

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A TIME OF FRACTURED MEANING:
BEYOND THE LEGACY OF HERBERT SIMON

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
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
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
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
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
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(ABSTRACT)

An intellectual history of the field of public administration is reviewed.

It is argued that since the nation's Constitutional origins, public administration has been suffering an identity crisis. The Anti-Federalist - Federalist debate pitted government by dialogue--the need for a community of meaning, on the one hand, against government by distant centralized authority--the objective control of administration, on the other. In the 20th century this same contradiction is manifested in the ethos of the progressive era which emphasized both rationalism (the objective control of administration) and embodied the ideal of public interest (administration as dialogue and the need for a community of meaning).

It is argued that Herbert Simon's *Administrative Behavior* appropriates the discourse of rationalism manifested in the progressive movement but that Simon's model of administration lacked the original symbol that legitimized the field--the

communitarian ideal of public interest. The result was the loss of a key tension in the American governance process: the Anti-Federalist - Federalist debate of community versus centralized control.

An analytical strategy called deconstruction is used to examine Simon's most seminal work, *Administrative Behavior*. It operates in a different fashion than traditional discourse and traditional academic research and critique. Two aspects of that uniqueness include: (1) the point of reference of the reader is not defined by the author, and (2) the subject matter under scrutiny is seen as a form of narrative rather than an objective representation of reality. The effect of using this strategy is to render uncertain many of the central assumptions and taken for granted aspects of *Administrative Behavior*. As a consequence, new intellectual space becomes available to other narratives in the field of public administration.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We live in a time of fractured meaning and a social experience that is qualitatively different from the past. The period of fractured meaning in which we find ourselves suggests a different realm of experience, one that is postmodern. In the postmodern condition, the primacy of individual consciousness can no longer hold stable the realm of meaning established by and associated with modernism. The postmodern experience exposes traditionally held categories of meaning as illusory and arbitrary. So, we are confronted daily with fractured meanings that require a different style of thinking, a style that seeks to suspend judgement and infinitely defer meaning. What are the possibilities and consequences of this development for public administration? One aim of this dissertation is to address this question. This dissertation also reviews the intellectual history of the field of public administration to examine carefully the discourse that has influenced the current post modern period.

Some current discourses in the literature address the history and direction of the field of public administration. For example, Wamsley et al., *Refounding Public Administration* (1990) is in the tradition of works addressing the role of public administration within a democracy. More recently, a set of writings entitled *Public Management in an Interconnected World* (1992) addresses the current state of the field by presenting works by a group of writers associated with the second Minnowbrook

conference. Jun (1993) and Hummel (1993) call for the field of public administration to examine its ontological and epistemological foundations. Finally, White and McSwain have revitalized and reexamined critical discourses of the field (1990) and have also charted new theoretical territory (1993) in light of the postmodern experience. In some form or another these writings address a paradoxical aspect of the legacy of the field of public administration. The paradox is that public administrators throughout the 20th century have sought to create dialogue within an institutional framework that prizes not dialogue, but instrumental rationality.

Throughout its history, public administration has been suffering an identity crisis that dates back to the nation's Constitutional origins. The Anti-Federalist - Federalist debate pitted government by dialogue--the need for a community of meaning, on the one hand, against government by distant centralized authority--the objective control of administration, on the other. In the 20th century we find this same contradiction in the ethos of the progressive era and in the period leading up to and just after World War II. Curiously, this tension between a search for a community of meaning and the need for the objective control of administration seems to recede during the zenith of modernism that is associated with the social, political, and technological developments in the 1950's and 1960's (Gitlin, 1988). By modernism I mean a paradigm of thought that emphasizes the idea of progress and the idea that grand solutions to problems can be achieved through the use of logic

and reason. White (1992) suggests: "Belief in the power of science to solve natural and social problems is itself a grand narrative, as is Peter L. Berger *et al.*'s (1973) designation of the main features of modernity: technical rationality, the bureaucratic administrative state, and pluralist politics" (p. 170). In this dissertation, I argue that public administration in the 20th century has been primarily a discourse of modernism, that is, a discourse emanating from the progressive movement and as it culminated in the rational model of administration delineated in Herbert Simon's *Administrative Behavior*. As the contradictions of modernism have revealed themselves, the hegemony of this model is being called into question more and more persistently.

A Search for Truth

Our social experience is in flux. The message of the Enlightenment and the grand narrative of modernism that evolved from it now appear to pose as many questions as answers. The complexity of our social life is such that there are far too many inputs to successfully predict the outputs. Western society is over-rationalized to the point that the cause-and-effect model of inquiry is no longer meaningful. White (1992) aptly describes this view:

...[a] feature of postmodernism is the breakdown in the legitimating force of grand narratives, leading to a sense of loss and meaninglessness, in the lives of the people who once believed in them. The same meaninglessness, without the

loss, exists for those who never had the chance to appropriate the grand narrative. All the grand narratives...have lost their legitimating function--they no longer provide a comprehensive understanding of society and one's place in it (1992, p. 170).

Modernism and Truth

As suggested above, the narrative of modernism centers around the idea of reason as well as the ideas of truth, progress, unity, and representation. To further illuminate this narrative let us examine the modernist idea of progress, which can be summed up: There is a world whose existence and character is independent of perception or thought. The "Truth" is that which corresponds to this independently existing world. At least in this model, natural science has come progressively closer to the Truth about nature. The "progress" in moving toward the Truth about society requires that social science follow the same logic of inquiry. The modernist view of progress assumes that the "Truth" is attainable in various ways, even if we haven't developed or refined the methods for attaining it. More importantly for public administration, modernism argues that there is some notion of utopia, some vision of objective reality--and we must strive toward that vision.

The idea of modernism as exemplified in art, architecture, and the literature of social science suggests tearing down the old Truth and bringing in the new Truth. Simon's rejection of the principles of administration

as "proverbs" (Simon, 1947) is precisely such a modernist move. In this dissertation, I do not wish to rehearse a litany of current "problems" that the "old" methods can no longer solve and then introduce a new method that will brighten the picture. Instead I wish to call into question the whole strategy of searching for a new "Truth" that will lead the field of public administration theory on a utopian path.

Postmodernism resists this search for "Truth" and claims this utopian search is only a search for the sublime. Lyotard (1984), for example, suggests that the discourse of modernism is grounded in the Kantian notion of the sublime. The mind has the capacity to conceive and present ideas. However, some ideas can only be conceptualized and, therefore, are unrepresentable (i.e., "sublime"). As a result, they constitute a collectively shared *illusion*, an illusion that we have shared through the discourse of modernism. Postmodernists argue that the modernist perspective constitutes a grand discourse that is really no more than a style of thinking. Rather than trying to represent reality through a grand discourse, they argue that there is no way to represent reality and that all attempts at representation are just multiple discourses as a theory of representations (Calas, 1987). Based on this view, postmodernists tend to suspend judgment and employ innovative ways of "re-presenting" taken-for-granted aspects of our modern consciousness.

Analytical Strategy

This dissertation uses the strategy of deconstruction, an analytical strategy that has evolved along with the postmodern line of thought. Deconstruction exposes the devices by which meaning is created in traditional writing and discourse. Traditional writing and discourse imputes meaning to the words that we speak. The deconstructive stance follows the Saussurean (1966) tradition which argues that language is a closed system of signs and that meaning emerges from the differences between elements of this system. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1974, 1976, 1978b) is most closely associated with this approach. For Derrida, all the world is a text, whether these texts be written documents, institutional practices, or events that occur in a given culture. Based on this view, language is implicated in the structuring of what is called "reality." As a result, deconstruction is an excellent strategy for re-examining taken-for-granted assumptions. Calas and Smircich note the following about deconstruction:

This approach allows us to re-trace how rhetorical and linguistic forms used to signify 'knowledge' work under the assumption that they represent a referent which is external to language. Deconstruction helps us understand how this assumption masks the play of textual signification where words are meaningful, not because of their external referents, which are also linguistically constituted but because of the existence of an oppositional term which each apparently 'self-standing' term stands to differentiate itself from the other, and become meaningful (1992, p. 569).

