U.S. in the Unipolar Moment: Analysis of George W. Bush Middle East Foreign Policy

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ABSTRACT

Using a comparative trend analysis for fifteen states in the Middle East during President George W. Bush's eight year administration, this paper provides one method for answering the research question, "What was the priority/focus of U.S. Middle East policy during the W. Bush Administration?" Within the context of international relations theories neorealism, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism, U.S. policy is broken down into three policy priorities: stability, security, and democracy promotion and measured for each state for each year of the administration. Line graphs illustrate the changes from year to year and linear trend lines indicate the direction of change as positive, negative, or neutral. The results are used to validate the three working hypotheses: 1) if the U.S. views stability as paramount, then its foreign policy will be to support the status quo regimes, 2) if the U.S. wants to maintain security, then its foreign policy will be to demonstrate power projection via its military, and 3) if the U.S. aims at democracy promotion, the its foreign policy will be to implement economic aid and assistance programs to reform non-democratic governments and strengthen existing democratic institutions. Eleven states confirmed the stability hypothesis, nine states confirmed the security hypothesis, and twelve states confirmed the democracy promotion hypothesis. There was no discernable pattern between the trends across states indicating that the U.S. consistently pursued one policy priority over the others. There were only two complete cases in which a state had only one positive trending policy priority.

Acknowledgements and Dedication

Completing this thesis and finishing my degree would not have been possible without the support, direction, and patience of my wife, Marissa. She continually stayed on top of my progress and pushed me to continue working even when I was frustrated and stumped. She did this while raising two young children and running the day to day household activities, both when I was at home and deployed with the military. I am eternally grateful to have such a selfless partner who rose to such a challenge. I also want to thank my two young boys, Everett and Foster, who did not understand why they couldn't bother dad on the computer upstairs. I hope I set a good example of how perseverance and hard work do pay off in the end.

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Chapter One: Introduction to the U.S. Unipolar Moment

As the most dominant player in Middle Eastern affairs, the U.S. is consistently criticized over elements of its foreign policy. The fervent world-wide backlash following the 2003 invasion of Iraq has intensified this debate and renewed calls for a dramatic policy shift. The U.S. has been accused of pursuing policies of double standards and hypocrisy as it seeks to both maintain stability and promote democracy in its battle against non-state terrorists in the region. Others have judged U.S. policy as uncoordinated and ineffective as it stumbles from one emergency to the next without any attempt at consistency or a long-term strategy.[1] Researchers and analysts have quickly evaluated U.S. policy in the Middle East as it unfolded, resulting in numerous publications that address specific elements of a larger issue. These controversies underscore the importance of vigorous study of this region and period.

To allow for this robust analysis of U.S. policy, there first must be a clear understanding of what the policy consisted of. Therefore, the research question is "What was the priority/focus of U.S. Middle East policy during the W. Bush Administration?" Previous research attempted to answer this question during the administration, latching onto key events and statements as they happened. By looking back upon the entirety of the administration, more data is measured to provide a comprehensive conclusion. While the methods used offer one of many approaches to answer the research question, providing a solid foundation of the priorities of U.S. policy allows for superior policy evaluation and understanding future reactions.

Although every presidential administration has its share of critics, the policy choices of the Bush administration in the Middle East garnished an intense negative reaction. Robert Gilpin described "the hubris, ambitions, and incompetence of the ideological amateurs managing the foreign policy of the Bush Administration [as] unparalleled in the history of the United States."[2] Along a similar vein, Ken Jowitt likened President Bush's policies on Iraq and the Middle East as a poison dart with a boomerang effect, compelling states to oppose and question U.S. motives.[3] Conversely, some policy analysts embraced these same decisions as not only a new

[1] Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 19.
[2] Robert Gilpin, "War is Too Important to Be Left to Ideological Amateurs," *International Relations* 19 no. 5 (2005): 5.
[3] Ken Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change," *Policy Review* 188 (2003): 41.

prescription on how the U.S. should handle the states of the Middle East, but how the U.S. should execute policy throughout the world.[4] These diverse and diametrically opposed judgments on U.S. policy warrant additional research to determine the actual focus of U.S. policy.

Within the context of multiple international relations theories, this paper will provide a comparative trend analysis of U.S. policy priorities for fifteen states in the Middle East throughout President George W. Bush's eight year administration. Instead of allowing a single decision or event, such as the invasion of Iraq, to define the policy of an entire region, this paper will analyze trends across multiple states to provide a larger frame of reference through which to understand a regional foreign policy. I will quantitatively measure three primary goals of U.S. policy (stability, security, and democracy promotion) for each state to determine the presence of trends and shifts in these goals. These three goals are the dominant themes from the literature review. Measuring them across the administration and for each state separates isolated events from consistent patterns and will identify any similarities or differences between individual state policies and regional policy. I will present raw data and comparative graphs to illustrate any observed trends. This data will allow me to present what priorities were reflected in the W. Bush Administration and determine which theory of international relations best explains this administration's policies.

While each presidency must deal with foreign policy situations from previous administrations, this paper seeks to address what the focus of U.S. policy in the Middle East was during the Bush Administration. By focus, I refer to the three goals of U.S. policy I seek to measure: stability, security, and democracy promotion, and whether one consistently dominated over the other two, or if U.S. policy was a more complex balance between competing, mutually exclusive objectives and overlapping goals. To determine the focus, I will use the following three hypotheses:

1. If the U.S. views stability (or status quo) in the Middle East as paramount, then its foreign policy will be to support the status quo regimes.
2. If the U.S. wants to maintain security in the Middle East, then its foreign policy will be to demonstrate power projection via its military.

[4] Charles Krauthammer, *Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2004).

3. If the U.S. aims at democracy promotion in the Middle East, then its foreign policy will be to implement economic aid and assistance programs to reform non-democratic governments and strengthen existing democratic institutions.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States finds itself at the apex of the international system, possessing the ability to project its power and influence throughout the world in an unrivaled manner. This unipolar moment represents an unprecedented point in the formulation and application of U.S. foreign policy as it allows the U.S. the flexibility to decide when and where it will engage other states. The Middle East is one such area where the U.S. has chosen to maintain a significant presence in order to deal with a range of economic, political, and security issues. Beginning with the First Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. has simultaneously projected a robust military presence to counter and contain the Iraqi and Iranian regimes, attempted to moderate the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and strove to maintain stability in an energy rich region. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 increased academic and political scrutiny of U.S. foreign policy and sparked fierce debate on its merits and effectiveness.

The W. Bush period in the Middle East juxtaposed a unique set of circumstances ripe for analysis through a neorealist, neoliberal, and neoconservative lens: U.S. hegemony, a vital economically important region, and an unprecedented challenge to U.S. security. Although the U.S. was the dominant player in world politics since 1991, Scowcroft and Brzezinski argued that the U.S. had an adjustment period after the unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union, requiring a shift from concentrating on a single primary problem, to dealing with a multitude of competing issues.[5] By 2001, the U.S. had ten years' experience as a world hegemon in a unipolar world, developing policies and strategies to maintain its position. This factor, especially in conjunction with the challenge of terrorism to U.S. power, lends itself well to the various international relations theories that comprise the analytical framework to be discussed in the literature review.

The Middle East is an energy rich region, vital to the world economy and of immense importance to the U.S. As Henry Kissinger explains, "the industrial democracies cannot permit access to Gulf oil to be denied to them or acquiesce in the Gulf's being dominated by a country

[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 3-9.

or group of counties hostile to their well-being."[6] The U.S. has a long history of interaction with the states of the Middle East regarding energy reserves, which will likely continue through future administrations. This fact both establishes the importance of the Middle East region in the study of U.S. foreign policy and mitigates selection bias of this region as singularly important due to the rise of international terrorism.

Sources and Methods

This paper seeks to provide a quantitative trend analysis of U.S. policy in the Middle East for the fifteen states selected. I will measure the presence of three policy priorities to identify the presence of trends or shifts over the time period for each state. I will organize the data into raw data tables and line/bar graphs to illustrate any trends in the policy priorities as well as provide comparisons between states across each policy priority.

The object of this paper is to address what was the overall U.S. policy towards Middle East states. The issue is how to measure an overall policy when it is comprised of various elements that cannot be directly compared. To bypass this 'measuring apples to oranges' issue, I will measure change in the overall US foreign policy through three policy priorities; stability, security, and democracy promotion, which are based on the three major themes from the literature review. I will quantitatively tally specific actions for each policy priority (described in detail below) creating a total for each state for every year of the Bush Administration (2001-2008). While I will be unable to directly compare the policy priorities against one another, I will be able to track trends across the time period for each policy priority and compare each one to the same policy priority in the other fifteen states. I can then discuss these trends within the context of events in the Middle East to better understand overall U.S. policy.

I selected these three specific policy priorities through observing the main themes of U.S. policy through the history of U.S.-Middle East interaction, main points from the literature review, and the stated policy goals of the administration. Additionally, these three policy priorities align with Mazarr's triangle discussed in the literature review of the main elements of U.S. foreign policy. Energy dependency is not specifically addressed even though it represents a major point in the discussion of the Middle East. The U.S. pursues policies of stability and security in the Middle East to facilitate a steady distribution of energy resources from the Middle East. Additionally, energy dependency is a complex variable and because it results from the

[6] Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* 166.

policy priorities, it does not fit into the scope of this thesis. Internal stability of states in the Middle East is paramount in order to maintain the flow of oil out of the region. Without smooth relations between boarder states, agreements for transient passage, and government oversight of rules and regulations, oil exports would be very problematic. In a similar vein, the security policy priority also effects energy dependency. Without security guarantees, the infrastructure would be open to both state and non-state attack. Additionally, the world oil futures market routinely reacts negatively to any security threats, instantly increasing the price of oil worldwide. Although the U.S. does not directly import the majority of its energy from the Middle East, major allies, such as Japan and some European states, do. As individual state economies become more intertwined with one another through globalization, the U.S. becomes more sensitive to the overall health of the global economy, thus taking a vested interest in maintaining both stability and security in an effort address energy dependency.

An appendix will provide a table for each state with the raw data for each of the policy priorities for the time period so that other researchers may better assess my work and use the data for themselves in further research. The raw data from these tables will be presented in graphs to better illustrate the changes from year to year and also to calculate the trend lines using the linear trend line function in Microsoft Excel for each state. Additionally I will compare all fifteen states in each policy priority to provide a comparative analysis and to determine if states shared similar trends across similar periods.

There are three general possibilities for trends in the data: positive, negative, and neutral. A positive trend would demonstrate that the U.S. was increasing the priority of that particular objective towards the target state, while a negative trend would demonstrate the opposite. A neutral trend would indicate a constant level of importance in the policy priority. While I cannot directly compare each policy priority against the others, I can compare the trends of each against the other during the same time period to identify any consistent patterns, i.e. if the trend in stability was negative, and the trend in democracy was positive. However, I will not be able to empirically determine which trend caused the other, only the presence of these trends.

Stability Policy Priority

The stability policy priority will measure the level at which U.S. policy focused on maintaining the status quo in regards to support for established regimes. I will measure this through two indicators. First is number of high level heads of state visits, phone calls, and

meetings. By high level heads of state visits, I refer to state executive leaders (such as the President, Prime Minister, King, Crown Prince, and Emir), secretary of state or equivalent, special envoy, or ambassador. Meetings and conversations between state leaders acknowledge the legitimacy of the established regime. Secondly, I will count the number of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and each state. This measurement will ensure I collect data for states that the U.S. may not have direct relations with, for even the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War came to established agreements from time to time, thus acknowledging the legitimacy of each other's government.

My working hypothesis for the stability policy priority: if the U.S. views stability as paramount, then its foreign policy will be to support traditional allies irrespective of regime type (despite their record with human rights, democracy, or regime type).

The sources for the stability policy priority are from the White House and State Department archives for the Bush administration[7]. Under White House archives I have access to press releases, proclamations, and office travel. The daily press briefing provides an update on any phone calls or meeting the U.S. government had with various states around the world. Although not a complete count since some conversations are most likely classified, by providing this data to the press corps it indicates the desire of the U.S. government to acknowledge these conversations between state leaders. The State Department keeps track of the Secretary of State's foreign travel on their website for each year.[8] For the number of bilateral agreements, I will use the State Department's Treaty in Force 2012[9] to count the number of agreements. This report has treaties and agreements broken down for each state and ratifying year.

Whether it is through negotiated bilateral agreements and treaties, or high level leadership meetings, state interaction fosters stable relations and mutual support for the established governments. Consistent communication can prevent misunderstanding and misinterpretations of actions and events, prevent conflicts, and manage crises. This type of

[7] "White House Press Briefings," The White House: President George W. Bush, accessed May 15, 2012, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/briefings/index.html#y2001.
[8] "Secretaries of State Foreign Travel," U.S. Department of State Archive, accessed May 15, 2012, http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/travels/index.htm and http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/trvl/index.htm.
[9] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaty Affairs Staff, *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2012*, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2012.

diplomacy evolved to stabilize relationships between political entities.[10] In the Middle East, establishing and maintaining good working relationships with allied states is paramount to maintaining a sense of stability in a turmoil prone region. Even with the preponderance of U.S. military and economic power, facilitating communications and interactions with its allies in the Middle East allows it to maintain stability in the region.

Despite the vast competition and rivalry between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War, both nations maintained at least basic diplomatic relations with the other and recognized each other sovereignty in order to prevent large scale nuclear war. The hot line between Washington and Moscow in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis provided a method of communication to help stabilize relations during times of rising tensions. Even as the rhetoric between the U.S. and USSR intensified and moderated, the two states maintained contact and negotiated agreements and arms reductions, sustaining some semblance of stability in the international system. A. Claire Culter's work exploring different perspectives on the presence of an international society helps explain this situation.

Culter presented multiple theorists' reasoning's for the presence of an international society and the stability that comes with consistent state interaction. Grotius argued that the norms and customs embodied in natural law bind nations together and therefore states continue to adhere to these laws and rules in their own self interests.[11] Martin Wright acknowledged that standards and practices were inspired by natural law, but are maintained in an anarchical system through "diplomacy, international law, the balance of power and functional international institutions."[12] Hedley Bull argued that international society was not based on universal principles of right and wrong, but rather by positive rules, practices and institutions which embody the common interests and values of states. Even in an anarchical system, states maintain a minimum standard of cooperation and adhere to a set of rules in order to preserve the status of their own sovereignty.[13] Overall, states make a concerted effort to maintain stability through interactions, rules, and norms because it is in their own self-interest to do so. This does not mean that instability, rising tensions, and armed conflict are completely avoidable, but that by entering

[10] Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge, "Patterns of Diplomacy," *Journal of Peace Research* 2, no. 2 (1965): 102.
[11] A. Claire Culter, "The 'Grotian Tradition' in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 17 no. 1 (1991): 47.
[12] Ibid., 52-53.
[13] Ibid., 55.

into agreements and recognizing the legitimacy and sovereignty of other states, crises can be diffused and conflict resolved.

Other authors also supported this viewpoint, seeing diplomacy and state interaction as a stabilizing action, which can prevent or blunt conflict and manage crises. Frank Schuller and Thomas Grant argued that even a hegemonic state, such as the U.S., needed to foster relationships and maintain stable allies in order to reduce the costs of maintaining hegemony around the world.[14] This was accomplished through balancing consent and success oriented communications. Consent oriented communications seeks agreement and mutual understanding in order to proceed towards common goals. Conversely success oriented communications looks to influence others to adopt certain viewpoints of one side.[15] Both of these types of interstate communications required established relationships between states, which is one of the measurements of the stability policy priority. Barry Steiner presented a similar argument, by dividing diplomacy into a dependent and independent variable. On the dependent side, state diplomacy adapted to the changing preferences of its society, which equates to success oriented communication; in other words, pushing other states to adopt the viewpoint of another. On the independent side, diplomats worked towards dispute management and consensus building, similar to consent oriented communications.[16] Overall, it is a combination of these styles that helps sustain international stability.

Security Policy Priority

The security policy priority will measure where the U.S. focused power projection as a policy goal. I will measure this through two indicators. First, I will tally the amount of military aid in dollars distributed to each state. Secondly, I will count the number of deployed U.S. forces in each state. The security policy priority offers some challenges since it combines numbers of troops as well as dollar amounts. Additionally, when counting deployed forces can become overly complicated when including troop numbers, air wings, missile batteries, armored units and ships; units that do not equate numerically (i.e. 1 soldier does not equal 1 navy ship). Therefore for this policy priority, I will create two graphs to demonstrate trends in both measurements. For ease of measuring the data and displaying trends, I will tally the number of

[14] Frank C. Schuller and Thomas D. Grant, "Executive Diplomacy: Multilateralism, Unilateralism and Managing American Power," *International Affairs* 79 no. 1 (2003): 40.
[15] Ibid., 44, 50.
[16] Barry Steiner, "Diplomacy and International Theory," *Review of International Studies* 30 no. 4 (2004): 495.

troops deployed in each state and disregard weapon types (aircraft, missile batteries, tanks), since this data is not consistent throughout the issues of the *Military Balance*. My working hypothesis for the security policy priority; if the U.S. views security as paramount in the Middle East, then its foreign policy will be to demonstrate power projection via deployment of its military and military aid to states in the region.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies publishes a yearly reference volume that "provides an accurate assessment of the military forces and defense expenditures of 171 countries."[17] This resource will provide the data for the deployment of U.S. forces in the Middle East. In the United States chapter, the *Military Balance* provides a detailed listing of deployed forces by state. I will use the *United States* chapters in the annual publications from 2001 through 2009 to cover the eight year administration (2001-2009). For military aid, the Congressional Research Service has published two reports outlining U.S. military aid to specific Middle Eastern states. It provides a state-by-state breakdown and the specific categories distributed to each state. The three categories measured are Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which is given to states so that they may purchase weapon systems, upgrades, and spare parts; Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related programs (NADR), which is used as a counter proliferation and counter terrorism funding line; and International Military Education and Training (IMET), which is used for training foreign military personnel.

A common theme in the international relations literature is the security of the state. Maintaining security is an essential task for the state, allowing it to protect its sovereignty from others while also providing a quantifiable means for assessing its strength in the international system. For the U.S., particularly after World War II, the military has been a major component of U.S. security policy. Through forward deployed units and military aid, the U.S. built up an impressive security regime throughout the world during the Cold War. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. continued to maintain a robust military presence throughout the world as it sought to maintain its hegemony and standing. When a crisis arises or tensions escalate, the U.S. military is one of the primary options. For these reasons, the security policy priority is measured by troop deployments and military aid to states in the Middle East.

[17] "The Military Balance," International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed May 15, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2012-77da.

The worldwide U.S. military presence established after World War II to contain the Soviet threat, continued into the twenty first century. With the U.S. positioned as a world leader and hegemon, any threats or tensions throughout the world could be potential threats to U.S. security. Under this rationale, as described in the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) in 2001, the U.S. had four main objectives: assure allies of its capability to fulfill its security commitments, dissuade advisories from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of its allies, deter aggression and coercion by forward deploying the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties, and be ready to decisively defeat any enemy.[18] As globalization further intertwined states and the speed of communications and information increased, a forward deployed military presence is essential for the U.S. if it wants to maintain its vision of a world order.[19] As further expanded upon in the literature review chapter, under the auspicious of anarchy, a hegemonic state such as the U.S. would tie its security to the security of various critical regions throughout the world. Therefore, any attempts or shift in the established order would be viewed as a threat to U.S. security.

Christopher Lane argued that the U.S. has been pursuing the same grand strategy since the 1940s, one of preponderance. This includes "the creation and maintenance of a U.S. led world order based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power, and maximization of U.S. control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers."[20] Underlying this strategy, was the fear and uncertainty of what might happen if the U.S. was not actively involved in shaping world events. The U.S. has therefore created a security umbrella around the world both to prevent the rise of rival powers and maintain its ability to maintain its version of a world order. To successfully accomplish this, it forward deployed its military on various allied state's territory to demonstrate its capability and credibility of this security umbrella.[21]

In the post- Cold War world, critics of preponderance have challenged the cost and ability of the U.S. to maintain a world wide security umbrella. However, even in alternate

[18] International Institution for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002): 12.
[19] Ivars Gutmanis, "United States International Policies and Military Strategies in the Era of Defunct Aggressor," *GeoJournal* 37 no. 2 (1995): 265.
[20] Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2009), 312.
[21] Ibid., 317-318.

theories, such as Robert Art's selective engagement, the U.S. used forwarded deployed military forces. Art contended that the U.S. should continue the basing of U.S. troops overseas to maintain specific alliances as a method of forward defense. The U.S. military would maintain the peace and dampen security competitions, slow the spread of WMDs, facilitate the waging of war by maintaining alliance force structures, and maintain institutional links among other major powers within these alliances.[22] Certain states also grasped the value of an alliance with the U.S. as a means of obtaining their own security. By entering into military alliances, other states gained access to U.S. military technology, training, and possibly deployed U.S. forces, to protect against their own specific security concerns.[23]

Whether it is preponderance, offshore balancing, or selective engagement, much of the literature on U.S. security identified the Middle East as a critical region in the calculus of U.S. strategy.[24] Lane and Art both identified the Middle East as critical due to its oil reserves and the necessity for stable output and export for the world economy. Although the U.S. does not import a large amount of Middle Eastern oil for its own consumption, its allies in Europe and Asia do. Therefore to maintain economic stability and military capability of its allies, the U.S. must ensure a secure Middle East.[25] Art also identified a strong priority for the Middle East as a necessity for U.S. homeland security as a way to stem the spread of WMDs among adversarial states and non-state terrorist actors in the region.[26] Lastly, the geography of the Middle East, specifically the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz, necessitated forward basing in the region to allow for rapid military response.[27]

A second method of U.S. security policy is the use of military aid to allied states and partners to help create regional pillars and extensions of the U.S. security umbrella. The U.S. uses military aid to encourage peace between Israel and its neighbors, create close military ties between the U.S. and other states in the Middle East, and prevent the spread of regional terrorist actors and their state supporters.[28] Providing military financing allows states to purchase high

[22] Art, "The Strategy of Selective Engagement," in *The Use of Force*, 329.
[23] Walt, "Taming American Power," in *The Use of Force*, 351.
[24] Ibid., 356.
[25] Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing", 313 and Art, "Strategy of Selective Engagement," 337-338.
[26] Art, "Strategy of Selective Engagement," 331.
[27] William E. Odom, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs* 76 no. 4 (1997): 56-57.
[28] Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2006 Request*, by Jeremy M. Sharp, RL32260 (Library of Congress, 2005), 2-3.

tech weaponry, while additional counter proliferation and terrorism funds bolster their own internal security capabilities. In addition to persuading states to adhere to U.S. foreign policy goals, military aid also ties a state's military capabilities directly to the U.S. Middle East states in particular, become dependent on U.S. military aid to maintain these new capabilities, requiring training from the U.S. on their employment and maintenance, as well as a reliable source for acquiring spare parts and upgrades. Middle Eastern states with large amounts of U.S. military equipment participate in annual military training exercises, such as Bright Star with Egypt and the International Mine Countermeasure exercise with Gulf Coast states. This further links the security concerns together with those of the U.S. Lastly, these state's militaries can become wholly dependent on the U.S. for their existence and prestige within the state, therefore becoming further entrenched with U.S. security objectives.[29]

The U.S. military continues to be a major component of its foreign policy in both strategy and implementation. It forward deploys military units worldwide to prevent the growth of rival powers, maintain economic stability, and allow for rapid response in order to maintain its position in the world order it leads. Military aid is another aspect of this strategy which further ties states to its policies and objectives. Measuring these data, particularly in the critical area of the Middle East, is one method to illustrate how the U.S. views security concerns and which, if any states are most vital.

