PATRICK S. ROBERTS

The Lessons of Civil Defense Federalism for the Homeland Security Era

The era of civil defense from World War II through the 1970s was a period of anxious preparation for attack from abroad by airplanes and missiles, yet the drills, techniques, and agencies that this mission spawned also had secondary purposes, namely, responding to domestic emergencies such as flood, fire, and hurricanes.[1] Scholars investigating civil defense during this period generally focus on where it fell short of protecting the nation against attack.[2] But civil defense in the United States was more than backyard shelters and sham "duck and cover" defenses against nuclear war. Civil defenders trained volunteers, organized state and local associations, educated citizens about fire and flood safety, and generally engaged the public to a greater degree than do today's homeland security programs. They also took important steps to prepare communities for natural hazards that today's homeland security programs would do well to emulate.

From the point of view of American government, homeland security could learn from civil defense's success in using federalism to meet diverse needs across geographic regions and mission areas. Contemporary homeland security programs have drawn criticism for developing procedures that prioritize the terrorist threat and marginalize efforts to prepare for natural hazards such as fires and floods.[3] Homeland security policies have also been shown to lack coordination and accountability, and reformers have proposed greater centralization and federal government oversight to bring coherence to the field.[4] In contrast to this recommendation, the decentralized federalism of the early civil defense period offers advantages over the more heriarchical and centralized approach to today's homeland security.

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This article analyzes three areas in which civil defenders achieved purposes that ought to be of interest to today's homeland security officials: public involvement, state and local implementation of a national program, and preparation for natural disasters. Homeland security agencies have achieved mixed results at best in these areas. One of the primary achievements of civil defense, in contrast, was the substantial level of public involvement in and awareness of the program in its World War II and Cold War varieties. To be fair, Americans during that period were more likely to belong to voluntary associations such as the PTA or church groups than to participate in formal civil defense programs.[5] Nevertheless, the point of civil defense was to build awareness of the collective national effort to prepare for attack, and many Americans did volunteer. During World War II, a small number of civil servants recruited citizen volunteers to plan evacuation routes and blackout drills and monitor the skies for enemy aircraft. The collective national effort continued on a smaller scale during the Cold War.

In addition to public involvement in a national project, civil defenders at the state and local level succeeded in using a national and largely military program to prepare for natural disasters. For example, North Carolina's governor created programs to involve citizens in military-style planning for air attacks as well as planning for floods and hurricanes. When disasters did occur, civil defense agencies and volunteers used their managerial and technical skills to aid in the response. State and local civil defenders went beyond the militaristic national aims of civil defense in implementing the programs in their districts. National leaders knew that this flexibility helped to make civil defense more palatable; a national-level program to prepare for attack from overseas was a hard sell unless the program could have some day-to-day utility for states and localities. Since then, American federalism has transformed from a division of labor among separate spheres to greater cooperation among levels of government to a situation where federal authorities presume to take the lead in all domains. The collapse of an earlier federalism of shared responsibilities has been costly for today's homeland security programs.[6]

One obvious basis for comparison is the shared federal character of both Cold War civil defense and contemporary homeland security. Cold War civil defense was arguably a more successful case of subnational governments using federalism to suit their needs, whereas homeland security policies have spawned complaints about an overbearing national-level bureaucracy. For example, May et al. criticize homeland security's "failure to foster a strong

constituency among state and local interests, or among first responders."[7] What is more, some homeland security officials have made the same point: during his tenure, former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff hyperbolically warned against a "'Soviet-style' management, where there's the heavy hand of government on everything" version of homeland security. Instead, he thought states and localities should have more discretion.[8] By contrast, one might say that civil defense half a century ago showed the light hand of government and the dividends of such an approach.

Civil defense's successes are remarkable given that national politicians interpreted civil defense as first and foremost a defensive military tactic. In achieving its defense aim, however, President Dwight Eisenhower recognized that effective civil defense needed cooperation from localities. Eisenhower was one of the last presidents to endorse the spirit of cooperative federalism, where the national government pursues national aims but has faith in the distinctive capacities of the states.[9] The construction of interstate highway systems is the paradigmatic example: Congress appropriated the funds and set standards, while states carried out the construction. Like civil defense, the highway project was justified as essential for national defense, but the roads were used largely for civilian purposes. Eisenhower used the same rhetoric of cooperative federalism in other domains. "Civil defense by its nature is a critical local problem," he said. "You cannot give civil defense to Atlanta from New York City or vice versa. The people on the spot have got to take an interest or it cannot be done."[10] The need for local buy in allowed state and local civil defense agencies to use their resources to prepare for a range of situations, including natural disasters. Local buy in also required local mobilization, signing up people to volunteer for drills and campaigns.

In an age in which American government is criticized for being broken because of its outdated Constitution and gridlock among branches of government, or when federalism is said to fail during catastrophic disasters, the history of civil defense provides a more hopeful example.[11] One of the virtues of American federalism is its ability to respond to different needs in different geographic areas. The development of speedy and expert hurricane preparations and response in Florida and California's evolving building codes to protect against earthquakes are just two contemporary examples of how subnational governments made innovations beyond national government standards.[12] The history of civil defense also shows the virtues of an American federalism that allows states and localities to participate in a national project, while giving them substantial discretion to meet geographically-specific needs.

WORLD WAR II MOBILIZATION

Civil defense is most often associated with World War II and the Cold War, but its true origins are earlier if it is defined as the use of bureaucratic means to organize the home front and focus public attention in preparation for war. Civil defense under this definition emerged as part of a military reorganization after the poor performance of militia-style forces during the Spanish-American War.[13] One result of the reorganization was a more professionalized civil defense that was first tested during World War I.[14] These civil defenders watched for invading aircraft, organized blackout drills to darken cities, planned evacuation, and prepared to extinguish fires. The World War I Council of National Defense was charged with "coordinating resources and industries for national defense" and "stimulating civilian morale," prefiguring Cold War civil defense's goals of national coordination and mettle rather than tangible defensive machinery.[15] The first civilian defense organizations did not have to address strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, which framed more familiar debates about Cold War civil defense. They did face organizational challenges posed by a large country and the need to shore up morale, and they accomplished these goals by leaving most of the work of civilian defense to states, localities, and citizens.

Despite or perhaps because of its new importance, civilian defense had ambiguous and multiple goals. The council of national defense coordinated state defense councils, which increased food production through agricultural colleges, organized volunteers to harvest crops, and led snow removal efforts to help ship goods, all in the name of civil defense.[16] Civil defense's ability to assume diverse missions under a single heading contrasts with homeland security's top-down narrowing of its missions to those that suit national goals. For example, today even members of Congress repeat the idea that FEMA long had a policy of "no dough for snow." That ended in 1993 when, after several severe snowstorms, FEMA rescinded the policy of not classifying snowstorms as major disasters.[17] In fact, snow removal and many other tasks outside the scope of FEMA were part of early civilian defense when state councils had wide latitude over their affairs. The councils disbanded after the war, and civilian defense functions receded to become a very small part of military planning.

After the outbreak of World War II in Europe in 1939, preparations for war lifted again security concerns to the top of the agenda. President Franklin Roosevelt created the Office of Emergency Management by executive order to coordinate preparations to defend the home front against attack. In August

1940, the president recommended that governors form state and local civil defense councils and develop plans to protect civilians.[18] Some officials opposed mass civil defense out of a concern that mobilization would spark panic, but arguments for being prepared won out over arguments against. [19] By January 1941, in less than a year's time, thirty-seven states had formed state councils, and seven hundred localities had created defense councils.[20] Also in 1941, Roosevelt created the Office of Civilian Defense, which included a Division of State and Local Cooperation housed in the executive branch to encourage subnational governments to cooperate with civil defense aims.[21] The OCD's light hand in guiding civil defense was a relatively new development. In the post–New Deal government, federal authorities had a newly invigorated capacity to coordinate state and local counterparts, but federalism still had sufficient vitality for states to lead implementation.

