What Happened? An Examination of Critical Change in the 2016 Election

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Abstract

The 2016 U.S. presidential election results surprised many, after several groups many believed to be surefire voters for Democrats based on previous elections voted for Republican Donald Trump (Bump, 2016). Whenever a change takes place in voter patterns, one begins to hear phrases like "critical election" and "political realignment." A critical election is an election where there is a change of at least 10 percent in partisan alignment, but it does not persist in the next election. A partisan realignment is similar to a critical election, but the change is more durable. This research explores whether the 2016 election can be classified as a critical election and whether and how key groupings of Democratic voters voted in the election compared to their votes in the 2012 election. Using data aggregated at the county level, regression analyses suggest that voters' education, access to health care, union membership, racial/ethnic diversity, and income level all had statistically significant relationships with votes in both elections and with the change in vote between 2016 and 2012, all were substantively significant or in directions consistent with the presence of a critical election when viewed either from the national or even regional viewpoint. Evidence suggests that 2016 was a critical election.

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General Audience Abstract

If 2016 proved anything about elections, it is that at times they can be difficult to predict. Predicting voter behavior based on past elections is not straightforward, in part because at times voters can make sharp changes in their party alliance over the course of four years. Sometimes those changes are lasting, but they also can fade by the next election cycle. This study examined whether the 2016 U.S. presidential election constituted such a sharp and sudden change from the 2012 election, an event social scientists term a "critical election." Conducted at the county level, the study examined whether and how voter groupings (based on education, access to health care, union membership, income, and race/ethnicity) changed notably between 2012 and 2016. What was found was that as expected Democrats experienced a negative change in support among union, white, and impoverished voters. What was not expected was the negative change in Black votes for Democrats between 2012 and 2016. Another unexpected, though smaller, change was a drop in Democratic support by the college educated. No significant change in Democratic support was found among Hispanics or those with access to healthcare. Based on these findings 2016 can be considered to have been a critical election for Blacks

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Chapter One- Introduction

Many likely have wondered “what happened?” in the 2016 election that resulted in Republican Donald J. Trump becoming President. The idea seemed far-fetched that the bombastic Trump, who began his campaign with the promise to remove illegal immigrants he described as “bad hombres” and “rapists,” would beat the composed former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a bid for the presidency. Perhaps most notable of those posing this question was losing candidate Clinton, in her book of the same title. It is little wonder that the question would be posed when up until the day of the election, most polls had Clinton with an 85% chance of winning the presidency over Donald Trump. On the lower end, on the day of the election, Nate Silver gave Clinton a 71% chance of winning the presidency (Silver, 2016). Of course, to be fair Hillary Clinton did in fact win the overall popular vote as was predicted. However, what those polls did not account for quickly unfolded on election night as those watching the election results saw the longtime Democratic strongholds of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, which the Party had held consistently since 1984, went to Trump. In addition, although Ohio had been a battleground state where Republicans had slowly strengthened since 2012, Democrats lost the state in 2016. The bottom had seemingly fallen out from under Democrats in the Rust Belt. Democrats could once count on union voters but in 2016 that was no longer the case. Leading by just eight percent among union voters, Clinton trailed Obama’s 18% in 2012 (Hesson & Levine, 2016), suggesting perhaps that union voters had become less reliable Democratic supporters. Although, wasn’t it Andrew Gelman that argued in 2009 (Gelman, 2009) that the poorer working class, a group often associated with blue-collar union voters, tend to vote for the Democrat? What happened?

This weaker union support may well in part have been the result of the candidates' rhetoric. Leading up to the 2016 general election both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton spewed polarizing rhetoric. Trump promised to bring back factories to the United States and resurrect a dying coal industry. Of course, these words appealed to many conservative white union workers, who likely had less formal education to draw on for other employment but instead relied on dwindling numbers of factory and mining jobs. On the flipside, Clinton referred to Trump supporters as "deplorables" and threatened to shut down mines and many factories for environmental reasons. By alienating many union voters and naming initial Trump supporters as deplorable, Clinton narrowed her voter base. This shift in past Democratic support illustrates what I believe is part of the story of what happened in 2016, and perhaps offers further insight into Gelman's argument.

To begin, it is important to understand the terms "alignment" and "re-alignment" in relation to partisan politics Partisan alignment refers to patterns in the partisan support of a region's demographic groups. Partisan re-alignment, then, refers to changes in a group's support from one party to another. Identification of a realignment typically begins with what political scientists have called a critical election. Yet a realignment also involves a durable pattern of change that contains several critical elections. For an election to be a critical election, there must be measurable change in party support from the previous election (Nardulli P. , 1995, p. 11).

The research here relies in part on David Mayhew's (2000) definition of realignment, which discards the time-based cyclical pattern put forth by others, such as Walter Dean Burnham in "Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics" (1970). In the latter, Burnham suggests political realignments follow a thirty-year cyclical pattern (Burnham, 1970, p. 288).

Instead, Mayhew, by defining events affecting electoral behavior that result in partisan shifts of varying sizes, enables examination of all shifts, not just the largest ones.

The first realignment in the U.S. began in 1800 with the turnover of power from the Federalist Party to the Democratic-Republican Party with the election of Thomas Jefferson. This would be followed by the realignment of 1828 that solidified the separation between the Democratic and Republican parties, placing Democrat Andrew Jackson in the presidency supported by his political power in the South. The re-alignment to follow took place in 1896; it resulted in Democrats losing significant strength. Key (1955, p. 9) connected the realignment to the 1893 bank failures, unemployment, labor strikes, Democratic support for deflation of the gold standard, and railroad receiverships in 1893. The next realignment began with the 1932 election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, an election in which Republican strongholds in the Northeast voted for Democrats in large part as a response to Hoover's handling of the 1929 market crash and the resulting deep recession.

Things become murky and contested after 1960. Political scientists debate whether another realignment occurred before 1980. I argue that the next re-alignment emerged in the mid-1960s in the South, pushing an increasing number of whites in southern counties away from the Democratic Party and toward the Republicans amid the 1960s civil rights movement and passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Nonetheless, no clear consensus exists on what put the realignment, if there was one, into motion. After that, smaller realignments arguably led to further alignment in the 1980s with Reagan Republicans, re-structuring Republican ideology to appeal to greater numbers of lesser educated White Christians in the South, in more rural parts of the Midwest, and among ethnic groups in many cities in the Northeast and Midwest (Black & Black, 1987, p. 292).