Democracy Policy Priority

The democracy promotion policy priority will measure the extent of U.S. actions to strengthen democratic institutions and reform governments of states in the region. I will measure this through two indicators: number of U.S. aid programs active within each state, and amount of economic/development aid distributed. The democracy policy priority shares the same issue as the security policy priority in that it counts a number of units as well as a dollar amount distributed. I will handle this in the same manner as the security policy priority, by providing separate graphs, if appropriate, and viewing trends within both data types.

My working hypothesis for this policy priority: if the U.S. views democracy promotion as paramount, then its foreign policy will be to implement economic aid and assistance programs to

[29] See Lloyd Gardner, *The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak* (New York: The New Press, 2011) for an argument on how this aspect is a vital part of U.S. Egyptian relations.

reform non-democratic governments and strengthen existing democratic institutions regardless of their relationship with the U.S.

The USAID Foreign Assistance Database provides a detailed breakdown of US dollars distributed to each state, through specific programs, by fiscal year and provides the primary measure for democracy promotion policy priority.[30] After selecting the specific state, I used the data under the link for *Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency* to tally the raw data. I will provide the total amount per state each year and leave the link to the detailed reports within the Bibliography. To ensure the most accurate data, I will not count operating costs for the USAID offices, nor any DOD funding lines (specifically NADR on a few occasions), which may be included in yearly reports in the total for developmental aid. In order to measure the democracy policy priority accurately as possible, I want to ensure that the total amounts are being distributed to actual programs and not for operating costs or programs designed for security purposes. USAID has an interactive web map that allows for specific queries of projects by date and state.[31] I gathered data by setting the range for calendar year and tallying the results for each state provided. This allowed for a yearly tally of USAID projects in Middle Eastern states.

While the rhetoric for promoting human rights and democracy as part of the Bush Administration is well documented in numerous speeches, announcements, and official statements, measuring this policy priority is more problematic. Although not a perfect fit, U.S. foreign aid provides a numerical measurement to illustrate the importance of democracy and human rights in overall U.S. foreign policy. The literature on U.S. foreign aid demonstrates that both democracy and human rights are viewed as one of many criteria used in developing U.S. foreign aid policy. Just as U.S. foreign policy is multifaceted, so too does U.S. foreign aid seek to influence multiple goals, ranging from security to democracy promotion. However, the same literature is mixed on the effectiveness of foreign assistance on actually promoting democracy and human rights. Interestingly, the general trend after the Cold War indicates that the importance of democracy and human rights records in determining aid levels and their effectiveness in promoting democratization are increasing. Some authors have argued that since

[30] "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Foreign Assistance Data by Country," USAID, accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/country.html.
[31] "Where We Work Interactive Map," USAID, accessed May 15, 2012, http://map.usaid.gov/.

the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has had more flexibility to tailor aid to promote democracy and liberal economic reforms instead of security concerns.

The growing literature on the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and foreign policy goals of democracy promotion and advancement of human rights demonstrated a continuing perception that the two are related. Steven Knack discussed the potential for aid to improve electoral processes, strengthen legislatures and judiciaries as checks against executive power, and promote civil society institutions such as a free press.[32] Additionally, aid had the ability to improve economic conditions to the point of creating a middle class, which other authors such as Samuel Huntington, had correlated to a prerequisites to democratic transition.[33] Jeremy Sharp outlined that since September 11, 2001," the U.S. established new region-wide aid programs to promote democracy and encourage socio-economic reform in order to undercut the forces of radicalism in some Arab countries."[34] Finally, USAID, the main governmental organization distributing U.S. foreign aid, listed the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance as one of its main objectives in determining its foreign aid allocation.[35]

Historically, U.S. foreign aid was mainly geared to U.S. national security interests, which included support of anti-communist allied states, the backing of states with vital resources and economic linkages, and to those least economically developed. Specifically in the Middle East, Sharp outlined the use of U.S. aid in promoting peace between Israel and its neighbors, in addition to strengthening bilateral agreements with moderate Arab states.[36] During the Cold War, critics of U.S. foreign aid policy routinely condemned the flow of aid to states that repressed their citizens and exercised authoritative control. Security concerns clearly trumped any attempts to promote good governance.[37] Starting in the 1970s, the U.S. Congress began passing legislation to restrict the amount of aid distributed to human rights abusers and link good governance to increased amounts of aid. The end of the Cold War further contributed to the rise in salience of democracy promotion in the calculation of U.S. foreign aid as it reduced the

[32] Steven Knack, "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48 no. 1 (2004): 251.
[33] Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
[34] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006 Request*, 1.
[35] USAID, "What We Do," accessed Jan 15, 2013, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do.
[36] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006 Request*, 2.
[37] L Schoultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions," *Comparative Politics* 13 no. 2 (1981): 167.

overarching security concerns and allowed a refocusing of policy to attune to U.S. ideological values.[38]

Research studying the links between U.S. foreign aid and the promotion of democracy and human rights evolved and yielded mixed results. One main difficultly was the multifaceted use of U.S. aid that encompassed numerous objectives. Priorities in aid distribution may change over time, but there will always be competing objectives. Recent research presented three approaches to studying U.S. aid policy: a systemic approach highlighting security concerns, a societal approach highlighting domestic priorities of business and industry expansion, and a statist approach focusing on ideological goals and values of the states, which in the case of the U.S. is democracy promotion and human rights.[39] Understanding U.S. aid policy in this manner assisted researchers' abilities to control for specific circumstances to more accurately measure individual objectives. Another aspect complicating the study of U.S. aid policy involved the process of its formation and implementation. David Cingranelli and Thomas Pasquarello were the first to research this as a two-step function: a gateway function that first determines which states would actually receive aid, and then an allocation function to determine the level of aid each state would receive.[40] What they determined, and additional research confirmed, is that different criterion drive the decisions during each stage.

Although the results have been mixed, the general trend in the literature supported the argument that U.S. desires for democracy promotion and support of human rights does play a part in the distribution of aid. Cingranelli and Pasquarello, by separating military aid from economic aid, concluded that while human right abuses were not a factor in the gatekeeping decision process, those states with better human rights records did receive more economic aid in Latin America.[41] Carleton and Stohl addressed some of the shortcoming of this research by highlighting the limited timespan, removal of outliers from the data, and difficulty in determining levels of human rights abuses. They determined that human rights did not play a

[38] James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War," *Journal of Politics* 60 no. 1 (1998): 63-64.
[39] See Brian Lai, "Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-Cold War Period, 1991-96," *Journal of Peace Research* 40 no. 1, (2003): 104-105, and James Meernik, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy," 64-67.
[40] David Cingranelli and Thomas Pasquarello, "Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 no. 3 (1985): 540.
[41] Ibid., 560.

significant role in either process.[42] This early research set the stage for more robust analysis, particularly a comparison between the Cold War and post-Cold War environment.

Abrams and Lewis measured U.S. aid worldwide and attempted to control for security concerns and natural disaster assistance to better measure human rights issues on aid allocation. They also used dummy variables to control for major outliers (such as Egypt and Israel) that would skew the data. While they did not address the gatekeeping and allocation stages separately, they concluded that human rights play a significant and substantive role in determining aid distribution.[43] Research by Apodaca and Stohl as well as Meernik, Krueger, and Poe included more data from the post-Cold War period and both concluded that states with better human rights records were more likely to receive aid; however they reached conflicting conclusions on how human rights affected the amount distributed. Apodaca and Stohl correlated better human rights records with higher levels of aid, while Meernik and others found the opposite. Meernik and others also researched how the level of democracy affected aid, concluding that more democratic states were both more likely to receive aid and at increased amounts than less democratic states.[44] Brain Lai, also looked at U.S. aid before and after the Cold War, determined that while human rights and democracy did not affect the gatekeeping process, better human rights records and more democratic states received higher levels of aid overall.[45]

The variance in results amongst the research indicates that there is still more work to be done to definitively conclude how policy goals of human rights and democracy promotion affect U.S. foreign aid. The human rights aspect contains the most variation, while there does exists agreement on a positive correlation between democracy level and aid levels. Specifically, is foreign aid used to promote democracy and human rights in states, or reward states for improvements in good governance? The variation may indicate elements of both issues with U.S. aid policy.

For the basis of this paper, increased levels of aid are used to indicate the objective of U.S. policy to promote democracy and human rights, which is expanded in the literature review

[42] David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal," *American Journal of Political Science* 31 no. 4 (1987): 1015.
[43] Burton A. Abrams and Kenneth A. Lewis, "Human Rights and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid," *Public Choice* 77 no. 4 (1993): 819.
[44] Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, "United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 no. 1 (1999): 195, and Meernik, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy," 78-79.
[45] Lai, "Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-Cold War Period, 1991-96," 119, 121.

chapter. This stance derives from the stated positions of the Bush Administrations on the importance of promoting democracy and establishment of aid programs designed to link aid directly to improving democratic institutions. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) as well as Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA) attempted to directly support the formation of democratic institutions and separate security concerns from the promotion of democracy and human rights. The initial implementation of MEPI demonstrated a lack of coherent strategy, a repeat of direct government-government aid, low funding levels, and a primary focus on the economic pillar, which "raised troubling prospects for democracy promotion as an aim of American policy in the Middle East."[46] However, MEPI corrected these initial problems as funding levels generally increased, more aid was directed to non-governmental organizations, and focus shifted away from traditional economic reforms towards the political and education pillars. By the end of the Bush administration, Wittes commented that "MEPI today is perhaps the best available example of successfully integrating democracy promotion into U.S. foreign policy." [47]

Measuring this data would be preferable to using USAID economic aid distribution since it directly addresses a key component of stated U.S. policy. However, the data has not been disaggregated by state, which is the main focus of this paper. Therefore, the next best measure would be to substitute USAID economic/development aid and separate military aid and financing to provide a measure for democracy promotion. As presented above, even economic aid can have multiple objectives, which includes stability and security. However, these other objectives can be measured using different sets of data, while economic aid remains one of the few methods to measure the levels of U.S. democracy promotion.

Limitations

This project is not without its limitations. As previously mentioned, because the policy priorities measure actions and events that are not based on similar units, I will be unable to directly compare them to each other. This limits my ability to empirically determine the specific priority (stability, security, or democracy) towards each state. Likewise, I am unable to make

[46] Tamara Wittes and Sarah Yerkes, "The Middle East partnership Initiative: Progress, Problems, and Prospects," *Middle East Memo* no. 5, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (Nov 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2004/11/29middleeast-wittes.

[47] Tamara Wittes and Andrew Masloski, "Democracy Promotion under Obama: Lessons from the Middle East Partnership Initiative," *Brookings Middle East Memo* no 13, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (May 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/05/democracy-promotion-wittes.

that same determination for the region as a whole. Secondly, I have chosen to discount any domestic factors influencing U.S. foreign policy so to remain within a state centered analytical framework and maintain a workable thesis. While Gilpin and others do discuss domestic factors as constraints on the options available to states in their policy calculus, I am measuring end results, not a specific decision making process. This issue is a debate in the international relations literature as a whole and it is not my intention to address it here. Rather I will assume that due to the increase in mass communications and social media that official press statements emphasizing high level meetings have an intended international audience.

I must deal with the differences between fiscal and calendar years since I am both counting events and programs (calendar year), and dealing with distributed funds from budgets (fiscal year). To keep things simple, FY02 funds will be matched with CY02 events. While this may slightly skew the yearly data, by consistently applying across the administration it should average out over the eight year term.

Certain states with more limited interaction with U.S. policy may not have enough data to pull out trends. I have mitigated this factor by selecting measures for each category that encompass each state, but overall this cannot be avoided. Minimal data in policy priorities are nevertheless important in and of themselves, since they demonstrate a lack of importance in the eyes of U.S. policy makers. Minimal data may require the grouping of like states together in order to product noticeable trends and will limit the ability to draw definitive conclusions.

Lastly, although I am attempting to isolate specific objectives of U.S. foreign policy by measuring three policy priorities, there nevertheless remains an overlap among them in the longer term. Stable states help improve the security situation, just as a strong security environment can help bring stability in interstate relations. The increased desire for democracy promotion in the Middle East from the Bush Administration stems from the notion that once these state embrace democracy, they will foster improved security and stability for the region. While this convergence of goals in the long term may link these policy priorities together, as demonstrated further in the literature review, the short term implementation of these goals illustrates one of competing priorities.

The objective of any research project is to increase the overall understanding of the topic by adding empirical research value, something which I believe this paper will accomplish. The literature on U.S. policy in the Middle East illustrates the vast difference in opinions of political

analysis as well as differing conclusions from scholarly research. It also points to a lack of empirical research based on these policy priorities such as the ones selected in this thesis. While I do not doubt that the invasion, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq that dominate the literature will also prove to be a dominant factor in my research, I also feel there is additional value added by continuing to look at the rest of the Middle East states and the region as a whole. Tracking shifts and trends in U.S. policy throughout the administration will demonstrate the complexity of seeking various objectives in a state's foreign policy and will also provide empirical evidence to support various international relations theories on hegemons. This project will hopefully lay a ground work for further study on U.S. policy during the Bush administration and provide a framework for comparing past and future administrations' policies.

Structure of Thesis

Chapter One presented research question, hypothesis, and justification for this thesis. It then outlined the methodology of the study, the source used to collect and measure the data, and support for the selection of the three policy priorities. It included the limitations of the thesis and lastly present the outline for the remainder of the thesis.

Chapter Two presents a brief historical summary of U.S. foreign policy and actions in the Middle East from World War I up to the terrorist attacks in September 2001. This chapter provides a contextual background of the various themes of U.S. policy and illustrates the struggles of pursuing multiple objectives in a volatile region. It provides an understanding of the shared historical background of the Middle East region to better understand contemporary U.S. foreign policy. It also provides a brief analysis and justification for the fifteen states selected to comprise the Middle East region.

Chapter Three contains the literature review, which is divided into four main sections. The first section discusses the unipolar world system after the collapse of the Soviet Union and presents the viewpoints of neorealist and neoliberal theorists on its implications for the U.S. This provides a theoretical framework through which to analyze U.S. foreign policy. The second section addresses the U.S. reaction to the terrorist attack in New York and Washington and its impact on U.S. policy decisions. Specifically it addresses the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent shift in U.S. policy. The third section expands on neoconservatism, as it evolved into the main policy calculus of the administration and its implications. The final section presents the

various viewpoints on how effective the W. Bush Administration's policies and actions were in the Middle East.

Chapter Four presents the measured data for each policy priority in line graph format to illustrate the various trends. Each state is addressed individually through each policy priority within the context of events during the period. At the end of each state's discussion I provide an analysis of which international relations theory best encapsulates U.S. policy actions.

Chapter Five presents my summary of the region as a whole and conclusions for what the overall U.S. foreign policy was in the Middle East. It provides comparative data of the states for each policy priority and then addresses the combination of trends for the region.

Chapter Two: Background of U.S. – Middle East Interaction

Even though the primary focus of this paper is on contemporary U.S. foreign policy, understanding the historical context of U.S. relations in the region will provide a strong base from which to interpret the events during the George W. Bush administration. While this section offers a brief overview of U.S. policy themes within the context of major historical events, it does not represent a complete chronology of events, nor a detailed analysis of all policy decisions. It does provide a general overview through which to trace the many competing goals of U.S. foreign policy and the importance of the Middle East Region for the U.S. Lastly it briefly illustrates the rise of the Bush Doctrine through the events during the last decade of the 20th century. Throughout the period, the U.S. worked for stability of economic trade, security against communist inroads and Israeli integrity, while wrestling with its own notions of self-determination, democracy, and human rights. Traditional realists would point out the consistent U.S. actions maintaining power and security as the summation of relations. However, not every event fits neatly into this paradigm. For example, consistent U.S. support for Israel limited the ability of the U.S. to engage with other states in the Middle East and remains one of the major causes of instability in the region. Additionally, the U.S. created institutions to link specific Arab Allies together to work against Communism and other adversarial states; the work through the UN to impose international sanctions has impacted world economic stability. The following chapter will outline the competing goals of U.S. policy and the variance in their application.

Defining the Middle East

The term "Middle East" is widely used and easily recognizable by various professions and researchers. The region's exact borders and precise definition as a political region is much more ambiguous. Therefore, this paper must clearly delineate which states are included in the analysis and how they come to form a particular region that deserves such attention. The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs combines the Middle East and North Africa into a continuous unit, spanning from Morocco across Northern Africa into the Arabian Peninsula and ending with Iran.[48] Paradoxically, the Department of Defense Central Command's area of responsibility groups different combination of states together. The region begins in the

[48] "Near Eastern Affairs: Countries and Other Regions," U.S. Department of State, accessed Jan 29, 2012, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/index.htm.

west with Egypt, excludes Israel while including its neighbors, continues through the Arabian Peninsula, east through Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and north into the predominantly Muslim former Soviet republics to Kazakhstan.[49] While some overlap does exist between State and Defense, primarily in the central Arabian Gulf region, the northern, eastern, and western borders remain vague.

In a recent analysis of U.S. policy in the Middle East, Donna Stewart argues that the regional identity of the Middle East that the Departments of State and Defense espouse, ignore geographical reality. These departments have stretched the Middle East region beyond conventional limits to include states from neighboring regions that do not share similar political, economic, and cultural elements.[50] Through the lens of terrorism and an overreaching view of the religion of Islam, the U.S. has combined the largest grouping of states possible to fit within the specific policy objectives they want to pursue.

The past literature on the Middle East region mirrors the ambiguity on the Middle East borders found between the Department of State and Defense. Stephen Walt's *The Origins of Alliances* simply lists countries in the Middle East to include Israel, while excluding Iran, Turkey, and North Africa without providing any explanation. Carl Brown's *International Politics and the Middle East* uses the states formed from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to define the region, which includes Israel, but excludes both Iran and Morocco. Michael Barnett takes a normative approach, using the founding members of the Arab League (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the PLO) to define and rationalize the region.[51] Likewise, Gamar and Hilal simply include all Arab states while excluding all other states in the region through the belief that Arab states see themselves as constituting their own region in their pursuit of nationalism.[52]

F. Gregory Gause argues that the above definitions fail to provide satisfactory criteria for identifying the boundaries of the Middle Eastern region because they ignore conflict as an essential characteristic. He states, "any definition of system membership that ignores important conflict dyads is simply not a useful basis upon which to proceed to more substantive analytical

[49] "Area of Responsibility Map," United States Central Command, accessed Jan 29, 2012, http://www.centcom.mil/.
[50] Dona Stewart, "The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's Ideological Imagination," *The Geographical Review* 95 no. 3 (July 2005): 401-402.
[51] Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 16.
[52] Gamil Matar and Ali al-Din Hilal, *The Arab Regional Order*, (Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-cArabi, 1983), 57.

issues."[53] The problem to formulating a practical definition of the Middle East region revolves around keeping it large enough to include all interacting states while limiting membership to the smallest number possible to prevent cumbersome constraints on explanatory power. Gause recognizes three main elements that lead to the "sustained, durable interest and involvement, to a common agenda of issues" of a region of states: geography, self-identification, and a common social-historical background.[54] Therefore, Gause's Middle East system includes the eastern Arab States from Egypt to Iraq, the Palestinians, Israel, Iran, and Turkey.

Of the various explanations and rationales surrounding the contending borders of the Middle East, Gause's criteria provides the most convincing logic for including both Arab and Islamist cultural identities and those states with which they are in conflict. Energy exports, via oil production, countering Soviet inroads and the foundation and integrity of Israel dominate the historical literature of U.S. interests in this geographical area. Combining these main concerns with Gause's three elements creates the bounded Middle East region through which to analyze U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, this paper defines the Middle East as the Gulf countries of the Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, U.A.E, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, and Iraq, moving westward through Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt to include Palestinian territories, with Iran marking the border on the east.

Although many of the above researchers, to include Gause, chose to include Turkey in their system, Turkey's inclusion in NATO during the Cold War insulated it from the era's political and military maneuvering that the rest of the Middle East experienced. The secular nature of its post-World War II government and desire to economically integrate into the European community further separates itself from the common social-historical background of other Middle Eastern states. Likewise, while the State Department considers the shared cultural-religious identity of the north African states as reason to include them in the Middle East region, their post-World War II experience was dominated more by European powers in the struggles of post colonization rather than Cold War interactions with the United States. The strategic importance of these states paled in comparison to those in the Arabian Gulf. Therefore, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are not considered part of the Middle East region.

[53] F. Gregory Gause, "Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations," *International Studies Review* 1 no. 1 (1999): 15.
[54] Ibid., 24-25.

Along similar lines, this paper excludes the central Asian countries from Afghanistan through Kazakhstan that the Defense Department considers part of the Central Command's area of responsibility. Those former Soviet republics never factored into American interests and despite their independence are still considered entrenched in Russia's sphere of influence. Afghanistan and Pakistan are key actors in the Global War on Terror, but they factor little into the management of energy export stability of the Arabian Gulf or the history surrounding the foundation of Israel. Current U.S. focus on Afghanistan, lacking a shared Cold-War history with the other states, and Pakistan, with its self-fixation on border issues with India, can be compartmentalized from the rest of the Middle East region.

The State of Israel is a major point of contention in the region and is therefore included, despite its lack of self-identification and common social-historical background. Per Gause, Israel is involved in "conflict dyads," as are Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Jordan. The special relationship between the U.S. and Israel and the political limitations this generates in how the U.S. interacts with other states in the Middle East necessitates its inclusion. Although physically located in North Africa, Egypt contains a vital chokepoint, the Suez Canal through which energy exports, commercial goods, and U.S. Naval warships traverse on a daily basis. Its history with Israel and continued alliance with the U.S. explains its inclusion.

Despite Iran's Persian background and its exclusion in other definitions of the Middle East, it is included in the scope of this paper. Iran also shares numerous 'conflict dyads' as one of the most vocal opponents of Israel and supporter of non-states groups in the Levant. Iran has played a major role in U.S. calculus of the Middle East in its competition with Iraq during the 1980s and its desire to oppose U.S. influence through the support of Shia majorities in other Gulf countries (Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia). Lastly, its geographic proximity to the Arabian Gulf and its ability to greatly affect a major chokepoint, Strait of Hormuz, makes it a major component of how the U.S. addressed its 'common agenda of issues' in the Middle East.

