PITIRIM SOROKIN AND THE DUALITY OF MIND

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am also solely responsible for the synthesis of ideas attempted here and for my tentative theoretical formulations about the nature of social change. If what I have done here is found to have merit, I hope it may serve as a tribute to the wisdom of Pitirim A. Sorokin.

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INTRODUCTION

This essay is about social change. More specifically, it is about Pitirim Sorokin's theory of social change. Two presuppositions underlie everything that follows. First, Sorokin turns out to have been right more often than not in his estimates of what changes would be taking place in Western culture.[1] Which is to say, his ideas about how society works and how it changes appear to be useful. Second, if Sorokin's theoretical work was useful, it still is. Therefore, it is worthy of thought, attention, and creative modification.

What I am going to do here is add support for some of Sorokin's most important ideas even as I attempt a constructive modification of others. The end result, I believe, will be a contribution to our understanding of social change.

The Problem

Sorokin's theory of social change does not account for selection or choice by human beings. That, in my opinion, is the essence of what is problematic in his thought about change. It is the problem I intend to deal with in this essay. But, having designated what I feel to be an important difficulty in Sorokin's system of thought, let me hasten to state again that much of what Sorokin does say about man's

social world and how it changes is most valuable. As I have already noted, Sorokin's ideas appear to be useful because they have permitted a measure of accurate prediction. But Sorokin's system also meets the criterion of coherence. His ideas hang together -- at least within limits I mean to specify. Put another way, what I intend to add, although it is original as a synthesis of ideas, should add to the coherence of a system of thought that already exists. I do not expect, in other words, to supersede Sorokin.[2]

Let me begin then by sketching out a few key ideas from Sorokin's system which will give initial form to the problem as I have stated it.

The Sensate-Ideational Polarity. Sorokin is, perhaps, best known for his concept of fundamental cultural types. These types, or supersystems are characterized by basic premises about the nature of reality. For Sorokin, all aspects of a culture, to the extent that its parts are integrated, will tend to reflect these basic premises. Thus, music, architecture, law, ethics, philosophy, modalities of behavior, even conventions about the nature of space and time, will be related together around a basic world-view.

There are, for Sorokin, two ideal, limiting types or sets of premises, the Ideational and the Sensate.[3] The Sensate world-view emphasizes the realm of the senses. Truth in Sensate terms is understanding derived from the qualities and quantities of immediate objective experience.

For individuals, the emphasis on sensory understandings is reflected in an ethical orientation which is relativistic and individualistic. That is, people who live in a Sensate culture tend toward a Sensate mentality which incoporates the official world-view. Sensate ethics are seen as a concommitant of Sensate premises.

The opposite of Sensate culture is the Ideational. Where Sensate truth is that of the senses, Ideational truth derives from faith or revelation. The Ideational culture looks to supersensory values or ideals which are eternal and absolute, fostering and sanctioning an ethical orientation which presupposes such ideals.

In the West, Sensate culture may be associated with the current historical period dominated by science and the industrial division of labor. A Western Ideational period was, presumably, the period from the sixth to the twelth centuries A.D., a period dominated by institutional Christianity.[4] In general, in fact, it may be understood that world-views associated with the great religions are Ideational in nature. The negation of things sacred, on the other hand, may be associated with the Sensate.

Sorokin does not presume that there are no sub-types of supersystems between his ideal, limiting types. Nor, for that matter does Sorokin presume that <u>any</u> type of actual historical situation will ever be perfectly Sensate or Ideational or whatever. In the first place, Sorokin does

not imagine that any cultural situation involves the perfect integration of all of its parts. (Perfect integration, after all, would preclude change.) Secondly, Sorokin does propose intermediate types of supersystems, the most important of these being the Idealistic.

For Sorokin the nature of reality is, as he puts it, a "complex manifold in which we can distinguish at least three different aspects: sensory, rational, and supersensory."[5] This "integralist perspective" as Sorokin calls it, is actually rather like that which one would have if he were possessed of some variety of Idealistic mentality. For it is the Idealistic synthesis which pays homage to the truth of the senses <u>and</u> to the truth of faith through the arbitration of reason. Historically, Sorokin designates two Idealistic periods in the West -- both of them rather brief intermissions between Sensate or Ideational dominance. The first spanned the time of Plato and Aristotle, the classic period of Greek philosophy (fourth to fifth centuries, B.C.); the second had its apogee in the Gothic architecture and scholastic philosophy of the medieval thirteenth century. Thomas Aquinas' great theological treatises, justifying the truth of faith by way of an Aristotelean framework of logic, represents the Idealistic synthesis at its most potent.

Other types of supersystems may exist, but for now we may think of these, simply, as Mixed. The main super-

systems for Sorokin are the three mentioned in any case. But the main point is that the Sensate and the Ideational types are proposed as a polarity of limiting extremes. A culture may only approach and never quite attain a completely Sensate or Ideational ideal.

Principles of Change and the Components of Sociocultural Systems. If one studies the volumes of data and analysis which comprise the Social and Cultural Dynamics[6] he may come away convinced that "Sorokin is on to something there." But if that is so, how is one to understand the way that transitions occur between basic world-views or supersystems? Why, for example, in the West, has there been a shift from Ideational through Idealistic to Sensate -- in that order -- twice since about 500 B.C.?

Sorokin offers two principles of change to account for these transitions. One he calls the principle of immanent change, the other the principle of limits. The first is a postulate regarding the nature of structures or systems. (A matter which will be taken up in chapters 4 and 5 of this essay.) In most general terms, it presupposes (1) that sociocultural structures are dynamic entities. (This is so whether we are speaking of organisms, for example, or of information structures.) And (2) structures are in dialectic tension with their environment. Immanent change is change given by the nature of the structure itself, taking any structure as a set of possibilities with respect to

the environment of that structure.[8]

The principle of limits is a logical and causal principle that has two main implications: (1) If there are n possible types of cultural premises (or of other cultural components) which continue to exist through time as possibilities, then only one of these can occur at any time, followed by some other possibility of n which is other than the first type, and so on through the elements or possibilities of the set n. (As the number of elements in n decreases, the alternation of types becomes more nearly rhythmic.) (2) If a system or structure has some range of potential it has only that range and no other. Here, the term potentials may be thought of as the possible ways a structure may change with respect to its environment. A rabbit, for example, has just so many ways of acting and responding as a rabbit within critical limits set by the organism on the one hand, and the environment on the other. Similarly, for Sorokin, a system of meanings (which may also be thought of as an information structure if that is helpful to the reader) has only so many possibilities for influencing human action. What this amounts to with respect to an ethical norm like "Thou shalt not work on the Sabbath" is this: Given a cultural context, there are a finite number of meanings for this norm as it is applied to activity called work or to a span of time defined as the Sabbath. Logically, this is all the idea of limits can mean with re-

spect to a meaning system. Interpretive notions about what work consits of, or of how seriously one is to take the sacredness of the Sabbath bear on the concept of immanent change, not on the notion of limits.

Yet how is one to understand the operation of such principles? Since organic structures, such as human beings, and structures of information which involve meanings seem to have a different way of changing, how is one to apply the principle of immanent change and limits to social phenomena? The solutions to such questions are found in Sorokin's system of sociology, particularly in his concept of the _sociocultural system_, as we shall see.

Sorokin refers to the proper realm of sociology as the _superorganic_. Now although there are some parallels, the term is not used quite as Kroeber used it. Where Kroeber seems to postulate a sort of superpersonal entity, Sorokin simply emphasizes that social phenomena cannot be accounted for, say, by individuals' psychologies.[9] The superorganic for Sorokin is, simply, the realm of phenomena distinguishable from other, organic phenomena by the influence of the human mind and its products. In other words. ". . . the superorganic is found exclusively in the realm of interacting human beings . . . "[10]

The superorganic is three-tiered. It is comprised of (1) _cultural systems_, (2) of social action or behavior, and of (3) personality. _A sociocultural system is any superor-_

ganic entity constituted by all three of these components. Put another way, if one may observe human interaction, one is observing personalities (human agents, as Sorokin often refers to them), behaving in terms of shared meanings. Shared meanings are, in brief, cultural systems. Thus, when Sorokin speaks of sociocultural change he is speaking of change in systems comprised by people interacting because they share meanings. When he speaks of a supersystem, he is speaking of a great complex of cultural systems integrated around certain key ideas (also cultural systems) which have the capacity to relate many meanings into relatively coherent configurations. In effect, a supersystem is a set of basic premises about the world and its nature.

This concept of cultural systems may be bothersome to some readers. And, in any case, I will return to an elaboration of Sorokin's meaning of it in Chapter 2. In the meantime, to extend an explanation already suggested, consider that anything intelligible to human beings as information is also a cultural system. Recalling that these are my terms now and not Sorokin's, here is what I mean. For Sorokin a proposition like "2 + 2 = 4" or "That is a watermellon" are little cultural systems. Many millions of such systems are needed to express a body of law, say, or algebra, or a theology, or to constitute language itself. But one may extend the notion of little systems below the notion of a full proposition. Thus, the word "is" may stand alone and be un-

intelligible to one who hears it. On the other hand, at the moment that the hearer may associate the word "is" with other words a structure of information exists -- at least in the hearer's mind. In a more explicit example, the word "butterfly," if it is known to the hearer, carries its association with it, so to speak; it is an information structure <u>if it is meaningful</u> to the person who encounters the word. But consider a bit further. There are more general terms for seeing how information (as I have used the term) amounts to the same thing as cultural system. Thus, one can see that information involves symbols (something designates something else); symbols require objectification (Sorokin calls the medium by which meanings are objectified vehicles and symbols are symbols precisely because they convey meanings.[11]

But to proceed. We have observed so far that sociocultural systems may be integrated around particularly powerful [12] related ideas (premises, suppositions) called supersystems. (These last are information systems too, recall.) The term supersystem, then, refers to a relative integration not only of other lesser cultural systems, but also of the actual behavior of people which is patterned in entities called sociocultural systems. The most important changes in these entities occurs as they unfold their immanent potential, but causal limits constrain this immanent change at every point in time-space.

So, now that we have some of Sorokin's terms, here is the problem re-stated.

If sociocultural systems have three aspects -- cultural systems, people, and their behavior, then the two change principles must refer to all three of these aspects. But they do not. The principle of immanent change in systems of meaning is not separable from human action, of course, but as stated by Sorokin, it can only apply to the unfolding of meaning systems themselves and not to the action of people in either constituting, selecting, or extinguishing such systems. (In more formal terms, if a meaning system exists with _n_ possibilities, only a subset of _n_ will be selected in actual behavior. What principle of change accounts for the actualization of one subset rather than another?) The principle of limits as given by Sorokin applies to causal limits on meaning systems themselves, and not, explicitly, to limits or conditions set by the nature of human action itself. What is missing is a principle of choosing. This essay is designed to locate and make sense of that missing change principle.

Significance of the Problem

If it can be established that Sorokin's theory of change may be made more coherent by the addition of a third change principle, the usefulness of his social and historical analysis should be enhanced. Further, Sorokin's system, modified by the addition of a principle of choosing may per-

mit an increased degree of confidence in predicting social change. These are the main contributions this essay attempts to make and, as such, they constitute the primary significance of the problem.

Beyond that, however, it should also be pointed out that the many criticisms of Sorokin's thought have not included a clear proposal that there should be a principle of change appropriate to the level of personality. Schneider, in commenting on Sorokin's theory, points out the absence in his system of an adequate psychology. He suggests "that an effort to develop something on the order of a socio-psychological theory might have given Sorokin considerable help . . . [with the problems Schneider sees in Sorokin's work]"[13] But no such theory is proposed. Alexandre Vexliärd provides us with a fine review of Sorokin's psychological theories but does not suggest how these might be integrated with the change principles.[14] Merton and Barber, in one of the more comprehensive general criticisms of Sorokin, list seven "major questions" about Sorokin's work.[15] And although these are cogent, relevant questions, they <u>do</u> <u>not</u> include a suggestion that there needs to be a principle of change appropriate to the level of personality.

Solving the Problem

<u>The Plan of Investigation</u>. Three analytical tasks must be accomplished to deal adequately with the problem set for this essay. First, I must show the way in which

Sorokin's principles of change fail to include a principle of choosing. This will amount, largely, to a critical analysis of the principle of immanent change. Secondly, having found a lacuna in the substance of Sorokin's change theory, I will attempt to fill it. That is, I must show what the principle of choosing may indeed be. Finally, I must give some indications of the utility of the third change principle to the analysis of social change.

But before beginning the first analystical task, I must lay some foundation for it. This I mean to accomplish first by showing the general sociological tradition in which Sorokin was working.

Therefore, in Chapter 1 I will attempt to show that Sorokin's limiting types, the Ideational and the Sensate, have their counterpart in the writings of Maine, Durkheim and Toennies. This chapter, frankly, is aimed at sociologists more than at scholars-in-general. Those without much interst in placing Sorokin's work in sociological thought may wish to skip over it.

In Chapter 2 I will sketch out the main points in Sorokin's general system of sociology. Particular attention will be paid here to his concepts about culture, cultural integration, and the characterization of the main supersystems.

In Chapter 3 I will turn to an exposition of Sorokin's vision of change. Although I will try to sketch the general form of Sorokin's findings about change, aspects of his work

most relevant to this essay will be emphasized.

Chapter 4 will be devoted first to a discussion of Sorokin's change principles and then to a critique of them. At this point, we will come to grips with the first of the analytical tasks -- the critique of the principle of immanent change in Sorokin's thought.

Chapter 5, entitled "The Relational and the Objective," will provide a background for making sense of the principle of choosing. The thesis of this chapter is that the socio-cultural opposition of the Ideational and the Sensate is echoed in the opposed but complementary aspects of the human psyche itself. Among other things it will be shown that there appears to be a Sensate and an Ideational side of the human cerebrum.

Having raided the new psychology, Chapter 6 will be devoted to using our booty for sociological purposes. By an analysis of human action and its selective nature, we will see that the principle of choosing is, in fact, a principle of exclusion involving the aforementioned Sensate and Ideational aspects of the psyche. In effect, when one sees the world Sensate he cannot also see it Ideational -- at least not easily. If this last seems cryptic, read on; I mean to make it clear enough. In any case, at the end of this chapter, the second analytical task will have been completed. A third principle of change will have been proposed.

In Chapter 7, through example and projections, I mean to tackle the third analytical task by showing how the proposed principle of choosing may be useful in analysing social change.

The Concepts of Meaning and of Mind in this Essay. Sorokin makes the notion of meaning central to his sociology. Meanings as we shall see, are the binding force that makes superorganic phenomena possible. The norms, artifacts and roles of the thing we call the 'family' hang together, so to speak, because they are meaningfully related.

Having said that it must be pointed out that Sorokin is impatient with those who criticize his use of a term like 'meaning, 'mind' or thought. Such terms are, as he says, 'ultimate' and therefore, not definable by other terms.[16]

Yet, lest Sorokin's doctrine on this matter of meaning' and similar terms should appear too uncomfortable for some, let me attempt to interpret Sorokin. First, a meaning exists if any stimulus[17] accessible to awareness may be construed as a symbol or sign.[18] Secondly, a symbol or sign implies a more or less consistent association between any such symbol or sign and any phenomenon or class of phenomena which it designates. Finally, any construing of symbols or signs by human beings implies the context of social conditioning and learning.

Therefore, something like the verifiability notion of

meaning may bear on the logical integration of cultural symbols, but it does not, for example, apply to what Sorokin calls the aesthetic mode by which culturally conditioned information may also be coherent for us. Thus, as I interpret Sorokin, it is not necessary that a proposition be verifiable as true or false for it to be meaningful in the sociocultural universe. The proposition: "Unicorns are pure of heart and only tame for virgin ladies," is not verifiable at all. It is nevertheless meaningful. Why? Because such a proposition, as a belief, may have real consequences in action. And that, of course, is nearly a sociological truism.[19]

As regards the term mind, I do not dare to interpret Sorokin. And, unfortunately, I cannot in honesty propose, as Sorokin does, to disallow any question about my use of the term. Therefore, I will make an epistemological observation about Sorokin and the term mind, before I turn to explaining my own position on the concept. The observation is this: Sorokin maintains that man has sensory, rational, and "supersensory-superrational" or intuitive access to knowledge. As such, in Sorokin's integralist philosophy, man shares as "an active and important creator . . . in the creative processes of the cosmos."[20] From this and similar comments, Sorokin at least makes it clear that he sees mind as an active rather than as an epiphenomenal or determined aspect of reality. I hope that sort of observa-

tion is useful. It is, in any case, all I choose to read into Sorokin on the nature of mind.

When I use the term mind I shall mean to imply two ideas. First, mind and matter are, in some way, continuous. Julian Huxley puts it this way: "There is a continuity of all matter . . . and of mind. . . . All reality has both a material and a mental side, however rudimentary and below the level of anything like our consciousness that mental side may be."[21] Second, although mind is experienced as awareness under some conditions, mind and consciousness or awareness are not equivalent (using the term consciousness here as referring to one's being conscious-of something).

For one who is comfortable with the idea of an unconscious in the human psyche, the second assertion will seem axiomatic. It is important to this essay because I shall want to maintain that the selective or purposive responsiveness of a human being is or may be independent of specific awareness under many conditions. This is certainly not an unusual idea to anyone who would concede to the actuarial usefulness of statistical information on accident proneness. But it is important if one wishes to consider the possibility that fundamental beliefs about reality, say, may be out of awareness even as they directly guide behavior of which we are fully conscious.[22]

NOTES

[1]In Pitirim A, Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: Bedminster Press, 1941), IV, pp. 775-779, a list of thirteen "trends" is given. In 1976, thirty-five years later, they seem, in general, to have been accurate. See also R. P. Cuzzort, Humanity and Modern Sociological Thought (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 243-253.

[2]See the discussion of coherence included in Stanislav Andreski, The Uses of Comparative Sociology (Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1964), pp. 38-59.

[3]Cuzzort in Humanity and Sociological Thought, also maintains that these are fundamental or "limiting" types in Sorokin's thought.

[4]See, for example, Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 311.

[5]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956).

[6]Sorokin, Dynamics, 4 vols.

[7]See the last chapter of this essay for further comments on the problem of sequence in the replacement of supersystems.

[8]The problem of immanent change in Sorokin's theory is taken up in Chapter 4 of this essay.

[9]On the other hand, Kroeber "recants" on the extremity of this position in a later commentary on his 1917 essay. Furthermore, Sorokin does cite Kroeber, without comment, in alluding to the idea of a superorganic. See A.L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 22-51. Also see Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1947), p. 4n.

[10]Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality, p. 4n.

[11]This should be self-evident.

[12]The "power" of a cultural system to integrate may, in fact, be thought of as its capacity to render many lesser systems into coherent wholes.

[13]Louis Schneider, "Toward Assessment of Sorokin's View of Change," in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, eds.,

Social Change (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 371-400. The quote is on page 395.

[14]See Philip J. Allen, ed., Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review Review (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 160-187.

[15]Robert K. Merton and Bernard Barber, "Sorokin's Formulations in the Sociology of Science," in Allen, ed., Sorokin in Review, pp. 332-368.

[16]Sorokin, Society, p. 4n.

[17]By a stimulus here, I mean to include both external and internal excitations of the nervous system.

[18]Formally, one may wish to think of a symbol as a set or category of equisignificant "tokens." Further, following Peirce, the concept of the sign "is wider than that of language." One may think of indexical, iconic and conventional signs, the latter including the symbol (token sets) of language. See Hans Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic Logic (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 1-22. See also Justus Buchler, ed., Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 98-119. Peirce's theory of signs is a bit more complex than Reichenbach's summary of it, but the simplification is useful.

[19]Turning to Peirce again, this concept of "thirdness" includes the general concept of meaning as "irreducible to either quality or reaction," and as always involving a triadic relationship (which binds qualities or reactions across time). This is a broader idea of meaning than that of the logical positivists. See Buchler, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, pp. 74-97. The quote given above is on p. 91.

[20]Allen, ed., Sorokin in Review, p. 382.

[21]Julian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation (New York: The New American Library, 1956), pp. 45-46.

[22]The discussion of such matters in this essay begins with Chapter 4.

CHAPTER I

SOCIOLOGY AND THE DUALITY OF MIND

> Conceive then . . . that there are these two . . . one reigns over the region and things of the mind, the other over those of the eye.
>
> Plato, The Republic

That there are two divergent yet elemental aspects of mind in human beings which give rise to two different modes of social life is a very old idea indeed. For Plato the ideal Republic, shaped in the understandings of the philosopher guardians, is founded in ideal, timeless principles which Plato associates with the Good. The three elements of the soul, the reasoning, the spirited and the desiring are related to the forms of polity from the ideal republic to the dead end of tyranny. In the Republic the reasoning faculty of mind is utilized in interpreting fundamental ideals of virtue which, ultimately, transcend reason.[1] In the more decadent forms of polity -- timocracy, oligarchy, etc. -- one sees the steady encroachment of the knowledge of the senses or of the eye, so to speak.

Across the centuries, at the portal of medieval European civilization, Augustine of Hippo gives another account of two mentalities in his classic City of God. Like Plato's Republic, Augustine's City of God represents society as an eternal

order based in ultimate principles. It is the condition of sacred being opposed to the helter skelter of becoming. For "the peace of the heavenly city," Augustine writes, "lies in a perfectly ordered and harmonious communion of those who find their joy in God and in one another in God. Peace, in its final sense, is the calm that comes of order."[2] In opposition to the City of God, the earthly city is doomed by its Hobbesian divisiveness and the inadequacy of any law or custom which is used, over all, to individualistic advantage.

> The city of man, for all the width of its expansion throughout the world . . . is a single community; . . . the bond of a common nature makes all human beings one. Nevertheless, each individual in this community is driven by his passions to pursue his private purposes. Unfortunately, the objects of these purposes are such that no one person . . . can ever be wholly satisfied. The reason for this is that nothing but Absolute Being can satisfy human nature. [3]

Of course Augustine, one sees, is viewing the world from what Sorokin would call an Ideational perspective. We need only recall Durkheim's relatively sanguine approval of organic solidarity with its emphasis on individuality and contractualism (restitutive law) to gain an opposed Sensate view, a view wherein the fundamental conditions of human society are similarly dichotomized but quite differently understood.

One could go on with references to classical approaches which point to two basic types of social order. In Sorokin's foreword to Toennies' Community and Society (the Loomis translation, 1956), he mentions, among others, Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas, Nicolaus of Cusa, Ibn Khaldun, the Ger-

man thinkers in the tradition of Hegel and, finally, the sociologists such as Durkheim, Toennies and himself.[4]

In this same foreword Sorokin comments on the appropriateness of adding further variations on this theme, noting, in effect, that the problem I am designating by the phrase "the duality of mind" is not less worthy of attention by having been considered many times. "After all," he writes

> among the fundamental categories and concepts of the social science there is hardly one that was not mentioned, developed and used by the social thinkers of antiquity. . . . If a modern social scientist makes an artful use of them in his individual manner, showing their value and painting his own picture with their help, his contribution is made. . . . [5]

In this chapter, then, made a little bolder by Sorokin's *imprimatur*, I will begin my own variation on the theme with a brief examination of how two basic types of society are presented in the works of Maine, Durkheim and Toennies. This exploration will have two ends. The first will be to illustrate that the duality-of-mind theme has been a vital one in sociology and the second will be to show that it still is. Put another way, by noting the place of the theme of two mentalities among prominent fathers of the discipline I will have blown an intellectual fanfare of a sort for the work of Pitirim Sorokin in developing this same theme.

Two Analytical Concepts. I have called this essay *Pitirim Sorokin and the Duality of Mind* because I see in Sorokin's Ideational-Sensate extremes a reflection of a fundamental polarity in the human psyche. I will call the terms of

this polarity the relational and the objective aspects of mind.

The philosopher Martin Buber has expressed the fundamental duality of mind in his well known essay, I and Thou.[6] "To man the world is twofold," Buber's essay begins, " in accordance with his twofold attitude."[7] There are two fundamental orientations to reality; one which separates, another which relates. Man's twofold relationship to the world is expressed for Buber by the primary words "I-Thou" and "I-It."

Causality, Buber tells us, "has unlimited reign in the world of It."[8] Here, the realm of It represents the face of mind which encompasses physical and psychical events. Opposed to the universe of I-It is the relational universe of I-Thou which is seen as outside ". . . the context of space and time."[9] In the relational orientation of man resides the acausal complement, that which unites the countless splinters of the causal and gives them meanings.

Expressions of mind given by perceptual experiencing, by action or by using objects in ordered (causal) sequences may be said to reflect the objective mode of knowing. The more direct, pre-verbal understanding one may have, called by Buber the "I-Thou" attitude, is that which relates. This, the intuitive mode of knowing or the attitude which is inclined to endorse intuitive understandings may be called by the name relational.

In the discussion that follows I believe the reader may

be able to see that not only Sorokin, but, to some extent, Maine, Durkheim and Toennies have sketched opposed "mentalities" reflected in opposed societal types, which partake in a general recognition that there may be either an objective or a relational attitude toward the world. Therefore, I will use these terms -- relational and objective -- as generic concepts which may be postulated as encompassing some set of similar concepts. But I do not propse by this device to move one up on Sorokin, Durkheim, or any other thinker. Instead, the relational and the objective modes of the psyche may simply be thought of here as general properties or capacities of the human mind. In different social orders first one and then the other seems to be emphasized. Many students of sociology, I submit, have noted this dichotomy in their own ways and each has given us his own understandings about it.

Maine. The duality of mind theme is not obvious in the writings of Henry Sumner Maine. The diffidence of Maine's stated concerns seem, at the outset, to preclude a direct attack on fundamental theoretical notions. Even so, in Maine's apparently modest efforts to illuminate the "real as opposed to the imaginary, or the arbitrarily assumed history of the institutions of civilized men,"[10] he touches on profound sociological matters. The general concern in his work, quite apparent in his classic Ancient Law, to refute the so-called Natural Law doctrines of Rousseau and Locke may be seen as implying the primacy of a conservative approach. As Burrow

writes of him, Maine had ". . . an urge to classify, order, abstract and generalize . . . and there was nothing of the mystic in him."[11] That is, we may say of Maine that he was a product of his nineteenth century; a thinker inclined to the intellectualist bias of his time and one whose positivist leanings excluded him from too great a debt to the forces of romanticism.[12]

Still, while we may not prefer the somewhat monotonous gray of Maine's scholarly vision, we cannot gainsay his insights. For in Maine we do find a fresh and important effort to link the early forms of law and custom to their European heirs. And, most importantly for this essay, we find observations on the earlier and later forms of law and custom which can be seen to outline two modes of social order and two distinctive mentalities. In a nutshell, Maine's distinction between stationary and progressive societies may be seen to represent one pioneering approach to the opposition of objective and relational world views as these are manifested in characteristic social orders. To show how this is so I will first summarize elements in Maine's discussions of the shift of legal conventions from an emphasis on status to an emphasis on contract. In discussing these elements I will indicate how they imply an opposition of mentalities.

Although Maine has been classed with the evolutionists or, perhaps, with the approach which Martindale has called "positivistic organicism,"[13] Burrow points out that Maine

was not, strictly speaking, a "social Darwinist," at least not in the way that Spencer or Sumner or Comte might be so classified. (It may be noted that where Spencer is much taken with the survival of the fittest theme, Comte better represents a fascination with immanent forces that give rise to societal stages.[14]) Instead, with Maine, we have a recurring reference to dualisms -- aggregate to individual, stationary to progressive, status to contract -- which imply a critical limit crossed over in the exceptional instance of progressive or civilized conditions. For Maine did emphasize the uniqueness of the progressive condition even as he refuted the idea that conditions immanent in social orders give rise to any sort of necessary evolution.[15] In the movement of Roman law through its various stages of development, one senses that Maine sees radical, even perplexing exceptions to the general condition of mankind.[16] He writes, in fact, that had the Roman code been set down at a time only a little later than it was, its classic symmetry and flexibility would not have played its part in the rise of civilized Europe or might, in fact, have altogether prevented those progressive events.[17]

Maine's discussion of the transformations of ancient law and custom may be seen as having three stages. First there is the stage of judgements, of _themistes_ or divinely inspired opinions handed down by a secular ruler and rendered like intuitive thunderbolts, ad hoc, for each situation.

In Maine's discussion of *themis*, one pictures a dominant male figure rendering judgements from the figurative pedestal of his immediate and forceful status in the family.[18] Maine of course, was convinced of the primacy of the patriarchal format, at least in the Indo-European culture areas.

It was Maine's conviction that custom followed rather than preceeded the individual judgements of patriarchal authority. Therefore, only as *themistes* became categorized across situations and tradition becomes a guiding rationale for juridical decisions does custom and, finally, an epoch of customary law come into existence.[19] A third stage materializes with the setting down of laws, that is with literacy and some condition of the polity lending itself to "era of codes"[20]-- such as the Twelve Tables of Rome. It is only at this third stage that the distinction between stationary and progressive societies becomes noticeable.[21] In effect, Maine sees "agencies by which laws are brought in harmony with society. These instrumentalities included Legal Fictions, Equity and Legislation."[22] But only in the progressive situation are all these agencies employed, as they were with Roman law, to both effect and to accompany a transformation of the social condition. For if there is anything with immanent properties in society for Maine it is law after it has been written into codes. As he writes, "When primitive law has once been embodied in a Code, there is an end to what may be called its spontaneous development."[23] Only, it

seems, as the ends of law are adaptive or as they entail certain criteria may they lend themselves to the ends of civilization.

But what indeed are these criteria? For an answer we may consider the opposed properties of the two conditions of society, of the progressive versus the more common stationary orders.

In the stationary orders we find "that the unit of society is the family . . . while of a modern society it is the individual."[24] And further, "The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place."[25] Or, in the more famous words, "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement <u>from</u> <u>Status</u> <u>to</u> <u>Contract</u>."[26]

Now an elemental property of the family in ancient times, Maine tells us, is its character as a religious unit. (He refers often to Coulanges in this regard.[27]) Religious understandings therefore inform the nature of penal justice and of ancient law generally.[28] For Maine, this association of law and religion is a trap to be avoided; one which may (and generally does) work to keep society at its normal stationary levels. Only as law may escape being bound by superstitions which purport to explain them may the flexibility of law ascend to a capacity for legislation. Legis-

lation, representing a closer marriage of usage and law than tradition may permit, when it has the upper hand, may wield the legal means to circumvent the stagnation of sacred, immutable custom. So a fundamental property of the progressive society, as one of Maine's interpreters tells us, is,

> the self-conscious embodiment of change in their basic cultural outlooks and institutions. [While] in Progressive societies the fundamental canons of the culture are, in theory, open to constant discussion and revision. 29

If one were to associate Maine's term self-conscious with Sorokin's use of such terms as individualistic or contractual (types of relationships) it would become evident that there is some parallel between an Ideational or stationary society on the one hand and a Sensate or progressive one on the other. Of course, for Sorokin the progressive society's capacity for self-conscious evaluation of custom becomes a tyranny of relativism in the extremes of Sensate culture. Progress becomes less marked than incertitude.[30]

One begins to see that the shaking off of the stationary order amounts, in some measure, to an ascent of properties in the body of custom and law which may enhance what I am calling objective legitimations of action. In fact, characterizing the medieval period as the context of one stage in European progress, Maine writes that there was,

> in the first place, a great enthusiasm for generalization and a curious admiration for all general propositions, and consequently, in the field of law, an involuntary reverence for every general formula which seemed to embrace and sum up a number of . . .

rules . . . in various localities. 31

That is, there was an increasing emphasis on abstracting general principles for classifying categories of empirical events; just the sort of intellectual enterprise, one may note, which might be associated with an emphasis on the objective expressions of mind. Contract law too, with its emphases on discrete individuals and their obligations implies the refutation of what we are calling relational valuations of action in favor of objective ones.[32]

In effect, we see that for Maine the rise of progressive society involves the suppression of the relational understandings of human action or of what Sorokin might call a truth of faith in favor of the objective understandings. But, as Burrow writes, Maine has a positivist perspective which could, unabashed, declare that "All nature witnesses to her own laws and is a witness that can never be silenced. The stars in their courses fight for truth."[33] Maine's sort of "intellectualist bias," as Burrow aptly notes, "really disables him from doing what in other respects he was admirably suited to do -- to probe the great problem of non-rational action and non-utilitarian codes of conduct."[34]

Still, in the subtleties of his analysis of law and custom, Maine raises the issue of opposed mentalities. And, one suspects, these issues are not altogether lost behind the screen of his positivism. It is Maine, after all, who notes the error of "judging the men of other periods by the

morality of our own day."[35]

Maine also recognizes that elements of the static or the progressive style are retained in either condition to some degree. "Neither Ancient Law nor any other source of evidence discloses to us society entirely destitute of the conception of Contract," Maine writes.[36] He goes on, however to note the rudimentary nature of such conceptions in ancient societies. And, on the other hand, Maine points to European ideas of natural law as "survivals" from an earlier stationary order. These observations on Maine's part seem to me salient since it is my position -- and Sorokin's[37] -- that both relational and objective expressions of mind and action make up any concrete social order. This is so even though only one or the other will tend to be emphasized in dominant systems of ethics, law, philosophy, and so on. The point here being that Maine, like Sorokin and others who have thought about two fundamental types of social order, note that the qualities of mentality found in one order remain, to some degree, in the other. The difference between Maine (or Durkheim or Toennies) and Sorokin in this matter is that the mentality associated with a stationary order is not seen as necessarily regressive or stagnant by Sorokin. If one may assert that Maine's stationary condition is equivalent in some respects to Sorokin's Ideational culture, then aspects of a stationary order may return historically and even achieve ascendancy. What is residual in Maine is the 'seed'

of new social conditions for Sorokin.

Finally though, one does not find in Maine any suggestion that the contest of the mentalities represented by the two modes of social order may continue beyond a scenario of ongoing progress and enlightenment. Understandably, Maine tends not to see beyond the horizon of the nineteenth century and there is no hint from him that the exceptional, progressive condition of his world might become, from a new historical vantage point, the sinister stationary condition of another era.

Durkheim. In Durkheim's rich sociology the two mentalities find an elaborated framework. Where in Maine there is a fairly special concern for the rise of progressive from stationary societies, in Durkheim we find an evolutionary perspective on the mutation of organic social complexity from the static conditions of mechanical solidarity. For both thinkers the positivist viewpoint has its special charms, but in Durkheim, echoing Darwin's themes, the progress from mechanical to organic solidarity is given by conditions immanent in the social environment. Where Western society is an exceptional emergence for Maine, Durkheim would have us understand that organic solidarity -- the division of labor -- is likely to arise whenever and wherever certain conditions prevail. In Durkheim's words, "these changes are . . . mechanically produced by necessary causes."[38]

In The Division of Labor we learn that these conditions include: (1) an "already constituted society;"[39] (2) a social or "moral" density which "multiplies intra-social relations"[40] and (3) competition among increased densities of population for resources grown scarce as a result of this increased social volume.[41] With respect to this latter idea, Durkheim flies his Darwinian colors boldly. "Darwin justly observed," he notes, "that the struggle between organisms is as active as they are analogous."[42] That is, when the segmental nature of mechanical solidarity is sufficiently compressed the division of labor rather automatically ensues. Likeminded social animals battle for common values.[43] Not unjustly, moral or dynamic interactional density is seen as equivalent to an actual numerical density of the population.

Durkheim's notions about the rise of the division of labor have been much criticized. The rise of population density, for example, has been seen to follow and not to precede the division of labor,[44] or the linking or moral and numerical density has been questioned with respect to the East. Why, for instance, did not organic solidarity arise in China?

Durkheim responds to this last criticism by claiming that "the increase of social volume does not always accelerate the advances of the division of labor, but only when the mass is contracted at the same time and to the same ex-

tent."[45] But Durkheim then refers to " . . . two orders of fact" beyond this rather mechanistic law of proportions.[46] Namely, there must be both numerical density and the wherewithal for intimate contact . Which is to say, there must be some normative plan, some particular type of moral consensus if organic solidarity is to develop.

Now arguments about whether or not population density precede or follows the division of labor, however resolved, seem not to negate the validity of many of Durkheim's insights. In particular, it is difficult to refute the assertions that (1) the division of labor arises in a context of normatively patterned competition and (2) that the game plan for any such competitive order must reside, as it were, in the _conscience collective_. It is for this latter reason that I placed first, above, the prerequisite of an already constituted society. For Durkheim this element is but an _a posteriori_ corollary of the rise of moral density.

It seems fairly evident thus, that a certain degree of population density must precede complexity in the division of labor, even if the relevant density, finally, is that of _information_ in a cultural context open to the utilization of knowledge and technique for _commonly valued_ ends. But however one wishes to interpret Durkheim, it appears a reasonable assumption that the division of labor arises as a social environment becomes so altered as to call forth an adaptive response on the part of actors. Which is not to

imply that such a responsiveness is, somehow, a natural one for individuals. As Durkheim tells us, the emphasis on individuality in organic solidarity (which so impressed Mill and Spencer) arises from the conditions of the collective and not the other way around.[47] What changes, that is, is the form of the general or collective mentality. Or, to use the terminology established for this essay, the relational mentality of mechanical solidarity is replaced by an objective mentality in the condition of organic solidarity. In the first case, according to Durkheim, we find solidarity based on a homogeneity of goals and norms which, it seems, forcefully constrains social actors -- in part by repressive sanctions -- while it fails to call forth norms of individuality . In organic solidarity, on the other hand, the emphasis on operations, on production rather than conservation or tradition appear to be linked to a mentality of rational objective cooperation -- represented by the rise of contractual and restitutive sanctions in bodies of law.

So it may be suggested with some justification that the development of organic solidarity is also the rise of an objective from a relational mentality. For Durkheim, the relational mentality precede the objective one in an evolutionary sense. But the theme of the duality of mind can be followed beyond Durkheim's concern with the division of labor. Most importantly, it is found again in his later and perhaps more profound explorations into the categories of

consciousness given in the later parts of Suicide (1897), the essay "On Collective Representations" (1898) and, most strikingly, in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912).[48] In these writings we find particularly relevant insights into the links between religion and the relational mentality one may associate with mechanical solidarity. We also see in Durkheim's later works that the transformations of the conscience collective which accompanies the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity includes a change from sacred to profane emphases with respect to the legitimation of action. To put this another way, one may surmise from Durkheim's thought that the very concern with moral facts in his later work is a recognition of the decline of normative vitality in organic solidarity. With the increased emphasis on objective as opposed to relational legitimations of action, morality based in the effervescence of collective sentiment becomes problematic.

But the threads that lead me to these assertions must be picked up where they first appear. In the Division of Labor (1893) we already note minor themes that will become dominant in later movements of Durkheim's work. He is already prepared to assert that "religion is essentially a social phenomenon."[49] And one, further, from which the bulk of important institutional forms and categories arise. Penal law, for one, is seen as " . . . essentially religious in its origin."[50] But the linkage of religion to

mechanical solidarity, with its implications for the nature of organic solidarity, is not completed here. In the Division of Labor, Durkheim seems convinced that the religious (relational) mentality of mechanical solidarity, rooted as it is in the collective conscience, is eliminated rather than repressed by the rise of the divivision of labor. As he writes, "It is the division of labor which, more and more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the common conscience."[51] The division of labor itself, he is saying, seems to be the "principle bond of social aggregates of higher types."[52]

But to follow out the logic of such a position would have been, for Durkheim, an espousal of a position not unlike Spencer's. At last he would have been drawn to tell us that society emerges or changes "from a society governed by collective imperatives to one where common order is created by the free decisions of individuals."[53]

Yet Durkheim is clearly in opposition to any such economic contract vision.[54] But to maintain a consistent stand in favor of social agencies as causative of social phenomena, it became necessary to restore the significance of the foundation of consensus: the collective conscience. Thus, in asserting that suicide can only be explained sociologically, Durkheim turns to elements in the collective conscience, to representations which, we are told, essentially compose social life.[55] Elements of egoism, of

altruism and of anomie run through society, variously characterizing these representations in both mechanical and organic solidarity.

But a dilemma continues to underlie these insights. Namely, if the mentality of consensus is religious in nature and if religion should turn out to be, in essence, a property of mechanical solidarity, what, indeed is the foundation of consensus in organic solidarity? For religion is, as Durkheim writes, "the system of symbols by which society becomes conscious of itself; it is the _characteristic way_ of thinking of collective existence," (italics supplied).[56] In his final major work, Durkheim is even more specific about this idea. "There is something eternal in religion," he writes in the _Elementary Forms_,

> . . . which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments . . . which make its unity and its personality. [57]

In the same paragraph then, Durkheim proceeds to compare the religious celebrations of Christians and Jews with those that Robert Bellah would associate with "civil religion."[58] We are to suppose, that is, that there is no basic difference between a political rally and a service of Holy Communion. Qualifying such an idea though, he also writes that

> If we find a little difficulty in imagi-

> ning what [the religious] feasts and ceremonies of the future could consist in, it is because we are going through a stage of transition and moral mediocrity. 59

It is in the future, apparently, when we may finally expect new " . . . hours of creative effervescence," to serve as a " . . . guide to humanity."[60] Yet one must be suspicious of associating religious celebrations with the cycle of holidays generated by the French Revolution of 1789. More disturbingly, by these criteria, how is one to distinguish between a religious celebration and a Nazi rally? Surely Durkheim himself would have been among the first to condemn effervescence conducted by a Goebbels, but how, indeed, is one to derive a spontaneous, solidary sentiment from a daily life that sets the individual in normative competition with one and all?

Now Durkheim does _not_ assert that science can replace religion. He teaches us, in fact, that religion must serve both to aid the expression of collective solidarity and to _explain_ the categories of nature, man and society.[61] Yet as organic solidarity becomes established, as science tends to substitute itself for religion with respect to cognitive and intellectual functions, one must inquire as to the new quality of the residual expressive functions. For if the explanatory power of religion is removed, surely the change in religion has been profound. As the _rationale_ of existence and action becomes the progressive stripping away of

"myth" and "superstition," even to the explanation of things sacred in profane terms, man's relationship to his social environment has been changed in a very basic way. To the extent that such a world-vision exists, in fact, we might suppose that the categories of reality are placed beyond man's immediate, concrete experience. The world becomes redefined in terms of abstraction and principle which devalue the present or the past in favor of a future which is, also, an abstraction. As Durkheim notes, the nature of reason is to express categories and classes -- as abstractions -- which become, in themselves, the principles of existence and therefore, the legitimators of action. In observing that the rise of a scientific and objective world view replaces a mythical theory of existence, one must also note that the relational and arational properties of religion are undermined. Religion fades away in the world made productive through organic solidarity. And as religion fades, so too do the relational terms which may justify action. These become residual categories to be reduced to pleasure principles and 'need hierarchies,' or to be explained, vainly, in rational or practical terms.

We see then, a suggestion of one way in which both Durkheim's positivism and his evolutionist perspective shape his view of the duality of mind. We are led to important insights but, in the end, the relational properties not accounted for by Durkheim, turn back on us in his sociology,

raising questions that he cannot deal with. More precisely, Durkhiem fails to grasp some vital part of the qualitative difference between the mentalities of mechanical and of organic solidarity.

Still, as we shall see, many of the limitations that may be judged to be present in Durkheim's work are also present in that of Toennies.

Toennies. In Toennies' classic Community and Society,[62] the two mentalities are represented by the natural and rational forms of will, while the two modes of social order associated with these are, of course, the Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft. Yet the relationship of these two mentalities and their respective social forms is not, for Toennies, one of reciprocity or of balance. The evolutionary line is drawn inexorably from one condition to the other. Gesellschaft replaces Gemeinschaft in an apparently irreversible sequence. Even when Toennies seems to suggest that both qualities of will, the natural and the rational, have their place in the social order, he is not optimistic about a renaissance of the Gemeinschaft. Nothing, it seems, will easily shake the uniform organization of the cosmopolitan Gesellschaft.[63]

One need only sketch out the elements of Toennies' ideal types to see that the dual tendency of the human mind and its social environments is central to his sociology. But one may also see that the evolutionary emphasis in his work,

the vision of immanent progress from unified simplicity to complexity, is somewhat self-limiting. These limits, perhaps, can be made apparent in considering the elements in his types.

The natural mind in Toennies' thought is, in effect, the foundation which underlies rational consciousness. The natural will (Wesenwille) is a sort of organic potential from which the rational will (Kürwille) must emerge. And "such a rational, individual view of life," is consciousness for Toennies. As such it represents "the freedom of rational will in its highest expression."[64]

The natural will is associated not with a modality of mind which is complimentary to the rational will, but rather as a primeval framework upon which the rational mind may rest. In Toennies' words, "The thinking agent of natural will . . . is related to its form as the mass of an organism . . . is related to the form itself. . . . It is nothing aside and apart from them; it is their entity and substance."[65]

On the other hand, the rational and the natural will are seen as inseparable, as having a sort of organic togetherness. Before and beyond the two forms of will, Toennies tells us, "there always exists . . . a totality which expresses itself in the two forms of will and has a relationship to them; the relationship between the whole and the parts is primary."[66]

In this last structuralist assertion, one sees an implication, not fully developed by Toennies, that the two

forms of will must transform each other in their dialectic tension. The rise of rational will must retain its foundation in the natural will while the natural will is, in turn, modified.

