coded as +1 for policies which increase restrictiveness, and -1 for those which reduce restrictiveness. I alter this measure to create a 0/1 binary dummy variable within this binary, legislation coded as "no change" and "N/A" are all coded as "N/A". Restrictiveness in the database is simply an additive measure of whether a certain legislation makes the overall migration policy more or less restrictive.[84] Additionally, this database disaggregates legislation and codes the different components differently, as some major laws passed can contain four or more components of varying restrictiveness.[85] This means that the number of data points evaluated in this chapter do not

[81] Ukrainian News Agency, "Yanukovych Approve a Ratification Of Social Security Agreement With Poland."
[82] Ukrainian News Agency, "Ukraine Expects To Sign Agreements On Social Security With Germany, Israel, Hungary, Spain."
[83] Bellamy, "Poland's Opposition Accuses Government of Migration Policy Hypocrisy."; Osuki, "Refugee Hypocrisy: Poland Embraces Ukrainians, Shuns All Others."; Wamsley, "Race, Culture and Politics Underpin How — or If — Refugees Are Welcomed in Europe.".
[84] De Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Migration Policy Change."
[85] De Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Migration Policy Change."

equate to the amount of individual pieces of legislation passed. However, for simplicity's sake, each data point in this dataset is treated as its own entity, regardless of whether it is a part of a larger piece of legislation. Finally, it is crucial to understand that the evaluation of each new measure's restrictiveness is additive. The authors note that, "The code hence captures the change in restrictiveness introduced by the new policy measure compared to the previous situation."[86] This means that a data entry coded as "1" is more restrictive than the law that it is replacing. For example, the authors explain that "a policy measure making family reunification more difficult (for instance, through introducing income requirements) would introduce a change towards more restrictiveness, as it is making access for family migrants more difficult compared to the previous situation."[87] In the interest of this analysis, my aim is to provide an idea of how Polish migration policy has changed over time as a whole. Therefore, tracing the additive effect of restrictive legislation within each policy aim (i.e. labor, asylum, naturalization, etc.) is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, figure 1 shows the amount of disaggregated legislation passed each year, and how its restrictiveness is coded within the dataset in order to provide a better understanding of the policy's evolution. The graph shows that each year, the majority of legislation passed is less restrictive than that which it replaces, meaning that in general, Polish migration policy has been liberalized over time.

[86] Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli, "Compiling and Coding Migration Policies: Insights from the DEMIG POLICY Database," 14.
[87] Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli, "Compiling and Coding Migration Policies: Insights from the DEMIG POLICY Database," 14.



Figure 1. This graph shows the amount of disaggregated legislation passed each year. Within each year, each bar is broken down to display the amount of legislation determined to make the policy it replaces more or less restrictive, and those which do not change the restrictiveness of the policy they replace. We can see through this graph that the majority of legislation passed over time is coded as less restrictive, meaning that Polish migration policy has been liberalized over time. (Source: DEMIG Policy)

With this understanding that Poland's migration policy has been liberalized over time, I now look to understand whether the mean restrictiveness of policies targeted towards specific people groups varies based on their country of origin. If, for example, policies targeted towards Eastern European migrants are additively less restrictive, and those targeted towards Middle Eastern migrants are additively more restrictive, this would mean that Poland has a discriminatory migration policy. In total, I do not find this to be the case. As we can see in figure 1, very little additively restrictive migration legislation is passed in Poland each year. Quantitatively, the entire dataset has a mean restrictiveness of 0.130, which is reflected in figure 1, and further denotes a liberalized policy, since an average of 0.5 and above would denote an increasingly conservative policy.

In looking at policies targeted towards migrant groups from specific countries, I create a subset of the data which contains data points in which citizens from European countries (whether EU members or Eastern European countries) are listed in the "Specific nationalities" column. Of course, since joining the EU in 2004, Poland's migration policy towards EU member states has had to be fully liberalized to allow free travel between all EU states. Therefore, here I am concerned with Poland's policy towards Eastern European migrants specifically. This subset has a mean restrictiveness of 0, including data from every year of this case study, with 20 policies coded as "0," and 3 as "N/A." This means that every piece of migration legislation passed in Poland from 2003-2019 targeted at Europeans has liberalized the state's migration stance toward this group specifically. Since this indicates a more liberalized stance towards migrants from Eastern European countries than towards migrants as a whole, I argue that Poland has a migration policy which is preferential to Eastern Europeans. There was only one migration bill passed between 2003-2019 which targets citizens from specific non-European countries, and this bill is coded as 0, meaning that the discrepancy in restrictiveness between the entire dataset and the European subset comes solely from general, unspecified bills. Due to this, I do not find that Poland has a discriminatory migration policy.

In this analysis, I am also interested to see if the 2015 European refugee crisis had an impact on the restrictiveness of this policy. Given my findings in the Emigration and Ethnic Migration section of this chapter, I hypothesize that Polish migration policy would become increasingly restrictive on average after 2015. I find support for this hypothesis, as the data shows that from 2003-2014, Poland's migration policy had a mean restrictiveness of 0.104 (accounting for 64 data points). From 2015-2019, the policy had a mean restrictiveness of 0.1905 (accounting for 21 data points). Since migration legislation concerning Europeans passed from

2003-2019 has a mean restrictiveness of 0, we know that this increase in restrictiveness comes from bills which do not target citizens from any specific countries.

Looking at figure 1, which breaks down the restrictiveness of the disaggregated legislation by year, we can see that 2019 presents itself as an outlier. In 2019, more additively restrictive legislation was passed than any other year studied here. Additionally, the data shows that the mean restrictiveness of legislation passed this year is 0.6, making 2019 the only year in this case study during which the legislation passed trends restrictively (with a mean above 0.5). This anomaly might be explained by the fact that in 2019, Poland held both national and European Parliamentary elections, both in which the right-populist Law and Justice party (PiS) won the majority of seats. Additionally, the state held presidential elections in 2020, so it is plausible that the incumbent PiS presidency attempted to pass more policies than average during its last year in office, although the party won the presidency again in the following election. Further, democracy watch groups have reported on the party's concerning actions since it took power in 2015, working to strengthen its control over the legislative process through actions such as "radically restructuring" the Supreme Court in order to appoint 40% of its judges.[88] Due to controlling actions like this, the PiS would have been able to pass legislation more effectively, allowing them to pass a total of 15 migration policies in 2018 and 2019. Of the policies passed in 2018, the majority were less restrictive and targeted at migrant workers. Of the policies passed in 2019, of which 3 out of 5 were determined to be restrictive, only one law was targeted at migrant workers, which set quotas on the amount of work permits available for migrant workers. The other restrictive policies passed during this year were targeted at asylum seekers, which were not the target of any policy changes in 2018. This indicates that the government held different

[88] Davies, "Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland's Courts."

priorities in its migration policies across the two years, reflecting the differences in restrictiveness.

Conclusion

In the evolution of Poland's migration policy, we can see a steady effort to combat emigration and brain drain, as well as to expand the eligible labor migrant workforce. The state's various attempts to retain young Polish workers, through Tusk's return campaign in 2008 and the eradication of income tax for young workers in 2019, have not been successful enough to support the Polish economy, and the state has therefore gradually liberalized its labor migration, regularization, and integration policies over the years. Poland has a specific vested interest in attracting ethnic Poles from foreign countries, having expanded the Card of the Pole over time to provide enticing benefits and availability to ethnic Poles all over the world. Additionally, the state has implemented an especially liberal labor migration policy for citizens of its neighboring countries, such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia to stimulate its second-sector labor market. In terms of general migration, Poland made many changes to its policy in the years leading up to and directly following EU accession to better align with Western goals and policies. Over the years, the state has further liberalized its regularization, naturalization, and integration policies to further attract migrants for permanent settlement. Although immigration to Poland has increased since its accession to the EU, the proportion of immigrants entering the state is still relatively low compared to that of other EU states. Many migrants still consider Poland to be a gateway to the West, and therefore do not settle in Poland permanently.

Overall, I find support for my hypothesis that while Poland does not have an explicitly discriminatory policy, its policy does show some preference towards migrants from Eastern European states. So, then, we know that attracting labor migrants and integrating them into the

workforce is an important goal for Poland, which drives their migration policy. We know that quantitatively, these policies show a slight preference for geographically proximate and ethnically similar migrants. This begs the question, how are these aspects of the policy reflected in practice? To explore this, I turn to work permit data in the following chapter.

Chapter 3: Labor Migration Trends in Poland, 2010-2020

As noted in the previous chapter, the majority of Poland's migration legislation is aimed at supporting the state's economy by contributing to its workforce. Many of the policies discussed in the previous chapter are either entirely or partially geared towards expanding labor migration. This finding is supported in the literature, as scholars argue that labor migration is one of the most important determining factors of a state's migration policy.[89] With this in mind, I seek to understand whether the gradual liberalization of Poland's labor migration policy is reflected in the policies' implementation.

To do so, I first turn to political economy literature to better understand why labor migration is so sought after, and the typical trends that labor migrants follow in Poland specifically. Next, I look at Polish foreign work permit data from 2010-2020. A work permit is a document which allows migrants to legally work in Poland. Migrants from countries other than those with short-term regional work agreements in Poland (such as Belarus and Ukraine) are required to have a work permit if they engage in more than 30 days of work.[90] Employers are required to sponsor every migrant they wish to hire for a work permit, and migrants staying in Poland under a tourist visa or temporary residence permit are not permitted to work in Poland without a permit.[91]

Through this analysis, I expect to find that the amount of overall work permits granted to foreigners will generally increase each year, since the state's migration policy continuously expanded to better accommodate the need for labor migrants during this time period. Although Europe experienced a migration crisis at this time and therefore an increase in xenophobic rhetoric, I do not expect to find a decrease or stagnation in the amount of permits granted in

[89] Caviedes, Prying Open Fortress Europe.
[90] IOM, "Documents Entitling a Foreigner to Work in Poland."
[91] IOM, "Documents Entitling a Foreigner to Work in Poland."

2015, given that in the previous chapter, I found that no restrictive migration policies were passed at that time (fig. 1). Finally, I expect to find that work permits are granted to foreigners from nearby countries such as Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus at a higher proportion than foreigners from non-Eastern European countries.