In each of these realignments, several factors evidently made certain communities more predisposed to realignment: economics, race, religion, gender, and education. The focus of this research is to better understand the role of such factors in the context of the 2016 presidential election. More specifically, the study connects the results of the election to examine whether 2016 was a critical election. I hypothesized that a critical election occurred in 2016 based on changes in voting behavior from 2012 to 2016 among several key demographic groups, particularly voters who were members of labor unions and/or from union households. I anticipate that enough labor union voters did not vote in 2016, with important consequences for the Democratic candidate. I expected that the answer to "What happened?" in 2016 is that it was a critical election. What I found was that as expected Democrats experienced a negative change among union, white, and impoverished voters. What was not expected was the negative change in Black votes for Democrats between 2012 and 2016. Based on my findings 2016 was a critical election for union members, college graduates, and high school graduates.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

To begin the analysis of whether 2016 was a critical election that might have pointed to realignment, this chapter reviews the foundational realignment scholarship as the basis for building my definitions of realignment and critical elections. This is followed by an overview of observed voting behavior and of changes in the voting of the focal groups, here those based on race, union membership, access to health care, education levels, and income. Lastly, I position the analysis in the broader literature and discuss its contributions to research on critical and realigning elections.

Defining Realignment and Critical Elections

When it comes to political realignment and critical election theory, there is little consensus on definition. I base my analysis of realignment on V.O. Key's "A Theory of Critical Elections" (1955). Key first defines an election as realigning if there is "a sharp durable change" (Key, 1955, p. 9). Little consensus exists on what constitutes a "durable change" (Sundquist, 1974). A realignment involves more than some Republicans voting for a Democrat in one election because they do no/t like the candidate the Democratic candidate, their typical party of choice. For Key, a realignment indicates that voting behavior changes more permanently than in just one election. Some suggest that realignments can be seen in the large scale in the 1890s and 1930s but that smaller shifts in partisan alignment can be referred to as "sub realigning" (Burnham, 1967). Others believe that "if two events share all essential characteristics except that of magnitude…preferably, then, they should carry the same identifying label" (Sundquist, p. 8). None of these definitions by themselves can capture what happened in 2016.

The 2016 election is difficult to easily define as a realignment, since it likely contained only one feature of a realignment, a "critical election." The biggest confusion and area of disagreement among those studying realignment comes in defining a critical election and the size of change that constitutes one. Among the concerns in identifying a critical election is the magnitude of change. No single measure has emerged, but some have produced more compelling research than others. Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980), for example, maintain that a critical election must involve at least a ten percent change in partisan realignment (Clubb, Flanigan, & Zingale, 1980, p. 92). At first glance, this appears to be a useful measure in identifying elections that most consider to be realigning; 1932, for instance, fits well. In 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Democrat, won in a landslide election against the incumbent, Republican Herbert Hoover. This landslide likely reflected responses to the Great Depression and ongoing Prohibition as well as the lack of strong Republican support for the President.

Yet, 1932 did not meet the 10 percent threshold. Other scholars approach realignment and critical elections using an aggregate "vote shares" model. The vote shares model "conceptualizes party alignments as latent class constructs, or factors, and changes in these latent class constructs as party realignments" (Aistrup, 2012, p. 750). In this approach, elections, instead of being viewed from a broad national perspective are viewed from a subnational (parish, county, city) perspective. Rather than examining change by looking for one national percentage vote change, changes occurring at the county level may better capture shifts at that smaller scale.

I seek to explore the possibility that we may have seen a period of stagnation in terms of partisan realignment as examined by Mayhew (2000), but the intention of this research is to explore the possibility that in 2016 a critical change was at play, and it would be an impediment to our understanding of elections to dismiss it. Further, by using past research to build upon, I am furthering that work by allowing it not to be hindered by cyclical patterns or set percentages that have fallen flat in past studies (Prindle, 1979, p. 144). I am instead examining whether a possible critical election occurred by comparing the magnitude of *actual* observed change in an election with the expected change.

The following section turns to possible factors that may help account for vote change, on occasion being associated with critical elections.

Factors Related to Voting

One aspect of my research to examine whether 2016 was a critical election is the observed change in voting behavior by identifiable groups, including racial and ethnic minorities. At least since the 1960s, minority groups, particularly African Americans and (though to a lesser degree) Hispanics, have tended to strongly support Democratic candidates (White & Laird, 2020, p.56), making declining support a clear indicator of a critical election in 2016. If these groups change their support even in minor ways, this may signal a realignment. For example, Black voters by and large did not support Trump in 2016, scarcely a surprise since “they are justifiably wary of some of the racist rhetoric that seems to have sprung up around the Trump candidacy” (Williams, 2017, p. 13). Even so, President Trump did better with Black voters in 2016 than Romney did in 2012; “exit polls show Trump claimed 8 percent of the vote to the previous Republican nominee’s 6 percent” (Sakuma, 2016). Although this change might indicate a critical election in 2016, some disagree. Hanes Walton suggests several faults when examining Black voting. One is the tendency to mark the Black failure to vote as “’apathy’, ‘alienation’, ‘fear’, ‘cynicism’, or ascribed to low socioeconomic status…” (Walton, 1985, p. 9) and to fail to take into account basic aspects of voter suppression such as reregistration requirements and gerrymandering.

With that in mind, some scholarship suggests that even with a two percent change in Black votes for Trump, other factors may have influenced the vote in 2016 (Bump, 2016). Black voter turnout for Clinton declined in 2016 (Bump, 2016), compared with Black voter support for the

Democratic candidate in 2012 (dropping from 93 percent to 88 percent). The combination of decreasing support for Democratic candidates and an increase in support for the Republican candidate points to a possible critical election.

Another key minority group are Hispanics. The overall Hispanic support for Democratic Party candidates, apart from Cuban Americans who typically vote for Republicans (Prieto, 2009), can be misconceived as a safer voter base for Democrats. However, this likely is incorrect. For example, in 2004 there was increased Hispanic vote for George W. Bush (Kenski & Tisinger, 2006). In 2008, some suggested that 2004 was an outlier, as removing an incumbent during war rarely happens (de la Garza, 2008). This can be confirmed by the movement of Hispanic voters behind Obama in 2008 in enough numbers to help flip swing states, such as Nevada and Florida, to the Democrats (Barreto, Collingwood, & Manzano, 2010).

Further, since by 2050 the Hispanic population will hit 106 million, double what it was in 2014 (Krogstad, With fewer new arrivals, Census lowers Hispanic population projections, 2014), both parties will try to attract their votes. A change greater than the predicted observed vote from Hispanics in 2016 in future elections would suggest this election was critical because it pointed to the realignment of a particular group (Leighley & Nagler, 2016).