Today, the Department of Homeland Security struggles to coordinate state and local efforts, but it runs up against heavy-handed federal leadership, a diffuse bureaucracy that is difficult to coordinate even horizontally, and a federal government that issues detailed guidelines prescribing exactly what subnational governments are to do to administer federal programs.[22] While federal officials intended for states and localities to use civil defense programs for their own purposes during the Cold War, today federal officials criticize state homeland security fusion centers if they serve missions such as local law enforcement beyond the terrorism and immigration purposes of the DHS.[23]

Unlike the top-down manner of homeland security that Chertoff warned against, civil defense was not merely federal government aggrandizement. Initially mayors requested federal government and international help.[24] Even before Pearl Harbor, local leaders watched events in Great Britain and worried that the United States might need to undertake similar preparations for war and air raids. In January 1941, New York mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, who served as head of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, submitted a report on civil defense administration that recommended a greater federal government role in civil defense to reduce the financial and planning burdens on municipalities.[25] The International City Managers Association also expressed "concerns about the burden of civil defense on municipal officials" at its 1940 annual meeting in Colorado Springs and welcomed the federal government as a partner in providing plans, guidance, and standards that could be adapted to local needs.[26] While LaGuardia greeted the federal government with open arms, today mayors welcome federal homeland security officials with a cold embrace at best.

Cities agreed about the need for a national program of civil defense, but there was less agreement about what exactly civil defense should do. FDR considered many options—from doing nothing, to elaborate air raid drills, to Interior Secretary Harold Ickes's idea for a program of government-sponsored propaganda to neutralize the isolationist campaign.[27] Florence Kerr, a deputy administrator of the Works Progress Administration, proposed Home Defense programs that would foster volunteers for social services.[28] Roosevelt asked his assistant, Wayne Coy, and budget director, Harold D. Smith, to come up with a plan.

The Coy group's proposal incorporated disparate proposals for what civil defense was to be—propaganda, patriotism, functional defenses against air raids, and support for mayors and governors—into a single organization. FDR had a tendency to fuse multiple programs and goals into one "new deal" innovation, and some historians criticized this approach for creating overlapping agencies and goal ambiguity.[29] But there was genius in FDR's approach, too, because he allowed stakeholders to battle among themselves over what tasks an agency might accomplish, which gave civil defense an extraordinary flexibility to meet a protean threat. At the time, no one knew whether the United States faced a serious threat of an air raid, or whether the more urgent task was inspiring Americans to contribute to the war effort before the situation worsened (in Europe, most predicted at the time, rather than in the Pacific).[30]

Roosevelt officially created the Office of Civil Defense by executive order 8757 on May 20 along the lines of the Coy group's suggestions.[31] The OCD had two divisions, the Board for Civilian Protection and the Volunteer Participation Committee. The OCD had representatives from cabinet departments and from the U.S. conference of mayors, the American Municipal Association, and the Council of State Governments. The Volunteer Participation Committee had civilian representatives appointed by the president.[32] LaGuardia appointed Eleanor Roosevelt to head the committee and create volunteer programs to support public health, nutrition, and recreation. The level of state and local participation and the prominence given to volunteers stands in contrast to today's professionalized Department of Homeland Security with two hundred thousand federal employees.

The OCD gave civil defense a home at the national level, but it was largely an advisory organization. Local authorities were responsible for carrying out protective activities, and for developing what those activities would be, whether training volunteer firefighters, rehearsing evacuations, or conducting blackout drills. In contrast, states and localities today are told in no uncertain

terms precisely what they need to do to receive homeland security grant dollars, even if the detailed instructions result in purchases of questionable utility, such as a new $256,643 armored truck, complete with a rotating turret, for the police department in Fargo, North Dakota.[33]

In contrast to concern over federal oversight and imperfect accountability in today's homeland security programs, early civil defense pioneered a shared state-federal government regionalism.[34] LaGuardia created nine regional OCD offices that corresponded to the Army Corps of Engineers' regions, and the War Department and Army Corps assigned officers to each region.[35] LaGuardia's biographer reports that he spent three days per week at OCD's headquarters, and two days in New York as mayor.[36] In addition, he toured the country to draw the attention of state and local officials and the public to civil defense.[37] Compared with what would have happened without an OCD, LaGuardia succeeded. Historian Robert Miller found in the archives hundreds of letters from governors, mayors, and other officials offering support for OCD initiatives, and testifying to the influence of the office.[38]

To strengthen ties between the federal government and local efforts, LaGuardia appointed former mayors to posts in regional offices.[39] Regional directors worked with state and local defense councils to develop civilian protection plans, fill sandbags, and mobilize spotters who watched for air invasions. Local councils organized volunteer efforts such as scrap drives, collecting metal that would ostensibly be used in a war effort, if war ever came to the United States.[40] Local blackout drills drew widespread attention—and how could they not, with pitch-black skies in cities that usually glistened at night. News reports show that more than ten thousand people in East St. Louis left their homes one night 1941 to observe a dark sky.[41] Some cities recruited auxiliary police forces, ostensibly to help protect critical infrastructure and provide emergency services. These police forces connected citizen volunteers to police professionals, and they provided capacity that could be used for other purposes. One enterprising local defense council in Bridgeport, Connecticut, created a "bomb taxi," a metal protected vehicle that helped to remove unexploded ordinance. Meanwhile, the federal government civil defenders and congressional advocates did not assume that they could direct all civil defense activity, and they did not assume that local officials were so amateurish as to be unreliable partners. Whether because of a lack of resources for civil defense in the federal government or respect for federalism, national authorities kept their distance.

At the same time, however, national political figures did try to define civil defense according to their own worldview. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt viewed

civil defense as an opportunity to expand government's social welfare programs, and she was concerned that the OCD was not taking advantage of opportunities to improve health, education, the arts, and help for the poor.[42] She joined the agency as LaGuardia's assistant and led its civilian participation branch.[43] She clashed with LaGuardia, who criticized social welfare programs as "sissy stuff," and wanted civil defense to retain a military focus.[44] Nevertheless, Roosevelt's efforts were no small thing in a country with an isolationist tradition and active antiwar factions.[45] The *Chicago Tribune*, an isolationist paper, charged that the OCD was created by "a war minded administration to whip up war fever."[46]

The public's interest in shoring up defenses at home spiked after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7. By the end of 1941, more than seven hundred and fifty thousand men and women had volunteered. In addition, the Red Cross issued nearly two hundred thousand first-aid certificates as part of a civil defense drive from June to November 1941. LaGuardia believed in volunteers as the backbone of civil defense for principled and practical reasons. The OCD had fewer than one hundred staff members during his time there, and local offices were similarly bare-bones. Civil defense tasks far outstripped the number of professionals available to carry them out.[47]

After the United States entered the war, the debate shifted from whether to mobilize to how, and the OCD prepared for an influx of new volunteers. In the eight months since his appointment, LaGuardia created thousands of local defense councils and programs to involve citizens as auxiliary police, air-raid wardens, and medical staff. There was even a program for messengers sixteen to twenty-one years of age to deliver news among civil defense organizations.[48] Total participation when LaGuardia departed was 5,601,920 volunteers through 8,500 civil defense councils by one estimate, but critics in the Roosevelt administration thought participation was not high enough and that LaGuardia neglected the social welfare function of civil defense promoted by Eleanor Roosevelt.[49] "Little Flower," as he was known, both because Fiorello is Italian for Little Flower and because he stood only five feet tall, also drew criticism for dealing directly with mayors and city governments and bypassing state offices.[50] The brunt of the criticism was that volunteer programs were too small, and that LaGuardia was too brusque in style and too willing to approach localities in his management practice. These criticisms are in sharp contrast with today's focus on accountability, which usually means accountability to federal guidelines. Today's criticism of the DHS is also notable for the relative absence of concern about volunteers and local improvisation, both of which characterized civil defense.[51]

After Pearl Harbor, FDR elevated regional director and Harvard law professor James Landis to become the full-time head of the OCD in 1942, while LaGuardia returned to his mayoral duties.[52] To address the surge in interest in the war effort, Landis created the Civilian Defense Corps, which recruited 10 million volunteers by the end of 1943.[53] Over the next two years, volunteers covered streetlights for blackout drills, learned basic emergency techniques, and practiced cleaning up chemical spills. Public support for civil defense grew as the war continued, along with the number of volunteers. Between May 1941 and July 1942, the agency developed air raid procedures that state and local councils implemented. The threat of an enemy invasion receded as the war was fought in Europe and Asia, but the OCD did not close its doors. It sent its volunteers to health, welfare, and community service activities such as community fitness programs. The OCD also continued its morale-boosting efforts, shoring up support for a war in which the United States was now officially involved. FDR underlined the importance of civil defense to the war effort in a 1942 fireside chat, claiming that civil defense volunteers "are helping to fortify our national unity and our real understanding of the fact that we are all involved in this war."[54]