Literature and Non-Traditional Work

Labor Market Sectors and the Reserve Army of Labor

Michael Piore uses the theory of economic duality to explain a dual-sector labor market where migrant workers exist in the secondary sector.[92] Second sector jobs are often referred to as 3D jobs - dirty, dull, and dangerous.[93] Later discussion of his influential work *Birds of Passage* finds additional segmentation within the labor market, including industrial, craft, and salaried, just in the primary sector.[94] This segmentation of the labor market exists because the type of worker needed for different jobs can vary greatly. As a result, movement between sectors is difficult, and each labor sector has its own distinct labor force.[95] Migrant workers, along with women, youth, and minorities, primarily belong to the secondary sector because jobs in this sector are the least attractive.[96] Migrant workers are an ideal target of the second sector because across the literature, the immigrant population is found to be on average low-skilled, less educated, and willing to work hard.[97]

Because these jobs are unattractive, the secondary sector requires what Marx deems a reserve army of labor - an ever-ready reserve of willing workers to step in and fill low-sector,

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[92] Piore, *Birds of Passage*.
[93] Menz, *The Political Economy of Managed Migration.*
[94] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works.*
[95] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works.*
[96] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works*; Piore, *Birds of Passage*; Wright, "Immigration Policy and Market Institutions in Liberal Market Economies"; Lever-Tracy, "Immigrant Workers and Postwar Capitalism."
[97] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works*.

unskilled job openings.[98] In their book *Refugees on the Move*, Balkan and Tonak [99] argue that the reserve army pits the unemployed working class against the employed, thus driving down wages. Therefore, having an ever-present and eager migrant workforce is beneficial to the capitalist economy. The goal of capitalism is for firms to make the most profits possible, which means maximizing the firms' income and minimizing the costs of production, including employee wages. The secondary sector industries which recruit migrant workers are under the pressure of this goal, which has only grown as globalization has taken off. If firms pay higher wages to attract workers, they lose their competitive edge within global capital markets, so they therefore rely on the presence of a reserve army of labor, notably on migrant labor, to remain competitive.[100]

There is a slight disagreement within the literature as to the exact role of migrant workers within the reserve army of labor. Economist Constance Lever-Tracy[101] argues that migrant workers are at the core of the working class and directly contribute to surplus value within capitalism, and that they do not regulate the overall wages or carry fluctuations in the system. On the other hand, other scholars[102] argue that labor, including migrant labor, is forced to bear the brunt of the cost of economic flux and uncertainty.

Characteristics of the Migrant Workforce

There is an agreement in the literature that second-sector employers prefer to hire migrant workers over domestic workers because they are seen as "good." [103] That is, they display a willingness to work (and to do whatever task is required of them with little to no complaints),

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[98] Lever-Tracy, "Immigrant Workers and Postwar Capitalism."
[99] Balkan and Tonak, *Refugees on the Move*.
[100] Piore, *Birds of Passage*.
[101] Lever-Tracy, "Immigrant Workers and Postwar Capitalism."
[102] Piore, *Birds of Passage*; Burgess and Connell, "Vulnerable Work and Strategies for Inclusion: An Introduction.".
[103] Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?"; Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Work*s.; Piore, *Birds of Passage*; Ribas, *On the Line*; Waters, *Black Identities*.

open availability, and the ability to work long hours. Caviedes explains that employers look for four types of flexibility in their ideal labor force, which the migrant workforce fully embodies. These flexibilities are:

1) Numerical flexibility, meaning a large reserve army,
2) Temporal flexibility, or the ability to adjust to fluctuations in demand,
3) Wage flexibility, or independence from bargaining,
4) Functional flexibility, or the ease at which employees can shift between tasks according to demand.[104]

Because migrant workers come from outside the destination country's culture, they enter the workforce with a complete social and economic disconnect. This makes them the ideal candidates for second-sector work. With little knowledge of the economies of their new home, many migrant workers accept and work diligently at low-paying jobs because the pay is far higher than they would make in their home country. The longer they work, though, the more they realize that their pay is actually menial.[105] In line with this, Saskia Sassen[106] argues that migrant workers' outsider position makes them particularly dependent on their employers, ergo very willing to work. A quick analysis of this literature shows that the more time migrant workers spend in their destination country, the more social capital they gain, and the less they rely on their employers, making them less subservient workers.

Having a social disconnect makes migrant workers ideal for second-sector work because they are willing to do jobs that they may not have taken in their home country.[107] There are two main reasons for this. First, because most migrant workers see their time in their destination

[104] Caviedes, *Prying Open Fortress Europe.*
[105] Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?"; Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works*.; Piore, *Birds of Passage*.
[106] Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital*.
[107] Boehm, *Intimate Migrations.*; Piore, *Birds of Passage*; Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?"; Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works.*

country as temporary, they are willing to work strenuous jobs for the time being until they hit their financial goals.[108] Importantly, migrants are target earners, meaning they are typically willing to work no more than is needed to meet their set financial goal.[109] Second, there is a complete divorce between migrants' perception of self and their role in society and their role at work.[110] For example, men who migrate alone often live packed into small apartments and share household duties with their roommates such as cooking and cleaning, something they would be unlikely to do at home with their wives.[111] According to Piore,[112] first generation immigrants who end up settling and raising their families in their destination countries look back on their second-sector jobs as degrading and humiliating, having only been worth it for the economic benefits that the work provided.

Network Hiring

Migrants who have strong social network ties are widely seen in the literature as better equipped and more likely to achieve their goals.[113] It is very common for industries that employ many migrant workers to engage in network hiring, which is the hiring of other migrant workers based on referrals from current employees.[114] Because immigrants are the ideal employee in many second-sector industries, managers will use employee connections to hire friends and family members, assuming that if the current employee does good work, their referrals will as well.[115] Managers benefit from this referral system because it means that they do not have to put

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[108] Piore, *Birds of Passage;* Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?".
[109] Piore, *Birds of Passage*.
[110] Piore, *Birds of Passage*; Boehm, *Intimate Migrations*.
[111] Ribas, *On the Line*.
[112] Piore, *Birds of Passage*.
[113] Kindler and Szulecka, "Messy Arrangements?"
[114] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works*; Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?"; Ribas, *On the Line*; Waters, *Black Identities*.
[115] Baxter-Reid, "Buying into the 'Good Worker' Rhetoric or Being as Good as They Need to Be?"; Waters, *Black Identities.*

effort into seeking out their preferred employee demographic. In some instances, candidates will apply for a vacant position before it is actually vacant, since they know that their friend is planning on quitting before management does.[116] Managers have reported that sometimes a vacancy will open up in the morning and be filled in the afternoon due to how strong the network hiring system is amongst migrant workers.[117]

In Poland, a 2022 study found that 44% of Ukrainian migrants found work through their social network, with family ties and ties to people already living in Poland being the most helpful connection.[118] The phenomenon of network hiring is important to keep in mind when looking at trends of work permits granted to foreigners over time, because social networks allow migrant flows to act as a siphon - once community connections are established in Poland, it is easier for other foreigners to migrate and find work as time passes. In line with this, research shows that network hiring is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to stop immigration flows once they have started.[119] Due to this, coupled with the fact that immigration has become increasingly prevalent in Poland since the country joined the EU, we can expect the data to reflect this siphoning effect, barring any extraneous circumstances.

Short-Term and Informal Work

As established in the previous chapter, regional guest worker policies were introduced in Poland in 2006, and were expanded as recently as 2017. While these programs were first created to support the state's agriculture industry, which requires an influx of labor during harvest seasons, they were later expanded to include the horticulture and tourism industries, and eventually had no industry restrictions.[120] Poland's regional short term work program has

[116] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works*.
[117] Waldinger and Lichter, *How the Other Half Works.*
[118] Kindler and Szulecka, "Messy Arrangements?"
[119] Piore, *Birds of Passage.*
[120] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2018.

exploded in popularity in the past decade. In 2013, there were an estimated 160,000-240,000[121] hiring declarations from employers, as required by the 2010 expansion of the short-term work program.[122] By 2018, that number had grown to around 1.6 million declarations, making Poland the largest recipient of seasonal foreign workers in the world.[123] Notably, somewhere between 91-95% of these workers were Ukrainian. Ukrainians are a likely group to participate in Poland's short term work program, as in 2019, 57% of the total population of Ukrainian migrants reported that they stay abroad for less than three months of the year.[124]

The illegal employment of a foreigner is defined in Polish law as hiring a foreigner without a proper work permit, or hiring a foreigner to carry out work outside the parameters of their work permit.[125] Informal labor contracts hurt both the economy and the employee. Because those employed illegally do not pay taxes, the existence of an informal workforce results in a lessened stream of revenue for pension and social security funds.[126] Additionally, being informally employed means that workers are not entitled to the same basic protections and rights as those employed legally, such as the right to sick leave. The literature on labor migration agrees that labor migrants are a vulnerable group.[127] Though there is little consensus as to what constitutes vulnerable work in the literature, according to Burgess and Connell,[128] power structures play an important role in determining vulnerability, and weak bargaining power is a good indicator of a vulnerable actor. Those employed illegally have even less bargaining power

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[121] Górny and Kaczmarczyk, "Temporary Farmworkers and Migration Transition: On a Changing Role of the Agricultural Sector in International Labour Migration to Poland."
[122] DEMIG, "DEMIG POLICY."
[123] Górny and Kaczmarczyk, "Temporary Farmworkers and Migration Transition: On a Changing Role of the Agricultural Sector in International Labour Migration to Poland."
[124] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[125] European Commission, "Factsheet on Undeclared Work - POLAND."
[126] Yaroshenko et al., "Combating the Illegal Employment of Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the European Union."
[127] Burgess and Connell, "Vulnerable Work and Strategies for Inclusion: An Introduction."; Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital*.; Krivonos, "Carrying Europe's 'White Burden', Sustaining Racial Capitalism."
[128] Burgess and Connell, "Vulnerable Work and Strategies for Inclusion: An Introduction.".

in the workplace, and are commonly paid less than those employed legally would be, therefore labor migrants working illegally are a highly vulnerable group.[129]