Perhaps the most influential group to indicate whether 2016 was a critical election included union members and those in union households. In what follows, labor union voters are key to whether 2016 can be classified as a critical election in due to their apparent shift in loyalty to Democrats over the course of a single election. Members of labor unions typically were relied upon to vote for Democrats, since labor unions worked for the reelection of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 (Schlozman, 2013). In the 1984 election between Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale, some blamed the labor unions in part for the sizeable Democratic loss; Mondale won only his home state of Minnesota, but not union heavy states such as Pennsylvania and Michigan. Further studies found that although unions did under-perform that election year, they remained effective in getting their members to vote for union backed candidates; it was unlikely that the influence of labor unions was coming to an end (Juravich & Shergold, 1988). However, since 1984 labor unions have continued to be on the decline. Since 1984 the manufacturing jobs in which labor unions thrived, have also declined (Gunn, 2018).

On top of the decrease of overall union membership nationally, an increasing gap between public and private sector unions has appeared. Those in public sector unions tend to vote at higher rates than their private sector counterparts, with little difference in the voting rates between private union and non-union members. When those in public sector jobs vote, a clear “union effect” can be observed: 6.7-point difference in voter participation between members and non-members appears (Rosenfeld, 2010). A slow decrease of union votes following the decline of union jobs may have been in process for a number of years; yet when combined in 2016 with suspected mass abstention and changes in voter preference among those who did vote, a shift associated with critical elections is possible.

Another key group to consider are the impoverished, those living below the federal poverty line. Impoverishment affects a growing number of citizens as economic inequality continues to grow. With that gap growing, the impoverished have become a growing group that Democrats have needed to continue to appeal to with promises of economic change. E.E. Schattschneider observed in 1960 that there was a connection between not voting and being poorer (Schattschneider E. , 1960, p. 123). Sixty years later, economic inequality in the United States has grown, and voter participation overall has dropped (Solt, 2010, p. 285).

A related question is how those on differing ends of the economic spectrum vote. Some, including conservative political commentator Tucker Carlson, claim that those making over $100,000 annually vote for Democrats (Gelman, 2009, p. 3). Although Democrats do win some of the wealthiest states (e.g., New York and California), many of the wealthiest individuals vote for Republicans (Gelman, 2009). In this research, if there is an increasing gap in wealth inequality, a critical election might be indicated by impoverished voters showing greater support for Democrats in 2016.

It should also be considered that when analyzing the role that income plays on partisan preference when it comes to voting, education follows closely, as has been observed that the more educated a voter is the more likely they are to show preference for the Democratic candidate (Cohn, How Educational Differences Are Widening America's Political Rift, 2021). With that being said, it would go against the observed behavior to see those with more education show greater support for Republicans in 2016. A critical election could be indicated with the aforementioned support in 2016.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the difference in support for Democrats over Republicans by those with a high school education or less was close to 18% (Pew Research, 2016) . By the 2016 election, Republican candidate Donald Trump appealed to those without a college education (Bonvillian, 2016). Was this a sudden change indicating a realignment or a fluke based on the appeal of Trump's campaign rhetoric among the lower educated, specifically poorer whites without a college degree? In 2008, as then-Democratic candidate Barack Obama was preparing for his eventual election, some observed that he would likely attract Black voters to the polls because of the historic nature of his candidacy and in later elections, he would need to bring in those without college educations who had overwhelmingly decided not to vote in 2004. However, to say 2008 came down to persuading less educated Black voters to vote for the Democratic candidate based on the fact that Kerry lost Ohio narrowly by 100,000 votes and 350,000 black voters in Ohio chose to not vote that election, would be misinformed. In 2004, one-third of educated Black voters chose not to vote at all; and in actuality the problem for Democrats in 2004 was the difficulty to appeal to less educated, unregistered white citizens (The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 2008, p. 44). Therefore, if Democrats had lost the vote of the lower educated going into George W. Bush's second term and the Obama presidency, then a positive change in the relationship between less educated voters and Republican support in 2016 would indicate a series of critical elections leading to 2016 instead of a sharp partisan realignment in 2016.

Although a change in access to healthcare does not seem to be an obvious factor associated with the appearance of a critical election, I argue that it might be based on how pivotal the issue became in partisan politics after 2012. The possible effects of the Affordable Care Act on voter behavior are not fully known, particularly how implementation of the healthcare plan championed by a Democratic president affected Clinton in 2016. Existing research has made it clear that the ACA did push voters in the states where it had been implemented to support Democrats in 2012 and especially in 2016 (A Decade of Obamacare: How Healthcare Went from Wrecking to Boosting Democrats, 2019). In states where it was not in place by 2016, particularly those in the Midwest and South, Democratic candidates were hurt (Hollingsworth, Soni, Carroll, & Simon, 2019, p. 13). It has already been observed that lower income, less educated, minorities, and union members frequently abstain from voting because of alienation from government. A similar expectation might be that Democrats fared less well in 2016 in states where the ACA was not implemented because those who might have voted for Clinton did not benefit from the ACA, making the debate about whether to preserve or overturn it less salient.

Utilizing the picture that this literature has created of voting behavior patterns leading into 2016, my research provides a clearer answer to whether the 2016 general election for president was a critical election. By using the variables of race, income, education, healthcare coverage status, and union membership, I hope to contribute to the discussions of contemporary realignment. The next chapter will focus on the theoretical framework supporting a critical election.

Chapter Three - Theory

Having reviewed both the scholarship defining realignment and the literature describing the voting behavior of key groups, I will now begin setting up the theoretical framework for whether and how change in voter behavior between 2012 and 2016 indicated a critical election. The framework also conceptualizes changes in voting behavior based on education, healthcare coverage, and the behavior of minorities, and union members as key indicators of a critical election. I do this by describing the relationships between critical elections and these variables. I suggest that changes in these groups in relation to the percent of the vote obtained by Democrats between 2012 and 2016 that go beyond 10% indicate a critical election. The possibility of a critical election is important because if there is a change in voter behavior by groups Democrats rely upon, beyond group members not liking a candidate, this alters the picture of the partisan landscape in terms of who votes how, and which votes are up for grabs. Minority groups, union members, the college educated, and those without healthcare were expected to be the driving forces in concluding that 2016 was a critical election and may set the stage for continued change in later elections if they mark the beginning of a full-scale political realignment.