By the war's end, more than 5 million Americans had registered for various kinds of volunteer activities, training, and certifications through some fourteen thousand local defense councils.[55] Other estimates placed the number of volunteers at 11 million, or one out of every thirteen Americans.[56] Either number dwarfs the size of OCD's paid staff, which was under one hundred people during the LaGuardia years, and which never exceeded fifteen hundred until Truman closed the office at the end of the war.[57]

The OCD and World War II civil defense succeeded because of the sheer number of participants and because of their strong sense of solidarity—we're all in this together, they thought. Even if the volunteers' contribution to the offensive and defensive purposes of the war were negligible, their participation was not. Their involvement—however small—required some level of consent and sacrifice of time and attention, which are not small matters from the perspective of democratic theory. Civil defense participation comes closer to the civic ideal of participatory democracy than many contemporary forms of political participation such as occasional voting or checkbook activism.[58] It is certainly closer to the ideal than contemporary Americans' interaction with Transportation Security Administration officials at airports or the disbursement of disaster relief aid. In civil defense, citizens in local communities volunteered to be the eyes and ears of the state and shaped the implementation of the law. In the TSA, by contrast, federal civil servants

and their technological accouterments question, irradiate, and monitor relatively passive citizens.

In recent years, federal officials have asked the DHS to develop a "culture of preparedness," but studies show that citizens remain woefully underprepared, failing to stock enough food, water, batteries, and medical supplies to be able to remain in their homes for several days, the recommended course of action during many disasters.[59] Citizens also remain unengaged in defining the purposes of homeland security, which are usually administered by federal civil servants and contractors. The culture of preparedness standard is below the wartime civil defense ideal of community volunteers staffing civil defense programs and adapting them to their own, local purposes, but even this standard has proven difficult to meet. Perhaps civil defense's cooperative federalism was key to its modest but real successes. Federal, state, and local officials made policies jointly, often at the request of localities, even as national figures such as Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt or LaGuardia used civil defense to fulfill their political agendas.

The fate of civil defense in Portland, Oregon, is typical of many other cities, and its malleability contrasts with the more static history of DHS programs. During the war, Portland created food and water stockpiles and recruited volunteers who learned how to put out small fires. For example, by 1942 Portland had trained twenty-five hundred volunteer firefighters.[60] In 1956, Portland became the first city in the United States to build a second government operations center outside of the city, a practice that has become standard for emergency management in large cities.[61] The city's civil defense teams conducted practice evacuations and mock air raids, and sometimes responded to floods. In 1963, however, Portland withdrew from the Federal Civil Defense System and the *Los Angeles Times* declared civil defense in the city "dead" after its poor performance in the Columbus Day Storm of October 12, 1962, which killed forty people and caused damages estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The state legislature and city council asked "Where was civil defense when the storm struck?" and civil defense's communications and warning procedures were found lacking.[62] An outspoken city commissioner led the charge against civil defense, and the council voted to terminate the city's program in full, eliminating eleven full-time jobs and millions in equipment.[63] Civil defense did not really disappear in Oregon, however, even though the formal agency in Portland did. Instead, as fire and police agencies took over the underground command center, evacuation routing, and other tasks, civil defense transformed into emergency management. In contrast, homeland security programs today are

driven by federal government financing and thus federal government priorities. One wonders whether the DHS and its grant programs or local homeland security offices will have the same capacity for adaptation as Portland's civil defense programs.

FROM DEFENDING AGAINST ATTACK TO DEFENDING AGAINST DISASTER

Civil defense served multiple goals even in wartime, but its legacy for cooperative federalism was put to the test when wartime fervor waned. Portland publicly severed ties with civil defense, but behind the scenes emergency and fire services personnel adapted civil defense's plans, routines, and operations center to prepare for natural disasters. After the war, many more states and localities transformed their wartime civil defense programs into efforts to prepare for natural disasters. Civil defense succeeded in strengthening national-subnational ties in American federalism by providing a policy area in which states could implement national concerns. Civil defense's shelter program is often criticized for never coming close to the goal of providing adequate shelter from nuclear attack. It may be precisely because the federal program never came to fruition, however, that key decisions shaping civil defense were made at the state and local level, even in areas such as disaster preparedness that had a limited tradition of public action.[64]

Whether because of federal inaction or a genuine commitment to cooperative federalism, the early Cold War showed the potential for states and localities to direct federal programs to regionally-specific needs. The 1960s were a pivotal time in American federalism according to Martha Derthick, as the divisions of power and prerogative between states and the federal government were tilting toward the latter.[65] Civil defense was both a cause and effect of this shift in federalism. The postwar American federal government assumed new powers, which affected civil defense as well as many other fields. But civil defense after the war also created new, permanent state and local level agencies that initially implemented an ineffectual shelter program. These same organizations, however, would later implement other policies, including natural and industrial disaster management described in the third case in this article. The shelter program is associated with the much-lampooned Bert the Turtle character, who "knew just what to do" during an atomic bomb attack—duck and cover.[66] Yet the organizational routines it spawned, such as evacuation and warning procedures and the connections between national and state programs, were a success, measured by the wide adoption of civil

defense at the state and local levels in the 1950s and 1960s and the durability of these organizations, which persist in new forms to the present day.[67]

The shift to natural-disasters work is striking because of the distinctly military origins of Cold War civil defense. The Soviet Union detonated an atomic device in August 1949, and soon after Truman signed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, creating the Federal Civil Defense Administration.[68] The FCDA consolidated functions of wartime agencies and developed programs to provide structural protection from attack, including shelters. It also developed posters and brochures to warn Americans about the dangers of Communism and the Soviet military threat.[69] Without financial incentives for states and localities, it only loosely coordinated subnational agencies. Section 201(i) of the law required that federal government funds could not be used for state and local equipment or personnel.[70] Therefore, state and localities were left to foot the bill.

The act encouraged states to form interstate compacts if they needed additional resources, rather than rely on the federal government. The FCDA's 1955 Annual Statistical Report concluded that "the interstate compact was considered necessary by the Congress to avoid Federal centralization of civil defense operations which might result if each State could operate in civil defense matters only as a separate entity."[71] The report's self-assured language belies the shifting attitudes toward federalism and the prerogatives of states during the period. Congress created the First Hoover Commission in 1947 ostensibly to dismantle the New Deal, but Democratic electoral gains and the commission's work produced recommendations that helped to ratify the New Deal's administrative structure, reorganizing some government agencies around hierarchical lines and recommending the creation of larger departments.[72] Civil defense largely escaped these recommendations, perhaps because no one quite knew what to do with a national civil defense program. The Department of Defense was reluctant to claim it, preferring to focus on offensive strategies.[73]

What explains why civil defense was not swallowed up by the federal government?[74] National politicians of the 1950s were divided about the value of Cold War civil defense, and they had not yet discovered the electoral benefits that came with bureaucratizing and claiming credit for disaster relief.[75] Meanwhile, Val Peterson, who led the Federal Civil Administration, justified the centralized but relatively light hand of the agency as the "most efficient" way to provide disaster aid to states.[76] The Federal Disaster Act of 1950 authorized federal agencies to fill "gaps" in assistance after disasters. The governor of a state would apply directly to the president for assistance in

events where the damage outstripped state and local capacity to respond and recover, and the president could certify an event as a "major disaster" eligible for federal assistance. Even so, the bulk of the aid was to be provided by subnational governments and private and quasi-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross.[77]

While the federal government wanted to avoid federalizing civil defense, the states were allowing civil defense to be used for natural disasters and other emergencies beyond foreign attack. The federal government transferred responsibility for natural-disasters programs to the FCDA in 1953, and most states followed suit, moving their natural-disaster functions under the supervision of the state civil defense director.[78] Large cities had similar systems, and they relied on a small civil defense professional staff supplemented by trained civil defense and Red Cross volunteers.[79] By 1955, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia permitted civil defense programs to be used for a range of hazards, including natural disasters.