But, much influenced by Marx, Toennies' conception of the rational will links it to the capitalist order. As such, it seems less to stand in a dialectic with the natural will than to progressively dominate it. The rational will sets "the individual ... . againt the whole of nature," to give and to receive, but above all, to control the world in terms imposed by the reasoning will. And finally for Toennies, it seems to be exchange which is the ideal form of the rational will and "commerce which is its material perfection."[67]

Whereas the Gemeinschaft is the natural predecessor of the Gesellschaft, as in the case of the two forms of will, it like the natural will seems doomed to be displaced rather than transformed.[68] Progressively, the natural forms of social arrangement are set aside by those which are associations of the rational will. To the extent that members think of the social collective "as a gift of nature or as created by a supernatural will,"[69] as Toennies writes, it will have the characteristics of the Gemeinschaft. Somehow, in other words, as people become self-conscious about their social collectivities, particularly at the stage of bourgeois society, a transformation occurs. The natural collective conscience of the Volk becomes, in Marxian style, class con-

sciousness. As the Gesellschaft and its values increasingly command the resources and labor of society " . . . the consciousness of the Gesellschaft gradually becomes the consciousness of an increasing number of people."[70] The hiatus between the true Gesellschaft and the mass of the people must be resolved by the state.

Yet one does not envision a new class beyond Toennies' capitalist Gesellschaft. The rational state, in spite of its foundations in natural and psychic collectivities, is ultimately just the Gesellschaft and not some new synthesis. The state tends ever to make of the family an accidental collectivity; convention based in reason tends steadily to replace the folkways and mores based in sentiment and experience.[71] In this condition, where consensus based in public opinion replaces that of harmony, Gemeinschaft is repressed.

> In the same way as the individual natural will evolves into pure thinking and rational will, which tends to dissolve and subjugate its predecessors, the origianal collective forms of Gemeinschaft have developed into Gesellschaft and the rational will of the Gesellschaft. 72

Instead of the consensus of harmony there arises that situation where "peace and commerce are maintained through conventions and underlying mutual fear."[73]

But if there is not to be a new class for Toennies, there is perhaps to be a rebirth of a new culture from the repressed Gemeinschaft elements of the old. As he says,

while "city life and the Gesellschaft down the common people to decay and death,"[74] class struggle may in time give rise to the destruction of the full blown state. And, rather paradoxically, the seeds of any new culture, derived from the "essence and ideal of Gemeinschaft," seem only capable of giving rise to still another Gesellschaft. The web of convention and commerce, grown like some geometric structure in the nutrient foundation of the Gemeinschaft, appears perpetually to be doomed to collapse of its own weight.

Although the duality of mind and its expressions is clearly seen in Toennies' thought, the relationship of the polar types is made sharply uneven by an evolutionary bias. Although he seems to suggest the need for a balance between the natural and the rational properties of mind, between the Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft, he nevertheless cannot see how such a balance might be achieved. He does not, like Sorokin, envision a marvellous balance of some idealistic cultural environment, one which blends reason with sentiment and the immediacy of experience. For Toennies the direction of societal order from unity to complexity seems to be, inexorably, one way. Where in Sorokin the elements of the duality of mind may be related in terms of a pure dialectic, giving rise to a dynamic picture of change, in Toennies they are related only as energy is related to entropy.

<u>Summary</u>. The dualistic positions of Maine, Durkheim, Toennies and Sorokin are summarized in Table 1. The reader will see that I have used the concepts of the relational and objective modes of the psyche to characterize opposed mentalities. Either mode, that is, may be <u>emphasized</u> in opposed social orders. I wish to indicate in the table that there are common elements in the dualistic change models of the writers considered. This is not to assert that for any of these writers, save Sorokin, the mode of the social order is seen as <u>equivalent</u> to a mentality. It is asserted instead that a mentality, or a world-view if one prefers, is associated with each condition of the social order and that one may find common elements among these generalized attitudes toward the world. Further, such an association is quite evident from the writings of the scholars themselves, as I believe I have shown.

Each of the theorists considered here draws somewhat closer to the position Sorokin has developed. Each adds important insights into the nature of two limiting types in human societies. But only in Sorokin is a linear, evolutionist perspective replaced with a broader view that sees these types, however they may finally be characterized, as joined in a great, harmonic opposition that brings first one and then another to the fore in human civilizations.

TABLE 1

A COMPARISON OF DUALISTIC MODELS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE WRITINGS OF MAINE, DURKHEIM, TOENNIES AND SOROKIN

Scholar	Condition of the Social Order which may be thought to include a Generalized attitude toward the world.	
	Relational	Objective
Maine	Stationary Society	Progressive Society
Durkheim	Mechanical Solidarity	Organic Solidarity
Toennies	Gemeinschaft (Natural will)	Gesellschaft (Rational will)
Sorokin	Ideational	Sensate

NOTES

[1]The translation of The Republic used here is found in W.H.D. Rouse, ed., Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: New American Library, 1956). The quote which heads the chapter is taken from pp. 308-309.

[2]See St. Augustine, The City of God, abridged by Gerald G. Walsh, et al. (New York: Doubleday Image Books, 1958), p. 456.

[3]Ibid., p. 392.

[4]Sorokin summarizes the history of the theme that there are "two different modes of mentality and behavior and . . . two different types of society" in the Forward to Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. vii-viii.

[5]Ibid., p. viii.

[6]Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Scribner's, 1958), p. 3.

[7]Ibid., p. 51.

[8]Ibid., p. 22.

[9]Ibid., p. 33.

[10]J. W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966), p. 154.

[11]Ibid., p. 145.

[12]Ibid., p. 157.

[13]Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1960), p. 97, for example.

[14]Such an idea is given by one important interpreter of Comte. See Richard Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought (New York: Doubleday, 1968), I, 73-143.

[15]See Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (Glouchester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1970), pp. 23; 74-75; 112-113. Also see Burrow, Evolution and Society, p. 160; 164n.

[16]Burrow, Evolution and Society, p. 165.

[17]Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 16-17.

[18]Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (New York: Arno Press, 1975), p. 38. See also Maine, Ancient Law, p. 210.

[19]Maine, Ancient Law, p. 11.

[20]Ibid., p. 13.

[21]Ibid., p. 21.

[22]Ibid., p. 24.

[23]Ibid., p. 21.

[24]Ibid., p. 121.

[25]Ibid., p. 163.

[26]Ibid., p. 164.

[27]Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, n.d.).

[28]Maine, Early Law, pp. 32-33.

[29]Donald A. Nielsen, "The Sociological Theories of Sir Henry Maine," Ph.D. Diss.: New School for Social Research, 1972, p. 154.

[30]For a treatment of these themes by Sorokin see, for example, Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: Dutton, 1941), chapter 5, pp. 167-204.

[31]Maine, Ancient Law, p. 78.

[32]Ideas about the relational and objective aspects of action will be developed in chapter 6 of this essay.

[33]Burrow, Evolution and Society, p. 170.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Maine, Ancient Law, p. 301.

[36]Ibid., p. 303.

[37]In Sorokin's terms, of course, we would talk of Sensate and Ideational elements of sociocultural systems.

[38]Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 273.

[39]Ibid., p. 275.

[40]Ibid., pp. 257-260.

[41]Ibid., p. 266.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]See, for example, Frank Clemente and Richard B. Sturgis, "The Division of Labor in America," Social Forces, 51, 1972, 176-182.

[45]Durkheim, Division of Labor, p. 262.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid., p. 279.

[48]In order of publication see Emile Durkheim, Suicide, trans. George Simpson and John A. Spaulding (New York: Free Press, 1951); Sociology and Philosophy, trans. D.F. Pocock (New York: Free Press, 1974), particularly the essay "Collective and Individual Representations," pp. 1-34; The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. J.W. Swain (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[49]Durkheim, Division of Labor, p. 92.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Ibid., p. 173.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid., p. 220. Also see Aron, Main Currents, II, 11-97.

[54]Durkheim, Division of Labor, p. 206 cf.

[55]Durkheim, Suicide, p. 312.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 475.

[58]Referring of course to the idea of civil religion as proferred by Robert N. Bellah in his essay, "Civil Religion in America," Daedalus, 96 (Winter) 1967: 1-21.

[59]Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 475.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Ibid., p. 477.

[62]Toennies, Community and Society.

[63]Ibid., p. 234.

[64]Ibid., p. 159.

[65]Ibid., p. 136.

[66]Ibid., p. 139.

[67]Ibid., pp. 140; 101.

[68]Ibid., p. 258.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid., p. 259.

[71]The sense of Toennies' idea of reason seems best expressed by Max Weber's notion of means-ends-rational action (zweckrationalität). See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947).

[72]Toennies, Community and Society, p. 225.

[73]Ibid., p. 224.

[74]Ibid., pp. 230-231.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEATIONAL AND THE SENSATE

Sorokin's sociological work is monumental measured either by its scope or simply by the sheer amount of writing he accomplished. Even so, if one takes the _Social and Cultural Dynamics_ as a watershed in his thought, it is possible to discover the elemental concepts on which his system is based. In this chapter some of these elements will be designated and described. First an effort will be made to sketch the outlines of Sorokin's general system of sociology. Secondly, Sorokin's vision of the great cultural mentalities or supersystems will be considered.

Sorokin's General System of Sociology

The center of Sorokin's sociology is meaning, since only meanings may draw together elements of the sensory world to produce _superorganic_ phenomena. Now this superorganic is essentially ". . . equivalent to mind in all its clearly developed manifestations."[1] In effect, the superorganic amounts to language, philosophy and religion, to art and technology, to social organization itself. Yet Sorokin does not by any means wish to reduce social phenomena to mind. Instead, we are led to understand that the social

arises in human interaction. Meanings, therefore, are not separable from human agents or from some means of conveying those meanings. The superorganic is the proper subject of sociology just as the organic is the proper subject of biology; yet the superorganic and mind itself arises directly or indirectly from human interaction, just as (one supposes) organisms may be thought to arise from specified organic interactions.

In the concept of the superorganic one sees the generic structure of sociocultural phenomena. As Sorokin explains:

> Every process of meaningful human interaction consists of three components, each component, in turn, being made up of many elements that determine its concrete forms. These components are (1) thinking, acting, and reacting human beings as subjects of interaction; (2) meanings, values and norms for the sake of which individuals interact, realizing them and exchanging them in the course of the interaction; (3) overt actions and material phenomena as vehicles or conductors through which immaterial meanings, values and norms are objectified. 2

Considering these three dimensions further, one may derive the elements of Sorokin's general system. In effect the three levels of the superorganic -- human agents, meanings, and concrete interactions (by way of vehicles) -- parallel the three dimensions of the sociocultural universe. These, in Sorokin's terms, are personality, society, and culture. Human agents as personalities interact meaningfully to give rise to cultural systems of all sorts. These systems may be as elemental as propositions like "2 + 2 = 4" or as complex as a language. Cultural systems may have purely mean-

ingful significance to human actors, as in the case of tribal myths or fairy tales; on the other hand, they may involve practical techniques for dealing with the empirical environment. In any case, the set of cultural systems generated in in human interaction is presumed to take on characteristics, *sui generis*, which transcend any particular personality or any *pattern* of interactions. Any set of systems, too, may be more or less integrated by shared contexts of meaning or value.

Cultural Systems. The system of sociology on which Sorokin's change theory is based may be viewed from three points of reference. But though the levels of action or behavior and personality have their appropriate vantage points, cultural systems are emphasized in Sorokin's thought. In fact, as Cowell and Maquet both have pointed out, and as I have suggested above, the idea of cultural systems is central to his understandings of social phenomena.[3]

I will attend to four aspects of Sorokin's thought about cultural systems here. These are (1) the substance or properties of cultural systems generally; (2) the integration of systems, which leads one to ideas about superorganic causality ; (3) the genesis of cultural systems, and (4) their types.

We have seen that what Sorokin designates as an *empirical* sociocultural system must consist of human agents, mean-

ings and vehicles. But differentiating between the properties of meanings and vehicles is critical to making sense of Sorokin's ideas here. First of all, of course, the existence of meanings (and of minds) is taken as an irreducible "first premise."[4] Further, meanings may be thought of as existing beyond an empirical context. That is, they may be grounded in an empirical sense and may, thus, be associated with some object or concrete symbol, or they may <u>not</u>. There is, for Sorokin, a realm of "pure meanings."

> A pure system of meanings may exist in the mind without any definite externalization or objectification in material vehicles. But as soon as it is transmitted to other persons . . . it must be clothed in some sort of external vehicle; because without some vehicle that serves as a conductor, the meaning cannot be transmitted and socialized, and therefore cannot become an empirical sociocultural system. 5

Vehicles are necessary empirical agents by which meanings may be conveyed. But they are not meaningful <u>per se</u> as either physicochemical or biological phenomena. "This profound difference between the componential structure of sociocultural phenomena . . . and physicochemical or biological ones,"[6] <u>includes</u> the boundary between the causal and the meaningful.

Sorokin's system embraces the complementarity of meanings and of things that may be meaningful. Just as the quanta of physics are both waves and particles, Sorokin's sociocultural phenomena are both causal and acausal. Critics of Sorokin seem not to have attended to this characteristic

of his work.[7] But I think it is best faced head on. For the implications of this use of a complementarity principle makes of Sorokin's work a foundation for an escape from the limitations of a mechanistic social science.

The substance of any cultural system is its three-part nature. Acausal meanings may be objectified in the causal world. The agent of this cultural universe, the human culture spinner must stand with one foot in each realm -- the causal and the acausal, the objective and the relational.

Cultural Integration. The first problem considered by Sorokin in Volume I of his Dynamics is that of cultural integration. One may presume from this fact that the nature of integration is, in some respect, prior to a consideration of cultural change. For certainly, if one is concerned with how an entity changes one must begin with some idea about how that entity is composed. To use a strictly causal metaphor, hands on a watch change positions because of the way in which the watch's parts are assembled. This sort of understanding may be considered apart from questions about the *function* of a watch or the nature of its prime mover (i.e.: one who winds a watch).

For our purposes the review of Sorokin's thought on this problem will be divided into an analysis of three questions. Namely: (1) What is the nature of the *parts* of culture which may be integrated? (2) *How* are the parts integrated? (3) What are the degrees of integration either within

or between cultural systems? Is integration an all or nothing matter as in the case of the watch?

Now the parts of any empirical sociocultural system (and, hence, of any cultural system) have been shown to include meanings, vehicles, and human agents who may both attend to the meanings and manipulate (or be manipulated by) the "vehicles." But these are three different kinds of things. Meanings may be read by minds, but few would argue that meanings are, thereby, "minds."[8] Further, as Sorokin explains, vehicles are somewhat arbitrarily related to meanings. A poem by Robert Frost may be written in sand, printed on vellum, or recited mechanically by medium of magnetic tape after it has been recorded.[9] On the other hand, there are any number of objective phenomena or relationships which may not serve as vehicles in a given social environment. Culture "A" may lump several species of marine snail under one label; or, due to indifference, consider "triangles" to be "triangles," whether they are equilateral or isoceles. Culture "B" may know red ochre as a pigment for decorating the skin, but not as "iron oxide." In any case, "vehicles" are not "meanings."

The separability of the three elements of cultural systems imply four basic types of relationship or integration among these elements. These are, Sorokin tells us (a) "spatial or mechanical adjacency," which may be either accidental or mechanical in nature; (b) "causal or function-

al integration," and (c) "internal or Logico-Meaningful Unity."[10]

Mechanical or external adjacency, what Sorokin calls by the name congeries, may be illustrated by the more or less unrelated objects one discovers on cleaning out the glove compartment of the family car. A mechanical congeries, on the other hand, might be represented in the welding together of a V-8 juice can and the handle of an old hairbrush by fire in the city dump. The importance of the notion of a congeries in Sorokin's thought is, primarily, his conviction that no complex of cultural systems as represented by vehicles collected in a particular physical space, say Idaho or the city limits of Akron, will be meaningfully associated. But we will return to this point below.

In a critique of Clark Wissler's notions of integration, Sorokin asks how Wissler's three dominant characteristics of our culture, mechanical invention, mass education and universal suffrage, are related. Granted that they are related at all, Sorokin asks, how are they related? Are they a spatial congeries? Or is the interrelationship of these elements "internally and functionally determined?" To this question, Sorokin writes, "there is virtually no answer."[11] Yet Sorokin is suggesting an answer. One can cite some "principle" behind the appearance together of things in a city dump. But the interrelationships of a

Barbi doll and a broken hair dryer may be simply impossible to determine. And the "principle" cited may be reduced, finally, to some abstraction such as "they are here, together, because this is where things end up when they are discarded." We cannot know from this why things may have been discarded or what their interrelationship might be. One must not deny, Sorokin warns, that there is a critical difference between the relatedness of objects in a pile of garbage and elements in a functional or logical union. The Barbi doll and the hair dryer are simply not related in the same sense as the parts which compose a working Chevrolet. To assume such an equivalence "of totally different classes of unity is . . . inadmissable."[12]

There are then <u>degrees</u> of integration ranging from indirect causal association through direct meaningful integration.

As an example of indirect causal association through an external factor, Sorokin notes the association of skis, Vodka, large stoves for heating and felt boots. Their "causal" linkage in Russian peasant villages is cold winters. But, to be sure, this particular set of artifacts need not have been linked together. Cold as an external or environmental factor might have united other artifacts. And the causal nature of this sort of integration (Sorokin only implies its causal nature) is the fact that elements may be substituted. "Rum," as Sorokin writes, "can serve for Vodka" in his illustration,

"or snowshoes for skis."[13] In other words, given a condition like cold winters or a desert climate, a fairly finite set of causally functional artifacts may be developed or adapted.

Direct causal or functional integration is represented by the "organic" interdependence of working parts in an auto as such parts are in functional juxtaposition. Parts of a car lying on a factory floor, as Sorokin notes, are spatially and externally, but not functionally associated.

There are degrees of functional association of course. These may be represented by the degrees of integration among cells in some series of organisms ranging from volvox to a chimpanzee. Similarly, purely mechanical functional integration may vary from that of logs being floated together down a river, to the integrated circuits of a television receiver.

With respect to cultural elements:

> If variation A is always followed by B (under the same conditions and ina large enough number of cases so that mere chance is eliminated), we say that they are functionally related. This means that any cultural synthesis is to be regarded as functional when, on the one hand, the elimination of one of its important elements perceptibly influences the rest of the synthesis in its functions . . . . and when . . . a separate element, being transposed to a different combination, either cannot exist in it or has to undergo a profound modification. (italics removed) 14

The highest form of integration for Sorokin is not causal. As he says, having made the distinction between spatial adjacency or external association and functional integration, we must not fail to see a yet higher principle.

"Above functional integration proper there is an additional form of association quite different from it."[15] This is the sort of integration Sorokin calls, "for lack of a better term," _logico-meaningful_.[16] And logico-meaningful integration, simply, is that which occurs when cultural elements are associated together by meanings.

But in an empirical cultural system this "higher" principle and those of the causal-functional order are mixed together. Empirical cultural systems must be embodied in some form in order to be transmitted between human beings or be "socialized" (made part of the environment of social symbols). In short, empirical cultural systems are _meaningful-causal_; they are a blend of their "causal" empirical expressions and acausal (timeless, spaceless) meanings. In Sorokin's words,

> cultural phenomena have two aspects: the inner one, or the aspect of the immaterial (spaceless, timeless) meaning and value, and the external or "material shell," externalizing in the space-time continuum this meaning of immaterial. 17

Further, vehicles which express meanings are interchangeable. Identical empirical entites may have quite different meanings. Aphorisms may be written on chalk boards or traced in sand. Of two painted pebbles which might appear to us to be equivalent, one may be a sacred Churinga for the Australian aboriginal who knows it as such.

A key principle of logico-meaningful integration in Sorokin's system is that meanings and values may be superim-

posed on causal forms of integration. Let us return to the example of the watch. Its internal mechanism is causally-functionally integrated; a motion of part A has a measurable and determinate relationship to a second part B. But the *raison d'etre* of this functional relationship is not found in the watch "for-itself." A candle does not burn for itself; nor does a watch, a computer, or a turbine "run" for itself. Causal laws are the "boundary conditions"[18] which set limits on the ways meanings may be objectified, either in symbols (like an icon), or in technologies from pottery making to space craft assembly and operation.

To reiterate, "meanings, as pure meanings, or validities or values are timeless and spaceless in the sense of physical time and space."[19] And the acausal properties of meanings from law-like "causal" propositions (F = ma) to ethical or aesthetic understandings ("Thou shalt not kill") are either "not here or there or anywhere or . . . here and there and everywhere."[20]

One might add here that logico-meaningful integration for Sorokin is, basically, of two types. It is *aesthetic* or *logical*.[21] The first may be thought to emphasize relational and the latter an objective mode of "putting the world together." By this distinction a law-like proposition such as Ohm's law is clearly of the logical sort. The aesthetic principles conveyed among French impressionist painters and revealed in their works might exemplify the aesthetic form

of integration. Or, among other possible examples, a code of law, although it may have an "aesthetic" symmetry or balance, tends to emphasize a logical rationale within itself. A code of ethics, on the other hand, may be seen as essentially aesthetic in character since its injunctions are founded more or less directly in human experiences of value, such as "the good," "justice," or "the sacred." A system like that developed by Comte might be seen to fall somewhere between the logical and the aesthetic, in spite of his positivist faith (or because of it).

Finally, with respect to cultural integration, Sorokin refutes the position which calls for an "all or nothing" functionalism. Functional integration on the causal level, that is, is not to be confused with meaningful integration. Just as elements and compounds only occasionally become arranged or patterned, either in mechanical form (as in crystals) or in organic systems, cultural elements become associated in grand meaningful configurations less often than not. The sense of Sorokin's understanding here seems to be that human beings, in interaction, continually "produce" cultural systems whether simple or complex. These systems, most often of the simple variety, may or may not become integrated as more comprehensive systems. However, that various forms of integration _do_ occur is taken as phenomenally self-evident, given the fact of social life. And, of course, increasingly complex modes of integration

up to and including generalized mentalities or supersystems are the central concern of his sociology.

What Sorokin emphatically denies, though, is that all potential elements of some ideal integrated system will, in the contingencies of praxis, ever get together. No such cultural "superorganism" is apparent to Sorokin. Nor is any such "functionalism" necessary to his thinking about actual change or its patterns. What is of critical importance here is the idea that integrated systems of meanings, values, norms, will tend both to consolidate congeries and to drag other unintegrated elements along with them in the flow of behavior or action.

Since, fundamentally, integration has two distinct formats in Sorokin's system, it is only consistent that his thought would encompass a distinctive view toward the nature of "causality" among social phenomena. In effect, his integralist perspective divides relationships among sociocultural "variables" into "(1) chance relationships between congeries and (2) meaningful-causal relationships between the parts of the same system and between respective systems."[22]

Clearly, such a position sets Sorokin apart from sociologists who attempt to rely on a purely "probabilistic" methodology. But, as Sorokin insists,

> the variables of the probabilistic approach have to be few in number, narrow in scope, and highly recurrent. Such comprehensive variables as econ-

> omic systems, democracy, religion, ethical systems, and the fine arts -- not to mention the supersystems . . . are not amenable to study by this method. 23

The elemental dynamics of cultural systems, whether integrated or not, is their perpetual externalization by human beings.[24] And the process of this ongoing culture-building includes three phases. These are:

> (1) The conception (invention, creation, and unification) of two or more meanings, values and norms to form a consistent system or congeries; (2) the objectification of the ideological system or congeries in the vehicles; (3) its socialization among human beings in either an ideological form only or behavioral and material forms. 25

These ideas closely resemble those given us by Berger and Luckmann in posing three "dialectical moments" of expression in a "socially constructed reality."[26] For Berger and Luckmann, the symbolic universe is seen as the "matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings."[27] Individual action is seen as events that occur within such a structure. Paralleling Sorokin's are their three "dialectical moments" of the social which they call "externalization, objectification and internalization."[28] As Sorokin notes, and as Berger and Luckmann would agree, these phases or "moments" may be "telescoped in time sequence."[29] Generally, however, Sorokin thinks of conception as being prior to objectification and socialization.[30] It might also be argued, however, that a more consistent understanding here is implied in the fact that these "operations"

of the psyche are not located in time-space. The three moments of human action become "caught" in time-space only as they are objectified. Hence, with regard to the psyche there is no "first" moment, but with respect to the concrete praxis, the social consists of the very tension between psyche and its objectifications. It is this tension which "appears" as the facts of internalization and externalization emerge.[31]

The conception or "idea" for Sorokin may be thought of as beginning with "simple systems," like "That is my bottle," or "The moon is yellow," which are given in interactions between human beings. Citing Pavlov, Sorokin sees the human mind as tending toward the "combination of images," or patterning of ideas out of an innate curiousity.[32]

But while the typical human being is capable of generating simple systems, this is not the case with respect to important ideological systems. "Only a small number of individuals, in only a small number of groups, are capable of conceiving such systems." (italics removed)[33] Further, only small numbers, "hardly more than fifty,"[34] of all the nationalities, ethnic groups, tribes and clans have created important cultural systems. Creative genius, it seems, is as rare as an adaptive genetic mutation.

There are five basic factors, though, which favor the discovery of new ideological systems. These are: (1) Favor-

able heredity; (2) the social need for a new system which might arise, for example, as a result of war or some other contingency; (3) the cross-fertilization of a culture area with useful ideas, i.e., cultural diffusion; (4) good luck; (5) cultural freedom.[35] Regarding the first of these, Sorokin hastens to disavow any sort of "genetic determinism." He is, he indicates, only pointing to the puzzle of genius and the manner in which it suddenly appears in various cultural settings. In effect, one explanation for a Mozart may be some as yet unknown hereditary factor. And as for cultural freedom, Sorokin takes his stand with the position (countering Danilevsky and Toynbee) that only a necessary minimum is required; there should be just enough freedom to permit creativity.

Sorokin's discussions of objectification may be summarized by noting that he emphasizes: (1) the availability of vehicles, (2) the capacity of the human mind for interpreting and recombining meanings, given any set of vehicles in a social environment, and (3) the criteria by which vehicles are created, selected, or synthesized. Thus, television technology has necessary "prerequisites"; literature requires not only a cultural lore, but some means of writing. And, through reason, intuition and sensory inputs together, new vehicles may be derived through the combining and abstracting properties of mind.[36] Finally, the "direction" of vehicle selection, it must be implied, will reflect basic

premises of dominant mentalities. Sensate supersystems will encourage science, for example, with an emphasis on empirical information and causal operations. Ideational orders may select "vehicles" appropriate to a concern with contemplation and the pursuit of eternal values.

By the term socialization, Sorokin does not mean to imply some process of human psychogenesis in the fashion of Mead or Cooley.[37] Socialization in Sorokin's system is, essentially, the diffusion of ideas, behaviors or material artifacts through social space.[38] For our purposes here, nothing further need be said about this topic except to reiterate that the types of cultural systems for Sorokin are either ideological, behavioral, or material and that these need not be transmitted (or diffused) together. Most importantly though, it is a convention of Sorokin's system that cultural systems are, above all, systems of ideas.

To discover the possible types of cultural systems, therefore, we must look to the elemental categories of ideas and not just to material manifestations of them. Sorokin gives as the main cultural systems language, science, religion, art and ethics.[39] These five, it should be noted, represent fundamental capacities of mind. Thus, language represents a generalized symbol-making capacity. Science represents the manipulative, operational functioning of mind, the causal or objective mode. Religion may be thought to stand for the psyche's acausal capacity for grasping re-

lational understandings. Art would seem to be related both to man's quest for the beautiful and to the playful property of mind.[40] Finally, ethics may be seen as representing the need of men in groups to order their actions and to have them validated by some consensus about norms.

Other sorts of cultural systems are, for Sorokin, derivative or "mixed" in nature.[41] Thus, main systems may be mixed; one may find science-religion or religion-art. Of greater importance perhaps, are derivative cultural systems such as economics, politics, and philosophy. The latter, by the way, is seen as having its own nature, _sui generis_. At its best it combines ethics, religion and science, but in such a manner as to give rise to a fully new sort of "compound." Integrated philosophical systems may also, in Sorokin's thought, be seen to yield a finite set of _elemental_ positions about reality. Epistemologies, thus, may range from Empiricism to Mysticism; metaphysics may span types between Idealism and Materialism.

Similarly, economic and political systems may represent new "compounds" at their best, again combining elements of the main five. And, to be sure, his comments regarding these are both extensive and fascinating, but they cannot concern us further here.[42]

Behavior. For Sorokin, the difference between categories of the cultural and the social is " . . . conditional and relative."[43] The social world is the _objective_ dimen-

sion of cultural ideas, values or norms as these are acted out. Put another way, interaction is elemental to the super-organic; in a non-mechanistic approach, it is the "atom" of things social.[44]

Now the dynamic or processual analysis of interaction for Sorokin centers on a consideration of three basic types which he calls the _familistic_, the _contractual_, and the _compulsory_. These, in turn are to be understood with reference to a set of "modalities" such as one which bears on interactive "direction." Direction in this case, refers to an affective sense of social action; interaction may be _solidary_, _neutral_ or _antagonistic_.[45] A structural modality ranges between organization and disorganization. A property called extensity refers to the range of experiences and activities seen as appropriate to the sphere of a particular interactive system. Marriage, for example, is expected to involve high extensity; one's interaction with a sales clerk is low in extensity. Intensity, on the other hand, may be a property of either a marriage or a transaction with one's dentist.

The analysis of the structure of interaction gives rise to a fairly complete treatment of group forms, extending from the categorization of groups to a theory of stratification. Among the most important of these structural considerations, beyond the presence or absence of organization, is the number of shared _values_ in a group. In these terms a

family may be thought of as multibonded while a work organization may be simply unibonded. Again, though, a discussion of the nature of Sorokin's ideas about human groups and organizations is beyond the scope of this essay.[46]

Sorokin is elaborate in his consideration of the types of interaction and their changes with respect to changes in dominant mentalities.[47] The familistic type of interaction among these types is marked, ideally, by as "all embracing extensity, high intensity, purely solidary direction and durability."[48] To characterize this style, Sorokin refers to Aristotle's treatment of true friendship. "The real friend," he notes from Aristotle, is "one who intends and does what is good . . . to another for that other's sake."[97] Familistic relations, thus, are made by "mutual love, devotion and sacrifice."[50]

The contractual type is limited in its duration and extensity, although its intensity, of course, may be high or low. This type is also solidary with respect to the terms and objectives of the contract. Still, Sorokin sees this sort of solidarity as "in a sense egoistic," since it involves, "getting as much as possible for as little as possible."[51] A close relatedness between people, represented for Sorokin by the altruism of his familistic type, tends to be excluded in the contractual type by the need for constraint and by the need of the contracting parties to be exact in defining the terms of the contract. To the extent

that a relationship is contractual in nature, it is limited both in time and in extensity. On the other hand, to be in contractual relationship with another is also to have selected the terms of the contract. Thus, although the contractual type may be based on "utilitarian and hedonistic considerations . . . carefully calculated . . . and rationalistically bargained,"[52] it also permits freedom to the individual.

The purely compulsory type of interaction is characterized, chiefly, by being antagonistic in nature. It is imposed, therefore, "contrary to the desire and inclination" of one or more parties; it is coercive.[53]

In actual life the ideal interactional types are seldom encountered. Instead the types "run together."[54] A family may be "pseudo familistic." It may become what R. D. Laing characterizes in his harsh portrait of the necral family. Here, the actual nature of the parents' actions is to "consume" children by a sham love which betrays the child's experience. "Love" may become violence which pries the child away from his experience of reality, "re-directing" that experience through alienating conventions of interaction.[55] In other instances, contractual relationships may be riddled with coercion, even as a norm. How much choice, for example, does a Southern textile worker have about the conditions of his employment "contract?" For that matter, how much choice is exhibited by the rank and file

in routine collective bargaining between labor unions and management? As Simmel has shown us, even the relationship between slave and master -- a paradigm of the compulsory type -- may not be free of conditions imposed on the master.[56]

In the next chapter we will consider how the three ideals of interaction are related to changes in the great supersystems. For although the main types of interaction may be ideals, ideals may sometimes be approached and, certainly, ideals may have periods of ascendancy that may be related to fundamental premises about the nature of reality.

Personality. Although Sorokin's superorganic universe is taken as consisting of "three interdependent systems,"[57] the personality as a system is least well developed in his over-all scheme.

The psychogenesis of human personality for Sorokin, following Durkheim, Cooley, Mead, Piaget and others, is seen as a reflection of the social order;[58] it is patterned by interaction. Or, put another way, "Personality is a microcosm reflecting the sociocultural macrocosm wherein the individual is born and lives."[59] Biological conditions, to be sure, play their part in human existence, but overall, sociocultural forces determine the significant aspects of the environment, the availability of roles, personality, mentality, and, to some extent, the biological properties of the organism.[60]

Sorokin's model of the personality has four levels, but only three of them are considered in theoretical writings. Further, two of these -- the levels bearing on the biological -- seem to blend illusively into one another. Thus, there is first a superempirical or transcendental soul which must be left, as he says, to religion and to metaphysics. (That may be unfortuante since this "egoless soul" is thought to be the ultimate agent which integrates biological and conscious egos into a unity.)

The three remaining levels include a set of conscious <u>sociocultural egos</u>, a set of <u>biological egos</u>, and a set of unconscious biological predispositions which be thought of as corresponding to reflexes or drives. The latter, of course, would include air, water, food and sex "drives."

The most distinctive feature of Sorokin's ideas about personality, perhaps, is his insistance that the social self is a collection of "egos" or "selves."

> . . . The individual has not one empirical soul or self or ego, but several: first biological, and second, social egos. The individual has as many different social egos as there are different social groups and strata with which he is connected. These egos are as different from one another as the social groups and strata from which they spring. 62

The various empirical egos not only reflect various roles, they are rooted in the set of group memberships. The set of these egos may be harmonious or disharmonious depending on whether or not an individual's group-set "urges that

individual to think, feel, and act in the same way."[63] Needless to say, particularly in complex, highly differentiated societies, a complete harmony of the "egos" is problematic. As Sorokin says, the "family self" may be quite different from the "occupational self" with respect to values, or to demands made upon the person. To use an example like Sorokin's, the "selves" may be as distinct as the Blue Danube and a James Taylor ballad, even though they are "played" on the same nervous system.[64]

The conscious biological egos seem to blend hazily into unconscious drives. In Sorokin's rather peculiar use of the term "ego" here, one may count an ego for each drive. Hence, there is a "sex-ego," a "hunger-ego," a "self-protection-ego," and so on. Depending on the situation, these may be conscious or not. And, as in the case of the social egos, any one biological ego may stand in a solidary or an antagonistic relationship with another. The "food-ego," thus may become conscious along with a "self-protection" ego in the instance when individual A is risking farmer Brown's shotgun to steal breakfast from the latter's orchard.

Now this essay is aimed, in part, at showing how the polar mentalities in Sorokin's theory of change may be understood in terms of a duality of mind. That is, the relational and objective modes of the psyche are thought to parallel the Ideational and Sensate mentalities. But it

should be clearly understood that for Sorokin himself, the duality of the social person is represented by the division between the social and the biological egos or ego-sets.

The biological ego for Sorokin represents a counterpart to the Freudian id, or less neatly, to Jung's notion of the unconscious. Responding particularly to the psychoanalytic ideas (rather than to the greater subtleties of Jung's thought) Sorokin deplores the depiction of the id as satanic, treacherous, radically asocial or irrational. As he sees it, the biological egos are "neither irrational nor rational, neither anti-social nor social."[65] Instead, there is a rather complex relationship of the various biological egos to the set of social ones. He also warns that we must differentiate between the nature of this biological ego-set at different stages of the life cycle. Thus, childhood, adulthood and old-age incline persons toward particular sorts of social roles which reflect organic limitations and propensities.[66]

Yet, for good or ill, there is in Sorokin's view a genuine and continuing struggle between the biological and the social in man. Thus, he cites Durkheim's essay, Le dualisme de la nature humaine, to the effect that there are two "persons" in every individual; the biological and the social.[67] This idea, Sorokin says, is a psychic principle. In the moral sphere, as he says, this dualism

is manifested in the opposition between the egois-

> tic and altruistic wishes and actions; between our social and carnal egos; between the biological temptations and moral and social duties; between the bodily appetites and the social norms inhibiting them; between the flesh and the spirit. 68

There is a dynamic as well as a structural account of personality in Sorokin's system. But with comparison to his insights into cultural change they are sketchy and, frankly, a little unsatisfying.

The life cycle of the human actor is emphasized in the dynamic account. He feels that the immanent unfolding of the organism undergirds the formation and transposition of roles as persons move through the life cycle. As biological predispositions push man inexorably from infancy to old age, from role-set to role-set, it is the sociocultural environment which largely determines the individual's identity. Thus, as a "microcosm" each person may be thought of as having an ideological, a behavioral, and a material culture. And quite simply, it appears that the relationships between these parallels that of the three dimensions of the superorganic itself.

Summarizing Sorokin's System of Sociology. In Table 2 an effort has been made to summarize key concepts in Sorokin's system of general sociology. (Needless to say, the special sociologies -- criminology, stratification, and so on -- do not bear on this essay.) The left margin of the table represents the tri-partate division of the superorganic. The top of the table is divided between the

TABLE 2

A SUMMARY OF SOROKIN'S SYSTEM OF SOCIOLOGY

Levels of the Superorganic	Concepts	
	Structural	Dynamic
Culture	1. Supersystems (Ideational, Idealistic, Sensate) 2. The main cultural systems (religion, science, art, ethics, language) 3. Derived and Mixed systems; Congeries 4. Simple systems	Principles of Change: 1. Immanent change 2. Limits 3. Linear (accretion)
Society (behavior)	1. Unibonded groups (race, sex, nationality) 2. Multibonded groups (family, tribe, class, state) 3. General forms of stratification	1. Interactional types (familistic, compulsory, contractual) 2. Interactional modes (antagonistic, solidary, etc.)
Personality	1. Social ego-set (roles corresponding to group memberships) 2. Biological ego-set ("drives," "reflexes") 3. Personality types	1. Dynamics of immanent development (life cycle) 2. Dynamics of contingency (effects of war, class struggle, normal mobility, disease, etc.)

structural and the dynamic emphases.

In Table 2 the principles of change (in the upper right cell) are found to correspond to the cultural level. It should be understood however, that Sorokin sees the principles of change as bearing on all three levels of the sociocultural universe, culture, society and personality. Still, Sorokin's sociology centers on the nature of ideological or cultural systems. He argues, for example, that that both quantitative and qualitative changes in behavior and personality move toward or away from consistency with the ideological supersystem. In effect, where there is an integrated sociocultural world it is patterned at all levels on the premises and properties of the supersystem.[69]

The summary constituted by the table is meant to focus on concepts relevant to this essay while still being fair to Sorokin's thought. It is, of course, selective and interpretive.

Cultural Mentalities

Culture for Sorokin includes both _external_ and _internal_ aspects. The first is " . . . composed of inorganic and organic phenomena," including all of their manifestations in terms of objectivity or process, "which incorporate or realize or externalize the internal [social and cultural] experience."[70] And internal culture is the "realm of mind, value, meaning, which, for the sake of brevity Sorokin characterizes by the term 'mentality of culture.'"[71]

Recognizing that there are varying degrees of meaningful integration which may bind the elements of external culture, Sorokin has proposed two opposed, ideal cultural types. But here it will be best to let Sorokin speak for himself.

> We can begin by distinguishing two profoundly different types of the integrated culture. Each has its own mentality; its own system of truth and knowledge; its own philosophy and _Weltanschauung_; its own type of religion and standards of "holiness"; its own system of right and wrong; its own forms of art and literature; its own mores, laws, codes of conduct; its own predominant forms of social relationships; its own political and economic organization; and, finally, its own type of _human personality_, with a peculiar mentality and conduct. The values which correspond to one another throughout these cultures are irreconcilably at variance in their nature; but within each culture all the values fit together closely . . . .
>
> Of these two systems one may be termed _Ideational_ culture, the other _Sensate_. And as these names characterize the culture as a whole, so do they indicate the nature of each of the component parts. 72

In these paragraphs we glimpse the controversial scope of Sorokin's thought and discover three critical propositions of his theory of change.

The first of these propositions is the idea that what characterizes any integrated set of cultural systems is common values, including distinctive points of view about reality. Each ideal culture, that is, has its appropriate mentality. Secondly, the idea that diverse systems of culture, such as the arts, literature, law, technologies, etc., may be consistent implies that certain values or meanings

may "over-ride" or transcend particular cultural manifestations, styles of behavior or techniques of utilizing the natural environment. This is not to say that Sorokin sees himself as a cultural determinist. He is, in fact, critical of what he calls the "main factor" theories of Marx, Weber or Ogburn.[73] From his integralist perspective, Sorokin sees change as proceeding in terms which, in some way, blend the contingencies of praxis, the properties of the psyche, and the peculiar characteristics of meaning (or value) systems. It must also be noted, though, that the main thrust of Sorokin's thought is to show how praxis (action in the empirical world), and psyche appear as aspects of empirical sociocultural phenomena. It remains to be seen whether this emphasis is a weakness or a strength of Sorokin's thinking. In any case, another way in which Sorokin reveals this idea of the primacy of integrating values or meanings is in his critique of kindred social philosophies. Thus, after analyzing the historical theories of Spengler, Danilevsky, Toynbee, Kroeber and others, he notes the junction of all of these approaches at the notion of a transcendant cultural framework or "supersystem."[74] "In the boundless ocean of sociocultural phenomena," he writes,

> there exists a kind of vast cultural entity, or cultural system, or civilization which lives and functions as a real entity. It is not identical with the state or the nation or any other social group. [75]

Continuing in his effort to find areas of agreement between himself and these other "grand theorists," Sorokin finds a second area of concord in the notion that the number of types of such supersystems is quite limited. He cites his own Sensate-to-Ideational types as an example, noting their rough parallel with Spengler's Apollonian-Faustian types, or Danilevsky's Positive, Negative and Ethnographic types.[76]

The third important proposition to be found in the above paragraphs is that the main or polar types, the Ideational and the Sensate, are "irreconcilably at variance."[77] This assertion will lead us, finally, to a third change principle, a principle of choosing; it is therefore most important for the theme of this essay. But it must remain to examine just how Sorokin's understanding of this "exclusivity property" may be elaborated on or, perhaps, modified.

Cultural Premises. For each of the ideal, integrated cultural types, the Sensate, the Ideational and the balanced Idealistic, there is a single characteristic premise about the nature of reality.[78] The Sensate premise is that reality is fundamentally sensory in nature, that what we can know through the senses is, in fact, the "ground of being." The Ideational premise asserts that reality is supersensory, even that the empirical world is an illusory veil. The Idealistic premise affirms that reality is both sensory and supersensory. There are other "solutions" as to the nature

of reality, of course. One is that reality is unknown and unknowable -- the position of skepticism. Another is that the apparent (phenomenal) aspect of reality is knowable while its transcendant or supersensory face is hidden from us. This latter position Sorokin associates with Hume's empirical skepticism or with Kant's noumenal-phenomenal dichotomy.[79] The many seemingly ungainly hybrid solutions one might derive from associating fragments of the five "major" solutions are not seen as important in civilizational terms. In Sorokin's thought, any such eclectic blend, taking irreconcilable premises together, would constitute a <u>congeries</u>, not a system.

Sorokin sees Skepticism and Agnosticism, the last two of the five most consistent solutions, as negative. They cannot, he tells us, serve as "a basis for a long existing integrated culture by virtue of the principle of limit and immanent change."[80] We are left, thus, with the Sensate, Ideational and Idealistic premises on which to build lasting cultural supersystems.

Now Sorokin does <u>not</u> maintain that there is any concrete historical case which has been purely Sensate, Idealistic or Ideational. No actual culture is ever fully integrated around any reality premise, and one may not expect to find an El Dorado wherein people are "homogeneous" as to their mentality.[81] With these reservations in mind, however, we may proceed to characterize the three mentalities as

ideal types.

The Sensate. Beyond any reality premise, Sorokin teaches us, a mentality must also include some "solution" regarding (1) the nature of needs and ends to be satisfied, (2) the degree to which such defined needs-ends are to be satisfied, and (3) the method of satisfying these defined needs.[82] Given some reality premise then, one may imagine a set of consistent solutions regarding needs (things valued), their nature, and the means of attaining them.

For Sorokin, the purely Sensate needs may be seen as "carnal or sensual," as opposed to the purely spiritual needs of the Ideational type. The degree to which needs are to be satisfied one may take as a "function" of the commitment to a particular reality premise. A Sensate mentality may embrace carnal-sensual needs as "primary," yet be variably committed to attaining them.

As to the method of satisfying needs, Sorokin instructs us that adaptations may proceed by (1) the modification of empirical circumstances, (2) the modification of the self or of one's responses to an environment, or (3) some balanced combination of these. Needless to say the Sensate "method" is modification of the environment.

Now Sorokin speaks often of the multi-faceted nature of truth. Truth is "white" as he says.[83] It is a seamless composite of the coincidentia oppositorum,[84] embracing the Becoming emphasized by a thinker like Heraclitus, or the time-

less categories of Being given by Plato. Still, while some balanced view of this "mixture of colors" is possible -- in the Idealistic mentality to be specific -- the tendency remains in human beings to see one "color" at a time. The Sensate mentality, in these terms, centers on the reality of change and process, of evolution and flux.