I base my analysis on the argument that minorities, union members, the college educated, and those without healthcare have been faithful to Democrats over the last several decades so changes in that loyalty would indicate a critical election, making these groups perhaps the most important to focus on in a study on critical elections. As a way of identifying these possible changes in behavior by voter groups, I base their previous behavior on what was observed in the 2012 election as well as behavior previously examined in the literature. I chose 2012 as the sole election to compare 2016 to because in that 4-year period there was a public perception of a sizable change in partisan preference after going from Democrat, President Barack Obama to President Donald

Trump that often appealed to far-right Republicans (Adjei, 2018). For 2016 to have been a critical election, one should see a change >/= 10% in the Democratic vote of at least one of the key voter groups in the observed change between 2012 and 2016. The reason I have chosen 10% as a marker of change is based on the research by Clubb, Flannigan, and Zengale (Clubb, Flanigan, & Zingale, 1980).

In 2012, votes for the Democratic presidential candidate in the general election will be positively related with being Black, white, Hispanic, college educated, impoverished, and not having access to affordable healthcare (H1). Then in 2016 the Democratic voter base will have a decrease in support by union members, Blacks, the impoverished, those with a high school education, and white voters, but will have increased support from Hispanics, those without healthcare, and the college educated (H2). Between the 2012 and 2016 elections, I expect to see negative change in the support the Democratic candidate received from white, high school educated, impoverished, Blacks, but a positive change in support from Hispanic, and uninsured voters (H3). If the change in the proportion of partisan preference is greater than 10% a critical election may be present. The subsequent chapter will focus on the variables, data sources, and the method for tapping change.

Chapter Four- Methods

I have proposed that to test the hypothesis that between 2012 and 2016 there was change in partisan voting behavior indicative of a critical election, one must hold it to a 10% minimum observed change. This chapter describes the operationalizations of the independent and dependent variables in the hypotheses, followed by a description of the models created to test the hypotheses.

Operationalization: Data Sources and Variables

The research focuses at the county-level in determining whether changes between 2012 and 2016 in the voting patterns of minorities, union members, the college educated, and those without healthcare indicated a critical election. Using the county as the focal level of analysis was appropriate since election data for these groups are available at that level.

To begin I used U.S. Census Bureau estimates from 2012 and 2016 for each county to tap the percentage of white, Black, Hispanic, high school educated, college educated, uninsured, and impoverished in each county. To retrieve county percentages of union members, I used the U.S. Bureau of Labor's estimates of union membership in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) from 2012 and 2016.[1] I analyzed the data using multiple regression and STATA. The dependent variables are percent of the two-party presidential vote won by Democrats in 2012 (*per_dem12*) and in 2016 (*per_dem16*). A third variable, *change*, taps the difference in Democratic vote between the two elections; negative change indicates that a county voted more Republican in the latter election and a positive change a county voting more Democratic between 2012 and 2016. The independent variables include the percentages of county residents that are White, Black, and

[1] Discussion of the possible limitations of these data appears later.

Hispanic are high school and college graduates, have incomes below the federal poverty line (*Impoverished*), did not have health insurance in 2012 or in 2016 and were union members in 2016.

In a critical election I expect to see the observed percent of change sit at >/= 10% between 2012 and 2016 regarding their relationship with the independent variables and their previous behavior.

To measure the key variables in the hypotheses, I gathered data on the percentage of Democratic votes for president in the 2012 and 2016 elections from all 3,113 counties and parishes in the United States using data published by the *New York Times*[2] (The New York Times, 2017) in both election years. Demographic data used is drawn from U.S. Census bureau estimates (United States Census Bureau, 2019). Percent *White* is the percent of whites in the county *Percent Black* the percent of blacks in the county, and *Percent Hispanic* the percent of Hispanics in the county. *Percent High School Grad* represents the percent of high school graduates in the county. *Percent College Graduate* represents the percent of college graduates in the county. *Impoverished* is the percent of county residents that the U.S. Census Bureau defined as "poor" (those individuals whose "income is less than the individual's poverty threshold" (United States Census Bureau, 2019). *Uninsured 2012* is the percent of those without health insurance in 2012, *Uninsured 2016* taps the percent without health coverage in 2016. *Percent Union 2012* represents the percent of union membership in metropolitan areas in 2012, and *Percent Union 2016* the percent of union membership in metropolitan areas in 2016.

Finally, further in the research to test how region might offer a more dynamic view in terms of the bivariate relationship between the change in relationship between the independent variables and the change in vote percentage won by Democrats between 2012 and 2016, I create a dummy

[2] The *New York Times* reported data from the U.S. Census Bureau and state and election boards.

variable *region.* Region is then split into 9 regions and renamed as follows: New England (New York, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine); Mid-Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania); East North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin); Mid-West (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota); South (Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia); Deep South (Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana); South Adjacent (Florida, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas); Mountains (Arizona, Wyoming, Utah, Montana, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho); and Pacific (Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii).The regions were chosen using Census maps, but had to be further split due to STATA allowing for a limited number of states in each regional group.

H1: I hypothesize that counties with higher proportions of Blacks, Hispanics, college-educated, poor, and those without access to health coverage will be more likely to support the Democratic candidate for president in 2012. H2: In 2016, the Democratic vote in counties with previously observed higher proportions of Democratic voters will be negatively affected by the observed voting behavior of union members, Black, white, the impoverished, and those with high school diplomas. H3: There will be a negative change in the observed vote between 2012 and 2016 that is greater than or equal to 10% among county proportions of high school educated, Black, white, and impoverished Democratic voters. If the change in county Democratic voting meets or exceeds the 10% threshold this would be consistent with viewing 2016 as a critical election. Since I am observing the change between two election years, I will be creating three models, with the first two models focusing on the 2012 and 2016 elections, respectively, and the third model displaying the change between the two years. I expect the 2012 model to generate positive relationships between county Democratic vote share and county percentages of Blacks, Hispanics, union members, the college educated, and those without health coverage. To test these hypotheses, I relied on multivariate regression.

In the next chapter, I begin by describing where I retrieved the data for my variables, followed by using those variables in regressions, and finally interpreting the findings.

Chapter Five – Results

I have proposed that that a critical election will be observed between 2012 and 2016 based on observed change >/= 10% by white, Black, Hispanic, high school educated, college educated, uninsured, and impoverished people. Descriptive statistics for each of the variables can be found in the Appendix. Appendix A includes the mean the mean percentage of each variable in counties, and Appendix B lists the mean of each of the dependent variables including the change variable. Appendix H looks at the results of the normal vote model. Appendix C -D are collinearity models used to test for multicollinearity between independent variables mentioned further in the research. When looking at the VIF table I was looking for anything over 5 to indicate a collinearity issue. To test relationships between Democratic vote and my independent variables, I ran separate OLS regressions for 2012 and 2016. A third regression included the change variable.