Given the genuine concern about nuclear war during the early Cold War, the ability of states to fuse natural disasters and traditional military civil defense missions was remarkable. To take one example, North Carolina governor William Kerr Scott created the North Carolina Council of Civil Defense on July 24, 1950, which provided for a civil defense director "subject to the direction and control of the Governor."[80] The agency was modeled after national-level civil defense plans, but it was technically a creature of the governor. The organization's primary tool was the ability to focus citizens' attention on preparing for emergencies through volunteer campaigns and educational programs. The North Carolina agency was to address an expansive category of emergencies; its mission was to "promote and direct thorough and extensive community organization for common protection and orderly action . . . in disaster."[81]

The agency's most influential early director was Major General Edward F. Griffen, who served from 1954 to 1967. Like many civil defense leaders, he made the transition from military service in Europe to engaging volunteers on the home front. He had also been a lawyer and state legislator, which provided experience for the political part of his job, rallying groups around the state behind his civil defense programs.[82] Civil defense in the immediate postwar period had a distinctly military tone. Former military leaders like Griffen took the helm of agencies that focused on the threat of attack from abroad, both nuclear and conventional, assuming that these were threats that could be defended against with enough preparation on the home front. The government's preparations for war reflected the anxiety of the broader society.[83]

One of the most enduring legacies of federal government involvement in civil defense against attack was the shelter program. The federal government provided encouragement and guidance, but most shelters were privately financed. The earliest shelters protected against bombs, but by the 1950s attention shifted to the newly discovered dangers of fire and fallout.[84] To some degree, new knowledge about fallout made shelter construction easier. Fallout shelters were less expensive to build than the bomb shelters of the early days of civil defense because they only needed to provide protection from radiation fallout rather than the pressure and fire of a nuclear blast.[85] The National Fallout Shelter Survey, which lasted from 1948 until 1986, was designed to identify shelters and regulate their conditions. The survey highlighted the relatively small number of shelters compared to the population.[86] In March 1960, Congress held hearings on civil defense, and learned that in the thirty-five states and sixty-six cities that provided reports, only 1,565 home fallout shelters had been built. North Carolina civil defense reported on March 7, 1960, that only twenty-five private homes had constructed shelters and just two public buildings had shelters.[87] Historian Frank Blazich reports that "by October 1962, the survey had located and licensed public fallout shelter spaces for only 2.8 percent of the state's resident population, and it had determined that adequate space was available for an additional 4.9 percent of the population."[88] While shelter construction did not reach the levels its advocates had hoped for in any state, North Carolina's shelter population was especially sparse. The practice of constructing shelters for defense against foreign attack stemmed from federal government and defense planners, but Raleigh and local communities led its implementation. [89]

In implementing the program, state civil defense offices built connections to a number of agencies beyond those with civil defense in the name. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided civil defense information to rural areas through cooperative extension offices. The USDA informed rural counties about "inexpensive shelters" and "methods for protecting livestock and crops against fallout."[90] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers participated in the shelter survey, inspecting and registering spaces deemed shelters. Experts from federal agencies participated in state initiatives as genuine partners, not as the sanctimonious big brother that contemporary homeland security officials in states and localities complain about.[91]

To be sure, the rhetoric and debate about civil defense and the flurry of new government organizations in North Carolina far outstripped the state's ability to provide tangible protection to citizens. In this, North Carolina was typical of many places in the United States.[92] The bulk of the financial

responsibility for building shelters and organizing air-raid watches and auxiliary emergency services fell on individual citizens rather than the state and federal government.[93] The governor and mayors like LaGuardia before them occupied the bully pulpit, exhorting citizens to do their part. State offices did provide lasting peacetime programs to spur citizen involvement, however. Women's and rotary clubs held discussions about fallout dangers. The state agency delivered Office of Civil Defense publications *Fallout Protection* and *Family Shelter Designs* to localities that requested them, and sometimes the agency sponsored fallout shelter construction workshops. An Office of Civil Defense regional director wrote a sober memo reminding local directors of the morale-boosting purpose of their work, noting that the workshops "will not impart knowledge in depth. They will help dispel misinformation and build support for the shelter program within the construction industry."[94] Civil defense maintained its propaganda mission even at the state level. Historian Frank Blazich's survey of news and editorial opinion in North Carolina newspapers in the 1960s finds that "citizens did not focus on the lack of fallout shelters. Instead, they appeared to accept that North Carolina's civil defense strength was in the ability to maintain communication and a centralized oversight over the local civil defense offices. Citizens seem to have valued the fact that the state could react to the crisis in an efficient and collected, orderly fashion, far more than they bemoaned the dearth of shelters."[95] The shelter program may have had little functional effect on protection or even on the Cold War, but it did mark a period of state institutionalization of a federal government program in which a region not in the Soviet bull's-eye, North Carolina, mimicked national priorities.

LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE FOR MANAGING NATURAL DISASTERS

While civil defense began as a federal government effort to defend the home front against military attack from abroad, the federal structure of the United States allowed states and localities to use civil defense organizations at the subnational level to prepare for the natural disasters that threatened them more than the war that never came. In the United States, governors do not work for the president, and mayors really do not work for governors. States have authorities separate from the national government, and mayors and local officials have different electoral bases than state politicians. While the national government focused citizens' attention on civil defense as part of national defense and provided templates and programs that state and local

officials could use, subnational government implementation showed the dynamic character of American federalism. If an enduring national program of peacetime civil defense was part of a transformation in American federalism in which the national government's priorities prevailed over those of the states, the subsequent use of civil defense to prepare for and respond to local disasters marked a flexibility in the cooperative federalism of the era. In this, the civil defense approach to federalism could be a model for contemporary homeland security programs.

The best evidence for the flexibility of the cooperative federalism of the era is the existence of defense goals for civil defense at the national level and other disaster and emergency preparedness goals at the state and local level.[96] For instance, states and localities used the concept of civil defense as a way to address the quotidian but deadly danger of house fires. The *Negro Star* of Wichita, Kansas, ran an editorial titled, "Fire prevention is an important part of civil defense."[97] The newspaper began with the assumption that civil defense was first and foremost about defending against military attack, noting that the fires caused by bombing raids can cause more damage than the blast, but that people can take precautions to reduce the damage of firebombing.

The Wichita newspaper advised readers to clean out "trashpiles, rubbish, or stored odds and ends," clear vacant lots, not store flammable fluids, and sweep chimneys. A chimneysweep is not usually thought of as a frontline civil defender, but the newspaper and many others like it recognized that broad civil defense purposes could inspire people to act to prevent more routine dangers. In this case, a newspaper, as a private, local organization not yet part of national conglomerates, used civil defense for a purpose that was not part of national-level goals. One could imagine a DHS-like federal organization sanctioning local civil defenders for using federal resources for non-homeland security goals or, worse, providing grant guidance requiring that local authorities purchase expensive fire trucks rather than simply working with the media and private organizations to spread the word about the dangers of fire hazards.

As faith in the value of civil defense in war declined, cities seized on natural-disasters missions as a replacement. When a 1963 fire destroyed more than six hundred homes in Los Angeles, the city's civil defense command posts were activated to lead the response, and civil defense professionals and volunteers used their knowledge of the grant process to access federal funds to help with the cleanup. Los Angeles Civil Defense director Joseph Quinn said that "it was the disastrous Bel-Air fire, the second greatest fire from the point of loss in our history, that we feel civil defense passed its stiffest test."[98]

The measure of the civil defense agency was its performance in a natural disaster, not its preparations for war.