In its <u>active</u> aspect the Sensate mentality is represented for Sorokin by great temporal rulers, by Caesar, Lenin or Napolean. But where we find people "drunk with empirical life," whether warlord or junior executive, we are contending with the Sensate mentality. After the conquerors one may recall popular images of Teddy Roosevelt, or of the steel imperialist Andrew Carnegie, or even of Jack London's men-againt-nature. Or, perhaps, as Sorokin writes, "This type of mentality . . . is so well known, it is so common in this age, that no further commentary is necessary here."[85]

But there is a <u>passive</u> variety of the Sensate mentality. Sorokin cites as examples of this more hedonistic orientation selected literature of ancient Egypt ("Follow thy desire and do good to thyself."[86]), and in Renaissance Europe, Boccaccio's <u>Decameron</u>. Also, a bit sardonically, he points to the modern, consumer-oriented image of <u>homo economicus</u>. What is more passive or more Sensate than a mind which links pleasurable "self-actualization" to advertisements for deodorants, or to the latest automotive fantasy

from British Leyland.

To these examples one might add the images conveyed by Jack Kerouac out of America's 1950's.[87] More problematic is the place in Sorokin's vision for the instant "flower culture" of the sixties, the puzzle of Haight Ashbury, or the uncertain trajectory of Ken Kesey's psychedelic school bus."[88]

The Ideational. The Ideational mentality is guided by the truth of faith. With a supersensory vision of the world, Tertullian could ponder the death of the Son of God and characterize that event as ". . . credible because it is absurd."[89] Sorokin designates the teachings of the major world religions as springing from and fostering the Ideational mentality. "Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Taoism, Sufism, and early Christianity . . . have been predominately Ideational," Sorokin writes. "Ascetic Ideational at the highest level, Active Ideational on a lower, and Idealistic and Mixed on the lowest."[90] All Ideational systems of teaching and thought, Sorokin feels, espouse an ascetic "world-renouncing" vision in their "sublime and supreme form."[91]

For the Ideational mentality sensual and carnal objectives are secondary or altogether subservient to things spiritual. The primary needs of this view are simply transcendant of empirical matters. Whether the quest is for Nirvana or Salvation in Christ, the "end" amounts to a negation of "worldly values." In these terms, the degree to which

spiritual needs are to be satisified are as "extreme" in their way as those of the most ambitious Epicurean. The aim of the Zen disciple is nothing less than total enlightenment, a transcendance of time and space; the goal of the ascetic Christian is (or was) nothing less than total committment, all-embracing "Christ-consciousness."

The method of achieving Ideational needs is, in Sorokin's view, clearly centered in the control (negation, subjugation, transcending) of the "self." Particularly in their sublime early forms, the Ideational world-vision involves melting man's links to the empirical world. However, as religious teachings become diffused to the masses of men, active ideationalism appears to dilute and transform the ascetic quest. At first there are the "housekeeping" chores and internal squabbles we see reflected in Paul's letters to the young Christian Church.[92] Later, temporal princes like Asoka in India, or Constantine in Europe, act to institutionalize the religious systems and their earlier purity fades. (One is reminded of Weber's discussion of Charisma and its rountinization.[93]) It seems, in fact, that the very act of organizing an Ideational vision in some social environment is but the first step toward Holy War in the name of Allah, the Machiavellian undercurrents of the Christian Crusades, or the nightmare human flesh burning by the "holy" direction of a Malleus Malificarum.[94] Negation of the self is transformed into negation of the causal order itself as

divine inspiration is turned outward in the bedlam of the battle field or the market place.

The Idealistic Synthesis. Of the three major integrated mentalities, the Idealistic is both the least likely and, somehow, the most attractive. Certainly, one must observe, it represents the mentality Sorokin thinks necessary to any who would risk the paradox and complexity of his integralist perspective on sociology. Sorokin clearly prefers it.[95]

Yet he must admit that historical periods where the Idealistic view has been dominant have been rare. And, as he notes quite apropos of the work of this essay, "The reason for the rarity of the Idealisitc form . . . is probably the exceedingly great difficulty of reaching a real synthesis of elements opposite in nature, the Ideational and the Sensate."[96]

Nevertheless where one may envision a mentality that balances sensory and spiritual needs on the glittering edge of an Aristotelean mean, there we may have a subjective picture of an Idealistic mind. The balancing act, for Sorokin, is accomplished by reason. As Sorokin states flatly in Crisis of Our Age,

> Human reason . . . combines into one organic whole the truth of the senses, the truth of faith, and the truth of reason. These are the essential of the Idealistic system of truth and knowledge. 97

As the only "perfectly integrated and logically con-

sistent form of Mixed mentality,"[98] the Idealistic must be characterized as illusive but influential out of proportion to its short periods of ascendancy. As Sorokin demonstrates, the Idealistic periods of history have been marked by creative brilliance. The time that spanned the years of Plato and Aristotle was brief (427-322 B.C.), yet one must concede the importance of this period to Western culture. Similarly, the Idealistic "chemistry" of European civilization between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries gave birth to music that seems beyond the capacity of later Western cultural configurations to emulate. In Bach, Mozart and Beethoven, Sorokin finds the "miracle if Idealistic music."[99] In fact, in a passage by Sorokin about Beethoven, one gets an insight into Sorokin's meaning of the term Idealistic. "In Beethoven," he writes,

> . . . finally we have the music of a sage, to whom all the known ecstasy of wisdom and all the tragedy of reality are known; who has scaled the heights of empirical pain and pleasure, with its noble and vulgar aspects; who has fathomed all this and not been seduced by it. He knows its inexorability as Destiny, but he knows also that beside and beyond it there is another world, the world of . . . supersensory values, something difficult to define and put into words, but expressible in the mysterious language of music. 100

Significantly perhaps, it is difficult to find a "man on the street" characterization of the Idealistic mentality, particularly if we concede that its manifestations are contingent on persons having scaled the heights of reason.[101]

Far more typical, as Sorokin explains, are the sundry

Mixed types of mentalities -- other than the Idealistic. Yet what can one say of these? They are, it seems, characteristic of the cluttered diversity of actual "types" among human beings. The projected personalities of recent Western literature, for example, seem to this writer to be most often poorly integrated, mixed mentalities. Surely, as citizens of a Sensate time, we identify quickly enough with the "mixed" world view of a character from an Updike novel (say Piet in _Couples_, or Caldwell, the high school teacher protagonist of _The Centaur_). And certainly, if Charles Schultz's Charlie Brown is an everyman for our age, the mentality conveyed by his actions suggests something less than an integrated type.[102] The cognitive and evaluative conflicts of actual human lives would seem to indicate that many of us muddle through with "mixed" mentalities of one sort or another.[103]

Sorokin, as I have indicated above, divides the main mentalities into sub-types. But along with active or ascetic Ideational types, active and passive Sensate types, and the various Mixed varieties (from Idealistic to non-integrated), he sketches two additional types.

The _Cynical Sensate_ mentality has not been "endorsed _openly_ by any great system or group," it seems, but

> . . . in a limited way, it enters into the mentality and conduct of almost all human beings who do not always tell the whole truth . . . . In brief, those who are to some extent "hypocrites," "diplomats," "well educated persons," . . . and so on. [104]

As an ideal, this type could be represented by the well integrated con man, perhaps one of the famous Texas "flim-flam" men such as Billie Sol Estes.

Finally, the Pseudo-Ideational type appears to be a sort of residual category. Sorokin writes that it might be styled "subcultural if the term culture were to designate only a logically integrated system."[105] In effect the category designates human beings upon whom sociocultural conditions have been imposed. The deprivations of slavery, of hard labor in a prison, of indentured service or serfdom, deprives one of options. Sensual and spiritual needs are, perhaps, only minimally supplied, but this "asceticism" is not selected out of convictions derived from values. More than any other type described by Sorokin, this one seems to be understandable, as it were, from the "outside." For certainly, as Sorokin might note, if the constraints of a galley slave are loosed, some other mentality (probably Sensate) may quickly emerge.

NOTES

[1]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 3.

[2]Ibid., p. 42.

[3]See F. R. Cowell, Values in Human Society: The Contributions of Pitirim A. Sorokin to Sociology (F. Porter Sargent, 1970). By showing how Sorokin places values at the center of his sociology, Cowell also demonstrates the importance of ideological (cultural) systems for Sorokin. In one place in his book he states, flatly, that "the superior power of Sorokin's presentation over all alternative schemes so far proposed is due to the fact that it is soundly based upon an understanding of the implications of culture." (p. 280) See also Jacques Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, trans. by John F. Locke (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). In his treatment of Sorokin, Maquet notes that it is around the intuition of the three great supersystems -- the Ideational, the Sensate, and the Idealistic -- that he integrates his system of sociology. (p. 120)

[4]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1941), IV, 12n.

[5]Pitirim A, Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time (1943; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 16.

[6]Sorokin, Society, p. 3.

[7]Robert K. Merton and Bernard Barber in the critique of Sorokin entitled "Sorokin's Foundations in the Sociology of Science," raise this sort of issue obliquely in questioning Sorokin's integralist perspective. In claiming that Sorokin clings, finally, to Sensate premises (and, therefore, "scientific" ones) these authors seem also to affirm that Sensate perspective as the solid fulcrum on which intuition and sensory input must balance. In effect, Merton and Barber are noting that Sorokin's superorganic is both "reasonable" and "beyond-reasonable." But they do not follow out the implications of that observation; they are only concerned to defend the attack on "scientific" validity. See Philip J. Allen, ed., Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 332-368.

[8]As Sorokin notes, we need not know Beethoven's motives to understand his music as music. Sorokin, Dynamics,

p. 59.

[9]Vehicles become interdependent once pressed into service. This is not because of the nature of the vehicles, i.e., their chemical or physical properties, but because they have become related by meanings. See Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 35.

[10]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 10. Sorokin later elaborates these four types to six. See Sorokin, Society, p. 145. The elaboration, however, does not add substantially to what is needed here for making sense of Sorokin's ideas about integration.

[11]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 11.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid., p. 13.

[14]Ibid., p. 15.

[15]Ibid., p. 19.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 12.

[18]Michael Polanyi has a special meaning for this term "boundary condition" which we will return to later in this essay. For the present it might be noted, simply, that the nature of an artifact -- say a brass vase -- is contingent the nature of the materials from which it is made, that is, on the physical properties of brass. See Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being: Essays, edited by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969).

[19]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 20

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., p. 21.

[22]Sorokin, Causality, p. 91.

[23]Ibid., p. 97.

[24]Sorokin, Society, p. 537.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966).

[27]Ibid., p. 96.

[28]Ibid., pp. 60-61; 129. It is interesting that in their entire work, Sorokin is only given one reference and that, on p. 11, with regard to his influence on Merton!

[29]Sorokin, Society, p. 537.

[30]See, for example, Sorokin's comments, Society, p. 325 ff. As with the sociocultural universe, the individual's culture is integrated around conceptions or ideas.

[31]Georg Simmel argues this sort of point in a similar way. See, for example, his essay called "The Transcendant Character of Social Life," in Donald N. Levine, ed., Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 353-374.

[32]Sorokin, Society, p. 538.

[33]Ibid., p. 539.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., pp. 540-543.

[36]Ibid., p. 556 ff.

[37]Ibid., p. 714 cf.

[38]Ibid., p. 563 ff. See Also, Sorokin, Causality, p. 115. For Sorokin, "Not only . . . pure meanings, but even objectified and socialized meanings cannot be located in . . . geometric space of any kind."

[39]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, pp. 106-120.

[40]See Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950). Huizinga argues for the importance of other factors such as competition in the plastic arts, but he does see music, for example, as essentially "playful." The part of play in the social universe is also treated in an interesting way by Edward T. Hall. See, The Silent Language (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1959). Hall sees play as a poorly understood but elemental "message system" among others, including language, defense, bisexuality, etc. See particularly,

pp. 56-57.

[41]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV. 120.

[42]These problems are treated extensively in Sorokin, Dynamics, III, chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8. His ideas about polity and economics, incidentally, are not separable from his conceptions of different ideals of freedom corresponding to the main supersystems or mentalities.

[43]Ibid., p. 3.

[44]A meaningful interaction is defined by Sorokin as "any interaction where the influence exerted by one party over another has a meaning or value superimposed upon the purely physical and biological properties of the respective actions." See Sorokin, Society, p. 40. In this regard, see also Sorokin, Dynamics, III, chapter 1.

[45]Sorokin, Dynamics, III, 21.

[46]On the nature of sociocultural interaction see the summary table in Sorokin, Society, p. 66. On the theory of groups see the same source, chapters 8 and 9. Social mobility is treated in Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility (New York: The Free Press, 1959). See also Society, chapters 10 through 16.

[47]Sorokin is not much interested in systems of interaction which are short lived, unorganized or low in intensity. These, he says, "count for comparatively little in the social world. Sorokin, Dynamics, III, 23.

[48]Ibid., p. 24.

[49]Ibid., p. 25.

[50]Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1941), p. 167.

[51]Sorokin, Dynamics, III, 30.

[52]Ibid., p. 35.

[53]Ibid., p. 35 ff.

[54]Ibid., p. 38.

[55]Ronald Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Ballantine, 1967).

[56]See Kurt H. Wolfe, trans., ed., The Sociology of Georg Simmel (New York: The Free Press, 1950)

[57]Sorokin, Society, p. 347.

[58]Ibid., p. 343 ff.

[59]Ibid., p. 714.

[60]Ibid., pp. 714-715.

[61]Ibid., p. 45n.

[62]Ibid., p. 345.

[63]Ibid., p. 351.

[64]Ibid., p. 348.

[65]Ibid., p. 347. Sorokin cites in particular here, Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1960), and C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949). His generalizations about the unconscious seem not to fit the subtleties of Jung's thought. It is a little surprising, in fact, that the kindred nature of their ideas did not occur to him, particularly as regards the general polarity of mentalities represented by the nature of introversion-extroversion.

[66]Sorokin, Society, p. 347.

[67]Ibid., p. 346.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Ibid., p. 587.

[70]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 55.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ibid., p. 67.

[73]See particularly, Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, pp. 155-196, where Sorokin discusses these authors as representing a dichotomous approach to social change. In general, Sorokin abhors the division of the sociocultural universe into material and non-material, a division he sees as false and misleading.

[74]See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Modern Historical and Social Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1950).

[75]Ibid., p. 275.

[76]Ibid., pp. 49-112, for the discussion of these two thinkers.

[77]Ibid.

[78]See Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, pp. 738-739 and Sorokin Dynamics, I, 70 ff.

[79]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 738.

[80]Ibid., p. 739.

[81]This is stated unequivocally. See Sorokin, Society, pp. 325-341. Also, Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 141 cf.

[82]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 70.

[83]Sorokin, Crisis, pp. 104-105.

[84]Ibid., p. 112.

[85]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 140.

[86]Ibid., p. 141.

[87]John Kerouac, On the Road (New York: Viking Press, 1957).

[88]The popular account of Kesey's adventures, of course, is Tom Wolfe, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968).

[89]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 85.

[90]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 112.

[91]Ibid. See also the discussions of the Idealistic forms of truth in Sorokin, Dynamics, II, for example, pp. 78-94.

[92]Referring, for example, to such passages as that in Paul's letter to the church at Philippi where we read in chapter 4: ". . . I beg you by name to make up your differences as Christians should! And you, my true fellow worker, I ask you to help these women. They both worked hard with

me for the gospel, . . ." See J. B. Phillips, The New Testament in Modern English (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 416.

93 In his discussions of religion, Weber associates charisma with personal or magical gifts attributed to particular individuals. Prophets may have this property as renewers or founders of religions. See Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans, by Ephraim Fischoff Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 46 ff.

94 For conflicting discussions of the significance of the Malleus Maleficarum, see Charles Williams, Witchcraft (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1971) and Gerald B. Gardner, Witchcraft Today (New York: The Citadel Press, 1970).

95 Sorokin refers time and again to the "marvellous balance" of the Idealistic synthesis. See Sorokin, Dynamics, I, pp. 290; 401; 600, for examples.

96 Ibid., p. 143.

97 Sorokin, Crisis, p. 82.

98 Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 143.

99 Ibid., p. 568.

100 Ibid., p. 579.

101 The Idealistic mentality strikes one as necessarily confined to an elite, perhaps like Plato's philospher-kings in his Republic.

102 Referring, of course, to the syndicated cartoon strip, Peanuts, by Charles Schultz.

103 One could undoubtedly make an intersting study of "mixed" personality types as they are portrayed in modern films.

104 Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 150.

105 Ibid., p. 76.

CHAPTER III

SOROKIN'S VISION OF CHANGE

> Motion and change cannot exist in themselves apart from what moves and changes. For, wherever anything changes, it always changes from one thing to another; or from one magnitude to another; or from one quality to another; or from one place to another . . . . in each of these four cases, there are two poles between which change moves.
>
> Aristotle, Physics[1]

The four volume Social and Cultural Dynamics is certainly the most impressive of Sorokin's theoretical works. It is also, one may argue, the core of his sociological contribution. In any case, taking all his theoretical works, no topics are given more extensive treatment than the nature of culture and the dynamics of its change. In this chapter we will consider Sorokin's findings about change, particularly as these emerge from the Dynamics. Since these findings are so extensive, though, I will need to be selective. While trying to be honest and correct in presenting Sorokin's thought, I must also be attempting to fulfill my plan of investigation.

To do this I will first of all have to show how the idea of world-premises or mentalities is related to change in culture, behavior or personality. Secondly, I will need

to consider change in key systems <u>at the three levels</u> of the superorganic. The over-all objective of the chapter then, will be to supply the substance of a critique. That is, reflecting on the patterns of change that Sorokin found, it will be important purposes of this essay to see whether or not change in the three system levels -- and in the three supersystems -- are roughly consistent.

The question behind such a critique is this: If the three levels, culture, society, and personality, are indeed as inseparable trinity, what is the locus or primary impetus of change? Although this question is not meant to be rhetorical, an answer of a sort is immediately suggested from the discussion up to this point. Namely, the locus of change is in the ultimate premises men in groups may have about the world. That is, for Sorokin, change is mainly change in *ideological* systems. Now such change is constrained by limits, as we shall see, such as those set by biology on the one hand, or by causal possibilities for environmental adaptation on the other. But the main thing that changes is ideas.

Further, without offering to refute much that is substantial about Sorokin's findings concerning change, one must still inquire into the limitations of thinking about the three system levels as, simply, single faces of a seamless reality. A more useful, but still integralist perspective will require us to discover the principle of

change at each level of the superorganic and then to see how these are related. Such an aim, of course, is what this essay is all about. So, in this chapter we will try to show that a principle more like that of complementarity is an option which may be more adequate than the doctrine of an inseparable trinity.

The Systems of Truth

The great supersystems, the world premises around which the elements of the social world may be integrated, are a small set, ever bracketed between the Ideational and the Sensate types. Thus, in its pure form, Sensate truth is a truth of the senses. At another extreme, the pure Ideational truth is one of superempirical, supersensory insight into the nature of the world, into the Divine.[2] Where either of these premises is held to be central, as we have said, the other must be rejected as untenable. Only in the Idealistic synthesis are the truths of faith and of the senses joined by the arbitration of reason.[3]

Now it should be noted that Sorokin himself did not design the *Dynamics* to show *at the outset* that the systems of truth are, roughly, *equivalent* to the nature of the supersystems. Only in the fourth volume of this major work on change, and then only in the sixteenth chapter of that volume is this equivalence made explicit, even though it is evident enough far earlier.[4] Here, in any case, Sorokin writes,

> At the basis of the Ideational or Idealistic or Sensate form of integrated culture lies, as its major premise, its system of truth and reality. It is this premise that, to use W. I. Thomas' term "defines the situation" for the rest of the related compartments of each of these forms of culture.
> Art and philosophy, ethics and religion, science and forms of social organization of a . . . supersystem are articulations of the . . . system of truth and reality. 5

I think it best to assert this equivalence at the outset to make it clear that the locus of sociocultural change for Sorokin is, indeed, the immanent self-development of idea-systems, particularly of the major premises or supersystems.

In analyzing the systems of truth and knowledge, Sorokin first notes that any such system is, "in integrated or unintegrated form . . . embodied in what is loosely styled the <u>Religious</u>, <u>Philosophical</u> and <u>Scientific</u> thought of a given culture."[6] In effect, the mix of these three key cultural systems in any instance takes on a general pattern given by the way people think about the world. These patterns, Ideational, Idealistic, and Sensate, may be designated as having systematic properties <u>sui generis</u>. That is, the pattern <u>is</u> the supersystem which is reflected in attitudes and, presumably, in action orientations to the world.

Underlying the idea that there are distinct "systems of truth" is one of Sorokin's most original and elemental insights. It is that truth, whatever that may be, is known

only in part, whether the world-view be a Sensate one or one of a faith which glimpses its substance through a glass darkly. Sorokin himself must take his integralist stance on some construction of reason which bridges these extremes, that is on an Idealistic synthesis.[7] So Sorokin, as he must, disavows any ultimate allegiance to a truth system, at least for purposes of his sociological work. But reflecting on his finding that the systems of truth in Western culture have shared roughly even weight, he writes,

> The data suggest . . . that possibly each form of truth has its own important function in the psycho-social life of mankind and is equally necessary . . . . Perhaps, indeed, the devil in one of Anatole France's novels was after all not so wrong in saying that the absolute and whole truth is "white." 8

But, again, Sorokin feels that in studying the various truth orientations, he must take the part of an impartial observer.[9]

To trace the actual changes in the systems of truth, Sorokin had first to reduce these systems to six epistemological types and then, further, to a number of first principles such as Idealism-Materialism; Realism-Nominalism; Universalism-Singularism, and so on. The six epistemological types he calls Empiricism, Rationalism, Mysticism, Skepticism, Fideism and Criticism or Agnosticism.[10]

Here, I will first characterize each of the epistemological types. Then I will consider Sorokin's method in measuring changes in these positions and, finally, I will

summarize his findings. Less attention may be spared the various first principles which Sorokin traces through history, but I will, at least, suggest what some of these principles have to do with the epistemological positions.

The Epistemological Positions. Empiricism, strictly speaking, imputes validity only to the observable. Yet, since validity is sensual in nature, only moments exist, only events in space-time. No absolute dicta of reason or understanding may link either moments or events into configurations which span time or space as generalizable realities. Hume's philosophy may be pressed into service as exemplifying this position. His insistence that the world begins (and ends) with impressions of the senses leads to the famous assertion that causality may not be inferred from any finite set of observations which link two events, A and B. In general, cause and effect relationships may be experienced but these experiences may not imply laws of causality. As Hume says, "There is no object which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves."[11] Categories which presume to rise above the nominal, such as the self, are rendered invalid or meaningless.[12]

Rationalism for Sorokin has two variants. One of these leans towards the Ideational, the other toward the Idealistic. But "both regard the truth of reason, of logical and mathematical inference as more valid than the truth of the

senses."[13]

Ideational rationalism however, makes the truth of reason altogether subservient to a supersensory vision. Like mysticism, it embodies the truth of faith, but unlike its Ideational first cousin, this epistemological stance finds a place for intellectual systems, if only as embellishments to things taken whole by intuition or revelation. Plato, Sorokin feels, blends mysticism and Ideational rationalism in his later system. (His earlier work is considered to be more of an Idealistic rationalism.) Augustine of Hippo certainly exemplifies this position as an intellectual heir of Plato, bound by his Christian faith. Russell, discussing Augustine, directs us particularly to Book XI of the Confessions.[14] Here, in an effort to deal with the philosophical problems of creation as revealed in Genesis, Augustine discourses on the nature of time. In doing so, he reveals elements in a vision of reality which illustrate Sorokin's type. Time for Augustine is found to be a property of the "primal substance" and, therefore, a property of mind. Mind or soul, created out of time, participates in the unfolding of the world-stuff as it manifests its potentials or probabilities. This unfolding is experienced by us as time passing. But from a Divine perspective, past, present and future events exist, as it were, all at once. This sort of insight, whether one ascribes validity to it or not, may be considered high-

ly reasonable, given Augustine's premises. It is, as Russell tells us, "first rate philosophy."[15] But, above all, it is philosophy and reason subservient to a need to defend the revealed doctrine of creation given by Genesis.

The aspects of Plato's thought, wherein "all truths are harmoniously blended into one,"[16] is a paradigm of Idealistic rationalism. Aristotle, as Plato's pupil, represents this stance as well, although Sorokin sees his thinking as following a "growing sensualization of Greek culture."[17] Both thinkers, to be sure, may be associated with an Idealistic phase of Greek culture. But for both, too, there are supersensory universals. For Plato, there is the idea of the Good; for Aristotle, there is the idea of the cause which moves without itself being moved. Still, for both there is a reasonable concern with empirical data, even while it is reason and not data that must finally pass on the nature of things.

In the thirteenth century the rise of Scholasticism marked another Idealistic period. The work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) in particular, "was exactly the system of Ideational rationalism."[18] This assertion for Sorokin follows from Aquinas' utilization of Aristotle's understandings. For example, there are for Aquinas three kinds of knowledge -- the sensory, the intellectual, and the divine.[19] Still, for Idealistic rationalism some supersensory elements, some truth of faith reigns as a primus inter

pares. For Aquinas, thus, the objective of the Summa Contra Gentiles is to demonstrate the empirical and reasonable validity of the Christian faith.[20]

Mysticism as a pure truth of faith unencumbered or uninterested by worldly justification is exemplified by two epistemological species. One Sorokin calls "a mysticism par excellence."[21] This is a Mysticism of Despair characterized by world-renouncing visions and ecstasies. Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross are examples of such mystics. The mysticism of Emmanuel Swedenborg might also be placed in this category, although here the ascetic dimension os not pronounced.

A second type of mysticism is little different from religious or Ideational rationalism. This type is represented in the West by the philosophy of Plotinus, although in the East there are any number of examples of this pragmatic brand of mysticism. The Analects of Confucius or the writings of Lao Tzu come to mind.

While the first three epistemological positions are, in their own terms, positive about something, whether it is sensory or supersensory, Skepticism, Fideism and Criticism seem founded on doubt or on negation. "Skepticism has a cynical mask; . . . others -- Mysticism and Fideism -- a pathetic one."[22] Criticism, on the other hand, as a phenomenon of more recent centuries in the West, appears to

consist in large measure of a sort of philosophical defensiveness, beginning perhaps with Kant, which tries to balance the sources of truth in the onslaught of a scientific, Sensate claim to ultimate truth.

Fideism appears as a mysticism of despair where despair becomes hopelessness. Fideism, it seems, hides in the darkness of history, certain that some presence at its back breaths chaos. The stoics are placed in this category by Sorokin, as is some of the thought of William James. With regard to the former, in Marcus Aurelius or with the slave Epictetus, there is an effort to find peace or a sense of security in a world which cannot offer it. Thus, in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius we read, "Soon you will have forgotten all things and all things will have forgotten you."[23] And in William James (although one could not characterize his thought as mainly Fideistic) there is the discussion of the religion of the sick soul.[24] Summarizing this "variety of religious experience," James writes, "life and its negation are beaten up inextricably together. But if the life be good, the negation of it must be bad. Yet the two are equally essential facts of existence; and all natural happiness thus seems infected with a contradiction. The breath of the sepulchre surrounds it."[25]

Skepticism in its negative or agnostic form even doubts its own existence as an epistemology, while accepting, perhaps fatalistically, the existence of a concrete,

sensory world. A straight skepticism, more consistently, simply doubts that anything at all can be known. Its tenets for Sorokin are like those of the American pragmatists, such as James. The latter's als ob approach to reality is found to be abhorent. (Thus, Sorokin interprets James as declaring religion "useful" because it "works" to some end, regardless of the questionable validity of any religious doctrines or tenets.) In our own time, skeptical positions abound, of course. The romanticism of Schopenhauer and Nietzche, or the existential despair of Kirkegaard or Sartre are well diffused, I believe, in modern thought and literature.

Finally, criticism, as we have seen, occupies the peculiar position of attempting to balance empiricism, rationalism and skepticism even as its ground is a sort of empiricism. Though Kant is seen as having laid much of the groundwork of the critical movement in modern philosophy, there are others, such as Ernst Cassirer, who exemplify the type.[26]

Changes in the Epistemological Positions. Sorokin's method in tracing the rise and decline of the epistemological types is characteristic of his rather exhaustive use of historical data. Looking at leading thought available between 580 B.C. and 1920 A.D., Sorokin examined the numbers of partisans adhering to particular positions over twenty year increments.[27] For early thinkers "practically all the names of great thinkers were selected."[28] During the last

three or four centuries though, only the more prominent philosophers were considered.

The prominence or influence of the thinkers was weighted on a numerical scale of one to twelve. Thus, Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas and Kant, among others, received a rating of twelve. On this same scale, John Locke (empiricism) is rated "8"; Schopenhauer (criticism) "8"; Emmanuel Swedenborg (mysticism) "4". Thinkers are rated more than once, under different epistemological categories when their systems are complex enough. (See Sorokin's extensive appendices to volume 2 of Dynamics.[29]) Thus, Plato is given both as a mystic (after 385 B.C.), and as a rationalist (Ideational type), on the basis of his earlier work.

The objective criteria for this weighting is given by the number of monographs devoted to a particular philosopher, by whether or not the thinker founded a school of philosophy, by the frequency of revivals of a philosopher's system through the centuries, and so on.[30] That this is a rough system of analysis one must concede. Under it William James is listed both as a mystic and as an empiricist; Whitehead is given both as a rationalist and as an empiricist; and lumped together in one group of rationalists (1900-1920) are Whitehead, Russell, Husserl, Heidegger and Einstein. (This is partly a result of combining Ideational and Idealistic rationalism in a single general category.) Even so, it is difficult to quibble about the main results

of Sorokin's immense effort.

Roughly, Sorokin manages to show that particular epistemological positions seem to dominate particular historical periods.[31] He also shows us that there has been no noticeable linear trend among these epistemologies; they do fluctuate strongly, but that fluctuation is "trendless."

Empiricism as a Sensate truth of the senses is generally linked in the Greek period to the natural philosophers (Empedocles, Democritus). In the Roman period, Lucretius and the Epicureans represent this stance. More recently, of course, empiricism is linked to the rise of science. It is clearly associated, thus, with what Whitehead called the "century of genius" (17th) which yielded Boyle, Hooke, Bacon, Newton, Leeuenhoeck, and others.[32]

Inexorably though, Sorokin finds that the "empirical truth" tends toward relativism and reductionism. Skepticism tends to rise as the truth of faith declines in favor of Sensate understandings. Similarly, fideism and the mysticism of despair rise as a reaction to the shaking of Ideational foundations.

A summary of these findings is found in Figure 1. Here we see that the contest between the dictates of Ideational and Sensate forms of truth involves a sort of oscillation; first one and then the other "world-vision" becomes dominant in its turn. Only briefly, during the Idealistic periods (4th century B.C., 9th and 13th centuries A.D.) is



FIGURE 1. FLUCTUATION OF THE INFLUENCE IN SYSTEMS OF TRUTH BY CENTURY PERIODS.

(Taken from Pitirm A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: Bedminster Press, 1937), II, 32.

there a respite, a relative balance of the three sources of truth.

Empiricism, the truth of the senses, has successfully eroded the Ideational epistemologies that reached their zenith in the Medieval centuries. In the process, Sorokin tells us, materialism and relativism have, like the fearsome mythical attendant of Mars, corroded the capacity of modern culture to build a lasting stability. As Sorokin states flatly in Crisis of Our Age, scientific empiricism has "distinctly impaired our understanding of reality; . . . it has ushered in the Age of Incertitude."[33] By claiming to be the sole authority over matters of validity, untempered empiricism guarantees an absence of support for social values. Why? Because the notions of ethics, of the good, of justice or virtue have no empirical base. There can be no science of virtue, no Walden II can successfully encompass the actualities of human experience.[34] When, in Sensate culture, reason itself is ruled out of bounds for casting too uncomfortable a light on things of the senses, intuition is left no place at all. And, without some sense of the validity of things known by intuition, Sorokin clearly feels social values have no foundation. It is for this reason, certainly, that Sorokin spends many pages demonstrating the role of intuition in all important scientific discoveries.[35] If validity may arise in our insights about sensory phenomena, is the unspoken assertion, insight may also lead us

to supersensory validity.

Through much of his work, Sorokin argues, as he must, for the vital importance of recognizing alternative forms of truth. Though he may not pass on the ultimate validity of any source of truth, he argues that there is a place for each. Writing, as he is, in an age he himself has declared Sensate, Sorokin must stand as an advocate for both the truth of faith and the lonely, arbitrating role of human reason. He is, at times, a prophet of the forms of truth ruled irrelevant-for-being-immaterial, in the court of the senses. He is pointing out, above all, that behind adaptive behavior, behind the directiveness of human organisms there are values, choices. And these choices are not, simply, imposed by the nature of the senses. For, in Kantian fashion, the senses must select and discriminate by principles not located among the chemical reactions of the nervous system. The truth of the senses, to be sure, may yield marvellous fruit. Sorokin is not altogether negative about the Sensate mentality, especially in its active phases; nor does he refute the value of science and technology.[36] He only warns us that the truth of the senses ends with "a fatal narrowing of the realm of true reality and true value."[37]

Comments on the First Principles. The first principles associated with the key epistemological positions include the Kantian *a priori* -- space and time; the concepts of causality and number; a set of assumptions about *what* may

be known in reality, as well as how such things may be known. There are also varying positions about ultimate premises, about ontology. All of these categories and concepts tend to fall toward either Sensate or Ideational extremes unless there is a powerful mediating influence by reason.

Thus, nominalism, as one might expect, is an empirical position, while unmitigated realism is the position of an Ideational mentality. A mediating position is possible (which is not in this case to be associated with idealism). Conceptualism may hold that although ideas or universals may not exist in themselves (or in the Mind of God, say) they may, in fact, exist (*post rem*) for the mind.[38] Similarly, universalism tends toward the Ideational mode, singularism toward the Sensate. Or, Ideational mentalities tend toward an eternalistic vision of events; Sensate ones tend toward a temporalistic view. Or, again, indeterminism (voluntarism) is an Ideational, and determinism a Sensate type of assumption.

To give a slightly more extensive example of Sorokin's concern with "first principles," he finds that there are three elemental ontological positions. These are *idealism*, *materialism*, and a *mixed* category.[37] Idealism may be monistic or pluralistic depending on whether some one transcendant, non-material substance is seen as constituting the unity of all manifestation (as in Hegel or Bergson); or whether there are thought to be a plurality of such super-

sensory entities or systems (e.g. "monads" for Leibnitz).

Materialism in its hylozoistic form is often called "monism." It may postulate that the corporeal and spiritual are two faces of the same coin. Such a position is that of Chardin in postulating the "within" and the "without" of things.[40] This animistic principle may encorporate some type of consciousness as an aspect of all being. A mechanistic materialism, on the other hand, would reduce such ideas as consciousness to the level of epiphenomena arising from purely material arrangements of molecules. There are only mechanistic principles, no structural or transcendent ones.

Finally, the mixed category is a sort of residual catch-all into which no less than Kant must be placed. Skepticism, criticism and agnosticism, in other words, are the epistemological masks of mixed ontologies.

Again, through an exhaustive analysis of philosophical systems, Sorokin finds a pattern for ontology very roughly like that for epistemology.[41] Using the same kind of frequency and weighting analysis, the same trendless fluctuation is found. More importantly, Ideational supersystems are found related to the dominance of idealism, Sensate systems to the predominance of materialism.

There is a curious property of these findings that deserves mention. It seems that purely materialistic ontologies are hard to maintain. Or, as Sorokin says, " . . .

a considerable proportion of Idealism is a prime requisite for the durable existence of society."[42] Thus, the proportion of all materialisms -- including the rather nonmaterialistic hylozoistic forms -- to idealisms between 580 B.C. and 1920 A.D. is 946:3670 = (aproximately) 1:4. For the total of materialistic ontological positions, the ratio is 946:4927 = (aproximately) 1:5.[43]

It might also be suggested that a materialism of the purer sort, with its strictly causal possibilities for explaining the world, is inadequate for underpinning <u>ultimate</u> values. This would be so in particular, if (1) values, or the derivation of values in experience is associated with action, and (2) if values, like meanings, are found to have non-causal properties as Sorokin maintains.

Changes in the Main Cultural Systems:

The Case of the Arts

The objective of this essay is not to reiterate all of Sorokin's findings. Nor do I even intend to summarize Sorokin's discussions of change the way that Cowell has already done so well.[44] My aim, instead, must be to distill elements from Sorokin's thinking which show the <u>nature</u> of his findings. Having done this I will then attempt to draw implications from these understandings. To that end, in looking at changes in key cultural systems, it seems advisable to concentrate on the arts. For it seems that the arts are a highly sensitive barometer of the mentality of a historical per-

iod or of a cultural environment.[45] Thus, architecture may echo a peoples' ideas about the nature of the cosmos.[46] Literature recounts their concerns and hopes, their fears and their values.[47] The plastic and graphic arts may act as a sort of projective test, absorbing themes and ideas rather unselfconsciously. Music and the lively arts, finally, may tell us a great deal about the role of the sacred.[48]

Importantly for my thesis, one may see in the arts the character of the human psyche in more or less nonadaptive and sometimes quite spontaneous, expression. Unlike others among the main cultural systems, the techniques of the arts may be filled with meanings and impressions that have their own purpose. This is to say that art may mirror values that stand clear of the exigencies of immediate survival or adaptation. Science may attempt to guide and rule over things empirical (however extensive that realm may be judged to be); ethics and the set of law norms[49] are the very format of cooperation, of interaction generally, and so on. But the arts, though they may be sacred crafts in one case, or products of a near chaos of secular caprice in another, are <u>never</u> altogether practical. The decoration on an Eskimo hunter's harpoon, the designs on baskets or pottery, or the fluting on a Corinthian column add nothing to the utility of these artifacts in strictly sensual or empirical terms. To an even greater extent music or the pure graphic arts (as these are dissociated from language) may

be altogether superfluous to apparent adaptive needs.

My discussion will center on the graphic and plastic arts with somewhat less attention given to literature and music. Unfortunately, the matter of the lively arts must be bypassed, and the treatment of architecture at Sorokin's hands must be accorded only passing comments.[56]

Ideational Art. There are Ideational, Sensate and Mixed styles of art which correspond to the main cultural mentalities.[51] The Ideational mentality, stressing the eternalistic, produces art that is most often symbolic. Whereas the purely Sensate forms of art must be bound by the world of becoming, by the superficial appearance of things, the Ideational forms of artistic expression look beyond appearance to some idea of essence. In its purest form, for Sorokin, the subject of Ideational art is immaterial, supersensory, "having no resemblance to the visual or sensory appearance of the object depicted."[52] The Christian representations of symbols in the Roman catacombs are an example. Here, a dove, an anchor, or an olive branch may stand for Ideational concepts or "noumena."

Strictly speaking any artistic expression is not free of vehicles. Any art, architecture or literature must be constituted by: (1) some degree of intelligibility -- it must be able to convey meaning by being grounded in conventions about reality; (2) materials or a medium (stone, pigments, the body itself); (3) technique.[53] In these terms,

a pure Ideational art cannot exist since it must, in some degree, be corrupted by the limits of objectification in vehicles. The subjective experience of ceremony, perhaps, or the mental state created by a mandala are, in themselves, Ideational art. [54] But to say this is to suggest that Ideational art is often not meant as art so much as a guide or aid to an experiential context. Impure examples of Ideational art for Sorokin would include ethereal representations like Michelangelo's Pietá, or the geometric designs created by preliterate cultures such as those of North America (Hopi, Zuni, or Kwakiutl, for example). Figure 2 is a representation of the Hopi symbol called Tapu'at (Mother and Child). It is a symbolic map which relates the emergence of man from a primal condition. As an example of Ideational symbolic design, though, it may be noted that the figure retains an aesthetic or decorative balance. According to Waters, the design may be interpreted as follows:

> The square type design represents spiritual rebirth from one world to the succeeding one, as symbolized by the Emergence itself. . . . The straight line emerging from the entrance is not connected with the maze. Its two ends symbolize the two stages of life -- the unborn child within the womb of Mother Earth and the child after it is born, the line symbolizing the umbilical cord and the path of Emergence. . . . The inside lines represent the fetal membranes, . . . the outside lines the Mother's arms . . . [55]

Such symbolic representation is, as we see, both more abstract and more formally constrained than the more visual Pietá. Somewhere between the sparseness of the Hopi design



FIGURE 2. THE HOPI SYMBOL TAPU'AT.

(From Frank Waters, Book of the Hopi (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), p. 29.

and the visual impact of Michelangelo's piece, one might place Egyptian sculpture of certain periods. Certainly, old kingdom structures such as the pyramids at Giza can only be understood in terms other than Sensate ones. As Frankfort writes of them, they "cannot be compared with any other type of structure. They well illustrate the fact that Egyptian accomplishments are apt to assume in our eyes a paradoxical character. . . . They do express, with unanswerable finality, the ancient Egyptian's conviction that his universe was a world without change."[56] That is, a world of timeless, Ideational ideals and values.

Ideational literature is, undoubtedly, well illustrated for us by the mythical stories of many people. But beyond the accounts of Jahweh or Marduk, there are more familiar Western and modern writings that illustrate the type. There is the poetry of Walt Whitman or William Blake; one might even count the American mystic Edgar Casey in this modern group. But it will noted that if we seek Ideational literature in the modern West, it will seem to fall into a marginal or mystical category. Only in Ideational settings, it seems, will Ideational literature have a central place.

But once again, a pure Ideational literature is problematic. Language must by its nature distort the tacit experience whether this is thought of as an ethical revelation or an account of Samadhi. The revelation of St. John,

thus, however it may be understood, would seem to leave a great deal of room for interpretation. Even when one is quite open to the idea of there being Ideational aspects to reality, intellectually, supersensory meanings may remain obscure, perhaps because our tacit, Ideational understandings are not simply intellectual.

Further, one must suspect that as Ideational writings become increasingly intelligible to masses of people in more or less conventional terms, they lose a great deal of their earlier, Ideational or supersensory capacity. They no longer connect the seeker directly with meanings that might have seemed evident in some more esoteric literature, particularly to some elect that had been initiated into the significance of metaphor, allusion, meter, and so on. Such an idea, of course, follows from the assumption that religious insights, charismatic gifts to use Weber's terminology, become diluted with the exigencies of practice and the distortions of objectifying them in writing (to the extent that such an objectification is possible at all.)

Ideational music for Sorokin is exemplified by a form and type of music which is, simply, not familiar to modern Westerners. He cites Boethius: as against a celestial music of the spheres, "Human music is that which is understood by anyone who descends into himself or enters into himself."[57] "A strange definition indeed!" Sorokin comments.[58] But he goes on to explain that for the Ideational mentality, music

is not just the means of escape or of entertainment but, quite literally, it is a technology of maintaining social order, or solidarity more properly, and of higher consciousness.

In Ideational terms, joy to the ear is not the thing. As Sorokin notes, Confucius himself is reputed to have selected music for festivals and state occasions.[59] The ritual uses of music among preliterates (when these may be classed as Ideational) is a sacred concern of great importance to the people.[60] In The Republic and in other writings, Plato writes most seriously about the importance of music. He notes, at one point, that music is appropriate to the "philosophic and spiritual" aspects of men.[61] Aristotle, with Pythagoras and others, devoted attention to distinguishing among sacred and profane forms of music. Although he is not so concerned for special Ideational values in music as Plato is, he argues that there are "ethical melodies, melodies of action and passionate or inspiring melodies."[62] In the literature of the Sufis, to take another case, we find accounts of music as Ideational or sacred, this time associated with the mental states of the Dervishes.[63]

The Gregorian chant is a more familiar sort of music with Ideational properties. Sorokin sees the plain chant as characteristic of Medieval Ideational music, noting that most modern listeners simply do not or would not like it. It has no engaging harmony, no catchy tune; it may even seem

arythmic.[64] And yet, as Sorokin tells us, this sort of sacred music was the dominant style for ten centuries of Western history.

Sensate Art. As in the case of the Ideational arts, there can be no pure Sensate art. By definition, for Sorokin, Sensate art is that which captures or emphasizes the visual in graphic or plastic art, or the sensual in music and literature. Thus a pure Sensate form of painting concentrates on the immediate impressions of light and color. Sensate art, generally, emphasizes the world of becoming, of novelty and transition.

Now Sorokin is rather editorial in his treatment of the arts. Particularly in a book like Crisis of Our Age, it is difficult for one to distinguish a boundary between what might be seen as a purely Sensate art, and the mixed condition of modern forms in painting, sculpture, music, and so on. This problem may be exemplified by his treatment of the graphic and plastic arts.

Sensate painting and sculpture for Sorokin is marked, above all, by its visual emphasis. Sensate art should be pleasing to the eye. Following from this, the work of the impressionists is, simply, the end of Sensate painting. The works of Manet, Gauguin, Degas, Renoir, Seurat, Monet and others have reached a conclusion, an ultimate boundary of pure visualism. They have done what can be done by being receptive to the fleeting moment.[65]

Post impressionism then marks the beginning of non-visual representation and, therefore, of the Mixed condition of the arts. Sorokin quotes Michel here:

> The dominant trait of the contemporary painting is a vigorous reaction against impressionism. Almost all the post-Impressionists are Anti-Impressionists. 66

What presumably is returned to art, beyond a passive Sensatism, in the efforts of Dadaism, Cubism, Abstractionism, etc., is intellect, thought, an active effort to constitute meanings. And, certainly, this sort of effort has touched us. Picasso's <u>Guernica</u> is not visually pleasant, yet a message is clearly conveyed. But what sort of a message is it? Does it not seem that the meanings conveyed by a painting like <u>Guernica</u>, or by Klee's <u>Demon as Pirate</u> are, finally, subjective? I believe that is the case. And Sorokin argues that such art is, indeed, strongly individualistic. It is questionable, then, to assume that post-impressionist art art conveys universally intelligible notions of principle or value or belief. They do not. When the boundary of visualism is passed, the artist of the various mixed <u>genres</u> resides still in his solipsism. The stark messages of Klee, Braque and Miro are not, perhaps, sensual in the manner of Renoir, but they are certainly not timeless, eternalistic, Ideational vehicles either; they are not even intelligible at the level of convention, as a thousand cartoons directed at modern art surely may

attest.