It is important to understand the factors which contribute to illegal work contracts (which are typically referred to as informal or undeclared in the literature) because as seen in the previous chapter, Poland has passed several migration laws targeted at reducing the amount of labor migrants employed illegally in the state. These policies are in response to an EU law enacted in 2009. According to a 2014 survey by the state's Central Statistical Office, the majority (57.8%) of workers employed illegally have no more than basic vocational education. Further, the agriculture industry employed the most undeclared workers, with 22.2% of all undeclared workers employed in this sector.[130] As we understand from the literature, these characteristics align with a typical migrant worker in Poland, as the state has passed several policies to bolster the flow of migrant labor into its agriculture industry.[131] According to data from Poland's Labour Force Survey, the share of undeclared workers in Poland's workforce has shrunk from 14.9% in 1995 to 4.5% in 2014.[132] Still, though, among other OECD countries, Poland is identified as having a higher than average informal economy.[133] In 2007, it was found that foreigners accounted for about one-third of the undocumented worker population.[134]

It is important to keep this information in mind when looking at work permit data in Poland. While work permit data reflects trends of the general labor migrant population, there are additional labor migrants employed illegally in Poland who are not included in these statistics, therefore the data analyzed in this chapter is unable to encapsulate the entire labor migrant

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[129] Yaroshenko et al., "Combating the Illegal Employment of Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the European Union."
[130] European Commission, "Factsheet on Undeclared Work - POLAND."
[131] European Commission, "Factsheet on Undeclared Work - POLAND."
[132] European Commission, "Factsheet on Undeclared Work - POLAND."
[133] Boulhol, "Making the Labour Market Work Better in Poland."
[134] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2008.

population in the state. Additionally, since Poland has implemented several short-term work programs for citizens of neighboring Eastern European countries, there are far more labor migrants from Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia working in Poland than the work permit statistics reflect.

Work Permit Data

Taking these factors into consideration, I now turn to look at trends of work permits granted to foreigners over time. As explained in the introduction chapter, the data analyzed here only reflects the work permits granted from 2010-2020, as opposed to the case study timeframe of 2004-2020, due to issues accessing the data. However, in one study[135] from 2019, which looks at work permit data from 2008-2018, we can see that in 2008, there were 18,022 total permits granted, and in 2009 there were 29,340 total, indicating an increase in the amount of permits granted. Given this, coupled with the steady increase in the amount of permits granted over time, as seen in figure 2, we can assume that the amount of work permits granted to foreigners has steadily increased since 2004. Additionally, the main countries of origin of permits recipients in 2008 and 2009 are Ukraine and Belarus, which is a consistent theme throughout the 2010–2020 data.

For this analysis, I created a dataset using the data published in the *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* biennial publication, which provides information regarding work permits granted to foreigners each year, including the country of origin of each worker. Within this dataset, I used R to organize the data by region, so that it is easier to visualize. R's "countrycode" package uses ISO country codes to determine each state's regional affiliation. I created a bar chart in R to visualize the total number of permits granted, regardless of region or country of origin, by year, in order to test my first hypothesis, which says that despite an increase in anti-immigrant

[135] Sterniński, "Economic Migrations to Poland in 2008-2018."

sentiment due to the 2015 refugee crisis, there would not be a decrease or stagnation in the amount of permits granted in 2015. I find support for this hypothesis. Next, I create a bar chart of the total number of work permits granted by region over time, in order to test my hypothesis that Eastern European countries would be disproportionately overrepresented in the data. I ultimately find overwhelming support for my hypothesis, although due to R's grouping, this column of data includes migrants from Eastern European and Central Asian countries.

At a first glance of the dataset, we see that during this 10-year period, Poland granted work permits to citizens of 48 different countries in 7 different regions. Since citizens from other EU member states do not need permits to work within the EU, all of the countries included in this data are non-EU states. Of these countries, 9 are in East Asia and the Pacific, 16 in Europe and Central Asia, 4 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 7 in the Middle East and North Africa, 2 in North America, 6 in South Asia, and 4 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the countries included in this dataset were granted 0 permits until 2017. Therefore, aside from North Korea (East Asia and the Pacific), which is the only country that Poland stopped granting permits to in 2017, the above numbers reflect the countries in which citizens were granted work permits from 2017-2020. From 2010-2017, work permits were granted to citizens from only 24 countries. Of these 24 countries, 7 are in East Asia and the Pacific, 8 in Europe and Central Asia, 1 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2 in the Middle East and North Africa, 1 in North America, 4 in South Asia, and 1 in Sub-Saharan Africa.



Figure 2. The total amount of permits granted to all regions by year. We can see here that Poland's labor workforce has grown steadily, especially since 2015. The small dip in the amount of permits granted in 2020 can be accounted for due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which impacted travel globally.

In figure 3, we can see that there is a steady increase in the amount of permits granted to foreigners over time. This data supports my hypothesis that there would be no decrease or stagnation in the amount of permits granted in 2015. This also supports my conclusions drawn in Chapter 2, because this steady increase in the amount of permits granted agrees with my findings in the previous chapter, that Poland has steadily liberalized its labor migration policy over time. While we do see a slight decrease in the amount of permits granted in 2020, this makes sense given that the COVID-19 pandemic greatly impacted worldwide movement.

Even by looking at the raw data, it is immediately clear that there is an incredible inequality in the amount of permits granted to each country in any given year. In the summary statistics generated for each year of data, the mean is larger than the median by hundreds and sometimes thousands of data points. For example, in 2016, the median number of work permits granted was 18, while the mean was 2,604. This begs the question, where is this inequality coming from?

To explore this, I first look at the total number of permits granted by region over time. In figure 3, we can see that the amount of permits granted are incredibly disproportionately distributed. In fact, the distribution between the regions is so skewed in favor of Europe & Central Asia that only the East Asia & Pacific and South Asian regions are even visible on the graph, and barely so. Within the Europe & Central Asia region, Ukraine (most prevalent) and Belarus (second-most) are the two most prominent sending countries, according to this data. Additionally, given the short term work programs that Poland has established with neighboring countries Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, we know that there are even more labor migrants from the Europe and Central Asian region than the data in figure 3 reflects. As we know from the high level summary conducted in Chapter 2, while Poland's migration policy is less restrictive towards European immigrants, its overall migration policy does not trend restrictively, with a mean restrictiveness of 0.130. Therefore, we know that the stark contrast in the number of work permits granted each year by region is not the result of an inherently discriminatory migration policy. Given this, I argue that there are two possible explanations as to why this inequality exists.



Figure 3. The total number of work permits granted to foreigners each year, separated by region.

Analysis

This disconnect between the nature of Poland's migration policy and how the results of that policy are reflected in the work permits granted each year is a common phenomenon in the field of migration policy. One theory which scholars have used to understand this phenomenon is the gap hypothesis. This theory says that the gap between migration policy and its outcomes is growing continuously wider in democracies with industrial economies, which in turn creates a growing anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the native population, pushing the government to adopt more restrictive policies.[136] This indicates that migration policy is written in a reactionary

[136] Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius, *Controlling Immigration*.

cycle, and suggests that it should become more restrictive over time. However, a 2019 study looking more closely at this hypothesis in Western European states found that political parties with restrictive stances on immigration are less likely than those with liberal stances to achieve restrictive policy outputs.[137] This suggests that in a state like Poland, where populist movements have been on the rise in the past two decades or so, and political parties in office are more likely to hold restrictive views on immigration, we should not expect to see a high rate of restrictive policies being passed.

Further, the study finds that migration policies tend to be passed in response to the state's net migration rate.[138] As we saw in Chapter 2 (fig. 1), the years in which restrictive legislation was passed do not follow any sort of pattern. However, in looking at figure 2, we can see that the amount of permits granted follows a steady increase over time. This indicates that while the policies themselves do not dictate the work permit trends, they may be influenced by other factors, such as the state's economic needs. As previously discussed, labor migration is crucially needed to support capitalist economies, and Poland's economic growth since entering the EU requires plenty of labor migrant support. The issue seen in this data is not in the amount of permits being granted each year, as that aligns with my findings from Chapter 2. Instead, in answering my research question, it is important to understand from where this stark regional inequality in the granting of permits stems.

I argue that there are two important and coinciding factors at play, which explain the disconnect we see between the restrictive nature of Poland's migration policy (or lack thereof) and the regional inequality in the granting of work permits. First, migrants from non-European countries may simply be uninterested in migrating to Poland. Second, while the migration policy

[137] Lutz, "Reassessing the Gap-Hypothesis."
[138] Lutz, "Reassessing the Gap-Hypothesis."

itself is not discriminatory, there may be external factors at play which discourage non-white migrants from migrating to Poland, such as populism amongst Polish citizens, or discriminatory rhetoric from Polish politicians. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore these possibilities.

Migrant Preferences

First, Poland may simply not appeal as a destination country for migrants living outside the CEE region. It is possible that migrants from other regions would rather migrate to other EU states, but that those from Europe and Central Asia, especially from former Soviet states, would rather migrate to Poland due to factors such as geographical proximity and cultural similarities. Further, it is widely understood that Poland has not historically had a high rate of immigration, and is generally not an interesting destination for migrants.[139] Since migrants often rely on familial connections in their destination country for economic and emotional support, the fact that Poland historically has not had large migrant communities likely means that migrants from culturally-distant countries without established familial connections are unlikely to consider Poland as an option for immigration. It is commonly said in immigration scholarship that once migration flows start, it is difficult to stop them. In this case, I argue the opposite.

In the late 1980s to early 1990s, migration to Poland was dominated by Europeans, with about half of all immigrants from 1988-1992 originating from elsewhere in Europe, and anywhere ranging from 11%-18% of all immigrants coming from the USSR.[140] From 1993-1997, migrants from Ukraine and Russia, respectively, made up the largest migrant populations to be granted permanent residence in Poland.[141] Notably, behind Ukraine, Vietnamese migrants made up the second-largest population of migrants being granted work

[139] Fańczak, "Why Do Poles Oppose Immigrants?"
[140] Iglicka, *Poland's Post-War Dynamic of Migration*.
[141] Iglicka, *Poland's Post-War Dynamic of Migration.*

permits in Poland from 1994-1998.[142] Through the end of the 20th century, migrants from Ukraine, Russia, and Vietnam remained the largest immigrant groups in Poland.[143] This means that at the beginning of this case study, there were very few migrant communities established in Poland, and the majority of those that were, were populated by ethnically similar migrants from nearby countries.