Even during large-scale regional disasters, local civil defense offices often led the response. Hurricane Betsy in 1965 provides a telling example.[99] Betsy first made landfall in the Caribbean, then continued across the Florida peninsula, strengthened in the Gulf Coast, and came ashore through Louisiana on September 9, wrecking havoc along the coast. Known as "Billion-Dollar Betsy," the hurricane was the first in the United States estimated to cause a billion dollars in damages.[100] Much like Hurricane Katrina in 2006, Betsy carried a storm surge that overtopped the levees in the city's Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish, flooding the city and many of its homes with soupy water.[101]

Nuclear weapons scientist Edward Teller made waves after the hurricane when he said that if New Orleans' civil defense organization "had been on its toes" a faster evacuation would have saved lives. At least seventy-five deaths were attributed to the storm, most of these in Louisiana. "It is incredible that people had only twenty minutes between the time they first knew water was rising and the time it reached a height over their heads," Teller alleged. "Then it's too late."[102] Teller was a staunch advocate of the protective and deterrent value of military civil defense, but he worried that New Orleans was not prepared for a nuclear attack because it "was not even prepared for the tragic, but relatively smaller force of superstorm Betsy." Teller was not alone in his criticism of Betsy as an object lesson in the failures of civil defense. Secretary of Commerce John T. Conner said that the storm pointed out the need to develop fail-safe communications systems through improved technology and redundancy.[103] New Orleans' power and telephone systems failed two hours after the storm began. Though civil defense underperformed according to some, the criticism assumes that preparing for and responding to natural disasters is part of civil defense.

Placed in context, civil defense did not perform badly given very limited resources. The death toll of seventy-five pales in comparison to the devastation of the Camille and Katrina storms that later struck New Orleans. After Betsy, New Orleans officials denounced Teller's claims, and mayor Victor Schiro said that New Orleans has "the best there is" in civil defense. To city officials, civil defense *was* disaster preparedness, and the mayor turned to city civil defense director Charles W. Erdman to detail the city's efforts. Erdman told the press: "We were prepared, even two days before. The people did have adequate warning."[104] Civil defense officials manned shelters housing tens of thousands of people in New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish. In St. Bernard,

thirty thousand of the parish's forty thousand people were forced out of their homes by floods. The local civil defense agency found shelters in schools, gyms, and other cavernous buildings. The military pitched in, too, hosting a dozen evacuees at the naval air station in Algiers, Louisiana. Local civil officials assumed the difficult job of deciding when people could return to their homes—or barring them from doing so. "You can't keep 40,000 people cooped up without feelings becoming a little strained," St. Bernard parish assistant civil defense director Arwyn Corne told reporters.[105]

With obvious suffering all around, finger pointing among federal, state, and local officials usually accompanies catastrophic disasters.[106] National figures criticized Betsy's devastation as evidence that civil defense failed. Local officials, however, pointed to the crucial functions performed by civil defenders in responding to a catastrophic hurricane, and by 1965 both national and local figures assumed that civil defense included natural-disaster management at its core. Federal authorities were partners in the response, filling in the "gaps" mentioned in the 1950 Federal Disaster Act rather than directing the subnational effort.

CONCLUSION

The standard accounts of civil defense explain why it never lived up to its original goals. Civil defense lacked sufficient technology, funding, transparency about the effects of fallout, and leadership commitment to ever be a viable defense against massive aerial attack.[107] The most critical histories of civil defense portray it as a propaganda campaign designed to frighten Americans into supporting the government's Cold War policies.[108] These histories are correct in that civil defense would not have been an effective defense against attack. There were never enough shelters to house the American population, and the shelters, air-raid spotters, and evacuations would have been of limited use in a nuclear exchange. But shelters were not the point of civil defense, and because civil defense had multiple goals, it had many points depending on who invoked the idea. The president and the federal government created civil defense programs to shore up support for military mobilization abroad, from World War II into the Cold War. Governors, mayors, civil servants, and private leaders such as newspaper editors used civil defense to meet state and local needs in preparing for more routine emergencies, such as fires, flooding, and hurricanes. State and local managers built civil defense organizations that engaged the public, not fully, but to a greater degree than today's homeland security organizations. Most of the citizen preparedness

programs of contemporary homeland security have fallen flat, which may say something about the contemporary age, or about the more confused aims of homeland security.[109] One reason for the different levels of engagement may be that civil defense organizations had a civilian presence at the local level that contemporary homeland security, usually housed in police departments and intelligence fusion centers, lacks. Homeland security continues to favor law enforcement direction over broader emergency management.[110] New York mayor Michael Bloomberg's plan for building a more resilient city after the devastation caused by hurricane Sandy in 2012 gives the lead in emergency and crisis management to the police department rather than the emergency management department.[111]

Given the problems facing homeland security, civil defenders from the past can offer ideas about how to encourage participation in the future. Civil defense succeeded in giving subnational governments discretion over programs, and these governments used civil defense for their own (usually natural disasters) purposes. Civil defense may have attracted volunteers because local and state agencies were more attuned to the needs of localities where the volunteers resided. Civil defense's military patina also offered an attraction. Studies show that uniforms can have a powerful effect on behavior and attraction, and civil defenders readily bought their own uniforms and assumed titles, as they still do to this day in the civil air patrol.[112]

Contemporary homeland security has many of the same "dual use" possibilities as civil defense.[113] Some programs to respond to terrorism can be used to respond to natural disasters. For example, FEMA performed admirably in responding to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, albeit in a limited role.[114] Similarly, many of the same technologies to prepare for natural hazards can reduce the damage caused by terrorism. Concrete reinforcements in buildings protect against earthquakes and bombs. These contemporary dual-use provisions developed over a decades-long dance between natural hazards and national security advocates in government, and they sprung from the seeds planted by civil defense. Advocates of postwar civil defense used the fear of attack to encourage communities to take rather mundane steps to reduce natural hazards such as cleaning debris from vacant lots, stocking sandbags, or rehearsing evacuations.[115]

Finally, the history of civil defense has implications for federalism. The postwar United States shifted toward more nationally directed policies in areas ranging from the military to social welfare and education.[116] Martha Derthick makes the claim starkly: "The place of place in the American polity had been sharply devalued [in the postwar United States].

Autonomous individuals as political actors had gained at the expense of place-based communities." [117] Derthick's studies of education and welfare bear this out.[118] Not all policy domains are the same, however, and civil defense shows how place-based communities asserted their aims against or even while using national programs. Until at least the 1960s, civil defense, spawned out of New Deal emergencies, retained a measure of cooperative federalism whereby states and the federal government each pursued multiple goals. What Rexford Tugwell and Edward Banfield concluded about the ideas behind the TVA held for civil defense: "The mistake was in thinking that it would be the policy of President Roosevelt to enhance the federal power . . . at the expense of that of the states. He seemed to conclude finally that both powers could be enhanced at the same time."[119] The salience of the threat of attack combined with very limited federal resources by necessity produced civil defense policy that was not far from the "associative state" of the Herbert Hoover era in which business, nonprofits, and governments at all levels shared policy design and implementation.[120] While national civil defense looked anxiously at geo-political threats abroad, state and local civil defense adapted to local needs at home, even with starkly limited resources.

Virginia Tech

NOTES

1. This article benefited from the support of two National Science Foundation grants: SES-1041508 provided support for presenting an earlier version of this paper at a Law and Society conference panel in Boston in 2013; CMMI-1133263 supported the author's research on local emergency management networks. The author's dozens of interviews and informal conversations for the latter contemporary policy project led to the idea that the civil defense past could provide lessons for homeland security's future.

2. Dee Garrison, *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked* (New York, 2006); Guy Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* (New York, 1994); Harry B. Yoshpe, *Our Missing Shield: The US Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective* (Washington, D.C., 1981).

3. Christopher Cooper and Robert Block, *Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security* (New York, 2006); Charles R . Wise," Organizing for Homeland Security after Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What's Missing?" *Public Administration Review* 66 (2006): 302–18; Charles Perrow, *The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters* (Princeton, 2011).

4. In particular, state and local fusion centers have been criticized for lacking oversight. See Torin Monahan and Neal A. Palmer, "The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers," *Security Dialogue* 40 (2009): 617–36. For the use of common performance goals as a

means of accountability, see Elaine Kamarck, "Applying 21st-Century Government to the Challenge of Homeland Security," PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government Report, 2002, 1. On recommendations for using the Incident Command System as a means to centralize and coordinate, see James F. Miskel, *Disaster Response and Homeland Security: What Works, What Doesn't* (Westport, Conn., 2006), 16–20; Kathleen J. Tierney, "Recent Developments in US Homeland Security Policies and Their Implications for the Management of Extreme Events," in *Handbook of Disaster Research*, ed. Havidán Rodríguez, Enrico L . Quarantelli, and Russell Dynes (New York, 2007), 405–12.

5. For Americans' level of involvement in civic associations, see Robert Wuthnow, "The United States: Bridging the Privileged and the Marginalized?" in *Democracies in Flux*, ed. Robert D. Putnam (New York, 2002): 59–103; Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York, 2002).