The deconstructive stance challenges the modernist viewpoint by taking apart a text to show that there are no irreducible truths or essences in it but only instances of discourse. Deconstruction shows, for example, what has been left out, distorted, or compacted, as Marshall and White (1990) point out:

Implicit in this postmodern (poststructuralist) posture is the view that all epistemological arguments are linguistic constructions. These constructions from the postmodern viewpoint must be *deconstructed* to reveal their true nature as discourses. Such deconstruction serves not to *destroy* but to question the irreducibility of fundamental truths to which discourse are wont to lay claim. Hence what deconstruction does is expose truths as styles of thought or products of discourse (1990, p. 71).

Review of the Dissertation

This dissertation introduces deconstruction as an analytical strategy for the field of public administration. It does this by deconstructing Herbert Simon's *Administrative Behavior* and exposing the discourse of rationalism as a style of thinking. This introductory chapter provides the background and line of argument that will be followed in this dissertation and reviews the major points of each chapter. The second chapter is an intellectual history of the field of public administration and addresses the rise of the progressive movement, which both emphasized rationalism (the objective control of administration) and embodied the ideal of public interest (administration as dialogue and the need for a community of meaning). It shows how *Administrative Behavior* appropriates the

discourse of rationalism manifested in the progressive movement. This chapter also shows that Simon's model of administration lacked the original symbol that legitimized the field--the communitarian ideal of public interest. The result, then, was the loss of a key tension in the American governance process: the Anti-Federalist - Federalist debate of community versus centralized control.

The loss of this tension served to dislocate public administration from its place in the governance process and lead the field into an inescapable search for the certainty of technique. Public administration, like most of the social sciences, became engrossed with technique. Chapter 2 concludes by contrasting the Simonian emphasis on rationalism with aspects of the ideal of the public interest that become marginalized.

The third chapter catalogs the key elements of Simon's work and provides a bibliographical profile of his life. Simon's life has been dedicated to the study of human behavior from the specific vantage point of bounded rationality. He notes:

It [*Administrative Behavior*] was built around two interrelated ideas that have been at the core of my whole intellectual activity: (1) human beings are able to achieve only a very bounded rationality, and (2) as a consequence of their cognitive limitations, they are prone to identify with subgoals. I would not object having my whole scientific output described largely as a gloss--a rather elaborate gloss, to be sure--on the pages of *Administrative Behavior* where these ideas are set forth (1989, p. 88).

The chapter also shows how Simon's view departed from that of most other authors in the field of public administration.

The fourth chapter identifies deconstructive strategies and methodological tactics used in deconstructing *Administrative Behavior*. The main focus of my dissertation is to examine *Administrative Behavior* in detail by employing a deconstructive method. Deconstruction is the process of examining a text to show that the text is a style of writing, a set of rhetorical devices, rather than the representation of a truth. By deconstructing Simon's *Administrative Behavior*, I hope to show that although his text sets the paradigm for thought in public administration, his theory is no more than a discourse that can be revealed as one of many possible discourses. *Administrative Behavior* purports to promote a unified, coherent theory of action for administration, but in actuality Simon creates a rhetoric of rationalism around the progressive movement. In doing this, all the other elements of the progressive debate become subordinate to the development of a rational model of administration. Thus, the legacy of the progressive-modernist ethos is administration at a distance, supported by an ideology of objective control.

The fifth chapter deconstructs *Administrative Behavior* and alters all the traditional critiques of this text from the fields of public administration and political science. The methodological tactics employed in this dissertation are: (1) Privileged Terms, (2) Column Comparisons, (3) Applying the "Logic" of the

Supplement, (4) Denotative Language, (5) Intertextuality, (6) Etymological Analysis, (7) Unified Subject, (8) Examining the Silences, (9) The Silencing of Women, (10) Contradictions and Disruptions, (12) Textual Taboos, and (13) Metaphors, Metonymy, and Multiple Meanings. Since deconstruction is more a style of reading than a formal method, it seems awkward to delineate and enumerate the tactics above. Nevertheless, the list, by no means exhaustive, illuminates the mode of operation used in this dissertation. These tactics are drawn from the work of others (Calas, 1987; Calas and Smircich, 1991; Martin, 1990; and Jacques, 1992) as well as my own ideas.

The final chapter draws together the different themes that I present. I summarize the line of argument taken in the dissertation and discuss its ramifications. In doing so, I offer a different approach for understanding the field of public administration, its intellectual history, and the issues that face those in the field, particularly theorists whose realm is to understand and articulate how knowledge is produced.

Although there have been many exciting advances in organization theory since World War II, it seems that public administration theory has been trapped in an intellectual cul-de-sac created by behavioralism, the micropolitics of the discipline of political science, and the power of Herbert Simon's writings. -- Gary Wamsley

CHAPTER 2

THE EARLY HISTORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A Hope for Renewal Denied

This chapter identifies the model of administration outlined in *Administrative Behavior* as the most influential model of 20th century public administration. The book gained legitimacy from the wave of technological consciousness after World War II. The deeper roots of this model of administration lie in the ethos of the progressive movement. This chapter describes those roots and discusses the ideas that were marginalized as Simon's model of rationality became dominant. With the advent of the Simonian perspective, the model of administration that attains prominence is void of the symbol that legitimizes the field--the ideal of public interest. The public interest

can be described in many ways, but at its core it symbolizes a communitarian ethos--the assumption that society and individuals are inextricably linked.

The Simonian emphasis on rationalism and technique that had served mainly to supplement the ideal of the public interest during the classical period of public administration overwhelm this original symbol, in a sense overturn it in the post World War II period. Those authors that have presented the most penetrating critiques of Simon's view of administration include in chronological order: Waldo (1948, 1952); Dahl (1953); Banfield (1959); Storing (1962); Marini (1971); Argyris (1974); Denhardt (1981); Harmon (1981); White and McSwain (1990); and Wamsley et al. (1990). I draw extensively from their work and follow in their tradition. In this chapter, I extend the work of these authors by demonstrating that Simon's view of administration captured the ethos of the progressive movement, but at the same time marginalized a critical tension that had historically been a part of the history of public administration--the tension between the need for a community of meaning on the one hand, and the objective control of administration on the other.

The Ethos of the Progressive Movement

Anti-Federalist Influence

The past decade has seen a realization of the important link between the founding period of the country and the history of public administration. We can find this emphasis most prominently in the writings of Van Riper (1983) and Rohr (1986). While these writings are primarily concerned with linking the role of public administration to the Constitution, the emphasis on the founding period has called attention to the importance of the Federalist - Anti-Federalist traditions that were imprinted on the national psyche at the time of the founding. In this vein, it is important to note the indispensable role of Anti-Federalist sentiment in the rise of both the populist and progressive movements. For example, the ethos of the progressive movement argued for the "improvability of the human condition and a responsibility...for one another and a willingness to use all government and social institutions to give that responsibility legal effect" (Shaffritz, 1988, p. 447).