Additionally, one prominent theory of economic migration flows says that for migrants, the opportunity cost of prospective income versus distance to migrate is an important consideration to make.[144] Not only is it expensive to move to a different country in general, but it is also important to consider the cost of returning home to visit family. Further, migrants often do not know what their income will be in their destination country, meaning that the higher the cost of migration, the bigger the monetary risk if one cannot find a well-enough paying job. In terms of income, the difference between the potential incomes of migrants in their home country versus their destination country plays an important role in determining migration flows.[145] For example, due to a plethora of differing policy decisions, Poland has better economic opportunities than Ukraine, and since the countries are neighbors, under this theory it makes sense that there would be a large population of Ukrainian labor migrants in Poland. However, because Poland has not always been an attractive destination for economic migrants, alongside the understanding that migration is dependent on existing flows, we can begin to understand how this regionally disproportionate migrant population formed in Poland.

[142] Iglicka, *Poland's Post-War Dynamic of Migration.*
[143] Iglicka, *Poland's Post-War Dynamic of Migration.*
[144] Vanderkamp, "Migration Flows, Their Determinants and the Effects of Return Migration."
[145] Vanderkamp, "Migration Flows, Their Determinants and the Effects of Return Migration."

Populism and Xenophobic Rhetoric

Next, to understand to what extent anti-immigrant sentiment exists in Poland, it is important to look at the evolution of the populist movement in the state. Populism is a political movement that makes an appeal to the collective. It creates a specific ideal of "us" within a country, which can easily be mobilized to stir up and feed off of anti-immigrant sentiment. Right-wing populist President Lech Kaczyński entered office in 2005 alongside a parliament filled with members of the populist Law and Justice party (PiS). Kaczyński won the presidency with the least amount of votes ever recorded for a victorious presidential candidate in Poland, with only a quarter of the popular vote.[146] During his inauguration, Kaczyński said that Poland needed to be "rebuilt and purified," and pledged to rid the country of corruption.[147] However, a few months into his term, Kaczyński appointed his twin brother, the head of the PiS, as Prime Minister, and the two then joined forces with two notoriously anti-Semitic, right wing parties: the League of Polish Families, and the Self Defense of the Republic of Poland.[148] These three parties are the most notoriously populist in Poland, though the PiS is the largest of the three and uses populism as a means of political communication rather than an ideological platform.[149] The brothers then increased their political power, hiring friends to cabinet positions, and giving themselves control of the national broadcasting system. By the end of his presidency, which was cut short after Kaczyński was killed in a plane crash, he had merely a 20% support rate.[150] Kaczyński's presidency shows the origins of populism in Poland, not as an outlet for xenophobia, but as a platform for rebuilding and the eradication of corruption, although his presidency did the opposite of these tenets.

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[146] Hauser, "Polish President Lech Kaczynski (1949–2010)—from Solidarity Advisor to Right-Wing Politician."
[147] Waszak, "New President Says Poland Must Be 'Rebuilt and Purified.'"
[148]OECD, International Migration Outlook 2006.
[149] Ociepka, "Populism and National Identity."
[150]Hauser, "Polish President Lech Kaczynski (1949–2010)—from Solidarity Advisor to Right-Wing Politician."

Despite the ever-growing presence of populism in Poland in the early 2000s, campaigns were not filled with anti-immigrant rhetoric, considering that Poland did not have any politically significant minority populations at the time.[151] Instead, populist campaigns in 2003 focused on persuading Poles to vote against EU accession, warning that Poland would lose its sovereignty as a member. In need of an enemy, the campaigns specifically targeted the Netherlands, calling the state morally corrupt, and France, arguing that the EU only cared for its existing members and would not prioritize new members.[152] These campaigns were commonly targeted to young voters via the internet, which helps explain the lingering presence of populism in Poland even today.

After Kaczyński's death in 2010, the opposition Civic Platform party (PO) initiated a successful campaign of fear against the PiS, portraying it as a right-wing radical populist party.[153] By 2015, however, the effects of this campaign had worn off, as young voters did not remember a time when the PiS was in power. Further, over this five-year period, the PO received backlash from voters over its lack of effectiveness, and suffered widely-covered internal leadership divisions.[154] So, when Poland held its 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections in the same year (May and October, respectively), it resulted in the complete governmental control of the right-wing PiS party.[155] The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe played an important role in the success of the PiS in the parliamentary election. The incumbent PO party's decision to accept 2,000 refugees had detrimental effects on the public's support for the party, and the PiS took advantage of this, speaking out against immigration from Muslim countries and playing on young people's fears.[156] The differences in the PiS platform during the 2005 and 2015 elections show that even

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[151] Ociepka, "Populism and National Identity."
[152] Ociepka, "Populism and National Identity."
[153] Stepinska et al., *Populist Political Communication in Poland.*
[154] Stepinska et al., *Populist Political Communication in Poland.*
[155] Stepinska et al., *Populist Political Communication in Poland.*
[156] Stepinska et al., *Populist Political Communication in Poland.*

amongst populist circles, migration was not a significant concern in Poland until the 2015 refugee crisis.

Therefore, 2015 served as the turning point in the restrictive nature of Poland's immigration rhetoric. A common theme in politicians' rhetoric concerning refugees in 2015 was rebranding them as economic immigrants looking to come to Poland for better opportunities, rather than refugees fleeing from war. This reification of Middle Eastern refugees as economic immigrants was given a negative connotation, saying that these 'immigrants' were going to overrun Poland and take advantage of social programs. The irony here is that we saw in Chapter 2 how Poland has liberalized its migration policy specifically with the goal of attracting labor migrants. This disconnect signals the underlying xenophobia and discrimination present in Polish migration politics, which is not evident in its policy. Further, PiS politicians exhibited incredible amounts of islamophobia in their rhetoric, with one politician saying, "there will be terrorists among refugees. [Furthermore,] 90 percent of immigrants do not want to work and are aggressive. Your naïveté with respect to Islamic State is reminiscent of the naïveté of people who in 1938–39 believed that Hitler was good."[157] Conversely, Poland accepted an influx of Ukrainian refugees that same year due to fighting in the Donbas. These refugees were considered as such in politicians' rhetoric, and Poland spoke on the world stage on behalf of the Ukrainian refugees.[158]

This stark difference in the receiving of these two refugee populations and the political discourse surrounding them exemplifies the disconnect that we see between migration policy and practice in Poland. First, we understand that the evolution and rise of the right-wing populist PiS came as a result of growing anti-immigrant fears during the 2015 refugee crisis. We see how

[157] Fańczak, "Why Do Poles Oppose Immigrants?", brackets added in original.
[158] Fańczak, "Why Do Poles Oppose Immigrants?"

politicians' rhetoric painted Muslim refugees as economic migrants who will pose a burden on Poland's economy, despite clear trends of liberalization in the state's labor migration policy since 2004. At the same time, these politicians spoke about Ukrainian refugees as true refugees who needed support and sympathy from the European community. This indicates clearly that while Poland's migration policy may not be restrictive or discriminatory, politicians' rhetoric still creates a hostile and unappealing environment for non-European migrants. I argue that this type of rhetoric, coupled with the fact that Poland has not historically been an immigration destination and therefore does not have established non-European migrant communities, aside from its Vietnamese community, explains the immense inequalities in the distribution of work permits by region (fig. 3).

Conclusion

Labor migration is incredibly important for the success of capitalist economies, because it supplies employers with vulnerable, eager employees, ready to do difficult work at low wages.[159] In this chapter, I found that the work permit data from 2010-2020 does not necessarily reflect the trends (or rather, lack thereof) of the restrictiveness of Poland's migration policy, as found in the previous chapter. Instead, I argued that the trend of work permits in Poland follows a more reactionary pattern, in line with the findings of political scientist Philipp Lutz in his exploration into the nuances of the gap hypothesis.[160] In this, I found two main factors at play impacting both the trends of permits granted and to which countries of origin they were granted. First, that because Poland has historically not been a destination for migrants, its lack of established communities and cultural diversity make it an unappealing destination for non-European migrants. Second, the evolution of the right-wing populist PiS party and its utilization of an

[159] Piore, *Birds of Passage.*
[160] Lutz, "Reassessing the Gap-Hypothesis."

increase in anti-immigrant sentiment amongst citizens, culminating in anti-immigrant rhetoric surrounding the 2015 refugee crisis and the demonization of economic migrants during this time, make Poland an even more unappealing destination for non-European migrants.

An interesting finding in my analysis is the difference in rhetoric surrounding Muslim refugees versus Ukrainian refugees in 2015. Further, the work permit data analyzed shows that Ukrainian migrants consistently receive the highest number of work permits each year, more so than any other country. Why is this the case? What motivation or reasoning do Ukrainians have to migrate to Poland, and why is Poland so quick to defend and accept Ukrainians? These important questions will be explored in the following chapter.

Chapter 4: Why Ukraine?

A Look Into the Relationship between Poland and Ukraine

As found in the previous chapter, Ukrainian migrants make up the largest labor migrant population in Poland. This chapter seeks to answer the question, why Ukraine? It looks to better understand how the multifaceted relationship between Poland and Ukraine facilitates high levels of migration between the two countries, and what motivations each state may have for maintaining close ties with the other. Migration is a good way for countries to build and maintain relationships. Scholars theorize that international migration is one way for states to facilitate relationships with each other, and that their relationships are impacted by the nature of this migration.[161] I hypothesize that there are several interacting factors that motivate these states to maintain close ties with each other: their geographical proximity and cultural similarities, Poland's security goals, and both states' economic goals. In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the significance of each of these factors, ultimately finding mixed support for my hypothesis.