6. For just one account of the problems that the Department of Homeland Security poses for state and local emergency managers, see Thomas Birkland and Sarah Waterman, "Is Federalism the Reason for Policy Failure in Hurricane Katrina?" *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 38 (2008): 692–714.

7. Peter J. May, Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne, "Constructing Homeland Security: An Anemic Policy Regime," *Policy Studies Journal* 39, no. 2 (2011): 285–307, 302.

8. DHS, "Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to the National Congress for Secure Communities," 17 December 2007, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1197986846840.shtm.

9. Tim Conlan, "From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations," *Public Administration Review* 66 (2006): 663–76.

10. Dwight Eisenhower, "President's News Conference of March 14, 1956," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Washington, D.C., 1956), 310.

11. Birkland and Waterman, "Is Federalism the Reason for Policy Failure in Hurricane Katrina?" 692–714; Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track* (New York, 2008).

12. Naim Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, and Matthew Lloyd Collins, "Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic Disasters Toward a Network-Centered Approach," *Administration & Society* 42 (2010): 222–47; Carl-Henry Geschwind, *California Earthquakes: Science, Risk, and the Politics of Hazard Mitigation* (Baltimore, 2001).

13. Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars, The American Army, 1989–1941* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). For an account of early civil defense, see Thomas J. Kerr, *Civil Defense in the U.S.: Band-Aid for a Holocaust?* (Boulder, 1983), 10, 13. For the creation of a Council of National Defense charged with "coordinating resources and industries for national defense" and "stimulating civilian morale," see "Records of the Council of National Defense," National Archives, Record Group 62, 1915–37, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/062.html#62.1.

14. The Army Appropriations Act of 1916 authorized the president to create a National Council of Defense to mobilize the home front for war. William J. Breen, *Uncle Sam at Home: Civilian Mobilization, Wartime Federalism, and the Council of National Defense, 1917–1919* (Westport, Conn., 1984), 4. Breen (1984, xvii) finds that "home front mobilization

was more dependent on a decentralized, voluntarist council of defense system than on the centralized coercive powers of the adminsiration."

15. President Wilson centralized what in those days was called civilian defense functions by signing the Army Appropriation Act (39 Stat. 649), on 29 August 1916. The act's new Council of National Defense consisted of the secretaries of War, the Navy, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, and a presidentially appointed advisory commission. In May 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker emphasized the importance of civilian defense to the war effort: "Under modern conditions, the whole nation is at war and it [is] as much in the home and on the farm as it is in the fighting front." Newton D. Baker, memorandum, c. April 1917, OCDP register 171, entry 10, box 20, Suitland, Md.: Washington National Records Center, cited in Robert Miller, "The War That Never Came: Civilian Defense, Mobilization, and Morale during World War II" (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 1991), 16.

16. Breen, *Uncle Sam at Home*.

17. Jim Oberstar, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, "Snow Disasters for Local, State, and Federal Governments in the National Capital Region: Response and Recovery Partnerships with FEMA," Washington, D.C., 23 March 2010.

18. Franklin Cooling, "US Army Support of Civil Defense: The Formative Years," Military Affairs 35 (1971): 7–11, 8.

19. Miller, "The War That Never Came," 27.

20. Ibid., 24.

21. Kerr, *Civil Defense in the U.S.*, 13.

22. On tensions between levels of government in homeland security, see Paul N. Stockton and Patrick S. Roberts, "Findings from the Forum on *Homeland Security After the Bush Administration: Next Steps in Building Unity of Effort*," *Homeland Security Affairs* 4 (2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.4; Patrick S. Roberts, "Dispersed Federalism as a New Regional Governance for Homeland Security," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 38 (2008): 416–43; Erica Chenoweth and Susan E. Clarke, "All Terrorism Is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and Governance for Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System," *Political Research Quarterly* 63 (2010): 495–507. On the development of DHS grants-in-aid, see Samuel Clovis, "Federalism, Homeland Security, and National Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy," *Homeland Security Affairs* 2 (October 2006), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.4.

To take one example, state and local officials often praise fusion centers for providing a valuable resource for law enforcement, but federal officials question their value in supporting homeland security missions such as sharing intelligence preventing terrorism. The majority of DHS-funded fusion centers have become analytical hubs about information for many kinds of crimes beyond homeland security and terrorism-related issues, and this mission creep is cause for concern among federal officials and critics. See Torin Monahan, "The Future of Security? Surveillance Operations at Homeland Security Fusion Centers," *Social Justice* 37 (2010): 84–98; Torin Monahan and Neal A. Palmer, "The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers," *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 6 (2009): 617–36; John Rollins and Tim Connors, *State Fusion Center Processes and Procedures: Best Practices and Recommendations* (New York, 2007).

23. Charles S. Clark, "Homeland Security's Fusion Centers Lambasted in Senate Report," *Government Executive*, 2 October 2012. Available at http://www.govexec.com/defense/2012/10/homeland-securitys-fusion-centers-lambasted-senate-report/58535/.

24. U.S. Conference of Mayors director Paul Betters said that his organization was in "constant communication with municipal colleagues in England and Canada for the purpose of security detailed statements regarding the experiences of municipal authorities under wartime conditions." Paul Betters to Fiorello LaGuardia, 1 February 1941, FHLP, Box 4528, Folder 7, quoted in Miller, "The War That Never Came," 31.

25. Elwyn A. Mauck, "Civilian Defense in the United States: 1940–1945" (unpublished manuscript by the Historical Officer of the Office of Civilian Defense, July 1946), 2–3; Miller, "The War That Never Came," 30–31.

26. Miller, "The War That Never Came," 30.

27. Richard W. Steele, *The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933–1941* (Westport, Conn., 1985), 83–92.

28. Mauck, Civilian Defense in the United States, 5–6.

29. William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York, 1962), 327–28; "Memorandum to the President, Wayne Coy, William Bullitt, and Harold. D. Smith, Wayne Coy Papers, Box 2 (FDRL), cited in Richard W. Steele, "Preparing the Public for War: Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda Agency," *American Historical Review* 75 (October 1970): 1640–53, 1644. Volunteerism for Steele is simply "propaganda of the act," designed to encourage citizens to rally around the flag in the war effort.

30. Susan Dunn, *1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler: The Election Amid the Storm* (New Haven, 2013).

31. FDR created the Office of *Civilian* Defense in 1941, and during World War II people continued to use the term "civilian." After the war, however, planners switched to "civil" defense, specifically in 1946 with the Provost Marshal General's Study 3B–1, Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians. The term civil emphasizes the protection of people, the economy, and government, not just the citizenry. See Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945–1950" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967).

32. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Executive Order 8757 Establishing the Office of Civilian Defense," 20 May 1941. Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16117.

33. Andrew Becker and G. W. Schulz, "Local Cops Ready for War With Homeland Security-Funded Military Weapons," *The Daily Beast* and Center for Investigative Reporting, 21 December 2011, available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/20/local-cops-ready-for-war-with-homeland-security-funded-military-weapons.html Chenoweth and Clarke make the point that more localities with more "advanced, multilevel, and formal governance arrangements" are more effective at using federal homeland security grants because these grants are so complicated to administer. See Erica Chenoweth, and Susan E. Clarke. "All terrorism is local: Resources, nested institutions, and governance for urban homeland security in the American federal system." *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2010): 495–507. State and local emergency managers who participated in a homeland security expert forum chafed at the persnickety oversight from federal officials. See Paul N. Stockton and Patrick S. Roberts, "Findings from the Forum on *Homeland Security After the Bush Administration: Next Steps in Building Unity of Effort*," *Homeland Security Affairs* 4, no. 2 (2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.4.

34. For an example of scholars concerned about a lack of state and local accountabiltiy to national homeland security goals, see 2009 Torin Monahan and Neal A. Palmer, "The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers." *Security Dialogue* 40 (6): 617–636.

35. Miller, "The War That Never Came," 50.

36. Kessner, *Fiorello H. LaGuardia and the Making of Modern New York City*, 493. Quoted in Miller, "The War That Never Came," 46.

37. "Civilians Everywhere Offer Voluntary Aid as LaGuardia Takes Charge of OCD," *Defense*, Vol. 2, May 27, 1941, 3–5.