History of the U.S. and the Middle East since World War I

The idealism resulting from the conclusion of World War I manifested itself in President Wilson's notion of self-determination. This marked the early aspirations of U.S. policy before it transformed into a more interventionist strategy designed to counter threats to Western strategic interests in the Middle East. Realists would therefore argue that U.S. policy is best viewed through their self-interest paradigm as the U.S. embarked on an imperialistic policy to gain

control of the region by supplanting the European colonial powers. During the Cold War, the U.S. followed this pursuit of power as a method to control vital resources and contain what it viewed as its greatest threat, the Soviet Union. However, even as the U.S. established its presence in the region, it sought to reconcile the conflict of its support for the democratic state of Israel with its desire to maintain stability and security. As Soviet power waned, the U.S. shifted focus to balance the rising challenger states of Iraq and Iran. The end of the Cold War marked a shift from a bipolar to unipolar international system, which saw the U.S. first attempt a mix of multilateral sanctions and military intervention through the United Nations to control Iraq and Iran. The terrorist attacks in 2001 precipitated a shift away from the constraints of international institutions and towards a more direct application of U.S. power.

The modern boundaries of the states comprising the Middle East were drawn during World War I, when British promises of Arab self-rule prompted internal rebellion in the Ottoman Empire. The vague details of exactly what territory would be set aside for self-rule allowed for a quick alliance between Europe and Arab nationalists; it also generated increased tensions after the war as European powers divided the territory according to their geo-strategic and economic interests. This theme of foreign intervention increased due to the Balfour Declaration, which outlined British government's approval to set up a Jewish State in Palestine.[55] These events, "from the perspective of Arab world, set the scene for a history of Western influence and intervention that would span the twentieth century."[56] However, the U.S. clamored for Arab self-rule and protested against European control first due to President Wilson's idealism of national self-determination, and later as a way to make commercial inroads with the region's oil sector, which was dominated by British companies.[57] The lack of progress towards Arab self-rule spurred Nazi sympathies during World War II, prompting the Allies to intervene militarily to suppress coup attempts and shifting alliances in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The U.S. supported these occupations because it recognized the immediate threat of Axis control of the energy supplies and the strategic benefit of controlling the region as more important than self-determination.

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[55] Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of Anti-Americanism*, (New York: Routlege, 2008), 11-15.
[56] Ibid., 8.
[57] Peter Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire: The US and the Middle East since 1945*, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc, 2005), 2.

Towards the end of the Second World War, it appeared the U.S. would once again support self-determination as President Roosevelt declared an 'open door' policy of equal economic opportunity for all in the Middle East. However, the postwar costs of rebuilding Europe forced Britain and France to scale back their overseas empires and the rapid "decolonization generated a wave of nationalism conducive to Soviet exploitation and intra-regional conflict".[58] To counter Soviet inroads, the U.S. required a more direct policy to establish U.S. influence in the region. Through both political and economic means, the U.S. would come to exercise a tremendous influence on the internal politics of Middle Eastern states, which included support for regimes and governments not fully supported by the majority of their own populations. Shireen Hunter attributes much of the anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East to this history of influence, resulting in disequilibrium of power and structural inequalities between the U.S. and the Middle East.[59]

The declaration of the state of Israel in 1947 added an additional complication to U.S. policy. According to Baxter and Akbarzadeh the issue surrounding the foundation of Israel "is one of the greatest factors in the formulation of US policy in the region and a major contributing force to the dynamics of Arab anti-Americanism."[60] Likewise, Hahn attributes the prioritization of Washington's anti-Soviet containment policy over regional conflict resolution to its inability to establish a stable and noncommunist Middle East.[61] Stopping Soviet influence in the region necessitated constant intervention in various states' political processes. However, supporting Israel severely constrained the ability to accomplish it. Already we see the pursuit of the specific policy of supporting Israel, affecting the ability to achieve other objectives, such as moderating other Middle Eastern states.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia solidified a long-standing alliance in the aftermath of World War II, based on security of the region, stability for the export of its vast oil reserves, and mutual desire to prevent Communist intrusion into the region. The U.S. recognized the Al Saud family as the legitimate rulers of what would become Saudi Arabia in exchange for oil exploration contracts to U.S. companies. While the Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1948, 1967, and 1973 severely tested this special relationship, U.S. presidents "viewed the Saudi monarchy as an ally in relation

[58] Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire* 12.
[59] Shireen Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 20.
[60] Baxter, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 47.
[61] Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 33.

to other nationalist and socialist governments in the region and as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in the Gulf region."[62] Throughout the Cold War, Saudi Arabia stood as the major pillar of U.S. stability and security, which continued into the next century.

The growing Arab nationalism and backlash against Israel threatened U.S. authority in the region. Revolutions in Syria in 1949, Egypt in 1952, and Iraq in 1958 established pro-Soviet governments, spurring President Eisenhower to better manage the U.S. position. Following the loss of Egypt, the U.S. directly backed the 1953 military coup in Iran to return the pro-U.S. Shah to power, undermining a popularly elected prime minister. After the fall of Iraq, the U.S. sent the Marines into troubled Lebanon to prevent a popular uprising there and manage the ensuing transfer of power. Additionally, the U.S. supported British troops in Jordan to bolster King Hussein's friendly regime. These events demonstrate the precedence of security and stability needs over more democratic principles.

The surprising move of President Eisenhower to force the British and French out of Egypt and allow the shift of control to the Egyptian state boosted U.S. standing in the region. Security wise, maintaining control over the canal via European allies would be preferable, but the U.S. decided to back Egypt's self-determination. Unfortunately, the continuing hostilities between Egypt and Israel complicated any U.S. attempts to court Nasser and his non-aligned movement back towards the West, as the Pan-Arab political movement gained momentum. Egypt remained a high priority for the U.S. given its strategic control over the Suez Canal, affecting the flow of both economic trade and military deployments.

Soviet attempts to exploit the rift between the U.S. and the Arab world over Israel resulted in The Six Days War in 1967 and later, the 1973 War.[63] These events were important to U.S. policy for three reasons. Israeli military victories discredited the non-aligned movement causing the end of the Pan-Arab nationalism and facilitating the rise of revolutionary Islamism. The Arab oil embargo in 1974 demonstrated the strategic importance of oil and helped convince policy makers that the Arab world had the ability and resolve to use oil as a weapon. Lastly, the U.S. commitment to Israel in the face of Soviet meddling intensified as it attempted to restore

[62] Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, *Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Christopher Blanchard, RL33533 (Library of Congress June 2010), 5.
[63] Warren Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Vol IV: American in the age of Soviet Power 1945-1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 192-196.

balance and stability, thus further solidifying the U.S.-Israeli alliance.[64] With Pan-Arabism discredited, Egypt succumbed to U.S. economic power, signing a separate peace with Israel in return for a massive influx of U.S. aid and military hardware.[65]

The U.S. attempted to focus the rising animosity of the Islamist movement against the Soviet Union. Particularly after the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979, which ousted the pro-West Shah, the U.S. needed to quell the "discontent with Western interference, failed or failing systems of national leadership, secularization, and economic decline"[66] of the movement to maintain its influence and stability in the region. However, the U.S. desire to militarize this movement against the Soviets only helped organize radical Islam and provided it with the skills, reach, confidence, and unifying objective that transformed it into the Al Qaida terrorist movement.[67]

With the Soviets temporarily occupied in Afghanistan, the U.S. concentrated on exploiting the conflict between two states threatening the current status quo: Iraq and Iran. Evidence shows that the U.S. conspired to play both Iraq and Iran against each other in an attempt to decrease their power and influence. Meanwhile, President Reagan's 'consensus of strategic concerns' policy, to arm and provide aid to regional allies (Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia) and to maintain friendly regimes, faltered. Its central flaw was its disregard for intra-regional tensions.[68] Israel balked at weapons sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while Israeli violation of Saudi airspace on their strike against Iraq's nuclear reactor elicited an equally harsh reaction. Lastly, the U.S. inability to manage and resolve the Lebanese civil war sparked by the 1982 Israeli invasion, further amplified anti-American sentiments and U.S. credibility on managing the overall dispute.

Numerous historians and political analysts have attributed the rise of an anti-Western, and specifically an anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, to the pervasive influence of the U.S. in the internal affairs of regional states. This brief history outline presented some of the major historical events supporting these claims. The majority of the authors cited, repeatedly mention these facts as one of the causes and drivers of international terrorism flowing from the

[64] Baxter, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 66.
[65] For a detailed look at the history of U.S.-Egyptian relations see Lloyd Gardner, *The Road to Tahrir Square.*
[66] Baxter, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 85.
[67] Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 127-129.
[68] Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 78.

Middle East, which manifested itself on September 11, 2001.[69] However, the terrorist attacks themselves do not fully explain the subsequent U.S. foreign policy towards the region, particularly its invasion of Iraq and subsequent rhetoric for democracy promotion. For this, I will briefly explore the events and ideas during the 1990s and how they set the stage for the Bush Doctrine.

The emergence of a neoconservative foreign policy, evolved from a specific set of circumstances. The breakup of the Soviet Union and liberalization of Eastern Europe ended the Cold War, leaving the U.S. as the sole remaining superpower. While the U.S. maintained its Cold War alliances and used international institutions to foster a New World Order, fractures began to surface. Specifically in the Middle East, the removal of the threat of communism allowed many states to question the existing power distribution and hegemony of the U.S. States such as Iraq and Iran vied for regional dominance against U.S. traditional ally, Saudi Arabia, while the Islamist movement in general used the lack of progress between Israel and Palestine to act as a call to turn on their Cold War benefactors. Incidents of terrorism increased both because of their use as proxy actors for states, and as transnational non-state groups coalesced into an organized movement. The perceived inability of the Clinton Administration and UN to adequately moderate Saddam Hussein's weapons programs added the specter of WMDs to the mix. Frustrated groups of conservative foreign policy analysts saw this changing threat as an invitation for a new strategy. While the underpinnings of the neoconservative foreign policy had its roots before the September 11 attacks, only after the attacks shattered the U.S. image of invincibility did it gain momentum. The literature review to follow will briefly outline this progression towards the neoconservative foreign policy and then quickly examine its application.

Following the absence of the communist threat in Middle East policy calculations, the U.S. was initially willing to tolerate Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in exchange for predictable foreign policy behavior, and on a larger scale would accept any pro-Western authoritarian regime in exchange for stability and the status quo. However, the war debts accrued from the past decade spurred Hussein to invade Kuwait to exploit its oil reserves. During this first unipolar moment, the U.S. decided to build a multinational coalition, gain UN

[69] Shireen Hunter, Mahmood Mamdani, Peter Hahn, Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh acknowledge the role the U.S. played in the development of Arab governments and how its influence and interference helped create an environment where terrorism seemed a viable solution to a large enough percentage of society to address historical grievances.

approval and legitimacy, and convince enough of the Arab World to allow U.S. troops to force Saddam to retreat. The U.S. did not push further into Iraq to foster regime change after its initial victory, as restoring the pre-war power balance returned to pre-war status quo. Additionally the U.S. feared the segregation of Iraq into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia sections, which would again threaten stability in neighboring states.[70] In the end, Saddam was weakened but remained firmly, if not more so, in control of Iraq, growing into the main challenger to U.S. power. While the presence of U.S. troops on Saudi Arabian soil did spark the growth of Al Qaeda, the perceptions of constraints on U.S. actions through the use of the UN and a broad coalition with limited objectives garnished a positive international response to the U.S. led war. Interestingly, a good portion of the U.S. military presence was required to protect and assure Israel to keep them out of any direct military action so as to preserve the support of other Arab states.

Throughout the rest of the 1990s, the U.S. pursued policies to maintain its relative influence in the region, and block the growing aspirations for regional supremacy of both Iraq and Iran. The U.S. used the UN to facilitate and legitimize multilateral actions to contain Iraq, while simultaneously endeavoring to force regime change. The U.S. was unable to establish a similar multilateral policy against Iran, and therefore resorted to unilateral economic sanctions to prevent any Iranian resurgence. This policy of dual containment, failed to moderate Iranian policy and force Saddam out of Iraq, especially as numerous allies grew weary of U.S. rhetoric and sanctions towards the end of the decade.[71] During this decade, U.S. foreign policy calculus evolved to incorporate 'rogue states' as the new threat and grew increasingly worried about the spread of WMDs as globalization created a more interconnected world.

Rogue states evolved into the predominant threat to the U.S. in the aftermath of the Cold War. Through the 1990s, this threat developed to encompass the use of WMDs and the growing rise in Islamic terrorist activities directed against the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, first classified this new threat in a 1994 article. He exclaimed that rogue states constituted the latest threat to international peace as they refused to conduct their international affairs by the established rules. Therefore, the U.S., as the sole superpower, had a responsibility to neutralize, contain, pressure, and transform such states

[70] Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 130.
[71] Robert Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War* (Washington DC: John Hopkins Press, 2000), 69, 84, 123, 159.

back into constructive members of the international community.[72] Michael Klare outlined the rise of rogue states as a new class of threats as the U.S. searched for a new strategic vision after the end of the Cold War.[73] Some argued that this new threat justified maintaining Cold War level defense budgets and spending in order to prevent too large a reduction in the U.S. military capabilities.[74]

Elizabeth Saunders shared similar sentiments as she approached the topic of rogue states from a more theoretical viewpoint. The U.S. sought to exercise and establish its power in the unipolar system by casting out certain states from the international society. She traced the criteria to a synthesis of security concerns and democratic peace theory, where rogue states threatened the U.S. transformation of the international community, sought to acquire WMDs, and whose authoritarian governments lacked legitimacy due to their oppressive actions on their own populations.[75] Interestingly, not all authoritative regimes were classified as rogue states, only those who challenged the U.S., mainly Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. As Shireen Hunter illustrated, Saudi Arabia has maintained an extremely close relationship with the West and the U.S. in particular, yet its political structure is one of the more repressive and exclusionary in the Middle East.[76] The development of the rogue state as the new security challenge and its incorporation of a liberal interpretation of the legitimacy of its governments marked the beginning of what would evolve into a foreign policy of invasion of Iraq and democratic change of the region during the W. Bush Administration.

While the U.S. led multinational effort after the first Gulf War was designed to stop Iraq from pursuing WMDs, dismantle any current weapons, and allow for a return to normal relations, the U.S. unilaterally stated its foreign policy goal for Saddam's removal as the only acceptable solution.[77] This dual policy of containment and rollback prevented any resolution, for the U.S. refused to ease sanctions with Saddam still in control, yet the need to keep the UN unified on sanctions limited the U.S.'s ability to apply adequate military force to change the situation. Despite the U.S. exclusion of Iraq and others from normal relations, a majority of

[72] Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 73 no. 2 (1994).
[73] Michael Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), chapters 1,2.
[74] Ibid., 14.
[75] Elizabeth Saunders, "Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude "Rogue States"?" *International Studies Review* 8 no. 1 (Mar 2006): 24-27.
[76] Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West*, 152.
[77] Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 123-126.

other states, particularly in Europe continued to push for and maintain diplomatic relations. This further complicated the Iraq issue as the U.S. remained unsatisfied with the level of pressure on Iraq and the international community desiring more integration as a method for moderating the regime.

As the multilateral sanctions against Iraq slowly began to erode under mounting pressure from Europe, the world witnessed a resurgence in terrorist activity. A Foreign Policy Briefing in 1998 tracked the decline of state-sponsored terrorism to the end of the Cold War, and the formation of new groups of extremists into a loose network of terrorist organizations. It further correlated U.S. involvement overseas to an increase in terrorist attacks against the U.S. during this time, linking 15 events to specific U.S. policy decisions and actions throughout the decade in the Middle East.[78] In a related article, Richard Betts examined this new threat of terrorist groups using WMDs to inflict casualties on the U.S. population rather than directly attack regional military forces. He argued that the Cold War method of deterrence was outdated and unable to address this new threat. Convinced of past U.S. aggression, terrorists were constantly planning attacks but were undeterred by typical Cold War retaliation. Additionally, even if terrorists could be deterred, without knowing their exact location, military strikes were futile.[79] Therefore, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy during the 1990s was more intent on punishing and criminalizing terrorists than addressing and managing underlying causes.[80] The U.S. demonized these rogue states and terrorist groups as evil, demanding their destruction. This growing U.S. outlook prevented any type of diplomatic or negotiated resolution to these issues, making the UN and other international organizations inappropriate tools to deal with the problem.

By the end of the 20th century, the U.S. was dissatisfied with the eroding will of the international community to maintain pressure on Iraq, frustrated by the constraints on its ability to act due to international institutions, and watching as the Middle East seemed to become more volatile. Despite the actual success of sanctions, as argued by George Lopez and David Cortright, U.S. neoconservatives dismissed them as weak and ineffectual while the left despised

[78] Ivan Eland, "Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record," *Foreign Policy Briefing* no. 50 Cato Institute (Dec 1998): 2, 4, 14-21.
[79] Richard Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs* 77 no. 1 (1998).
[80] Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

them due to the humanitarian costs.[81] This factor also contributed to the rise of the Bush Doctrine in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

Throughout the history of the Middle East, the U.S. formulated its foreign policy around security concerns of Israel, stability of anti-communist government, and minimal pressure for liberalization. The U.S. accomplished this by projecting power over the regional states and influencing the outcome of events to maintain the U.S. hegemony. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry dominated the specific policy actions taken to expedite these goals, prompting the U.S. to intervene in some states to roll back the Soviet threat, while bolstering authoritarian regimes in other states to prevent communist influence. The U.S. tried to resolve the underlying regional issue surrounding Israel and Palestine, but in the end was unwilling to sacrifice the ability to influence the entire Middle East region to accommodate a durable peace settlement. Absent from this narrative is any attempt to foster liberal democratic transition, a policy even the leaders of the free world could not consider during the power politics of the Cold War.[82] Notions of regime legitimacy in liberal terms only arose during the 1990s, and then only as a corollary to security and stability concerns. The literature review in the following chapter will expand on U.S. Middle East policy and outline how the U.S. reacted to the September 11 attacks and its effect on U.S. policy formation.

This history of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East illustrated that not all U.S. actions and decisions fit neatly into a single paradigm. While supporting authoritative Middle East leaders did help maintain stability of the state, it also fostered resentment and extremism within certain segments of the population. These feelings manifested into the Islamic terrorist groups the U.S. is combating today. Security was a major objective of the U.S. in its attempt to contain Communism, yet the U.S. steadfast support of Israel, limited the ability to connect with other Middle East states. Changing dynamics within the Middle East region forced shifts in relations, where once an ally such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq quickly became the main cause of instability. Having this overview of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East demonstrated the presence of multiple priorities in U.S. foreign policy and provided a better foundation/context through which to study the objectives and methods of the W. Bush Administration. The following chapter turns to a review of the literature addressing these issues.

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[81] George Lopez and David Cortright, "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," *Foreign Affairs* 83 no. 4 (Jul - Aug, 2004): 94-95.
[82] Baxter, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 4.

Chapter Three: Literature Review

The vast literature surrounding the W. Bush Administration's Middle East policy spans numerous topics that I will organize into four sections, comprised of both policy analysis and scholarly academic research. The first section focuses on the thoughts of major International Relations thinkers after the end of the Cold War but before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 about US policy in the Middle East. The second section illustrates the discussion on the legality of preventive war in Iraq and whether this decision represented a drastic shift in U.S. policy. During the midpoint of the Bush Administration, this debate transitioned into the third section, a discussion on neoconservatism, the term analysts converged around to describe U.S. policy, and what this policy entailed. The final section expands on neoconservative themes and then focuses on evaluating U.S. policy, specifically the democracy promotion pillar in the Middle East. The majority of the literature revolves around the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, which is understandable giving the enormity of this decision and resulting consequences in the region. The literature evolved from this Iraq-centric focal point to broader implications of U.S. policy in the region, with each theme building upon the one before it. Overall though, the Iraq issue remains a central foreign policy focus of U.S. policy during the W. Bush Administration.

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World

The collapse of the Soviet Union and disappearance of the threat of communism in the early 1990s shocked the world and drastically changed the environment of international politics. The lack of a direct peer competitor to the United States erased the bipolar Cold War structure and ushered in an unexpected unipolar moment. International relation theorists were equally taken aback at this abrupt change, but nonetheless sought to incorporate this event into their respective theories to offer both predications for the future and recommendations for appropriate courses of action. The goal of this section is to present a brief outline of major themes in the international relations scholarship after the Cold War to better understand the events after September 11, 2001.

Despite claims that the end of the Cold War represented an end to the evolution of government through the dominance of liberal democracy and the beginning of a drastic shift in the structure of the world political system[83], major neorealist thinkers disagreed. Kenneth Waltz

[83] See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

argued that although the internal distribution of power among states had changed, the overall anarchical international structure had not.[84] States were still driven by 'self-help' in order to maintain their own security and survival.[85] Waltz went further, repudiating notions of democracy, peace and economic integration among states as concepts that would create lasting peace and overcome the conflictual nature of the anarchical structure. Instead he predicted the eventual rise of balancers to the United States as a natural response and argued for prudence in U.S. policy to maintain its power among the rise of these balancers. U.S. unipolarity would be even shorter lived if the U.S. overextended itself in pursuit of non-vital interests. Ironically, Waltz specifically mentioned the dangers of militarizing the push for democracy for the U.S. as one such endeavor.[86]

John Mearsheimer arrived at similar conclusions through his offensive-realism prism. Mearsheimer agreed with Waltz, that the rise of balancers to U.S. power was inevitable and that the best strategy involved restraint and passing the buck to other states to counter growing powers until direct U.S. intervention was required.[87] However, unlike Waltz, who argued that states were capable of moderating their pursuit of security to become status quo powers, Mearsheimer's offensive realism argued that all states pursued hegemonic policies to dominate the overall structure. These attempts would always result in failure because the costs would eventually outweigh the benefits and thus become unsustainable.[88] Glenn Synder synthesized the commonalities between Mearsheimer and Waltz, looking to combine their offensive and defensive realism into a broader theory. Both recognized the growth of balancers to unipolarity, the unlikely hood of continual bandwagoning with a growing hegemony, and thus the instability of the unipolar power distribution. The costs for Waltz's status quo hegemon to maintain the power distribution would eventually grow too great, just as the costs for a domineering hegemon would in Mearsheimer's framework.[89]

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[84] Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," *International Security* 25 no. 1 (2000): 5-6.
[85] The anarchical structure posits that because there is no supreme authority to control or arbitrate among states, states can only count on themselves for survival and are compelled to proactively seek and maintain their security at the expense of other states. For a more lengthy description see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
[86] Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," 11-12, 28.
[87] See John Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," *Foreign Affairs* 80 no. 5 (2001).
[88] See Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
[89] Glenn Synder, "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay," *International Security* 27 no. 1 (2002): 171-173.