Geographical Proximity, Shared Values, and Public Opinion

As discussed in the previous chapter, Poland has a history of xenophobia in its politics and among its population. Xenophobia is defined as the fear of foreigners. The biggest factors contributing to xenophobic attitudes from an in-group are perceived differences of religion, race, and ethnicity.[162] The idea of the Other is a way for members of a community to separate themselves from minority groups, often through generalizing stereotypes.[163] The creation of the Other brings with it a defined in-group and out-group, in this case Poles and migrants,

[161] Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations."
[162] Kulik, "Xenophobia."
[163] Staszak, "Other/Otherness."

respectively. Theories of out-group acceptance deal with how migrant groups are perceived in their destination countries. Notably, the contact hypothesis says that the more two groups interact with each other, the more comfortable they will become with each other, and the more accepting the in-group will be of the out-group.[164] Significant to this case study, one study employing the contact hypothesis found that contact opportunities between ethnically similar in and out groups resulted in especially positive feelings toward the out-group.[165] Amid the growing populist movement in Poland in the past decade, which has been accompanied by an increase in xenophobic sentiment, the severity of perceived differences are crucial in determining whether a minority group will be accepted in Poland.

Poland and Ukraine's geographical proximity has resulted in the states having a shared history in many aspects, which most notably to this research, resulted in a sizable Ukrainian minority population in Poland. Largely due to this, as supported by the contact hypothesis, I argue that now Ukrainian migrants are an accepted out-group population in Poland. Additionally, as I will discuss shortly, because Ukrainians have in common with Poles the most polarizing aspects of identity which contribute to xenophobic attitudes, these similarities have helped Ukrainians remain an 'acceptable' out-group amidst the rise of populist movements in Poland since 2015. Geographical proximity is additionally important in migrants' decision on where to migrate, because given the financial risks associated with migration, research shows that migrants are more likely to choose a geographically proximate destination due to things like lesser travel costs and an easier ability to make trips home.[166]

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[164] Steele and Abdelaaty, "Ethnic Diversity and Attitudes towards Refugees."
[165] Havekes, Uunk, and Gijsberts, "Explaining Ethnic Outgroup Feelings from a Multigroup Perspective," (2011).
[166] Vanderkamp, "Migration Flows, Their Determinants and the Effects of Return Migration."

Proximity, similarities, and interaction

Geographical proximity plays an important role in Ukrainian migration to Poland. From 2005-2008, those originating from Western Ukraine made up over 75% of Ukrainian migration to Poland, and from 2010-2012, over 90% came from this region.[167] About one-third of Ukrainians move to the South and Eastern regions of Poland, in part because of its proximity to the Ukrainian border, and in part because of the presence of an established Ukrainian minority in these areas.[168] This trend supports the migration theory discussed in the previous chapter, which says that economic migrants are more likely to migrate to nearby countries because the cost of migrating is lower compared to traveling further distances, and it is easier to return home to visit family.[169]

Another factor which influences the regional pattern of migration from Ukraine into Poland are the cultural differences within different regions of each state. Western Ukraine is ethnically homogenous, and the most prominent language there is Ukrainian, while Eastern Ukraine is heavily populated by ethnic Russians, and Russian is the more prevalent language in the East.[170] It is also important to note that studies have shown that there is a high level of understanding between speakers of Polish and Ukrainian language, meaning that they can communicate on a basic level without speaking each other's language.[171] This means that Ukrainian migrants in Poland who do not speak Polish are still able to communicate with locals.

Additionally, the dominant religion in the West is Greek Catholicism, while in the East, the majority of people are Orthodox Christians.[172] This is significant, because Catholicism is the

[167] Brunarska et al., "Ukrainian Migration to Poland."
[168] Brunarska et al., "Ukrainian Migration to Poland."
[169] Vanderkamp, "Migration Flows, Their Determinants and the Effects of Return Migration."
[170] Lewicka, "Regional Differentiation of Identity: A Comparison of Poland and Ukraine."
[171] Rehbein and Romaniuk, "How to Check Understanding across Languages. An Introduction into the *Pragmatic Index of Language Distance (PILaD)* Usable to Measure Mutual Understanding in Receptive Multilingualism, Illustrated by Conversations in Russian, Ukrainian and Polish."
[172] Lewicka, "Regional Differentiation of Identity: A Comparison of Poland and Ukraine."

most prominent religion in Poland, and Orthodoxy is historically the most prominent religion in Russia. Finally, those living in the Western region of Ukraine tend to be slightly more pro-West than those in the East, with 61% of Western Ukrainians and 44% of Eastern Ukrainians supporting EU accession in 2005.[173]

Due to the contact hypothesis, I argue that geographical, religious, linguistic, and ethnic proximity is a major contributing factor to why Ukrainians are not considered the Other in Poland. Geographical proximity is the foundational factor in facilitating migration from Ukraine to Poland for the reasons outlined above: the relative ease of migration and an established Ukrainian minority population in Poland. As I argued in the previous chapter, this established Ukrainian minority population in Poland then encourages migration flows from Ukraine to Poland due to the effects of familial and social connections on migration flows. Then, as supported by the contact hypothesis, I argue that Ukrainian migration to Poland has helped the two countries to warm up to each other and have a better relationship, further encouraging migration, and increasing Pole's positive feelings towards Ukrainians. My argument is supported by that of area scholar Andrzej Szeptycki, who said that, "In the last three decades, each society's image of the other has undergone a fundamental evolution, which has mainly been the result of their getting to know each other better." [174] Poland's political interests have also played a role in encouraging Poles to take interest in Ukrainian affairs and have sympathy towards Ukrainians, as a majority of Poles followed Ukraine's 2004 and 2013/14 revolutions closely.[175] Further, opinion polls show that Poles' expressed sympathy for Ukrainians has increased from 9% in 1994 to 24% in 2018.[176] In addition to increased sympathetic sentiment, Poles' opinion of

[173] Lewicka, "Regional Differentiation of Identity: A Comparison of Poland and Ukraine."
[174] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine*.
[175] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine*.
[176] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine*.

Ukrainian migrants have improved over time. In 2000, 34% of Poles said that they would be alright with a Ukrainian "obtaining citizenship in your country," and in 2013, that number jumped to 90%.[177]

Social Values as Factors of Acceptance

Poles and Ukrainians are both ethnically Slavic (Western and Eastern Slavs, respectively),[178] and according to public opinion surveys, Poles tend to regard Ukraine as a Slavic country similar to their own.[179] This is an important factor indicating the acceptance of an out-group, since we know that perceived racial and ethnic differences are major aspects contributing to xenophobia. While each country has its own unique cultural practices and language, they share important similarities, which help influence Poles' positive opinion of Ukrainians. This is not to discount the fact that ethnic conflicts have plagued European history for centuries, or to say that because Poles and Ukrainians are both Slavic, they have no perceived differences. This is simply to highlight that the differences between Poles and migrants from Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria, are more easily perceived than the differences between Poles and Ukrainians, and that citizens from both countries have important values in common.

As previously mentioned, the dominant religion in Western Ukraine is Greek Catholicism, and Catholicism is also the dominant religion in Poland. We also know that from 2010-2012, over 90% of Ukrainian migrants to Poland originated in Western Ukraine, so we can assume that the majority of Ukrainian migrants to Poland are of Catholic faith. Further, a comparative study of cultural values in Poland and Ukraine found that members of both

[177] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine*.
[178] Kamusella, "Migration or Immigration?"
[179] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine*.

countries have "generally similar value systems." [180] The study found that both countries have similar perceived levels of social (in)equalities (on a scale from 0-100, Polish and Ukrainian responses marked 56 and 41, respectively), though in Poland, education seemed to play a more significant role in determining social movement and advantages. Respondents from both countries had almost identical attitudes toward ambiguity and the future (57 and 59, respectively), which the authors say indicates that both peoples, "prefer short-term agreements instead of strategic plans and relationships." [181] Both populations of respondents also show near-identical levels of collectivism, valuing community and the interests of others (71 and 73, respectively). The authors note that this trait is a reflection of Poland and Ukraine's pasts as Soviet-influenced states, with Ukraine being a former Soviet state, and Poland a member of the Eastern Bloc. Respondents from both countries also hold near identical conceptions of which gender takes on the dominant social role in society, overall leaning slightly more feminine than masculine (40 and 39 respectively, with 0 representing femininity). However, in both societies, men are seen as more competent in STEM fields, and are preferred for jobs and promotions. This role of women in society is also a reflection of Ukraine's Soviet past and Poland's past as a part of the Eastern Bloc, as women were highly revered members of Soviet society. Lastly, Poles and Ukrainians have similar communication patterns, scoring 49 and 56 in "contextuality in communication," respectively.[182] The results of this study reflect the influence of the former USSR on Poland as a member of the Eastern Bloc and Ukraine as a member of the Union, and illustrate how members of both countries hold many important shared values. These shared values can help create a mutual understanding amongst Poles and Ukrainians, aiding in

[180] Prokopenko and Kryvoruchko, "Podobieństwa i Różnice Kulturowe Jako Podstawa Rozwoju Wzajemnie Korzystnych Stosunków Między Polską a Ukrainą," 12.
[181] Prokopenko and Kryvoruchko, "Podobieństwa i Różnice Kulturowe Jako Podstawa Rozwoju Wzajemnie Korzystnych Stosunków Między Polską a Ukrainą," 12.
[182] Prokopenko and Kryvoruchko, "Podobieństwa i Różnice Kulturowe Jako Podstawa Rozwoju Wzajemnie Korzystnych Stosunków Między Polską a Ukrainą," 14.