Because of the Anti-Federalist influence on the final version of the Constitution and the subsequent Bill of Rights, Storing (1981) points out that the Anti-Federalists deserve equal status as "Founding Fathers." The Anti-Federalist perspective, based on the Rousseauian tradition, emphasized trust in social

dialogue and collaboration as a means for human interaction. McSwain notes that the Anti-Federalist perspective was defined by a "public spiritedness" that manifested itself as a result of "small, decentralized cohesive communities where access to the governmental function was immediate and direct" (1985, p. 141). The quality of public life and the emphasis on responsibility to the community were key tenets of the Anti-Federalist perspective. A good summary of this Anti-Federalist sentiment is contained in the statement of George Mason during the debates over the legislative branch:

To make representation real and actual, the number of Representatives ought to be adequate; they ought to mix with the people, think as they think, feel as they feel, ought to be perfectly amenable to them, and thoroughly acquainted with their condition (Rohr, 1986, p. 40).

In contrast to the Anti-Federalist position, the Federalists argued for a strong central government. Bailyn et al. (1977) suggest that what the Federalists had in mind was "a general government that would no longer be a confederation of independent republics but a national republic in its own right, operating directly on individuals and organized as the state governments had been organized, with a single executive, a bicameral legislature, and a separate judiciary" (p. 332). Rohr (1986) argues that efficient administration was a central concern of the Federalists. He notes:

It has often been observed that the word *administration* does not appear in the Constitution of the United States. From this correct observation there often follows the erroneous conclusion that the framers of the Constitution did not care about administrative institutions. Indeed, it is sometimes said that they were indifferent toward efficiency. If Publius is taken as a reliable guide to the thinking of the framers of the Constitution, sound public administration and the efficiency it will produce must be counted among their most serious concerns. *Administration* is one of the few words Publius bothers to define. He distinguishes two meanings of the word, to enable the careful reader to follow his extensive treatment of this topic in numbers 68 through 77 of *The Federalist Papers*. These ten essays are widely regarded as the first and perhaps the best treatise ever written on Public Administration. The word *administration* and its cognates appear 124 times throughout *The Federalist Papers*; more frequently than *Congress*, *President*, or *Supreme Court* (p. 1).

Changing Social and Political Conditions

This tension between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist principles became even more apparent as the industrial revolution took hold in the United States. The political and social conditions of this period have been well documented (Hofstadter, 1955; Wiebe 1967; McConnell, 1970; Bailyn et al., 1977; Woll, 1977; and Link and McCormick, 1983). The industrial expansion of the United States began to shift after 1830 from a predominantly agrarian society to an industrial society. By 1900, 40% of the American population was located in urban centers such as New York, Detroit, Chicago, and Philadelphia (Bailyn et al., 1977).

In addition, the structure of work changed. Bailyn et al. (1977) note that industrial technology, with its emphasis on specialization and the division of labor, melded man into an instrument of the manufacturing process. On the farm the harvester replaced the scythe, and in the cities machines and the technological assembly line processes revolutionized whole industries, as the Bessemer process did for the steel industry. Industrial and economic expansion occurred on all fronts, including mining, railroads, and industries in the cities. The result of this economic expansion was that by the end of the century, the largest business interests in each arena--steel, oil, agriculture, rail transport, and manufacturing--consolidated their market share to the point of monopoly. Technological changes and developments signalled the end of the period of rural democracy.

This period of industrial expansion and subsequent consolidation created a set of diverse political expectations and social conditions. On the one hand there were the unregulated interests and concentrated economic power of the industrialists, and on the other hand, there were the interests and distributed wealth of individuals who were farmers, local merchants, and industrial workers. "Bossism" predominated as the form of urban politics. Political bosses such as William Marcy Tweed in New York City, James McManes in Philadelphia, and Alexander Shepard in Washington, DC ran the cities using patronage and government largesse to insure their authority (Shaffritz, 1988). Bailyn et al. (1977) note that men such as Tweed and McManes:

...had watched the aimless spreading of their cities and understood the growing problem of managing them. Tweed frankly admitted that New York's population was 'too hopelessly split into races and factions to govern it under universal suffrage, except by bribery of patronage and corruption.' Their cities, the bosses realized, were fragmented like jigsaw puzzles. The boss alone could provide the liberal application of patronage to glue them together, though his workmanship might be both slipshod and expensive (1977, p. 874).

During this period in the late 19th century the effects of these social and political conditions gave rise to the populist and progressive movements. Bailyn et al. (1977) describe this period:

But there were still deeper wounds stirring by the 1890s. In agrarian revolts in the provinces and civic campaigns in the metropolis, reformers were beginning to draw on the resources provided by the two alternative traditions of American politics that had survived the spoilsmen. The Populist movement in the trans-Mississippi West and the South renewed the millennial vision promising the triumph of political righteousness. And by 1895, in the nation's cities progressive reformers were drawing on the patrician fears, business notions of efficiency, and the scientific hopes of new professionals and academics (1977, p. 875-876).

The Need for Reform

The ethos of the progressive period was characterized both by a faith in science and a public service idealism that produced the "good government" movement. As mentioned above, this period emerged on the heels of a tumultuous period of industrial expansion in the United States. In many ways the

governance process needed to respond to many of the major shifts that occurred in other sectors of the society. An urge for reform existed because the entrenched system of patronage and favoritism did little to combat the poverty, overcrowding, and poor working conditions in many of the nation's urban industrial centers and corporate towns.

Until the late 1880's there was little movement for a national authority to regulate economic activity. Rather, government had played a role in fostering economic development and as a result had a stake in continuing to promote the interests of business. More importantly, the reigning assumption of the period was that a natural economic equilibrium would occur independently of regulation. However, the social and political conditions eventually put government in an awkward position. As Woll notes:

Having fostered industries with subsidies of various kinds, both national and state governments had to contend with political and social problems such as economic instability, deceptive business practices, and the growth of monopolies that were directly attributed to the activities of groups that they originally supported (Woll, 1977, p. 39).

The Role of Administrative Agencies

In this environment of rapid industrial expansion and the failure of politics, public administration provided an institutional framework through which the disparate tensions of the national community could be resolved. The dominant feature of the progressive movement was the emerging administrative arm of

government, serving to mediate the tension between the Federalist doctrine and the Anti-Federalist principles. The railroad industry exemplifies one activity that required regulation. Its vital role as the transportation network that fueled the nation's economic expansion and its uncontrolled business practices make it a model illustration of the imbalances inherent in the shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy. The need for regulation of the railroads demonstrated that the reigning assumption of an organic harmony based on natural wealth and individual freedom did not work in an industrial economy. As a result, there was a need for a man-made harmony created through the "instrumentality of government bureaucracies" (Waldo, 1984, p. 8).

The influence of the railroads manifested itself through: (1) discriminatory rates, (2) rebates to powerful shippers, (3) payoffs to state legislators, and (4) high rates where no competition existed, coupled with below-market rates in competitive locations. These practices forced smaller shippers out of business, creating monopolies and financial behemoths that worked against the economic interests of individuals and small businesses. Sentiment was so strong against the railroads that farmers burned their crops rather than submit to the railroads' monopolistic practices (Woll, 1977).

In response to this situation, the Congress, via the Interstate Commerce Act, created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887. In 1889, it became an independent regulatory commission and foreshadowed the increased

role of administrative agencies in the governance process. The rise of administrative agencies required government specialists skilled in policy development and administration. According to Skowronek, "It was not the Congress, the Supreme Court, or even the small shipper who best embodied the public interest in regulation; it was the independent professional and the administrative expert" (1982, p. 254).