Hypothesis 1: County Democratic Vote in 2012 Election

Table 1: Democratic Vote by County in 2012 General Election for U.S. President: OLS Results

Variables	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**
Uninsured	-1.153*	0.049
Union	0.917*	0.049
White	-0.445*	0.027
Black	0.113*	0.029
Hispanic	-0.026	0.033
High School Graduate	-0.065	0.056
College Graduate	0.239*	0.035
Impoverished	0.271*	0.029
Constant	66.05	6.86
Number of Observations	3,113	
R-Squared	0.5006	
Adjusted R-Squared	0.4992	

Notes: Data from thesis data set. * p ≤ .05

To test the first hypothesis, I examined the associations between the 2012 county Democratic vote for president and the proportions of county residents who were uninsured, union members, white, Black, Hispanic, high school graduates, college graduates, or poor. Table 1 reports the multiple regression results.

Together, the independent variables accounted for close to 50% of the variation in the dependent variable, percent county Democratic vote, in the 2012 election. Several of the independent variables performed as expected. Controlling for other independent variables, counties with higher proportions of residents who were union members, black, college educated, or poor, controlling for the other independent variables, were more likely to have voted for Democratic candidate Barack Obama. Similarly, higher proportions of white voters were statistically less likely to support the Democrat. At the same time, no statistically significant relationship emerged between the proportion of high school graduates and the county Democratic vote. Similarly, as the proportion of uninsured in a county increased, the county was less likely to support the Democratic candidate. The county mean of uninsured was 18.37%. If there were a one percent increase in the uninsured population, we would expect a negative change of 115% in the relationship with Democrats. Since the Affordable Care Act was not signed into law until 2010, it took time for states to fully respond, and some states, particularly those in the Midwest, did not adopt its Medicaid expansion arrangements. It would be plausible that those still uninsured in 2012 would not see the benefits to voting for Democratic President Obama who pushed ACA through Congress.

The relationship between the next variable, union membership, and county Democratic vote also was statistically significant but positive ($p<.001$) in 2012. As the percentage of those in a union increases in a county, we would expect the percent won by the Democratic candidate increase by 91.7%. This goes along with what was originally expected when hypothesizing typical behavior between union members and Democrats, since it indicates a positive relationship between the two groups in 2012. In 2012, whites have a statistically significant but negative relationship with Democrats. If there was an increase of one percent of whites in a county, we would expect a -44.5% change in the percent of the vote won by Democrats in a county. Since the 1960s, white voters have tended to support Republican candidates (Phillips, 2016). Therefore, this relationship is unsurprising in 2012.

Another unsurprising but statistically significant relationship ($p<.001$) is that between a county's proportion of Blacks and the county Democratic vote in 2012. A one percent increase in the percent of Blacks in a county produces an 11.3% change in the percent of the vote won by Democrats. The only statistically insignificant relationship is that between county proportion of Hispanics and Democratic vote in 2012.

There is an observed positive relationship between Democrats and College Graduates in 2012. A one percent increase in the percent of college graduates in a county is associated with a 23.9% increase in the percent of the vote won by Democrats. The relationship between the level of education and Democratic votes continues the observed pattern that Democrats maintain the votes of college educated voters; meanwhile those with high school education or less tend to vote for the Republican candidate. Finally, there are the impoverished. The proportion of impoverished in a county is significant ($p<.001$) related to Democratic votes. If there is an increase if one percent in the impoverished people in a county, there is an expected increase of 27% in the Democratic vote.

Overall, examination of the 2012 election supported the first hypothesis that there would be positive relationships between the county Democratic vote and county proportions of union members, Blacks, the impoverished, and the college educated. Neither of the relationships between county Democratic vote and proportion of high school graduates or percent of Hispanics is statistically significant. In addition, there was a negative relationship between Democratic vote and the percent of whites in a county. Not fully consistent with the hypothesis was the relationship between county Democratic vote and proportion of uninsured residents.

Hypothesis 2: County Democratic Vote in 2016 Election

The second hypothesis proposed that in 2016 the Democratic presidential candidate would receive decreased support from union members, Black voters, the impoverished, those with a high school education, and white voters. The hypothesis also expects positive relationships between Democratic vote and county proportions of Hispanics, those without healthcare coverage, and the college educated.

Table 2: Democratic Vote by County in 2016 General Election for U.S. President: OLS Results

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error
Uninsured	-.0151*	0.005
Union	1.113*	0.050
White	-.461*	0.028
Black	.201*	0.031
Hispanic	-.113*	0.034
High School Graduate	0.058	0.057
College Graduate	0.656*	0.036
Impoverished	0.086*	0.305
Constant	29.98	6.84
Number of Observations	3,113	
R-Squared	0.5282	
Adjusted R-Squared	0.5268	

Notes: Data from thesis data set. * p ≤ .05

Much like 2012, the independent variables account for 52% of the total variation in the percent of county vote for Democratic candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton. The relationship between the proportion of uninsured in a county and Democratic votes is statistically significant (p=.003) and negative in 2016. We would expect that if there were a one percent increase in the uninsured population there would be a -1.51% decrease in the percent of the vote won by Democrats in 2016. The union variable is statistically significant in 2016 (p<.001) and has a positive relationship with the Democratic vote. We would expect a 111.3% increase in the vote for Democrats if there were a one percent increase in the population of union voters in a county. Not surprisingly, percent white was statistically significant (p<.001) but negatively related to the Democratic vote in 2016. If there was a one percent increase in whites in a county there was an expected 46.1% decrease in the percent of the vote won by Democrats in a county. Another unsurprising observation is the statistically significant ($p<.001$) and positive relationship of a county's percentage of blacks and Democratic vote in 2016. There was an expected 20.1% increase in the votes won by Democrats if there was an increase of one percent of blacks in a county. Surprising was the statistically significant and negative relationship between county Democratic vote and percent of Hispanics in 2016 ($p=.001$). This was surprising because earlier in my research I hypothesized there would be a positive relationship between Democrats and Hispanic voters. We expect a -11.3% less in favor of Democrats if the percent of Hispanics in a county were to increase by one percent. In 2016, there is still a positive correlation between percent of county residents with college degrees and Democratic votes. If there were a one percent increase in the college graduates in a county there was an expected 65.6% increase in Democratic votes. There is no statistical significance ($p=.310$) between a county's percentage of high school graduates and its percentage of Democratic votes. Finally, in 2016 the relationship between those considered impoverished and Democrats is still statistically significant ($p=.005$). We would expect to see an 8.6% increase for Democrats if there was a one percent increase in the percent of people living below the poverty line in a county. The constant is approximately 30%, indicating that if the percent of votes for Democrats is set to equal zero then Uninsured, Union, White, Black, Hispanic, High School Graduate, College Graduate, and Impoverished people then 30% is the expected mean of those independent variables at that point.