Ukrainian migrants' integration into Polish society, while simultaneously aiding Polish acceptance and positive public opinion toward Ukrainians.[183]

Shared and Changing Border

Geographical proximity not only aids migration flows, but historically has led to large Ukrainian minority populations in Poland and vice versa due to changing borderlines.[184] Both states have historically experienced much turmoil at the hands of the Soviets and the Third Reich. During the first few decades of the 20th century, the Polish-Ukrainian border was redrawn several times, resulting in a painful and shared history in their borderlands, and notably, a sizable Ukrainian minority in Poland. In the 1920s, after fighting against the Bolsheviks, Poland's border expanded East, absorbing Western Ukrainian territories such as East Galacia and Volhynia, and a Ukrainian population of about 5 million.[185] This land would later be the site of the Volhynia Massacre (or Tragedy, depending on whose perspective you take), an attempt by the nationalist Ukrainian Partisan Army under Stepan Bandera to wipe all ethnic Poles out of the region. The Massacre and the telling of its history is still one of the biggest areas of contention impacting the Polish-Ukrainian relationship today.[186] While both Poland and Ukraine have passed memory laws as recently as 2018 regarding the event of the massacre, animosity surrounding this event is mostly held by far-right Poles, though Ukrainian migrants in Poland have reported feeling discriminated against as a result of stereotypes existing due to these memory conflicts.[187] After

[183] Bailey, Knobe, and Newman, "Value-Based Essentialism.", Tuomela, "Group Beliefs.", Sortheix and Lönnqvist, "Person‐Group Value Congruence and Subjective Well‐Being in Students from Argentina, Bulgaria and Finland."
[184] Snyder, *Bloodlands.*
[185] Snyder, *Bloodlands.*
[186] Belavusau, Gliszczynska-Grabias, and Mälksoo, "Memory Laws and Memory Wars in Poland, Russia and Ukraine."; Rysicz-Szafraniec, "Ukrainian 'Working through the Past' in the Context of the Polish–Ukrainian Dialogue on Volhynia-43. Asymmetry of Memory."; Adamski, "Kyiv's "Volhynian Negationism: Reflections on the 2016 Polish–Ukrainian Memory Conflict."; Szeptycki, "Poland versus Russia."
[187] Rysicz-Szafraniec, "Ukrainian 'Working through the Past' in the Context of the Polish–Ukrainian Dialogue on Volhynia-43. Asymmetry of Memory."; Koposov, "Populism and Memory."; Golovashina, "Battles for Bandera."

WWII, the Polish-Ukrainian border was moved westward, so that this land once again belonged to Ukraine.[188] The changing of the border and turmoil of WWII left a Ukrainian minority population of about 200,000 in Poland. Modern Ukrainian migration flows into Poland began after the fall of the Soviet Union, and today Ukrainians make up the largest minority group in Poland.[189]

As previously stated, the relationship between Poles and Ukrainians is not flawless. One important factor contributing to the discrimination of Ukrainians in Poland are the lingering wounds of the Volhynia Massacre. Poland and Ukraine have both passed memory laws regarding the Massacre, and historians from each country write differing versions of the event's history in an effort to make their own country the victim.[190] Ethnic stereotypes are commonly deployed in construed accounts of the Volhynia Massacre.[191] Polish nationalist historians generally look to blame Ukraine for the tragedies of the time period, accusing them of cooperating with the Nazis against the Poles, playing an active role in the extermination of the Jews, and committing genocide/ethnic cleansing.[192] Ukrainian nationalist historians often look to establish a "symmetry of guilt" when discussing the events at Volhynia.[193]

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[188] Rysicz-Szafraniec, "Ukrainian 'Working through the Past' in the Context of the Polish–Ukrainian Dialogue on Volhynia-43. Asymmetry of Memory."; Portnov, "Clash of Victimhoods: The Volhynia Massacre in Polish and Ukrainian Memory."

[189] Brunarska et al., "Ukrainian Migration to Poland."

[190] Belavusau, Gliszczynska-Grabias, and Mälksoo, "Memory Laws and Memory Wars in Poland, Russia and Ukraine."; Rysicz-Szafraniec, "Ukrainian 'Working through the Past' in the Context of the Polish–Ukrainian Dialogue on Volhynia-43. Asymmetry of Memory."; Adamski, "Kyiv's "Volhynian Negationism: Reflections on the 2016 Polish–Ukrainian Memory Conflict.".

[191] Rysicz-Szafraniec, "Ukrainian 'Working through the Past' in the Context of the Polish–Ukrainian Dialogue on Volhynia-43. Asymmetry of Memory.".

[192] Copsey, "Remembrance of Things Past."

[193] Adamski, "Kyiv's "Volhynian Negationism: Reflections on the 2016 Polish–Ukrainian Memory Conflict."; Rysicz-Szafraniec, "Ukrainian 'Working through the Past' in the Context of the Polish–Ukrainian Dialogue on Volhynia-43. Asymmetry of Memory.".

One study[194], which looked at the "role of the Volhynian Massacres in the building of narratives about Ukrainians on the Polish internet," found shocking displays of xenophobia in the Polish dialogue surrounding Ukrainians and Volhynia. It is important to note, though, that it is mostly far-right nationalists perpetuating these ideas.[195] The study[196], which mainly looked at Tweets posted after the release of the 2016 Polish film Wołyń (Volhynia, titled Hatred in its English release), found this topic to be the most important and "emotionally provocative" discussion about Ukrainians in Polish media. Many Tweets highlighted the inhumanity and violence of Ukrainians, calling them things like "damn scumbags" and "animal[s]." Some Tweets even used the massacre as a call to action to cease support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian occupation. Users expressed that Polish politicians helping Ukraine to democratize were "robbing the viciously murdered Poles of dignity," and warn fellow Poles who may be friendly or sympathetic towards Ukraine, as they believe that Ukrainians are stupid, manipulative traitors. This rhetoric reflects the severity of the populist movement in Poland. While this kind of rhetoric does not reflect all Poles' opinions toward Ukrainians, this conflict is an important issue to touch on because it is widely understood as the most significant point of contention in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship, and therefore does impact Poles' perception of Ukrainians.

A separate study looked at how these conflicting narratives following the film's release affect the integration of Ukrainian migrants in Poland. Researchers found that many Ukrainian migrants will minimize or deny the existence of a rivalry between narratives if confronted with an issue related to the Volhynia massacre, such as discrimination or stereotyping.[197] The majority of the migrants interviewed felt that since the massacre happened a long time ago, there is no use

[194] Krakowska, "The Role of the Volhynian Massacres in the Building of Narratives about Ukrainians on the Polish Internet."
[195] Zhurzhenko, "Memory Wars and Reconciliation in the Ukrainian–Polish Borderlands."
[196] Krakowska, "The Role of the Volhynian Massacres in the Building of Narratives about Ukrainians on the Polish Internet."
[197] Golovashina, "Battles for Bandera."

in lingering on the past. Many also noted the uncertainty of the past due to multiple different historical accounts of the massacre, as historians have observed. Additionally, many respondents noted that they were more interested in finding work and establishing a life in Poland than they were in memory wars. The author argues that this downplaying of a historical rivalry is an attempt by migrants to avoid conflicts, and to avoid being seen as the "enemy." [198] Instead, many Ukrainian migrants try to play up aspects that make them appear Polish, such as adopting Polish mannerisms, emphasizing "the 'Slavic soul', [and] shared aspirations for national self-determination."[199] Despite these efforts, Poles have still been known to discriminate against Ukrainians for this historical conflict, commonly calling Ukrainian migrants "Banderites," after Stepan Bandera. This shows how, while I argue that Ukrainian migrants may be the "preferred" migrant group in Poland, they are still met with discrimination at the hands of historical conflict.

Security

Poland considers Ukraine to be a key ally in the region due to ethnocultural similarities, its size, and perhaps most importantly, its geographical location between Poland and Russia.[200] Andrzej Szeptycki argues that only Ukraine could play this role, since Lithuania is too small, and Belarus is too dependent on Russia.[201] Ukraine views Poland differently, though; not so much as a strategic security ally, but rather as a bridge to the West.[202] Poland has important security incentives for allyship with and encouraging the Westernization of Ukraine. Having Ukraine as a secure friend, ally, and member of Western international organizations such as NATO and the EU provides geopolitical security for Poland specifically, perhaps more so than other more Western

[198] Golovashina, "Battles for Bandera." 326.
[199] Golovashina, "Battles for Bandera."
[200] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine*.
[201] Szeptycki, "Poland versus Russia."
[202] Szeptycki, "Poland versus Russia."

EU states. Poland is located on the Eastern border of EU territory. On one hand, this puts a stronger than average pressure on them to keep their exterior (Eastern) borders secure. On the other hand, as previously mentioned, Poland has a rich and devastating relationship with Soviet dominance, and the prospect of Ukraine becoming a second Belarus - a Russian satellite state on the border of EU territory, and would increase Poland's security fears - means that they would once again be in direct geographical contact with Russian control and aggression. For these reasons, Poland's Westernization efforts in Ukraine are fueled by a fear of Russian aggression.[203] Poland's attitude towards Russia can best be summed up in this 2008 quote from former president Lech Kaczyński, "we also realize all too well that what has befallen Georgia today may befall Ukraine tomorrow, the Baltic States a day after, and then perhaps also my own country: Poland." [204] It is therefore in Poland's best interest to maintain a close relationship with Ukraine, and to make every effort to encourage Ukrainian Westernization.