As Sorokin himself clearly states, the antithesis of the post-impressionist works is not yet a new synthesis.[67] Further though, it must be seen that the mentality represented in the Mixed modern forms of art is, in effect, the logical boundary of the Sensate. Both the spirit and the substance of Sorokin's discussion of Sensate art, particularly its modern forms, leads us to this conclusion. For even in strictly visual terms, one may argue that there have been Sensate steps beyond the efforts of the impressionists. But at this logical extreme of the Sensate, paintings may no longer be identifiable as such. The fleeting moment may no longer seem to demand the formalism even of a Van Gogh and the immediate sensory impression may suggest a Campbell soup can, an old transmission, or a paper mache hamburger as art. That is, at the border of the Sensate, art may be no more than a satiric or cynical discrimination from the litter of stimuli. Art becomes a happening which exists for a moment and vanishes without a trace of meaning.

By its concentration on impressions, on the discrete and disconnected frame of experience, the Sensate vision emphasizes the isolated individual. It is particularistic, nominalisitc and temporal.[68] In literature, the extreme boundary of the Sensate, the region which leaves a passive sensory emphasis behind can only be a hymn to nihilism.

The extreme Sensate, like the extreme or pure Ideational vision, is largely unintelligible. It cannot be conveyed by conventions of meaning required by the exigencies of negotiating the causal, practical world. As an example of this lack of intelligibility, one need only consult the poetry of a host of moderns: Sylvia Plath, William Carlos Williams, Marianne Moore. Remarkable examples are found in Eliot. In The Wasteland, we read these lines:

> "Speak to me. Why do you never speak. Speak.
> "Whatever are you thinking of? What thinking? What?
> "I never know what you are thinking. Think.

These lines are purported to be those of a woman. But what do they have to do with the lines that follow?

> I think we are in rats' alley.
> Where the dead men lost their bones. 69

Here there is an allusion of symbol, but without a clear or common reference to meaning. There are no meaningful symbols where there is no common ground of intelligibility. And, instead of the Ideational collective embodiment of meaning in symbol, we have only symbol fragments. The allusions are finally only subjective, only accesible to us as we join with the poet in celebrating the negation of order.

Sensate literature at its boundaries, in other words, is no longer the occasionally joyous hedonism of the Decameron, nor even the amoral rage of a De Sade; it is the sound of despair. It is art that speaks without sound of things unspeakable not by their amoral enormity, but by

their endless triviality.[70]

> For this is the way the world ends,
> This is the way the world ends
> This is the way the world ends
> Not with a bang but a whimper. [71]

Following what has been said about the boundary of the Sensate, the Mixed termination of themes in Sensate art and literature, little need be said about Sensate music. Clearly, the music of the ear is presumed to be music which evokes pleasure.[72] As such music emerges historically in the West, separating itself from music designed to aid a higher consciousness or to unite people in a certain mood or disposition, these pleasurable, sensual aspects were emphasized. The emergence of polyphony and of an increasing diversity of musical instruments marks this shift from the sacred, Ideational to the Sensate. One may, in fact, trace the rise of Sensate music with the concern for increased amplitude. The pianoforte, by its capacity to vary and, above all, to increase loudness, is a Sensate step beyond the harpsichord. And, again, the Sensate boundary, the limbo of Mixed forms, may be seen to correspond to such aberrations as acid rock.

On the other hand, considering the extremes of Sensate painting and sculpture or literature, one may assume that pure Sensate music is not, in fact, represented by popular music. The highly experimental music of the serious modern composers is actually no more popular than the poetry

of T. S. Eliot, the fiction of James Joyce, or the paintings of Joan Miro.

Certainly, as we see in Sorokin's discussions, current popular music reflects not only the extremes of Sensate mentality, but also the economic and contractual conditions of the social environment. It reflects commercial needs for novelty and sensory appeal. Electronically amplified rock music, as an extreme case, has a Sensate appeal, but only, in effect, as a stimulus overload. It attraction for the senses is a relatively coarse one since extreme loudness overshadows nuance, tone color, and even complexities of rhythm. Of course the current popularity of very loud music may pass, for as Sorokin notes, Sensate art forms are often short-lived and their audiences are fickle.[74]

In general, the Sensate effort in literature, painting, sculpture, music, and even architecture is continually to create new effects, even to shock. The ever new forms tend to distort formal canons, perhaps because there is not time for new ones to develop. Every combination of colors, sounds and shapes is fair game. In the end, the emphasis on technique and method become the <u>raison d'etre</u> of rapidly passing products of the arts. Hit tunes become Golden Oldies in weeks. This year's bestseller may be forgotten the next. The quest for spontaneity and new meanings in the graphic and plastic arts produces a range of results from assembly line photo graphics to junk-pile sculpture. Anything at all

becomes art, from a happening consisting of a spaghetti dinner served by oddly costumed waiters on roller skates to the random results produced by nude models rolling through paints on life-size sheets of canvas. At the Sensate extremes, the quest for technique, for novelty, replaces any agreement as to the significance of the arts or their place in man's social world.

Ideational and Mixed Styles in the Arts. Nowhere, perhaps, does the distinction between Ideational and Mixed become more pronounced in Sorokin's work than in his discussions of the arts. One feels at times, in fact, that Sorokin's sweeping insight falters time and again against the diverse and often very strange forms of modern art. How, one wonders, can these be related in any way to the symmetry and dignity of Greek sculpture attributed to Phidias or to the paintings of Boticelli?

At one point Sorokin speaks directly to the problem of this great divergence in his intermediate categories which will bear quoting at length:

> The periods of declining visualism and of an ascending Ideationalism, like the transition from the Mycenean art to the Archaic Greek art, or from the overripe Hellenistic Roman art to the Christian art of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., or perhaps like the change in the present period in which we live . . . seem not to give [a] marvellous Idealistic art but the incongruous results of a search for something different from overripe Visualism: cubism, futurism, and other mixed "isms"which are neither the fish of Ideationalism nor the flesh of visualism; nor are they harmonious blends of both styles . . . . Such periods seem to produce "modernistic incongrui-

> ties," important as symptoms but far from representing the realization of the hopes of the Visual-sensuous man who seeks to find . . . a new and grand art. 75 (italics removed)

It would seem that in the West, at least, the Ideational, symbolic and formal art associated with the Christian faith has been tempered time and again by Visualism to produce waves of more or less Idealistic art. The golden age of Spanish painting tends toward an Idealistic style. "It represented a real synthesis of the remnants of the earthly Idealism of the Renaissance plus remnants even of the real Medieval Idealism, with exquisite visual tendencies." In this way does Sorokin characterize the works of Velasquez, Murillo, Ribera and Montañes.[76]

The Renaissance itself, of course, tends toward this balance in the works of artists like Giotto (died 1337) to Raphael (died 1520). In the sculpture of Donatello, for example, the idealism of the Christian faith is made "visual and lively."[77] It may well be, in some respects, that the blend of naturalism and reason (the concern with perspective and new techniques), and the idealized subject matter of much Italian Renaissance art is characteristic of an Idealistic balance in painting. Sorokin though, tends to identify the Idealistic apex in Europe with Gothic architecture and the thirteenth century. The cathedral, for him, represents a marvellous collective expression of the Idealistic mentality.

The Mixed categories of modern art have been considered both in our discussion of Sensate art and the Mixed forms. It should only be added here that Sorokin provides an extensive and illuminating discussion of the Mixed arts which, in their graphic and plastic forms, may be said to extend between the Idealistic forms of the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, and the impressionists of the nineteenth. The trend over this time has generally been toward the Sensate in all of the arts, with rough parallels existing between painting, sculpture, music, literature and architecture.

In painting this drift is marked by the increasingly _malerisch_ or visual styles of presentation.[78] In tandem, the increasing visual emphasis brings with it a focus on subject matter from everyday life -- portraiture, landscape, still-life, or perhaps very prosaic scenes of the street, the bath, or the bordello. Along with a concern to show things that are "pretty," "erotic" and "earthy," may come an increasing focus on the "seamy." With Hogarth, for example (1697-1764), concern with the human condition had unquivocally replaced an effort to reflect Divine truth or even to honor classic myths and heroes. His age was quite ready to accept series of etchings depicting _The Rogue's Progress_, _Marriage-a-la-Mode_ or _The Harlot's Progress_.[79]

Increasingly too, the individualistic emphasis in the arts is reflected not only in subject matter and technique,

but in the cults of personality surrounding favored artists. At an Idealistic extreme, the names of Gothic artisans are all but lost to us. At the individualistic (Sensate) extreme, an artist like Salvador Dali is so bizarre in his behavior that one feels he wishes to convey his life as a series of "Dali happenings" to be criticized along with his Last Sacrament or the Premonition of Civil War.

Summarizing the Changes. Sorokin's methods in analyzing the art objects, the literature, the music and the architecture of Western Europe is exhaustive. More limited efforts were made to evaluate the arts of the Islamic culture area. In Europe though, for painting and sculpture alone, Sorokin attempted to evaluate "all of the pictures and sculptural works known in the history of art, regardless of whether they belong to great or small or anonymous artists."[80] This enormous sample was taken, furthermore, by several independent investigators operating at Sorokin's request but, apparently, without knowledge of his hypotheses.[81] This check on subjectivity was accomplished by a meticulous concern to compare differences among the sample evaluations by taking advantage of the fact that the bulk of the more than 30,000 art objects studied were appraised by more than one investigator.

The following aspects of the art objects were investigated: (1) The proportions of secular to religious subject matter; (2) the fluctuation of Ideational (symbolic) and

visual styles of representing subject matter; (3) the spiritual and the sensual character of the art objects (i.e.: spiritual, neutral, sensual); (4) the fluctuation of nudity, regarding particularly the manner in which it has been handled (i.e.: ascetic, neutral, erotic), but also the absolute proportions of nudes as subject matter. Patterns in the fluctuation of the thematic spectrum were also studied, looking at the proportions of art objects devoted to portraiture, landscape, historical subjects, prosaic daily situations, and so on. As we might expect in these studies, spiritual, ascetic and Ideational (religious) properties were expected to be related together, as were the secular, sensual, erotic and visual (Sensate).

The results of such a monumental investigation should not be summarized without a warning that the original work (Social and Cultural Dynamics) should be consulted by any interested reader, for one does not summarize a study of 30,000 art objects in a paragraph or two for other than ad hoc, and limited purposes. That having been said, it may be declared that Sorokin seems to have suceeded in linking the properties studied to periods of history which have been characterized as Sensate, Ideational, Idealistic or Mixed.

A summary of these findings is found in Figure 3. Here one sees that given long time periods, and ignoring what Sorokin calls "ripples" (short-term movements in the arts),



FIGURE 3. LONG-TIME WAVES OF THE MAIN STYLES OF ART.

(From Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: Bedminster Press, 1937), I, 404.

there has been a rough balance of Visual and Ideational emphases in Western art. Shorter periods of Mixed or Idealistic dominance have fallen in between. It will be noted, in fact, that Idealistic phases have followed Ideational ones while Mixed periods have suceeded visual or Sensate periods. This rather consistent effect may be one of the more interesting of Sorokin's discoveries and certain of its ramifications will be considered in the last chapter of this essay.

Generally speaking too, fluctuations among these main types appears to be fairly similar when one takes other forms of the arts into account. Using fairly long increments of time -- not shorter than a century -- music, the graphic and plastic arts, literature and architecture all follow one another with reasonable consistency.[82]

Changes in Other Cultural Systems

Religion and Science. Among the four main cultural systems, other than the arts, Sorokin does not consider changes in language. Religion and science, on the other hand, may be seen to follow changes in the systems of truth. Ideational periods are periods when a truth of faith (in the West, Christianity) has been dominant in shaping institutions and world-views.

The rise of Sensate truth is cearly associated with a concurrent ascendancy of science and technology. In Sorokin's analysis, the fluctuation in frequency of discoveries

and inventions is linked to the rise of empiricism and materialism, particularly since the seventeenth century.[83] Looking at the numbers of patents issued, for example, Sorokin notes that the total of these has risen greatly from the end of the eighteenth century, coming toward the present, but declining somewhat since about 1920. Most interestingly, he shows that the precipitous climb in invention rates associated with the rise of Western science had peaked by the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For mathematics the zenith seems to have been the eighteenth century; for the natural sciences, the nineteenth.[84]

Sorokin characterizes our current age as one in which Sensate truth is losing its power to validate experience, to back up the institutions. He compares the modern West to the period of "Hellenic Alexandrian scholarship -- very industrious, very scientific, very factual, but devoid of ability to make any really important discovery or to create a single real value."[85]

Ethics. "The whole field of moral phenomena," Sorokin teaches, "can be divided into two main classes: the moral or ethical . . . and the juridical (or legal)."[86] Moral or ethical norms are ideals such as "Turn the other cheek," or " . . . give to him your cloak also." Juridical or law norms, however, are the requisite minimum morality of a social order. While the integration of ethical ideals may be thought of as an apex of a peoples' vision of the good,

the just, etc., the integration of law norms, whether codified or not, are the injunctions of vital, practical order.

Now it may readily be suspected, judging from Sorokin's ideas about the main sorts of mentalities, that the high order of ideal norms and the related set of juridical norms may be thought of as integrated differently around different world-views. Such a surmise would be correct. There are three such types of integration for ethical norms, following the Sensate, Idealistic and Ideational trinity. There are also conditions in juridical mentality corresponding, roughly, to the dominant ethical types, but Sorokin's discussions of law and juridical mentalities must be ruled beyond the scope of this essay.[87] It must suffice here to consider the main ethical styles and their fluctuations.

For purposes of summarizing Sorokin's thought about ethics it will be useful to imagine two continua, one Sensate, the other Ideational. The Sensate continuum is marked by three positions or systems of ethics which Sorokin calls the _eudaemonistic_, the _utilitarian_ and the _hedonistic_. Together, these sorts of positions are lumped under the category "Ethics of Happiness." The hedonistic position is that which espouses the ethical validity of personal, sensual pleasure as an end. Its mottos, as Sorokin notes, range from "Eat, drink and be merry . . . " to the motley of modern advertising slogans which link fulfillment to deodorants, shampoos, automobiles and microwave ovens. Taken as

an extreme of the Sensate position, hedonism emphasizes individualistic or egotistic fulfillment which, in turn, refers to an ever-shifting set of law-norms which are little more than rationalizations for self-seeking behavior. Sensate laws generally tend to be relativistic -- laws are made for men, not vice versa. Hedonistic ethics, it seems, give rise to this relativism to the extent that they produce a chaos of individualistic aims, a _bellum omnium contra omnes_.[88]

One may conceive of a gentle hedonistic ethics; one which is not altogether relativistic or ego-centered. But in Sorokin's writings, beyond an acknowledgement that this _may_ be so, hedonism is presented as the lowest form of ethics.[89] Utilitarianism though, with its effort to establish principles of general good, moves away from a chaos of relativism. In Benthamite utilitarianism the "greatest happiness principle" is taken as transcending particularistic aims. But Russel notes regarding Bentham's ethics that they did not distinguish between higher and lower pleasures; the ultimate pleasure was seen as self-approbation.[90]

Eudaemonistic ethics distinguishes among higher and lower pleasures.[91] In its "finest forms," for Sorokin, "the noblest systems of Eudaemonism are imperceptible from an ethics of principles -- that is from an Idealistic ethics." Thus, Plato's ethics is seen as having "one . . . foot in the supersensory world of absolute values, the other in the

noblest field of the sensory world -- eudaemonistic happiness."[92]

The Ideational continuum may be thought of as ranging between a position emphasizing <u>absolute principles</u> and one extolling an <u>ethics of love</u>. In general, an Ideational ethics, aside from assuming absolutes, also takes its principles from supersensory revelation, such as Moses' commandments to the Israelites. Such principles do not bend in the winds of expediency nor, at this extreme, do they waver before the individualistic, hedonistic needs of persons.

But where a system of absolutes like that of the Hebrews may extoll an ideal order,[93] an Ideational ethics of love emphasizes absolutes of altruism which fulfill the law. But on reflection, it seems that an altruistic ethics of love, like that taught by Christ, is not too far from the eudaemonistic ethics of Plato. If the reader will suffer an extension of the spatial metaphor suggested by our continua, one may imagine a triangle whose apex is the joining of the Ideational and the Sensate varieties of ethics at an Idealistic zenith. At the Idealistic position "aims are simultaneously transcendental and earthly," and minor principles are relative before an absolute major principle of love. (One recalls the incident when Christ recounted the taking of the bread from the temple sanctuary by David.[94])

If lateral distance be taken as a distance of disparity, the base of our metaphorical triangle represents the

maximum separation between a harsh Ideational casuistry which subjugates all action to inexorable law (as in the European inquisition), and a chaos of hedonism which recognizes no absolutes at all. This metaphor is given graphically in Figure 4.

Changes in the ethical styles are located by Sorokin, again, through an analysis of ethical teachings. Tracing these through time and classifying them in the manner discussed above for the systems of truth, he finds that the Idealistic balance is dominant during the period of the great scholastics like Aquinas, and during the Hellenic times of Plato and Aristotle. In effect, the ethics of love are more influential than the ethics of absolute principles during these periods. Sensate ethical positions have an ascendancy prior to the first century A.D., declining and finally losing dominance by the fifth century A.D.. They regain a primary place among ethical systems with the waning of the middle ages, remaining steadily influential into current times. See Figure 5 for a graphic representation of changes in the ethics of love, of principles, and of happiness in the West from about 500 B.C. to the present.

It should be mentioned in passing that Sorokin paid a great deal of attention to the decline of ethics in our times. The following quote from The Crisis of Our Age gives one example of the temper of these concerns:

More and more, present day ethical values are looked



FIGURE 4. A GRAPHIC METAPHOR REPRESENTING THE RELATIONSHIP OF ETHICAL SYSTEMS IN SOROKIN'S THOUGHT.



FIGURE 5. FLUCTUATION OF ETHICAL CURRENTS: 600 B. C. TO 1900 A. D.

(Adapted from Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1937), II, 489.)

> upon as mere "rationalizations," "derivations," or "beautiful speech reactions," veiling the egotistic interests, pecuniary motives, and acquisitive propensities of individuals and groups. . . . Legal norms, likewise, are increasingly considered as a device of the group in power for exploiting other less powerful groups. 95

One finds these resounding, sometimes sweeping damnations of the decaying Sensate in all of Sorokin's theoretical works from the Dynamics on, and in particular throughout his later works on altruistic love.[96]

Change in Behavior and
in Personality

Behavioral Changes. We have seen that for Sorokin there are three elemental interactional types: the familistic, the contractual, and the compulsory. It will be recalled that while the familistic type is collective, universal (embracing nearly all of the person's concerns and activities), and altruistic in nature, the contractual type emphasizes individuality (individual goals), and specific objectives which are by their nature mainly ego-centered. Compulsory interactions, of course, are imposed by coercion, force or duress. They are, therefore, antagonistic by definition. Ideally, familistic and contractual relations are solidary.

Any interaction network, any ongoing group or organization, may be characterized by the degree to which one of these three interactional types predominates. It must be assumed, however, that in actual social situations, all

three types will be present in some degree.[97]

Based on a survey of Western history, Sorokin found the following generalized sequence of relative domination among the forms of social relationship.

> (1) Familistic-compulsory-contractual (eighth to twelth centuries).
> (2) Weakened familistic-contractual-compulsory (thirteenth to sixteenth centuries).
> (3) Compulsory-familistic contractual (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries).
> (4) Contractual-familistic-compulsory (nineteenth and twentieth centuries, up to the war).
> (5) Compulsory-familistic-contractual (the postwar period). 98

Now behavior, as Sorokin discusses it, is most difficult to relate to changes in mentality. Thus, whether one is considering macroscopic phenomena like war, internal disturbances like revolution, or types of government, or microscopic ones like individual ideals of freedom, there is a hiatus between ideas and action. Sorokin, after reminding us that personality and cultural mentality are very nearly two faces of the same thing, writes: "It is quite another matter with the problem of the relationship between the dominant type of culture and the actual behavior or conduct of the persons who are a part of it."[99] (italics removed) Simply by scanning the summary of dominant types of relationships given above, we see how this is so. It is difficult, for example to relate the much admired Idealistic periods of culture to arrangements of dominant social relations. And, although Sorokin clearly sees the familis-

tic type as embracing Ideational or Idealistic ideals, and contractual arrangements as exemplifying the Sensate, the parallel is rather rough. Further, one can imagine that familistic arrangements as they have arisen in the West might actually be antithetical to Ideational or Idealistic ideals. Plato's republic, if Russell is correct, is a reflection of admired qualities in the arrangements of Spartan life! Certainly not a state which placed familial relations at the apex of social ideals.[100] Modern Tibet, as an example of an Ideational culture (before the Chinese invasion and genocide) seems to have centered on a compulsory hierarchy of priestly orders.[101] In effect, even though Sorokin has managed to write most convincingly about the relationship of the relational types to changes in mentalities in the West, one may not be convinced that familistic relationships, for example, are a _necessary_ aspect of an Ideational order.[102] Nor on the other hand does it seem necessary to assume that the Western development of contractualism is described very well by its relationship to the Sensate mentality, even if this relationship is found to exist. There may be Sensate cultures, hypothetically at least, that fail to develop contractual relationships as we know them in the West. It might be helpful, for example, to know if, in fact, familial as opposed to contractual relationships were dominant in the pre-Mycenean culture of Minoan Crete.[103]

Sorokin attempts to account for the obvious disparity

between his measures of behavior and the changes in main cultural systems by two ideas. First, that biological drives or needs tend to diminish the sharp distinctions between Sensate and Ideational extremes. Secondly, these same biological needs, as residues, seem to undermine any sort of behavior guided by ideals.[104] Thus, in any social situation, people must meet a minimum of biological needs. Men must eat, sleep, nurture their young, and so on. These practical exigencies of life temper all ideals. But beyond the minimum of biological requirements, there is, for Sorokin, an ongoing battle of the flesh and the spirit. Oddly though, the spirit in this case ends up being the systems of ideas which man himself generates, but which may or may not act to mold his practical behavior. And the flesh is none other than a natural biological man, more or less bereft of truly human qualities.

Thus, in several problematic passages, Sorokin suggests that a mentality (spirit given by cultural systems) may be molded by biological residues. In such a case, behavior will be rationalized by twisting the ideals of a mentality to suit immediate individualistic aims.

> In such cases the principle "Don't kill" is twisted into "For the glory of God (or progress or communism, etc.) kill the infidels, the enemy." The principle "Abstain from lust" assumes the form of encouraging religious prostitution, and other forms of sexual indulgence, all justified on religious, political, moral or other grounds. Still more common is the confiscation of the property of others . . . contrary to the maxims "Seek poverty," "Take no heed of the

morrow . . ." 105

In effect, biological drives and needs may either break down the "inhibitory nature of the cultural mentality,"[106] or act to exert a sort of secondary socializing effect. In this latter case a person presumably becomes motivated by residual biological drives which are screened or fronted in society by some sort of pseudo-mentality, such as the pseudo-Sensate.[107] There are, I believe, a number of intellectual difficulties with these ideas and they will be considered shortly.

To go on, though, Sorokin proposes that it is an error for us to assume that a poor fit between his measures of behavior and the cultural mentalities implies no fit at all.

> Having emphasized the fact that the relationship between culture and conduct is not always close, we are not yet entitled to conclude that there is no observable relationship whatever. 108

After the initial proposition asserting that the relationship should not be close -- for the reasons of biological drag discussed -- a second proposition is necessary.

> Though the relationship between the dominant culture and the behavior of its bearers is not always close, nevertheless it does exist. . . . The bearers of the Ideational and the Sensate cultures differ from one another not only in their mentality (ideas, opinions, beliefs, . . .) but also in their behavior and personality. 109

Note that personality here, as distinct from mentality, is "understood. . . to mean the total mentality-plus-conduct of an individual."[110] This is another problematic dis-

tinction which will be discussed below. But to go on:

> The difference between the bearers of the Ideational and Sensate cultures is less great with respect to conduct and personality than to mentality; nevertheless, the difference exists and is quite readily perceptible. 111

Now Sorokin asserts that this second proposition follows from the fact that the line between mentality and behavior is more or less imperceptible, "many phenomena of mentality are at the same time phenomena of conduct and behavior."[112] But the effect of this assertion or line of reasoning is to back away from an effort at linking the forms of social interaction, as Sorokin has described them in any measurable way, to cultural mentalities. The argument has become this: Regardless of the fluctuation of types of social relations or of types of economic systems, or whatever, Idealistic cultural expressions imply Idealistic mentalities, Sensate expressions imply Sensate mentalities, and so on.

Thus he turns to a study of historical persons, utilizing a study by one J. V. Boldyreff. Boldyreff, utilizing the Encyclopedia Britannica (ninth edition) attempted to determine the proportions of persons described, given that these descriptions could be characterized as depicting Ideational, Sensate or Mixed personalities. Taking fifty year increments, these proportions are traced from 950 B.C. to 1849 A.D. The fluctuation of mentalities emerges once again. There is a reasonable parallel between Boldyreff's measures

and, for example, the fluctuation of ethical principles.[113]

But something is lost. It is no longer clear what the relationship between contractualism, say, and the Sensate mentality may be. But again, these problems will be considered later in the chapter.

<u>Changes in Personality</u>. We have already seen that for Sorokin personality parallels the dominant cultural mentalities. There are, that is, Sensate, Idealistic, Ideational and Mixed personalities. Where there is a high degree of cultural integration and few cultural disturbances (such as war, famine, or revolution), a person tends to reflect the mentality which imparts its character to all of the main cultural systems. Human beings, it seems, are "windowless monads,"[114] with respect to cultural sources of illumination which they may reflect or not. On the other hand, where cultural integration falters, where there are no ideals of virtue to impose orderly designs on these monads, the residual common denominator is biology. What is common however, about the biological denominator is mutual antagonism, the predispositions of amoral predators. If the reflective surface of the human monad is cracked by violence, made dim by the black smoke of disorder, the beast in man emerges.

Here we have a paradox in Sorokin. He refutes the psychoanalytic school, seeing in Freud's view of man a "bag of dirty sex."[115] Yet it seems evident that Sorokin locates humanness in the world of ideas, if not precisely in a

thin, repressive veneer of civilization. If the light of culture does not repress, it certainly provides the only alternative to a primal condition not too different from that of the Freudian id. Certainly too, if this light of culture fails, there is no noble savage left behind to save the day. One can only suspect that Sorokin's personal experiences have shaped many of these ideas. He certainly knew far more than most of us can, the nature of the beast in man. There can be little doubt that his experiences with famine and imprisonment, political brutality, and the chaos of revolution have found their echoes in his scholarly thought.[116] Be that as it may, Sorokin's position on the relationship of natural man and culture is made clear enough when, in Society, Culture and Personality, he writes,

> Since the first period of revolution manifests itself in a sudden collapse of social and cultural institutions and values, and since personality structure is inseparably connected with social and cultural structures, the collapse of the latter is paralleled by a corresponding breakdown of the personality structure of a considerable portion of the population. 117

He also notes that some individuals may respond to the challenge of social disturbances with more integrated personalities (a phenomenon he calls "positive polarization"), but they are a small minority, one which is marked by some degree of incidental improvement in their interactional lives.[118]

Above all, what occurs when cultural systems fail to

guide behavior is regrssion. Pathologies of all sorts arise and, most interestingly for this essay, there is thought to be a "replacement of [the] logic of common sense by that of the _loi de participation_ ascribed by Levy-Bruhl to primitive man."[119]

So we see again that what changes in the cultural-social world is mainly the systems of ideas. Where ideas falter, social order becomes problematic. _Patterned_ change is largely the unfolding of systems of culture, majestically or prosaically, as these are objectified in human interaction. And personality? It is simply the reflection of these idea-systems, more or less distorted, in actual behavior.

Before ending this section, it may be useful to note again that Sorokin's thought associates humanness and virtue with the ordered and reasoning forms of behavior, given integrated systems of ideas. The failure of culture is, in large measure, the failure of reason. The form of this regressin for man turns out to be the ascendancy of what we have called the relational mode of understanding. For properly understood, that is what I believe Levy-Bruhl's "law of participation" in fact represents.[120]

It will be seen then, that a duality of mind may be viewed in different ways. It will be the task of later pages to show that Sorokin errs in placing that duality be-

yond man as a creature, locating it in the idea of the superorganic which, in this sense, transcends man. Meanings, after all, are elements of the psyche, and the ways of knowing the world, the systems of truth reside in human minds.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter I have tried to summarize the main aspects of Sorokin's vision of change. Above all, changes at the three levels of the superorganic have been considered with an eye toward comparing the patterns of change at each level. It was found that there are some difficulties in relating changes between levels. These difficulties will lead us in subsequent chapters to examine the way these three levels _are_ in fact related, since they are not found to be inseparable in a strict sense. The recent Pioneer space probe certainly involves the possibility of conveying meanings beyond the human sociocultural world. And, as we have seen, both vehicles and human agents may exist in their own right, disconnected from particular systems of meaning. Now it will remain for further thought and analysis to see if, for example, it makes sense to speak of sociocultural systems at all. In what way, thus, may we speak of interaction between causal empirical phenomena (machines, artifacts) and non-causal, non-empirical idea systems? Apparently the interaction of empirical phenomena and ideas must be acausal. Therefore, social systems must have acausal properties. Sorokin, in fact, seems to be suggesting something of

this sort often enough.[121]

Beyond the problem of the incongruence among the three levels of the superorganic, there are other problems which Sorokin himself did not seem to recognize. First, there is the problematic distinction between personality and mentality.

Now the most straightforward interpretation of Sorokin's statements in this regard might be this: personality represents the imperfect acting out of a mentality. A mentality, on the other hand, exists as a set of ideas, opinions, convictions, beliefs, tastes, etc., given by and for the human mind, which guides, orients and explains behavior.

But this straightforward interpretation generates two problems. If, as Sorokin asserts, the line between behavior and mentality is inseparable, why do patterns of interaction (represented by the familistic, contractual and compulsory forms) not change in a measure more congruent with changes in cultural systems? Secondly, if the systems of ideas are, as Sorokin teaches, transcendent of <u>biological</u> man, the social person is, literally, superimposed <u>by culture</u> on the organism which becomes, as it were, a culture carrier. This viewpoint has the added effect of blurring the distinction between categories of the psyche and those of cultural systems. This, to be sure, may be one reason Sorokin's psychology is not more developed.[122] While Sorokin certainly implies that the psyche has its proper

role in generating cultural systems, in other places he seems to make cultural systems and the content of the mind more or less equivalent. By treating human beings generally as variously capable transmitters of cultural signals, he removes the psyche and its categories from the mind and places them in cultural systems. Even, in fact, as Sorokin explains that man may generate cultural systems -- he talks at length on the role of intuition as a source of truth[123]-- he also implies at other points that the origin of such ideas is not the psyche itself, but a realm of pure ideas which may be accessible to mind.

These problems are most interesting and I will return to them later. In this chapter, only the following points need stand: one, Sorokin's insights are powerful and fruitful, particularly with regard to the nature and changes of cultural systems. Two, they falter, nevertheless, on the assumption of a seamless unity as a characteristic of sociocultural systems (which includes vehicles and actors). The axiom of inseparability must be carefully reconsidered. In doing so it should become clear that patterns of behavior, the human psyche and systems of meanings, all may have their own times and their own spaces. If I may demonstrate this fact to the reader's satisfaction, it will then be reasonable to ask the reader to consider new points of view about the subject of sociology -- the superorganic.

No effort will be made to travel very far beyond Soro-

kin though. It should become evident that much of what I may discover Sorokin has at least implied at one point or another. Even so, with respect to the problem of the relationship among the levels of the superorganic, it should do no harm to anticipate the later discussion. For there does seem to be a simple (if not easy) solution in the notion of complementarity. That is, the relationship of patterns of behavior, of acting human beings and of systems of meaning is one which encompasses paradox. The sociocultural world, whether we may call it a system or not, does manifest three faces: vehicles which follow causal tracks through the empirical world, systems of meanings which have no ultimate causal existence, and human minds which encompass both the causal and the acausal as a property of the mind itself.

NOTES

[1]Sorokin has cited this passage. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1941), IV, 639. This may be compared with a slightly different wording found in Aristotle, Physics, Book VI, found in Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 316-340.

[2]See the summary tables in Sorokin, Dynamics, II, pp. 7-9. See also Pitirim A. Sorokin, Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1941), p. 81.

[3]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 82.

[4]See Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 741. Further, in Ibid., II, 257, Sorokin writes: "When the Ideational tide is rising, realism appears to be more and more scientifically "valid." In this sense, "validity" is a function of the type of culture which rises and declines. . . . What appears to be truth to the human mind, is in a great degree a reflection of the transformation of the whole culture."

[5]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 741.

[6]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 3.

[7]See, for example, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), particularly chapter 1.

[8]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 55.

[9]Ibid., p. 14.

[10]Ibid., pp. 24-27.

[11]Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 665.

[12]Ibid., p. 674.

[13]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 24.

[14]See Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, trans. by R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1961), p. 253 ff. Russell's reference to the chapter is on p. 253 of his History.

[15]Russell, History, p. 253.

[16]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 25.

[17]Ibid., p. 64.

[18]Ibid., p. 97.

[19]See, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles), trans. and ed. by Charles J. O'Neil (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 33 ff.

[20]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 101.

[21]Ibid., p. 26.

[22]Ibid., p. 106.

[23]Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, in Marcus Aurelius and His Times, trans.by Georg Long, edited by the publishers, (Roslyn, New York: Walter J. Black, Inc., 1945), p. 71.

[24]William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 114-142.

[25]Ibid., p. 123. This view of the world is also characterized most powerfully in Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954).

[26]See, for example, Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven, Conn.: The Yale University Press, 1944).

[27]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, pp. 14-55.

[28]Ibid., p. 16.

[29]Ibid., p. 635 ff.

[30]Ibid., p. 17.

[31]See the tables, Ibid., pp. 30-32. See also, Sorokin, Crisis, p. 32.

[32]Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press, 1953, pp. 39-55.

[33]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 125.

[34]Burrhus F. Skinner, Walden II (New York: MacMillan Co., 1962).

[35]See particularly, Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, pp. 747-764; Sorokin, Crisis, pp. 105-112; Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 545 ff.

[36]In Sorokin, Dynamics, III, chapter 8, for example, increasing economic well-being (external freedom) is linked with the Sensate mentality.

[37]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 311.

[38]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, pp. 246-249.

[39]Ibid., p. 182.

[40]Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. by Bernard Wall (New York: Harper and Row, 1959).

[41]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, pp. 185-190; 648-662.

[42]Ibid., p. 201.

[43]Ibid., p. 200.

[44]I am referring to F. R. Cowell, History, Civilization and Culture: An Introduction to the Historical and Social Philosophy of Pitirim A. Sorokin (London: Thames and Hudson, 1952), as well as F. R. Cowell, Values and Human Society (New York: F. Porter Sargent, 1970).

[45]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 30.

[46]See, for example, Henri Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1948), particularly p. 150 ff.

[47]An insightful essay on the way modern arts reflect current world-visions is Wylie Sypher, Loss of the Self in Modern Literature and Art (New York: Random House, 1962).

[48]It does seem that ceremonies, festivals, rites of passage, and so on, are characteristically distinct between Ideational and Sensate extremes of culture. This is brought out by Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1959). This is assuming that one may identify an emphasis on the sacred as characterizing an Ideational world-view.

[49]The most concise discussion of the idea of law norms is given in Sorokin, Society, pp. 72-84. However, see also

Sorokin, Dynamics, III, chapter 15. Here, on p. 525, Sorokin notes that "The best source or 'social mirror' of the ethical mentality and respective forms of conduct, or of the mores, is usually given by the totality of the 'official' laws of a given group, plus its official moral prescriptions." With the official law, if it is enforced and functioning properly, one finds the most reliable reflection of the ethical mentality.

[50]The author (like Sorokin himself, perhaps) feels somewhat more conversant with the arts than with other cultural systems, having worked as a commercial artist for some years and having had a continuing if fickle affair with the fine arts. Sorokin's artistic background, by the way, is discussed in his autobiography. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, A Long Journey (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1963).

[51]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, pp. 243-268.

[52]Ibid., p. 249.

[53]These three dimensions of artistic production are suggested by Franz Boas, Primitive Art (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), although the terms are my own. Sorokin, incidentally, refers to this work by Boas quite frequently with regard both to primitive art and the general nature of symbolism in art.

[54]The most extreme Ideational "condition" perhaps -- one not envisioned by Sorokin --might occur when "solidarity" has become a "concrete facticity" (to take a term from Durkheim) in communal ceremonies. An example of just such a hypothetical situation is given in an account of the Amahuaca Indians of Peru. See Andrew Weil, The Natural Mind (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972), p. 106 ff.

[55]Frank Waters, Book of the Hopi (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), pp. 29-30. A rounded variant of this symbol relates to man's place in a universal life plan. Interestingly, the symbol is, according to Waters, identical with the diagram of the Labyrinth of Daedalus which appeared on ancient Cretan coins. See p. 31 and note.

[56]Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, p. 156.

[57]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, p. 531.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid.

[60]An example of an Ideational festival and accompanying music is described for us in an account of the Ituri Pygmies by Colin Turnbull, The Forest People (New York: Clarion Press, 1964).

[61]Plato, The Republic in Great Dialogues of Plato, translated by W. H. D. Rouse (New York: The New American Library, 1956), p. 211. Sorokin cites Plato's concerns about music in Dynamics, I, 536, giving a list of the places in his writings devoted to music.

[62]Aristotle, Politics, in Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1315.

[63]Idries Shah, The Sufis (New York: E. P. Duttin and Co., 1964).

[64]See Sorokin's discussion in Dynamics, I, 537 ff.

[65]Ibid., p. 349. Further, on p. 361, ibid., Sorokin writes, "Impressionism, photography, movies . . . [testify that] reality was reduced in that mentality to the mere surface of the sensory phenomenon; even in that surface the reality was thought of as a purely momentary, fugitive and passing glimpse." He also refers to visualism in these passages as solipsistic and shallow.

[66]Ibid., pp. 362-363.

[67]Ibid., p. 321.

[68]Ibid., p. 679.

[69]T. S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p. 40.

[70]See also Sypher, Loss of the Self.

[71]T. S. Eliot, "The Wasteland," in Complete Poems and Plays, p. 59.

[72]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 540.

[73]Sorokin might add that a pseudo-Ideational use of music is also possible to the ends of promoting solidarity or even hysteria. Goebbels certainly assisted Hitler's rally "productions" by attending to the psychological impact pro-

vided not only by the scope or size of the proceedings, but by uses of music.

[74]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 62 ff.

[75]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 321.

[76]Ibid., p. 351.

[77]See Peter and Linda Murray, The Art of the Renaissance (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), particularly chapter one.

[78]Sorokin uses this term malerisch to depict a meaning more complex than that conveyed by the words "pictorial" or "visual." See Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 217n. Among other things the term for Sorokin implies showiness, a concern with individualism, freedom, and illusionism.

[79]William Gaunt, A Concise History of English Painting (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

[80]Sorokin, Dynamics, I, 371.

[81]Ibid. and ff.

[82]Ibid., p. 681.

[83]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, pp. 125-180; Sorokin, Crisis, pp. 116; 132.

[84]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 169; Sorokin, Crisis, p. 129.

[85]Ibid., p. 127.

[86]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 481.

[87]Ibid., pp. 525-585.

[88]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 161.

[89]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 484.

[90]Russell, History, p. 93.

[91]Sorokin, Dynamics, II, 483.

[92]Ibid., p. 492.

[93]I am thinking of Max Weber's discussion of the Hebrews as an "oath-bound confederation" to a God who did not

esteem "an eternally valid ethic or could himself be ethically judged." This very uncertainty about Jahwe's intentions, it seems, is related to recurring emphases on obeying complicated laws to the letter -- as absolutes. See Max Weber, Ancient Judaism, trans, by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale, (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p. 136.

[94]In Matthew 12: 1-8, the Pharisees accuse Jesus and his followers of violating the Sabbath by eating grain from the fields. Christ recounts to the Pharisees that David, in need, had taken the Bread of the Presence from the temple. "I desire mercy and not sacrifice," Christ says on this occasion. Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1952).

[95]Sorokin, Crisis, p. 157.

[96]See, for example, Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Reconstruction of Humanity (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948). On page 226 of this volume, Sorokin writes, "No creative explosion of the superconscious forces is possible until the minimum of love is achieved by creators, groups, and nations." (italics removed) On page 224, apropos of our later discussions, Sorokin notes that the ultimate goal must be to control conscious and unconscious forces by superconscious, i.e. cultural and transcendant ones.

[97]Sorokin, Dynamics, III, chapter one.

[98]Ibid., p. 124.

[99]Ibid., p. 510.

[100]Russell, History, p. 108 ff.

[101]See the discussion in Jacob Needleman, The New Religions (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 164-187.

[102]See particularly the relevant discussions in Sorokin, Crisis.

[103]Sorokin seems to idealize the family, as any number of comments in his theoretical writings would attest. He is most explicit about this idealization in his autobiography. See Sorokin, A Long Journey.

[104]Sorokin, Dynamics, III, 511.

[105]Ibid., p. 512.

[106]Ibid.

[107]See the discussions in Sorokin, Society, pp. 489-490.

[108]Sorokin, Dynamics, III, 512.

[109]Ibid.

[110]Ibid., p. 513.

[111]Ibid.

[112]Ibid.

[113]Ibid.,p. 517 ff.

[114]I think there is a genuine parallel with Leibnitz here. In the Monadology, Leibnitz writes, ". . . souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things. . . ." G. W. F. von Leibnitz, Monadology and Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. by George Montgomery, in The Rationalists (New York: Doubleday and Co., Dolphin Books edition, 1960), p. 469.

[115]See Sorokin, Crisis, p. 122, for example.

[116]Referring to Sorokin, The Long Journey.

[117]Sorokin, Society, p. 489.

[118]Ibid.

[119]Ibid. n.

[120]Lucien Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, trans. by Lilian A. Clare, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966). Without reducing society to psychic functions one may still say that the psyche produces boundary conditions -- relational and objective -- which may be approached (as a limit, so to speak) given Ideational or Sensate cultural environments.

[121]The very definition of logico-meaningful integration suggests as much.

[122]The problem of distinguishing among cultural and psychic "systems" cannot be easily resolved, I am sure. Even so, Jung's idea of archetypes may, finally, serve to guide us toward the identification of categories which are, somehow, "inherent" in the psyche and which interact with

cultural objectifications in concrete human interaction.

[123] See, for example, Sorokin, Society, pp. 545-547.

CHAPTER IV

PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE

Sorokin's general sociological concepts and his vision of social change have been discussed. Hopefully, elements of his thinking which are salient to the work of this essay have been illuminated. In this chapter I will first consider the principles Sorokin gives us for the why and the how of sociocultural change. Having considered these principles, I will proceed with a critique of them. In this chapter, though, criticism will mostly be confined to the change principles themselves and not to the implications and alternatives that may come to light.

Sorokin's Principles of Change

Immanent Change. For Sorokin, "any sociocultural system, as soon as it emerges as a system, bears in itself its future destiny."[1] As such, it must (1) generate consequences which immanate from the system itself, not from the environment, and (2) act in a relatively self-determinate manner.

Sorokin's discussion of immanent change in Volume Four of his *Dynamics* begins with an assertion that there are three possible explanations for the fact that empirical

sociocultural systems are in constant flux or change. The first of these, those theories Sorokin designates as *externalist*, are the most popular in current sociology. Such theories propose that any change in a system must be referred to an external cause. The stimulus-response model in psychology, or the main factor theories which purport to explain economic conditions by geography, say, or sunspots, are examples. The problem with any externalistic approach, Sorokin notes, is the absurdity of being thrown back infinitely in any sequence of putative causes to discover a final cause. One may, of course, end up with a prime mover *a la* Aristotle. But while such an unmoved mover may be acceptable for metaphysics, it is not useful scientifically.[2]

The second possibility is to explain all change as a result of immanent forces; a third would attempt some reasonable mixture of immanent and external causes. For Sorokin's part, he favors "the principle of immanent change of each sociocultural system supported by the externalistic principle within certain conditions and limits."[3] By adopting this position Sorokin is admitting the relevance of external agencies of change, including the *interaction* of systems changing immanently. But he is insisting, above all, that sociocultural systems have their own peculiar lives, their own built-in potentials.