38. Robert Earnest Miller, "The War That Never Came: Civilian Defense, Mobilization, and Morale During World War II" (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 1991), 48–50.

39. For example, Bernard F. Dickman, the former mayor of St. Louis, and Joseph D. Scholtz, the former mayor of Louisville, were named as inspector generals in OCD regions, charged with reporting to the director. "Director LaGuardia Names Three Inspector Generals," *Defense*, 2 (22 July 1941): 22.

40. Allan M. Winkler, *Home Front USA: America During World War II* (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1986), 31. Mauck, "Civilian Defense in the United States," 5–8.

41. "The City's Part in National Deviance," *American City* 56 (June 1941): 5, quoted in Miller, "The War That Never Came," 60.

42. V. R. Cardoszier, *The Mobilization of the United States in World War II: How the Government, Military, and Industry Prepared for War* (Jefferson, N.C., 1995), 185; Keith E. Eiler, *Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort, 1940–1945* (Ithaca, 1997); Mauck, "Civilian Defense in the United States, 13–14; Joseph P. Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin* (New York, 1971), 842.

43. Eleanor Roosevelt, "What Does Pan-American Friendship Mean?" *Liberty* 18 (4 October 1941): 10–11; Eleanor Roosevelt, "Shall We Draft American Women?" *Liberty* 18 (13 September 1941): 10–11. "Women in Defense: A Script by Mrs. Roosevelt," *New York Times Magazine*, 7 December 1941, 6–7.

44. Laura McEnaney, "*Civil Defense Begins at Home*": *Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, 2000), 17.

45. Lynne Olson, *Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight over World War II, 1939–1945* (New York, 2013).

46. Chicago Tribune, 1 December 1941, OCDP, RG 171, entry 10, box 2, cited in Miller, "The War That Never Came," 69.

47. Preliminary Report by Fiorello H. LaGuardia on Civilian Defense Week, FHLP, Box 3767 (NYMA), Folder 4; "LaGuardia Calls for More Volunteers in All Phases of Civilian Defense," *Defense,* vol. 2, 25 November 1941, 31, quoted in Miller, "The War That Never Came," 67.

48. *A Handbook for Fire Watchers* (Washington, D.C., 1941).

49. Cardoszier, *The Mobilization of the United States in World War II,* 185; Eiler, *Mobilizing America;* Mauck, "Civilian Defense in the United States," 13–14.

50. Miller, "The War That Never Came," 82–94.

51. A scholarly summary of the strains of homeland security research can be found in the journals *Homeland Security Affairs* and *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*. For three takes on the field's priorities, see Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?" *Homeland Security Affairs* 7, Article 1 (February 2011); Peter J. May, Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne,

"Constructing Homeland Security: An Anemic Policy Regime," *Policy Studies Journal* 39, no. 2 (2011): 285–307; Joseph T. Ripberger, "Whither Civil Defense and Homeland Security in the Study of Public Policy? A Look at Research on the Policy, the Public, and the Process," *Policy Studies Journal* 39, no. s1 (2011): 77–91.

52. Donald A. Ritchie, *James A. Landis, Dean of the Regulators* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 103–19.

53. Kerr, *Civil Defense in the U.S.*, 13. Landis left the position on 13 September 1943.

54. "The President Reports on the Home Front," 12 October 1942, in Samuel I. Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 13 vols. (New York, 1938–50), 1942: 416, 432, also quoted in Miller, "The War That Never Came," 2.

55. Lingeman, *Don't You Know There's a War On?* 36; Lee B. Kennett, *For the Duration: The United States Goes to War* (New York, 1985), 33–36.

56. Miller, "The War That Never Came," i; Reginald C. Foster, "Block-Aid Runner for the OCD," *Nation's Business*, vol. 31, issue 6, June 1943, 90–93.

57. Miller, "The War That Never Came," 11.

58. Peter Meyers, *Civic War and the Corruption of the Citizen* (Chicago, 2008); Christopher Ansell, *Pragmatist Democracy* (New York, 2011).

59. Citizen preparedness was a significant part of the original DHS strategy. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C., July 2002). The term "culture of preparedness" can be found in: U.S. White House, "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," foreword by Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C., 23 February 2006), 79. On citizens' lack of preparedness and engagement, see Peter D. Hart and Public Opinion Strategies, "The Aftershock of Katrina and Rita: Public Not Moved to Prepare," Washington, D.C., Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, December 2005. Paul C. Light, "The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness: A Report on the Lessons Americans Learned in Watching the Katrina Catastrophe Unfold," New York University Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, undated.

60. *Civil Defense Programs in Portland, 1936–1963* (Portland, Ore., n.d.).

61. "Your Guide for Defense Against the H-Bomb," July 1955, Portland, Ore.; Trudy Flores and Sarah Griffith, "Civil Defense Underground Headquarters," Oregon Historical Society's Oregon History Project, 2002; Communication from Brian K. Johnson, City of Portland Archives, 10 July 2013.

62. Herman Edwards, "Civil Defense Is Dead in Oregon," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 June 1963, A2.

63. By that time, civil defense had become politically suspicious among progressive politicians. Senator Wayne Morse called civil defense "senseless, wasteful, and unrealistic" in 1963 and ignited a conversation among his constituents in Oregon. "Congress Cool Toward Fallout Shelter Plans," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 May 1963, C7.

64. The government's role in disaster relief has a long tradition, but in the 1960s it was still rather limited compared to contemporary times or to other policy areas. See Michele Landis Dauber, *The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State* (Chicago, 2013), and Patrick S. Roberts, *Disasters and the American State: How Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Public Prepare for the Unexpected* (New York, 2013).

65. Martha Derthick, "Crossing Thresholds: Federalism in the 1960s," *Journal of Policy History* 8 (1996): 64–80.

66. The 1951 civil defense film is available here: http://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=File%3ADuckandC1951.ogg.

67. Patrick S. Roberts, "Civil Defense and the Foundations of Disaster Policy, 1914–1979," in *Disasters and the American State* (New York, 2013); Patrick S. Roberts, "FEMA and the Prospects for Reputation-Based Autonomy," *Studies in American Political Development* 20 (Spring 2006): 57–87; Keith Bea, "The Formative Years: 1950–1978," in *Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010*, ed. Claire Rubin, 2nd ed. (Boca Raton, 2012), 83–114.

68. Ernest R. May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (New York, 1993).

69. Grossman, *Neither Dead Nor Red*, 81; *FCDA Annual Report for 1952* (Washington, D.C., 1952), 66.

70. Wilbur J. Cohen and Evelyn F. Boyer, "Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950: Summary and Legislative History," Social Security Bulletin (April 1951): 11–16, 14.

71. Federal Civil Defense Administration, "Annual Statistical Report," Battle Creek, Mich., 30 June 1955, available at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/HistoricalInterest/FCDA1955AnnualStatisticalReport.pdf (a ccessed 27 May 2010).

72. William E. Pemberton, *Bureaucratic Politics: Executive Reorganization During the Truman Administration* (Columbia, Mo., 1979), 174; Brian Balogh, Joanna Grisinger, and Philip Zelikow, "Making Democracy Work: A Brief History of Twentieth-Century Executive Reorganization," Miller Center of Public Affairs Working Paper, Charlottesville, 2002, 44.

73. The Bull Board concluded that the military should have only limited involvement in civil defense. Military planners feared that civilians would want the military to run civil defense but concluded that it was in the military's best interest to keep civil affairs in domestic agencies for fear of the budgetary impact and the danger that civil defense would erode combat effectiveness. See National Military Establishment, Office of Secretary of Defense, "Study of Civil Defense (Bull Board Report)," Washington, D.C., 1948, 7; Lyon G. Tyler Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945–1950" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967).

74. In the 1950s, a second Hoover Commission examined possible executive branch reorganization, but the executive himself, Dwight Eisenhower, preferred to look inward for advice, creating the President's Advisory Committee on Government in parallel. PACGO followed the fashion of public administration of the day by recommending the creation of new, larger hierarchical departments in order to rationalize management. The committee's recommendation to merge the Housing and Home Finance Administration and the Federal Civil Defense Administration in a new department was never implemented, however. Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978* (Washington, D.C., 1978), 173–74; Balogh, Grisinger, and Zelikow, "Making Democracy Work," 40–43.