Administrative practice in the ICC foreshadowed an experimental approach to government regulation that later became the hallmark of public administrators in the 1940's and 1950's. While the ICC's independence was initially hampered by a Supreme Court that was inhospitable to government regulation, the Hepburn Act of 1906 gave the Commission binding authority and the ability to replace an existing rate with a "just-and-reasonable" rate (Hoogenboom and Hoogenboom, 1976). As Skowronek notes: "A legislative power had been clarified and delegated to an administrative body. The administrative management function of the federal government had been strengthened. The courts were asked to retreat with dignity" (1982, p. 257).

Expanding the Role of Administration

In these early years, two perspectives conflicted. Some sought to remedy the excesses of political corruption through more democracy, which would be manifest in reforms such as home rule and proportional representation. Others

avored a planned society aided by strong administrative agencies (Waldo, 1984).

As the classical period of public administration evolved, the latter view gained legitimacy. The section below explores the expanded role of administration.

The field of public administration responded to the material requirements of a modern administrative state required in the wake of industrial expansion. This was reflected in the infrastructure needed for the cities, as well as the need for regulation of monopolies. Between 1870 and 1930, five federal departments and three regulatory agencies were formed (Woll, 1977). With the delegitimation of party politics and the rise of interest groups, administrative agencies came to be seen as the locus for the reconciliation of disparate interests (McConnell, 1966; Lowi, 1979). The tension between the Federalist principles on the one hand and the Anti-Federalists principles on the other was mediated through the legitimating role that administrative agencies played in the governance process.

Administrative agencies were seen as stable and legitimate institutions. The agencies' legitimacy was recognized by their (1) constitutional authority (establishing an agency is an act of law), (2) political base, (3) expertise, and (4) normative view of the public interest.

As public administration entered the 20th century the role that was being carved out continued to take shape. In the next section we will see that public administration in first three decades of the 20th century was very attached to the symbols of rationalism and science, yet also preserved (albeit implicitly at times)

the democratic ideals of administration emphasizing the importance of the citizenry and the public interest. In many ways it seemed to value community and the public interest, yet methods were employed that resulted in administration at a distance through the need for objective control. Haber (1964) aptly describes the inherent tension:

Though marching with the people, the progressive reformers clearly marched at their head. Progressive political reform often seemed to involve a singular attempt to bring government close to the people and at the same time keep it somewhat distant (p. 78).

As mentioned above, during the progressive era there was an increased emphasis on science and rationalism. At times it seemed that the discussion of democratic principles became an implied discussion as opposed to an overt discussion in the writings of many theorists during this period. The emphasis on rationalism at the expense of democracy later led Dwight Waldo to suggest that "‘Autocracy’ at work is the unavoidable price for ‘Democracy’ after hours" (1984, p. 74). Later in this chapter we will explore the role of writers such as Waldo, Redford, and Appleby who began to call into question this emphasis on scientific rationalism and technique. Their critique shows the paramount importance of the tension between the Federalist principles the objective control of administration and the Anti-Federalist principles, represented by need for a community of

meaning. The existence of this tension served to anchor the legitimate role of public administration in the governance process.

The Ethos of Technique

While the founding period has received increased attention in the literature of public administration, Woodrow Wilson's *The Study of Administration* (1887) still serves as a marker for identifying the expanded role of administration in the governance process. Between 1870 and 1930 the number of federal employees rose from 73,000 to 700,000 (Mosher, 1975). As Wilson noted: "It is getting harder to run a constitution than it is to frame one" (Wilson, 1887, p. 484). The expanded role for public administrators was heralded by most because of their (1) subject matter expertise, (2) continuity as civil servants, and (3) commitment to the public interest. In addition, their application of scientific principles in the conduct of administration was seen as a positive step. It was assumed that the scientific method employed by the administrator would bring both impartiality and progress (better solutions through the ordered process of rationality) to an untenable situation.

During the period spanning from the turn of the century to 1935, many changes and developments took place in the field. The Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency led the way for budget reform and an executive budget by 1921. The New York Bureau of Municipal research became a clearinghouse

for new research efforts in public administration. Specialized knowledge about municipal governance was sought. The ideas generated from their efforts became known as the bureau movement and represented "...the conviction that only through efficient government could progressive social welfare be achieved... so long as government remained inefficient, volunteer, and detached, [any] effort to remove social handicaps would continue a hopeless task" (Mosher, 1981, p. 93). The influence of the municipal reform movement was instrumental in the development of public administration because the problems that best lent themselves to administration were manifest in the urban areas of the country.

The progressive movement was bolstered by the "gospel" of efficiency and the rise of scientific management. Frederick Taylor was the strongest proponent of these ideas with his work at the Midvale Steel Company. Waldo (1984) notes that the field of public administration was captivated by the methodology of science, which emphasized the efficacy of the scientific method, primacy of expertise, reliance on exact measurement, and the isolation of "facts." Merkle (1980) outlines the arguments made for a scientific management approach to government:

- Elective democracy caters to the lower instincts of the masses at the expense of expertise.
- "Authority" of the traditional governmental type is an ineffective, personalized, coercive attempt at control and must remain so until the introduction of scientific measures of performance.

- Government is more efficient at encouraging high productivity and arranging fair distribution of goods.
- State power is therefore properly exercised by a technical elite through a process of scientific planning of the production and distribution of goods for the benefit of the entire population.

Merkle and Haber (1964) and Skrowonek (1982) argue that those in the field of public administration were not only naively enchanted with the possibilities of the scientific method, but that administrative rationality constituted a redefinition of statebuilding that rivaled and superseded politics.

Administrative Management and the Influence of Rationalism

In this section, I delineate the expanded emphasis on rationalism during the period in public administration which emphasized the possibility for universal principles of administration. This expanded emphasis corresponded with the move to centralize and integrate at the national level those lessons learned at the municipal level. In addition, there was a clear shift to the study of *management* in the field of public administration as opposed to the earlier tradition of public law and political science. The history of this period has been recorded by many scholars in the field of public administration. My discussion below draws primarily on the work of Denhardt (1984), O'Toole (1984), Rohr (1986), and Uveges and Keller (1989).

The first textbook specifically in the field of public administration is Leonard White's *Introduction to Public Administration*, published in 1926. This text delineates the first attempts to develop a universal science of administration. In the introduction of his book, White emphasizes that public administration should have its base in management. He writes:

Public administration is the management of men and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the state. This definition emphasizes the managerial phase of administration and minimizes its legalistic and formal aspect (1926, p.16).

While underscoring the shift to the study of administrative management, White was keenly aware of the ever-present tension between the objective control of administration and the requirement for a continued community of meaning. He argued that centralized administration would make it impossible for the public administrator to be accountable to the citizenry. He suggested that in many cases decentralization was a more effective administrative practice, thereby maintaining involvement at the local level.

Other writers during this period such as Willoughby, Mooney, and Gulick and Urwick were concerned primarily with the study of management to improve the organizational structure and in Willoughby's words the "administrative machinery." Denhardt points out:

For White, the issues of centralization and integration are clearly bounded by a concern for maintaining democratic responsibility. Willoughby and Gulick, in contrast, focus

more strictly on the development of principles to guide the actions of administrators seeking greater efficiency. In their work, concerns for democratic responsibility, though not absent, take a back seat to concerns for structure, control, and efficiency (1984, p. 58).