Any organism may respond differently to the same stim-

ulus when it is encountered a second time. Any such inconsistency in the first and second response, assuming that the stimuli are indeed equivalent, and assuming that other environmental conditions are constant, indicates that the organism is, in some degree, self-determinate.[4] Similarly, Sorokin tells us, the three components of any sociocultural system "bear in themselves the seeds of their, and of the system's change."[5] Human agents change as do vehicles and meanings. But it must be understood that each of these may change in their own way; a vehicle _qua_ vehicle may wear away or rust, or in some other way lose its capacity to convey meanings; human agents and meanings themselves change in their own terms, independently of vehicles or of each other.[6] We see then, that change in an organism is not quite like change in an empirical sociocultural system. Here is the reason: vehicles change in _causal terms_. They are altered, that is, in time-space. They come and go, as we have noted, independently of particular human agents or idea systems. To use one of Sorokin's examples, a radio receiverceiver may be tuned to any number of frequencies, receiving any number of unrelated meaning systems (or meaning fragments, perhaps). There are aspirin ads, station breaks, acid rock and the world news. And, should a particular radio receiver cease functioning, another may be put in its place.[7]

On the other hand, systems of meaning _do not change in_

causal ways. The relationship F = ma will not rust; the technique for manufacturing optical lenses is independent of an particular lense, it is not visible ; the means of carrying on a joking relationship with a Chiricahua sister-in-law -- if one is an Apache husband -- has no material substance. A relationship in mechanics, or a technique in optics, may reflect causal exigencies but they are not, thereby, causal. A cultural convention may have practical functions, but it is not, thereby, causal. As we have already seen, for Sorokin meanings exist "nowhere" or "everywhere,"[8] which is to say that in themselves meanings do not occupy time or fill space.

But what of human agents? Obviously, as organisms, they are restrained and guided by causal conditions in reality. On the other hand, as creatures with minds they contain meanings which, by Sorokin's arguments, cannot be said to have causal properties. Further, in experience at least, meanings and the causal relationships of the organism appear to be independent. The cells composing various tissues in my body are not the same today as they were when I was ten and blissfully ignorant of sociology. Yet today my name, the characteristics of my second grade teacher, and the reasons I was given for the germination of bean sprouts remain. They are meanings, ideas, understandings, which appear to be independent of the empirical parts which make up my body. For not a single cell still lives in my body

which was alive when I was ten. The suggestion must be, then, that changes in human agents are both causal and acausal -- for I would not presume to say that my ideas, my understandings, my sense of many meanings have not changed. But I cannot link these changes to biochemistry, say, in any conclusive or necessary way. My ideas change, conveying to me a sense of time. But ideas do not occupy physical spaces; therefore, even this sense of time may not be considered equivalent to the time of physics. It may, in fact, be argued that the time of my ideas is altogether relative to mental and emotional spaces which are not necessarily contingent on physical space and time.[9]

In any case, because empirical sociocultural systems are, in fact, composed of systems with distinct temporal and spatial properties, they cannot be said to be equivalent to causal-functional systems. To the extent then, that an organism is a causal functional entity, it cannot be compared, strictly speaking, to a logico-meaningful system, such as a code of ethics.

Sorokin does not distinguish among causal and acausal aspects of sociocultural systems.[10] That is, when Sorokin discusses sociocultural systems he is clear that these have both causal and acausal (logico-meaningful or aesthetic) properties. But in stating that any sociocultural system changes by way of a principle such as immanent change, we are not informed as to how this principle can account

for changes in both the psychic and the physical stuff of a system in the same related manner. (Note that one cannot safely say at the same time or in the same place.) What, for example, changes immanently in the game of baseball, the non-material or the material (empirical) aspects of the game?

The answer of course, for Sorokin, is that these change together. But try as I might (and the reader is welcome to join in this effort) I can imagine no <u>immanent</u> changes in baseball that are not related to the desires, needs, expectations, and understandings of people who play or watch the game. In every case, what changes immanently is the idea, the value, the intention. And the empirical aspects of the system of baseball, such as uniforms, bats, or whatever, seem always contingent on what people expect baseball to be. Further, I believe this predominance of the idea, of the non-empirical aspects of sociocultural systems, is always more or less evident.

From the perspective of the person, at least, the empirical may not seem to determine what baseball will be, even though it <u>limits</u> what it can be. The adoption of aluminum bats, for example, was a <u>potential</u>. It was not <u>necessary</u> that aluminum be used for baseball bats. A second generation of color television receivers may be <u>suggested</u> by the first, but increased sophistication in any direction was not required. There is always feedback from things

man has wrought. Such feedback effects may even be crucial to the choices of further behavior. But no feedback behavior is, strictly speaking, necessary. Technology does not determine anything so much as the intentions and inclinations, the world-view of the people who create that technology.

So Sorokin applies this principle of immanent change, and the derivative principle of limit, together to sociocultural systems. Thus, he is explaining sociocultural change by principles which relate to physical-temporal properties on the one hand (in the principle of limits) and non-temporal, non-spatial conditions on the other (in the principle of immanent change).

The second main fact of immanent change in structures or systems is the fact that they are relatively self-determinate.[11] Thus, Sorokin poses a question. "Is the immanent principle of change a variety of determinism or is it one of indeterminism?" And the answer is: Neither or both.[12] Sorokin is attempting, in effect, an ambitious synthesis. In answer to the half truths of either a deterministic or an indeterministic view, free will is given as the possibilities of a system and determinism is and determinism becomes the limits imposed on that system, internally or externally. For example any organism which relies on the peculiar bonding properties of the carbon atom may only behave within certain limits. No creature of carbon-based

biochemistry may outrun an orbiting space vehicle, digest pure platinum, or breathe methane. Yet, within limits, an organism will tend to unfold its built-in potentialities. And, as Sorokin insists, "Potentiality has always a margin for variation, especially on its fringes."[13] Otherwise, as he says, potential would mean predeterminism. Yet one also sees that the unfolding of potential is relative or indeterminate precisely because of the interaction of any organism or other structure, or system, with other systems which comprise the environment. For sociocultural systems as for causal-functional systems, it seems that indeterminism is the distance between ideal potentialities and necessary limits.

An example of a sociocultural system in some context may be of use here. Imagine an intersection manned at certain times by school age safety patrolmen. "Safety patrol" here exhibits an empirical face because one may see young people wearing belts and badges and performing ritual acts at the cross walks during prescribed periods during the school day. By inquiry one may discover the rationale, the ethics, the rules and the conventions of safety patrol. So there is here a system of ideas, agents, and vehicles which convey meanings particular to this system of ideas.

Let time pass. School years come and go. Yet, at intersections near Somewhere Elementary School, children continue to act out the role of safety patrol. They are dif-

ferent children. The belts and badges may be different. The system of ideas goes on. But this may change too. Girls may appear one fall day, wearing the bright badges and belts that only boys wore before. A victory for women's lib.

Let more time pass. The intersection is widened and the stream of traffic that passes over it becomes heavy. The intersection is deemed too dangerous for safety patrol boys and girls. A policeman must take over the task of watching the cross-walks. Since there is no other intersection that needs guarding, safety patrol is abolished at Somewhere Elementary School. Systems affecting transportation and the flow of traffic have directly and indirectly interacted with safety patrol to cause its eventual demise. Over some longer period of time, one can imagine that safety patrols would vanish altogether, the immanent possibilites of that species of sociocultural system having been exhausted.

It will be seen in this example that the discussion of immanent change in the thing called safety patrol alludes only implicitly to the immanent change of ideas or meanings. Far easier to imagine are externals : the arrival of altered sex role norms, the widening of the intersection. That which undergoes immanent change in something like a safety patrol is not empirical. Meanings are easily lost sight of. Conventions of language alone deny us easy access to what is inside the entity called safety pa-

trol. But there _is_ something inside. Namely, the ideas and understandings of people who are involved with that sociocultural system. Immanent change in a sociocultural system then, is nothing less than active human minds interpreting expectations and ideals which bear on that system. Thus, in the example, girls are made safety patrol persons, and one gets the sense that safety patrol is forced into a new form by extèrnal ideas. In fact, the interpretation of the safety patrol role, probably conceived in large measure by teacher-sponsors, may also be seen as having the _potential_ to admit female as well as male actors. For it might still be decided at some other school that only boys should be initiated into that organization.

One must remain aware of the nature of any sociocultural system as constantly selecting _potential_ behaviors in order to conceive of its changing from within. And this is not, apparently, easy to do. Still, only by such imaginative acts may we conceive of what sociocultural systems may become and, hence, observe their immanent unpredictability. At one school, for example, safety patrol might become an elitist organization, controlled by a clique of upper middleclass students who benefit from its privileges. (Free hall passes, perhaps.) At another school, the same service organization might manifest itself as a nearly para-military organization of alienated male students sponsored by a politically radical physical education teacher.

Immanent change is the selection of possibilities between brackets set by causal contingency on the one hand, and the possibilities of human imagination on the other.

<u>The Principle of Limits</u>. In the principle of immanent change, Sorokin finds the main reason for sociocultural change, but

> . . . the special reason why many sociocultural systems have recurrent nonidentical rhythms and turns, instead of proceeding forever in the same direction, or undergoing ever new changes devoid of any recurrence, or running in an identical cycle, is given by the principle of limits. 14

The concept of limits here is intended to imply three related ideas. First, there are limits implied in causal-functional relationships. Second, the direction of change in any sociocultural system reaches limits and third, given the existence of classes or types of sociocultural phenomena (systems or processes) the number of their variations may usually be found to be finite.

A. <u>Causal-Functional Limits</u>. Sorokin points out that to have a strict causal-functional relationship one must also have limits. A relationship like that between sodium and chlorine, for example, is set by the limits within which it may hold. The relationship described by the notation $NaOH + HCl - NaCl + H_2O$, is typically presented as having a general validity. Limits are not specified for the relationship even though they obviously must exist. That is, the relationship given in the notation is only <u>empirically</u>

valid under those conditions wherein the reagents may exist in an ion state which allows the reassembly of molecules to produce salt water from sodium hydroxide and hydrochloric acid. Above a certain temperature, thus, sodium hydroxide cannot exist in a manageable solution, and so on.

Sorokin is simply pointing out that causal-functional relationships are often not given along with the limits within which they occur.[15] In the case of the chemical reaction given above, this observation may amount to something of a quibble. But what if "income" is found to have a causal relationship to "occupation." Aside from the fact that no relationship between income and occupation is ever likely to be a strictly causal one, the fact remains that if such a relationship were found to exist, one would wish to know the conditions and limits of it. Certainly, in the natural and life sciences, such limits are commonplace. The amount of phosphorus, for example, that may be utilized by an organism falls within strict limits.

B. Limits in the Direction of Change. Sorokin is insistent in denying the existence of any perpetual linear development in social processes or systems which are not trivial in sociocultural terms. He rebukes any who conclude that some "Providential Progress will unerringly lead mankind ever nearer to some . . . bigger and better state."[16] In effect, there are limits in the direction of change simply because there are limits to systems. Integrated systems

and processes have immanent possibilities which, eventually wear out. Thus, a code of law, considered as a sociocultural system will retain its integrity or identity only as long as it fits with related systems (such as the form of polity or religion). Or, at some point, the premises on which a code is based may no longer work -- in the business of adjudication -- with the body of interpretations or precedents. Maine, certainly, seems to indicate the immanent limits inherent in the forms of law.[17] One can see that through usage and through transformations in related cultural systems, a code of law must in time cease to exist in the form in which it may have been conceived.

C. Limits on Possibilities. Identity implies limits, Sorokin argues.[18] Thus, if any sociocultural system may be said to have identifiable characteristics, an identity, these characteristics must form a limited set. Otherwise an entity would be composed of an indefinite or infinite number of characteristics and, hence, be a chaos, void and without form.

Empirically, after all, sociocultural systems seem to have limited numbers of characteristics. By the term arts it is possible to indicate a fairly limited set composed of techniques, mediums, and subject matters which occur among cultures and through hisorical times. Or, considering political organization, Sorokin notes that there are probably not many more than the five or six forms described by Plato

or Aristotle.[19] The same may be said again for forms of religion, ethics, and so on. Further, among the forms of interaction, or of sociocultural processes, or of types of personality, there seem to be only a limited number of personalities.

In effect, if there are only three main types of supersystems, say A, B, and C, these three must occur every so often in human societies, following some order that excludes one third of the possibilities for each succeeding appearance. (If A appears, only B or C may follow A, etc.) Thus, one must expect a _trendless_ fluctuation which more closely approximates a rhythmic one as the number of possible types for a system decreases.

Linear Change and Accretion. Over a time span which is short enough, any changing system may be seen to follow a "linear" path of development.[20] But over all, if the primary fact of the sociocultural universe is self-directing systems with finite potential for expression or development, then for the great majority of such systems or processes, there must be a time limit to changes that may be represented by a line. In other words, nothing goes on forever, And that is Sorokin's basic teaching about the nature of linear change.

On the other hand,,Sorokin does not deny that there are processes of accretion. It is obvious that writing and printing, for example, have had the effect of allowing the

accumulation of information in the last few centuries. But while Sorokin admits that there is accumulation, linear accretion, he draws back from attributing any great significance to the fact. One feels that Sorokin sees in the eternal forms of philosophy, art and ethics the main substance of societies. The details of Sensate societies may not be the same, but their essence will be. And clearly, since Sorokin is committed to the long view, he does not see in the present media explosion the possibility of a radical transformation _in kind_. The present Sensate time, with its nearly overwhelming barrage of media and messages,[21] its congeries of facts and impressions, is finally only symptomatic of decay. Unlike Chardin,[22] Thompson,[23] or McLuhan,[24] Sorokin cannot envision a fundamental transformation in the quality of the social order.

At one point Sorokin even cites the great length of man's history as, perhaps, disguising abrupt endings in the accumulation of knowledge. "The past history of mankind," he writes,

> goes back some 200,000 to 800,000 and more years. Even with a slight rate of growth such a period would have given an enormous figure [for the accumulation of knowledge] at the present time. If such is not the situation, this means that somehow the growth has been checked, and was either stationary for long periods, or had gradual or catastrophic declines. 25

Idea systems may have their immanent potentials, but the superorganic does not, for Sorokin, have an overall identity

contiguous with the race <u>homo sapiens</u>. To this extent, Sorokin rejects an Hegelian view of history.[26]

<u>Changes in Supersystems</u>. There are one major and two secondary reasons for the alternations of the three great supersystems -- the Ideational, the Sensate, and the Idealistic. Let us first consider the two lesser reasons. They are, first, the principle of limits concerning possibilities of existence for <u>integrated</u> forms in the superorganic. There are a finite number of possible supersystems, for example. Of course, there may be any variety of mixed or eclectic forms, at least hypothetically, but this possible variety is one of disorder. Transitional forms, for example, which might mix some odd assortment of Sensate and Ideational elements, are not integrated; they have no coherent character that is likely to continue for long.[27]

Secondly, since any integrated cultural supersystem encompasses some finite set of immanent possibilites, these must be realized, in some degree, and then exhausted over the life of the system. No supersystem can go on indefinitely.

The major reason for changes in the supersystems, though, is given by what Sorokin calls the "integral theory of truth and reality."[28] The three sources of truth, the senses, reason, and intuition(faith) reveal only a part of the "whole truth." If this were not so, Sorokin assumes, if for example the Ideational truth of faith were a fully adequate

"model" for knowing the world and dealing with its problems, the truth of faith would not be undermined periodically by the truths of the senses or of reason. But, in fact, the truth of faith is displaced.[29]

Truth, then, is "white" and the truths of the senses, of faith, and of reason are the "primary colors." "The assumption of the absolute truth by the representatives of any of these systems of truth" -- any of the primary colors -- "would mean a presupposition that the truereality is exhaustible and finite."[30] No mind, further, can contain the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

So the Sensate period now in its death agony is failing because of a widespread, officially prescribed insistence on "painting the world Sensate." But any system based solely on a truth of faith or reason should likewise fail at last. For,

> . . . each of these systems of truth separated from the rest becomes less valid or more fallacious even within the specific field of its own competence. 31

And this fact, this dynamic of the succession of supersystems is "the deepest and most important."[32]

An implication of Sorokin's thought about the "mixed" nature of truth lends some support to the idea that human action is valuative in nature, an idea that will receive more attention in the last two chapters of this essay. The implication is this: If truth models become exhausted it must be because human action involves an ongoing evaluation

of the fit between one's premises and one's experiences. Supersystems don't just wear out, they are worn out by peoples' use of them.[33]

This last point is an important one. Sorokin wishes to speak of ideas changing "without premeditation in the process of meaningful interaction."[34] As he puts it, "this or that potential meaning, hitherto hidden . . . comes out . . . into the open."[35] Such lines as these are redolent of Sorokin's brand of cultural determinism. But they may, as it were, be turned upside down. What, after all, can be meant by the phrase "without premeditation?" Nothing, I would suggest, that may safely lead us to assert that ideas force themselves on us unbidden. There is always, I believe, some context of action, of intention, to which ideas are related. No sort of understanding, no facet of the "infinite manifold" may reflect its truth if our intentions do not illuminate it. One may accept Sorokin's integralist perspective and say that all truths are partial. But how is the potential of a meaning or an idea to become relevant if it is not grounded in the existential qualities of somebody's experience? One does not see what does not bear on needs or intentions. I may, for example, see a landscape as a geologist or as an artist. In the one case my reflections on the uneven erosion of strata, or on the formation of an anticline may lead me to see implications (for the instability of a bridge placed at a certain spot, or for the

existence of a petroleum deposit) which are relevantto me. As an artist, on the other hand, I may see a new color in the sandstone which causes me to discover a new use of ultramarine or burnt sienna. In either case I see what I am inclined to see.

If I may be allowed a cryptic comment: Things valued are not only things experienced but things conceived as possible to experience. And ideas of value, like clothing, are worn both for utility and for vanity until they wear thin at the elbows or become discordant with prevailing styles. Yet, while we wear our ideas we expect them to cover what needs to be covered and to reveal what we want revealed.

Also, for reference in later discussions, note that Sorokin holds the truth of faith, of intuition, as primus inter pares. Sorokin writes, "there is hardly any doubt that intuition is the real source of real knowledge."[36] All important scientific discoveries, not to mention religious or ethical ones, have their base in intuition.[37] Further, then, values themselves or the act of valuing, is founded in the intuitive potential of the mind. Or, to use the terms established for this essay, values pertain to the relational as opposed to the objective mode of understanding the world.

There is one other implication here. To place meanings and values at the center of sociology is to say that mean-

ings or values exist for us because they are given relative order by our valuating. Meanings, thus, are first of all *nomina* which designate properties, objects, things discriminated by the senses. At a second level, meanings are *realia* which bind these nomina into categories and relationships. This is the level of reason which, at its most sublime, may attempt to relate whole ranges of categories and relationships in an harmonic and mathematically beautiful order -- as in the special theory of relativity. At a final level, that of intuition, there are the non-objective "meanings" of categories and relationships constructed by the reason, as well as a sort of propensity to discriminate among the range of sensual stimuli. Both these non-objective "meanings" and the general orientation to stimuli are, in effect, the *values* for us of our experiences. At the level of intuition, the nomina of the senses are arranged by reason according to the *valuative* acts of mind.

Critique

Sociocultural Systems. I believe that my main objection to Sorokin's approach to change has already been suggested in the preceeding discussion. It amounts, in effect, to a question about how a sociocultural system may have both causal-functional and logico-meaningful properties.

This is not to say that there may not be such systems. It could be argued, in fact, that organisms presumed to have consciousness must also be thought of as manifesting

both sorts of properties.[38] But organisms, as such, are not apparently composed of systems of meanings and vehicles for conveying those meanings which are contingent on interaction with other organisms. If organisms as conscious entities manifest both tempero-spatial and non-temporal properties, these are contained together in the structure we see as an organism. An integrated sociocultural system, on the other hand, is constituted of elements distributed over space-time in a most uncertain way. (Which is why Sorokin turns to discussions of social space and social time.[39])

Sociocultural systems are not systems in the same way that organisms are. Still, as no less a systems theorist than Bertalanffy writes, Sorokin and others have shown us that there are civilizational entities or systems.[40] As he puts it,

> History is not a process in an amorphous humanity, or in Homo Sapiens as a zoological species. Rather it is borne by entities or great systems, called high cultures or civilizations. [41]

So, in a real sense, Sorokin may be thought of as a pioneer in systems-thinking about sociological problems. And, from the systems-theory perspective, a sociocultural system may be thought to manifest (1) the constitutive property, (2) closure under transformation and (3) some degree of self-regulation. Let us consider each of these in turn.[42]

The constitutive property, as Bertalanffy writes, is in mathematical terms the idea that an entity may not be ex-

plainable from the characteristics of its isolated parts.[43] A sociocultural system, in these terms, manifests an identity that is not the identity of meanings, vehicles or human agents. A family for example, as a system, proceeds through time and history taking somewhat different forms and qualities. But it proceeds more or less independently of particular individuals, hearth relics, or conventions regarding filial piety.

The property of being closed under transformation is discussed by Piaget. He writes,

> . . . all known structures -- from mathematical groups to kinship systems -- are, without exception, systems of transformation. [44]

Note, though, that "transformation need not be a temporal process."[45] A relationship "y = a + bx" does not apply to any particular numerical set, to no particular regression line, even as it designates any number of such transformations as occuring in Cartesian "space." On the other hand, chemical transformations in the substrate of cells are causal transformations in space-time. Chemical raw materials are processed in a complex "throughput" which, even as particular molecules change positions, maintains structural relationships within the cell (within critical limits).

A sociocultural system is "closed under transformation" in <u>both</u> temporal and non-temporal terms. Vehicles and human agents are subject to causal limits. Meaning systems change atemporally. (Recall that for Sorokin, "y = a + bx" is a

simple cultural or meaning system.) In effect, sociocultural systems whether complex or simple would seem to consist of immanent potentials for atemporal transformation constrained by temporal, causal limits.

Self-determination, through the immanent change of sociocultural systems, is assumed by Sorokin. As we have seen, some degree of self-determination is simply a property of systems with immanent potentials. But note: self-determination in sociocultural systems is a playing-out of a limited set of possibilities which are imparted to that system in the actions of human beings. Further, as Maine pointed out with respect to law, once any such system becomes more or less formalized (as when a code of law is written down); once, that is, an objectified idea system is at a remove from the ability of people to change it freely, its possibilities become rather sharply proscribed. What I am getting at is this: systems of ideas, once objectified, or socialized as Sorokin puts it, do indeed take on a life of their own. But that life is limited by the efficacy of those now fixed ideas for men and women who utilize them.

Take the example of a traditonal cultural system or complex. The Shoshone, according to Farb,[46] had a conventional set of ideas for their occasional cooperative hunts for rabbit or the pronghorn-antelope. Although this system had not been codified in writing, it required the existence of certain conditions such as a number of free fami-

lies, an abundance of game, and someone to lead the hunt. The hunt was always conducted in certain ways -- women drove the game, the leader divided up the take, etc. This complex, once objectified for the Shoshone, offered important, but still limited utility for the people. And I mean limited here in the sense that the cooperative hunt could not become other than the cooperative hunt. When the horse and rifle were introduced, in fact, this complex was mostly abandoned. Put another way, there may be _n_ ways to skin a cat, or to hunt rabbits, but there are _only n_ ways.

The Nature of Sociocultural Systems. Almost any arrangement of things can be said to have a form, even a stack of pebbles.[47] But a stackof pebbles is a "structure" in a very limited sense. At a higher level of integration, the parts of an auto jack, properly assembled, constitute a simple mechanical system of some use in changing flat tires. (Note that ideas of what makes a structure are, in general, related to ideas of function or relationship between the designated structure and something proximally related to that structure -- such as the car on which one may use a jack.)

Among zoological phyla, colony animals like some coelenterates (corals, portuguese man o'war, etc.) seem to have less structural integrity or formal distinctness than, say, echinoderms (starfish, sand dollars, etc.). Animals with developed nervous systems manifest increasingly great-

er system complexity and organic interdependence. A flat worm will regenerate complete organisms from each of a very large number of severed fragments, should one wish to cut it up. A reptile, on the other hand, can only retain its structural integrity within far narrower fragmenting limits.

In short, some systems are more highly integrated than others; some systems are "richer" or more complex than others, having greater potential for varied adaptive responses, for example. Although these two dimensions -- complexity and integration -- need not necessarily be related, for Sorokin system potential and integration do parallel one another. As he tells us, the more integrated sociocultural systems are those with the highest degrees of self determination.[48]

From Sorokin we also get an impression that the great sociocultural systems are to be thought of as higher (richer in complexity and integration) than any component of them, such as sub-systems or the three elements of such systems. Personality, thus, is depicted as the reflection of main sociocultural systems. Personal mentality is cultural mentality writ small. What is not social in the individual is, apparently, the residual biological man which in its own right is distinctive only as a variably capable transmitter-receiver for cultural signals.

There is another interpretive possibility. Sociocultur-

al systems are contingent structures and not, necessarily, higher structures or systems than those represented by individual human beings. I believe this to be so, in spite of the difficulties created by such a position. I will try to explain why.

A. An Analogy of the Bees. In White's The Once and Future King, the young Arthur is allowed to participate in a society of ants through the magical aid of his tutor, the wizard Merlin.[49] Although young Arthur's experiences may not help us here, Merlin may have had the right idea in assuming that social insects have lessons for men.

Among the hymenoptera, bees are a bit more respectable than ants (they don't have wars), so with a bow to Merlin, let us consider a bee hive as a rough analogy of a sociocultural universe.

Notice that the hive has three elements. There are individual bees who are "agents" of the hive's life and order. There are "systems of meaning" conveyed among bees by formal gestures. An example is the "this-way-to-the-pollen" dances initiated by worker bees who have been scouting for the hive. Finally, there are "vehicles" for hive meaning-systems. These include the gestures of communication (the honey dances) as well as the physical ordering of the hive. Comb cells, for example, have different functions; some are for storing honey, some for the incubation of eggs, and so on.

Now the systems of meanings shared by bees are vital to the survival of the hive. Further, individual bees live and die while these meaning systems go on. But, and this is the point of my analogy, only bees can generate new hive universes.

And only human beings may generate cultural systems or unfold the implications of ideas. Meanings as structures and the association of objects or qualities to convey these meanings are contingent on human beings.

B. An Argument by Teleology. Bertalanffy explains that there are different orders of self-determination in systems corresponding to different levels or orders of teleology. Now by teleology here, Bertalanffy only wishes to point out that structures, by including some set of functional possibilities, tend to imply end states or final conditions.[50]

Without getting into unnecessary discussions of what else teleology may mean, one may at least consider Bertalanffy's types of finality as representing system properties. Regarding what must be considered the lowest degree of finality, he distinguishes first, a static teleology of fitness, meaning that an arrangement seems to be useful for a certain purpose."[51] A chair accommodates the average human anatomy in a sitting position, for example.

Dynamic teleology is found where there is a directiveness of process. Among these is a

. . . directiveness based upon structure, meaning that

> an arrangement of structures leads the process in such a way that a certain result is achieved. 52

This is a condition of man-made machines. Among biological entities such structural arrangements are represented by homeostasis. Homeostasis, of course, is a situation wherein structural properties such as "feedback" maintain an aproximate stability in some condition. Mammals maintain an aproximately constant internal temperature, for example.

But a true "purposiveness . . . [is found] when actual behavior is determined by the foresight of the goal. This is original Aristotelean concept."[53] It seems evident that a human system alone is capable of foresight.[54] The final condition of any idea or meaning system, once objectified or socialized, can only be given by the possibilities of such a system. And, as Sorokin has taken pains to point out, for the main, integrated cultural systems, possibilities are limited and finite.

Further, since the possibilities of any conceivable cultural system are a potential of the human mind in some cultural context, the _implications_ of any meaning-system are also a potential of the human mind. This point is not obviated by asserting that the human mind arises in or exists in interaction (as we learn from Mead or Cooley). That is undoubtedly so and it is implied in the statement that cultural idea and meaning systems are developed in the human mind.

Taking any human psyche in social context as a system, then, it manifests both a richer structural potential and a higher degree of self-determination. This statement must be true as long as one grants that foresight implies the potential for choice among a fairly unlimited range of possible cultural systems.

C. Contingent Structures. A final argument rests in the nature of any kind of structuralism. In effect, taking structuralism or systems theory as a method of constituting or constructing the world for the mind, any human sociocultural system must, as a structure, be constituted as such by the mind. On this point Piaget bears quoting at length.

> There is no structure apart from construction, either abstract or genetic. . .[and] these two kinds of construction are not as far removed from one another as is commonly supposed. Since Godel, logicians and students of the foundations of mathematics distinguish between "stronger" and "weaker" structures, the stronger ones not being capable of elaboration until after the construction of more elementary, that is "weaker" systems [which are] yet conversely, themselves necessary to the "completion" of the weaker ones. 55

And further, "any content is form relative to some inferior content and form the content of some higher form."[56] Put another way, the line between abstract and real structures is not altogether clear and nowhere is this more evident than in the "Sorokinesque" sociocultural system. Here, through human action, both abstract idea-systems and empirical sociocultural systems are constantly "under construction."

Complementarity in Sociocultural Systems. To make sociocultural systems contingent on the potential of the human psyche is not meant to downgrade the structural or constitutive reality of such entities. The grandeur, particularly of great cultural supersystems or vicilizations seems to be real enough. But the very bigness of such systems does not mean that they are, by definition, higher or transcendent. The marvelous spiral galaxy in Andromeda, for all its awesome size, seems to be a very loose structure as such -- hardly a step away from the heap of pebbles mentioned earlier. Although a galaxy is real enough it is contingent on structures with higher degrees of integration, namely the stars which compose it.

But the whole point in trying to show sociocultural systems as contingent structures with respect to human beings is to get at the significance of Sorokin's principles of change. We are still moving toward some answer to the question about how systems composed by elements with radically different spatio-temporal properties can have common principle of change.

There is a solution which follows from our preceeding discussion. First, taking any sociocultural system as contingent with respect to human beings, principles of immanent change may be seen as applying to systems of meanings -- i.e. cultural system components of empirical sociocultural systems -- taken *sui generis*. Here, the idea of contingency

always directs us to the fact that such systems can only develop in and through human minds.

Second, the principle of limit is relevant at the level of behavior or action, It constitutes the causal limits on the immanent non-temporal transformations of cultural systems as systems of ideas or meanings.

Third, the potentialities of cultural systems, given causal limits, are set by the nature of the psyche itself. For neither the principle of immanent change as it bears on idea-systems, nor the principle of limits bearing on the vehicles of meanings or idea-systems, accounts for the selection of these by people.

Sorokin's principles of change do not include a principle about choice, except by implication. But there is, I think, an important principle of change at the level of the personality which deserves more than an existence by implication. That principle should be one which relates human valuing and choosing to changes in sociocultural systems.

By designating sociocultural systems as contingent with respect to human beings my hope has been to show that the three elements of such systems, as designated by Sorokin, can only converge in human action. The two principles of change given by Sorokin apply to the elements called cultural systems and vehicles, but not to human beings because no principle of selection by people is offered. In Sorokin we can only see that people act in terms of cultur-

al systems, including world-premises, which are accessible to them.

Given that there are three change principles instead of two, it can still be seen that these principles pertain to a complementary relationship among the elements of socio-cultural systems. This complementarity is exhibited first by the fact that sociocultural systems may appear to us (1) as ideas or idea-systems, (2) as patterns of behavior, or (less easily) (3) as patterns of vehicles. A baseball park, thus, has a real existence. It is a complex of vehicles related to baseball behavior. This latter, of course, involves a set of rules, a body of baseball mythology, and ideals about how the game should be played. It is also true, as Sorokin rightly insists, that neither the park nor the game will be intelligible to us unless we know its meanings. But having identified ideas or meaning-systems as the place where behavior and artifacts make sense, Sorokin chose to emphasize the central nature of idea systems _as such_ in sociocultural systems. This emphasis is given by his use of the idea of immanent change.

Another option, chosen here, avoids the cultural determinism which arises from Sorokin's position. Change in sociocultural systems is derived from changes in _each_ element which converges in concrete actions by human beings. _Aspects_ of ideas, _aspects_ of tempero-spatial phenomena, and aspects of human behavior converge to create empirical

sociocultural entities.

The complementarity of sociocultural systems is also shown by the fact that vehicles, like the baseball park, the ideas of baseball, rules, etc., and "agents" (baseball players) may all change _in their own terms_.[58]

Boundary Conditions. Another useful perspective on the nature of sociocultural systems is given us by Michael Polanyi.

Now sociocultural systems are systems for themselves, but their process or change is a convergence of changes in aspects of their elements. But how, or in what sense, can such principles as these converge?

First, we turn to Polanyi's version of what Bertalanffy designates as the constitutive principle. "The higher principles which characterize a comprehensive entity cannot be defined in terms of the laws that apply to its parts _in themselves_."[59]

This means, simply, that not all laws of human beings, or all laws of tempero-spatial phenomena, or even all laws of ideas have to do with sociocultural systems. Thus, while _all_ phenomena in the universe might be related together in principle, effectively there is no way to see how laws of electromagnetic waves, of optics, or of colloid suspensions may produce the game of baseball.

Similarly, in looking for a change principle which accounts for the valuating acts of people, we are not seek-

ing a psychological explanation of sociocultural systems. We are instead looking for a property of the human psyche which constitutes one or more of the necessary _boundary conditions_ for the possible existence of sociocultural entities. Such "psychic boundary conditions," once located, cannot _in themselves_ require the existence of sociocultural phenomena any more than electromagnetic laws require the restriction of religious broadcasting to the fifteen meter band.

Even ideas may be seen as a "set" or "probable set" not requiring the existence of sociocultural systems. With a bow to Sorokin's propensity to endorse a Platonic world or realm of pure ideas,[60] I know of no reason why one cannot postualte a trans-human "meaning set" which by its nature implies an indeterminate range of subjective ideas, relationships, understandings, etc., given the existence of any consciousness in the universe which is not human but which is of an equivalent or higher order. Even so hard-nosed an empiricist as astronomer Carl Sagan conceeds the probable existence of such extra-terrestrial intelligence.[61] If one may add to this conjectural probability the notion that the trans-human meaning set may be constituted from fundamental properties or relationships which appear to exist throughout the universe, the point has been made. Such fundamental relationships might include the value of _Pi_, the velocity of light, the ratios among electromagnetic waves, and so

on:[62]

What Polanyi means by boundary conditions may need a bit more elaboration though. Here is an example which, through analogy, may help us to see the way in which the elements of sociocultural entities constitute their boundary conditions.

Linguistically one may, through conditioning in a social context, learn to imitate and produce a very wide range of sounds or phones. But any actual language selects from among these sounds a limited number, a set of phonemes. (And if, for example, one does not learn Arabic at an early age, its sounds -- phonemes -- become nearly impossible for one who speaks English.) In English, for some hundreds of possible phones -- _boundary set 1_ -- we actually use only forty or so. Those phonemes which are characteristic of English -- _boundary set 2_ -- may be arranged as meaningful sound-symbols called morphemes (roughly, "words"). Morphemes -- _boundary set 3_ -- may be arranged in some order to convey propositions, relationships, etc. But to make a sentence or phrase one requires a grammar (formal or informal). Finally, since neither grammar nor morphemes are _in themselves_ meanings, English grammar must be understood as the 4th boundary set among the boundary conditions for speaking English.

For sociocultural systems the boundary sets are (1) those aspects of sounds, materials, light, and so on which

may be used to convey meanings; (2) those aspects of human beings which may utilize vehicles and/or ideas to convey meanings in social (or at least socialized) situations; (3) those aspects of meanings or ideas which may enter into or serve as a guide or reference for human behavior, thought and action.

Summary. In this chapter I have considered Sorokin's ideas about the why and how of sociocultural change. Following that, I have argued for the relevance of a third principle of change to complement Sorokin's principle of immanent change and limits. This principle of choosing is implied in Sorokin's thought, but in the following chapters we will see that implication turn into formal propositions for the third boundary set of socicultural systems.

NOTES

[1]Pitirim A. Sorokin, _Social and Cultural Dynamics_ (New York: Bedminster Press, 1941), IV, pp. 602n; 603.

[2]Ibid., p. 595 ff.

[3]Ibid., p. 542.

[4]Ibid., p. 593 ff.

[5]Ibid., p. 595.

[6]Ibid., p. 594.

[7]See, for example, Pitirim A. Sorokin, _Society, Culture and Personality_ (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 52-57.

[8]Pitirim A. Sorokin, _Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time_ (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), pp. 4-11.

[9]Any competent work in the nature of hypnosis tends to substantiate the relative nature of subjective time. See, for example, "Time Distortion in Hypnosis," by Linn F. Cooper in Leslie M. Lecron, ed., _Experimental Hypnosis_ (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 217-228. Also see the chapter on the temporal dimensions of consciousness in Robert E. Ornstein, _The Psychology of Consciousness_ (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1972), pp. 75-93.

[10]Sorokin, _Dynamics_, IV, 702.

[11]Ibid., p. 605 ff. See too, Sorokin, _Sociocultural Causality_, pp. 25-27, for a concise listing.

[12]Sorokin, _Dynamics_, IV, 604.

[13]Ibid., p. 606.

[14]Ibid., p. 694.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., p. 699.

[17]Henry Sumner Maine, _Ancient Law_ (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1970). Also see Chapter 1 of this essay.

[18]Sorokin, _Dynamics_, IV, 702.

[19] Ibid., p. 705.

[20] Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 738.

[21] Referring, of course, to Marshall McLuhan's thesis that the extension of man's capacity to transfer information over space-time is producing a radical transformation in the human condition. See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (New York: New American Library, 1964).

[22] Chardin proposes a special sort of evolution ending with a radical transformation of the "noosphere" and an "ultimate earth." See Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. by Bernard Wall (New York: Harper and Row, 1959).

[23] William Irwin Thompson, At the Edge of History (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

[24] McLuhan, Understanding Media.

[25] Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, pp. 721-722. Recent information from East African archeological work by Mary Leakey suggests that man's history may be rather older. According to various media reports, up to four million years.

[26] Sorokin rejects Hegel's theory of history, in his own words, since ". . . my whole Dynamics is a refutation of linear conceptions of sociocultural processes." See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Modern Historical and Social Philosophies (New York: Dover Publications, 1963), p. 20.

[27] Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 738.

[28] Ibid., p. 746.

[29] Ibid., p. 765.

[30] Ibid., p. 744.

[31] Ibid., p. 763.

[32] Ibid., p. 769.

[33] Sorokin, Society, p. 585

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 761.

[37]Ibid., p. 746 ff. See also, Sorokin, Society, p. 545 and Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1941), pp. 105-112.

[38]See Chapter 5 of this essay.

[39]The best discussions of which are in Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality.

[40]Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory (New York: George Braziller, 1968), p. 199 ff.

[41]Ibid., p. 200.

[42]Jean Piaget, Structuralism, trans. and ed. by Chaninah Maschler (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

[43]Bertalanffy, System Theory, p. 55.

[44]Piaget, Structuralism, p. 11.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Peter Farb, Man's Rise to Civilization as Shown by the Indians of North America from Primeval Times to the Coming of the Industrial State.(New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1968), p. 29 ff.

[47]Piaget, Structuralism, p. 35.

[48]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, pp. 610-612.

[49]T. H. White, The Once and Future King (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1961).

[50]Bertalanffy, System Theory, p. 77.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid., p. 79.

[54]Barring the existence of extra-human intelligence, of course.

[55]Piaget, Structuralism, p. 140.

[56]Ibid.

[57]See, for example, Sorokin, Society, p. 39 ff.

[58]This property is by no means denied by Sorokin. See, for example, Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, p. 25 ff. It is I who choose to see it as an evidence of complementarity. Or put another way, it seems useful to me to designate that property of systems.

[59]Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, ed. by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 217.

[60]See Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, 20., for example.

[61]Carl Sagan, The Cosmic Connection: An Extraterrestrial Perspective (Garden City, New York: Andover Press, 1973).

[62]It might be added that the set of all meanings conjured up in the human psyche may not have bearings on sociocultural systems. Sorokin would agree. See Sorokin, Society, p. 345 n. In the spirit of a concept like Linton's "idiosyncratic traits," this is simply to acknowledge that people are "richer" systems than their sociocultural products. See Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936).

CHAPTER V

THE RELATIONAL AND THE OBJECTIVE

O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?

W. B. Yeats
"Among School Children"[1]

Sorokin teaches us that the human social world moves between the poles of two mentalities, between the Ideational and the Sensate. But if there are major cultural premises these are, finally, made real by people. Sorokin has argued that people socialized into any social world tend simply to mirror the dominant mentality which is given in styles of art, conventions for behavior, principle of ethics, assumptions about the relative importance of science and religion, and so on. But granted for the moment that people are social mirrors, they are also actors acting. There is a social dance, a plan given by systems of ideas, by conventions about reality. But as the human dancer forms the patterns of the social world he stands not only in the pattern, but in the significance of that pattern for himself. And, of course, that pattern changes; it is never still.

My world is the world of my experience. It is formed of

the things given for me by the social world of men, but it is constantly created for me and by me because I must act in it. If I cease to act, to be, to choose, I remove myself, or have been taken from the social pattern. I am dead to it and it does not exist for me. If you cease to act, to be (as a human being), to choose, I must think you dead, or at least escaped into the quasi-social or non-social place of psychosis. If the dance continues for us, it is only because we are the dancers.

As Berger and Luckmann argue,

> . . . the empirical fact that social institutions do hang together, despite the impossibility of assuming this *a priori*, can be accounted for only in reference to the reflective consciousness of individuals who impose a certain logic upon their experience. . . 2

In general, reality exists in experience. We know our experience and say that it is known by our mind. We experience things, objects, properties, relationships -- the things of the eye and of the mind. Together, these experiences are our world. Reality and experience are not separable.

But we have also seen, in the last chapter, that there is a complementary relationship between the three faces of the social, between human agents, meaning systems (which are associated bits of information meaningfully related), and vehicles for conveying meaning. That is, while the triad may be inseparable in order for an empirical sociocultural system to exist, each element of the triad may exist for itself

and change in its own terms. Systems at each level have their own change principles which act, as we saw, to create boundary conditions for the sociocultural entity. Sociocultural systems are the convergence of different kinds of structures -- causal and acausal ones -- in human action.

Here, our problem will be to begin to distinguish the "dancer from the dance." Having seen, in other words, that socialized human actors have a reality that is neither that of cultural systems nor of their empirical vehicles, we must ask what principle of change underlies human action? And then, how is human action related to systems of ideas which in Sorokin's sense have been socialized (i.e., made objective for you and me through vehicles that may convey these ideas)?[3]

In this chapter a third principle of change will be developed. In the next chapter this principle of exclusion as a principle of change at the level of personality will be related to Sorokin's principles of immanent change and limits.

Shifting the Center of Sociocultural Change. Changes in idea systems and in vehicles originate in human action. There are two reasons for this. First, an idea-system can only be unfolded by human minds (or by "minds" at any rate). Second, only in human agents of the social world can we find both the causal and acausal properties which comprise this social world. This causal-acausal polarity is repre-

sented for us by the ideas of being and becoming, by empirical objectivity (the things of the eye), and by the ideas which place the quantities and qualities of the world into relationship outside of space-time. These last, of course, are the things of the mind. The properties of empirical sociocultural systems, as vital or living entities, can only be located as they converge in the human mind. Relics of moribund or deceased systems of ideas (vehicles, usually) may exist, but only as mummies, devoid of actual sociocultural vitality.

Now Sorokin has stated that the "center" of the sociocultural system is interaction.[4] On the other hand, his emphasis on cultural systems and particularly his discussions of the principles of change lead one away from the development of this idea. Just as Sorokin does not guide us to a principle of change which is appropriate to the level of personality, he does not guide us to an understanding of <u>how</u> interaction is related to immanent change or to limits on that change.

Sorokin's disinterest in developing the dynamics of interaction relative to the system of ideas, make of him a sort of cultural determinist. His particular vision of the duality of mind in man is one that places an altruistic "cultural" man in opposition to an egoistic, sensual "biological" man. Following from this viewpoint, it is man's cultural products, those non-individualistic, collective

ideals which _transcend_ the individual, that may ennoble him. Here, by the way, Sorokin draws very near to Durkheim. For the great French sociologist also ponders a dualism between the egoistic and the altruistic in man.[5]

Sorokin errs, I think, in emphasizing the asocial nature of natural man. His assertion, noted earlier, that what Levy-Bruhl calls the "primitive mind" is both inferior and prior to the reasoning mind, demonstrates a distrust of all that is not rationally conscious and above board. With a determination that occasionally strikes one as nearly pious, Sorokin turns away from the dark side of man almost as clearly as does Freud. Again one notes an interstting parallel between Sorokin and a man whose ideas he detested. The unconscious for Sorokin is mainly the residual, the non-social beast which emerges like some wolf of the Russian steppes, turning to prey hungrily on his weaker brothers. _Homo homini lupus!_ This determination to "look to ideals" in Sorokin is, perhaps, reflected in the degree to which his discussions emphasize the highest achievements of thought, of culture, turning ever aside from the ordinary scenes and products of the human _tableau_.

Now that man may harbor a certain "beastliness" this writer would not presume to dispute. But it might be noted that the most beastly conditions in human societies have not always emerged from the shadows of revolution or the disorder of natural disaster -- those times when the cultur-

al armor is presumably stripped away. According to Gardner, some nine million human beings perished at the cool ecclesiastical hands of the Medieval inquisition.[6] Hitler's more modern (and more "efficient") record of beastliness is well known. Following from Sorokin's very insightful consideration of the "rarefaction" and "condensation" of social relationships, it may be more reasonable to assume that man suffers the tyranny or brutality of other men at either extreme. Under <u>either</u> totalitarian regimes, or under conditions like those of the French Reign of Terror, social orders are hard on "children and other living things."[7]

In any case, the tendency in Sorokin to associate human ills with the biological and natural in man (the decadent Sensate condition, for example), and good with the ideal superimposed supersystems may be misleading. It obscures the place of man himself in producing and directing, however blindly, the social "dance."