Snyder's fusion of Waltz and Mearsheimer is supported by Robert Gilpin's work analyzing the process behind the cost benefit calculation that states make. At some point dominant or hegemonic states spend more attempting to maintain their favorable balance of power, thus allowing revisionist states the opportunity to challenge the established power distribution. For the revisionist states, the benefits of challenging a stretched hegemonic power outweigh the costs.[90] Interestingly, realist thinkers advocated for a moderated U.S. policy in order to delay the rise of regional powers and thus maintain U.S. power, while their own theories indicated that the U.S. would most likely overextend itself and precipitate its own demise. Robert Jervis summarized this point adeptly in that, "something would've triggered an expansion of American active deployed power in the world as we've seen. That's exactly what Realism would lead you to expect, even if Realism thinks this is foolish, bad for the world, and bad for the United States."[91]

Neoliberal institutionalism contains many of the same basic assumptions of the structure of the international system. States are the principle actors proceeding in accordance with their national interests, power remaining an intrinsic variable in determining specific courses of actions, and the anarchical structure of world politics.[92] Both realists/neorealist and neoliberals accept that cooperation between states occurs and that international institutions provide an avenue. The main difference lays in the degree of cooperation and the ability of these international institutions to transcend the anarchical system. Neorealists argued that international institutions are one of many means through which an individual state can achieve its interests, something that neoliberal thinkers understood and agreed with. Robert Keohane, one neoliberal scholar, acknowledged that "the fact that international institutions were used by states to pursue their interest does not demonstrate how significant they will be when interests change."[93] It is the perseverance of international institutions beyond their original intentions, their evolution into organizations with 'minds of their own' that neoliberals expose. They cite the continuation and

[90] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 26, chapter 2-3.
[91] "Robert Jervis Interview: Conversations with History," Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, November 17, 2005, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/people5/Jervis/jervis-con1.html.
[92] James Dougherty and Robert Pgaltzgraph, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2001), 68.
[93] Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 294-295.

expansion of NATO during the post-Cold War period, the growth of the European Union and permanence of the United Nations as a guarantor of legitimacy of state actions as proof of this theory. Even realist thinker Robert Jervis, who still maintains that most institutions are a result of state's desires to cooperate rather than the force behind cooperation, acknowledges that in certain circumstances institutions may foster unintended consequences beyond initial state's desires.[94] It is in these situations that neoliberal institutionalism needs further exploration.

The post-Cold War environment proved an interesting time for neoliberal institutionalism thinkers. On one hand, the continued perseverance and prevalence of the UN, NATO, and EU in confronting world issues and the continued support of the United States through the Clinton Administration provided support for the ability of these institutions to help bridge the anarchical world structure. On the other hand, the volatility and rise of ethnic conflicts in Africa, Asia, and even within Europe itself and the inability of these same institutions to prevent actual conflict illustrated continuing shortcomings. Ultimately, neoliberal scholars maintained the usefulness of institutions, attributing the success of the U.S. during the Cold War and its rise as a hegemon to its use of institutions to further cooperation. Beeson and Higgott argued that this success continued in the post-Cold War world because the U.S. was more effective by indirectly influencing other states through institutions and intergovernmental organizations that it established during the Cold War and that constrained its ability to act unilaterally.[95] Robert Pape expanded on this point arguing that the constraints that institutions placed on the U.S. both during and after the Cold War helped reinforce its reputation for non-aggressive actions. Pape saw this non-aggressive stance as especially important for the U.S. to prevent the growth of balancing states in a unipolar world.[96] Interestingly, both neoliberals and neorealists arrived at similar warnings for the U.S.: overly demonstrating U.S. power above other states and the international system would be the quickest way to squander the preponderance of U.S. power.

The U.S. had numerous options available in how it executed its foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The majority of international relation theorists advocated for moderation and caution in wielding and demonstration power and force. Using international institutions to share costs of maintaining favorable regional dynamics and using a surgical

[94] Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24 no. 1 (Summer, 1999): 61-63.
[95] Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, "Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Third World Quarterly* 26 no. 7 (2005): 1173-1174.
[96] Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30 no. 1 (Summer, 2005): 7-8.

application of force to deny rival states offered the best chance for the U.S. to navigate the unipolar system. Initially, the W. Bush Administration seemed to chart this course. However, the terrorist attacks in September 2001 drastically changed the perceptions and definitions of security and helped precipitate the growth and application of a more aggressive and widespread foreign policy. By measuring three principal components of U.S. policy, this paper will illustrate if/how U.S. policy changed during the Administration and if the aggressive posture towards Iraq applied across the entire region or only to specific states.

Post 9/11 World and Invasion of Iraq

Political commentary and academic analysis began to scrutinize the W. Bush Administration's Middle East policy during the buildup and immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Without a UN Security Council resolution authorizing force, and lacking key support from European and NATO allies, critics of the invasion lambasted the end of U.S. multilateralism. Immediately, political commentators flocked to discuss its repercussions. Robert Kagan argued that the U.S. has always acted unilaterally when its strategic goals were threatened, only now in a unipolar world did other states interpret U.S. actions as imperialistic.[97] Kagan specifically cited NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without the backing of the Security Council, as another example of necessary unilateral action. He attributed the backlash of the 2003 invasion to a growing divide with Europe over visions of international order. During the Cold War, the U.S. "did not consider it necessary to seek the approval of the Security Council to make or threaten war, and Europeans did not expect or demand that it should,"[98] but now Europe, fearing that it was losing influence in the international system, interpreted U.S. foreign policy as unilateral and imperialistic. In a scholarly vein, Robert Jervis agreed, reasoning "what critics call unilateralism often is effective leadership"[99] and since the structure of the international system changed to a unipolar world, so too had the interpretations of U.S. actions. The U.S. initially attempted to use its hegemony through the international institutions that it had built after World War II, to further its objectives in the Middle East. However, when these institutions failed to fall in line to its desires, the U.S. simply bypassed them altogether. In

[97] Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82 no. 2 (2004): 69-70, 77.
[98] Ibid., 67.
[99] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 18 no. 3 (Fall 2003): 375.

essence, the U.S. did attempt multilateral consensus, but rather than compromise on its objectives to achieve it, it instead selected groups of states willing to follow U.S. desires.[100]

Other political analysis disagreed with these views. John Ikenberry argued that the invasion of Iraq and subsequent new U.S. strategy was moving away from traditional use of international institutions. The strategy contained imperial designs, which enhanced U.S. sovereignty to the detriment of other states, ignored international rules, treaties, and security partnerships, and proposed destabilizing specific states in order to remove their dangerous and evil regimes.[101] Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson specifically responded to Kagan's earlier opinion, instead arguing that previous U.S. foreign policy actions represented a commitment to consensual modes of decision-making and adherence to international norms and law.[102] Despite the claims of reserving the right to take unilateral action for national defense, the U.S. regularly sought and obtained international recognition of legitimacy for intervening action. Therefore, they viewed current U.S. policy in the Middle East as a radical shift away from U.S. leadership in the international system towards one of complete dominance.

Imperialism and hegemony are common concepts mentioned in the above discussion. The unilateral methods of the U.S. had negative connotations and led towards views of imperialistic designs. Campbell Craig argued that it is a combination of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar structure that fosters unilateral action and can lead to imperialistic objectives. For Craig, U.S. foreign policy represented a mix of preventing the rise of any rival with an expansionist drive that actually reduced security, which is the main element of his definition of imperialism.[103] Hegemons therefore had a tendency to overextend their reach pursuing objectives that ultimately undermined their security even as they attempted to maintain it. Jervis argued that hegemons must behave differently than the other states in the system to maintain the established order, and this is what the U.S. sought to accomplish.[104] Building off of Mearsheimer's offensive realism, Carlos Yordán saw the W. Bush Administration's policy as the first step of the U.S. as a regional hegemon after the Cold War towards global hegemony. The

[100] Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," 374.
[101] G. John Ikenberry, "American Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs* 81 no. 5 (2002): 53-55.
[102] Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, "The Sources of American Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83 no. 6 (2004): 21-22.
[103] Campbell Craig, "American Realism versus American Imperialism," *World Politics* 57 no. 1 (Oct 2004): 160-161.
[104] Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," 376-377.

unipolar movement, shock of terrorist attack and dislike of Clinton policies enabled a more offensive foreign policy.[105]

Numerous international relations theorists were extremely critical of the W. Bush Administration and its decision to invade Iraq. Robert Gilpin authored a highly critical assessment arguing that the collusion between ultranationalists and the neoconservatives for intervention blocked any serious dissent from the military and professional policy makers. Ultimately Gilpin reasoned that this disastrous decision and constant restructuring of the rationale behind intervention would result in numerous tragic and yet unidentified consequences and limit the U.S.'s ability to respond to them.[106] Other noted realists also lent their voices in opposition to the invasion. In a collaborative statement, Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, John Mearsheimer, Randall Schweller, Stephen Walt, and Kenneth Waltz outlined why war with Iraq was not in the U.S.'s immediate national interest. Their main arguments included the fact that the threat of Iraq was overblown, there was potential to release more instability in the Middle East by upsetting the power balance, and there was a lack of plausible exit strategy from military operations.[107]

Jervis reasoned that Bush's policy in the Middle East, starting with the Iraq invasion, was not going to be successful or sustainable in the long run due to international and domestic pressure.[108] Waltz reasoned that by attacking Iraq to prevent its acquisition of WMDs would only force other states to acquire them at a faster rate. In leaving North Korea alone and concentrating on Iraq, the U.S. proved that having WMDs prevented U.S. intervention.[109] If the goal was to increase U.S. security by limiting the spread of WMDs, the U.S. actions precipitated the exact opposite. Mearsheimer, drawing on Hans Morgenthau, expanded on the dangers of framing this conflict in good versus evil terms, and restated his notions of hegemonic overstretch and rise of balancers as a result of this policy.[110]

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[105] Carlos Yordán, "America's Quest for Global Hegemony: "Offensive Realism, the Bush Doctrine, and the 2003 Iraq War," *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* no. 110 (August 2006): 126-128.
[106] Robert Gilpin, "War Too Important," 14-17.
[107] "War with Iraq Is Not in America's National Interest," accessed October 14, 2013, mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/P0012.pdf.
[108] Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," 23; and "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," *Political Science Quarterly* 120 no. 3 (2005): 359.
[109] "Kenneth Waltz Interview: Conversations with History," Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, February 10, 2003, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/people3/Waltz/waltz-con6.html.
[110] John Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-conservatism," Open Democracy, May 18, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp.

Not all reactions were as negative and pessimistic as those coming from the realist camp. In an interesting article, Press-Barnathan discussed the W. Bush Administration's foreign policy through the lens of Hedley Bull anarchical society of states. He argued that by combining the fear of terrorism and WMDs with Iraq, the Bush Administration effectively transferred a transnational non-state issue of international terrorism back towards a state centric issue of rogue states. This was a U.S. attempt to maintain the society of states in the face of globalization's blurring of state sovereignty. Press-Barnathan also agreed with the logic of moving from deterrence of the use of WMDs to the prevention of development of WMDs as the way the world hegemon, the U.S., manufactured change in the new system of balance of power.[111] Overall, Press-Barnathan had an understanding of why the U.S. invaded Iraq and a tempered optimism on its chances of success.

Kenneth Pollack and Ronald Asmus provided a neoliberal take on U.S. policy offering initial support for the invasion of Iraq but cautioning against an overly militaristic application of force as the basis of a foreign policy. They aligned themselves with the emerging acceptance of the neoconservative movement in desiring democratic change throughout the world, but then quickly shifted focus to promote effective nation building, international leadership and solutions to the Israeli-Palestine dispute.[112] Here we see support for the end state goals of the W. Bush Administration, but reluctance and a general hesitancy on the forceful methods proposed to accomplish them. In a similar vein, Robert Looney presented a neoliberal economic perspective on U.S. policy in Iraq, which illustrated that Iraq was the test case for creating economic reforms in the Arab World. He argued that the Bush Administration linked free market economic reforms and government liberalization together. Thus to create a modern economy, Iraq's governance must be completely transformed. Unfortunately, the problem with economic liberalization is that it creates short-term risks, such as unemployment, bankruptcies, and increased concentration of wealth, which in turn can lead to political instability and generate backlash.[113] Thus, the liberalization of Iraq's economy was a major factor undermining the U.S. effort to create and functioning government.

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[111] Galia Press-Barnathan, "The War against Iraq and International Order: From Bull to Bush," *International Studies Review* 6 no. 2 (Jun, 2004): 196, 198-199.
[112] Kenneth Pollack and Ronald D. Asmus, "The Neoliberal Take on the Middle East" Brookings Institution, July 22, 2003, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2003/07/22middleeast-asmus.
[113] Robert Looney, "The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraq's Economic Transition," *Middle East Journal* 57 no. 4 (Autumn, 2003): 575.

However, most neoliberal institutionalism thinkers like their neorealist brethren, shared negative outlooks for U.S. policy following the invasion of Iraq. The international community saw the military invasion as overly aggressive at a time when the U.S. was also rejecting any institutional restraints on its application of foreign policy. This is turn caused a number of states to question the 'benign hegemon' appearance the U.S. presented and turn towards 'soft balancing': a series of "non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive military actions through international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements."[114] Other authors agreed, arguing that the U.S. desire to transcend the limitations of international institutions only forced the international community to embrace these institutions further.[115] For some this highlighted both the power of the U.S. to act unilaterally despite international opposition as well as its vulnerabilities as it failed to garnish a large enough 'coalition of the willing' to share the military and economic costs.[116] Ultimately, without the international community working in concert, stopping the spread of WMD to rogue states and international terrorists remains a near impossible task, even for a hegemon.[117]

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 may be the hallmark of the W. Bush Administration's foreign policy. The negative reaction for the international community and eventual growing pessimism with the U.S. population forced the W. Bush Administration to continually justify and rationalize the reasons for war and shattering the status quo in the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq does play a large role in this paper as this decision ultimately affected how the U.S. executed its foreign policy to other states in the region. Additionally, the rationale for a more interventionist and preventative foreign policy manifested as the neoconservative movement. This movement capitalized on both the security fears in the aftermath of 9/11 and the preponderance of U.S. power in a unipolar world to reshape U.S. foreign policy. This paper seeks to analyze the trends during the highpoint of the neoconservative movement to see if it adequately explains the application of U.S. foreign policy.

Neoconservatism: A New U.S. foreign Policy?

The argument for a more aggressive and interventionist foreign policy was best explained in David Frum and Richard Perle's book, *An End to Evil*. At the time when most of

[114] Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 10.
[115] Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, "The Use of Force: International Law after Iraq," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 53 no. 4 (Oct., 2004): 794.
[116] Beeson and Higgot, "Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy," 1184-1185.
[117] Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 44.

the U.S. and world was still dealing with the political and security repercussions of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, they provided one of the first looks at the thought process of neoconservatism and unrelenting support for the W. Bush Administration. The entire narrative and prescription on how the U.S. should govern the world represents a repudiation of the multilateralism associated with the Clinton Administration. Diplomacy and international cooperation only hindered the achievement of U.S. national goals, power projection was the solution. Instead of Iraq being an isolated convergence of multiple threats, it was actually the starting point for a democratic militarism to spread universal ideals. Interestingly, Frum and Perle also sought a much tougher stance on traditional allies, specifically Saudi Arabia due to its funding of Sunni extremists worldwide.[118]

As major combat operations concluded and the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq began, the literature then focused more on the specifics of this new U.S. foreign policy. The most easily recognizable term from this debate was neoconservatism, which originated during the Cold War and had now evolved into the rationale behind the Bush Doctrine. Political commentators William Kristol and Robert Kagan highlighted important factors of neoconservatism that would become key components of U.S. decision making in 1996. They described this 'neo-Reaganite' concept as a combination of military supremacy matched with moral clarity, allowing the U.S. to rule as a benevolent hegemon.[119] They advocated for the U.S. to seize the moment of U.S. supremacy in the international system and actively work to preserve it as far into the future as possible.[120]

Francis Fukuyama expanded upon these themes by providing a scholarly analysis of the formation of neoconservatism and its eventual application in the Middle East as military centric in its pursuit of achieving American national purposes. Fukuyama explained that despite the complex roots of the neoconservative movement, the Bush Administration had latched on to specific elements: preemption, regime change, unilateralism, and benevolent hegemony that fit into their preconceived notions of foreign policy.[121] This continued into Bush's second term, when the strong militaristic component of preemption seemed to merge into a push for

[118] David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*, (New York: Random House Inc., 2003), 24-26, 56.
[119] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 75 no. 4 (1996): 19-20.
[120] Ibid., 23.
[121] Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroad: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 7.

democracy promotion. Fukuyama argued that this is when Bush became a true neoconservative, as the notion of remaking the world into a region where democracy could flourish became an established goal of the administration.[122] Remaking the world to promote democratic governments would solidify U.S. hegemony and maintain the unipolar structure through U.S. leadership. The Middle East appeared to be the first case study for this new strategy.

An excellent companion piece to Fukuyama's historical analysis of neoconservatism is Mann's *Rise of the Vulcans*. He traced the careers of the major W. Bush Administration cabinet members: Cheney, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Powell, and Rice, to illustrate how their opinions and viewpoints on foreign policy evolved through recent U.S. history and emerged into a neoconservative doctrine. More importantly, he demonstrated that the September 11 attacks did not reshape the thinking of how the U.S. should execute its foreign policy, but rather provided neoconservatives the opportunity to implement their prescribed foreign policy.[123] Interestingly, while democracy was recognized as the preferred solution to solidify U.S. hegemony, the emphasis was on the efficacy and dominance of U.S. military power as the primary means to reshape the world.[124]

While most other authors shared similar opinions and findings with Fukuyama's and Mann's assessment that the U.S. had taken the opportunity to remake the world order, they disagreed on how seriously the U.S. would pursue democracy promotion in that process. Michael Mazarr presented a different take on the Bush Administration's policy viewing it as an idealist attempt to transcend the limitations of the anarchical structure of classical and neorealism by creating a lasting U.S. hegemony. The U.S. would rise above the international structure and direct international institutions in creating a lasting peace through primacy. Not only would other states be unable to balance the U.S. they would be dissuaded to even try.[125]

Many similarities exist between Fukuyama and Mazarr, particularly the proactive attitude to maintain U.S. power. However, in tracing the thoughts of the decision makers within the Bush Administration, Mazarr explained U.S. policy as a strategic triangle with each corner constantly in tension with the other two. He presented the three corners as, first idealism and commitment to freedom and human rights, second toughness and credibility, and third restraint,

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[122] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroad*, 46, 186-187.
[123] James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York, NY: Penguin Group Inc, 2004), 304.
[124] Ibid., 362-363.
[125] Michael Mazarr, "George W. Bush, Idealist," *International Affairs* 79 no. 3 (May 2003): 510-512, 517.

humility, and prudence.[126] Unlike Fukuyama and some of the additional authors yet to be discussed, Mazarr did not allude to a military centric policy, just that U.S. policy required constant focus to ensure one corner did not come to dominate and overshadow the other two. While not a perfect substitution, these corners match up to the three components of U.S. policy I seek to measure: Stability (restraint), security (toughness), and democracy promotion (idealism). That Mazarr argued that these points are in contention with one another further supports the analytical framework of this thesis.

While Mazarr presented a triad of competing priorities on how he envisioned the Bush Administration to pursue relations with the world, other authors concentrated more on the militaristic aspect that Fukuyama described. In an interesting twist, this group included those who were suspicious of U.S. intentions and reasoned that the U.S. clarion call for democracy and universal rights was more of a cover for militaristic hegemony. Others acknowledged the emphasis on military force, but saw it as the method for forcing the democracy issue, which was a major priority of the U.S., in areas resistant to change.

With nearly a decade serving on the United Nations weapons inspection team to Iraq, Charles Duelfer witnessed firsthand the miscommunication and misunderstandings between the U.S. and Iraq that resulted in the invasion. Ultimately, Duefler recognized the security threat the Saddam region in Iraq posed to the U.S. and its allies in the region. Saddam was a genuine risk leading a rogue state, had a poor track record, and nothing indicated that he would ever accept the UN resolutions and reform Iraq.[127] While the security reasons were more than adequate to justify action, Duelfer found fault in the application of the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. The decision to ban all former Baath party members from helping to maintain basic services and work on reforming the government prompted much of the chaos and unrest within the country. Despite all the talk of regime change in Iraq as a solution to the security situation, "there never seemed to be an adequately coordinated approach to implement it."[128] Duefler agreed with the U.S. rationale to militarily force regime change, but recognized the failure in its implementation.

A majority of foreign researchers and analysts were particularly skeptical of U.S. power. Jorge Heine argued that the Bush Administration viewed international institutions as a constraint on U.S. military power and on its ability to maintain hegemony and beneficial world order.

[126] Mazarr, "George W. Bush, Idealist," 519.
[127] Charles Duefler, *Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq* (New York: Public Affairs TM, 2009), 464, 467.
[128] Ibid., 467, 471.

Setbacks in U.S. objectives were the result of restraining U.S. power within international norms and the way forward was to strengthen military forces even further, occupy trouble states, and enforce imperial conditions.[129] Challenges to U.S. superiority, either from the terrorist attacks in New York or the constant evading of responsibility from Iraq, needed to be met with overwhelming military force and occupation. Muqtedar Khan shared similar skepticism of U.S. desire for worldwide democracy, especially when it came to the Middle East. He argued that democracy was never in the U.S. interest in the past and instead attributed U.S. policies as historically the most powerful barriers to democratization in the Middle East.[130] More importantly, he foreshadowed failure for democracy efforts unless the U.S. demonstrated the same sense of urgency and commitment in rebuilding Iraq and realizing a Palestinian state as it did in the military counter-terror campaigns in the region.[131]

Bruce Russet, in his research of democratic peace theory and methods of democratic transition supported Heine's and Khan's suspicion of U.S. democracy promotion. He argued that the U.S. had re-structured the argument for invading Iraq because no WMDs were found. Furthermore, this *ex post facto* justification was simply a front to legitimize continued intervention in the region.[132] Overall, armed intervention had limited success in fostering democratic transitions, but more importantly, states with no previous democratic experience and states who experienced civil war before or after intervention, had a much lower chance of democratizing.[133] If the U.S. did not aggressively confront these two points, both of which were applicable to Iraq, how serious could U.S. democracy promotion efforts be? Outlining the trends in the three IVs provides one avenue to answer this question.