The second hypothesis is not fully supported. Statistically significant and positive relationships appeared between the county Democratic vote and county percentages of impoverished, Blacks, union members, and college graduates. Yet the second hypothesis predicted negative relationships between Democratic vote and the percentages of impoverished, Blacks, whites, union members, and those with a high school education. The expected positive relationships did not appear between counties' Democratic vote and percentages of Hispanics, and those without health insurance. Hypothesis 2 did not anticipate a negative relationship between the percentage of Hispanics in a county and the Democratic vote for president; it also did not anticipate that the relationship between Democratic vote and the proportion of high school educated in a county would not be statistically significant or that the direction would be positive; moreover, the relationship between county Democratic vote and proportion of uninsured was negative.

Hypothesis 3: Differences in County Democratic Vote between 2012 and 2016

The third hypothesis focused on observed changes in county Democratic vote for president between 2012 and 2016, seeking to identify evidence that 2016 was a critical election, by comparing the projected expected change using the normal vote model to the observed change and looking for change >/= 10%.[3] The hypothesis predicted that the change between 2012 and 2016 in county Democratic voting percentage would be negatively related to county percentages of whites, Blacks, Hispanics those with high school educations, the impoverished, and uninsured.

[3] Please see Appendix G: for visual of normal vote model chart

Table 3: 2012-2016 Change in Democratic Presidential Vote by County: OLS Results

Variables	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**
Uninsured	.0016	0.0170
Union	-.2280*	0.0167
White	- .0277*	0.0093
Black	.0618*	0.0102
Hispanic	.0471*	0.0115
High School Graduate	- .1622*	0.0190
College Graduate	.3318*	0.0121
Impoverished	- 0.081*	0.0102
Constant	11.37	2.29
Number of Observations	3,113	
R-Squared	0.4996	
Adjusted R-Squared	0.4982	

Notes: Data from thesis data set. * p ≤ .05

Table 3 reports the results. They generally support the third hypothesis, with statistically significant negative relationships between observed change in county Democratic vote share and county proportions of union members, whites, high school graduates, and the poor. At the same time, the proportions of blacks, Hispanics, and college graduates in a county was positively associated with change in county Democratic vote; no statistically significant association emerged, however, between county in Democratic vote and the percent uninsured.

Meanwhile, the proportion of county residents who were union members was negatively related to the change in county Democratic vote share between 2012 and 2016 ($p<.01$). The observed percent of change was -22.8%. This is similar to the votes of high school graduates. The observed percent of change in support for Democrats by high school graduates was -16.22%. Whites evidently were less likely to cast votes for the Democratic candidate in 2016 than in 2012 ($p=.003$). The observed percent of change was -2.77%

Between 2012 and 2016, for Blacks there was a -6.18% observed change in Democratic votes between 2012 and 2016. Perhaps surprising in magnitude, for college graduates there was a statistically significant ($p>0.01$) observed change of 33.18% in Democratic votes between 2012 and 2016. The percent of the impoverished faced a negative change in support with -8.1% in Democratic votes between 2012 and 2016. Together the independent variables accounted for approximately 49.8% of the variation in Democratic vote change between 2012 and 2016.

Further, because there is suspected collinearity in the model, I thought it pertinent to run bivariate regressions with the independent variables[4] to test the relationship between them and the dependent variable, Change. When run it is most notably found that there is a 12.3% change in the relationship between the percent of Hispanics in a county and the percent of the vote won by Democrats between 2012 and 2016. As well as a -11.85 change in the relationship between the percent of whites in a county and the percent of the vote won by Democrats between 2012 and 2016. The rest of the bivariate regressions run stayed in the same area of either meeting the 10% threshold or not when run in a multivariate. Both bivariate regressions for white and Hispanic changing from having a relationship of not meeting the critical election threshold of greater than or equal to 10% when run together versus being considered offering evidence of a critical election between 2012 and 2016 when run separately further indicates a collinearity issue between the two variables.

Was there evidence of a critical election? The next chapter draws conclusions from these findings.

[4] See Appendix IE

Chapter Six- Conclusion

Beginning with the question of "'what happened?!'" in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the research explored whether and why 2016 was (or was not) a critical election. I analyzed votes at the county level, looking at relationships between vote choice and the proportions of residents of varying races, education levels, union membership, poverty, and health insurance status, looking for change in presidential general election voting patterns between 2012 and 2016 that may point to a critical election. This chapter summarizes the findings and offers alternative explanations. This will be followed by a discussion of the possibility that a critical election occurred in 2016. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research on critical elections.

Summary of findings

Compared to the 2012 presidential general election, in 2016, Democratic candidate received reduced shares of county votes from union, white, and impoverished voters. This was not completely surprising. Presidential candidate Donald Trump's campaign aligned his candidacy and the Republican Party with poorer white voters, while criticizing the entry of "illegal" immigrants and advocating a wall to be built on the U.S - Mexico border.

Meanwhile, Democratic support in counties with higher proportions of union members also was weaker in 2016. A possible explanation might have been Democratic candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton's unpopularity with union voters following her statement that she would seek to put coal mines of business, in effect putting coal miners, a unionized group, out of work (Strauss, 2016). At the same time, union support for Democrats had been dropping more generally, and private sector labor union membership has declined by nearly half since 1978 (Levitz, 2018). Despite increases in the number of union members of color, in 2016 many of them stayed home instead of voting (Golshan, 2019). This suggests that declining support for Democrats is a possible explanation for negative change in the Democratic vote percentage.

Democrats between 2012 and 2016, had some differences in the observed percent change possibly indicative of a critical election when observed at the regional level. The observed percent of change between Blacks and Democrats was -6.18% when all regions were included. However, when examined at the regional level, as can be observed in appendix IF, the relationship and magnitude of the effect of Black population had on the percent of Democratic votes between 2012 and 2016 shows a greater effect in regions such as New England where a positive change of approximately 30% is observed. This sharp difference may be due to overall population size in New England, and the strong relationship with Democrats and Blacks in the region. One explanation for the decline in Black support on the larger scale may be a general lack of mobilization of Black voters in 2016 (Krogstad & Lopez, 2017). Black voters simply may not have supported Clinton in 2016 with the same enthusiasm they had for Barack Obama. In 2016 "The Black voter turnout rate declined for the first time in 20 years in a presidential election, falling to 59.6% in 2016 after reaching a record-high 66.6% in 2012", while national turnout rates as a whole held at 61.4% (Krogstad & Lopez, Black voter turnout fell in 2016, even as a record number of Americans cast ballots, 2017). However, with a change of only - 6.18% it is difficult to say for certain turnout was the only explanation for a sharp dip in the relationship between Black population and Democratic votes between 2012 and 2016.