Let me reiterate. The center of change in sociocultural systems is indeed men interacting, but interaction itself is not separable from the directions (the patterns of socialization) for it in your mind or mine.

Further though, those cultural directions are not neutral. Each belief, each attitude, each idea about the world is linked with some "affective weighting," some relative value for us. If you choose to greet your neighbor on the street, you are aware of conventions surrounding the

gesture of salute or the passing "good morning." But included in such an action there is some degree of evaluation, some degree of affirming or denying by which you choose to speak or, perhaps, to remain silent.

Human action is selective, directive, voluntaristic -- however one wishes to put it. Within limits not now determined, we withdraw or approach, affirm or deny, select or reject. Interaction then is the selection of alternatives, of potentials and possibilities.

What is being suggested thus far is that something we may call valuative action is the fulcrum on which social systems sway. But this is not to suggest that sociocultural systems do not have their own system reality, their own inertia or momentum. They do indeed. By asserting that sociocultural systems are contingent on action, I am not reducing them to a sum of individual actions. It will simply be argued that valuative action, like the properties of idea-systems and of vehicles, are _conditions_ of the superorganic entities called, by Sorokin, sociocultural systems.

A Preliminary Summary of the Argument. Let it be assumed that the discussion to this point has established a need for a third principle of change to complement Sorokin's principles of immanent change and limits. Clearly, an opinion or rudimentary hypothesis about this principle has already been suggested. It must be a principle to relate human choices in concrete action to the other elements of

sociocultural systems.

Thus for each level of superorganic phenomena there is a change principle. These three principles are summarized in Table 3.

Now it has been argued that the fulcrum of change is human choosing (regardless of whether such choices are tacit or explicit for the person). This fact, or postulate if one prefers, has been called the contingency of sociocultural systems with respect to human beings. It means, simply, that sociocultural systems move because people move them. Cultural systems unfold because human minds have the capacity to constitute, modify or even, extinguish them. The physico-chemical world, the medium of causal existence, is also the medium of empirical social behavior.

Now consider what a principle of choosing must do. First, it must account for change in sociocultural systems. Second, it must account for change not accounted for by the principles of immanent change or of limits as given by Sorokin. Third, as a sociological principle, a principle of choosing must have particular significance for the superorganic. That is, we are looking for a psychological principle, or principles, which constitute some set of boundary conditions for sociocultural systems.

These requirements can, I believe, be satisfied by looking to the valuative nature of action. In the discus-

TABLE 3

A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES BY WHICH CHANGE OCCURS IN SOCIOCULTURAL SYSTEMS

Level of the Superorganic	Change Principle
Cultural Systems	The principle of immanent change
Society (Concrete action)	Causal limits on the potential of idea-systems <u>and</u> on choices made in human interaction
Personality (Psyche-Soma)	An (undetermined) principle of choosing

sion to follow; therefore, it will be necessary first to consider how behavior or action is valuative -- that is, we must define "valuation." Secondly, we must see how the principles or nature of valuation, once aproximately established, approach limits.

The relational and objective properties of mind will be postulated as constituting these limits. It is proposed that there is a rational, operational side of the psyche, and an intuitive or relational side. These may also be thought of as the causal and acausal modes of knowing, following Jung,[8] or as explicit and tacit knowing, following Polanyi.[9] These two modes of the psyche, although complementary in our psychic life as we shall see, are not evident to awareness as a rule.

Here is a simple introductory example. First, read the words: SHENANDOAH FEVER. Now, re-read the words, but this time avoid focusing on the real or apparent meaning of the two words. Think instead about the way the syllables of the words would sound if spoken aloud. Repeat this "alternation of focus" once or twice.

Now, having forgiven the author for forcing you into apparently childish games, note the obvious fact that you can see words like SHENANDOAH FEVER two ways -- objectively or meaningfully. A second obvious fact is that in hearing words like these spoken aloud, the same "focus" shift is possible. Yet, in actuality, both ways of hearing the words,

either as sounds or as meanings are simultaneous possibilities. Both the sounds as such, and the sounds as representing meanings, may exist together. We see that at least two "modes" of consciousness exist together, for otherwise it would not be possible to choose one "mode" or "focus" over another.

One must forbear, however, from asserting that this sort of demonstration reveals the "objective" and the "relational" modes of consciousness. The matter is not so simple. But before leaving this fairly trivial exercise, consider a final obvious fact. If you followed the exercise you changed the focus. You changed the focus. And that, I believe, is a simple example of valuation or selection. I choose, you choose, we choose.

Another example that may be helpful is discovered in considering a representation of a cube like that in Figure 6. Notice that you can choose the direction the cube may face. On the one hand you may see a cube facing upward and to the right, so that the face of the cube closest to you is b, c, d, e. On the other hand, you may see a cube facing downward and to the left; in this case, the face closest to you becomes a, h, f, g. Both possibilities are present, but only one is selected at a time.

In this simple, graphic way one sees what is meant, in part, by a principle of exclusion. Both directions are equally valid. That can be known by reason. But only one direc-



FIGURE 6. REPRESENTATION OF A CUBE: ILLUSTRATING ALTERNATIVE VISUAL PERSPECTIVES.

tion can be seen at a time.

Now all of this may seem a sort of parlor trick sophistry, but it is not. In a sense, certainly, the examples are _metaphors_. But they also demonstrate actual principles both of perception _and_ of action.[10] In both examples the only reasonable way to account for the fact that options could be _both_ concealed for perception _and_ alternately selected, is that your consciousness and mine acts that way. The properties demonstrated are real for the mind apart from any further explanation that one may proffer.

It is but a small imaginative leap to the conjecture that in any human action situation, several points of view may be possible simultaneously, even as only one may be selected at a time. Thus, a principle of choosing must aid us to know why one point of view may be selected over another.

But such a conjecture requires a conceptual framework. We must have some generalized idea of just what an action situation amounts to. As it turns out, ideas for such a conceptual generalization are available to us from several writers, including Weber, Mead, and Goffman among others in sociology, and George Kelly and Prescott Lecky in psychology.[11] Adapting these ideas from writers such as these, the terms of action frames will be developed shortly.

Although elaborations of my model of the action frame must wait for the moment, a purely heuristic notion central

to such an idea may be suggested. Simply, in each of our life situations or scenes (taking a shower, filing invoices, riding the bus to work, etc.) there is some "definition of the situation."[12] Whether we are alone or with other people, we must as Kelly puts it, "construe" or "define" what is happening for us in some present. In effect, we make models by which to anticipate events or conditions flowing out of our perception of the present.[13]

These models -- clearly pushed on us to a great extent by culture -- are, in effect, selected. From conceivable or potential definitions of situations one must be actualized for any present through action. Put another way, in doing or acting or behaving we are also choosing some model of the action scene.

In the arguments ahead, here are some of the steps toward a principle of choosing. (1) Not all action frames are alike; some are important to us while others are ordinary in our experience. But for all social action frames (it may be supposed that there are non-social action frames, at least in theory), there are one or more references which are roughly equivalent to Sorokin's cultural systems. (2)As Sorokin has suggested, cultural systems are more or less integrated with respect to major or key systems of the sort already discussed (religion, ethics, etc.) which include rather elemental premises about the nature of the world. They are also more or less integrated in given individuals,

as Sorokin also teaches us. Following Boulding, each of us has some more or less consistent image of the world.[14] This image, as distinct from cultural systems as aspects of sociocultural systems, belongs to the individual himself.[15] Further, the "subjective knowledge structure or image . . . consists not only of images of fact but also images of value."[16]

(3)The most potent image systems are those which encompass important values or premises about the nature of our self, the cosmos, other selves, and so on.[17] In other terms, there is a strain toward consistency among the components of the image. We tend to make our models or constructions of the world consistent with our premises even thought these are, in part at least, tacit.

(4) Premises encorporated in the image tend to validate or rationalize our actions in action frames. But peoples' key ideas or values tend to endorse either relational or objective rationalizations for action and not both simultaneously. This, of course, is the principle of exclusion. It is also the principle of choosing we are looking for, expressed in general, aproximate terms.

Having sketched the argument ahead, the reader may be prepared for three stages between this point and a formal statement of the principle of exclusion. The first stage will be a discussion of the idea of the duality of mind. Secondly, there will be a consideration of the general nature of

valuation in the context of action. Thirdly, we will consider the ways in which valuative action and the individual's image are related to sociocultural systems. Through these examinations, the principle of exclusion will emerge and, at last, be clothed in formal terms.

The Duality of Mind

To seek the roots of the idea that there are two minds in men one might begin with Aristotle, who noted that there are ". . . two parts to the soul, the rational and the irrational."[18] Or one might turn to Plato, for whom the opposition of essences or ideals, and particular objects perceived by the senses, serves to signal two modes of knowing the world. In the parable of the cave (Book VII of _The Republic_), Socrates refers to these modes as the "world of sight" and the "world of mind."[19] And if Plato may be mentioned in this regard, surely so must Pythagoras. For in Plato's predecessor the super-sensible world, revealed by the harmony of number, is also a realm of spiritual essences. In the human psyche, as in all creation, there is the polarity of the animate and the spiritual, of becoming and being.[20] The first is the realm of the senses, of objectivities; the second is a realm of ideals which transcend object or number.[21]

After Plato, a Platonic sort of duality occurs in the philosophy of Plotinus.[22] And, among the Western fathers of the Church, the duality of mind has its place, as has

been noted, in the thought of Aquinas and Augustine. It continues, I believe, in Boethius and in the writings of John Scotus Erigena, among others.[23]

In Eastern religious writing, the ancient Chinese _Book of Changes_ (_I Ching_), encorporates a philosophy of duality. The world and the human mind is seen as a balance of active and creative forces (_Yin_) with receptive, passive ones (Yang).[24] In Hindu writings like the _Upanishads_, the duality of the world is recognized in, among other things, the opposition of the individual self and the immortal self. The prime religious goal is presented as the transcendence of the world of duality.[25] Likewise, in the teachings of Buddhism, from the Hinayana tradition to that of Zen, this is so. In Zen writings particularly, one is taught that the attainment of _satori_ is the "joining of object and subject in the 'here-now.'" The self-nature in Zen teaching is "no-self" -- beyond cause and effect, beyond the polarity of subject and object.[26] Somewhat similar understandings are conveyed by Sufi literature.[27]

Among Western philosophers, the duality of mind occurs first in one guise and then another. In Kant it is found in the opposition of _a priori_ categories and the substance of sensation.[28] In Bergson there are a number of dualities (such as those of mind and matter, or time and space), but in his treatment of the two sources of religion, I believe, there is a rather "sociological" account of the duality of

mind in the opposition of static and dynamic religion.[29] Buber's account of the duality of mind has been mentioned.[30] In Ernst Cassirer the duality is found in the distinction between mythical and verbal thought.[31] For religious historian Mircea Eliade, the duality of mind is certainly reflected in sacred and profane categories of time, space, and so on.[32]

In current social philosophic literature there is a trend which may be thought of as a reaction to current schools of thought which reflect the powerful images of early natural science. This group of writings bears mentioning here if only because the essay you are reading may be counted among them. I am referring to the works of writers like Theodore Roszak, Charles A. Reich, William Thompson and Joseph Pearce, among others.[33] All of these writers make references to, or arguments for, the need for balancing current excesses of what Sorokin called the Sensate mentality. For Roszak this concern focuses on an outrage with what he calls the "myth of objective consciousness." For Reich it is a rather naive faith in the advent of a new historical _Geist_, a "Consciousness III," which harbors " . . . a deep skepticism of both linear and analytic thought."[34] With William Thompson there is a recognition of Yeat's psychological opposites -- the ideational and the operational (corresponding to Sorokin's Ideational and Sensate mentalities). There is also the bare outlines of an evolutionary theory of his-

tory which, in some interesting ways, parallels Sorokin's thought even as it includes the evolutionary emphasis which Sorokin himself struggled to avoid.

In Pearce's work, The Crack in the Cosmic Egg, theological and metaphysical concerns finally displace ideas which touch on the properties of the social order. But above all, in Pearce there is a fascinating intellectual effort to lead us to non-rational "cracks" in our conventional world order, to see in effect that man makes his world and therefore holds options on alternative realities.

My concern here cannot be to review the wide body of thought and evidence which suggests the duality of mind. All, in fact, that need be established here is that there is a body of literature which permits one reasonably to postulate a relational-objective polarity of the psyche which may be of such a nature as to bear on the valuative (selective, constructive, intentional) properties of the psyche in ways which will be specified.

In my own discussion of the duality of mind, I will use an approach which centers on a limited body of current literature. Every effort will be made, in other words, to avoid the morass of philosophical or even metaphysical ramifications of this sort of topic. Michael Polanyi will provide my main avenue to a consideration of the duality of mind with his theory of personal knowledge. In an appendix an effort will be made to discover the intuitive and empiri-

cal justifications for postulating "two minds" in men from psychological writings that relate to the problems of this essay.

Michael Polanyi: Tacit and Explicit Knowing. In Plato's dialogue, Meno, Socrates instructs us with an argument about the nature of knowing. In a demonstration for Menon, he questions a young boy (a household slave) about the properties of geometric figures, and leads him by suggestion to express certain truths about the nature and relationship of areas in geometric figures from his own intuition. In effect, although in a richer and subtler way, Socrates demonstrated a fact that was shown above with the cube figure. That is, what can be known explicitly exists in some way tacitly. Ways of seeing may be made for us, even without a Socrates to guide us. Of course the more common way of expressing this famous paradox of Meno is given by Polanyi:

> To search for the solution of a problem is an absurdity; for either you know what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do not know what you are looking for and then you can't expect to find anything. 35

The solution for this paradox given by Socrates is that tacit knowledge or knowledge "knowable but not known" is contained in the soul (psyche). And,

> if the truth of findings is always in your soul, the soul must be immortal: so that what you do not know now by any chance -- that is, what you do not remember -- you must boldly try and find out and remember. 36

But the idea that unknown answers reside in the memories of

past lives is not very satisfying. For Polanyi a better answer to the paradox of Menon is the property or capacity of the mind to know more than can be related. Or, as he puts it, "we know more than we can tell."[37]

> For the _Meno_ shows conclusively that if all knowledge is explicit, i.e. capable of being clearly stated, then we cannot know a problem or look for its solution. And the _Meno_ also shows, therefore, that if problems nevertheless exist and discoveries can be made by solving them, we know things and important things, that we cannot tell. 38

As an example of tacit knowing, Polanyi suggests that we consider the way in which one recognizes a familiar face, or the moods and meanings expressed by that familiar face. We may recognize a friend on the street, but normally we cannot recall the _elements_ or details that make up that recognizable countenance; nor can we normally recount how we "know" a person to be distraught or amused, even though we "see it in their face."

That such particulars and elements of appearance may be accessible to awareness is not denied. But, for example, in the study of anatomy and physiology by art students, details once seen must be re-integrated into one's rendering or representation of a face or figure. Thus, once certain elements that compose the human mouth are understood, explicitly, this understanding must be, as it were, "re-absorbed" into an over-all (tacit) understanding of how to represent the human face, as in portraiture.

Respecting other sorts of skills such as cycling,

needle point, or whatever, Polanyi notes that we improve these by first breaking down particular operations (such as a golf swing) into elements, and then re-integrating the new explicit knowledge into the tacit Gestalt of actual performance. But there must be that re-integration, that reabsorption of explcitly known elements into an over-all configuration. We can, at the outset thus, improve our ability to ride a bike by attending to particulars. But having attained some level of integrated skill through practice, excessive attention to technical details may land us in a ditch. Similarly, smooth and rapid typing is not much enhanced by attending too much to the particular actions of our fingers.

We know then both explicitly and tacitly. But while these two modes are complementary it must be understood that in every case explicit knowledge is rooted in tacit knowledge. By an example, we may see how this is so.

Consider a black and white photo image in a newspaper. Its appearance may first strike us as representing some person or scene of action. But let us assume that the photo is of a familiar politician. In this case we recognize the image as representing a person with certain characteristics. But looking closely at the photo one sees that it is composed of very fine dots. If we magnify the news photo these dots become quite evident. In fact, if the image is magnified sufficiently it first turns grainy and then, liter-

ally falls apart. It becomes a galaxy of dots characterized only by some rough differences in spacing or density.

Now by a little imaginative work, it becomes evident that *any* objective thing we may observe has this property of the half-toned photo reproduction. At some point, at some critical limit of proximity, *anything* may seem to dissolve into components that no longer suggest the original phenomenon (object, configuration, etc.). In the physico-chemical sciences two such critical limits define the smallest theoretical quantities of a compound or an element.

The point is that the world is assembled in our comprehension into meaningful wholes. Thus, one could say that the photo of the politician is just dots, yet we are aware that the image is, phenomenally, real. One could also say of one's mother-in-law that she is just cells, but only, perhaps, at considerable risk to domestic tranquility.

Things, that is, at various levels of meaning are always *composed*, in various ways, of particulars. (Even the half-tone dots are, in one sense, just ink, and so on.) But whether the reference is to entities as concrete as mothers-in-law, or to apparent ephemera such as a scene imputed to a Rorschach ink blot, what appears to us must be constructed. For Polanyi this construction of things is called the functional aspect of tacit knowing. It is that process of mind by which elements are made subsidiary to the things on which we focus.

For the fact is, in attending to a neighbor talking to us over a fence, or to a pet Siamese cat climbing one's draperies, we attend from selected particulars to wholes. We are not, for example, aware of the details that convince us that Mrs. O'Leary is still Mrs. O'Leary between sentences; we are not aware of details of the cat's musculature. We _are_ aware of arrangements of particulars as wholes, and these wholes are selected, in some way, by their relevance for us.

The range of particulars even in an immediate environment is indeterminate, perhaps infinite. Therefore the construction of _proximal_ details into _distal_ configurations, in Polanyi's terms, must have its roots in the greater set of possible parts (qualities, details, etc.) which are tacitly known _or knowable_. To attend to some entity which, for the mind, is more than the sum of its parts, requires that the mind arrange explicit knowledge from tacit possibilities. I cannot make explicit that which does not have a tacit potential for being made explicit by me, and any explicit construction implies tacitly excluded particulars.[39] Ergo: explicit knowledge rests on a tacit foundation.

Valuation: The Dancer and the Dance. Much of this chapter has been devoted to justifying the idea that there is a relational-objective polarity of the human psyche. The fact is though that the existence of two such primary ways of knowing implies a _valuative dimension of the psyche._

Although the problem of imputing choice or selectivity to the psyche does not solve problems without creating new ones, the fact remains that an I-Thou as opposed to an I-It mode may, apparently, be chosen. Arthur Deikman puts it this way,

> The choice of mode is determined by the motives of the individual organism. Motivations exist, however, at different levels and with different time scales. It is hard to say much about the specific hierarchy of motives that effect the choice of mode. It is my impression, however, that the baseline of mode choice is set by the general orientation of the individual's culture. [40]

Psychologist Robert Ornstein agrees with the idea that we choose between the complementary modes, "selecting one and inhibiting the other."[41] He also agrees that the cultural orientation has some effect on the pattern of mode selection.[42] (Please see Appendix.) So does Dorothy Lee, reflecting on differences between Western and Trobriand conventions about time and space.[43]

Yet, as Sorokin has taught us, cultural orientation does not dictate choice so much as tend to preempt alternatives. Thus, the dominant orientation of a culture may be Sensate, but that fact, for a particular historical case, does not determine that all human beings in that culture will select Sensate references for action exclusively.

A metaphoric question opened this chapter: how can we know the "dancer from the dance?" How can we separate the levels of the personality from that of sociocultural sys-

tems of order to make sense of both?

Having already insisted that sociocultural systems are contingent with respect to human beings, it may now be said, flatly, that the dancer is the chooser, the dance the chosen potentiality. It is the wonder of sociocultural systems that the probabilities of a million human minds may converge in clusters of meanings, artifacts, and repeated gestures which all have their own laws. Even so, it is man who spins these social systems.

Summary: The Relational and the Objective Modes. In this chapter, moving toward establishment of a principle of change at the level of personality, the existence of evidence for postulating the polarized nature of the psyche has been demonstrated. It has been seen that the idea of two minds in men has many sources. In Table 4 there is a list of some of the advocates of a psychic duality who have been considered in this essay.[44]

Given the information reviewed in this chapter, the following postulates may be offered. Certain implications of these postulates will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7.

A. Mind or psyche is constituted by two primary modes of knowing which may be called the relational and the objective. The objective mode is characterized by lineal, sequential, temporal and rational understandings; the relational by nonlineal, atemporal and nonrational experiencing, including intuition.

B. *Human mental productions and actions may be said to emphasize either relational or objective understandings in different life situations. Productions or expressions of the first type may be designated by the term "relational"; productions or expressions of the second type by the term "objective."*

TABLE 4

A SUMMARY OF TERMS
BY DIFFERENT AUTHORS
WHICH DESIGNATE A DUAL NATURE
OF CONSCIOUSNESS OR MENTALITY

Author[1]	Relational Mode	Objective Mode
Bogan	Appositional	Propositional
Buber	I-Thou (relational)	I-It (separating)
Durkheim	Mechanical solidarity	Organic solidarity
Jung-Pauli	Acausal	Causal
Ornstein	Night (Left consciousness)	Day (Right consciousness)
Polanyi	Tacit	Explicit
Sorokin	Ideational	Sensate
Thompson (Yeats)	Ideational	Operational
Toennies	Natural will	Rational will
Weil	Stoned thinking	Straight thinking

[1]The writings of Bogan, Jung-Pauli, Ornstein, and Weil are discussed in the Appendix.

NOTES

[1]William Butler Yeats, Selected Poems and Two Plays, ed. by M. L. Rosenthal (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 117.

[2]Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 83.

[3]See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 537. Socialization for Sorokin, in this sense, is a third phase in the genesis of sociocultural systems.

[4]Ibid., pp. 39-41.

[5]See particularly, Emile Durkheim, "Le dualisme de la nature humaine et ses conditions sociales," Scientia, vol. 15, No. 34, 1914, pp. 206-221.

[6]Gerald Gardner, Witchcraft Today (New York: The Citadel Press, 1970), p. 35.

[7]See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: Bedminster Press, 1937), III, from about page 181.

[8]See Carl G. Jung, "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," in Robert E. Ornstein, ed., The Nature of Human Consciousness (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 445-457.

[9]Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, edited by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969). Also see, Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966).

[10]In this regard see Ulric Neisser, "The Processes of Vision," Scientific American, 219 No. 3(Sept., 1968), pp. 204-214.

[11]See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 87-145. Among Erving Goffman's writings a most pertinant book is The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959). George A. Kelly's psychology of personal constructs is introduced in A Theory of Personality (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1955). See also Prescott Lecky, Self-

Consistency: A Theory of Personality (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday and Co., 1955).

[12]The term, of course, is from W. I. Thomas. See Morris Janowitz, ed., W. I. Thomas on Social Organization and Social Personality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 117-167.

[13]Kelly, A Theory of Personality.

[14]Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1956).

[15]Ibid., p. 54.

[16]Ibid., p. 10.

[17]This is a partial list of what Kluckhohn and others have called "value objects." For a recent use of this concept see, Richard L. Means, The Ethical Imperative: The Crisis in American Values. (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1970). Means borrows the terminology of values, largely, from Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Petersen, 1961).

[18]Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Louise R. Loomis, ed., Aristotle on Man and the Universe (Roslyn, N. Y.: Walter J. Black, 1943), p. 169.

[19]Plato, The Republic, in the W. H. D. Rouse translation, Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: The New American Library, 1956), p. 315 ff.

[20]Edouard Schure, The Ancient Mysteries of Delphi: Pythagoras (New York: Rudolph Steiner Publications, 1971), p. 83.

[21]See the discussion of Pythagoras and incommensurables in Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), pp. 35-36.

[22]Ibid., pp. 284-297.

[23]See Anne Fremantle, ed., The Age of Belief: The Medieval Philosophers (New York: The New American Library, 1954).

[24]The I Ching, trans. by Richard Wilhelm from the Chinese and by Cary F. Baynes from the German (Princeton,

N. J.: The Princeton University Press, 1967).

[25]The Upanishads: Breath of the Eternal (New York: The New American Library, 1957).

[26]Excellent essays on this kind of idea are found in Abbot Zenkei Shibayama, A Flower Does not Talk: Zen Essays (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1970).

[27]The best modern introduction to Sufi thought appears to be Idries Shah, The Sufis (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1964). See also Idries Shah, The Way of the Sufi (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1970).

[28]Emmanuel Kant, Selections, edited by T. M. Greene (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957).

[29]Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1935).

[30]Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

[31]Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (New York: Dover Publications, 1946).

[32]Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1959).

[33]Specifically, Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969); Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970); William Irwin Thompson, At the Edge of History (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Joseph Chilton Pearce, The Crack in the Cosmic Egg (New York: Pocket Books, 1971). Among the "others" are Ronald Laing. See, for example The Politics of Experience(New York: Ballantine Books, 1967). See also, David Cooper, The Death of the Family (New York: Random House, 1970). Another interesting quest for new dimensions in our view of man is Stan Gooch, Total Man (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972).

[34]Reich, The Greening of America, p. 241.

[35]Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p. 22.

[36]Plato, Meno, in the W. H. D. Rouse translation, Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: The New American Library, 1956), p. 51.

[37]Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p. 5.

[38]Ibid., p. 22.

[39]See Polanyi, Knowing and Being, particularly the essays called "The Logic of Tacit Inference" and "Knowing and Being."

[40]Arthur J. Deikman, "Bimodal Consciousness," Archives of General Psychiatry, 25 (Dec., 1971): 481-489.

[41]Robert E. Ornstein, The Psychology of Consciousness (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1972), p. 62.

[42]Ibid., p. 181 ff.

[43]Dorothy Lee, "Codifications of Reality: Lineal and Non-Lineal," Psychosomatic Medicine, 12 No. 2 (1950), pp. 89-97.

[44]There are similar tabular summaries of this sort in Ornstein, Psychology of Consciousness, p. 67, and in Joseph E. Bogan, "The Other Side of the Brain: An Appositional Mind," in Robert E. Ornstein, ed., The Nature of Human Consciousness (San Francisco W. H. Freeman and Co., 1973), p. 111.

CHAPTER VI

VALUATION AND ACTION

> We are waves whose stillness is non-being.
> We are alive because of this, that we have
> no rest.
>
> Abu-Talib Kalim[1]

What follows is aimed at the reader's intuition as well as his reason. The nature of what I am calling valuation will be considered first, then some aspects of the nature of action. The discussion could begin with either action or valuation since, as I conceive them, they are inseparable. Action or behavior is by nature valuative -- it involves selection and exclusion.

Valuation

Consider these propositions: First, mind or psyche is not an objectivity or thing. Mind is activity, flux, change. Like the photon and similar quanta of physics, its "rest mass" is zero. This sort of idea has been stated or implied very widely. With William James, for example, one sees it in the assertion that "consciousness of some sort goes on. States of mind succeed each other. . ."[2] Polanyi sees awareness as always attending from something to something.[3] Some, perhaps, may prefer to accept Leslie White's assertion that "mind is minding," with all that such a phrase implies for White.[4] On the other hand, since mind is not simply consciousness in the sense of awareness, the

lines of the Sufi poet which head this chapter may express the idea best. Mind and our experience of being, at least, are not separable, and experience is never still. But the point is aproximately the same; mind is, or implies, activity. This is not to say that where there is simple motion there must also be mind. By activity here I mean to designate those attitudes, acts and responses of an entity which relate that entity to its environment. This sort of activity is meant, further, to include both observable activity from one perspective, and the effects of consciousness from another.

Second, mind or psyche is characterized by restlessness, by continual activity which is selective. The activity of mind is selective. And the general selective property of mind may be called valuation.[5]

Now in describing the valuative property of mind, one could take James' assertions about consciousness as at least suggestive of what I am trying to get at. He writes, "Consciousness is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks."[6] And further,

> The phenomena of selective attention and of delinerative will are of course patent examples of this choosing activity. But few of us are aware how incessantly it is at work in operations not ordinarily called by these names. Accentuation and emphasis are present in every perception we have. We find it quite impossible to disperse our attention impartially over a number of impressions. 7

It would certainly be helpful if I could simply lean on William James for my idea of valuation. But, unfortunately, in James' classic essay on the "stream of consciousness" from which the above quote comes, the reader is encouraged, I feel, to identify consciousness with awareness. Such an idea is quite unacceptable from my point of view. Instead, at least heuristically, it seems far more useful to assert that the activity of an entity manifests the presence of mind.[8]

In other words I agree that in sense at least, "the age-old problem of body and mind," as Bertalanffy puts it, is rather like that of the opposition of structure and process, or of matter and energy. For all three dichotomies are "different aspects, wrongly hypostatized, of one and the same reality."[9] Now the reader need not agree with this monist position, but it does seem a more useful tack for a sociologist than either avoiding the issues of mind and experience, or selecting a behaviorist position like that of Skinner or Scott,[10] which begins with the assumption that mind either does not exist, or that it may be reduced in some way to objectivities which are presumed to compose the mind (i.e. biochemical reactions, conditioned responses, or whatever). In the first case we have no way of speaking of values, and hence, no way of speaking to human problems or to actual experience; in the latter we pretend (as Skinner clearly does) that there <u>are</u> no values,

only determined conditions.[11]

In any case, if one may understand that activity of the organism, <u>or of mind</u> therefore, need not be in awareness, one is approaching a significant fact about the nature of valuation. In effect, although we may, apparently, choose among alternatives in a conscious way, more generally selection occurs outside of awareness. (James implies the idea of tacit selection, by the way, in his concept of a consciousness "fringe."[12]) But let me explain how this may be so.

<u>The Tacit Nature of Valuation</u>. The tacit aspect of valuation may be seen from reflecting on the following propositions. <u>First</u>: Selection implies negation. <u>Second</u>: Negation implies the presence of alternatives. In other words, there must be a tacit set of phenomena with respect to which explicit phenomena are a subset. Earlier, it was pointed out that this understanding, taken from M. Polanyi, enables one to assert that knowing is either tacit, or rooted in tacit knowledge. Allowing the second proposition to stand on its own, let us consider the first proposition only.

Selection implies some alternative not selected. But the nature of this process of negation may be seen in considering an example of "simple perception." Thus, imagine if you will, a "simple perceptual act" bracketed most arbitrarily (and only analytically) from what James called the

"stream of consciousness."[13] Let this simple act amount to looking at a vase sitting, perhaps, on a table. Now to see the vase you must first abstract it, so to speak, as a _figure_ with respect to its environment or _ground_. That is, the vase emerges perceptually by contrast with a "not-vase" background.

In a _logical_ sense, all discrimination must proceed by such a process of selection and negation. Only by such a perceptual focusing, by the _translation_ of sensible qualities into forms or things, can we make sense of a world. Or make a world at all.

But of course there are no simple perceptual acts. Where there are objects or things there are contexts. Where there are figures there are grounds. We see the vase, in other words, because of its relationships in a context which includes both immediate sensible qualities _and_ ideas about what vases are (e.g. the whole range of associations with vases.)

What is true of imagined "simple perceptual acts" is true of complicated actual life situations. From a veritable flood of sensory inputs, we select what we are disposed in some way to select. We continually arrange the world by _not_ responding to most of those inputs,[14] as well as by constructing or assembling particulars into meaningful entities. In the social world, as Mead and others have shown us, it is the _context_ of one of these construc-

tions -- the social self -- looming on the margins of awareness, or out of it, which must be valuated in interactions with others (or in autonomous or internal role playing, for that matter). Thus, valuation as negation and selection is at the root of social action. Put another way, _the social world is founded in the relational capacity of mind to yield a synthesis which transcends the immediate focus of awareness._[15]

In general then, the main fact about valuation is that it entails a negation of the ground, not only as stimulii are selected, but also as we form categories which group these stimulii _and_ as we adopt orientations that make sense of categories.

Levels of Valuation. The reader need only accept my set of basic propositions, perhaps only for the sake of argument, to continue onward toward implication. Again, these propositions are: _A_. Mind has the character or property of being restless or active. (Activity expresses mind.) This means I am willing to risk a hypothesis that the property or process called mind is, in fact, as general a property of organic structure as energy is of matter,[16] although degrees of mind, in this sense, may vary greatly. _B_. Mind is selective. _C_. This selectivity, which I choose to call valuation, is _not_ the equivalent of conscious choosing.[17] That is, the valuative activity of human organisms operating at various levels is not necessarily

"conscious" valuation, although it <u>may</u> be, in principle.

Beyond these ideas, it may be obvious that if the universe is not composed of homogeneous monads, there must be different orders of existence which may be valuated. Given the duality of the human mind, in fact, there must be both an objective "realm of particularity" and a relational "realm of constitution." In other words, there are parts and wholes for the mind. The parts which compose the sensible world may or may not be constituted by the mind as wholes.

Following a common sense approach then, if there is an objective realm of parts, then parts may be valuated. At an objective extreme (which probably only exists as an ideal type) the world may be valuated as objective, unrelated fragments. Bits and pieces. Random qualities in random motion. As the reader may suspect, it is no accident that such an idea suggests Sorokin's notion of the extreme Sensate mentality.

In your imagination though, move up one step from the nightmare of randomness to a realm of impressions. Imagine, that is, a biological level of unmitigated sensory inputs, a situation where the organism receives all possible stimulii (up to the receptor limits of that organism -- e.g. visual sensitivity to electromagnetic waves between certain wave lengths, auditory sensitivity to sound frequencies between limits, and so on.) Such an open organ-

ism should delight behaviorists, since it is presumed to passively read all conceivable data as equivalent. Such an organic condition is also quite inconceivable, but let it stand, anyway, as an ideal type.[18]

At the opposite extreme of an imaginary valuative continuum, place a conceivable (if unlikely) condition of mind which relates all inputs. If you like, consider the objective extreme as a sort of hyper "I-It" condition, the relational extreme as a compleat "I-Thou" condition.

Now place four points on this continuum. These four, all of which have some empirical grounding, may be designated by the terms (1) biological (2) propositional (3) ethical and (4) mystical. For purposes of discussion, presume that the biological level is a level of the senses. In other words, we are focusing on incoming sense data with respect to the over-all organism as these are in fact discriminated by the central nervous system. In this way, we may place the biological level near the objective end of the continuum. At the other end of the continuum, of course, is the mystical level. In every case, I believe the conventional meanings of these four terms can be taken as sufficient for my explanatory purposes.

Now valuation at the biological level is simply selective discrimination of stimulii. This condition of selectivity is, in effect, the observable responsiveness or *irritability* of organisms, to use the biologists' terminology.

Beyond noting that we are normally not aware of our organic irritability (e.g. the functioning of the pancreas or the blinking reflex, etc.), nothing more need be said about biology for the moment.

By a propositional valuation I simply mean to imply the kind of general cognitive discrimination which allows one to see vases, for example. In the human mind, if you like, this is the level of symbolic perception made possible by language. Thus, a simple example of propositional valuation is the designation of anything by a name or "cognitive label." To see a dog is to negate the "not-dog ground" in the act of valuation. To construct a sentence is, as Polanyi notes, to select for awareness (explicit knowing) one combination from roughly ten to the fortieth power tacit possibilities.[19] In general, the nature both of perceptual and symbolic feedback operations of mind illustrate propositional valuation. One estimates the breaking distance to a stopsign (while driving a car) by a perceptual feedback which involves continual correction -- i.e. negation of alternatives -- given by a prior and partly symbolic selective criterion. The criterion includes the meanings of stopsigns, estimates of the consequences of not stopping, and so on.

The most formal examples of propositional valuation, one must suppose, occur in intellectual operations which utilize formalized propositions. Thus, formal logic is in

part at least, an extension of a propositional capacity or potential given or implied by the nature of language.[20] Similarly, mathematics is an extension of informal ideas of number and ratio.[21] It should be recalled, though, that even in solving a mathematical equation, particularly if there are a number of steps in the calculation, there is an alternation between numerical or objective operations, and synthesizing or relational checking. In dividing an equation by some value, thus, the goal -- an expected solution -- remains as a tacit reason for performing the division. Further, explicit operations occur in awareness (e.g. adding, dividing, etc.) against a tacit background of negation (e.g. of incorrect numerals, values, coefficients, etc.) which is not in awareness.

Ethical valuation is seen, generally, in the over-all pattern of behavior. As Lecky puts it, talking about what he calls "self consistency," "organization does not reveal itself in the attitude toward any single situation but only in the consistency of the attitude toward a variety of situations."[22] So what must be postulated in the notion of ethical valuation, as Lecky's comment suggests, is first of all, some strain toward consistency, some tendency of the human being to organize the propositions he maintains about the nature of the world.[23] In effect, such a tendency to organization is known to us as character or personality. When one can observe apparently consistent responses

on the part of individuals, this consistency is categorized as representing personality. And in fact, the idea of the person or the self may be thought of as founded in the experience of such patterns of organization. Put another way, the experience of identity is given by consistencies in that experience.

Now given the idea of a self or me as a basic datum of experience, ethical valuation may be associated with two ideas. One, that there is, as William James put it, a basic distinction between "me" and "not-me."[24] And two, that given this rather basic dichotomy of the universe, action must include some orientation of the me or the self to the rest of the world.

If we are to follow Sorokin, the number of such orientations is fairly limited. There are only a certain number of ways to be oriented to the social world. Indeed, if this were not so the very idea of social convention would be meaningless.

The manner by which orientations to action take place has been described by George Herbert Mead. As he puts it, "It is because of the 'I' that we say we are never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action."[25] As was suggested earlier, the self as an I -- as an identity which relates experiences -- remains on the margin of action proper. The I, in Mead's sense, may be taken as an object to consciousness only as action passes

into memory. In the moment attributed to the acting me, the I is a tacit backdrop. Yet the I, the identity, is present in some way, behind the acting me in each instance of concrete <u>or</u> imaginary (role playing) action.

The valuational field of social orientations or of ethical positions, broadly conceived, may be thought of as a finite set which may be selected in the <u>process</u> of action. Thus, while it is true (and no doubt significant) that orientational alternatives may be made self-conscious <u>qua</u> alternatives, it is also true that tacit negation occurs with respect to this ethical set. Further, this tacit exclusion of alternatives operates in quite the same way as it does in the realm of nomic[26] or propositional world data. In the process of action, therefore, the selected ethical position may be in awareness as a truth or validity, but only as alternatives are quashed or altogether repressed from awareness. The Nazi brown shirt, busily boarding up a Jewish shop in some town square, presumes his actions to be not only correct but virtuous. Any awareness, even if only in passing, of alternative ethical positions are not posed to the self as true. If alternatives are taken into awareness at all, they only serve as contrasts which are seen as false with respect to what is true.

A bit more will be said about the idea of social or ethical valuation, but that must wait for the discussion of action which follows shortly.

At the far end of our imaginary, valuative continuum we placed something called mystical valuation. If I were cautious, this point would be left without comment, but caution does not generally lead to new ideas. Therefore, having suggested that at one extreme the world may be arbitrarily broken into myriad causal points (which might be called acts, perceptions, or whatever) an opposing condition was implied. This condition, for purposes of discussion, may be called mystical awareness. Yes, awareness. For only at this end of the valuational continuum, we must speculate, is the selecting, acting flux of mind in some way a potential thing. (If that is paradox it is not, thereby, absurdity.)

From the mystical perspective, the realm of one's actual ordinary life, of one's experience, is a flow of pieces that never complete their suggested puzzle. In Hindu and Buddhist convention, life is illusion. We may pose values to ourselves out of the store of them provided by our culture. But they will be rationalizations. We may consult our ideologies or write treatises on natural law, but always we remain in the solipsism of what Toennies called the rational will.

In mystical awareness though, valuation becomes the object <u>and</u> the subject. Awareness encounters reality in some way that is simply transcendent of abstractions and absolutely there, absolutely concrete. The meaning of such

a statement is suggested in Thomas Merton's quote from the Zen master Hui Neng.

> To recognize the inmost mind is emancipation. . . . This means the realization of the unconscious (wu nien). What is the unconscious? It is to see things as they are and not to become attached to anything. . . . To be unconscious means to be innocent of the working of a relatively (empirical) mind. . . . 27

A designation of the purely relational or acausal nature of this sort of awareness or encounter is given by the *Tao Te Ching*.

> Tao can be talked about but not the eternal Tao,
> Names can be named, but not the Eternal Name. 28

Or, again, in the poetry of Lao Tzu:

> Existence is beyond the power of words
> to define.
> Terms may be used
> But are none of them absolute.
> In the beginning of heaven and earth there were
> no words. . . . 29

Speculatively, one may suggest that the very meaning of religion is the effort to translate such (apparently rare) encounters into conventional -- i.e. objective, verbal -- understandings. Such a suggestion implies the hypothesis that the non-causal or relational complement of all objectification may, in itself, be valuated and is, in fact, the essence underlying religious values.[30]

To this point the discussion has focused on the selective or *valuative* property of action. Now it is time to turn to reflections on valuative *action*.

Action

To say, as Sorokin does, that interaction is the "atom" of the superorganic, is to affirm one kind of understanding at the expense of a more fundamental one. Certainly it must be true that empirical systems like those called families, churches or supermarkets move in the processes of interaction. But a woman's solitary work in the kitchen, a priest's solitary meditation before preparing a sermon, or a supermarket manager's late night struggle with the quarterly sales reports still pertain to sociocultural systems. Human action, in other words, may move these systems without there being direct interaction between people.

With respect to the human actor, the sociocultural system is the context of action, but only as acting minds may construct or actualize that context. Interaction works because you and I, should we interact, have the capacity to _define_ the nature of the interaction for ourselves, to construct it from a cultural blueprint. Where no such blueprints exist, as a number of ethnographic accounts attest, the other may well be declared "not-human-at-all," and perhaps pursued as a game animal.[31]

In this same vein, it should not be forgotten that an individual's _idea_ of sociocultural systems is altogether relevant to what such a system may _become_. It is hard to deny, for example, that Richelieu's vision of France's relationships to other powers created much of the substance of

those relationships. Certainly Napolean's particular vision of the location of army units, artillery batteries, and supplies had a considerable bearing on the outcome of the battle at Austerlitz (and, perhaps, on future ideas about uses of artillery).

Interactions are meaningless unless from some _individual's_ perspective they are grouped, classified and construed as fitting such conventions or categories over time. We are all sociologists in this sense. For we must all, like Sorokin, differentiate between antagonistic and solidary interactions; we must all classify actions which seem appropriate for mothers, shop foremen, grocery clerks, and so on, if we are to know how to act.

Now all of this is leading to the assertion that not interaction, but simply action, is the _reductio sine qua non_ of the superorganic. For certainly social action implies human society. But having said that, it is a fallacy to then seek the atom of social action in behavior that is only a subset of all social behavior. Surely, for example, no one would claim that a teenage girl's solitary primping before a mirror is _not_ social behavior.

Therefore, with Weber and Parsons, I believe that the beginning of society is social action. Unlike Parsons, though, I do not seek an atom of social action in some kind of "unit act."[32] And unlike Weber, I do not agree that social action is only oriented to the behavior of others.[33]

The social self has its own life, its own behavioral goals <u>as a social self</u>, which do not involve even the expected behavior of others. For example, on a vacation, I may be alone at a beach cottage for several hours. For one hour I read a mystery novel. In general, I become immersed in phantasy characters, experience empathy with one or more of the characters, etc. Having read the mystery novel, I put it aside, and perhaps turn to making spaghetti sauce, an action that does perhaps involve the expected behavior of others. But the fact is that my reading was <u>not necessarily</u> oriented to the behavior of others in any way. Am I then to presume that in reading the novel I abandoned the world of symbol and of language -- that is, the "social world"? Did I, while reading, lose touch with my sense of self, with my identity ? To think so would be patently absurd. I can no more leave my social world by social activity than I can escape the earth's gravity in a row boat!

There is no "unit act" for the simple reason, so often explained by Sorokin, that the significant, the essential component of social action is <u>meaning</u>. The idea of a "unit act" is misplaced behaviorism for two reasons: (1) there is no way to agree on just what an <u>empirical</u> act may consist of, and (2) any such arbitrary division of the flow of action can only exist if it is <u>assigned</u> a meaning by the observer.[34]

What then is an appropriate atom of social action?

The answer, I think, is an analytical construct which has some actual grounding in experience. It may be called the <u>action frame</u>.[35]

To see what an action frame is, we may begin with an example. Imagine an actual life situation starring John and Marsha. Let this life situation consist of a <u>setting</u>, rather like what Geoffman calls a "region."[36] This particular setting exists in the present for John and Marsha. (Past or future frames, as we will see, have either remembered or imagined settings.) It consists of a moonlit night in May in some pleasant suburban neighborhood. The smells include a mixture of japonica and power mower, a cat's litter box somewhere under the porch, and Marsha's perfume. John and Marsha are sitting together on an old fashioned porch swing, the kind that may leave flakes of white paint on the palms of one's hands, or squeak loudly at inopportune moments.

Permit the assumption that John and Marsha each may define the situation. That is, each has a biography, or as sociologists may say, each is socialized.

For simplicity, let us focus on Marsha. For her there is (a) some interpretation of the setting, some tacit and explicit knowledge of what is around her, (she may experience some of the tacit elements as a mood) and (b) some current <u>action frame</u> of the situation. That is, Marsha has some idea or definition of "what's happening."