Other analysts such as Ken Jowitt, John Gaddis, Andrew Fiala, and David Dunn contended that U.S. policy was serious about democracy promotion, but through the use of military force rather than diplomacy. David Dunn attributed the emphasis on military power in U.S. policy in Iraq and the Middle East as a result of the lessons learned from the Vietnam War. Since then, "the American way of warfare is to fight to win massively and quickly… with

[129] Jorge Heine, "Empire Defanged? Non-US Perspectives on US Foreign Policy," *International Political Science Review* 28 no. 5 (2007): 532-533.
[130] Muqtedar Khan, "Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy," *Middle East Policy* 10 no. 3 (2003): 80, 82, 86.
[131] Ibid., 83.
[132] Bruce Russet, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (2005): 396, 405.
[133] Ibid., 400.

overwhelming decisive force."[134] For Dunn, the use of military force does not undermine U.S. support for democracy and universal rights, it is simply one of many parts of U.S. policy shaped by history. According to Jowitt, the Bush Administration altered U.S. policy from supporting democratic transitions to democratic imposition through military support.[135] The outcome is similar, "releasing natural impulses favoring market capitalism, procedural justice, liberal republicanism, and individualism"[136], just the methods have changed. Gaddis argued that the military intervention in Iraq was necessary as a way to shatter the status quo in the Middle East to clear the way for democracy efforts[137]. Lastly, while Fiala cautioned against using democracy promotion as the sole justification for going to war, he nevertheless accepted the positive elements that may arise from its success. The Bush Doctrine envisioned democratic regime change as a primary method of maintaining U.S. security, whether one agrees with the effectiveness of promoting democracy in this manner was another question.[138]

The literature from this section illustrated the multiple viewpoints on U.S. policy as well as the multiple components of U.S. foreign policy. Fukuyama and Mazarr both described the competing objectives and elements that formed during the Bush Administration, while the disagreements in their precedence were covered by other authors. While the above authors use numerous documents and policy statements to justify their arguments, there is a lack of more rigorous quantification and/or measurement of U.S. foreign policy elements towards the region. Besides the invasion of Iraq, much of the other supporting evidence on which these arguments are built was based on generalizations of historical evidence. My research will present additional data to help measure democracy promotion against the military and diplomatic components for the selected period.

Evaluating the W. Bush Administration's Middle East Policy

Lastly, the literature concentrated on an evaluation of U.S. policy, with the success of democracy promotion taking center stage, but also addressing overall security and stability of the region. A large majority of the literature professed negative assessments of U.S. policy and were not optimistic in their future predictions of success. Many described a large gap between the

[134] David Dunn, "Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations': The Bush Administration and Iraq," *International Affairs* 79 no. 2 (Mar 2003): 286-287.
[135] Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change," 37.
[136] Ibid., 38.
[137] John Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," *Foreign Affairs* 84 no. 1 (2005): 12.
[138] Andrew Fiala, "The Bush Doctrine, Democratization, and Humanitarian Intervention: A Just War Critique," *Journal of Social and Political Theory* no. 114 (2007): 29.

high rhetoric behind the push for democracy promotion and the minimal amount of aid dollars and/or programs initiated. Others discussed the sustainability of high levels of U.S. intervention without the support of traditional allies as a constraining factor. While my paper does not comment on the failure or success of the Bush Administration policies, understanding the criticism increases overall understanding.

Steve Radelet first began to evaluate the seriousness of U.S. democracy promotion through his analysis of the Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA) in 2002; however he recognized that the program was too new to judge its effectiveness.[139] Overall Radelet possessed a positive view of the increased emphasis on foreign aid, particularly as a way to demonstrate more soft power to offset military interventions. However, his prophetic warning that without an understanding how foreign aid fits in with other policy objectives and international trade, the MCA and other programs would not yield the desired results was further expanded on by other authors.[140] Most striking was his observation that 16 months after President Bush has announced the MCA, no states had been identified as recipients and no funds had been allocated.

Donna Stewart presented a critical examination of two other democracy initiatives developed after the MCA, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI), both designed to promote democratic institutions in the Middle East to help liberalize the region. Her analysis concluded that "the administration commitment to MEPI appeared more rhetorical than substantive, especially in budgetary terms" and overall failure to coordinate with Middle East leaders lessened the ability to implement democratic reform.[141] Stewart compared the funding levels of these programs against direct bilateral aid (hundreds of millions) and military aid (billions), and found the MEPI and GMEI funds (tens of millions) were at a fraction of the level of the others.[142] Her questioning of the reception of U.S. aid in the Middle East was directly addressed in Sami Baroudi's analysis. Baroudi argued that the overall U.S. record was a failure, with the region less stable, less friendly to the U.S. and not a bit more democratic. This failure was a result of incongruity between how the Bush administration presented their policies and how the Middle East public, intellectual elites, and governments

[139] Steven Radelet, "Bush and Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs* 82 no. 5 (2002): 104-105, 110-112.
[140] Ibid., 115-116.
[141] Dona Stewart, "The Greater Middle East and Reform," 406, 409-410.
[142] Ibid., 406-407.

perceived them.[143] Increased aid levels and lofty goals of improving governance and infrastructure could not overcome the skepticism and mistrust of the Middle East, yielding these programs ineffective.

Ali Allawi's analysis of the W. Bush Administration's attempt to create a functioning democratic government in Iraq following the invasion continued this trend of negative assessments. While Allawi recognized that in theory the U.S. desired a friendly democratic Iraqi government to replace the Saddam regime, he nevertheless concluded that "the Bush administration's position on Iraq, in the immediate aftermath of the war, was riddled with expedient decision-making, departmental infighting, conflicting strategies, and policy incoherence."[144] This unpreparedness for reconstruction, lack of understanding of the historical conflicts between Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations, and the use of terms and ideas not fully understood in Iraqi society, fostered a growing resentment towards the U.S. that could never fully overcome. Allawi argued that by 2004, the U.S. had abandoned the neoconservative goals for a Shia led democratic Iraq to counter growing Sunni extremism in Saudi Arabia and instead sought security and stability with only limited freedoms.[145] Despite the negative conclusions on U.S. policy application, he remained hopeful that Iraq may one day be able to resolve its internal conflicts and transition back into a fully functioning state.

Shireen Hunter expanded on one of the issues that Allawi highlighted: the disconnect between U.S. language on democracy, human rights, and liberalization and its interpretation among the Muslim world. While the U.S. primarily focused on civil-political issues of human rights, Muslim states prioritized social and economic issues at the expense of the civil-political.[146] This disconnect presented one of the major factors undermining the U.S. message on human rights and its ability to affect lasting government liberalization. Ann Mayer agreed with Hunter, arguing that the U.S. remained focused on 18th century enlightenment ideas of government to judge the legitimacy and traditions of other states.[147] Muslim states viewed this

[143] Sami Baroudi, "Arab Intellectuals and the Bush Administration's Campaign for Democracy: The Case of the Greater Middle East Initiative," *Middle East Journal* 61 no. 3 (Summer 2007): 390.
[144] Ali Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 110.
[145] Ibid., 398-399.
[146] Shireen Hunter, "Introduction," in *Islam and Human Rights: Advancing a US-Muslim Dialogue*, ed. Shireen Hunter and Huma Malik (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 5.
[147] Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Evolving Concepts of Human Rights," in *Islam and Human Rights*, 22.

focus as reminiscent of European colonialism and lack of self-determination, thus creating discord in any discussion of human rights and liberalization.[148]

Robert Pastor brought the discussion back to the specifics of Iraq, expressing that many Muslim states thought the U.S. was disingenuous about democracy promotion because it was wrong about Iraq WMDs and because it afforded different treatments to allies than to adversaries. Muslim opinion on U.S. democracy promotion is marred by a hypocritical history of shrouding national interests with human rights, complicated by bureaucratic hurdles and divisions between U.S. branches of government to affect a consistent foreign policy, and compromised by an attempt to balance ideals and interests.[149] Overall, these authors see value in engaging Muslim states on human rights and democracy promotion. However, for the U.S. to be successful, it needs to stop talking about human rights past Muslim states and recognize how its actions in the region as a whole affect the opinions of the population on the sincerity of U.S. desires.

Jeremy Pressman provided a critique of the entirety of the Bush administration, concluding that overemphasis on military force, insufficient reliance on diplomacy, and an unwillingness to learn and adapt, presented a hypocritical face which undermined U.S. goals, specifically democracy promotion.[150] For Pressman, the U.S. failed to eliminate terrorist networks, stabilize the region and promote democracy not because these goals were unattainable, but rather because they could not be attained simultaneously.[151] Tamara Wittes argued that the U.S. did not promote democracy equally throughout the Middle East and concentrated on adversarial states which lacked strong institutions. This made them less susceptible to transitions towards democracy in the first place. Additionally, the U.S. constantly faced the conflict between short-term security goals versus long-term democracy goals in friendly Arab states, with the former trumping the later.[152] Katerina Dalacoura provided an alternate position, which argued that the Bush Administration was serious about democracy promotion, which increased attention to lack of democracy in the region and initiated a debate on prospects for reform.

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[148] Mayer, "Evolving Concepts of Human Rights," 18.
[149] Robert Pastor, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Reconciling Ideals and Interests," in *Islam and Human Rights*, 110-111.
[150] Jeremy Pressman, "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East," *International Security* 33 no. 4 (2009): 150-151.
[151] Ibid., 169-170.
[152] Tamara Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2008), 17-18, 80-81, 84-85.

However similar to Wittes, she attributed limited success due to the misunderstanding that democracy promotion was part of a wider set of interests and policies, and not the primary focus.[153] While the U.S. encouraged friendly Middle East states to liberalize and acknowledged even the smallest of progress, it combined security issues with democracy reform in adversarial states demanding immediate and significant progress.[154]

The issue with these evaluations is that they disagree on the priority of U.S. policy goals and do not provide a systematic analytical framework to evaluate US foreign policy towards the region. Radelet and Stewart provided some data on the funding of various reform programs; this data is limited to only a portion of the Bush administration and to projected allocation of funds. My analysis will cover the entirety of the administration, measure funds distributed to each state, and illustrate the trends of the three policy priorities to more accurately determine overall US foreign policy. The other authors addressed the democracy promotion element of U.S. policy and presented differing conclusions on its importance and viability. While Wittes argued that to date democracy promotion had not been successful, a correct approach could yield better results.[155] However, since democratic transitions are long processes, is it useful to expect immediate change? While my analysis does not attempt to evaluate the success of U.S. policy, it will provide data to support more comprehensive conclusions. The trend analysis will show if there was a comprehensive push for democracy promotion throughout the region, or if the U.S. was more selective. The same goes for the other two policy priorities. Most of the negative analysis during this period criticizes the W. Bush Administration for its lack of finesse in dealing with different states: the measured data offers a way to test this claim. Pressman's argument on the incompatibility between various U.S. objectives translates well within the analytical framework. Again, the measurement of specific policy actions should combine well with his measurement of results. Overall, this thesis seeks to fill in the void by empirically measuring U.S. policy priorities, thus providing more clarity to policy evaluation.

While the above themes are not the primary focus of this analysis, some of the elements raised during these discussions are relevant, specifically the establishment of a unipolar world and U.S. hegemony. My goal is not to determine the legality of U.S. actions, discuss unilateral

[153] Katerina Dalacoura, "US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique," *International Affairs* 81 no. 5 (Oct 2005): 974, 978.
[154] Ibid., 968-969.
[155] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 102-145.

versus multilateral actions, or comment on imperialistic goals. Rather it is to provide a more accurate analysis and understanding of overall U.S. policy in the Middle East region. The points raised by these authors and theorists do illustrate the contrasting opinions on the basis for U.S. actions and what it means to the international structure. My analysis will constitute a test of some of these opinions by presenting data on what the focus of U.S. policy was in the Middle East overall, not just towards Iraq. This data can also be used to compare policies of previous and future administrations, in addition to providing additional context for discussing U.S. policy.

Chapter Four: Policy Priority Trends and Analysis of the W. Bush Administration

This section will present the measured data of the three policy priorities; stability, security, and democracy promotion, provide descriptions of trends during the W. Bush Administration and provide a context of major events. As described in the limitations section, certain states provided large amount of data, while others had more limited contact with the U.S. and therefore yielded less data. While lower amounts of data can limit the analysis, it also indicates which states were important to U.S. foreign policy, and which states were less important.

Bahrain

The Kingdom of Bahrain plays an important calculus in U.S. Middle East policy, primarily due to the location of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet Command headquarters in the capital of Manama, but also due to the importance to Saudi Arabia as a check against Iranian influence. The ruling government is comprised of the population minority Sunni, while the majority Shia is minimally represented and remains on the lower levels of society. Overall, Bahrain experienced a steady measure on the stability policy priority, a sharp spike in the security policy priority during the invasion of Iraq that decreased and then leveled out throughout the rest of the time period, and an increase in economic aid for the democracy policy priority. The raw data in Appendix A illustrates these trends.

As Figure 1 shows, Bahrain experienced a positive trend line in the Treaties in Force, beginning with 13 in 2001, signing two agreements in 2004 to rise to 15, and then signing one additional agreement in 2007 to rise to a total of 16. The number of bilateral agreements increased by three, with the most significant being the free trade agreement signed in 2004. This occurred near the Iraq invasion and could be related to maintaining stability in the Bahraini government by improving economic opportunities. For the bilateral state interaction measurement, the data was more sporadic, although the trend line indicated a slightly negative slope. There were two interactions in 2001, which dropped to one in 2002, before peaking in 2004 with three interactions. The data again dropped to a low of zero in 2007 before spiking again in 2008 at three interactions. These interactions involved a fairly even mix of phone conversations and high levels visit to Bahrain. The years 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2008 had the highest number of state interactions. The high levels during 2001, 2003-2004 corresponded to

the terror attacks in New York and invasion of Iraq and the increase of U.S. presence in the Middle East. This demonstrates a desire of the U.S. to maintain positive relations during turbulent times and solidify support with a key ally.



(Figure 1: Bahrain Stability Policy Priority)

As Figure 2 shows, the security policy priority illustrated the widest change, roughly approximating a bell shape curve with peaks for both troop levels and military aid in 2003-2004 before decreasing. The U.S. based approximately 725 troops in Bahrain in 2001, which sharply increased to a high of 4500 in 2003. After 2003, the number of deployed troops decreased, first to 3000 troops in 2004 and 2005, and then down to approximately 1400 for 2006 and 2007, with a final total of 1324 troops in 2008. Overall the trend line was negative due to the early peak in 2003 and reduction from this high level. However, the number of deployed troops in 2008 was approximately double the measure from 2001. For military aid, the data increased from a low of only 235,000 dollars in 2001 to 90.4 million dollars in 2003. In 2004 aid levels dropped to approximately 25 million dollars and slowly decreased before sharply dropping to 5.8 million in 2008. The raw data on page A-1 illustrates that FMF comprised the vast majority of military aid levels and is responsible for the dramatic increases and decreases in the overall data. NADR funds were not provided until 2005 and IMET funds never surpassed the 100,000 dollar mark.

Years 2002 and 2003 witnessed a sharp increase in both deployed troops and military aid. By 2008, both the troop levels and military aid were significantly reduced from the 2003 peak, but remained much higher than the 2001 levels. This is best explained by the location of the U.S. Navy's main headquarters for the Middle East in the capital city of Manama. This facility received upgrades and expanded to handle the influx of personnel needed to support the robust military presence in the Arabian Gulf and Iraq due to increased operations and the Iraq invasion.

The U.S. maintains a large logistics center in Bahrain for equipment repair, and is the major hub for personnel movement into and through the region. As the military presence in Iraq began to draw down, so too did the security policy priority measurement in Bahrain.



(Figure 2: Bahrain Security Policy Priority)

Per Figure 3, the democracy policy priority was sporadic, with peaks and valleys throughout the period. Overall, the trend line was positive as aid increased nearly tenfold from 2001 to 2008. Development aid increased in 2002 and 2003 before dropping to zero in 2004. Aid increased again for 2005 and 2006 before dropping again in 2007. Aid then sharply peaked in 2008 to a high of 185,000 dollars. Each two year increase in aid was more significant than the previous rise and each drop had a higher floor. Despite the positive trend in aid levels, economic aid remained significantly below that of military aid. The USAID interactive programs map indicated no aid programs established or in progress in Bahrain during the period. However, the U.S. Department of State's document *Supporting Human Rights and Democracy* report presented a broad summary of the U.S. involvement within Bahrain indicating the promotion of "the rule of law, greater political participation, freedom of the press, judicial reform, civil society development, labor rights, the protection of foreign workers, and actions to combat trafficking in persons."[156] However, this data was only supplemental since there is no consistent measurement from this source on all states. Therefore, the economic funds constitute the sole measure of democracy policy priority.

[156] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006*, 11411(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), 154.



(Figure 3: Bahrain Democracy Policy Priority)

Overall, the U.S. policy towards Bahrain indicated an increased priority to promote democracy, unchanged priority to maintain stability, with security only a concern during 2002-2004 before decreasing. The stability policy priority demonstrated a neutral trend, confirming the stability hypothesis. The security policy priority peaked in 2003 before decreasing for the rest of the period, which indicated its importance only during the initial invasion of Iraq and uncertainty surrounding the terror attacks in late 2001. The negative trend in the security policy priority does not confirm the security hypothesis. This could be explained by the use of a regional security proxy, which is beyond the scope of this paper, reallocation of military units/funds to more important states, or a decrease in priority of Bahrain security. The democracy policy priority demonstrated a solid positive trend, confirming the democracy promotion hypothesis. While the trend analysis indicated that the U.S. priority was on democracy promotion, the difference in amounts of economic aid and military aid is vast. The highest amount of economic aid was lower than the lowest amount of military aid. The trends indicated a mix of neoliberal and neoconservative U.S. foreign policies towards Bahrain. Because of the neutral stability trend, coupled with a negative security trend and positive democracy trend, the U.S. demonstrated a more benign influence in promoting democracy, as opposed to outright hegemonic pressure. While initially the foreign policy was neoconservative, during the brief security increase, overall it was neoliberal.

Egypt

Egypt has remained a stalwart U.S. ally since it signed a peace with Israel in 1979 and began receiving a robust aid package from the U.S. Its control over the Suez Canal, a vital

waterway linking Europe with the Middle and Far East regions, made Egypt a critical part of any security and economic calculations as both military vessels and cargo ships traverse the waterway every day. President Hosni Mubarak maintained power in Egypt throughout the period and the military elite control much of the economy and wealth. Overall, Egypt experienced a very slight positive trend on the stability measure, neutral trend on the security measure, and a neutral trend on the democracy measure, with an overall decrease in funding, yet also a significant increase in active aid programs.

Per Figure 4, state interaction comprised of a mix of both diplomatic travel to Egypt as well as direct conversations between President W. Bush and President Mubarak. Interaction increased from 2001 to a peak of eight in 2003 before dropping to five interactions in 2004-2005. Interactions then steadily increased to another peak of eight in 2008. Most phone conversations with Egypt correlated with upticks in violence between Israel and Hamas/Hezbollah, which indicated the importance of Egypt in the Arab-Israeli peace process and the necessity to maintain a stable and friendly government to prevent any escalation. The Secretary of State visited Egypt every year throughout the period and there were additional interactions at conferences and multistate meetings. Most of these meetings revolved around the Israeli-Palestinian issue. There was no increase in the number of bilateral agreements. Overall, the stability trend line was slightly positive.



(Figure 4: Egypt Stability Policy Priority)

Per Figure 5, the U.S. maintained a minimal troop presence in Egypt, comprised mainly of trainers and observers to the Egyptian military. Levels remained steady from 2001-2005 at 750 troops, with a sharp drop to a low of 288 in 2007, before increasing nearly back up to 2005

levels at 688 troops in 2008. Overall the trend line indicates a negative slope due to the drop in 2006 and 2007.

Since 1979 Egypt has been the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. The trend line is stable for military aid with minor fluctuations in exact distributions. Peaks above 1.3 billion dollars occurred in 2002 and 2007, with a low point of 1.29 billion in 2006. The majority of this aid has been in the form of FMF, allowing the purchase of modern F-16 fighter aircraft, M-1 Abrams main battle tanks, and Patriot missile batteries.[157] The Egyptian military remained almost completely reliant on this military aid to maintain their capabilities and train to the U.S. equipment, effectively tying the two state's militaries together. George Lloyd argued that the vast amounts of military aid maintains the peace with Israel and prevents the Egyptian military from conducting any actions not sanctioned by the U.S.[158] Despite continuing calls from some Congressmen to reduce or withdraw military aid from Egypt due to lack of democratic and reform progress and the specter of supporting Palestinian terrorism, aid levels have remained constant.[159] There is very little variation in the military aid, averaging approximate 1.295 billion dollars a year throughout the period.



(Figure 5: Egypt Security Policy Priority)

As Figure 6 shows, the democracy policy priority proved the most interesting of the three. USAID programs increased from a low of zero from 2001-2002, to a peak of 24 in 2004, before dropping in 2005 and 2006 to two programs, finishing with a dramatic spike to 68 programs in 2008. The trend line for aid programs is sharply positive. Conversely, the level of

[157] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 13.
[158] See Lloyd, *Road to Tahrir Square.*
[159] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 24.

economic aid fluctuated throughout the period with an overall negative trend line. There were peaks in 2002, 2004, and 2007, immediately followed by valleys in 2003, 2005, and 2008. Overall the level of economic aid decreased from a point nearly equivalent to military aid in 2001, to a level half that of military aid by 2008. While the multiparty elections in 2005 did represent an improvement in Egypt's governance, it was marred by low voter turnout and accusations of fraud. The continued used of the Emergency Law allowed for indefinite detentions and the passage of a press-law that criminalized the vilification of heads of state, limited individual freedoms and allowed for continued human rights abuses.[160] The U.S. protested the imprisonment of opposition politician Ayman Nour in December 2005, which also coincided with the lowest level of economic aid in 2006.



(Figure 6: Egypt Democracy Policy Priority)

Overall, U.S. policy towards Egypt remained constant throughout the period, with the U.S. prioritizing stabile relations in the face of continued violence in the Levant and U.S. operations in Iraq, confirming the stability hypothesis. The security policy priority had a negative trend in troop deployments, but the vast amount of military aid remained steady demonstrating a steady security measure, confirming the security hypothesis. Minor changes in the stability and security measures are more indicative of their overall high levels compared to other states as the conclusion will address further. The democracy policy priority offered mixed results, with funds decreasing at an equal rate that programs increased, demonstrating an overall steady democracy measure, confirming the democracy promotion hypothesis. This reinforces neorealist/defensive realist thinking that since Egypt was a key ally, the importance lay in

[160] *Supporting Human Rights and Democracy*, 156-158.

maintaining the *status quo* as opposed to pushing for democratic reforms above stability and security.