Between 2012 and 2016 there was a 35 % change observed between 2012 and 2016 for Democratic votes by the college educated. Although it is unsurprising that more educated individuals still aligned with Democrats, it was surprising to see that large of a change between 2012 and 2016 in their support for Democrats; for a group historically relied on by Democrats for votes, I would not expect a change of greater than 10%. Even when broken down by region to see how that might affect the relationship between Democrats and the college educated population, there are not large deviations, as can be referenced in appendix IF, with the lowest change being found in the south at 20%.

The first hypothesis was that in 2012 county Democratic vote would positively relate to the proportions of county residents who were Black, Hispanic, union members, college educated, poor, and did not have access to affordable healthcare. The county Democratic vote was predicted to be negatively related to the percentage of county residents who had high school educations and were white. The evidence here partly supported the hypothesis, although counties with higher percentages of Hispanic residents and of those without health insurance were less likely to support the Democratic candidate.

The second hypothesis predicted that in 2016, counties with higher proportions of residents who were union members, Black, white, and had high school educations would have lower support for the Democratic candidate. Clinton was anticipated to receive more support in counties with higher percentages of residents who lacked access to healthcare, were Hispanic, had college educations. Again, the hypothesis was partially supported. Nonetheless, no statistically significant relationship appeared between county percent of Hispanics and Democratic vote; counties with higher proportions of poor residents and those who lacked access to health care also were less likely to support the Democratic presidential candidate.

The third hypothesis predicted that the relationships between the independent variables and the change in county vote for Democratic presidential candidates between 2012 and 2016 would differ by >/= 10%. I expected to find evidence of less support for Democrats in 2016 than in 2012 in counties with higher proportions of residents who are high school educated, poor, uninsured, Black, and Hispanic. The findings again were not fully consistent with the hypothesis. The relationship between county proportion of uninsured and change in county Democratic vote was not statistically significant and the relationships between proportions of Black and of Hispanic residents and changes in county vote were statistically significant and positive, as was the relationship between proportion of college graduates and change in vote. The relationships between change in presidential vote and counties with higher percentages of high school graduates, union members, and poor residents were negative.

Critical Election

Finally, were any changes in the relationships between county characteristics and Democratic votes for president between 2012 and 2016 sufficient to consider 2016 a critical election? My expectation that a critical election was at play was mostly supported. The parameters set for a critical election defined a critical election as having a change of >/= 10% between 2012 and 2016. When it came to examining change between election years, all the results did show, a change although not all met the 10% marker. What happened in 2016? Based on this research, a critical election is an answer to that question.

A critical election had been defined as a change of greater than or equal to 10%. Leading up to running the actual models, the perception of a sudden change in support from labor union members no longer boosting up the Democratic candidate in the Rust Belt, for example, indicated that 2016 was a critical election. What was discovered through examining the observed change was that there was significant change in the relationship between Democrats in 2012 and 2016 observed among Union members. There was an approximately -22% percent difference in the relationship between union members and the percent of the vote won by Democrats between 2012 and 2016. What this may indicate is that 2016 was in fact a critical election, covering all the variables tested, because if the independent variables underperformed in the all-region regression, they performed at larger than the 10% mark in one of the various regions[5], when I isolated the regions. 2016 may have been a catalyst for the 2020 Presidential election, which saw an impressive mobilization of Black voters for example by Democrats in traditionally Republican states, such as Georgia, that is largely credited with securing the presidency for Joe Biden (Cohn, Conlen, & Smart, Detailed Turnout Data Shows How Georgia Turned Blue, 2020). With each variable displaying changes of over 10% when examining by region and overall, between 2012 and 2016, a critical election can be considered as having happened in 2016.

Alternative Explanations & Frustrations

There are possible explanations for the changes observed resulting in a possible critical election. One possible explanation for the change in voter behavior by Blacks at the county level between 2012 and 2016, for example, could have been a result of turnout, and not a change in partisan preference, although it could be argued that a lack of preference where there was previously between elections, is a clear preference change. It would be difficult to observe turnout change among demographic groups at the county level, with a level of certainty for the change in impact it may have had, based on the sheer fact that only a handful of states keep this voter information. Using unions as an example, when examining the change in county proportion of Democratic votes in relation to county proportion of unions residents there is a largely negative change observed from 2012. However because there is no ability to have a change in mean for Blacks in a county in relation to democratic voters because the data are limited to 2016, it is reasonable to state that though there is enough evidence to believe there was a negative relation between the mean proportion of blacks in a county and Democratic votes between 2012 and 2016,

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See Table IF

it is difficult to state with certainty that the magnitude of change outside of the expected was as large as it was observed in the research.

One of the greatest frustrations in this research was the lack of data on union membership by county. Analysis relied instead Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) data, and MSAs are core population areas consisting of at least 50,000 people.[6] This excludes many counties, since some more rural counties may only have 8,000 residents. For example, in Virginia the MSA data made it nearly impossible to have conclusive union data in 2012 and 2016 because of the gaps in less populated areas.

More generally, relying on U.S. Census data introduced other limitations. The census data used were 2016 estimates, with the exceptions of the percent of uninsured and impoverished people in a county, for which I was able to incorporate 2012 estimates as well. Using one set of estimates over a four-year period, raises a question of accuracy and of causal ordering. It makes it difficult to observe change in a static independent variable with just one year of values. Perhaps there would have been a more accurate picture of change presented if there had been data that permitted one to see change in the county proportions of Black or Hispanic residents, for example. This, of course, can be more easily remedied with data from the 2020 election and census once estimates are published between 2021 and 2022. There will be some time before the census data are available, but it will at least give a more accurate picture than just one estimate. There also are limitations associated with not having actual data about eligible and actual voters (e.g., their race, union

[6] For example, in Virginia the MSA data made it nearly impossible to have comprehensive union data for 2012 and 2016 due to missing data for lower population areas. I attempted to fill gaps where I could in places like Virginia, using judicial districts to supply some union data. Not only is the appropriateness of this approach problematic, but nationally numerous counties had no data on union membership.

membership, education). This could have been remedied through the usage of ANES (American National Election Studies) survey data. ANES data would offer a more individual level analysis using surveys to sample a population, in comparison to the broader county data used in this research.