75. On the developing of politicians' and bureaucrats' credit claiming, see Roberts, *Disasters and the American State*.

76. Val Peterson, "Co-ordinating and Extending Federal Assistance," *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 309 (1957): 52–64, 52.

77. Ibid., 53–54.

78. Ibid., 55.

79. Ibid., 63–64.

80. "North Carolina Laws on Civil Defense, Reproduced by the North Carolina Civil Defense Agency, Raleigh, April 1965," State Civil Defense Agency Intelligence Section, Public Information Office, Box 6, Department of Military and Veterans' Affairs, Office of Civil Defense, State Civil Defense, 1951–72, State Archives, quoted in Frank A. Blazich Jr., "Accelerated Action: North Carolina Civil Defense Agency and the Cuban Missile Crisis, October–December 1962," *North Carolina Historical Review* 86, no. 1 (January 2009): 53.

81. Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 63; Summary of Operations, July 1950–September 1952," Box 9, NCCD, State Archives, 1–2.

82. Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 65.

83. Paul Boyer's detailed examination of newspaper articles, church sermons, polls, and scientific meetings finds that before roughly the end of World War II to the beginning of the Korean War, many organizations worked to convince Americans that the world would be destroyed by nuclear war. Civil defense publications intended to convince a nervous public of the opposite. The National Security Resources Board's book *Survival Under Atomic Attack*, published in 1950, advised citizens, "You can SURVIVE atomic warfare." The book suggested that people could rinse away radioactivity with soap and water. Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (Chapel Hill, 1985); Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time* (New York, 2013), 3–27; National Security Resources Board, Civil Defense Office, *Survival Under Atomic Attack* (Washington, D.C, 1950), 3, 30.

84. Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 55–56. The 1950s saw increased atomic testing, including the Castle BRAVO test in the Marshall Islands on 1 March 1954, which at fifteen megatons was the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated by the United States. A useful collection of documents relating to nuclear testing can be found at http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/atomic/atmosphr/index.html.

85. Kerr, *Civil Defense in the U.S.*, 41.

86. Ibid., 104; "National Fallout Shelter Survey, 1948–1986," Washington, D.C. Portions available at http://csudigitalhumanities.org/exhibits/exhibits/show/shelter-survey.

87. House Committee on Government Operations (HCGO). Military Operations Subcommittee, Hearings, Civil Defense, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960, 317–18.

88. Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 67.

89. For example, the governor worked with the survey and local authorities to identify more shelters. Colleges and universities were particularly good prospects because they had gyms, theaters, and large basements that could double as shelters. See Memorandum from Governor Terry Sanford to All Department and Agency Heads, Having Emergency Assignments under the North Carolina Operation Survival Plan, 24 October 1962, Box 140, Sanford Papers, State Archives, cited in Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 68.

90. Teletype message from U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Region III to NCCD, 30 October 1962, Box 6, NCCD, State Archives; Jenny Baker Devine, "The Farmer and the Atom: The Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service and Rural Civil Defense, 1955–1970," *Annals of Iowa* 66 (Spring 2007): 161–94; Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 80.

91. For one example of these complaints, see Stockton and Roberts. In 1962, the Governors' Civil Defense Committee unanimously adopted fifteen resolutions that all

governors would follow, including that "each Governor should personally report to the Mayors and local government executives and to the people of his state with respect to these recommendations and the character of the need for fallout protection and other civil defense activities." Telegram from New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller to the Honorable Terry Sanford, Governor of North Carolina, 28 October 1962, Box 140, Sanford Papers, State Archives, cited in Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 81.

92. Allison Ring, "El Paso's Civil Defense Network in Crisis: History of Local Nuclear Preparedness, Focusing on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis," *Password* 52, no. 4 (2006): 197–98.

93. McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home,* 7.

94. Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 87–91; Memorandum to Local Directors from State Director on Shelter Construction Workshops, 9 November 1962, Box 6, NCCD, State Archives, cited in Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 91.

95. Blazich, "Accelerated Action," 93.

96. See, for example, Kenton Clymer, "U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origins of the Ground Observer Corps," *Journal of Military History* 75 (July 2011): 835–85; "Plane Spotter Need Stressed," *Spokesman-Review*, 31 August 1951, A18; Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945–1960* (New York, 1994); Federal Civil Defense Administration, "Women Expected to Form Major Part of CD Force," *Civil Defense Alert*, April 1952, 2; City Council of Philadelphia, "Special Committee to Investigate Civil Defense Program," Philadelphia City Archives, 25 February 1952, 13; Benet D. Gellman, "Planning for a National Nuclear Emergency: The Organization of Government and Federal-State Relations," *Virginia Law Review* 52 (April 1966): 435–62.

97. "Fire Prevention and Civil Defense Go Hand in Hand," *Negro Star*, 26 October 1951, A1.

98. Walter Ames, "Civil Defense Saving Tax Money, Chief Says," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 June 1963, A2.

99. Hurricane Audrey in 1957 is another such example. See George W. Baker and Leonard S. Cottrell Jr., eds., *Behavioral Science and Civil Defense* (Washington, D.C., 1962), 126.

100. In 1965 dollars, damages were estimated at $1.42 billion, which would be between $10 and $15 billion in 2010 dollars. Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Mobile District, "Operations Progress Report: Disaster Activities in Connection with Hurricane 'Betsy' (Final Report)," 28 July 1967, http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/Hurricane_files/Hurricane%20Betsy%20Final%20Report.pdf; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Hurricane Betsy Disaster of September 1965: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee to Investigate Areas of Destruction of Hurricane Betsy of the Committee on Public Works House of Representatives,* 89th Cong., 1st sess., 25 September 1965; Craig E. Colton, "From Betsy to Katrina: Shifting Policies, Lingering Vulnerabilities," paper presented at the McGrann Research Conference, April 2006, available at http://magrann-conference.rutgers.edu/2006/_papers/colten.pdf.

101. Louisiana governor John McKeithen called Betsy "the greatest catastrophe in our State since the Civil War." U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Hurricane Betsy Disaster of September 1965: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee to Investigate Areas of Destruction of Hurricane Betsy of the Committee on Public Works House of Representatives,* 89th Cong., 1st sess., 25 September 1965, 8; Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers,

Mobile District, "Operations Progress Report: Disaster Activities in Connection with Hurricane 'Betsy' (Final Report)," 28 July 1967, http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/Hurricane_files/Hurricane%20Betsy%20Final%20Report.pdf; Edward F. Haas, "Victor H. Schiro, Hurricane Betsy, and the 'Forgiveness Bill,'" *Gulf Coast Historical Review* 6 (Fall 1990): 67–90; For a comparison with 2006's Hurricane Karina, see Kent B. Germany, "The Politics of Poverty and History: Racial Inequality and the Long Prelude to Katrina," *Journal of American History* 94 (December 2007): 743–51.

102. "The Nation: Hurricane: Were Warning Adequate?" *Los Angeles Times,* 19 September 1965, J5.

103. Ibid., J5.

104. Associated Press, "Giant Pumps Battle Flood in Louisiana: Dr. Teller Attacks Civil Defense," *Chicago Tribune,* 16 September 1965, 21.

105. "Profiteering Reported in New Orleans: Storm Refugees Growing Restive," *New York Times,* 13 September 1965, 19.

106. Patrick S. Roberts, Robert Ward, and Gary Wamsley, "From a Painful Past to an Uncertain Future," in *Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010*, ed. Claire Rubin (Boca Raton, 2012): 237–46; Roberts, *Disasters and the American State,* 1–28. The San Francisco Earthquake in 1906, Hurricane Andrew in 1996, and Hurricane Katrina in 2006 are three such examples. For an analysis of the politics of blame during and after disaster, see Arjen Boin, Allan McConnell, and Paul 't Hart, eds., *Governing After Crisis: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability, and Learning* (Cambridge, 2008).

107. Kerr, *Civil Defense in the U.S.*; Yoshpe, *Our Missing Shield*; Blanchard, *American Civil Defense, 1945–1984*.

108. Dee Garrison, *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked* (New York, 2006); Oakes, *The Imaginary War;* Andrew D. Grossman, *Neither Red Nor Dead: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War* (New York, 2001).

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