Iran

The U.S. has not had direct diplomatic relations with Iran since the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent taking of over 400 U.S. hostages from the embassy. Any state interaction was conducted through proxies, usually through Swiss diplomats. Because of this state of affairs, there is very little data on Iran on the three policy priorities. Only a single diplomatic interaction was logged in July of 2008 when U.S. representatives met directly with an Iranian envoy during a multi-state meeting in Egypt. There was no increase in bilateral agreements as Figure 7 illustrates. For the security policy priority, there was no direct measurement of troops and no military aid provided. While the U.S. Navy did maintain one Carrier Battle Group within the Arabian Gulf, comprised of one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, four destroyers, one frigate; and one Amphibious Ready Group, comprised of one LHA, one LPD, and one LSD class ships, it did not compare easily with the other states measurements of deployed ground troops. However, with a constant U.S. naval presence in the Arabian Gulf, and combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (on Iran's western and eastern border respectfully), one could argue that the U.S. had effectively surrounded Iran with military forces. Unfortunately, the methodology for this paper is not able to effectively measure this type of data. The one policy priority that yielded adequate measurement was the democracy policy priority, as Figure 8 shows, with an positive trend in aid, peaking in 2004-2005 before decreasing and leveling off during the last three years of the period. As an adversarial state towards the U.S. the stability hypothesis does not apply. With interaction effective zero, I argue that stability in Iran was not a priority for US foreign policy. Without effective measurement on the security measure, the security hypothesis cannot be tested. Overall, the data supports a U.S. desire to promote democracy within Iran over stability and security, which falls in line with neoliberal application of foreign policy and confirms the democracy promotion hypothesis.

(Figure 7: Iran Stability Policy Priority)



(Figure 8: Iran Democracy Policy Priority)

Iraq

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent occupation and reconstruction made the data the most diverse of the states in the Middle East. Early interaction was minimal due to UN sanctions and limited diplomatic relations with the Saddam regime. Post-invasion, there was a dramatic uptick in all three policy priorities, which demonstrated multiple objectives of U.S. policy.

Per Figure 9, the stability policy priority witnessed a positive trend throughout the period, which corresponded to minimal relations prior to the invasion and increasing U.S. involvement in the process of forming a new Iraqi government. New bilateral agreements involved the cancellation of debts, reestablishment of consular property, and reinstatement of military training and education, demonstrated by the increase in 2004, and the strategic framework for friendship and cooperation signed in 2008. State interaction increased from zero in 2003, and continued to climb post invasion, reaching its first peak in 2005 with 15. After a slight decline in 2006, it reached its highest peak in 2007 as the U.S. was advocating for a renewed security agreement and pressuring the Iraqi government to draft and pass a new constitution. In 2008 the interaction dropped to 2004 levels with seven events, most likely due to the passing of the constitution and security agreement in 2007 lessening the need for U.S. interaction. These interactions involved numerous visits of Iraqi leadership to the U.S. as well as numerous phone calls from President Bush to Prime Minister Maliki during the latter half of Bush's second term.



(Figure 9: Iraq Stability Policy Priority)

Figure 10 shows the influx of U.S. combat troops, for military operations, and military aid, to pay the Iraqi military and police force salaries and purchase updated military hardware, both share similar positive trend lines beginning with the invasion in 2003. Troop levels surged in 2003 with the beginning of military operations, only to decrease in 2004 after the invasion was declared a success. Increasing violence between ethnic groups necessitated a surge by U.S. forces which explains the peak in 2005 followed by a gradual reduction in 2006 held steady through 2007 before another gradual reduction in 2008. By 2008 the troop levels had returned to the same approximate level as 2003 (143,000 troops). Military aid gradually increased in 2003 and 2004, before sharply increasing to its peak in 2005. Aid levels then decreased in 2006 through 2008, returning to approximately the same level as 2004 (1.2 billion dollars). The majority of the military aid was marked as military reconstruction funds to pay for the Iraqi police and security forces and build up the decimated military infrastructure.



(Figure 10: Iraq Security Policy Priority)

Figure 11 shows there were only three years that had active USAID programs, 2004 with 18 programs, 2007 with 18 programs and 2008 with two programs. These three data points are enough to generate an increasing trend line, although the actual plot graph looks more sporadic. Active programs correspond to the reconstruction of a state devastated by decades of sanctions and two wars which crippled its infrastructure. For the most part, economic aid mimics military aid in a bell shape curve, albeit at lower levels, with sharp increases towards a peak in 2005. 2006 and 2007 saw significant declines; however a sharp uptick in 2008, actually brought economic aid above the level of military aid for the first time. The trend line for economic aid is strongly positive. The literature review does paint a negative picture of the U.S.'s planning and execution of reconstruction, but the data indicates otherwise; it ultimately did facilitate a democratically elected parliament, president, and prime minister, helped establish some economic reforms, and opened up Iraq to foreign investment.



(Figure 11: Iraq Democracy Policy Priority)

Overall, Iraq is the most complicated state in this research as it represents both an offensive realist application of power to neutralize an enemy and then a neoconservative desire to replace an oppressive and adversarial regime with a democratic representative ally. Looking at the policy priorities throughout the decade, all three produced strong positive trend lines, indicating that stability, security, and democracy promotion were all important factors in Iraq policy. This confirms all three hypotheses. The trend lines support an overall neoconservative application of U.S. policy, the combination of offensive military power and liberal democracy to change the governance of an enemy into an ally.

Israel

As Israel was the only democratic state in this Middle East study, its data was unique. Bilateral agreements increased by a total of nine, with additions in 2002, 2004 through 2006, and in 2008, yielding a positive trend line. State interaction decreased from a peak of 15 in 2001 to a low of two in 2004, before increasing in 2005 and 2006, leveling off in 2007 and increasing again in 2008 to 14. Overall, state interaction had a slightly positive trend line. These interactions revolved around outbreaks of violence in Israel and incursions into the West Bank and Gaza Strip to engage Hamas and Hezbollah. Interestingly, the two lowest years of interaction were 2003 and 2004, during the initial invasion and occupation of Iraq. Figure 12 captures these trends.



(Figure 12: Israel Stability Policy Priority)

Per Figure 13, Israeli military aid had a slightly positive trend line while as Figure 14 shows, its economic aid had a sharply negative trend line. This is a direct result of an agreement initiated in 1999 that would reduce economic aid by 120 million a year and increase military aid by 60 million a year through 2009. Except for a sharp peak in 2003, which coincided with the Iraq invasion, both data points hold to the 1999 agreement. Over 99 percent of military aid came in the form of FMF, for the purchase of weapons and upgrades, with counter terrorism riders totaling less than 1 percent. With Israel an established democracy, there was minimal use for economic aid, while the security of Israel remains the priority.



(Figure 13: Israel Security Policy Priority)



(Figure 14: Israel Democracy Policy Priority)

While the U.S. proclaims to support a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, there is no evidence in the security or stability policy priority that indicated decreased support for Israel. Despite the U.S. urging restraint in the reoccurring Israeli attacks and occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as well as repeated requests to end continued settlement expansion past the borders of the 1967 war, there have been no major repercussions to U.S.-Israeli relations. The CRS report indicates a ten percent reduction in supplemental loans provided in 2003 due to continued settlement expansion, but these funds were on top of those routinely provided and hardly offer a renouncement of Israeli activity.[161] Continued support for Israel defies typical realist logic in that it impedes relations with the other states in the Middle East and negatively affects economic stability and security within the region. Therefore, U.S. policy towards Israel represents neoliberal thinking of maintaining established systems of cooperation between allied states and elements of democratic peace theory. The trend lines support the stability and security hypotheses. As Israel is already a democratic state, the democracy promotion hypothesis does not apply.

Jordan

As a constitutional monarchy, Jordan was noted as being one of the more stable and benign states in the Middle East, important for its assistance in maintaining the peace with Israel and sustaining an image of a moderate Arab state. In the past, the U.S. had engaged with Jordan on an 'as needed' basis, with more interaction during periods of conflict and crisis and less

[161] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 11.

involvement during disagreements and nonthreatening times.[162] This was also evident during the Bush Administration as all three measurements spiked during the prelude and invasion of Iraq and then stabilized for the remainder of the period.

Per Figure 15, the trend line of bilateral agreements had a positive trend line, beginning with President Bush signing a Free Trade Agreement, the first with an Arab state in September of 2001. An agreement in 2003 allowed Jordan to consolidate its debts owed to the U.S. for a more favorable repayment plan, and in 2005 Jordan agreed to train Iraqi police as the insurgency within Iraq was growing. Overall, agreements were level in 2001 and 2002, increased by one in 2003, by three in 2004, one each in 2005 and 2006, two in 2007, and one in 2008. High level state interaction was sporadic in the plot graph (see Figure 15) and actually had a slightly negative trend line. State interaction increased from 2001 to 2003 before dropping in 2004. 2005 had the peak with nine interactions before dropping again in 2006 down to four. 2007 and 2008 were level at five interactions. Increases in 2002, 2003, and 2005 equated to the build up to the Iraq invasion and beginning of the surge to combat the growing insurgency. The U.S. Secretary of State visited Jordan on an annual basis. The majority of these visits coalesced around the Israeli-Palestinian violence and also incorporated joint summits with leaders of Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.



(Figure 15: Jordan Stability Policy Priority)

Military aid gradually increased from 2001 to 2002 before peaking in 2003 with an increase in both military financing and military training and education (see Figure 16). Aid

[162] Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request*, by Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-5700 RL32260 (Library of Congress, 2010), 7.

dropped significantly in 2004 and except for a small drop in 2006, increased throughout the rest of the period. The trend line for military aid is positive. The large spike in 2003 coincided with the Iraq invasion and the smaller spike in 2005 was a result of the agreement for Jordan to train Iraq police officers, and the general increase in military financing provided for upgrades to Jordan's air force through the purchase of F-16s, Blackhawk helicopters and missile defense batteries.



(Figure 16: Jordan Security Policy Priority)

The economic aid measure shows a higher degree of fluctuation, also spiking in 2003 to its highest level and then experiencing a steady decrease from 2004 to 2007 before slightly rebounding in 2008 (per Figure 17). Jordan was the first and only Arab state to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Account, which conditioned the distribution of funds to a minimum level of government freedom and openness. Funds from the MCA increased from 10,000 dollars in 2006 to just over 10 million in 2008. Although USAID maintains a robust presence in Jordan, working to improve governance, women rights, education reforms, economic development and water production, the program map failed to provide any results. An incomplete list from the USAID Jordan site, lists 16 programs spanning from 2002 through 2008, mainly in healthcare, education, and water/economic development. Unfortunately, this data does not provide a consistent picture throughout the Bush administration to interpret trends, leaving just the distribution of economic aid as the sole data point. The trend line for economic aid is slightly negative.



(Figure 17: Jordan Democracy Policy Priority)

Between the two stability measures, the trend line is neutral. This confirms the stability hypothesis as the U.S. maintained interaction with an established ally. The security measure had a positive trend line confirming the security hypothesis, while the democracy measure had a slightly negative trend line, disproving the democracy hypothesis. This indicates the importance of Jordan as a partner state as the U.S. began its military operations in Iraq, and in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. While Jordan is one of the more moderate states in the Middle East, as its inclusion in the MCA indicates; the fact that military aid increased to a higher point than economic aid does not support the freedom agenda and emphasis on democracy promotion that the Bush Administration touted. Having Jordan remain secure and stable during the conflict in Iraq trumped any large strides in democracy promotion. This represents a neorealist/defensive realist application of U.S. policy as well as neoliberal institutionalism in the upkeep of continued interaction to maintain the multi-state peace with Israel.

Kuwait

Although the limited data on Kuwait prevents a more detailed analysis, there were a few visible trends. Both state interaction and bilateral agreement measures had positive trend lines. Increases in bilateral agreements were minimal, with an increase of one in 2002 and one in 2006. The main agreement provided air transportation services for the U.S. military. The peak of state interaction occurred in 2003, which was most likely the result of the U.S. engaging Kuwait during the military buildup and invasion of Iraq. Interaction dropped back down in 2004 and remained steady until another drop in 2007 followed by an increase in 2008 (per Figure 18).



(Figure 18: Kuwait Stability Policy Priority)

The security measure witnessed an increase from 2001 to a peak in 2003. This was followed by a slight drop into 2004, followed by steady levels until they dropped off again in 2007 and remained constant through 2008. The proximity of Kuwait to Iraq, the established military relationship from the first Gulf War, and the ability to use Kuwait as a military transportation hub into and out of Iraq, explained the changes in troop levels (see Figure 19). Kuwait received no military aid. The security measure had a slightly negative trend line as forces were significantly reduced by 2008.



(Figure 19: Kuwait Security Policy Priority)

Kuwait received no economic aid until 2005, which was also the same year the national assembly granted women the right to vote and successful free and fair elections were held. Aid levels dropped in 2006 before increasing to a peak in 2007, and then significantly decreased to nearly zero (9,600 dollars), per Figure 20. The jump in economic aid in 2005 through 2007

produced a positive trend line. Kuwait was assessed as one of the more moderate Arab States and ranked as partly free by Freedom House. There were no active USAID programs.



(Figure 20: Kuwait Democracy Policy Priority)

Overall, the stability and democracy measures had positive trend lines confirming the stability and democracy hypotheses, while the security measure had a negative trend line, disproving the security hypothesis. With the priority on stability and democracy promotion, U.S. policy towards Kuwait indicated a neoliberal foreign policy and a more controlled and benign application of U.S. power and influence.

Lebanon

Major shifts in Lebanon during the W. Bush Administration prompted increases in all three measured policy priorities beginning in 2006. The state itself experienced a wide variety of crisis and conflict, with the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon coming to an end in 2000, right before Bush took office, to the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005, followed by the first generally free and fair parliamentary elections. Despite the inclusion of the militant and designated terrorist organization, Hezbollah into the government, and the negative U.S. press that followed, the Bush Administration nevertheless increased contact and aid levels. Reports to congress outlined a "nearly six-fold increase in aid levels due to its commitment to Lebanon's internal security and economy in the wake of multiple crises between 2005 and 2009."[163]

Both measures of stability had positive trend lines. Bilateral agreements increased by one in both 2006, a military acquisition and cross servicing agreement, and in 2007, a law enforcement and judicial assistance. State interaction increased in 2002 and then decreased in

[163] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, FY2011*, 12.

2003 and 2004 to zero interactions. Interactions increased in 2005 and reached a peak in 2006 at four. In 2007 interactions again dropped to zero before rebounding to three in 2008. Both large increases in 2006 and 2008 occurred around scheduled elections. Figures 21 indicates these trends.



(Figure 21: Lebanon Stability Policy Priority)

Per Figure 22, from 2001-2005, Lebanon had low and steady levels of military aid, focused primarily on counterterrorism and military training in an attempt to bolster Lebanon's internal security forces. These levels increased in 2006 through 2008 due to the U.S. providing FMF. The largest spike was in 2007, possibly a result of the devastating Israeli incursion in the summer of 2006 and the U.S. desire to further strengthen security forces to provide an alternative to Hezbollah. The security trend line was positive and would remain so even if the 2007 outlier was removed.



(Figure 22: Lebanon Security Policy Priority)

As Figure 23 shows, the democracy policy priority experienced a sharp and steady positive trend line throughout the period. Aid programs initially dropped from 12 in 2001 to zero in both 2002 and 2003 before increasing to six in 2004. Following a drop in 2005, aid programs peaked in 2006 at 19 before dropping in 2007 and slightly rebounding in 2008. Economic aid remained fairly constant from 2001 through 2005, then increasing significantly from 2006 through 2008. This coincided with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory in 2006. It appears that the U.S. capitalized on the withdrawal of the Syrian presence and looked to support Lebanese attempts to reorganize their country.



(Figure 23: Lebanon Democracy Policy Priority)

Lebanon was one of the few states to experience a more equal distribution of military and economic aid, which supports the neoconservative agenda of democracy promotion, but with Israel providing the military force vice the U.S. Positive trend lines in all three policy prioritys confirm the stability, security, and democracy promotion hypotheses. The U.S. greatly expanded its influence and power towards Lebanon, particularly after the withdrawal of Syrian troops. This was indicative of a hegemonic power expanding its reach and influence.

Oman

Oman is located in the southern Arabian Gulf, bordering the Strait of Hormuz, the only water access into the Arabian Gulf, on the western side. As Figure 24 shows, both stability measures had positive trend lines. Bilateral agreements increased by one in 2004, 2006, and 2008, for a total increase of three. The most important of these was a bilateral free trade agreement signed in 2006. State interaction was extremely low, with four out of the eight years measuring zero interactions (2001, 2005, 2006, and 2007). There was one interaction in each year from 2002 through 2004 and the peak interaction, two events, occurred in 2008.



(Figure 24: Oman Stability Policy Priority)

Per Figure 25, both security measures had negative trend lines. U.S. troop deployment peaked in 2001, with nearly 700 troops, and then significantly decreased in 2002. Levels held steady until 2006, when they dropped significantly again until reaching zero in 2008. Military aid was at its lowest amount in 2001 (523,000 dollars), before increasing significantly in 2002 and peaking in 2003 at over 80 million dollars. Levels dropped from 2004 through 2006. After a slight increase in 2007, levels dropped to approximately 5 million in 2008. The peak in military aid coincides with the Invasion in Iraq and although the trend line is negative, military aid levels ended at a higher level than the beginning of the period.



(Figure 25: Oman Security Policy Priority)

Per Figure 26, the sole democracy measure was economic aid as there was no data for active USAID programs. The peak in 2007 at approximately seven million dollars, skewed the data and created a positive trend line, when the majority of the data indicated a neutral trend. This peak also makes it difficult to visualize the significantly lower levels of aid in the other

seven years. 2001 started at only 15,000 dollars, rising to 78,000 dollars in 2002 before decreasing to zero in 2003 and 2004. 2005 increased to 20,000 dollars, and the increased again in 2006 to nearly 150,000 dollars. In 2008, aid levels decreased significantly from the 2007 peak to 265,000 dollars, which was still significantly higher than the eight year average.



(Figure 26: Oman Democracy Policy Priority)

Overall, the stability policy priority had a slightly positive trend line, the security policy priority a negative trend line, and the democratic policy priority a positive trend line. This indicated a neoliberal application of U.S. foreign policy towards Oman, focusing on stability within the government, yet pushing for reforms and liberalization. While the invasion of Iraq temporarily increased security concerns, both security measures had negative trend lines, indicating a decreasing priority for security. The data confirmed the stability and democracy hypotheses and disproved the security hypothesis.

Qatar

Qatar is a small island nation off the southern coast of Saudi Arabia in the southern Arabian Gulf. Per Figure 27, while the data for bilateral agreements had a slightly positive trend line, the state interaction measure had a negative trend line. The positive trend line for bilateral agreements was due to one increase in 2004, which upgraded the aviation infrastructure of the country. This coincided with the relocation of the U.S. Military Air Operations Center and basing of U.S. and U.K Air Force squadrons on the newly constructed Al-Udeid Air base south of the capital. State interactions peaked in 2003 at a high of five events. Measurement after this was more sporadic with a decrease to one event in 2004, increasing up to three in 2005, back to one in 2006, zero in 2007, and finally one event in 2008. Based on the single increase in

bilateral agreements accounting for the positive trend line, the overall stability measure trended negatively.



(Figure 27: Qatar Stability Policy Priority)

Per Figure 28, the security measures also had conflicting trend lines, with U.S. troop deployments, in a bell shaped plot graph, yielded a negative trend line, while military aid, yielded a positive trend line. U.S. troops rose from a low of 37 in 2001 to 3300 in 2002 and 2003, before peaking at 6540 in 2004 and 2005. Troop levels dropped in 2006 to approximately 450 and remained level throughout 2008. The trend line was negative due to the consistent low levels in 2006 through 2008. Overall, troop levels increased as tensions in the Middle East rose after the terrorist attacks in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. After the number of air sorties required in Iraq began to decrease in 2006, the troop levels dropped. Military aid had a positive trend line, due to the sharp increase in aid from zero (2001-2004) to its peak of 1.4 million dollars in 2005. Military aid dropped every year after that decreasing to 15,000 dollars in 2008. Increases in military aid also coincided with the decision to move the U.S. military Central Command Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Center for the Middle East from Saudi Arabia. The trend line was positive due to no aid provided during the first four years of the administration, even though the plot graph is bell shaped as well. Overall the security measure has a stable trend line, as the two opposite measures canceled each other out.



(Figure 28: Qatar Security Policy Priority)

Per Figure 29, there were no active USAID programs, and only one year of economic aid distributions in 2008. Since no economic aid was provided from 2001 through 2007, this single data point created a positive trend line. However, due to the timing of the implementation of economic aid coming at the end of the period, it would be presumptuous to declare an overall increase in priority for the entire period. Therefore, the democracy measure had a neutral trend line.



(Figure 29: Qatar Democracy Policy Priority)

The limited data illustrated the priority of security and democracy for Qatar over stability. The data disproved the stability hypothesis and confirms the security and democracy hypotheses. The U.S. sought to influence and increase its power through security and democracy promotion, while minimizing stability concerns. This was best represented by a neoconservative application of foreign policy.

Saudi Arabia

The long standing relationship between the U.S. and the Saudi Monarchy continued during the W. Bush Administration, despite policy differences and the shock of discovering that 15 of the people who took part in the September 11 attacks were Saudi Arabian citizens. According to a Congressional Research Service report, the U.S. and Saudi governments "realized the strategic importance of the alliance, first against Iraq and then to contain Iran, even while their respective populations have grown to mistrust the other."[164] Overall, the stability and democracy policy priority has a positive trend, while the security policy priority had a neutral trend.

Per Figure 30, the W. Bush Administration maintained stable contact with Saudi Arabia, with high level visits to the state, direct phone calls from the President, as well as visits of Saudi King Abdullah to the U.S. Minor bilateral agreements were signed to share civil defense technology and for both environmental and scientific cooperation. There was one increase in 2002 followed by no movement until a two agreement increase in 2008. The trend line for agreements was positive. State interaction was more sporadic but also had a positive trend line. There was a sharp increase from 2001 to 2002 before another drop in 2003. There was another small increase in 2005 followed by another drop in 2006. Interactions increased in 2007 and 2008, when they peaked at nine. Much of the contact centered on U.S. calls to implement the road map peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, during the run-up to the Iraq Invasion in 2002, and during the drawdown from the surge in Iraq after 2006.



(Figure 30: Saudi Arabia Stability Policy Priority)

[164] *Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations*, 12.

The high troop levels deployed in Saudi Arabia through 2002 were remnants of U.S. troops from the first Gulf War who remained in theatre to continue to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein during the sanctions of the 1990s. These were drastically reduced to an observer force of approximately 300 personnel throughout the rest of the period beginning in 2003, as the main U.S. air base transfer to Qatar and military operations began in Iraq. The trend line for troop deployments was negative. Military aid remained minimal until a sharp increase in 2005 and peak in 2006, before decreasing in 2007 and 2008. Due to the significant increase, the military aid trend line was positive. The timing of increased military aid corresponds to the growing insurgency in Iraq and belief that Iran was inciting the Shia population towards violence. With the minority Sunni monarchy ruling over a majority Shia population, security became a larger concern. The increase in military aid came from increased levels of counterterrorism financing (CTF) and Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) riders. Funds for military training and education remained fairly consistent. By 2007, when the military surge had begun to successfully reduce the violence in Iraq, the aid levels decreased. The average of the two opposite trend lines produced a steady line indicating no change in the security measure, per Figure 31.