Of course at any moment which seems to Marsha a pre-

sent, she may stop attending to her frame of what is happening on the porch. She may for example "leave the scene" briefly to reminisce about Jerry. That is, she may focus on a past frame of some kind. As was suggested, the past frame will have its region or setting too. Why? Because we can neither project nor recall action outside of a context. Even if we are imagining Alexander's conquest of Persia, the mind clings to images, ideas about the setting or settings of action. Certainly this is true when we project or recall action involving the self.

As time passes, the scene which includes Marsha and John drifts. They talk of the weather; the moon gets higher; Marsha's brother stops yelling out the back window and is hauled away for a bath. Concrete action scenes, in other words, require not just single frames or stills, but groups or sequences of such frames. Further, in experience, frames, as those in a motion picture film, run together for us. That fact is so obvious we do not normally think about it. The point is, though, that present moments or simple frames are, indeed, like motion picture stills. They do not tell us much until we see series of frames in succession.

For our purposes, then, let us distinguish between present frames (or stills), and action frames which include real or imagined sequences of these stills. Incidentally, these simple frames may be thought of as corres-

ponding to what James called the "specious present." That is, our experience of the present moment seems to exist as a sort of "saddle-back" in time.[37]

Now if Marsha continues to act in our imagined scene she will also continue to define the situation. Let us say that she has M_n ways to do this. But recall that the set M_n is accessible to _tacit_ knowing while only M_i is likely to be explicit. Marsha, for example, is not likely to construe John as being my friend John and as a stranger at the same time. For the sake of illustration, let there be three members of the set M_n such that M_1 = "John is here because he wants to make out"; M_2 = "John is here because he is lonely with Sarah out of town"; M_3 = "John wants help with his algebra again." These three alternative would represent the finite set of _models_ applicable to the frame from Marsha's persepective.

Note that it is assumed here that the set M_n is finite, _if the situation is structured by interpretation._[38] In simplest terms, there are not an infinite number of ways of defining any frame _if_ the self is structures and _if_ there are any presuppositions about what is happening. (And there always are if one is socialized and if the situation is in any way interpretable in terms given by that socialization.)

Marsha may valuate the situation or frame in the sense of selecting M_1, M_2, or M_3, generally by a tacit negation

of the alternatives. Thus if M_1 ("John is here to make out") is valuated, and if the alternatives are, in fact tacit possibilities, they may still not enter into awareness. Of course all three alternatives may be weighed consciously and, unfortunately, the very manner in which the example must be put (i.e. in explicit verbal terms for each alternative) tends to suggest such a thing. But the point to be made is that although one may weigh alternatives, in concrete action large numbers of action definitions or models are simply negated in pre-verbal consciousness.

More illustrations may help. If I ask you for a synonym for the word big, you may select words like grand, or large from your vocabulary, by association as you might explain it. In this case, although non-synonyms are tacitly negated, the alternative set must be made explicit, i.e., must be placed in awareness, in order for the task to be completed.

On the other hand, if one is riding a motorcycle and a sudden decision must be made regarding an approaching truck, one does not take time to translate alternatives into verbal awareness, even though the alternatives do exist tacitly as a sort of probabilities set.

While synonym hunting, as a verbal task, is largely a left brain or objective mode function, bike riding is a relational activity (emphasizing, apparently, the relational mode or right brain). In between these two kinds of

situations, the social scene with John and Marsha mixes verbal-explicit and tacit elements rather more subtly. Marsha's sense of John's motives, thus, may not emerge, initially, as mental verbalizations. Marsha may report to us (should we ask) that she "felt" John's interest in her. Having verbalized the "John wants to make out" definition of the situation though, she may then, by association derive a verbalization of the "Sarah is out of town" definition.

Obviously then, the nature of orienting valuation is just very complex. Further, that complexity is beyond the scope of this essay. All that need be accepted here is that there are often finite sets of models or definitions applicable to any action frame, and that these models are valuated in selecting any particular model.

This is all very well, you say, but where do these models come from? Indeed, a reasonable question. It is at this point that we need to introduce Kenneth Boulding's concept of the image. It will be recalled that the image is, first of all, an individual or personal property. It is also, as Boulding puts it, "rich and complex beyond expression. . . . There is something in the image of man, . . . 'beyond what words can utter.'"[39] In general, however, beyond this further "rumor of the relational mode," the image is composed of categories of time, space, the self, and so on, along with a full complement of beliefs, affective predispositions, values and ideals. The contents of the

image, in effect, would seem to be the contents of the psyche.

Now impressions, ideas, definitions and other elements of the image may be seen as partly organized and partly not organized. As Sorokin puts it, some elements will constitute congeries while others are more or less integrated. Any such integration, needless to say, will be of the logico-meaningful variety.

Social psychologist Milton Rokeach has created a model for talking of integration in something like an image. His idea is that beliefs and attitudes are more or less peripheral in a person's <u>belief system</u>, depending on their relevance for one's sense of self or identity.[40] We may assume further that integration in Sorokin's sense tends to follow a similar pattern. What Rokeach calls "primitive" or "authority" beliefs are better integrated in one's image than "inconsequential beliefs."[41]

Since this is neither a psychological treatise nor an effort to develop Boulding's image concept beyond its immediate relevance for this essay, it does not behoove us to dwell on the great complexity of the image. Rather, I will attend to only certain elements of the image which may be presumed to exist if, indeed, one accepts the concept of something like an image. In short, we are concerned with (1) models of action frames, and (2) the <u>references</u> for such models which, it turns out, are rather like Sorokin's

cultural systems.

The concept of a reference here may be illustrated by the relationship between a spoken sentence and the language from which it is constructed. In a sense, every sentence is a little (or perhaps grandiose) frame of something in the world -- or out of it -- to which the speaker is attending. The reference for any sentence is the language itself. The sentence relates in some way to action, or conditions of action. The reference -- language -- stands outside of these descriptions, exclamations, interrogations, etc., not having any particular place (location in space-time) with respect to the action significance of the sentence.

But here is another example of this idea of a reference for an action frame model which may make things clearer. In our John-and-Marsha scene, imagine that Marsha has adopted the "John wants help with his algebra" definition (M_3). The existence of such a definition references at least the following cultural systems: (a) language itself, (b) algebra as a system, and (c) an ideal or value about the ethics or appropriateness of helping a friend with a homework assignement. It is this last sort of cultural system (verbalized for Marsha in some formula such as "people should do their own homework") which is of the most interest to us here.

In general the distinction between models and references in the image are distinctions between the becom-

ing and the being aspects of human action. In other words, while models for action frames must involve ideas of time and setting to some extent (of duration and event sequence), references (like Sorokin's cultural systems) have no particular temporal or spatial referent. To the extent that references are cultural systems then, they may be understood as systems of information, simple or complex, bound by meanings. These may range from the simplest objective cognitions (e.g.: cognitive labels like butterfly) to theologies or codes of law.

I do not think it is advisible to identify references for action and cultural systems too closely. For, as we have seen, sociocultural systems are structures *sui generis*. Cultural systems, as aspects of empirical sociocultural systems, are not the same thing as one's *image* of cultural systems. Of course, as Sorokin explains, cultural systems as systems of ideas do arise in the human psyche. I have certainly emphasized the same thing. For Sorokin, non-socialized ideas belong in some realm of pure ideas. With all respect to Plato, however, it seems best to me to simply assume that some components of the image are not social. They are not part of the superorganic at all.

An example of a non-social component of the image is any idea, construction, perspective on a situation, etc., which is idiosyncratic or particular to the individual and not necessarily shared. (To say, after all, that one can

only be human in a social context is _not_ to say that every expressive possibility for an _individual_ is encompassed by the set of socialized expressive conventions. If this were not so innovation could not occur at all.) In any case, while cultural systems are objectified among actors, a _reference_, as a component of the image, may not be. The implication of this assertion, of course, is that certain impressions or idea systems being, as it were, idiosyncratic may influence the construction of action frames even though they have no identity in socialized or conventional sociocultural systems.[42]

Action Frames as Time Frames. Just as there appear to be different "levels" of valuation, there are different sorts of action frames. But while levels of valuation evoke the hierarchy of _boundary conditions_ making social action possible, the different sorts of action frames are distinguishable by temporal reference.

Human action is, by definition, temporal. It "moves." Even one's experience of the present (or specious present) is the experience of duration. The present moves. (This is so even though our sense of duration may vary.) Freeze actions or slow motion sequences in films are dramatic, I believe, precisely because they distort our normal experience of duration.

From our location in the present moment we may, obviously, frame the specious present _or_ we may frame

sequences of action that have occured or which may occur; there are, that is, past or future frames.[43]

The problem of time and action frames frankly is worthy of a great deal of attention, but not in this essay. All that need be observed here is that the nature of the temporal referent for an action frame has a considerable bearing on just what sort of relevance an <u>ethical orientation</u> or value may have for action. There may be no ethical or moral questions attached to opening one's front door after coming home from work. On the other hand, considerable ethical problems may attend one's effort to frame a career. And if some minor frame has an ethical valuative significance, making a phone call, say, this is generally because it evokes a broader action frame, perhaps some projected future frame involving "what could happen if......" The phone call could be to one's mistress, after all, or to one's broker.

Before proceeding further with this discussion let us convert the term "reference" one more time. This is to avoid having to refer continually to one's reference to a reference. <u>From here on, please think of an action frame as a CS</u>. This abbreviation "CS" reminds one that what is being considered is, to some extent, the counterpart of a <u>cultural system</u> in the image. Further, the abbreviation CS may be associated with the phrase "coordinate system." A CS, that is, guides or orients action.

Operational and Explanatory CS. Among all CS that may occur in the image a major division may be made between those that are blueprints for doing and those that explain why one does it. Thus, operational CS orient action as it takes place. Explanatory CS account for action after it has happened or before it occurs. The relationship between operational and explanatory CS may be thought of as resembling that between Mead's "I" and "me." The "I" acts. It is the valuating, selective aspect of the self. The "me" is posed to the awareness as it appears to us taking any action frame as an objectivity.[44]

To return to Marsha on her porch swing, assume that she has adopted model M_1 -- "John wants to make out." Now if making out behavior should actually occur, Marsha (and John) will know how to carry out that sort of behavior. Although making out, since it is interaction, is unpredictable in detail, there is a sort of cultural grammar for such behavior which orients or guides it as it happens.

But along with guiding operational CS for making out Marsha may reference explanatory CS of different sorts which, in effect, tell what is happening. Thus, for one thing, the operational CS which guides tacitly may be made explicit. One may abstract a definition of action by posing some verbal description or explanation of it to oneself. To ride a bike, for example, requires that one have access to some operational CS (which may be called a

learned complex of behaviors from some other perspective). But one may also verbalize the riding of a bike; one may *explain* practically and technically what is involved in bike riding. These latter systems of information are what we are calling explanatory CS.

Another type of explanatory CS may be thought of as involving affect. An explanation at this level concerns the pleasurableness or painfulness of action. (These CS resemble Parson's idea of "affective definitions."[45])

Still another type of explanatory CS (Parsons might refer to these as "evaluative definitions,") may involve some *ideal* of behavior, some *ethical* orientation of the self. Some set of such orientations is valuated when Martha may first feel uncomfortable about making out with John. The ethical explanatory CS may become explicit when Marsha considers in awareness that "I'm being disloyal to Jerry" or "I'm leading John on," or whatever. Orienting CS of this type may be based in one's image of major cultural systems such as those of ethics or religion.

Relational and Objective CS. Some CS, explanatory *or* operational, are also relational. They are, that is, *references for definitions or actions which emphasize the relevance of atemporal, non-lineal and intuitive knowing*. Other CS are *objective* in that they are *references for definitions or actions which emphasize the temporal, sequential, and operational aspects of knowing*.

These two types of CS parallel the duality of mind itself. Examples of _relational explanatory CS_ might include theologies, myths, or ritual formulae as these occur in the image. (A Navajosand painting is an example of an objectified relational explanatory CS.) Among _relational operational CS_ one might include tacit guides which enable one to engage in contemplative prayer[46] or sacred ceremonies. _Objective explanatory CS_ include beliefs such as the world is round, or what goes up must come down. They may also include mathematical understandings or rational explanations for religious phenomena. _Objective operational CS_ enable a person to knit, run a potter's wheel, handle a fly rod, etc.

Some of the relationships between explanatory and operational CS on the one hand and relational and objective ones on the ather are given in Table 5.

Exclusion Among CS. I believe it is fairly evident, intuitively, how the four major types of CS given in Table 5 tend to exclude one another with respect either to _awareness_ or to _apparent validity_. The Genesis account of creation is quite unlike a scientific account of the birth of the solar system. The Genesis account, for one thing, may be taken as mythical. It tells us, in some way, what the universe means for the self. Further, it does not skip over teleological issues. An objective explanation, on the other hand, does not ask why in personal relational terms. In

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG MAJOR
ANALYTICAL TYPES OF ACTION REFERENCES

Distinctions Among CS by Function	Distinctions Among CS by Mode of Knowing	
	Relational	Objective
Explanatory function (symbolic explicit)	A Relational explanatory CS (myths, theology)	B Objective explanatory CS (science)
Operational (behavior-guiding) function (tacit)	C Relational operational CS (meditation)	D Objective operational CS (crafts, athletics)

fact, as Julian Huxley puts it, the scientist has a duty "not to believe."[47] In effect, then, if I attend to a scientific account of creation and take it to be valid, only a special intervention of reason may enable me to see how the religious, relational account may also, in its way, be true. As in the example of the cube, both facings may exist, each of them, perhaps, equally valid. But we can only see one of these at a time.

Now though one may, with Sorokin, adopt an integralist theory of truth, I would suggest that the adaptive problem of integrating the image in social environments, of maintaining a viable sense of identity, is eased by taking one explanatory position or another <u>but</u> <u>not</u> <u>both</u>. I will return to this point below.

Exclusion as to <u>validity</u> tends to occur at the explicit level (as one would expect) between cells <u>A</u> and <u>B</u> (relational explanatory and objective explanatory). Exclusion as to awareness occurs both between explanatory and operational CS (cells <u>A</u> or <u>B</u> with respect to cells <u>C</u> or <u>D</u>) and, although this is a more problematic assertion, between relational or objective operational CS (cells <u>C</u> and <u>D</u>).

Exclusion between explanatory and operational CS is, in effect, exclusion between explicit and tacit knowing. As I pointed out earlier, the tacit aspect of skills like those involved in typing, skiing, knitting, etc., are actually hampered by imposing explicit or technical knowing

on them.[48] Further though, as research on lateral specialization of the cerebrum has suggested, tacit, operational CS and explicit, symbolic-explanatory CS may co-exist _independently_ to some extent in the same action frame. One may ride a bike and think algebra, one may watch television and knit, and so on. Even so, when this occurs, actual awareness must focus on one activity or the other. And, in fact, if one's bike riding commands immediate attention it will, generally, over-ride any verbal-symbolic ruminations.

Exclusion between relational and objective operational CS, I believe, may be illustrated by the situation wherein an objective exercise or ritual aims at transposing consciousness. In this case the _intention_ is a re-focusing of awareness by some use of an objective procedure, such as Yoga, so that an objective activity becomes, in effect, a relational one. The ramifications of such a problem are only of peripheral interest for this essay, however.

Key Orienting CS. Corresponding very roughly to Sorokin's supersystems in the individual image is some set of more or less integrated orienting premises. These premises may be thought of as described, in part, by Milton Rokeach's concept of "primitive beliefs." Rokeach describes these as representing a person's basic truths:

> . . . about physical reality, social reality, and the nature of the self; they represent a subsystem within the total belief system in which the person

> has the heaviest of commitments. In the ordinary course of life's events they are . . . taken for granted . . . . [49]

Primitive beliefs, Rokeach feels, order the world, in part, by providing what he calls "object constancy," "person constancy," and "self constancy."[50]

Helpfully for my purposes, Rokeach differentiates A type primitve beliefs, about which there is 100% consensus, from B beliefs, about which there is "zero consensus."[51] One might add only that "100% consensus" would have to refer to a rather homogeneous cultural context. Having made that addition, it is possible to assert that the combination of A and B primitive beliefs would, together, constitute the basic set of CS which I am calling operational in an individual image.

Corresponding to key explanatory CS, on the other hand, are those beliefs which Rokeach designates as "authority beliefs." Where primitive beliefs have a largely taken-for-granted (tacit) character, authority beliefs may more often be explicitly expressed. And here we will need to quote Rokeach at some length:

> As the child interacts with others, his expanding repertoire of primitive beliefs is continually brought into play and he thus stands to discover at any moment that a particular belief he had heretofore believed everyone else believed, such as the belief in God or Country or Santa Claus, is not shared by everyone. At this point the child is forced to work through a more selective conception of positive and negative authority . . . . Most important of these nonprimitive beliefs seem to be those concerning positive and negative authority -- what the sociolo-

> gists call reference persons or reference groups. Such beliefs concern not only which authorities, positive and negative, are we to trust and distrust . . . as we go about our daily lives. 52

Although I think there is a rough parallel between what Rokeach is talking about and what I am trying to designate, the parallel is, admittedly, rough. Rokeach, for one thing, is not encorporating a theory of tacit knowledge into his ideas about "belief systems." (Boulding at least implies such an idea in his concept of the image.) Thus, he is not interested in clearly specifying the tacit nature of many so-called primitive beliefs. He only implies such a thing with his notion of their "taken-for-granted" character. Further, perhaps because of the need to describe the different sorts of beliefs in verbal, explicit terms, he does not specify that primitive beliefs may, in fact, be tacit guides to much behavior.

In any case, having exploited Rokeach's ideas (hopefully without having done them grievous injury) one may not find it difficult to accept the further assertion that some CS are more important for the person than others. Whether Rokeach's descriptions were designed to or not, they roughly describe the idea of primary or <u>key orienting CS</u>. In effect, some SC, whether explanatory (verbal, explicit) or operational (tacit), are more fundamental to one's sense of identity than are others. Further, exclusion among the potentialset of such CS, as these may be shown (even hypo-

thetically) to exist for the relational mode (tacit knowing) is more crucial to overall patterns of action than are less important CS.

The principle of exclusion in the image is a concommitant of valuation. To choose a course of action or behavior is to negate alternatives. But with respect to sociocultural systems the most important sort of exclusion among CS must be thought to occur among key orienting CS, particularly those centering on the experience of self or identity.

This should follow if only because valuation (conditioned or self-conscious) has a greater bearing on the nature of sociocultural phenomena if it concerns long range or overall patterns of action which express one's sense of self or identity. One's opinions about flying saucers (beliefs Rokeach would call either derived or inconsequential -- assuming one is not a flying saucer cultist) is not very important for the nature of sociocultural phenomena. But beliefs and suppositions about the nature of one's self, family, co-workers, friends, the law, religion, and so on, most certainly do bear directly both on the nature of sociocultural systems *and* on one's sense of self.

Exclusion among Relational and Objective CS. Although any value is rooted, finally, in tacit knowing, as we have seen, Cs may emphasize either relational or objective understandings, particularly at the explanatory level. If, however, relational explanatory CS are adopted for whatever

reasons, they will tend to exclude objective ones and vice versa. This exclusion may regard both one's attribution of validity to such references <u>or</u> even one's awareness of alternative (relational or objective) references. Thus, understandings about how to deal with witchcraft are neither valid nor relevant if one does not concede the reality of witches.

Relational and objective references, or CS, tend to exclude each other for the following reasons:

A. <u>Awareness tends to focus in either the relational or the objective mode</u>. As research tends to show, one's sense of validity or of truth tends to shift into the space one happens to be occupying. In Weil's terms, if one is in "stoned space" (the relational mode) one tends to discover "stoned truth." If one is not aware of such "stoned spaces" they tend to be outlawed. They are, in short, not spoken of as existing or having reality.

Most importantly, if validity or truth value is assigned to one space over another, the truths of the other space (relational or objective) tend to be either devalued or modified. Support for this kind of assertion could be derived, by the way, from any broad study of the so-called hippy generation -- those who have, in the last few years, deserted conventions of our Sensate order to seek new dimensions of consciousness, new religious ideas, etc. If my understanding of these matters is correct, peo-

ple who have identified with the relational, counter-culture values will tend not to re-adopt or endorse the conventional objective values of the industrial West, even over long periods of time.

Incidentally, from a perspective that affirms the existence of alternative 'psychic spaces,' Sorokin's notion of an Ideational "truth of faith" becomes replaced by the possibility, at least, of a truth of alternative experience. But such an observation is really the ssed of another essay.[53]

More cogently here, the tendency for "stoned" truth to at least modify and perhaps to nullify straight truths, particularly with regard to ideas of ethical orientation, is one reason that I find Sorokin's idea of the Idealistic synthesis rather problematic. In other words, I am not quite sure that balanced Idealistic understandings are ever very widespread in human society. This is not to say that an Idealistic social condition is not possible.

B. The problem of adapting oneself to conventions espoused by significant others and relevant groups requires the rejection of apparently ambiguous premises. The need to be accepted in human groups, as shown us for example by Cooley or Mead,[54] makes it difficult for people to counter a conventional reality. This idea of a socially constructed reality has been well introduced by writers like Berger and Luckmann. It amounts to the assertion that no cultural

arrangement exhausts all possible meanings that may be taken from reality.[55] And whatever the limits of the unknown complete reality, it is evident enough from much anthropological literature that conventions about reality differ across cultures.[56]

With Sorokin, I believe it is very useful to assume that the extremes of possible conventional realities is given, in part, by the concept of the supersystems, Sensate to Ideational. From my point of view this makes sense because the boundary conditions of the psyche suggest Sensate-Ideational limits in the polarity of the relational and objective modes of knowing.

In any case, if one's social order is Sensate it is much easier to get through the day declaring Sensate premises and believing at least some of them. Without raising the issue of alienation here, it would seem that the strain to self-consistency[57] is less of a strain when one can buy the premises, the primitive and authority beliefs, of one's social environment within some kind of limits.

But there do seem to be such limits. For Sorokin, espousing an integralist theory of truth, the limits are set by the exhaustion of possibilities in a cultural system as such a system unfolds itself. Any supersystem, any set of basic world premises, has limited possibilities.

But another way of looking at this is to take into account the excluding or negating property of valuative

action. To do so is to note that the psyche itself sets limits on supersystems. A Sensate or Ideational supersystem does not simply wear out, as I have said, it is worn out in concrete action. In general, that is, if culturally imposed premises strongly emphasize either the objective or the relational mode individuals must, in various ways, sooner or later, experience the inadequacies of such premises.

Although one could go into great detail about ways in which this would be true, as Sorokin has, these assertions follow from any assumption that there are 1 + _n_ ways of relating the self to the world -- if only in ethical terms. Thus, one can imagine an Ideational idea of the self as a sacred, immortal being, bound by eternally valid norms. One may also imagine an opposite Sensate position, wherein the self is seen as an object (a commodity perhaps) made irrelvant by being one of billions. In this latter case ethics are probably _ad hoc_ and relativistic. Even the term ethics may seem hollow and meaningless. And, as Sorokin has written, _either_ position will give way to exigency. The first position may be eroded by discordance among men, by seemingly malicious "acts of God," and so on. The extreme Sensate position, on the other hand, must give way if society of any sort is to be possible. Some degree of ethical consensus is required for society to exist. By this I mean to say simply that any consensus at all sufficient to the nurturance of children is, I think, a step away from the

extreme Sensate position. In effect, if there is cooperation (even cooperative malevolence as among the Dobu) there is an acceptance of some set of universals.[58] Pure Sensatism is no more feasible for actual life than is Hume's "pure" empiricism.

But to be quite clear about it, where Sorokin sees the possibilities of a supersystem being, as it were, discarded by time and history, by exigency and the stresses of change on sociocultural systems, I see the supersystem discarded also by the action of people who experience its partial validities. People are never altogether the tools of some Hegelian Weltgeist. That we are largely slaves of conditioning, of socialization and culture, one can hardly deny. Such conditions are, so to speak, the bounderies or the mold of the social order; as such they are, indeed, conditions of change in that order. But individuals must experience, interpret and act. They may act reflexively in terms of conditions and conditioning, but they may also, occasionally, see through conditioning, through the determining screen of culture to create altogether new sociocultural possibilities.

That people may escape partly from culturally imposed boundaries to create new potentials is attested to by the best efforts of the human sciences -- psychology, anthropology, sociology and philosophy.

Now Sorokin does not deny that things hidden may be

revealed, that one may in a sense see through the screen of culture. His emphasis on the role of intuition in discovery shows this. As he writes, "The deductive and inductive superstructure of science rests not upon logic or the testimony of the senses, but upon the ultimate intuitional verities."[59] Here again, one sees the platonic side of Sorokin. But Sorokin's sense of seeing through culture is not quite the same as what I am suggesting. Here is the distinction: For Sorokin the realm of essences or potentials <u>already exists in nature</u>. Regarding scientific discoveries he writes,

> Any . . . discovery is also a creation -- not necessarily in the sense of an imposition upon nature of what is manufactured by our mind, as Kant and his followers say, but in the sense of actualizing the hidden potentiality in the reality, . . . [60]

No particular power, no agency of selection is attributed to acting mind. Just as intuition, the Archimedean "eureka" is a discovery of what is already there, so the "social monad" can only reflect elements already in the cultural context.[61]

I have proposed a principle bearing on selection or valuation coupled with the concept of the structural contingency of sociocultural systems on human actors. In effect, I have proposed that we recognize the active, creative and constitutive property of human minds in actualizing more than new combinations of cultural traits already present. Not only new combinations, but distinctly new

qualitative orders of the social condition are possible. The world may yet be one of possibilities, but these potentials exist not only in nature, or in the superorganic, but in man himself.

So, in part, the wearing out of supersystems is an effect of their inadequacies. No supersystem, not even the most ideal Idealistic one, is capable of exhausting reality. This again is Sorokin's emphasis. The strain of inconsistency between social conventions about the nature of action and its effects, and one's experience of it must produce conditions characterized by concepts like anomie or alienation.

Now in the Durkheimian concept of anomie, awareness of the limits or boundaries that constitute the social order is vague. Normative borders are hazy. Since for Durkheim, society, particularly the <u>conscience collective</u>, is transcendent of the individual, anomie as a social condition can only be derived from " . . . a dim perception in the moral consciousness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, . . . " and so on.[62]

For Marx, who begins with concrete experience, relegating a Durkheimian <u>conscience</u> to a place with " . . . no history, no development,"[63] alienation must enter clearly into awareness to have historical significance. And history, of course, is little more than the conflict of interests among classes in the division of labor. Yet in both Marx

and Durkheim there is an effort to account for a certain restlessness; in both there is an effort to come to grips with society as problematic for the experience of people.

Interestingly, it is Sorokin's approach that permits ideas of anomie and alienation to attain a place in a broad civilizational perspective which links the quality of human experience to the objective properties of a concrete social type. Where Durkheim longs for some new religious "effervescence" to lighten the anomic threat of organic solidarity and Marx projects his "new class" out of the dialectic of class struggle, neither grasps the potential quality of some new social order. Neither can imagine, as Sorokin does, a horizon that does not become, somehow, utopian. Neither can leap beyond the premises with which they begin or conceive that those premises might themselves be transformed or replaced.

To what Sorokin has taught us about the advent and decline of supersystems, of civilizations and cultural orders, I wish to add what might be called the "valuative" factor. While the wearing out of supersystems is largely a sort of accretion through the results of many concrete acts, not all such erosion of major premises about the world is unreflective or unconscious. With the experience of anomie may also come the impetus to individual insight. New inventions, real innovations, as Sorokin insists, derive from intuition, from a consultation with

the relational mode of knowling.

Similarly, when conditions of the social order, through the principle of exclusion, have created a strain between experience and official versions of social or natural realities, some individuals will be driven out of the explicit field of understandings into the tacit realms of intuition. When objectification fails us, we must turn inward, toward the source of objectifications. New doctrines of natural law, new codes of religious ethics may emerge. Revelations both sacred and secular may rise like mushrooms from the night-shaded places of understanding. Of course many or most of these insights may wither in the light of the reality of everyday life. [64] Others, though, may be ingested and absorbed into an altered social order.

The principle of exclusion is rooted in a condition or property of the human psyche; it gives limits to the possibilities of immanent change. But it is the valuating, restless human mind that experiences the effects of the exclusion of alternative understandings, and forges the possibilities of new forms out of the pain of that experience.

Finally though, all that need be accepted to conceive of the theoretical validity of a principle of exclusion is (1) that reality is not exhausted by our ideas of it, (2) there are general limits on any sort of reality construction set by the nature of the psyche, and (3) one set of such limits is given by the relational-objective polarity

of mind.

Exclusion as a Boundary Condition. If, as Sorokin asserts, sociocultural phenomena are composed of cultural systems of meaning, human agents, and some physico-chemical means of expression for both, I believe it has been shown that a principle of change for each component is necessary. Yet, in adding a third principle, a principle of choosing, to those of immanent change and causal limits, it was necessary to re-examine the nature of action.

The salient characteristic of action, I attempted to show, was valuation -- conscious or unconscious choosing which implies the negation of alternatives.

In the processes of action one references various components of one's image of the world. Designating these references as CS we have seen that these action-guiding and explaining information bundles fall into certain categories which, in turn, tend to exclude each other either by not being in awareness simultaneously, or by not being accorded equal validity.

In particular, among the four specified types of CS, the relational and objective types of explanatory CS tend to be mutually exclusive in accounting for the personal significance either of operational or of alternative explanatory references for action frames. This, in formal terms, is the principle of exclusion which bears on the dynamics of sociocultural systems.

The significance of this principle of exclusion will be examined in more detail in the last chapter, but its relationship to sociocultural phenomena is that of a _condition_ or boundary limit on the immanent change of cultural systems. The principle of exclusion as it applies to sociocultural systems is in the tendency of action to endorse either relational or objective action references.

NOTES

[1]Idries Shah, The Way of the Sufi (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1970), p. 253.

[2]William James, Psychology: The Briefer Course (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 19. The full quote is: "The first and foremost concrete fact which everyone will affirm to belong to his inner experience is the fact that consciousness of some sort goes on. 'States of mind' succeed each other in him." These lines, of course, introduce James' famous chapter on "The Stream of Consciousness."

[3]Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, edited by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), particularly chapters 10 and 11.

[4]Leslie White, The Science of Culture (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1969), pp. 49-54.

[5]Where mind is taken as the "inner" face of biological structure, if one can accept such a postulate at all, then the general property biologists call "irritability" may be thought of as valuative in nature in the sense that it is selective with respect to the environment and directive in nature. In such a way, it is more than metaphor to say that any organism "values" certain aspects of environment and certain respones to it over others.

[6]James, Psychology, p. 37.

[7]Ibid.

[8]In general, this is to imply degrees of mind in the same way that there are degrees of biological structure. With Chardin, I am taking as a first postulate the idea that all energy is "psychic in nature." Chardin goes on to qualify this postulate with the notion that energy is both tangential and radial where energy exists at all. "A tangential energy . . . links . . . an element with all others in the same order (that is, of the same complexity and the same centricity) as itself in the universe; . . . a radial energy . . . draws it towards ever greater complexity and centricity -- in other words forwards." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. by Bernard Wall (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 64 ff.

[9]Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory (New York: George Braziller, 1968), p. 248.

[10]John Finlay Scott, Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971).

[11]See, for example, B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam Books, 1971). In Skinner what may have appeared sublime in the seventeenth century has clearly turned ridiculous.

[12]James, Psychology, pp. 32-33. For James the "fringe" is a consciousness of the halo of realtions around an image or definite perception.

[13]Ibid.

[14]On this idea of the perceptual apparatus as a "reality screen," see Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell (New York: Harper and Row, 1956).

[15]This synthesis, again, is experienced in the sense of self or identity which relates aspects of the present to some over-all trend of events and meanings. It includes not only the phenomena of memory and association but also those elements of any present which are known tacitly or by what psychologists call subception. See citations on this idea of subception or "learning without awareness" in Polanyi, Knowing and Being, p. 157.

[16]Among authors cited in this essay, Chardin, Julian Huxley, Russell and Whitehead have made similar assertions. Huxley puts it this way: " . . . there seems no escape from the belief that all reality has both a material and a mental side, however rudimentary and below the level of anything like our consciousness that mental side may be." See Julian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation (New York: The New American Library, 1957), p. 46.

[17]This is simply to assert, again, that we may see without being aware that we are seeing. Called subception or subliminal awareness, it means that consciousness must designate something other than phenomena confined to awareness.

[18]Obviously an organism that read all data as equivalent would quickly become food for predators or in some other way become a victim of its environment.

[19]Polanyi, Knowing and Being, p. 155.

[20]See Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language Thought and Reality,

John B. Carroll, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1956).

[21]Ibid., p. 248. Note Whorf's comments on Whitehead and Ouspensky.

[22]Prescott Lecky, Self-Consistency: A Theory of Personality (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1951), p. 48.

[23]Ibid.

[24]James, Psychology, p. 41.

[25]George Herbert Mead, On Social Psychology, ed. by Anselm Strauss (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 229.

[26]Peter Berger writes of the nomos as a meaningful order imposed on reality by the processes of "world construction" and of socialization. The nomos is a coherent association of nomic data (given mostly through language) taken to have over-all meaning. As Berger has it, nomos and some extreme condition of anomie are the opposing possibilities in man's social worlds. See particularly, Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967).

[27]Thomas Merton, Mystics and Zen Masters (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1967), p. 28

[28]Cited by Merton, Ibid., p. 73.

[29]Lao Tzu, The Way of Life, translated by Witter Bynner (New York: Capricorn Books, 1941), p. 25.

[30]Such an idea may or may not be further developed by this writer. One such effort exists, however as an unpublished paper: "Consciousness, Valuation and Religion: Toward a Paradigm," currently lost in the mail, I believe.

[31]I am thinking not only of accounts of Australian aboriginals, for example, but also of the various sorts of evidence that man has been a cannibal from early times. For discussions of cannabalism and Homo Erectus sites see, Chester S. Chard, Man in Prehistory (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969), p. 106 ff.

[32]Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: The Free Press, 1937), I, 43 ff.

[33]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), particularly chapter 5.

[34]In all fairness though, I suppose the action unit (if one got away from the idea that any such unit is some kind of empirical entity) could be seen as roughly equivalent to an action frame.

[35]I am hoping by this term to get away from the complex of abstractions given by Parsons in the notion of an action frame of reference. See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 56 ff. Thus, Parsons sees the actor as a component of the action frame of reference, but he wishes the idea of the actor to be construed two ways at once -- as a reference and as an object to be observed. And, as he writes, "As a system of action the actor may be either an individual or a collectivity." (p. 56) Now without invoking some sort of concept such as that of a "collective unconscious" I could not adapt such a "component" to my idea of an action frame. In short, the action frame is always a subjective construction, not an objectivity of any sort in the sense that I wish to use the term.

[36]Erving Goffman, The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life. (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), p. 106. Here, Goffman writes: "A region may be defined as any place that is bounded to some degree by barriers to perception." See also pp. 108-140.

[37]James, Psychology, p. 147.

[38]See the chapter entitled "Constructive Alternativism," in George A. Kelly, A Theory of Personality (New York: W. W. W. Norton and Co., 1963), pp. 3-45.

[39]Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 47-48.

[40]Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970).

[41]Ibid., p. 11 ff.

[42]Linton referred to idiosyncratic cultural traits as distinct from universal or specialty traits, for example, which comprise the actual culture. See Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936)

[43]See George Gurvitch, "Social Structure and the Multiplicity of Times," in Edward A. Tiryakian, ed., Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 171-184, for a consideration of various kinds of social times which would imply various sorts of time frames from the individual's perspective.

[44]Mead, On Social Psychology.

[45]Actually, of course, Parsons uses the more Freudian term "cathectic" not "affective." See Parsons and Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action.

[46]George A. Hillery, "The Sociology of Contemplative Prayer." Unpublished manuscript read before the Association for the Sociology of Religion, New York City, August 25, 1973.

[47]Huxley, Religion without Revelation.

[48]Edward T. Hall postulates a "technical" level of culture along with a formal and an informal level. Each of these levels of culture, he feels, correspond to types of awareness. While the technical level of awareness contains elements of both formal (unquestioned, traditional ideas) and informal (tacit) understanding, it is characterized mainly by being fully in awareness. Incidentally, for Hall informal awareness "describes a situation in which most of what goes on is almost entirely out of awareness." (italics added) See Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett World Library, 1959), p. 73 ff. In the terminology I am using, an operational CS would correspond to elements of informal culture in Hall's terms.

[49]Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values, p. 6.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[52]Ibid., p. 10.

[53]A sociology of religion which postulates the potential validity of relational understandings would be a decided step forward, I suspect.

[54]See Mead, On Social Psychology, pp. 199-246. See also Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind (New York: Schocken Books, 1962).

[55]Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966).

[56]A salient example for this essay is Dorothy Lee, "Codifications of Reality: Lineal and Non-Lineal," Psychosomatic Medicine, 12 No. 2 (1950): 89-97.

[57]Lecky, Self-Consistency.

[58]Ethical consensus, to be sure, may be negative -- at least in principle. Thus according to Benedict, the Dobu "agreed to be disagreeable." In any case, they had a sort of ethical consensus, even if it does not strike one as admirable. See Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934). In some of her last work Benedict tackled the problem of how consensus might be either "negative" or "positive." By adopting the biologist's notion of synergy, in effect, she proposed that high synergy might be said to exist in any "cultural groundplan" where voluntary and positively sanctioned behaviors on the part of individuals worked to the advantage of the whole group. I think the concept of synergy is a very useful one for the human sciences, particularly since it would allow one to recognize how to conceive of either Ideational or Sensate cultural settings with greater or lesser degrees of ethical "merit." See, in regard to synergy, Ruth Benedict, "Synergy: Patterns of the Good Culture," in Change: Readings in Society and Human Behavior (Del Mar, Calif.: CRM Books, 1972), pp. 6-11.

[59]Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1941), p. 106.

[60]Ibid., p. 107.

[61]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 586 ff.

[62]Emile Durkheim, Suicide, trans. by John A. Spaulding (New York: The Free Press, 1951), p. 249.

[63]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, C. J. Arthur, ed., (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 47.

[64]Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, PROJECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, after summarizing the main theoretical findings of this essay, I will atempt to show how one may relate a principle of choosing to Sorokin's civilizational perspective.

In the concluding paragraphs of the chapter I will try to evaluate the general theoretical worth and possibilities of having derived a principle of exclusion from a critique of Sorokin's theory of change.

Summary

In Chapter 6 a general principle of exclusion was developed. It was proposed that valuative action, characterized by tacit or explicit choosing, tends to come to a focus only as alternatives focuses are placed as it were, in a tacit field. In this way awareness tends to focus either on operations (actions in progress), or on explanations for action. Similarly, fundamental premises for action tend *either* to affirm the validity of relational *or* of objective references for action, not both.

With respect to sociocultural systems, the general principle of exclusion is most significant as it effects

the valuative relationship of the self to the world. Thus a condition of change in sociocultural systems is the tendency of people to valuate either relational or objective understandings of their ethical orientations to the self, other people, the social order, nature, and so on.

Here, by way of summary, it will be shown that the principle of exclusion meets the criteria set for it earlier. In so doing, it will also be seen that the principle of exclusion regarding socially relevant references (with respect to the self) may, in principle, be related to Sorokin's broader, civilizational perspective.

In Chapter 5 it was stated that any viable principle of choosing consistent with the postulates and propositions of this essay must: (1) account for change in sociocultural systems; (2) account for changes not accounted for by the principle of immanent change or of limits as given by Sorokin; (3) as a sociological principle, have particular significance for the superorganic.[1]

With respect to the third criterion, it will be recalled that this amounts to discovering one or more psychological principles which are, in effect, boundary conditions for sociocultural phenomena.

Regarding the first criterion, if sociocultural systems are contingent on human minds, then any change in sociocultural systems must reflect principles of change related to the nature of human minds. It is for this reason

that a number of pages in this essay were devoted to an attempt to demonstrate that sort of contingency.[2] Otherwise, this rather "too tautological" assertion may be thought to be excusable if only to reaffirm the idea that people spin societies by the capacity of the human psyche-soma to spin them. Spider webs are not spiders, but they are, indeed, contingent on the nature of spiders.

The second criterion is that the principle of exclusion in its general, and particularly in its special form (respecting key orienting CS) accounts for change not accounted for by either the principle of immanent change or the principle of limits. I believe that this has already been demonstrated to some extent, by showing that Sorokin's principle of immanent change bears on idea-systems or systems of meaning. It is more completely demonstrated by the fact that the principle of immanent change as given by Sorokin does not account for the genesis or selection of _new_ cultural systems. In short, the principle of immanent change is applicable only to systems _as they are already constituted_.

As to the matter of limits, if a third principle, one of choosing, is established, it automatically alters the concept of limits as causal constraints on the potentialities of systems of meaning. We will see why shortly.

Sorokin does not imagine for an instant that his idea of sociocultural systems is separate from its human agents.

But having noted that to be so, and even having pointed out how the genesis of cultural systems occurs in the human psyche, Sorokin does not differentiate the potential of idea systems from the criteria by which they are selected, or valuated, if the reader will now accept that term.

But let us turn to Sorokin himself on this matter. In discussing the factors of growth of cultural systems, Sorokin writes of the "self-unfolding of ideas when they are thought over and exchanged in meaningful interaction."[3] Then, further,

> . . . it was pointed out that meanings are highly dynamic forms of reality. They are, so to speak, always on the move, unfolding themselves, eliminating their hidden tensions and contradictions, the phase of thesis passing (in Hegelian terms) into antithesis and then into synthesis. Without premeditation, in the process of meaningful interaction this or that potential meaning, hitherto hidden, frequently comes out, . . . is objectified in this or that vehicle, . . . and undergoes further development. . . .[4]

Here, and in other "factors of growth" discussed by Sorokin, one sees rumors of some choice principle. But these adumbrations are mostly obscured by turns of phrase and by the general emphasis in his arguments. Sometimes Sorokin speaks of ideas "becoming linked in someone's mind," or, in another place, of the "qualitative growth of human agents."[5] Always, though, the sense of his discussions of such things leaves one to feel that ideas in some way use people. And, indeed, they certainly do. But of equal importance is the fact that people use idea systems. One may

think of the relationship, perhaps, as a dialectic one. But, certainly, little is gained in presuming that the third component of sociocultural systems is passive. Thus, meanings may indeed enter the world "without premeditation," *but not without valuation centered in the capacity of human beings to act and react selectively within limits not yet determined*.

In short, aspects of the *tacit* field of possible meanings are bound over to social service, as it were, only as they are valuated, consciously or unconsciously, in the context of action or action framing.

Sorokin simply does not include a principle of choosing among the principles by which sociocultural systems change. This is so unless one wishes to say that sociocultural systems are, in some way, equal to the sum of their parts. That is, since human agents who may have degrees of freedom are a part of sociocultural systems, sociocultural systems include some capacity for choice or selection within limits. But that sort of assertion belies the possibility of sociocultural systems having true structural properties. An additive picture of sociocultural entities obviates their being characterized as constitutive entities, *sui generis*. Besides, Sorokin does not seem to be implying any such thing. What indeed he does seem to imply, though, is the absence of psychic limits or principles as conditions of sociocultural systems. This is paradoxical, I submit,

since Sorokin is so obviously concerned both with the moral worth of social systems, and the problem of freedom.[6] But paradox or not, Sorokin does not propose a principle of sociocultural change to explain the final cryptic words of the *Crisis of Our Age*:

> Let us hope that the grace of understanding may be vouchsafed us and that we may choose, before it is too late, the right road -- the road that leads us not to death but to the further realization of man's unique creative mission on this planet! *Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini*. 7

If sociocultural systems exist as such it is because certain conditions in other levels of phenomena permit them to exist. These other levels include individual human beings (psyche and soma), as well as the properties of the physico-chemical universe and the nature of meaning systems. Put another way, change in socicultural systems must occur because certain and theoretically specifiable properties of each of these aspects of sociocultural phenomena act as boundary conditions with dynamic properties which may contribute to that change.

Consider an example of this point. When salt is formed it does not exhaust all of the possible qualities or properties of either chlorine or sodium. Either the gas or the metal may behave in numerous ways, given other conditions. But the theoretically specifiable properties of chlorine and sodium (the bonding properties in particular) may be stated as boundary conditions for ordinary table salt.

Similarly, all properties of human beings (and of the psyche) do not bear directly on sociocultural systems any more than do all properties of the physical universe or all possible meanings. Thus, much of what happens in dream spaces seems not to bear directly on the universe of social phenomena; 2000 meter radio waves do not have much effect on sociocultural systems one way or the other; all potential meanings (given, as was noted, that there are other than human minds in the universe *or* that there is some "realm of pure meanings," *a la* Sorokin) may not converge in any set of sociocultural systems extant in a given historical or cultural present. This is so, following Sorokin, if one supposes the existence of different and at least partially exclusive sets of premises about the world. It also follows in a more particular way from the concept of valuative action which excludes sets of potential alternatives *as a concommitant of action*.

The specifiable properties of the physical universe which do bear on sociocultural systems are those which relate to the organism, and particularly, it seems, to the central nervous system. As Sorokin puts it, there must be vehicles, including the body itself, which permit symbolic and social phenomena. But again not all physical properties are boundary conditions of the social universe. The atomic weight of gold existed, in some sense, before there was a concept of atomic weight. But neither before such a concept

nor after it did the atomic composition of gold have much to do with the monetary significance of that metal in the social world.

The boundary conditions of all conceivable meaning systems are, simply, only those meanings which have relevance for social systems. These apparently vary in the ways Sorokin has shown us.