In their *Papers on the Science of Administration*, Gulick and Urwick wrote that "...there are principles which can be arrived at inductively from the study of human organizations.... These principles can be studied as a technical question, irrespective of the enterprise" (1937, p. 49). In an essay entitled "Notes on the Theory of Organization," Gulick articulated the principles of administration known by the acronym POSDCORB--Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, COordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting. This essay was part of the *Papers on the Science of Administration*, published in conjunction with the report of the Committee on Administrative Management (CAM). CAM was co-chaired by Luther Gulick, Louis Brownlow, and Charles Merriam and resulted in the reorganization of the Executive branch. Rohr notes "By describing virtually every governmental activity as some kind of 'administrative management'--personnel management, fiscal management, planning management, or administrative reorganization--the committee asserted the president's power over the government as a whole" (1986, p. 138).

Of this period Denhardt suggests the following:

In Willoughby and Gulick, much more than in White, we see the emergence of the administrative management viewpoint of public administration theory. Here theory is

reduced to a set of general guides for designing administrative structures. The problems of public organizations are seen as essentially the same as those of private organizations and, consequently, the solution is much the same: the creation of hierarchical structures of authority overlaid on a careful division of labor and coordinated through a single directing authority. Agencies are to be governed by the principles of administrative management, principles far different from those of democratic government (1984, pp. 61-62).

The Traditionalist Perspective

The expansion of the administrative state during the New Deal period and during World War II had a profound effect on the field of public administration. Many public administration stalwarts served in key positions during the war effort, and their hands-on experience gave them a different perspective on administration. As a result, they called into question some of the arguments of the classical period in public administration. Three major points of contention were: (1) the appropriateness of the separation between politics and administration, (2) the implicit, rather than explicit, role of democracy in public administration theory, and (3) the heavy dependence on rationalism and instrumental action. The most well-known critiques were manifested in the works of Waldo, *The Administrative State* (1984), and Appleby, *Big Democracy* (1945). In concert with these critiques, other writers such as Redford (1958), Sayre (1945), Dimock (1945), and Dimock and Dimock (1952), echoed their views. These writers have been identified as the

traditionalists (White and McSwain, 1990). The discussion that follows is based on an article by White and McSwain (1990) entitled "The Phoenix Project: Raising a New Image of Public Administration from the Ashes of the Past."

In a move away from the scientific aspects of the progressive movement, the traditionalists, writing in the 1940's and 1950's, emphasized the "government by dialogue" aspect of public administration. Their perspective carried forth the tradition of the community of meaning pole of the tension with the objective control of administration that was manifest both during the founding period and the progressive era.

The key tenets of the traditionalist perspective include: (1) an emphasis on the concept of the public interest, (2) an informed pragmatism, and (3) a communitarian ethos. White and McSwain delineate four axioms of the Traditionalist movement. First, the realities of history served to place administrative action at the center of a government responding to a society in crisis. Second, the administrative agency was seen as the center of a group of policy communities. It was a repository of meaning for administrative action and societal values. Third, administrative action was seen not as a rational linear science, but as evolving from the institutional context and the social process of an agency. Fourth, the Traditionalists sought a structural understanding of administrative affairs. They argued that it was important to understand the underlying archetypal events that occurred in public

administration. This structural understanding would provide a line of action in the context of overdetermined social forces.

White and McSwain articulate six working principles related to these axioms:

- The idea of the public interest as a guide to administrative action.
- The public weal and the well-being of public agencies as synonymous.
- Effective control of agencies by the Congress and the political executive.
- The case study method as the most effective way to learn the correct sensibility of a public administrator.
- The pragmatic, experimental approach to action is the way to achieve effective administration.
- Collaboration achieved through dialogue as essential to effective administrative action and policymaking.

As suggested earlier, the traditionalist viewpoint represented the need for the community of meaning that has been part of the tradition of public administration dating back to the founding period of the country. The concept of the public interest articulated by the traditionalists provided an overarching guide for this perspective.

White and McSwain note that : (t)he public interest referred to the stake shared by all members of the social system in the continued well-being and viability of the social system itself" (1990, p. 10). This notion provided the administrator with a centering point in the conduct of his/her daily activities.

Other aspects of the traditionalists' position included the importance of the role of administrative agencies as a full participant in the political decisionmaking

and policymaking process. It was argued that administrative agencies served as repositories for consensus on why and how public programs and policies should be developed and implemented. In this context the agencies played a vital role within the governance process. This role was regulated by the controls placed on agencies through the congress and the political executive.

The case study method was advocated by the traditionalists as way for administrators to understand the complexities of the issues that they faced. The descriptive aspects of each case study were augmented by the normative view of the public interest mentioned above. White and McSwain summarize the traditionalists' methodology as follows:

Most of these case studies were published under the auspices of the Inter-University Case Program, and hence were based on an explicit philosophy and methodology which were set out by the governing board of this program.

According to this philosophy, students of public administration, as prospective administrators, could best be prepared for the real world of administration by reading comprehensively factual accounts of actual administrative events in the presence of and with the help of mentors. The case was regarded as what would be called in contemporary jargon a *text* that, in a sense spoke to the reader. What the text revealed through study and analysis, was the underlying structural pattern, the universal elements, that characterized situations of the sort of which it was an example. The student was schooled to perceive the archetypal forms of administrative events. The discernment of these forms, in turn, would provide an indication of what the fundamental tendencies of events in such situations were, including how actors involved in such situations would be disposed to behave (1990, p. 11).

One of the results of this approach to administration was that it fostered an attitude of pragmatism and experimentation. There was less reliance on comprehensive rational lines of action that claimed definitive solutions. Rather the expectation was that by engaging in administrative situations through the approach suggested by the case study method and through the normative view of the public interest a tentative line of action would emerge. As White and McSwain point out:

The key to effective action lay in how one engaged the struggle. As with the cases one read in school, the actual situations one faced as an administrator were to be regarded as like a case text that could be understood as a set of tendencies that themselves might indicate appropriate lines of response. Nothing was ever certain, however, and all action was necessarily tentative. The understanding and clarity that could be gained through subordinating oneself to the text of the situation, and this meant necessarily the institutional position that one occupied in the situation. The idea was that through the process of reading the text of a situation the 'right answer,' or correct line of action would emerge--that is would be indicated implicitly--and should be expressed by the administrator. The will of the administrator, that is his or her individual opinions, values, preferences, or concept of rationality, was not to be brought into play explicitly as it would be in the process of rational decision (1990, p.13).

The traditionalists saw public administration as a *vocation*. By de-emphasizing the will of the administrator, the traditionalist approach to administrative action fostered an environment that considered all aspects of the situation from arcane technical information to authentic concerns and feelings of citizens. The emphasis on collaboration generated a community of meaning in the sense that was expressed

by the Anti-Federalists. The context of administration was stressed and "the individual administrator's connection to it at every point--to the others in the situation as listener, to the agency and the government as protectors of general well-being, and, ultimately, to the public interest as a symbol and guide (White and McSwain, 1990, p. 14).

The Simonian Model

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the ethos of the progressive movement paradoxically contained the discourse of community as well as the discourse of rationalism and efficiency. However, after World War II a refined discourse of rationalism and efficiency took hold in conjunction with the technological innovation occurring after the war. The influence of empiricism was more pronounced and defined knowledge in terms of empirical evidence and scientific technique (White and McSwain, 1990). Technical solutions were very appealing given the scale of the changes that occurred in the wake of industrial expansion, the Great Depression, and two World Wars. As suggested by White and McSwain:

World War II created a new interest in and emphasis on understanding social process in a rational, objective manner, a manner that could yield applicable information and practical lessons. Money supporting this type of research began to flow into universities during the 1950's and 1960's in unprecedented amounts. A new consciousness about knowledge was forming, one that regarded research as a

process for improving technique. The priorities for what techniques needed to be improved or invented were set through the device of government and foundation research grants. Emphasis began to shift away from social philosophy to social theory and from wisdom and experience to empirical data (White and McSwain, 1990, p. 16).