(Figure 31: Saudi Arabia Security Policy Priority)

The democracy policy priority had a positive trend line. No aid was provided in 2001 and 2002. A gradual increase began in 2003 and 2004, followed by a sharp increase in 2005 and a peak in 2006. 2007 witnessed a sharp reduction and then remained steady in 2008. Large increases in aid coincided with King Abdullah assuming the throne after the death of King Fahd in 2005 and the "continued [pursuit] of an incremental reform agenda."[165] While women were

[165] *Supporting Human Rights and Democracy*, 174.

allowed to vote and run for minor offices in 2006, the lack of concrete reforms and continued human rights abuses by the religious police, spurred the Secretary of State to re-designate Saudi Arabia as a Country of Particular Concern in late 2006.[166] The following year, economic aid dropped significantly, per Figure 32.



(Figure 32: Saudi Arabia Democracy Policy Priority)

The positive trend lines for the stability and democracy measure indicated the priority of these two objectives. The security measure remained steady, which indicated no change in this priority. The data confirms all three hypotheses, maintain stability with established allies, using military troops and funding to project power and security, and promoting democratic reforms regardless of alliance. While the U.S. did prompt Saudi Arabia to reform its institutions and allow for increased religious freedoms, this did not come at the expense of stability or security. Economic aid levels remained well below military aid levels. Saudi Arabia was a strategic ally of the U.S., as a security check against Iran and as a lynchpin to the U.S. economy in its ability to influence the worldwide price of oil. Overall U.S. policy reflects a combination of defensive realist and neoliberal thinking, increasing the priority of promoting democracy, yet balancing this with an increased priority in cooperation and stability, while maintaining the status quo in security.

Syria

Similar to Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, Syria was ineligible for most government aid programs and had minimal direct interaction with the U.S. Per Figure 33, U.S. interaction was intermittent. There were no changes in bilateral agreements. President Bush spoke twice

[166] *Supporting Human Rights and Democracy*, 176.

with Syrian President Bashir Al Assad early in 2001 when relations were cordial, but there was no further interaction until 2003, when Secretary of State Powell visited the state. Relations turned negative due to the growing violence between and Israel and the U.S. designated terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah, from 2004-2005. The U.S. had repeatedly accused Syria of providing support and weapons to these terror groups. The U.S. issued a demarche to Syria for supporting the violence in Iraq in April of 2003, a censure for terrorist support in September of 2003, a recall of the U.S. ambassador in February 2005 in the aftermath of the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and the blocked Syrian funds by the U.S. Treasury in January 2006. Despite the W. Bush Administration's attempts to diplomatically isolate Syria and in direct opposition to White House and State Department desires, Democratic congressmen Bill Nelson (Armed Services Committee) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met with President Assad in late 2006 and early 2007 respectively. Surprisingly, then Secretary of State Rice met with the Syrian Foreign Minister in May 2007 when in Egypt, indicating a slight thaw in relations, the growing need to engage states to assist in the stabilization of Iraq, and a tacit recognition of the Assad regime. Interactions dropped back to zero for 2008. The overall trend line for the stability policy priority was negative.



(Figure 33: Syria Stability Policy Priority)

There was insignificant data on the security policy priority, with Syria receiving no military aid, and no deployment on U.S. troops within the state. However, the U.S. does maintain a substantial naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, of which Syria borders. Additionally, the large troop presence in Iraq on Syria's other border and continued U.S. support to Israel to Syria's south, effectively provided multiple avenues through which U.S. military

pressure could come from. However, there was not an effective method of measuring these points consistent with the methodology.

While Syria was ineligible for direct economic aid, the U.S. obligated funds through a Syria- specific appropriation from Congress to promote democracy and human rights. Per Figure 34, aid levels remained minimal through most of the period. There was a drop in levels in 2002, followed by an increase in 2003 and another decrease in 2004. Aid increased continually from 2005, with a significant jump to its peak in 2008. The democracy policy priority had a positive trend line.



(Figure 34: Syria Democracy Policy Priority)

With a negative stability measure, no security measure and a positive democracy measure, U.S. foreign policy follows neoconservative thinking of pressing for reforms in adversarial authoritarian regimes. The data disproved the stability hypothesis and confirmed the security and democracy hypotheses.

United Arab Emirates

Having successfully transformed its economy into a service and banking conglomerate from oil export, the UAE was one of the more stable and violent free states in the Middle East. The U.S. had maintained friendly relations since its founding in 1971 and as a result of this and its overall stability, the U.S. Navy conducted more visits into the ports of Jebal Ali and Dubai than any other state in the region. Per Figure 35, the stability policy priority had a positive trend line in both the bilateral agreements and state interaction with stable high level visits throughout the period and an increase of four bilateral agreements. There were increases in 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2006 and then remaining level through 2008. Bilateral agreements included increasing cooperation in geospatial and mapping, increased access for air transport, acquisition and

servicing agreements for military equipment, and agreement on surrender of persons to the International Criminal Court. State interaction increased from zero in 2001 to one in 2002 and remained constant until dropping back to zero in 2007. Interactions spiked to its peak of four in 2008. President Bush traveled to the UAE as well as reciprocal travel of the UAE President to the U.S. in 2008.



(Figure 35: UAE Stability Policy Priority)

Per Figure 36, U.S. troops deployed had a negative trend line. Troops levels were constant in 2001 and 2002 before increasing in 2003 and then spiking to a peak in 2004-2005. Levels dropped to its valley in 2006 before increasing slightly in 2007 and 2008. Military aid had a positive trend line (Figure 36). The UAE did not receive any military aid until 2004, which increased to its peak in 2006 before decreasing in 2007 and 2008. All military funds were under the NADR, except for a small amount of IMET in 2008. The timing of increased military aid after troop levels decreased indicated a stable measure for the security policy priority overall. The UAE and Iran have conflicting claims on numerous islands in the Southern Arabian Gulf, and the increasing measurement on the security policy priority partially coincides with an increase in tensions on this matter.



(Figure 36: UAE Security Policy Priority)

The democracy policy priority fluctuated with the UAE receiving funds in only four (2002, 2005, 2007, and 2008) out of the eight years. Aid increased from zero in 2001 to just under 500,000 dollars in 2002. Aid dropped to zero again in 2003, and increased slightly in 2004 and again in 2005. Aid dropped back to zero in 2006, before peaking at 1.8 million dollars in 2007. Aid dropped in 2008. Except for a large distribution in 2007, economic aid was substantially lower than military aid levels. With no active USAID programs, economic aid provides the only data point. The trend line was positive primarily due to the outlier in 2007.



(Figure 37: UAE Democracy Policy Priority)

The data measurement indicated an increase in the stability policy priority, stable security policy priority, and increase in the democracy policy priority. This confirmed all three hypotheses as the UAE was an ally. The data illustrated that the U.S. did promote democracy in the UAE, but not at the expense of the stability of the government. Overall, this aligned with defensive neorealism and neoliberalism in that the U.S. did not risk deteriorating diplomatic

relations or government stability in order to promote a democracy agenda. The U.S. did expend capital influencing the UAE towards its objectives through the security and democracy measures, but also increased state interaction to provide balance.

Palestinian Authority (West Bank and Gaza)

Although the Palestinian Authority was not a sovereign state during this time frame, its long-lasting conflict with Israel, its reverberations throughout the Middle East region, and the W. Bush Administration's support for an eventual two-state solution, required its inclusion. Per Figure 38, high level state interaction fluctuated throughout the period, and yielded a positive trend line. Interaction see-sawed from 2001 through 2006. The years 2007 and 2008 were the only consecutive increases, which also yielded the peak in 2008. Decreases in interaction in 2002, 2004, and again in 2006, were indicative of the declining relationship with Arafat and the election and inclusion of Hamas into the PA government system. Overall relations with Prime Minister Abbas were friendlier than when Arafat was in power. There were no bilateral agreements signed during the period.



(Figure 38: Palestinian Authority Stability Policy Priority)

There was no data for the security policy priority, as the U.S. does not provide any military assistance, nor station any troops in the region. One can argue that the unwavering U.S. support for Israel, during its many military operational incursions into the Gaza Strip and West Bank combatting Hamas, was an application of U.S. military power. The U.S. certainty paid a high price in relations with other states of the Middle East due to this relationship, as indicated in the historical section. However, this methodology provided no direct measurement to draw an analysis from.

Per Figure 39, both democracy measures had positive trend lines. Only three years of the period had active USAID programs, 2005, 2007, and 2008, with the last year peaking at 43 programs. U.S. economic assistance began in 1993 after the signing of the Olso Accords. The majority of the funding, 80 percent, is channeled through USAID, while the remaining 20 percent through private organizations. Per U.S. law, the U.S. cannot provide direct aid to the PA without a President wavier.[167] The U.S. provided direct aid to the PA in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008. The gap in 2006 was due to the election and inclusion of Hamas into a unity government and the decision to suspend all direct aid. Although the U.S. did provide aid to the Palestinian population to prevent suffering through USAID, direct aid to the PA was not restored until Prime Minister Abbas expelled Hamas from the power sharing government. Aid levels increased every year except for 2004 and 2006, with the peak occurring in 2008.



(Figure 39: Palestinian Authority Democracy Policy Priority)

With positive trends for the stability and democracy measures, and no data for the security measure, U.S. policy followed a neorealist/neoliberal application of foreign policy towards the Palestinian Authority. The data confirmed the stability and democracy hypotheses as the U.S. pushed for stability within the PA to help stabilize the region as well as push for democratic reforms and government. The security hypothesis was inconclusive due to no data.

Yemen

The state of Yemen is uniquely situated on the northern border of the Gulf of Aden, a critical waterway that links traffic exiting from the Suez Canal and Red Sea into the Arabian Sea. To the south of the Gulf of Aden is Somalia, which witnessed a tremendous increase in piracy

[167] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 15.

throughout the W. Bush Administration. This would lead some to see the importance of a stable and secure Yemen to counter both the growing terrorist networks in the Middle East as well as the check on the spread of piracy.

As Figure 40 shows, bilateral agreements had a positive trend line with an increase of two during the period. One reduced and reorganized debts in 2002 and the other was agreement to surrender persons to the International Criminal Court in 2003. State interaction had a significantly negative trend line. Interaction was limited to 2001, 2002, and 2004, with the other five years logging no interaction. Both the agreements and interactions occurred during the heighten tensions in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and invasion of Iraq. Overall, the trend for the stability measure is negative.



(Figure 40: Yemen Stability Policy Priority)

Per Figure 41, the security policy priority remained constant. Military aid witnessed a sharp increase from 2001 to a peak in 2002. Military aid decreased in 2003 and then increased to a smaller peak in 2004. The measured decreased from 2005 through 2006, increasing slightly in 2007 before decreasing again in 2008, although the 2008 level remained significantly above the 2001 start point. NADR and IMET funding lines remained steady, with the fluctuation in military aid overall attributed to FMF. There were no troops deployed within the state, however the Gulf of Aden sees a standard international military presence, of which the U.S. usually maintains one to two surface combatants, for a counter-piracy mission. Again similar to Iran and Syria, while this information illustrated the presence of U.S. military, it was not incorporated it into the data.



(Figure 41: Yemen Security Policy Priority)

Per Figure 42, the democracy policy priority had a positive trend line. While the USAID interactive map did not indicate any active programs during the period, the agency did re-open its mission in Sana'a in 2003, which had been closed since 1996. After low levels of aid in 2001 and 2002, funds increased significantly in 2003 and peaked in 2004 at over 40 million dollars. Levels dropped in 2005, increased in 2006 before dropping slightly in 2007. 2008 witnessed another increase to approximately 26 million dollars. Incumbent President Ali Abdullah Saleh, was reelected in September of 2006, which despite reports of irregularities was judged as open and competitive. However, the U.S. State Department did note the difficulty opposition parties had in breaking into the campaign cycle due to the incumbent party's ability to use state funding and resources in its operations.[168] Despite the State Departments concerns, the democracy policy priority indicated little change from 2006 to 2007 and levels actually increased into 2008.



(Figure 42: Yemen Democracy Policy Priority)

[168] *Supporting Human Rights and Democracy*, 181-182.

Overall, the data supports an increasing trend for the democracy policy priority with constant security and negative stability policy priorities. This confirmed the security and democracy hypotheses and disproves the stability hypothesis. Considering the security policy priority had significant levels of military aid, I argue that the priorities of U.S. policy in Yemen were democracy then security, which falls in line with neoconservative priorities of democratizing the Middle East over neorealist desires to prioritize stability and security. U.S. foreign policy towards Yemen illustrated a more forceful and hegemonic application due to the negative trend in stability.

Chapter Five: Conclusions

The research question for this paper was "What was the priority/focus of U.S. Middle East policy during the W. Bush Administration?" I hypothesized that the U.S. would support status quo regimes if it viewed stability as paramount, would demonstrate power projection via its military if the U.S. wanted to maintain security, and provide economic assistance and aid programs to reform non-democratic governments if it wanted to promote democracy. 11 states confirmed the stability hypothesis, three states disproved it, and one state had no data. Nine states confirmed the security hypothesis, three states disproved it, and three states had no data. 13 states confirmed the democracy hypothesis and two states disproved it, making it the most consistently supported hypothesis. Referring back to the literature review, neoconservative foreign policy advocated for such a consistent implementation of democracy promotion.

However, the overall results were not completely consistent with a neoconservative approach, as states had different combinations of trends lines among the three measured policy priorities. This indicated that while the U.S. had overarching objectives for the Middle East region, it tailored its foreign policy to the situation of specific states. This was more in agreement with neorealist and neoliberal foreign policy, where the U.S. would balance competing objectives against desired results to find the right combination. The methodology did not yield enough data for a few states: specifically Iran (on the stability and security policy priorities), Syria (on the security policy priority), and the Palestinian Authority (on the Security policy priority).

Stability

The stability hypothesis (if the U.S. views stability in the Middle East as paramount, then its foreign policy will be to support the status quo regimes) was confirmed for eleven out of the fifteen states. Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and the Palestinian Authority all had positive trend lines for the stability policy priority indicating a U.S. increase in priority of stability for these states. Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are long standing allies of the U.S. and their stability is vastly important. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, through which merchant and military vessels traverse. Its truce with Israel also prevents further escalations in the Levant. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter in the region, vital to maintaining the world economy. Stability in Israel also prevents escalations in the Levant . The

decreased Syrian presence in Lebanon offered the U.S. an opportunity to expand relations and bring resolution to a war-torn state. Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE are friendly with the U.S. and are located in strategic locations for the stationing of military troops, bases, and along the Straits of Hormuz.

Bahrain and Jordan had neutral trend lines, indicating no change in priority. This can be explained by the view in the U.S. that there was no further need to increase support over established norms. Jordan is one of the more moderate states in the region with little terrorist activity and outside pressure against the monarchy. The presence of a large military base in Bahrain may provide an element of stability towards the Bahraini government, lessening the need for the methods of stability measured.

Qatar, Syria, and Yemen experienced a negative trend line, while Iran had insufficient data. The results for Qatar and Yemen were surprising as both are considered friendly to the U.S. and are of particular importance to the region: Qatar for its location in the Arabian Gulf and the location of a major coalition air base near its capital, and Yemen for its proximity to Somali piracy events and efforts to combat Al Qaeda elements within the state. Qatar's location close to Saudi Arabia and lack of direct external or internal threats limited threats to its stability. Added with the presence of a large coalition air base, the U.S. could have reasoned that a decrease in interaction would have no major repercussions. Yemen's government does not have complete control over its territory and faces a growing threat from Al Qaeda. Lack of support may be more indicative of focusing priorities on other goals. The cases of Qatar and Yemen necessitate further study and analysis. The negative trend line for Syria was expected due to the adversarial relationship with the U.S. and its close ties to Iran and Hezbollah.

While the trend lines helped to illustrate the presence or absence of change in the policy priority, a comparison of the overall results provided additional context. States with high levels of interaction experienced shallow trend lines, while those with lower levels were more perceptible to changes. This was particularly applicable to Treaties in Force, which had a slower rate of change than high level state interaction. Overall, the two measures for the stability policy priority matched up closely for most states (see Figure 43). Only Iran, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority had significant differences. There were many agreements in place with Iran dating back from the Shah's reign that are still in force today, but due to poor relations, there is little to no state interaction. The negative relations with Iraq since the early 1990s explained the low

level of bilateral agreements and the high levels of state interaction was a result of nation building after the invasion. As the Palestinian Authority was not a recognized state, there was only one agreement in force, but the importance of mediating the conflict with Israel necessitates a high level of state interaction.



(Figure 43: Stability Policy Priority Comparison)

The high number of neutral and positive trend lines within the Middle East indicated that the U.S. did find the stability of the region as increasingly important in its foreign policy calculus. It also represented a desire to communicate and work with establish governments in the pursuit of other objectives in the region. The comparison graph (figure 43) illustrated that the U.S. engaged most with its traditional allies, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and only on a lesser extent with smaller less important states. According to neorealist theories, world hegemons should use regional allies to cost share in maintaining favorable balances of power and in implementing foreign policy. Neoliberal theories indicated the continued use of established methods of cooperation. The continued interaction with the majority of Middle East states supports these theories. Additionally, the increases in the stability trend lines indicated an effort to balance out any increases in the security and democracy promotion policy priorities, which can be viewed as being more interventionist than collaborative.

Security

The preponderance of the U.S. military as a tool of foreign policy and the discussion of the use of military force to reshape the Middle East in the literature review, would lead to the expectation of across the board positive trend lines in the security measure. However, results were more varied, although there was a consistent spike across most states during the years 2002 and 2003. The security hypothesis, if the U.S. wanted to maintain security in the Middle East, then its foreign policy will be to demonstrate power projection via its military, was confirmed by nine states and disproved by three. Only Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon had positive trend lines fully confirming the hypothesis. The invasion of Iraq epitomizes the hypothesis perfectly as the U.S. used its military to directly counter a threat. The U.S. has consistently provided Israel with military aid and remains the largest recipient. Again, the U.S. seized an opportunity to fill the vacuum left by Syrian withdrawal in Lebanon. Jordan shared border with Iraq and its importance to the peace with Israel help explain its positive trend.

Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen had neutral trend lines, which somewhat satisfied the hypothesis in that the desire for security remained stable. Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. military aid, a provision of its peace with Israel. Even during the increased security threats during the W. Bush administration, the already high outlays for Egypt were satisfactory. For Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, as the U.S. removed troops it simultaneously increased military aid resulting in the neutral trend lines. The preexisting security arrangements did not need adjustment beyond the shift between troops and aid. As the conflict with Iraq continued, reallocating troops to the fight was plausible. Replacing U.S. troop presence with increased military aid demonstrates the U.S. desire for security in these states and offers an explanation for conflicting measurement in the security policy priority

Surprisingly, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman had negative trend lines, and although all three had similar spikes in 2002 and 2003 coinciding with the aftermath of the New York terrorist attacks and invasion of Iraq, they did not confirm the hypothesis. Some of this variation can be explained by the concentration of U.S. forces in Iraq during the invasion and occupation. For both troops deployed and military aid, the shear demands in Iraq may have funneled resources away from other states in the region. For Bahrain, the negative trend in the security policy priority can be explained by leveling off in the personnel stationed at the U.S. military Central Command. The based swelled with extra personnel in the buildup to the invasion of Iraq and

they slowly decreased until leveling off towards the final portion of the administration. Similarly, Kuwait provided a staging ground for troops rotating into and out of Iraq. As the invasion turned into an occupation, the demand lessened for reserves in Kuwait. Initial military aid levels for Oman may have been too high to remain sustainable, especially as security concerns arose in other locations. The draw down towards the end of the W. Bush Administration does account for some of the shifts, but unlike other states, they did not experience an increase in military aid to offset decreased troop levels. Iran, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority had insufficient data for analysis.

The comparison graphs, Figures 44, 45, and 46, also provided interesting results. Except for Iraq, ranked first for both military aid and troops deployed, the U.S. used a combination of deploying troops and military aid to project security throughout the region. For the most part those states receiving the most amount of aid had lower totals of U.S. forces deployed within their territory, specifically Oman, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen. The converse was also true as those states with more troop presence received less in military aid, specifically Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Bahrain was the only state to have moderate levels of both troops and military aid, which corresponded to the presence of the U.S. Central Command and Naval Fifth Fleet headquarters in the capital.



(Figure 44: Deployed Troops Comparison w/o Iraq)[169]

[169] Iraq is excluded from the graph to better illustrate the lower troops levels in the majority of states. Iraq troop levels are nearly 7 times higher than those of Kuwait, totaling 936,900 for the eight years of the administration.



(Figure 45: Military Aid Comparison Top 4)



(Figure 46: Military Aid Comparison Remaining)[170]

The imperialistic themes from the literature review that hatched from the invasion of Iraq and neoconservative freedom agenda created an expectation of regional increases in security projection via the U.S. military. Iraq certainly fits this definition and remained a huge undertaking throughout the W. Bush Administration. However, the majority of the trend lines indicated steady or decreasing priorities for security. Of those states with positive trend lines, only Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon met the expectation. U.S. actions aligned more with offensive neorealism with regards to Jordan and Lebanon as the U.S. took advantage of situations to increase its security umbrella. For those states with stable trends, there was no need to expend the capital to increase security projection and therefore aligned with defensive neorealism as security partners. Additionally, those states with negative trend lines required lower levels, allowing for reallocation of military forces and capital to other states. All of this pointed to a more nuanced implementation of security than simply across the board policy for the entire region.

Democracy

The democracy promotion policy priority yielded the most consistent results across the region. The democracy promotion hypothesis, if the U.S. aims at democracy promotion, then its foreign policy will be to implement economic aid and assistance programs to reform non-democratic governments and strengthen existing democratic institutions, was confirmed by the eleven states with positive trend lines and one of the two states with neutral trend lines, and

[170] Iran, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Syria had no Military Aid provided.

disproved by one of the two states with negative trend lines. Israel was one of the two states with a negative trend line, which would be expected for an already democratic state, leaving only Jordan as a moderate constitutional monarchy yielding a decreasing democracy priority. Without any data on assistance programs in Jordan, the decreasing levels of economic aid provided the measurement. As one of the more moderate governments in the Middle East, pushing for modest reforms should have been an easy commitment in Jordan. One explanation may be that the U.S. sought to make gains in states that had much more to accomplish to democratize than one that seemed to be already on its way. Additional research is needed to fully understand this situation.

Egypt's neutral trend line was a function of decreasing levels of economic aid combined with an increasing number assistance programs. This could be a shift in tactics in democracy promotion in Egypt or merely a balancing of democracy promotion against the other policy priorities. For Qatar, although the trend was neutral (once excluding the one year outlier), the economic levels were consistently at zero dollars. Combined with zero assistance programs, this neutral trend line does not actually support the democracy promotion hypothesis. More analysis is needed to understand the situation with Qatar.