Following Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea, Poland did not send its ally any weapons for fear of Russian retribution, but instead supported the Ukrainian army in other ways. They advocated for Ukraine on the world stage when the war broke out, cut off their relationship with Russia at the highest level, partnered with Germany and France to try to find a resolution to the conflict, pushed strongly for EU sanctions against Russia, and were vocal about their fears regarding Russian aggression in the region.[205] They became involved in training the Ukrainian army, and played a key role in NATO's Defence Education Enhancement Programme in Ukraine, which has aimed to align the state's army to NATO standards since 2013.[206] Additionally, in 2015, Poland, the UK, US, Canada, and Lithuania formed the Multinational Joint Commission

[203] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine.*
[204] President.pl, "President of RP Sets off to Visit Georgia."
[205] Szeptycki, "Poland versus Russia."; Wynnyckyj, *Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War.*
[206] Szeptycki, "Poland versus Russia.".

on Defense Reform and Security Cooperation with Ukraine in order to help reorganize the command structures in the Ukrainian military. Among other countries, Poland sent non-lethal military equipment to Ukraine following the outbreak of the war. To further its Westernization efforts in Ukraine, Poland has tried to assist Ukraine with local government reform, which is still modeled after the Soviet-era. Additionally, the Polish Official Development Assistance contributes millions of dollars per year to Ukrainian development.[207]

Poland has been a longtime advocate of Ukrainian accession into the EU and NATO, though Russia has worked hard to prevent this. The rest of Europe does not share Poland's vision, though, and while Poland views Ukraine as a key ally and strategic partner, the EU has long treated it as a buffer state. However, since Russia's invasion of and subsequent war in Ukraine in 2022, scholars argue that Ukraine has become a border state, rather than a buffer.[208] It is therefore crucial now that the West supports Ukraine as much as possible without becoming directly involved. Otherwise, Russian victory and control over Ukraine would create another Russian-dependent country like Belarus.[209]

Despite its present geopolitical significance, the EU has never truly considered Ukraine to be a viable candidate for membership.[210] However, Poland has headed initiatives to bridge a relationship between Ukraine and the EU, including founding the Eastern Partnership (EaP) alongside Sweden in 2008 as an extension of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy to deepen the relationship between the EU and partner countries.[211] The goals of the EaP are to enhance "Democracy, proper governance and stability," "Economic integration and approach to the EU policy," "Energy security," and "People to people contacts" within participating states.[212]

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[207] Szeptycki, "Poland versus Russia.".
[208] Biscop, "Entering the Game of Geopolitics."
[209] Biscop, "Entering the Game of Geopolitics."
[210] Biscop, "Entering the Game of Geopolitics."
[211] EU External Action, "Eastern Partnership."
[212] Kostiuchenko and Akulenko, "The EaP Achievements in Ukraine and Georgia," 131.

However, a 2016 report notes that these initiatives did not make any substantial changes to Westernize Ukraine's legislation.[213]

Further, Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 following Euromaidan protests. The protests, also known as the Revolution of Dignity, occurred after former Ukrainian president Yanukovych refused to sign a portion of the Association Agreement with the EU, under pressure from Russia.[214] In reward, he received from Russia a 50% discount on Russian gas and a $15 billion loan to help prevent Ukraine from needing to turn to the IMF for economic aid.[215] The aftermath of Euromaidan led to Russia's initial occupation of Ukraine through its annexation of Crimea. During the initial protests of the revolution, Germany and Poland allowed Ukrainians to cross their borders using channels typically only allotted to EU citizens. This was widely reported in Ukrainian media, and was very well received among the Ukrainian population.[216]

Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001, NATO reevaluated its geopolitical security strategies, with the US leading. The US especially considered Eastern Europe to be a security vacuum, and prioritized security policy in the region, particularly in Westernizing Ukraine and Georgia.[217] Poland also pushed for Ukraine-NATO relations at this time, unsuccessfully proposing a Ukraine-NATO Council, but successfully implementing a Ukraine-NATO Action Plan in 2002. That same year, Ukraine declared its interest in joining the Alliance.[218] The Orange Revolution in Ukraine made Poland and NATO hopeful about the state's prospects for Westernization and NATO membership. Poland initiated efforts to persuade the Ukrainian public on the benefits of NATO membership, and in 2005, influenced NATO to begin seriously

[213] Kostiuchenko and Akulenko, "The EaP Achievements in Ukraine and Georgia."
[214] Szeptycki, "Poland versus Russia."
[215] D'Anieri, *Ukraine and Russia.*
[216] Wynnyckyj, *Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War.*
[217] Stepniewski, *Ukraine after Maidan.*
[218] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine.*

considering Ukrainian membership, however Viktor Yanukovych's electoral victory in 2006 cabinet elections derailed these efforts, as he repealed Ukraine's bid for membership.[219]

In recent years, in light of Russia's war against Ukraine, NATO membership is especially unviable for Ukraine, since NATO members have a responsibility to support each other militarily in the face of war. This responsibility is denoted under article 5 of NATO's founding treaty, saying that an attack against one member is considered an attack against all the members.[220] However, NATO still cooperates with and militarily supports Ukraine. For example, in November 2017, a NATO-Ukraine platform meant to combat hybrid threats, which encompass tactics of warfare such as disinformation, cyber warfare, and economic pressure, was introduced in Warsaw.[221]

So, then, we now understand why Poland prioritizes having a close relationship with Ukraine and how it has tried to bring Ukraine into Western organizations for security purposes, but what does this have to do with migration? Migration is one way for states to maintain relationships with each other, and positive migration relations can help influence a positive overall relationship between states.[222] Additionally, political scientist Christopher Rudolph argues that "threat perception lies at the core not only of alliance behavior, but of other elements of state grand strategy, including migration and border policies."[223] Under this line of thinking, since Poland perceives Russia as a threat and Ukrainian allyship as a way to provide themselves security from this threat, I argue that Ukrainian migration to Poland benefits Poland's security goals by strengthening the states' bilateral relationship. As we saw in Chapter 2, Poland has attempted to offset some of the negative effects of emigration that Ukraine may feel by, for

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[219] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine.*
[220] NATO, "Collective Defence and Article 5."
[221] Szeptycki, *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine.*; "Countering Hybrid Threats."
[222] Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations."
[223] Rudolph, "Security and the Political Economy of International Migration."

example, harmonizing the states' social security systems. This is one way that Poland has worked to ensure Ukrainian immigration flows and to maintain a strong relationship with Ukraine.

Economy

The third and final aspect of Poland and Ukraine's relationship that I argue drives high levels of migration from Ukraine to Poland are economic factors. It goes without saying that labor migration is an economically grounded phenomenon. Labor migrants move with the primary goal of finding better employment opportunities than they could in their home country, but how does this emigration benefit Ukraine, if a large number of its eligible workers are living and working in a different country?

As we saw in Chapter 2, attracting labor migrants is the driving goal of Polish migration policy. As has been previously discussed, Poland benefits from labor migration because its large emigrant population left gaps in its economy, which labor migrants then filled. Although the state has passed policies and initiated campaigns to re-attract Polish emigrants, these efforts have not been effective enough to bring back enough emigrants to support the economy, and therefore they have also implemented an increasingly liberal labor migration policy since 2004. This, coupled with the previous arguments from this chapter, indicate that while Poland's economy might not specially benefit from Ukrainian migration specifically, their economy does benefit from labor migration, and Ukrainian migrants are the 'preferred' labor migrant in Poland.

While Ukrainians have consistently made up the largest migrant population in Poland during the range of this case study, Poland was not the largest recipient of Ukrainian migration until recently. Before Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, it was the most popular destination for Ukrainian migrants, in 2012 receiving 43% of all Ukrainian labor migrants. After conflicts in

Ukraine began, however, Poland became the most popular destination country, and in 2017 received 39% of all Ukrainian labor migrants. An EU study attributes this change, in addition to the conflict, to "the dynamic growth of the Polish economy and the high number of job vacancies, but also to visa liberalization (since 2017) and legislative changes facilitating the employment of Ukrainians." [224] This means that through changes in Polish migration policy and the impact of remittances, Ukrainian labor migration to Poland has played an increasingly central role in bolstering the Ukrainian economy. Poland is an attractive destination for Ukrainian labor migrants not only because it is right next door, but because Ukrainian labor migrants have an opportunity to make higher wages abroad than they do at home.[225]

Remittances are the money that labor migrants make while working abroad and send back home. Migrants often send this money to their families, but official definitions of remittances are broad in order to reflect the many channels and motives which migrants have for sending remittances.[226] Research shows that remittances are a more stable form of economic aid which can be absorbed into the economy more effectively than official aid revenues, since they do not have to go through administrative channels.[227] In Ukraine, remittances far surpass money entering the country through foreign investment or official development aid.[228] According to the World Bank, Ukraine is the largest recipient of remittances of any European or Central Asian country.[229] Through official channels, World Bank statistics show that total remittances into Ukraine have increased from about $6 million in 1996 to $6.161 billion in 2016, peaking at $9.667 billion in 2013.[230] It is important to emphasize that these statistics only reflect official

[224] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy," 11.
[225] Kupets, "Economic Aspects of Ukrainian Migration to EU Countries."
[226] Koshulko, "Personal Remittances Of Labor Migrants To Ukraine."
[227] Strielkowski, Šperková, and Jacek, "Migration and Remittances Nexus: Economic Implications and Analysis."
[228] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[229] Ong, "Remittances to Reach $630 Billion in 2022 with Record Flows into Ukraine."
[230] Koshulko, "Personal Remittances Of Labor Migrants To Ukraine."

remittances sent via banks. One study notes that it is very common for Ukrainian migrants to send remittances home through unofficial channels, such as physically bringing cash across the border or sending it with friends or family, because this method avoids bank fees for money transfer.[231]

According to the National Bank of Ukraine, in 2018, 51% of remittances came through formal channels, and 49% through informal channels.[232] Since it is easiest to transfer remittances through informal channels across short distances, it is estimated that up to 92-94% of remittances from migrants in Poland are transferred through informal channels.[233] This means that the magnitude of significance that Ukrainian remittances from Poland have on Ukrainian citizens and the Ukrainian economy are almost undoubtedly under-emphasized and under-reported in official statistics. Nonetheless, according to a 2020 EU study, the largest amount of remittances to Ukraine have been sent from Poland since 2016, when they amassed 33% of total remittances.[234]

Remittances not only help Ukrainian citizens by providing financial support, but they also help bolster the Ukrainian economy. Official remittances have made up an increasingly significant amount of Ukraine's GDP, growing from 3.7% in 2007 to 8.5% in 2018.[235] Economists have found a direct link between remittance inflows and GDP growth in Ukraine.[236] Not only must Ukrainians pay taxes on these official streams of extra income, but this money is then put into the Ukrainian economy in the form of things like spending on education, property, and starting businesses.[237] As previously mentioned, remittances into Ukraine far surpass foreign

[231] Koshulko, "Personal Remittances Of Labor Migrants To Ukraine."
[232] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[233] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[234] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[235] Koshulko, "Personal Remittances Of Labor Migrants To Ukraine."; Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[236] Lastovetska, "Mechanisms of Remittances Influence on the Economy of Ukraine."
[237] Koshulko, "Personal Remittances Of Labor Migrants To Ukraine."