Perhaps the most obvious limitation in this research is the lack of a concrete and agreed upon definition and testing of a realignment. Every realignment scholar since V.O. Key has had their own critiques, methods, and indicators, some more quantitative than others, to identify a realigning election. This pushed me to define a critical election as change occurring outside of the 10% mark. I do not believe that using this model as a signifier of a critical election is flawed, I do, however, believe looking forward it would better serve the research to use years where more complete population data by county is available.

Finally, the issue of collinearity had been briefly touched upon, it had been mentioned that Hispanic, White, Black, High School Graduate, College Graduate had a suspected collinearity issue between 2012 and 2016 when referencing appendix C. This can be confirmed by a VIF of 5 or greater associated with the dependent variable. White, Black, and Hispanic all had elevated VIFs. One possible explanation for collinearity between these variables would be the broad-spectrum Hispanic covers. Hispanic can be defined as being of Spanish origin. This means that it covers those individuals identifying as Spanish that will likely identify as White, since Spain is in Europe. While also covering individuals from Afro-Hispanic backgrounds such as those from the Dominican Republic, who may also be comfortable identifying as Black in addition to Hispanic in census data. This possible explanation seems to be confirmed by the removal of the Hispanic variable in Appendix D, resulting in the disappearance of collinearity between those variables. This issue could be solved better perhaps by using data of those identifying as Latinx, since it would exclude those of Spanish backgrounds that also identify as White, although it may run into the same issues that Hispanic is presumed to have with Afro-Hispanic individuals having crossover between Black and Latinx. Although, they did not have an elevated VIF of over 5, it is suspected that there is collinearity between high school graduates and college graduates. The reason for this suspicion is not only based upon the VIF of college graduate going down with the remove of high school graduate in the regression model, but because of how the data is set up. Unfortunately, the data is limited in that it does not separate high school graduates as those individuals having ***solely*** achieved a high school diploma, and college graduates as those individuals whose highest level of education is college. Unfortunately, because graduating college requires a high school diploma, the data used marks someone who has graduated high school **and** college in both categories, rather than just college. This might be fixed in future research, by finding data that excludes individuals from crossing over into both categories.

Future research

At the end of *Red State Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do,* Gelman offers that although Democrats receive more of the poor vote and Republicans the wealthy vote there were other variables such as race and region at play that could offer greater insight (Gelman, 2009, p. 196). I believe that this research gave further emphasis to that point, and future research will only further that point. Including Census data from 2020 and examining the 2020 presidential election may help in interpreting the findings here. One could see if the patterns identified here persisted and look for evidence of the more durable change associated with realignment. This will create a clearer picture of the possible pattern emerging confirming whether a critical election took place in 2016 or not. I believe that based on this research, 2016 can tentatively be considered a critical election for union voters, high school, and college graduates as it points to a notable change in voter patterns on a broad scale, and a critical election for all independent variables dependent on region. The 2020 election displayed record voter turnout, and for the first time since Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, the Democrats had a sizable chance at winning Texas and did win the state of Georgia. Therefore, 2016 may have not only been a critical election able to answer "what happened" but it may also hold the key to understanding what happened in 2020.

Appendix A. - Tables

A. Summary of Variables

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min.	Max
Black	3,113	8.957	14.493	0	86.18491
White	3,113	77.330	19.786	.760	100
Hispanic	3,113	8.986	13.652	0	98.959
Uninsured 2016	3,113	18.09108	39.48898	3	2200
Uninsured 2012	3,113	18.37332	5.769323	3	43
Union 2016	3,113	8.530935	4.49	1.6	23.6
Union 2012	3,113	8.829072	4.619499	2.9	23.2
HighSchool Grad.	3,113	85.77317	6.543213	48.52064	98.72123
College Grad	3,113	20.78089	9.137482	2.985075	80.21012
Impoverished	3,113	14.54164	.1451442	.051	98

B. Summary of Dependent Variables

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min.	Max
Percentage Dem 2012	3,113	39.1628	15.0123	3.472222	93.95499
Percentage Dem 2016	3,113	33.29951	16.11545	3.246753	95.74907
Change	3,113	-5.863286	5.252773	-24.29028	16.73538

C. Collinearity Test

Change VIF

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
White	8.00	0.124957
Hispanic	5.05	0.197928
Black	4.93	0.203002
High School Graduate	3.00	0.333172
College Grad	2.22	0.451427
Uninsured 2016	1.01	0.986357
Impoverished	1.31	0.986357
Union 2016	1.39	0.719216
Mean VIF	3.22	

D. Change- Collinearity test with Hispanic and High School Graduate variables removed

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
White	1.72	0.581422
Black	1.72	0.581446
College Grad	1.12	0.889380
Uninsured 2016	1.01	0.989723
impoverished	1.26	0.822588
Mean VIF	1.33	

E. Change-Bivariate Regressions

Indep. Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**
White	-.1184806	.0042592
Hispanic	.123437	.0065333
Black	.0959044	.0062662
High School Graduate	-.0368238	.0143777
College Grad	.2681379	.0091167
Uninsured 2016	.0037259	.0023839
Impoverished	-.0365997	.0116107
Union 2016	-.2807202	.0203436

F. Bivariate regression run against Change by region coefficients

	New England	Mid-Atlantic	East North Central	Midwest	South	Deep South	South Adjacent	Mountains	Pacific
White	-.1435*	-.1440*	-.2255*	-.0894*	-.1150*	-.0327*	-.0475*	.0043	-.0686*
Black	.3041*	.1527*	.2517*	.2172*	.1249*	.0144*	.0264	.0836	-.0192
Hispanic	.2265*	.4293*	.5299*	.2255*	.3256*	.1322*	.0472*	.0015	.1292*
Uninsured	-.3254	-.6374	-.4858*	.1601*	-.3840*	-.0888	-.0044	-.0019	-.1832
Union	-.2731*	-4.429*	.0343	-.2125*	-.6059*	-.2087	-1.490*	-.7880*	.2198*
HS Grad	.4284*	.2415	.5001*	.1025	.2483*	.2947*	.0415	.1821*	.0003
College Grad	.4854*	.3167*	.4870 *	.3722*	.2064*	.2581*	.2718*	.2670*	*.2416
Impoverished	-.4855*	-.3965*	-.1414*	-.0205	-.0007	-.0112	-.0548	-.1867*	-.1480*

* $p \leq .05$

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