This nearly consistent across the board application of democracy promotion mirrored the neoconservative strategy of pushing for democratic reforms regardless of alliance to the U.S. and confirms the democratic hypothesis. Neorealist theories did not advocate for such broad implementation of foreign policy and cautioned against concentrating too much on the internal workings of states in policy calculations. However, the comparison graphs in Figures 47 and 48, provided additional context and tempered the result from the trend lines due to the large disparity in funds distributed across the region. Egypt and Jordan, with neutral and negative tend lines respectively, are in the top six recipients of economic aid with totals for the eight years in the billions of dollars (see Figure 47). The remaining states with positive trend lines had aid levels at much lower levels, only in the low millions (see Figure 48). An additional, weighed comparison would be useful but goes beyond the scope of this thesis.



(Figure 47: Economic Aid Comparison Top 6)



(Figure 48: Economic Aid Comparison Remaining)

This comparison data supports Wittes' conclusions that the U.S. was seriously about democracy promotion but is inconsistent in its application across the Middle East. The fact that the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iran ranked above other established allies, such as Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia also supported Wittes' argument that the U.S. concentrated democracy promotion on more adversarial states than allies. However, these levels are dwarfed by the aid to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. The general trend was positive for the region: however, the varying aid levels clearly illustrate which states were prioritized. Lastly, as discussed in the methodology chapter, democracy promotion was only one component of economic aid and further research is needed to confirm these results.

Combining the results from the three policy priorities together provides the final conclusions. Iraq was the centerpiece of the neoconservative movement, using force to remove an authoritative regime and create a democratic ally. The only other state to share the same trends as Iraq (positive in all three trends), was Lebanon. Much of this was explained by the withdrawal of Syria troops and U.S. effort to increase both military and economic aid in the aftermath. However, whereas the U.S. invaded Iraq, Lebanon only received increased military aid.

While the shock of the Iraq invasion certainly echoed notions of imperialism, the results from the other Middle East states were not as convincing. The only three states with negative stability trends were Syria, Qatar, and Yemen. As Syria was an adversarial state, the negative stability trend was paired with a positive democracy trend, which did match neoconservative

policy goals. On the other hand, Qatar had neutral trends for security and democracy. So while the U.S. did decrease interaction, it did not push for any further liberalization or power projective beyond the established norm. Yemen came closest to prioritizing democracy over the others, with a negative stability trend, neutral security trend, and positive democracy trend.

The remaining states with positive democracy trends also had positive or neutral stability trends, which indicated a more cooperative relationship than that of forceful democracy promotion. Likewise, all positive security trends were also matched with neutral or positive stability trends. This could be explained by imperial overreach, as the U.S. had to rely more on cooperation after overextending itself in Iraq during the first half of the administration. Only four states measured a positive trend on a sole policy priority. Bahrain, Iran, Syria, and Yemen had either neutral or negative stability or security policy priorities matched to a positive democracy policy priority. These three states came closest to demonstrating a single objective prioritized over the other two. The presence of one neutral trending policy priority for Bahrain and Yemen, indicated that while democracy promotion was the priority, it was not the only objective. The lack of data on Iran's stability and security policy priorities and Syria's security policy priority tempers their inclusion in the final analysis.

For the recognized allies: Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, three different combination arose. Egypt had a slightly positive stability trend and neutral trends for security and democracy, indicating a balancing of priorities. Jordan was the only state (besides Israel) to have a negative democracy policy priority and positive security policy priority. Saudi Arabia had positive stability and democracy policy priorities, and a neutral security policy priority. None of these support the neoconservative desire to push for reforms, even in established allies, and represented a more neorealist and neoliberal notion of tailoring foreign policy to specific situations and outcomes.

Overall, the U.S. initially attempted to increase its influence via its military in the Middle East, sliding more towards imperialistic power projection of foreign policy. This was represented by the invasion of Iraq and for numerous other states, spikes in the security policy priority between 2002 and 2003. This emphasis on power projection did not last across the Middle East, and actually tempered in a few states towards the final years of the administration. Many of the neorealist theorists warned of this imperial overreach as well as the tendency for hegemons to succumb to the temptation to attempt it. The data did support an increase across the

region for democracy promotion, which became more evident in the second part of the administration as well. It is important to note that the levels of economic aid are a fraction of that distributed for military applications. So while overall, democracy promotion increased in priority, placing it in context with military spending and identifying the disparity in aid between states tempers the results somewhat. Lastly, the U.S. maintained or increased interaction with major allies and the majority of smaller friendly states, possibly as a way to moderate security and democracy promotion objectives. Additionally, there was no consistent pattern between positive trends in the security and democracy policy priorities that would support a militaristic imposition of democracy, excluding Iraq. Additionally, the majority of states measured a positive trend on more than one policy priority, indicating that the U.S. did not consistently prioritize one over the others and instead pursued multiple policy priorities simultaneously. Therefore, after the initial attempt to implement a neoconservative foreign policy, the U.S. returned to a mixture of neorealist and neoliberal notions.

Although one policy priority did not consistently stand out as the main objective of U.S. foreign policy, what the trends of the three policy priorities do illustrate is a consistent expansionist push of the U.S. into the affairs of the Middle East. Initial claims of a less interactive foreign policy quickly gave way towards an overall policy of active interventionism by the U.S. The fact that every state experienced an increasing trend in at least one policy priority, and the majority of states experienced increasing trends in multiple policy priorities supports this classification of U.S. policy. This interventionist approach manifested through increased diplomatic interaction, power projection of military troops, influx of military aid, and a government supported effort to push for change in the internal workings of these states through democracy promotion. The three corners of Mazarr's triangle were all pushed outwards simultaneously. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was one of active intervention, as the U.S. acted as a world hegemon in its unipolar moment.

The methodology and data used for this study is only one of many ways to attempt to analyze U.S. policy during the W. Bush Administration. Some states did not provide enough data to provide a detailed analysis, particularly the two most adversarial states Iran and Syria. Alternate ways of measuring these policy priorities, or the inclusion or deletion of other objectives may produce more definitive results. Expanding the time frame to include the administration before and after would provide more validity to the results and allow for more

data to compensate for outliers. The objective of this paper was to provide a method to measure U.S. foreign policy objectives and understand where the priorities were. Understanding the W. Bush Administration has become even more important given the events of the Arab Spring and the budget constraints on the U.S. military. Hopefully, this research and analysis has increased our understanding of how international relations theory and foreign policy implementation interact.

Appendix A: Raw Data Tables

Bahrain

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[171]	2	1	2	3	1	1	0	3
Treaties in Force[172]	13	13	13	15	15	15	16	16
Security								
Deployed Forces[173]	725	4,200	4,500	3,000	3,000	1,418	1,389	1,324
Military Aid ($s)[174]	235,000	28,895,000	90,448,000	25,250,000	21,037,000	19,005,000	17,630,000	5,840,000
1. FMF	0	28,500,000	90,000,000	24,682,000	18,848,000	15,593,000	15,750,000	3,968,000
2. NADR	0	0	0	0	1,539,000	2,761,000	1,240,000	1,250,000
3. IMET	235,000	395,000	448,000	568,000	650,000	651,000	640,000	622,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[175]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[176]	16,500	58,300	63,000	0	80,000	124,700	33,000	187,599

[171] "White House Press Briefings."
[172] *Treaties in Force*, 17.
[173] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[174] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 18; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 14.
[175] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[176] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Bahrain, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/bhr_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Egypt

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[177]	6	7	8	5	5	6	7	8
Treaties in Force[178]	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59
Security								
Deployed Forces[179]	750	750	750	750	750	392	288	687
Military Aid ($s)[180]	1,294,692,000	1,301,217,000	1,292,278,000	1,292,699,000	1,290,800,000	1,289,237,000	1,302,738,000	1,294,252,000
1. FMF	1,293,592,000	1,300,000,000	1,291,550,000	1,292,330,000	1,289,600,000	1,287,000,000	1,300,000,000	1,289,470,000
2. NADR	0	0	0	0	0	1,029,000	1,545,000	3,545,000
3. IMET	1,100,000	1,217,000	1,232,000	1,369,000	1,200,000	1,208,000	1,203,000	1,237,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[181]	0	0	1	24	1	2	37	68
Economic Aid ($s)[182]	839,996,955	1,031,053,705	662,537,707	816,428,820	607,988,873	391,955,912	688,035,615	461,889,509

[177] "White House Press Briefings."
[178] *Treaties in Force*, 79-82.
[179] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[180] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 13; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 7.
[181] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[182] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Egypt, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/egy_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Iran

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[183]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Treaties in Force[184]	37	37	37	37	37	37	37	37
Security								
Deployed Forces[185]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Aid ($s)[186]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democracy								
Aid Programs[187]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[188]	35,000	191,250	221,667	4,446,737	4,384,288	2,282,074	2,095,171	2,568,144

[183] "White House Press Briefings."
[184] *Treaties in Force*, 133-134.
[185] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[186] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*.
[187] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[188] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Iran, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/irn_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Iraq

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[189]	0	0	2	6	15	13	23	7
Treaties in Force[190]	14	14	14	17	17	17	17	18
Security								
Deployed Forces[191]	0	0	146,000	121,600	192,600	165,700	168,000	143,000
Military Aid ($s)[192]	0	0	269,253,142	1,201,809,891	4,979,399,372	3,045,215,486	2,587,575,772	1,212,141,645
1. Reconstruction		0	266,303,142	1,193,617,241	4,977,749,372	3,040,805,250	2,576,629,633	1,192,065,856
2. NADR	0	0	2,950,000	8,192,650	1,650,000	3,710,236	10,946,139	20,075,789
3. IMET	0	0	0	0	0	700,000	0	0
Democracy								
Aid Programs[193]	0	0	0	18	0	0	18	2
Economic Aid ($s)[194]	151,750	68,100	456,020,237	1,833,808,238	2,363,265,269	1,445,684,606	1,094,096,480	2,177,223,977

[189] "White House Press Briefings."
[190] *Treaties in Force*, 134-135.
[191] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[192] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 10.
[193] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[194] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Iraq, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/irq_11100000100001_0111.xls. Military reconstruction funds and funding for Iraqi Military and Police were removed from the economic aid and factored into the Military Aid section.

Israel

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[195]	15	10	6	2	10	12	11	14
Treaties in Force[196]	77	78	78	80	83	85	85	86
Security								
Deployed Forces[197]	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	51
Military Aid ($s)[198]	2,007,122,811	2,044,546,959	3,098,235,601	2,165,486,628	2,212,957,827	2,262,850,496	2,342,140,938	2,381,652,418
1. FMF	1,989,000,000	2,040,000,000	3,086,350,000	2,147,255,000	2,202,240,000	2,257,800,000	2,340,000,000	2,380,000,000
2. NADR	0	0	0	0	210,000	342,535	134,000	166,132
3. Counterterrorism	18,122,811	4,546,959	11,885,601	18,231,628	10,507,827	4,707,961	2,006,938	1,486,286
Democracy								
Aid Programs[199]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[200]	898,601,938	784,801,919	662,975,144	531,218,915	420,787,323	289,077,074	145,024,473	54,672,422

[195] "White House Press Briefings."
[196] *Treaties in Force*, 136-140.
[197] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[198] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 12; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 4.
[199] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[200] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Israel, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/isr_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Jordan

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[201]	4	7	8	4	9	4	5	5
Treaties in Force[202]	36	36	37	40	41	42	44	45
Security								
Deployed Forces[203]	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0
Military Aid ($s)[204]	77,277,000	102,862,000	607,293,000	208,130,376	308,210,953	213,039,927	262,935,090	368,587,185
1. FMF	74,630,000	100,000,000	604,000,000	204,785,000	304,352,000	207,900,000	252,900,000	348,380,000
2. NADR	947,000	850,000	893,000	120,376	858,953	2,119,927	7,113,090	17,266,185
3. IMET	1,700,000	2,012,000	2,400,000	3,225,000	3,000,000	3,020,000	2,922,000	2,941,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[205]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[206]	138,461,850	141,245,313	1,048,894,300	368,235,586	365,554,790	274,087,718	203,791,482	260,084,085

[201] "White House Press Briefings."
[202] *Treaties in Force*, 153-155.
[203] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[204] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 14; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 9.
[205] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[206] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Jordan, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/jor_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Kuwait

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[207]	1	1	4	2	2	2	1	3
Treaties in Force[208]	13	14	14	14	14	15	15	15
Security								
Deployed Forces[209]	4,690	8,388	38,160	25,250	25,250	25,250	1,600	1,600
Military Aid ($s)[210]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democracy								
Aid Programs[211]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[212]	0	0	0	0	913,000	621,674	1,192,153	9,603

[207] "White House Press Briefings."
[208] *Treaties in Force*, 163-164.
[209] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[210] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*.
[211] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[212] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Kuwait, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/kwt_10100000100001_0111.xls.

Lebanon

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[213]	1	3	1	0	2	4	0	3
Treaties in Force[214]	23	23	23	23	23	24	25	25
Security								
Deployed Forces[215]	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Military Aid ($s)[216]	1,575,000	1,768,000	2,175,000	707,962	750,000	5,344,742	230,208,167	13,078,748
1. FMF	0	0	0	0	0	3,713,000	224,800,000	6,943,000
2. NADR	1,000,000	1,200,000	1,475,000	7,962	50,000	879,742	4,503,167	4,707,748
3. IMET	575,000	568,000	700,000	700,000	700,000	752,000	905,000	1,428,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[217]	12	0	0	6	1	19	7	11
Economic Aid ($s)[218]	20,112,527	27,103,876	29,869,971	26,651,867	37,812,274	59,317,769	130,501,831	227,249,864

[213] "White House Press Briefings."
[214] *Treaties in Force*, 166-167.
[215] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[216] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 18; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 13.
[217] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[218] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Lebanon, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/lbn_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Oman

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[219]	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	2
Treaties in Force[220]	10	10	10	11	11	12	12	13
Security								
Deployed Forces[221]	690	260	270	270	270	25	37	0
Military Aid ($s)[222]	523,000	25,976,000	81,567,000	25,695,000	21,217,000	15,297,253	16,041,011	7,342,030
1. FMF	0	25,000,000	81,000,000	24,850,000	19,840,000	13,860,000	14,000,000	4,712,000
2. NADR	273,000	495000	0	20,000	277,000	302,253	906,011	1,202,030
3. IMET	250,000	481,000	567,000	825,000	1,100,000	1,135,000	1,135,000	1,428,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[223]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[224]	15,106	78,220	0	0	20,000	141,569	7,271,000	265,260

[219] "White House Press Briefings."
[220] *Treaties in Force*, 211.
[221] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[222] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 18; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 14.
[223] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[224] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Oman, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/omn_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Qatar

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[225]	1	1	5	1	3	1	0	1
Treaties in Force[226]	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
Security								
Deployed Forces[227]	37	3,300	3,300	6,540	6,540	463	512	444
Military Aid ($s)[228]	0	0	0	0	1,379,000	940,649	791,538	15,287
1. NADR	0	0	0	0	1,379,000	940,649	791,538	1,287
2. IMET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[229]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[230]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	403,580

[225] "White House Press Briefings."
[226] *Treaties in Force*, 234.
[227] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[228] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 14.
[229] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[230] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Qatar, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/qat_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Saudi Arabia

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[231]	2	7	5	5	6	4	5	9
Treaties in Force[232]	30	31	31	31	31	31	31	33
Security								
Deployed Forces[233]	5,110	4,408	300	300	300	300	274	287
Military Aid ($s)[234]	0	24,000	22,000	24,000	966,900	1,596,300	286,446	113,000
1. NADR-CTF	0	0	0	0	200,000	189,000	0	0
2. NADR-ATA	0	0	0	0	760,000	1,387,000	267,446	99,000
3. IMET	0	24,000	22,000	23,500	6,900	20,300	19,000	14,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[235]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[236]	0	0	42,000	95,622	417,280	680,507	148,538	152,905

[231] "White House Press Briefings."
[232] *Treaties in Force*, 245-246.
[233] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[234] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 18; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 14.
[235] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[236] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Saudi Arabia, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/sau_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Syria

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[237]	2	0	1	0	0	1	2	0
Treaties in Force[238]	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Security								
Deployed Forces[239]	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Military Aid ($s)[240]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democracy								
Aid Programs[241]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[242]	15,372	0	70,000	46,000	350,573	634,889	1,618,079	20,268,256

[237] "White House Press Briefings."
[238] *Treaties in Force*, 268.
[239] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[240] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*.
[241] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[242] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Syria, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/syr_11100000100001_0111.xls.

UAE

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[243]	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	4
Treaties in Force[244]	13	14	14	15	15	16	16	16
Security								
Deployed Forces[245]	390	390	570	1,300	1,300	56	87	109
Military Aid ($s)[246]	0	0	0	50,000	411,331	791,355	596,073	460,531
1. NADR	0	0	0	50,000	411,331	791,355	596,073	446,531
2. IMET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[247]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[248]	0	425,000	0	0	31,201	0	1,863,750	45,657

[243] "White House Press Briefings."
[244] *Treaties in Force*, 288.
[245] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[246] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 15.
[247] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[248] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: United Arab Emirates, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/are_11100000100001_0111.xls.

West Bank/Gaza Strip (Palestinian Authority)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[249]	5	1	5	3	4	2	3	8
Treaties in Force[250]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Security								
Deployed Forces[251]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Aid ($s)[252]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democracy								
Aid Programs[253]	0	0	0	0	1	0	15	43
Economic Aid ($s)[254]	59,803,340	129,663,123	186,381,190	165,794,952	203,306,896	211,482,460	199,856,924	362,914,903

[249] "White House Press Briefings."
[250] *Treaties in Force*, 215.
[251] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[252] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 15-16; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 9-11.
[253] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[254] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: West Bank/Gaza, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/wbg_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Yemen

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Stability								
State interaction[255]	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Treaties in Force[256]	15	16	17	17	17	17	17	17
Security								
Deployed Forces[257]	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0
Military Aid ($s)[258]	1,158,000	21,238,000	3,288,000	15,946,000	12,943,000	9,554,298	11,321,820	5,274,624
1. FMF	0	20,000,000	1,900,000	14,910,000	9,920,000	8,415,000	8,500,000	3,952,000
2. NADR	1,023,000	750,000	750,000	150,000	1,923,000	215,298	1,736,820	370,624
3. IMET	135,000	488,000	638,000	886,000	1,100,000	924,000	1,085,000	952,000
Democracy								
Aid Programs[259]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic Aid ($s)[260]	1,307,024	758,339	30,382,860	41,483,587	14,736,589	21,282,023	19,728,030	26,527,515

[255] "White House Press Briefings."
[256] *Treaties in Force*, 306-307.
[257] *The Military Balance 2001-2002*, 129-151; *2002-2003*, 23-26; *2003-2004*, 25-27; *2004-2005*, 30-32; *2005-2006*, 31-35; *2006*, 40-44; *2007*, 38-42; *2008*, 38-45; *2009*, 41-44.
[258] *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2006*, 18; *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East FY2011*, 15.
[259] "Where We Work Interactive Map."
[260] USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Yemen, "Economic Assistance (Disbursements) by Funding Agency, Funding Account, and Implementing Agency," accessed May 15, 2012, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/tables/country/yem_11100000100001_0111.xls.

Appendix B: Policy Priority Rankings

Stability Totals

State Interaction		
Rank	**State**	**Total**
1	Israel	80
2	Iraq	66
3	Egypt	52
4	Jordan	46
5	Saudi Arabia	43
6	PA	31
7	Kuwait	16
8	Lebanon	14
9	Bahrain	13
	Qatar	13
11	UAE	9
12	Oman	7
13	Syria	6
14	Yemen	3
15	Iran	1

Treaties in Force		
Rank	**State**	**Total**
1	Israel	86
2	Egypt	59
3	Jordan	45
4	Iran	37
5	Saudi Arabia	33
6	Lebanon	25
7	Iraq	18
8	Yemen	17
9	Bahrain	16
9	UAE	16
11	Kuwait	15
	Syria	15
13	Oman	13
14	Qatar	6
15	PA	1

Security Totals

Deployed Troops		
Rank	**State**	**Total**
1	Iraq	936,900
2	Kuwait	130,188
3	Qatar	21,136
4	Bahrain	19,556
5	Saudi Arabia	11,279
6	Egypt	5,117
7	UAE	4,202
8	Oman	1,822
9	Israel	50
10	Jordan	19
11	Yemen	12
12	Lebanon	6
	Syria	6
14	Iran	0
	PA	0

Military Aid		
Rank	**State**	**Total**
1	Israel	$18,514,993,678
2	Iraq	$13,295,395,308
3	Egypt	$10,357,913,000
4	Jordan	$2,148,335,531
5	Lebanon	$255,607,619
6	Bahrain	$208,340,000
7	Oman	$193,658,294
8	Yemen	$80,723,742
9	Qatar	$3,126,474
10	Saudi Arabia	$3,032,646
11	UAE	$2,309,290
12	Iran	$0
	Kuwait	$0
	Syria	$0
	PA	$0

Democracy Totals

Economic Aid		
Rank	**State**	**Total**
1	Iraq	$9,370,318,657
2	Egypt	$5,499,887,096
3	Israel	$3,787,159,208
4	Jordan	$2,800,355,124
5	PA	$1,519,203,788
6	Lebanon	$558,619,979
7	Yemen	$156,205,967
8	Syria	$23,003,169
9	Iran	$16,224,331
10	Oman	$7,791,155
11	Kuwait	$2,736,430
12	UAE	$2,365,608
13	Saudi Arabia	$1,536,852
14	Bahrain	$563,099
15	Qatar	$403,580

Aid Programs		
Rank	**State**	**Total**
1	Egypt	133
2	PA	59
3	Lebanon	56
4	Iraq	38

Appendix C: Summary of Trends

Bahrain
Stability: neutral
Security: negative
Democracy: positive

Egypt
Stability: positive
Security: neutral
Democracy: neutral

Iran
Stability: N/A
Security: N/A
Democracy: positive

Iraq
Stability: positive
Security: positive
Democracy: positive

Israel:
Stability: positive
Security: positive
Democracy: negative

Jordan
Stability: neutral
Security: positive
Democracy: negative

Kuwait
Stability: positive
Security: negative
Democracy: positive

Lebanon
Stability: positive
Security: positive
Democracy: positive

Oman
Stability: positive
Security: negative
Democracy: positive

Qatar
Stability: negative
Security: neutral
Democracy: neutral

Saudi Arabia
Stability: positive
Security: neutral
Democracy: positive

Syria
Stability: negative
Security: N/A
Democracy: positive

UAE
Stability: positive
Security: neutral
Democracy: positive

Palestinian Authority
Stability: positive
Security: N/A
Democracy: positive

Yemen
Stability: negative
Security: neutral
Democracy: positive

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