And the human component sets boundaries for sociocultural entities where the mind may contain and actualize meanings which may enter into a social context. That this same human component exists, in a sense, both in and out of the universe of sociocultural systems is given by the apparent existence of what Rokeach calls "primitive beliefs," or of ideas and meanings which are not shared.[8]

In any case, it is only as ideas, beliefs, references -- whatever one wishes to call them -- are actualized in social behavior that they enter the realm of sociocultural phenomena. And, more particularly, it is only in valuation and its limits, given hypothetically by the principle of exclusion, that human action constitutes a vital boundary condition of sociocultural systems.

What we have then, in sociocultural phenomena, is something like the situation represented by the graphic metaphor of Figure 7. The intersects of the three circles, taking the figure as a Venn diagram, give rise to a particular design or structure. Certain properties of the cir-



FIGURE 7. A GRAPHIC METAPHOR REPRESENTING ANY STRUCTURE *D*, CONSTITUTED BY CONDITIONS GIVEN BY THREE SETS, *A*, *B*, AND *C*

cles, A, B, and C, given by their relationship in two-dimensional space, form boundary conditions which permit the intersect design D. The <u>area</u> in the circles outside of the intersect has no direct bearing on the area of the intersect design, although the nature or <u>form</u> of each figure, A, B, and C, most certainly does.[9]

The concept of complementarity in sociocultural systems is also illustrated by Figure 7. Imagine that each circle (which may be thought of as representing the three components of sociocultural systems) has the freedom to oscillate, such that the center of any circle may move now closer, now further from the point <u>d</u>. In any such oscillation the area of the intersect (area D) is altered. In other words, changes in any of the three aspects of a structure D constituted by properties of other types of phenomena, A, B, and C, is affected by changes in any of the three conditions.

If this is tediously obvious, it is nonetheless relevant as an argument by analogy. To confine the formal principle of change to "a" (immanent change, say) and "B" (physical conditions as these set causal limits on immanent change) without specifying a principle with regard to "C" amounts to an incomplete approach to social change. Of course that third principle "C" is the principle of exclusion as a <u>valuative</u> limit on idea systems.

In summary, if a system of ideas or a cultural system

has a set of implications or potentials which amounts to a greater number of elements than those actualized in human thought and behavior, then a selection factor enters in as a variable not accounted for in Sorokin's principle of immanent change. Actual social change involves a selected subset of potentials, given any set which constitutes a potential type of cultural system. Again, this must be so if the set of meaning systems actualized in behavior is a subset of the potential set of all meaning systems.

Further, the relationship of causal limits to cultural systems must be seen differently. If there is a hypothetical cultural system -- call this "X" -- its actualization in concrete action (through a valuative limiting of possibilities) is a necessary subset "x". In Sorokin's system, however, the principle that there are limits on the immanent change of sociocultural systems refers only to the set "X". This means two things: (1) Sorokin does not envision that the subset "x" exists as a limit imposed on possible cultural systems ("X"). That is, he does not deal with an initial limiting of meaning systems by human valuation. (2) Since this is the case, the limits on any sociocultural system include not only limits given for any cultural system that has been actualized, but also those limits on the originating or initiating conditions of any such system. As we have seen, these latter limits are given in part by the bilateral specialization of the central nervous system, and in

part by the various exclusive tendencies among components (references or CS) in the individual's image of the world.

In Table 6, therefore, we may revise the tentative tabular summary given in Chapter 5.

Projections

If Sorokin's data is accurately compiled and correctly interpreted in terms of his analytical categories, the alternation among the three main supersystems has not, in fact, been a trendless fluctuation. It has, instead, been a consistent succession in the West in which the Idealistic phase of synthesis has followed Ideational and not Sensate civilizational conditions. Further, there appears to be no evidence in Sorokin's data of a Sensate condition occuring after any but an Idealistic one, or of an Ideational supersystem occuring after any but a Sensate one, at least from about 500 B.C.[10]

Now by Sorokin's principle of limits the alternation of the main sociocultural types or supersystems must be a trendless one. Sorokin cannot offer an account, either by the principle of limits or by the principle of immanent change, for the consistency that has occured. Although one may suspect that the order -- Ideational-Idealistic-Sensate -- is implied in Sorokin's findings, the principle of change he proposes can make no sense of it. Therefore Sorokin is forced, as it were, to leave the matter hanging.[11]

But if, in fact, the observed sequence has occurred,

TABLE 6

A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES BY WHICH CHANGE OCCURS IN SOCIOCULTURAL SYSTEMS

Level of the Superorganic	Change Principle
Cultural Systems (Systems of meaning)	The principle of the immanent change of systems of meaning
Society (Concrete action)	Causal limits on the potential of idea or meaning systems for being actualized *and* on choices made in human action
Personality (Psyche-Soma)	The general principle of exclusion among references for action (particularly exclusion among relational and objective references for key orienting CS in the individual's image)

an account of it may be offered when one adds the principle of exclusion to the change principles given by Sorokin. For if the role of valuative action in sociocultural systems has been correctly construed, there is an ongoing tendency for people to reference either relational or objective CS (personal references to cultural systems) while framing action with reference to the self. And, if this is so, then an impetus or push in sociocultural systems is already present. Action itself may tend to endorse Ideational or Sensate premises as either variety appears to lose personal validity[12] in the exigencies of praxis. Sensate supersystems would tend to give way to Ideational ones and vice versa. This is all very well, one may say, but what of the Idealistic synthesis? Why should it not occur between stages in either direction?

The answer to that, I think, may lie in the nature of what Sorokin calls Idealistic supersystems. In Chapter 3, in the discussion of art as a major cultural system, it was noted that the gap between Mixed as opposed to Idealistic art is very great.[13] It may be observed now that while Idealistic art retains a lively and vital acceptance of what I call relational understandings, the Mixed expressions of art (cubism, abstractionism, etc.) do not. That fact, substantiated well enough by Sorokin himself,[14] is the substance of the difference between the intermediate supersystems. It amounts, in fact, to a difference between

art which may express some relational order in the world, as against art which seems quite incapable of such a feat. For though we may not be at all sure that Chagall, for example, is not in some sense a mystic, we can be assured that if he expresses some truth of the relational mode of knowing, it cannot be shared among many people; it is not widely intelligible in relational terms. Chagall, after all, could not have utilized _conventions_ of relational understanding because these are repressed in a world dominated by objective or Sensate premises.

But the gap between the intermediate forms, between the Idealistic and the Mixed varieties of supersystems, is by no means confined to the arts. The idea, particularly, that the Idealistic is permeated by relational or Ideational understandings is made clear by Sorokin himself. One can assume nothing else when scions of Sorokin's vision of the Idealistic synthesis are none other than Thomas Aquinas, Plato, and Confucius.[15]

But beyond the balanced age of the _Summa Theologica_ and the flying buttress, it seems that relational (if not strictly Ideational) premises lingered for some time in the West. Carl Becker, in a classic discussion of the _philosophes_ and the climate of opinion in which they lived, maintains just such a thesis. Beneath the cloak of cynicism and critical thought which is associated with the fall of the _ancien regime_, Becker tells us, there was a mentality

which took God for granted in the harmony of nature. Beneath the satiric wit even of Voltaire's Candide[16] was a certain faith in the order of things. Even Hume, that prince of skepticism, could assert that "To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step toward being a sound, believing Christian."[17]

Thus, long after Aquinas had asserted his version of natural law, human actions could still reference the "laws of nature and of nature's God" with a faith which was, by current standards, altogether naive. A critical line of some sort had not yet been crossed, even as capitalism took its shape in the new factories of Leeds and Manchester. Even that late, rumors of the sacred did not yet ring as sounding brass.[18]

By asserting that the Idealistic phase is, in fact, still permeated by Ideational premises, we have said nothing that Sorokin has not already said. By suggesting that the relational properties of dominant world-premises may yet linger in times well beyond any time of Idealistic synthesis, I am suggesting an idea that is critical of Sorokin's interpretations. But the idea that the impact of things sacred has been socially relevant in some respect right up to the dawn of this current historical period is not, I suspect, an historically indefensible thesis -- even though I may not take the time and space to defend it here.[19]

What is being suggested is that there may, indeed, be a rather critical line between two and only two basic genera of world premises, and these two are based on the relational and objective modes of knowing. Thus, ideally, one may find _n_ forms of cultural integration which emphasize the relational and, by the principle of exclusion, _n_ (apparently) opposed forms which emphasize the objective modality. From Sorokin one may reasonably expect that the two major forms of relational world premises are those he calls the Ideational and the Idealistic. Two objective forms are the Sensate and the non-Idealistic mixed forms.

Considering the various main types of supersystems discussed by Sorokin in Volume One of _Dynamics_, one might suggest further that the relational supersystems might include the Ascetic Ideational, the Active Ideational and the Idealistic, _perhaps_ in that order.[20] The objective supersystems may include the Active Sensate, followed _perhaps_ by Passive or Cynical Sensate forms.

Now certainly these projections are formal logical ones given by the postulates of the duality of mind and of the principle of exclusion. As such they are no more than suggestions, mere academic pointers. Even so, the ideas suggestive of two basic genera of supersystems are not, I think, spurious ones. Further, even the suggestion that there may be an order or sequence of types within each --

relational and objective -- type may be derived from Sorokin's discussions at various points.[21] More interestingly, such an order may be seen to follow from the principle of exclusion. Thus, if in a hypothetical case there existed a pure Ideational condition, a society of saints say, one could assume, first of all, that its future would be precarious. As Sorokin wrote, the difference between ideal and actual behavior, the penalties of exigency, misfortune and miscalculation must, in time, erode the brightest of relational visions.[22] (This assumes, to be sure, that no continuing source of relational renewal would continue to turn out new saints like new pennies in every generation. And, in principle, I suppose, such a situation is conceivable.) If such an "entropy of charisma," to put a twist on the Weberian term, is taken as a principle in human societies, then in time new adjusted relational orders, each drawing further from the pure and "eternalistic vision," would rise to dominance. (Again, barring outside influences, such as invasion.) Finally though, if the principle of exclusion has its place in the realm of sociocultural phenomena, relational premises will be rejected; objective references for action will be adopted in their place as institutional or official understandings.

Of course one could suggest that in this ideal, hypothetical example (involving a well-integrated society, needless to say) the decaying relational might give rise to

internal reform. Perhaps. But, in the West there has been reform and rev lution, Reformation and Counter Reformation. But has all this reform, in the main, refurbished the original charismatic charms of Pauline Christianity? Apparently not. Similarly, in my model ideal society, I suspect that the order of saints will have provided the basic set of world premises. One model for a sacred relational order. The alternatives to such a set of premises would not, normally, be another set of sacred premises (again barring an incursion from without -- some "holy war" for example). More likely, I feel, is the rejection of relational premises altogether. Western Christianity, once established as constituting, or at least underpining the world view did not, thereby, encourage the possibilities of Buddhism or Confucianism, say, as alternatives. A child reacts against the premises inculcated in him by <u>his</u> family, not someone else's.

But to proceed, if a purely objective supersystem can be imagined (and this has more difficulties than might be imagined in our Orwellian age[23]) it too must erode. But the reason this time is that values and meanings are not amenable to purely objective manipulations. To paraphrase a comment by Aristotle, both out first and our last premises about the world and how we are to act in it are intuitive not reasonable. [24] <u>The objective mode is not the ground of fundamental assumptions</u>. Just as explicit knowing is rooted

in tacit understandings -- those we cannot verbalize -- our ethical assumptions, for example, are, at their base, doctrines given us from the relational, intuitive mode of encountering the world. Therefore, as Sorokin has said, the purely Sensate condition must be marked by ethical uncertainty and moral relativism. If such moral relativism is carried too far, if nihilism or doctrines of existential despair are postulated as the foundation of cooperation and of ethical consensus, the health of a social order becomes problematic.

The alternative to a purely objective order might be some balance of the polar Sensate and Ideational world-views, but, by the principle of exclusion, that is unlikely. More probable in the ideal or hypothetical case is the rise of a new Ideational form, quite possible through a stage of world-renunciation. In effect, the line between the relational and the objective supersystems may not mark revolutionary violence, but it certainly marks radical transformations in world-view.

If the descent (or ascent if one prefers) from an ascetic Ideational world-view to the Sensate is by way of progressive Idealistic steps, the change from the Sensate to the Ideational world-view may appear more suddenly, perhaps precipitously. I believe such a supposition is reasonable, given the concept of a principle of exclusion.

In some ideal, purely Sensate or objective social con-

dition, the world is real to the extent that is has sensory concreteness. Quantity is emphasized over quality, substance or content over form; individuality, particularity, atomicity supplant universals of all sorts. But we cannot get rid of the complement to the objective mode of knowing any more than we can get rid of the right hemisphere of the cerebrum. Further, as Sorokin has shown us, no absolutely pure Sensate order is likely to exist. Always there are the unassimilated cultural bits and pieces of other, Ideational periods.

Still, where the relational, intuitive comprehension of the world is not socially validated, the products of such understandings may remain tacit. Where they _are_ inserted into the social milieu -- given as a justification for behavior, say -- they may well be rejected simply because there are no viable, acceptable social conventions for the intelligible expression of relational understandings. And, in case the reader has not noticed, it is this last situation which seems to characterize our current historical period in the West. It is the condition Sorokin referred to as the "dying Sensate."

If this characterization is correct, if a Durkheimian anomie may be seen, in part, as an absence of socially intelligible conventions for translating our relational understandings of the world, it may also be true that such a condition is, indeed, a time of "dying." For surely, a

social order wherein people must grope blindly, separately for the substance of ethics, of value, is not a social order that can long support its institutions.

The reason for such a statement has been given, but it bears reiteration: the objective mode, the way of knowing the world upon which a Sensate supersystem is built, cannot be the foundation of fundamental assumptions about the world. Fundamental assumptions about who I am, why I should live, why I should treat you as my brother or as my enemy are finally not objective or quantitative assumptions. That which characterizes my experience is its quality for me. Ideas of the good, of justice, of love are labels for these qualitites which I may only share with you if we may propose and maintain among ourselves some relational, qualitative understandings of the nature of these things. With all due respects to John Stuart Mill, there is no calculus of ethics, no science of basic premises.

If people who inhabit the stark landscapes of Sensate times are to survive the paroxysms of existential despair, of their dying gods, they must turn to the building of new foundations for meaningful, experientially fruitful life activities. One cannot doubt that any such turning is not intentional or consciously designed maneuvering. No Ideational order rose from a committee devoted to social engineering. Never, I suspect, could this be the case. But though the collective groping in human action may be with-

out explicit design, the predispositions of the psyche guarantees that its general direction among people in similar social environments will be the same. When the ground of value fails, the source of renewal is the relational, the intuitive mode of knowing. The dying Sensate gives birth to the Ideational, I suspect, as inevitably and perhaps as paradoxically as the ashes of despair give rise to the indomitable phoenix.

Currently, the West is in a sort of terminal Sensate phase, if Sorokin was correct -- and I believe he was. Even so, it is not yet possible, apparently, to see some new Ideational horizon. One could talk of the current robust health of fundamentalist Christian churches or the widespread advent of interest in Eastern religious thought or popular mysticism. But which of these cultural trends or elements is new and which old in Ideational terms? All that may be said now, it seems, is that the power of a Sensate world-view and of Sensate premises may be waning. Yet it is still very much an officially Sensate world. There may be those among us who are convinced of human immortality say, or the immutable validity of certain ethical principles. But except in special or limited social environments, when for example the person who harbors such beliefs is insulated socially from the cultural main stream, it is difficult for him to translate them into terms which are relevant for the "reality of everyday life."[25]

Tales of mystery and power may still surround some old temple to Apollo, but the tales are now fables or fairy tales. The visions of a saint are thought of as hallucinations, as subjects for psychoanalytic speculation. The sacred, however that may be experienced, can only be defined by profane categories.

It will be recalled that these comments are meant as speculation, as brain storming. Since the principle of exclusion is, itself, tentative and hypothetical, not too much should be built on it. As a theoretical tool, one might say, the principle of exclusion is forged but not tempered or even fully shaped. It may not safely be used for the work of implication.

Even so, it is a useful and legitimate exercise to have considered how the concept _may_ be used. For its uses, finally, will determine its value. Thus, if the projections offered here turn out to be even partly valid, much will have been accomplished. Not only will much that Sorokin has done been validated, but new possibilities for understanding, even for prediction will have been added. If it can be established, for example, that the Sensate (objective) supersystem may tend to end in the rejection of its premises, some new relational order may be seen as fairly probable. The current Sensate phase will evolve into an Ideational, not an Idealistic form.

Conclusions

An essay of this sort, like a tree, has a number of branches and not a little bit of foliage. Any effort to re-think basic postulates about the nature of social phenomena brings implications and questions in profusion. So even as I have tried to follow an orderly plan for this intellectual work, I am sure some ideas I would wish to be quite clear are concealed by foliage. Certainly too, I have failed to touch all the intellectual bases that might bear on the themes of this essay.

Having made my disclaimer though, I may go on to assert what main conclusions may be drawn from this work. These are, _first_, that there is good reason to count human beings as the agents of social phenomena, not simply as effects of them. _Secondly_, there are ways to balance the extreme positions which end either as psychological or sociological determinisms.

The notion of the contingency of social structures is aimed at the first of these ideas. In fact, both the idea that sociocultural systems or structures are contingent with respect to human beings, and the concept of the complementarity of sociocultural systems bear on that notion. Both emerged from the analysis of Sorokin's theory of change.

It seemed to me that while Sorokin was right about most of his understandings of change, the change principles

themselves were missing something. The clue to what was missing emerged, for me, in Sorokin's apparent cultural determinism. While on the one hand Sorokin does not seem to be any sort of determinist, on the other an analysis of his theory of change implies that there is a sort of primacy of idea systems. There is no point in going over the same ground again, but the fact remains that Sorokin's principle of immanent change, as given, does not make sense of why one set of world-premises (supersystem) should be chosen over another. To assert simply that one supersystem wears out by being only a partial representation of some more comprehensive reality does not actually answer the question.[26] One cannot see how a supersystem would wear out except in the selective processes of action. And, as I have suggested, the concept of a "trendless fluctuation" of supersystems implies the irrelevance of human valuation or selection in the flow of action.

There is another clue to Sorokin's sociologistic one-sidedness that I did not take up in this essay. Namely, many of the cultural categories he discusses (and meaning itself, for that matter) amount to exteriorized psychic categories. This seems to me particularly true, for example, of Sorokin's ideas about freedom. Without getting into a consideration of these ideas -- such as the notion that there are Ideational and Sensate ideals of freedom, for example -- the fact is that freedom is a peculiarly psychic

category. Certainly ideas and premises about what freedom should consist of are given in a cultural context. Even so, Sorokin must define freedom as being able to do what one *wishes*, to avoid doing what one does not *wish* to do, and not having to tolerate what one does not *wish* to tolerate.[27] In such a definition something like a choice factor seems evident. Freedom, after all, is an existential or experiential category if it is anything at all. And, as we learn from Sartre and others, freedom may be experienced as the negation of culturally imposed validities of any sort -- Sensate or Ideational. Of course I recognize that this last assertion can be argued at length. That is why I did not allow it in the body of the essay. Even so, I believe such arguments can be made.

But there is still another point. When Sorokin insists on meaning as the significant characteristic of social or superorganic phenomena, one can only applaud the insight. But that insight is, after all, not an objective or deductive one. It is, in fact, a phenomenological observation; one that is grounded in experiences which presumably are common to all men. As such it is strange that meaning, which is a phenomenological category, should be made, somehow, an "objective" aspect of what Sorokin calls empirical sociocultural phenomena. Yet, that Sorokin does this is evidenced by the difficulty he has in drawing a clear line between things psychological and things social. His view of person-

ality, as we saw, is that it is a reflection of cultural systems which are, as it were, outside the person.

Even while Sorokin appears in many places to endorse a nearly prophetic brand of humanism,[29] his sociology ends by portioning out psychological factors to those whose actual science is biology. From Sorokin's view, it appears, Pavlov's understandingssketch an appropriate boundary to the enterprise of sociology, which would appear to leave the work of someone like Jung in the category of poacher in fields better left to sociology.[30]

It was for these sorts of reasons that I had to make a clear distinction between psychological sorts of concerns (or social psychological ones, at least) and sociocultural ones. That was why, in effect, I had to distinguish between <u>cultural</u> systems of meaning and components of the image in an individual. It will be recalled that the dynamics of the latter were considered as boundary conditions for the nature of the former. In short, there seems to be no value in assuming that the dynamics of the individual image are simply those of the society or vice versa, unless of course we wish to eliminate the Durkheimian "staring line," i.e., that social facts are things.[31]

Finally, regarding the second main conclusion which I think may be drawn from this essay, what has been said here may suggest alternatives in the old debate about the relationship of society and individual. Thus, if particular and

theoretically specifiable properties of the psyche are taken as boundary conditions for sociocultural change, a certain demarcation line has been discovered. The proper sphere of psychological and sociological concerns might be identifiable both as they are distinct and as they overlap.

Further, the debate over whether consciousness emerges from action or action from consciousness in socialized human beings may be seen in new ways. Of course one may begin, as Berger and Luckmann have, by exploring the dialectic of action and of its "objectifications."[32] And, having so begun, any oversimplification of a Marxian or Weberian solution may be ruled out immediately. Instead, it may be assumed that certain conditions of the human psyche are dependent on the sociocultural environment and, certainly (beyond Mead and Cooley) on the praxis, including the means and relations of production.

On the other hand, the action of human beings, if it is taken to be selective or valuative, must impose its own limits both on the genesis of new sociocultural systems and on their negation. The analytical problem, then, becomes the discovery of the degress of freedom not only for sociocultural systems as they exist, but also for their potential alternatives, given the nature of the human actor.

Thus, the principle of exclusion as it is proposed here is not designed as a new psychological reductionism. I do think it is important to recognize the contingency of

social phenomena on people, but that is not the same as negating the validity of social phenomena as entities in their own right.

Quite frankly, if such a concept as contingency is not recognized, I cannot imagine what purpose the study of human societies can serve. If societies are not understood as products, rather than as exhaustive conditions for action, sociology is aimless introspection, a rattling of the great deterministic cage.

So our objectifications, our social artifacts and meanings take on a life of their own. But like the promethean gift of fire, society is wrenched from the potential of nature, from the possibilities of opposed thumbs and large brains. Like fire, society may serve for human good or ill even as it shapes man by its transforming properties. But the gods that turn in anger against whatever is Promethean in man threaten us from the clouded boundaries of the social reality, even more than from the shape that reality may take at a given historical point. For the source both of social worlds and of jealous gods that may destroy them is found in the nature of what man may become.

NOTES

[1]See Chapter 5 of this essay.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 585.

[4]Ibid.

[5]See, for example, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), chapter 4. The quotes are from Sorokin, Society, pp. 585-587.

[6]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1937), III, chapter 6, contains a discussion of the fluctuation of the types of liberty.

[7]Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1941), p. 326.

[8]Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970).

[9]In terms of set logic, only elements in the intersect of A with B and A with C and B with C are also elements of a set D.

[10]See Chapter 3 of this essay.

[11]See particularly, Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, the concluding discussion.

[12]By "personal validity" I mean to imply significance or relevance in the experience of the person.

[13]See Chapter 4 of this essay.

[14]Sorokin, Dynamics, I.

[15]Ibid., p. 149 ff.

[16]My copy of Candide, translated by John Butt, includes an introduction which comes to this sort of conclusion. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1947). See also Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1932).

[17]Carl Becker, The Heavenly City, p. 68.

[18]See Robert K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). Also see Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press, 1953). Both authors discuss the tacit assumptions about the world that I would call relational. In Merton, see particularly p. 85 where he writes, "Puritanism itself had imputed a threefold utility to science. Natural philosophy was instrumental first, in establishing practical proofs of the scientist's state of grace; second in enlarging control of nature and third, in glorifying God." In the same vein, Whitehead notes of Hume that he based his apparently devastating treatise on religion (On the Natural History of Religion) on a faith in the inherent order of nature (p. 57).

[19]This is, of course, a problem in the sociology of religion. My position implies that both Parsons and Luckmann may be incorrect in assuming the "tacit" or individualized relevancy of relational premises continues, in some way, even as the institutional validity of the church, for example, is much undermined. See Talcott Parsons, "Christianity and Modern Industrial Society," in Edward A. Tiryakian, ed., Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 33-70. See too, Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967.

[20]Sorokin discusses the types and sub-types of supersystems and cultural mentalities in the first part of his Dynamics, I, but the relevance of these sub-types to his over-all systems and theory of change is not much developed by him.

[21]See particularly the discussion of uniformity and periodicity in social change in Sorokin, Dynamics, IV, chapters, 8, 9, and 10.

[22]See Sorokin, Dynamics, III, chapter 15 for Sorokin on the relationships between behavior or conduct and premises or ideals.

[23]I agree with Luckmann to the extent that any worldview is a sort of personal religion in the sense that its root premises must be, to some extent, tacit and relational. See Luckmann, The Invisible Religion. Precisely because that is so, if major action premises are objective they must tend to go against the grain of tacit knowledge. Put another way, experience is both objective and relational. Over-

emphasis of either leads to some sort of mystification of experience. On the one hand, if the official world-view is objective, the foundation of fundamental values will be lacking. In the opposite case it is the validity of any but relational understandings which is the block to potential action. The undermining of values, I suspect, is more lethal to social order in most cases than the undermining of practical knowledge, although neither extreme condition would seem to be ideal.

[24]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1033.

[25]The term is from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966).

[26]Sorokin, Dynamics, IV.

[27]Sorokin, Dynamics, III, 162.

[28]My sense of Sartre on freedom comes mostly from his fiction. See, particularly, Jean Paul Sartre, The Age of Reason (New York: Bantam Books, 1947); The Reprieve (New York: Bantam Books, 1947); Troubled Sleep (New York: Bantam Books, 1950.)

[29]Particularly in his later works, beginning perhaps, with Sorokin's emphasis on the nature of altruism and its social implications. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Social Construction of Humanity (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948), for an example of this kind of emphasis in Sorokin.

[30]See Sorokin, Society, p. 356 n. Here, Sorokin lumps Jung with Ernst Kretschmer, Sheldon and Hooten as thinkers who have developed classifications of biophysical types. To imagine that Jung's introvert-extrovert conception is more than roughly identifiable with organic traits seems unfair to what Jung actually says, I think. Although Jung does identify a basic, polar potentiality of organisms to adapt in either an "introverted" or an "extraverted" manner, he does not account for these adaptive approaches in biophysical but in psychic terms. See Carl G. Jung, Psychological Types (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949), particularly chapter 10.

[31]Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, trans. by Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

[32] Another term from Berger and Luckmann, _The Social Construction of Reality_, although it could also be identified with Simmel, among others.

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APPENDIX

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DUALITY OF MIND

In a very general sense it may be said that there are three elemental psychological models. These are: (1) the stimulus-response approaches of Pavlov, Watson, Hull and others;[1] (2) the operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner and his advocates;[2] (3) the broad spectrum of relational approaches which presume that man may construct, or at least modify, his life situations in a selective sense. Sorokin refers to the first two kinds of approaches as externalistic and to the third as implying immanent properties of the psyche.[3] I am going to call the third group the intentional psychologies to emphasize the idea of choosing or selecting.[4]

Now in actuality major psychological theories like that of Freud probably contain elements of all three models. Thus, the simplest S-R account of behavior is that, given an organism, behavior is evoked by stimuli. Yet in the Freudian system such simple or classic conditioning might be said to account, in part, for the rise of the secondary process.[5] The simplest operant model of behavior presumes an organism which is emitting behaviors. Such generalized organic

activity may then be conditioned by rewards or punishments in the environment which reinforce particular ways of behaving. In the Freudian system, the conditioning of cathexes occurs by the displacement (for example) of innate drives, like that of oral gratification, to object cathexes which may be utilized by the ego, or secondary process. Finally, elements of intentional processes are not separable from concepts of motivation, whether conscious or unconscious. This is so even though Freud emphasized deterministic principles in his psychoanalytic theory.[6]

Lately, it seems the first two models, which one may link to the Sensate world-view, have gained ascendancy. It is an age of behavior mod and of reinforcement schedules. On the other hand, it is also an age of Gestalt and existentialist psychologies like those of Perls, Berne, Harris, Laing, Cooper and Szasz.[7] As in the more sociological sciences, there is a reaction against the mechanistic assumptions, the simplistic cause and effect determinism of much behaviorist thought. And, as it turns out, one rather widespread idea in the current literature that bespeaks an alternate view of man is that the human psyche is "polarized."

This psychology of reaction was not the first to stumble on such an insight. Pavlov, the father of classical conditioning and one of Sorokin's mentors, distinguished two modes of thought, speaking of first and second "signalling."[8] It is suggested by Bogan that Pavlov's ideas may

have been derived from his knowledge of the work of Sechenov who had written that, " . . . the cerebrum has two basic forms of integrative activity; organization into simultaneous and primarily spatial groups and into temporally organized successive series."[9]

Freud's distinction between the primary and the secondary process may be seen as reflecting the dichotomy of mental functioning -- although with some difficulties.[10] Jung's distinction however, between causal and acausal knowing is not so ambiguous. What Jung offers, in fact, is the essentials of a metapsychology which, I believe, is worthy of more attention than it has received. Although Jung's earlier writings seem to leave one to cope with an uncertain split between nature and spirit, between the subjective and the objective realities that are unreconciled in Western thought, a new approach emerges in his collaboration with Wolfgang Pauli.[11] In an effort to establish a general principle of synchronicity as " . . . a hypothetical factor equal in rank to causality as a principle of explanation," the tension between subject and object is found to exist both in the world and in the psyche.[12] Causal and acausal modes are both complementary aspects of the psyche <u>and</u> properties of events in the world. Put another way,

> Synchronistic events rest on the simultaneous occurence of two different psychological states. One of them is the normal, probable state (i.e., the one that is causally explicable), and the other . . . is the one that cannot causally be derived from the

> first . . . and whose objective existence can only be verified afterwards. 13

And, in a schema which is meant to satisfy " . . . the postulates of modern physics, and on the other hand those of psychology,"[14] these "states" (causal and acausal) must be congruent with the properties of energy (potential, transforming or expressed objectivity), and the space-time continuum (as the matrix relating all such expressions).

The Jung-Pauli schema is, to be sure, laden with difficulties. Jung, for example, relies on Rhine's experiments suggestive of extra-sensory perception as a foundation for his principle of synchronicity. He writes that "Rhine's experiments show that in relation to the psyche, space and time are, so to speak, 'elastic' and can apparently be reduced almost to the vanishing point, as though they were dependent on psychological conditions and did not exist in themselves. . ."[15]

Now deliberations over the relative weight of evidence for and against the existence of psi effects are beyond the scope of this inquiry, but it is evident nonetheless that the Jung-Pauli scheme is an effort to place the duality of mind into a general philosophical or epistemological framework. I believe this effort deserves further attention. But I am also aware that it flies in the face of current conventions about the nature of reality.

Beyond Jung, the new psychology approaches the pos-

tulate of two minds in men by attempting to account, first, for the nature of the nervous system and secondly, for the diversity of human experiences in subjective space. This latter concern seems to have paralleled the advent of psychedelic agents and Eastern religious thought into modern Western experience.[16] I will sketch out some of these findings here mainly to indicate:(1) that there is a psychological foundation which supports some of Sorokin's ideas. In particular, the Sensate-Ideational polarity may be echoed in the nervous system. (2) That the current psychological approaches have relevance for sociological questions about man's capacity for variably constructing the world should also become evident.

The Split Brain. Robert Ornstein, an important figure in the new psychology, has written a very fine summary account of research into lateral specialization in the central nervous system.[17] I highly recommend this discussion, along with other of Ornstein's writings, for those who are not psychological specialists. Ornstein shows how current research in psychology may effect the other human sciences.

Here, I can only attempt to review some of the key ideas about lateral differentiation in the brain, skimming findings in a cursory way.

In general, findings of psychological and physiological researchers have led to the conclusion that the two hemispheres of the cerebral cortex are specialized. Recalling

that the major nerve paths cross over in the brain stem, the left cerebral hemisphere -- associated with the right hand -- has been found to be associated with analytical or linear processes of thought, including verbal and mathematical operations. The right hemisphere, on the other hand, seems to be committed to "holistic mentation."[18] Thus, artistic activities, athletics, dance, and apparently intuition, are associated with the right hemisphere. In other terms, the left hemisphere focus is on temporal sequences, the right on (atemporal) synthesis.[19]

Among researchers who have demonstrated this lateral specialization is Roger Sperry of the California Institute of Technology. Sperry, in experiments with animals, found that the two halves of the cerebrum functioned independently when the corpus callosum (which connects them) had been severed.[20] Later, Bogen and Vogel, attempting a cure for uncontrollable epilepsy, utilized Sperry's findings with human patients. By severing the corpus callosum, and hence disconnecting the two sides of the cerebrum, seizures were indeed eliminated, and without damage to the intelligence or personality of the subjects.[21] But these ten or so "split-brain" subjects did reveal the independent functioning discovered by Sperry in Monkeys. For example:

> In one particularly interesting test the word "heart" was flashed across the center of the visual field, with the "he" portion to the left of the center and "art" to the right. Asked to tell what the word was, the patients would say that they had seen

> "art" -- the portion projected to the left brain hemisphere (which is responsible for speech). Curiously when, after "heart" had been flashed in the same way, the patients were asked to point with the left hand to one of two cards -- "art" or "he" -- . . . they invariably pointed to "he." The experiment showed clearly that both hemispheres had simultaneously observed the portions of the word available to them and that in this particular case the right hemisphere, when it has had the opportunity to express itself, had prevailed over the left. 22

But the "two brains" effect can be seen without surgical interference. Research by Ornstein and Galin showed, for example, that in electroencephalograph studies on humans, alpha rhythm predominance, indicating a sort of "off-line" or non-processing condition of the neural tissues, increased relative to the complementary hemisphere when, say, the right cerebral hemisphere was occupied with tasks particular to that side of the cerebrum.[23]

In any case, there is empirical evidence to support the idea that, in Polanyi's terms, functional specialization potentials of the central nervous system are boundary conditions of the two modes of human interaction with the environment.

Accounting for Alternative Reality Spaces. Among those concerned with the nature of consciousness, three persons may serve to represent what is , in effect, a pioneering effort in psychology. These are John Lilly, a physician specializing in biophysics, neurophysiology and electronics, Andrew Weil, another medical researcher who is concerned

with pharmacology and consciousness, and Robert Ornstein -- already mentioned -- who is a psychologist and researcher. All of these scientists, in their own ways, are attempting to broaden our understandings of the nature of consciousness.

John Lilly's thought and research into the realm of consciousness and its various chambers is somewhat difficult to synthesize for an essay aimed at sociological inquiry. His uses of language and his logic, though rigorous, deal with concepts that are uncomfortable for the linear[24] Western mind. With persistence though, studying his rather personal Center of the Cyclone,[25] and his monograph (prepared under a National Science Foundation Grant) Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer, general insights can be derived.

In particular, one comes to see that Lilly conceives of mind as constituted by programs on the one hand, and a self-programming capacity on the other. Programs as objectifications of various kinds dictating behavioral responses and mental productions are, in fact, the objective mode. The programming capacity -- referred to be Lilly as Essence -- may be thought of as including a relational center apparently equivalent to ". . . classical Satori-Samadhi."[26]

In Lilly we find an acoount of various psychic spaces, but we also get some indications about how these spaces may

be related to physiological limits on the one hand and to epistemological ones on the other. His considerations of mysticism[27] and meta-programming in particular, challenge our conventional reality models. For, if Lilly is correct, "the province of the mind is the only area of science in which what one believes to be true either is true or becomes true within limits to be determined experimentally."[28] (italics removed)

For Andrew Weil the discovery of the two modes of knowing also comes through an account of personal research and exploration. In his book, The Natural Mind,[29] the physiological effects of psychedelic agents from marijuana to LSD are seen as acting to eliminate normal "blinders." The central nervous system, apparently, operates to admit survival related stimuli and to repress those which are, in this sense, irrelevant. The psychedelic agents, it seems, allow awareness to process such otherwise irrelevant inputs. Put another way, it is possible, sometimes with chemical means and sometimes without them, for awareness of the ordinary waking mode to open up on less familiar spaces.[30]

Weil calls consciousness in its ordinary waking mode "straight" thinking. Briefly, straight consciousness is characterized by (1) " . . . a tendency to know things through the intellect . . ."; (2) "A tendency to be attached to the senses and through them to external reality . . . .";

(3) "A tendency to attend to outward forms rather than . . . inner contents . . . ."; (4) "A tendency to perceive differences rather than similarities between phenomena . . . ."; (5) "A tendency to negative thinking."[31]

This last notion seems to stem from Weil's unabashed conviction " . . . that external phenomena are caused not by things out there . . . but rather by consciousness."[32] One could characterize such a position as a sort of naive idealism, but it should be understood that it is given as an interpretive generalization of findings taken from empirical observation.

Seeing "stoned" thinking as " . . . the mirror image of straight thinking,"[33] Weil characterizes this mode as including: (1)"A reliance on intuition as well as intellection"; (2) "an acceptance of the ambivalent nature of things"; (3) "A positive experience of infinity."[34]

This last characteristic of the "stoned" mode is associated with positive value experiences of man's place in the universe. Valuation up to and including the forms of religious insight is seen as centered in stoned awareness.[35]

Robert Ornstein is perhaps the most balanced and convincing spokesman for the new psychology. Although his concerns, his value biases, clearly encompass a reaction against what one might call "excesses of the causal mode," his research and writing is attentive to a large body of evidence and is altogether lucid. Further, Ornstein acts as

an intellectual master of ceremonies for current research into nervous system physiology and the nature of perception, as well as into literature bearing on the nature of consciousness. In a work entitled The Psychology of Consciousness,[36] Ornstein makes many of the arguments with which we should now be familiar. There are two modes of consciousness. (Like Joseph Bogan,[37] Ornstein indicates the many sources of such an insight in scholarly literature from William James to Levi-Strauss.) Quoting Jerome Bruner, Ornstein summarizes the significance of the interplay of the two modes:

> "Since childhood, I have been enchanted by the fact and the symbolism of the right hand and the left -- the one the doer, the other the dreamer. The right is order and lawfulness, le droit. Its beauties are those of geometry and taut implication. Reaching for knowledge with the right hand is science. Yet to say only that much of science is to overlook one of its great excitements, for the great hypotheses of science are gifts carried in the left." 38

To the extent that Ornstein may be said to be offering an apolegetic for the nature of his inquiry -- and its subject -- it consists in a plea not only for understanding the nature of consciousness as "dynamically polarized," but in recognizing the sort of uncertainty principle this fact produces for the conduct of inquiry, particularly into psychological or social phenomena.

In effect, basic biological research can only indicate boundaries for inquiries into meaning and value. In this

regard Ornstein quotes Robert Oppenheimer:

> "The two ways of thinking, the way of time and history, and the way of eternity and timelessness, are both part of man's effort to comprehend the world in which he lives. Neither is comprehended in the other nor reducible to it . . . each supplements the other -- neither telling the whole story." 39

NOTES

[1]There are any number of references one could cite which introduce the ideas of the pre-Skinnerian behaviorists. Here are three: Clark L. Hull, "Framework for an Objective Theory of Behavior," in Robert L. Wrenn, ed., Basic Contributions to Psychology: Readings (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 131-138, and Ivan P. Pavlov, "Classical Conditioning," in Wrenn, ed., Basic Contributions, pp. 139-144. Also see John B. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1919), pp. 1-23; 392-420.

[2]See for example, Burrhus F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).

[3]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), and Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1941), IV, chapter 12.

[4]The concept of intentionality is undoubtedly worth relating to the concept of selectivity or valuation developed in chapter 6 of this essay. See, for example, Aron Gurvitch, "On the Intrntionality of Consciousness," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., Phenomenology (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), pp. 118-137; Alfred Schuetz, "Phenomenology and the Social Science," also in Kockelmans, ed., Phenomenology, pp. 450-472. Also see Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, trans., by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), and Marvin Farber, The Aims of Phenomenology (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

[5]I am suggesting that the Freudian ego is a product of reality conditioning. As Freud writes, "For the ego, perception plays the part which in the id falls to the instincts." Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1960), p. 15. Put another way, Pavlov's dog would not have salivated over symbolic food (the bell) had not the food been relevant to the dog in the first place.

[6]Lecky cites Lashley to the effect that psychoanalytic theory is, in effect, a theory of "psycho-hydraulics." Prescott Lecky, Self-Consistency: A Theory of Personality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 48.

[7]Laing and Cooper have been mentioned earlier, but see also in this vein, Thomas S. Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1970). For an introduc-

tion to Gestalt as it emerges in transactional analysis, see Eric Berne, Games People Play (New York: Grove Press, 1964), or Thomas A. Harris, I'm O.K. - You're O.K. (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

[8]Joseph E. Bogan, "The Other Side of the Brain: An Appositional Mind," in Robert E. Ornstein, ed., The Nature of Human Consciousness (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1973), pp. 101-125.

[9]Ibid., p. 122.

[10]Sorokin refuses to relegate intuition to the id. Instead he postulates a double unconscious. There is the unconscious biological nature on the one hand and a "higher" superconsciousness on the other. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 342-358; 714-723.

[11]Carl G. Jung and Wolfgang Pauli, The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955).

[12]Ibid., p. 91.

[13]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[14]Ibid., p. 137.

[15]Ibid., p. 28. Jung is referring to the findings given in such works as J. B. Rhine, The Reach of the Mind (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1947).

[16]An excellent work on the current influence of Eastern religions in the United States is Jacob Needleman, The New Religions (New York: Pocket Books, 1972).

[17]Robert E. Ornstein, The Psychology of Consciousness (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1972).

[18]Ibid., p. 60.

[19]Ibid., p. 63. Ornstein notes that the "lateral specilization of the brain seems unique to humans and related to the evolution of language. There is no evidence that the two cerebral hemispheres of other primates are specialized. . . ."

[20]Michael S. Gazzaniga, "The Split Brain in Man," Scientific American, No. 2, Vol 217 (Aug., 1967), pp. 24-29.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid., p. 27.

[23]Ornstein, Psychology of Consciousness, p. 62.

[24]John C. Lilly, Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer (New York: The Julian Press, 1968), particularly p. 100 ff.

[25]John C. Lilly, The Center of the Cyclone (New York: The Julian Press, 1972).

[26]Lilly, Programming and Metaprogramming.

[27]Lilly, Center of the Cyclone, chapter 6.

[28]Lilly, Programming and Metaprogramming, p. 57.

[29]Andrew Weil, The Natural Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

[30]Aldous Huxley presents such a theory in his book The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell (New York: Harper and Row, 1956).

[31]Weil, The Natural Mind, pp. 116-148.

[32]Ibid., p. 202.

[33]Ibid., p. 149.

[34]Ibid., pp. 149-159.

[35]Ibid., pp. 149-187.

[36]Ornstein, Psychology of Consciousness.

[37]Bogan, "The Other Side of the Brain."

[38]Ornstein, The Psychology of Consciousness, p. 70.

[39]Ibid., p. 22.

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PITIRIM SOROKIN

AND THE DUALITY OF MIND

by

Robert G. Turner, Jr.

(ABSTRACT)

The objective of this essay is a creative, critical analysis of Sorokin's theory of social change. In general, by showing the nature of Sorokin's system of sociology, and particularly his theory of change, it is demonstrated that neither of the two principles of change he proposes -- that of immanent change or of limits -- accounts for selection or choice by socialized human beings. It is shown that while the principle of immanent change accounts for the development of sociocultural systems and the principle of limits is informative with respect to exogenous conditions imposed on that development, no satisfactory principle is offered regarding the selection and/or extinction of such systems. In a nutshell: If n sociocultural systems are possible neither the principle of immanent change in a structure nor the principle of limits can account for the elimination of all but one possibility in the set n, at the point where a sociocultural system enters the social reality. Human choosing or valuation must be

introduced, therefore, as a third variable in the change of sociocultural systems.

A widespread theme in sociology is that there are two complementary but opposed dimensions of the human psyche. One emphasizes relationship, universality and intuition while the other is the realm of causality, of practical verbal understandings. This "duality of mind" is reflected, for example, in Toennies' Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction and in Durkheim's division between mechanical and organic solidarity, as well as in Sorokin's Sensate-Ideational dichotomy of main cultural types. In this essay the "duality of mind" is re-examined in light of Sorokin's theory of change.

Evidence is found to support the idea that the human psyche has its Ideational and Sensate modes. These modes, which are called here the relational and the objective, are associated respectively with intuition and aesthetic understandings as opposed to lineal, causal and verbal understandings.

In human choosing or valuation (which occurs both consciously and unconsciously) there is a marked tendency for either relational or objective understandings to predominate as a rationale for action. This phenomenon of exclusion means, among other things, that if one's basic premises about the world are objective, alternative relational understandings are rejected.

The tendency for one's basic assumptions to be either relational or objective represents a _principle of exclusion_ which turns out to be the missing change principle in Sorokin's scheme. In effect, if one's premises, whether relational (Ideational) or objective (Sensate) fail to be socially or psychically adaptive for the social actor _for any reason_, the tendency will be to substitute new (actually latent) premises which exclude the former ones as invalid or untrue.

Thus Sorokin's concept of an Idealistic supersystem which balances the Sensate and the Ideational world-views is thought to be problematic. Further, support is garnered for the idea, implicit in Sorokin, that the current Sensate period in the West will be replaced by an Ideational cultural form.