In the field of public administration, Herbert Simon's *Administrative Behavior* was the most influential expression of this emphasis on technique.

The following section presents is a definition and description of the rational model of organization presented by Simon in *Administrative Behavior*. There are several excellent volumes from which I draw to explain this model. In addition to Simon's own works, one of the most detailed treatments of Simon's model of organization can be found in Denhardt's book *In the Shadow of Organization* (1981). Harmon and Mayer's *Organization Theory for Public Administration* (1986) also provides a comprehensive view of Simon's model of organization. Authors of other key texts include Waldo, (1952), Storing (1962), Golembiewski et al. (1969), and Rainey (1989). I also explain the philosophical underpinning of Simon's view to help distinguish Simon's ontological stance from other approaches that are discussed in this dissertation. My discussion of the philosophical underpinning of Simon's view draws on the works of Whitehead (1925), Ayer (1959), Kolakowski (1968), Fay (1975), and Bernstein (1988).

Philosophical Underpinning

Simon's challenge to the body of knowledge that existed in public administration was to articulate, in clear and unambiguous terms, a method and approach to public administration that mirrored the discourse of science. Scientific discourse was firmly established as the way of explaining events in the "natural" world. The two key assumptions of scientific discourse are: (1) a world independent of human existence and (2) the possibility for the objectivity of facts. These assumptions are compatible with the philosophical doctrine of logical positivism upon which Simon based his views (Simon, 1947). The premise of this doctrine is that there is a world around us whose existence and character is independent of what exists in our minds. Truth is derived through physical sensations produced by our encounter with this independently existing world. The positivist perspective asserts that over its history, natural science has come closer to the "truth" about this independent world. This "progress" in moving toward the "truth" about the world around us suggests that social scientists will be successful if they follow the same precepts as natural science.

According to Simon, facts are incontrovertible. They are deemed correct by those experts in the hierarchy who have the technical ability and knowledge to put together the structure required for developing a rational course of action. Simon's view holds that there are universal principles of rationality that are a priori in the form and structure of rational thought. The structure and form of

rationality includes the notion that rational statements obey the laws of logic and also form an interlocking system of hypotheses and conclusions. These rules constitute a set of unambiguous and precise procedures that, from the Simonian perspective, ultimately can be developed into an algorithm that could be programmed into a computer as a set of decision premises.

The Rational Model of Organization

Given the philosophical basis for Simon's views explained above, how do those views translate into a model of organization? Following Denhardt (1981), some of the key aspects of Simon's model of organization are include:

- Strict adherence to the philosophical doctrine of logical positivism.
- A clear separation between facts and values.
- A clear separation between administration and policy.
- A formal organizational structure that assumes stable, rational behavior exemplified by uncomplicated role expectations.
- Behavior designed around organizational goals.
- A closed group of experts, who by virtue of the organizational structure, direct the "implementation" of those goals.
- A view of activity in public agencies as objective "behavior."
- Activity in organizations as distinct from activity outside the organization.

Implications for Public Administration

While a more detailed treatment of Simon's views will follow in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, it is important to underscore the impact of Simon's model of organization on the field of public administration. Critical to Simon's view is the separation between facts and values and the separation between policy and administration outlined in Chapter III of *Administrative Behavior*. In this sense his views return to the views of public administration that held sway for the first three decades of the 20th century. White and McSwain note:

Simon drew a direct analog between this epistemological axiom [the separation of facts and values] and the nature of the relationship between policy (and by implication, politics) and administration. That is policy as he stated it, is the proper province of politics, where emotionally based preferences can be given expression as policy. Administration on the other hand, is the arena where policy can be translated into the factual question of how efficiently to produce most of the preference that the policy defines and demands (e.g. reduction of crime). The result is a scientific question and an essentially technical issue: What line of administrative action will consume the least amount of resources per unit of policy outcome produced? This was Simon's standard of efficiency and the core idea of what administration is or ought to be (1990, p. 17).

Simon's view of human behavior also had a sustaining impact on the field of public administration. As mentioned above, the rational model of administration assumes a formal organizational structure based on stable rational behavior. Rational behavior in this case is the efficient achievement of the pre-

determined goals of the organization. For example, collaboration might exist on an interpersonal level but it is only a facade because it is merely the accomplishment of predetermined organizational goals and objectives. As Denhardt notes: "...both the form and nature of the cooperation among its members is determined in advance and enforced by the organization's management groups" (1981, p. 20). In addition, Simon viewed human beings as having limited rationality. This point will be explored more fully in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. However, suffice to say that Simon argues that the human mind is very limited in its ability to rationally solve complex problems (Simon, 1957b). As a result, a different ontological stance is taken toward human beings. For the model that Simon proposes human beings are characterized by the instrumental relationships of the formal rational organization.

Ontological and Epistemological Differences

The traditionalist perspective and the Simonian view reflect both ontological and epistemological differences. From the vantage point of 1993, it is clear to see that the traditionalists' approach fits into the interpretivist paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Their argument for collaboration through dialogue is consistent with the interpretivist view that reality is socially constructed. In contrast, as noted above the Simonian view is based on the existence of an external world independent of human cognition.

At the level of epistemology, the Simonian view emphasized logical positivism and the assumption that words carry objective meanings that can be discerned by all in the same fashion; the traditionalists held that language, and therefore social process, is much more problematic. Thus, where the Simonian perspective seeks to control dialogue and thereby limit social process, the traditionalists see the special dialogue that can be created within an agency as the basis for expanding social process and the community of shared meaning. An appropriate example would be the view of the public interest. From the perspective of the traditionalists, the public interest was a symbol and a mode of consciousness from which the meaning of public action could be derived (White, 1990). From the Simonian perspective, the public interest was a concept that to the extent possible should be deleted from the discourse of public administration. Writing in support of the discourse of scientific rationality, Frank Sorauf (1957, 1962), who along with Glendon Schubert (1957, 1962) extended Simon's ideas, asserts: "perhaps academicians ought to take the lead in drawing up a list of ambiguous words and phrases which 'would never be missed.' For such a list I would have several candidates, but it would suffice here to nominate 'the public interest'" (1962, p. 190).

The traditionalist perspective embodied many of the issues that ultimately became marginalized with the advent of the Simonian perspective. These issues included: (1) collaboration, (2) a moral perspective of the public interest, (3)

democratic administration, and (4) experimental action. White and McSwain point out:

In the eyes of the traditionalists, the new image of the administrator that was indicated by Simon's behavioral approach amounted to a significant denigration of the status of a functionary technician.... All important discretion, namely, the discretion to set policy and make reasoned judgments on issues of fairness, justice, equity, and so forth, was removed from this new role definition and was given to the political sector of government. Not only was the degree of subordination implied by this role definition both unrealistic and inappropriate in the traditionalists view, but the substantive dimension of the role was reduced to the mechanical application of expertise. This was a direct threat to the traditionalists, in that the expertise they had to offer was not mechanically applicable--indeed, it was an expertise not even specified to any great detail. The change that Simon represented amounted to a true paradigm shift, whereby the old perspective and the knowledge produced under it was rendered obsolete (1990, p. 20).

Concluding Comments

Simon's emphasis on technical solutions was reminiscent of the scientism of the progressive ethos from the standpoint that the world is too complex for human beings to predict and control without the aid of science. Yet the progressives viewed science as a supplement to the core mission, which was to serve the public interest. In contrast, Simon saw the public interest as a metaphysical concept irrelevant to the practice of good administration, a value outside the purview of the model proposed

by Simon. The Simonian perspective abstracted the concept of public administration and redefined it as technique in the service of instrumental rationality.