direct investment, official development aid, and portfolio investments. Additionally, remittances are more stable than these other inflows. The Ukrainian economy has in the past suffered a trade deficit, as imports far exceeded exports, and remittances were the most important source of revenue in counteracting this deficit.[238]

There are, however, some significant negative impacts of emigration which hurt the Ukrainian economy. Economists have not found evidence that remittances in Ukraine cause inflation, but have found that remittances in Ukraine cause a "Dutch disease" effect, which appreciates the Ukrainian national currency and can reduce the price competitiveness of the country's exports.[239] Similar to issues which Poland experienced in the early 2000s, Ukraine most prominently suffers a lack of competitiveness in its economy due to large waves of emigration. Second sector industries such as construction, an industry in which 40% of Ukrainian labor migrants work, suffer lack of manpower, and this lack is expected to increase in the coming years.[240] Unlike Poland around 2004, Ukraine does not seem to experience a decrease in productivity due to brain drain. Instead, many Ukrainian migrant workers report working in jobs which do not utilize their qualifications, or do not require any qualifications at all.[241]
In 2020, there were estimated to be between 2.2-2.7 million Ukrainian labor migrants working abroad, accounting for 13-16% of total employment in Ukraine. Notably, though, only 1.3-1.6 million of these migrants were employed in Ukraine prior to migrating, meaning that although a significant portion of the state's potential workforce has migrated, only 8-10% have actually left the workforce for better opportunities abroad.[242] In a 2017 survey, 70% of these types of workers reported migrating due to the low salary they received in Ukraine.[243] This motive for emigration

[238] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[239] Lastovetska, "Mechanisms of Remittances Influence on the Economy of Ukraine."
[240] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[241] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[242] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."
[243] Pieńkowski, "The Impact of Labour Migration on the Ukrainian Economy."

is particularly prevalent in poorer regions of the country, which places these regions in a vicious "development trap," which can be described as, "lack of jobs – high emigration – lack of labour force – no investments, necessity to revive the region – fragile economic activity – lack of jobs." [244] These issues have been greatly accentuated since the Russian annexation of Crimea and fighting in Eastern Ukraine since 2014, and later the Russo-Ukrainian war since 2022.[245] Such conflicts have contributed to the, "limited … availability and financial stability of the system of social protection of employees," which led to workplace insecurity, including layoffs across job sectors, and has further dampened the state's ability to rebuild the economic infrastructure needed to re-attract Ukrainian workers.[246]

Additionally, Ukraine lacks a strategic and effective migration policy.[247] On May 30, 2011, the state passed the Concept of State Migration Policy. The return and reintegration of emigrants is at the forefront of concerns and goals in this policy. This includes an aim to slow emigration flows and reduce illegal labor emigration, to simplify procedures for emigrant return, and to create social and economic conditions in which to invest remittance flows.[248] A 2015 report notes, however, that Ukraine suffers an implementation gap with these goals, and has not created the infrastructure necessary to bring them to fruition. There is very little research available online in English regarding Ukraine's emigration policy, though they have passed several diaspora policies to encourage emigrants to maintain a relationship with the state and its culture.[249] This indicates that despite the positive effect of remittances on Ukraine's GDP, they would prefer to have this emigrant population at home to work to build up their own economy.

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[244] Bogdan and Shpenyuk, "Social and Economic Effects Of Labour Migration in Ukraine." 135.
[245] Ilyash, "Directions to Ensure the Implementation of the State Policy Reforms in the Social Sphere."
[246] Ilyash, "Directions to Ensure the Implementation of the State Policy Reforms in the Social Sphere," 95.
[247] Bogdan and Shpenyuk, "Social and Economic Effects Of Labour Migration in Ukraine."
[248] Bogdan and Shpenyuk, "Social and Economic Effects Of Labour Migration in Ukraine."
[249] Tolstokorova, "State Policy on Emigration and Diasporas in Ukraine."

Nevertheless, until Ukraine is able to effectively implement its emigration policy, its economy benefits from migrant remittances in the meantime. Therefore, while encouraging emigration is not a goal of Ukraine's migration policy, the state is still able to benefit from it in some way despite the fact that mass emigration negatively affects the state's ability to revitalize its economy.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been to illustrate why Ukraine is the largest sending country of immigration to Poland. I hypothesized that geographical proximity and cultural similarities, Poland's security interests, and both states' economic interests drive this migration, and found varying levels of support for my hypothesis. I found that geographical proximity and cultural similarities play a role in Ukrainian migrants' likelihood to migrate to Poland and Poles' likelihood to accept these migrants, largely due to the observed effects of the contact hypothesis and the influence of Soviet culture on the social values in both states. Further, while cultural similarities and shared values between the two countries do help establish a foundation for mutual understanding amongst Ukrainian migrants and Poles, memory wars resulting from the countries' shared history create an environment of prejudice against Ukrainian migrants in Poland, though this is mainly perpetuated by far-right Poles. In terms of security, I found that Poland has made efforts to support Ukrainian ascension to the EU and NATO since it was granted membership in both organizations. However, attempts to bring Ukraine in as a member to either organization have not been fruitful. Nonetheless, the state has worked to maintain a close relationship with Ukraine in light of its security interests, including efforts to help Ukraine democratize. Under Weiner's[250] theory, in this way it is important for Poland's security interests

[250] Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations."

that it have a positive relationship with Ukraine concerning migration, so that its democratization efforts may be more effective. Further, Poland has long feared Russian aggression, and especially supports Ukrainian Westernization because it would provide Poland with additional security against Russia. Finally, I found that while Ukraine's economy does greatly benefit from the remittances sent home by labor migrants abroad, its emigration policy shows that the state would like to re-attract these emigrants, but currently lacks the infrastructure to incentivize their return, which is only exacerbated by conflicts and war with Russia since 2014 and 2022, respectively. These factors help show the multifaceted nature of Poland's migration interests and provide a deeper reasoning beyond media accusations of discrimination in how these interests are manifested through the state's migration policy. This is not to dispute or refute the xenophobic rhetoric of Polish politicians, as discussed in Chapter 3, but instead to illustrate the many interacting factors which result in such a high amount of Ukrainian migration to Poland.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Throughout this thesis, I have looked at how Poland's migration policy has aligned with the reality of its migrant workforce population makeup. In this research, I have argued that while Poland does not have a necessarily discriminatory policy (Chapter 2), other facets of migration and the treatment of migrants, such as geographical proximity as a contributing factor in the decision to migrate and the implications of Poland's growing populist movement since 2015 have played an important role in influencing migration flows into the state (Chapter 2). Furthermore, upon finding that Ukrainians make up the largest labor migrant population in Poland, I explored additional factors as to why this is the case. Ultimately, I conclude from this research that there are a multitude of variables which impact migration flows into Poland, namely the state's economic needs as a capitalist state, its growing populist movement since 2015, the impacts of geographical proximity on migrant's destination decisions, the impact of network migration, and Poland's vested interest in maintaining a close relationship with and supporting the Westernization of Ukraine. In sum, I conclude that it is not Poland's migration policy, but a multitude of interacting variables which contribute to imbalances in the makeup of the labor migrant population in Poland, in part bolstered by xenophobic sentiments amongst Polish politicians and citizens.

There were several limitations which I experienced while conducting this research, which impacted its potential breadth and depth. To start, while the phenomenon of Ukrainian migration into Poland is a heavily studied topic, it is one which is commonly studied at Polish and Ukrainian institutions, therefore it is plausible that much more research exists in other languages which I was not able to access, due to my inability to read the Polish and Ukrainian languages and the fact that I conducted my literature searches in English. Additionally, I experienced a

variety of issues when attempting to access the data needed for the work permit analysis in Chapter 3. Although the data I was granted access to showed a clear pattern of a steady increase of work permits granted to foreigners over time, which supported my hypothesis and allowed me to conduct a thorough analysis, my research certainly would have benefitted from including data which spanned my entire time frame from 2004-2020, rather than only 2010-2020.

In a world where host country populations seem to be turning increasingly hostile against migrant groups, this research contributes to the conversation of why this hostility exists, and what factors impact differential treatment of different migrant groups. Although this thesis is not the first piece of research which looks at the phenomenon of Poland as a host country, it adds to the ever-growing literature through its attempt to comprehensively examine the Polish case. Poland and the Polish-Ukrainian case discussed here are unique for several reasons, though I argue that this case study and applied framework could be telling about other post-communist EU members, such as Hungary and Czechia, who joined the EU in 2004 alongside Poland. As fellow post-communist Central European states, Hungary and Czechia underwent similar capitalist transformations in the late 1980s, and therefore likely experienced similar economic setbacks and needs for migrant labor. Furthermore, both states have experienced rising populist movements in recent years, like Poland. Because so much of this research is informed by specifics of the Polish case, I do not attempt to argue that the findings from this research could be universally applicable or relevant, but I believe that as a case study of a post-communist, Central European EU member state, it could be regionally applicable.

Further work on this research would benefit from a deeper discussion and understanding of the nuances of Poland's economic system. As I demonstrated through my Chapter 2 analysis, the state's economic needs play a central role in motivating the liberalization of its migration

policy over time. An expanded version of this research could benefit from a chapter looking in-depth at the state's economy over time, and then by analyzing the interactions between policy changes, work permits by sector, and the state of Poland's economy over time. Additionally, an extension of this research would greatly benefit from a chapter looking at the lived experiences of migrant workers in Poland. There is a sizable amount of literature on the subject already, but due to time and space constraints, I was unable to include a discussion of this literature in my research. However, I believe it is of the utmost importance to include people's lived experiences in political science research, in order to highlight how these immense issues impact everyday people.

This thesis has examined the case of migration in Poland. Encompassed in this, it has analyzed the evolution of Poland's migration policy from 2003-2019, labor migrant flows into Poland from 2010-2020, and factors contributing to the sizable Ukrainian minority population in Poland. My aim in writing this thesis has been to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the case of migration to Poland, guided by the overall question, "does Poland have a preferential migration policy?, and what are the implications of these findings?" In all, I hope that this research contributes to the ever-growing body of literature on migration to Poland and the Polish-Ukrainian relationship, and to the literature on migration in post-communist states.

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