By establishing boundaries around the definition of administration and declaring the primacy of empirical evidence, the range of discourse about what constitutes public administration became extremely narrow. Only one type of rationality--instrumental rationality--was important, and only one type of human action--conscious behavior--was given attention. In Simon's model, the significance of administration is as a tool to solve technical problems. When attention is placed only on the means without regard to the ends, which relate to the ideal of public service and the public interest, then the only requirements of administration are technical ones.

Until this point in the history of public administration, a dynamic tension had always existed between the communitarian ethos of the Anti-Federalists and the tendency toward the objective control of administration as represented by the Federalists. By moving away from the path of the traditionalists, the field of public administration became dislocated from its place in the governance process and fell into an inescapable search for the certainty of technique. The tension so vital to the anchoring of public administration's role in the governance process became a more constricted narrative about the objective control of administration.

The next chapter examines Simon's body of ideas in more detail. In Chapter 4, we will take perspective that questions not only the discourse of Simonian rationality but also the search for meaning, exemplified by the traditionalists.

A simplified model of human decision making is provided by the behavior of a white rat when he is confronted, in the psychological laboratory, with a maze, one path of which leads to food--Herbert Simon.

CHAPTER 3

THE SOURCE AND HISTORY OF SIMON'S RHETORIC

The aim of the chapter is to provide the context in which a reading of (1) provide a brief biographical narrative of Simon's life, (2) look at Simon's writings and the debates that these writings evoked, and (3) provide an understanding of Simon's ontological stance and the way in which that ontology was manifest in his personal life. The first section of the chapter explores the question, Who is Herbert Simon? The rest of the chapter explores the discourses that constitute his identity.

Is There an Author in the Text?

The goal of this chapter is to provide a composite sketch of the author and his work. To accomplish this, several questions must be asked and then answered. First, is it possible to separate a person's private life from his/her published writings?

If so, who is it that constitutes the author function--the producer of the words in the books that bear his/her name? Second, do we as readers accurately receive what the author has intended? In that vein, can we discern a uniform set of precise meanings from the text and so name them as the author's intended representations? Third, is there such a thing as an author? By this I mean, can we the readers, assume that the writings that we are reading are the product of one unified subject/self?

These questions are raised because of the poststructuralist approach that is taken in this dissertation (especially in Chapters 4 and 5). A synthesis of the questions raised in the paragraph above might be asked as: "What constitutes the author?" Foucault argues that:

We are accustomed, as we have seen earlier, to saying that the author is the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations. We are used to thinking that the author is so different from all other men, and so transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely.

The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede works; he is a certain functional principle by which in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion.... The author is therefore the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning (1977, p. 118-119).

Then who *is* Herbert Simon? The author is more than a subject traditionally defined by a chronological history of such things as birth date, education, and professional experience. He (in this case) is a composite of what other people speak and write about him, as well as what he writes about himself. The subjectivity that we impute to Simon is comprised of: (1) his academic writings, (2) his inventions (3) the comments of others both about their personal interactions with Simon as well as their views of his academic work, (5) Simon's autobiography, and (6) his life experiences. In addition, what constitutes the author is directly related to the reader's experiences as well.

In sum, his entire life is a text. The answer to the question, "Who is Herbert Simon," is that he's the intersection of many discourses. Below, I have suggested some aspects of the discourse that comprises Herbert Simon's identity. We begin with a traditional chronological account of his life.

Biographical Profile

Formative Years

Herbert Simon was born in 1912 to Arthur and Edna Simon of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Simon's father, an engineer, inventor, and patent attorney, emigrated from Germany in 1903. An exceptional student, Simon advanced several grade levels in elementary school and graduated from high school at the age of 16. Consequently, he was younger than most of his classmates, a significant point when

he was in high school. In his autobiography, *Models of My Life* (1989), Simon suggests his friends viewed him first and foremost as a "brain," but not arrogant about being so intelligent.

Simon made up for his lack of physical prowess with "verbal swordsmanship." As a member of the high school debate team, he recollects that "his opponents could seldom match his logic or careful preparation of evidence" (1989, p. 13-14). He also developed interests in politics and science. As a fourth grader, he fashioned a school constitution. In high school he recalls finding pleasure in proving that every quadratic equation could have two solutions.

Growing up, Simon appears to have valued thinking independently and proving his intellectual ability. Simon received a full scholarship to the University of Chicago. He entered at the heady time when the "New Plan" allowed for individual study without the required structure of classroom attendance. Simon received a Bachelors Degree in three years and then continued to his graduate studies in the Department of Political Science.

Intrigued with biophysics, economics, and philosophy, he developed an interest in the connection between science and the application of mathematics. His commitment to logical positivism was solidified through the courses taught by Rudolph Carnap. Simon's graduate work in political science was influenced by the behavioralist methods that were then taking hold within the discipline. What

impressed Simon was that, at the University of Chicago, "political science [was] science."

While in graduate school he worked for Clarence Ridley, Director of the International City Management Association (ICMA). During that period he edited an ICMA publication entitled *Techniques of Administration*. Following this work, he went to University of California at Berkeley on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Bureau of Public Administration. His work in California was to have considerable impact on his own thinking. Here he did the type of empirical research he had found lacking in the field of public administration. Simon considered the research conducted with the California State Relief Administration as one of the few studies within the public administration literature that met the standards for rigorous empirical research.

Academic Career

At Berkeley, Simon completed his dissertation, which was later published as *Administrative Behavior*. He then began his teaching career at the Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) in 1942. The experience of being at an engineering school was consistent with his approach to public administration. About teaching at IIT, he writes: "I was pleased at the prospect, for an engineering school seemed more likely to provide a congenial environment for a mathematical political scientist" (1989, p. 93).

He moved out of the arena of political science to economics and eventually to cognitive science and artificial intelligence. His view of the field of public administration, on which he had such influence, is disparaging. He notes:

But my actual research career started in an academic backwater: public administration. However important that field was and is to public affairs, it attracted few scholars with real understanding of what research was about, or how to construct the theoretical foundations for an applied field. Viewed by the norms of science, many of the books published in public administration (and management generally) are positively embarrassing....(1989, p. 114).

The direction of Simon's life beyond this point is relevant to his achievements outside of public administration and political science. What is clear is the influence of Simon and his colleagues in securing the favorable acceptance of the behavioralist agenda within political science. Of this period in the mid 1940's, Simon writes: "Our goal was to make sure that the research written within the behavioral framework would be received by the *American Political Science Review* and would have an appropriate place in the annual meetings of the [American Political Science] Association" (1989, p. 169).

After political science, Simon moved into the fields of economics and cognitive psychology. In 1949 he helped found the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at what is now Carnegie-Mellon University. In 1978, he received the Nobel Prize in economics. He has also been at the forefront of major developments in artificial intelligence.

Although he moved away from the discipline of public administration and expressed some disdain for the field, his influence in public administration has been powerful. Critiques of his work include those of Waldo (1952), Banfield (1958), Storing (1962), and Argyris (1973). Recently, a two-volume retrospective on Simon's work appeared in *Public Administration Quarterly*. In one of the articles for the retrospective, Dunn (1988) noted that all but one of twenty-seven public administration textbooks written since 1975 address *Administrative Behavior*.

Critical Discourses

The Discourse of Public Administration

A recent two-volume symposium celebrated the 40th anniversary of *Administrative Behavior*. These volumes highlight several key debates about Simon in the field of public administration. Two of these debates are: (1) the Simon - Waldo exchange of 1952 published in the *American Political Science Review*, and, (2) the Simon - Argyris debate of 1973 published in *Public Administration Review*.

The Simon - Waldo Debate

The scientific approach that Simon advocated in *Administrative Behavior* was in direct contrast to the moral-philosophical issues raised by Dwight Waldo in *The Administrative State* and subsequent writings. As Harmon (1989), notes: "Waldo's

project was, after all, to warn of the *limits* of science in human--and in particular administrative affairs--while Simon's was to inform us of its power" (p. 440). Two key issues that surfaced from the debate were (1) the separation of facts and values, and (2) the role of democratic theory in the study and practice of administration.

In *Administrative Behavior*, Simon establishes that:

The position to which the methodological assumptions of the present study [*Administrative Behavior*] lead us to is this: The process of validating a factual proposition is quite distinct from the process of validating a value judgement. The former is validated by its agreement with the facts, the latter by human fiat (1947, p. 56).

This quote from Chapter 3 of *Administrative Behavior* articulates a departure from the direction in which the field of public administration was headed. During this period, Appleby's *Big Democracy*, (1945); Waldo's *The Administrative State*, (1948); and Dahl's "The Science of Administration: Three Problems" (1947), were charting a direction in the field of public administration that strongly challenged the scientific emphasis of the classical period as well as the separation between politics and administration.

In contrast, the epistemological commitment to logical positivism that Simon makes in *Administrative Behavior* places him with the earlier writers of the classical orthodoxy who separated politics from administration. Over the years many have discussed and debated the different sections in *Administrative Behavior* that relate to the arguments that Simon makes concerning the separation between facts and values

and the analogous separation between administration and policy. However, critical point argued by Simon is that there exists a "class of decisions" which are "factual" in nature (1947). Because this class of decisions is seen to be distinct from politics, it can therefore be subject to scientific analysis. Waldo and others argue that all the important issues in public administration lie outside of the class of decisions that can be evaluated by the Simonian method. Nevertheless Simon was effective in shifting the debate away from normative questions--the moral and political character of government and toward an approach to administration that focused primarily on means rather than ends.

Simon's argument also relies on the assumption that these factual decisions can be validated in an objective external environment. What is never called into question is whether the picture of reality that we describe using these facts is faulty. At the time of the Simon-Waldo exchange, Simon's position was unequivocal. However, later in *Reason in Human Affairs*, Simon does acknowledge some problems associated with this view. He notes:

Facts, especially in science, are usually gathered in with instruments that are themselves permeated with theoretical assumptions...[and that]...the fallibility of reasoning is guaranteed...by the tentative and theory-infected character of the facts themselves (1982, p. 6).

The Simon - Argyris Debate

While the focus of critique toward the Simonian model of rationality was directed at the debate between normative issues and the logic of science, Argyris (1973) addressed the limitations that rational organization could impose upon human development and innovation. He argued that under circumstances where all decision premises are decided in advance, the Simonian model of organization truly becomes the Weberian iron cage. While the aim of Argyris' critique was to highlight organizational domination and to champion self-actualization, his disagreements with Simon illustrate another theme in which Simon's view significantly departs from others in the field of public administration. Namely, that rational organization, when designed as a set of decision premises, is devoid of meaning. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the traditionalists made the case for a special dialogue that could occur within the context of public agencies. This dialogue considered the overarching public interest rather than purely a reliance on the causal analysis of the behavioral approach.

Argyris also critiques the power relationship implicit in the Simonian model.

In his article in *Public Administration Review*, he writes:

The basic properties of formal pyramidal structures (specialization of tasks, centralization of power and information) are not altered... Indeed, in some ways, Simon goes further [than traditional administrative theorists] in making it explicit that it is management's task to inculcate the organization's values and objectives into the behavior-producing forces within the employees. For example, Simon states that it

is management's responsibility to inject 'into their [employees'] very nervous systems' the desired objectives and the criteria to be used to judge if these objectives were met (1973, p. 255).

In his response, Simon (1973) argues that Argyris overstates the argument that Simon is making. Nevertheless, the above quote exemplifies an important critique of the Simonian model of organization.

Finally, Argyris points to the reification of organizations that is typical in assessing the Simonian model. He emphasizes that human beings are the designers of organization. In addition, Argyris argues that there are intended and unintended effects of the heavy emphasis on instrumental rationality and organizational goals. He highlights a point which Simon is unwilling to accept that the set of epistemological assumptions about rational behavior limit the possibility for drawing other conclusions about organizational experience.

The Limited Rationality of Human Beings

As Herbert Simon notes in the preface of *Reason in Human Affairs*, human reason has been his "central preoccupation for over 50 years" (1982, p. vii). The key premise of this "preoccupation" is that there are limits to the human capacity for rationality. In *Administrative Behavior*, Simon notes that the limits include "(a) limits on the ability to *perform* and (b) limits on the ability to *make correct decisions*" (p. 39-41). Simon then delineates a triangle of limits:

On the one side, the individual is limited by those skills, habits, and reflexes which are no longer in the realm of the conscious.... On a second side, the individual is limited by his values and those conceptions of purpose which influence him in making his decisions.... On a third side, the individual is limited by the extent of his knowledge of things relevant to his job...[including] what the limits are on the mass of knowledge that human minds can accumulate and apply... (1947, p. 40).

The logic of Simon's argument begins with the premise that human beings have a "lack." This lack is manifested in the impairments to an individual's ability to be rational. The circumstances in which human beings find themselves is one in which the world is overly complex. Within that environment, human beings are hampered by their lack of rationality. These are the social and psychological "givens" under which human beings must exist (1947, p. 79; 1957, p. 201). To expand the capabilities of our own limited rationality, we create the artifice of organization. In *Models of Man*, Simon introduces his theory of "bounded rationality," which expands on the ideas delineated in *Administrative Behavior*. He states his theory thus:

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world--or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality (1957, p. 198).

This theory is consistent with the model of natural science in its aim to understand the complexity of a world independent of human existence. The key to understanding the complexity of that world is a universal idea called rationality,

which orders the world in terms of ideas that follow logical sequences. In addition, there are brute facts, objective events in the world that occur regardless of human existence--such as the proverbial tree falling in the woods. Thus, Simon has described the world upon which social science must model its methods as a world that is external and independent of human beings. The subsequent assumption is that human behavior can be described such that outcomes can be predicted and controlled.

As noted in Chapter 2, many contemporaries of Simon such as Waldo, Appleby, and Redford did not agree with this perspective. In a well-known article in *Public Administration Review* (1947), Robert Dahl articulates the view of his contemporaries when he writes: "In an attempt to make the science of public administration analogous to the natural sciences, the laws or putative laws are stripped of normative values, of the distortions caused by the incorrigible individual psyche, and of the presumably irrelevant facts of the cultural environment" (p. 1).

Dahl's perspective and that of most others in the field directly oppose the scientific perspective articulated by Simon. A persistent critique of Simon's writings is that his discussion of rationality is limited to instrumental rationality. Simon focuses on purposive rationality--goal-directed behavior. Dahl and others point out that in the field of public administration, instrumental technique plays an important, but secondary role. Again, Dahl's perspective articulates the views of his contemporaries:

Patently the contention that one system of organization is more rational than another, and *therefore better*, is valid only (a) if individuals are dominated by reason or (b) if they are so thoroughly dominated by the technical process (as on the assembly line, perhaps) that their individual preferences may safely be ignored. However much the latter assumption might apply to industry (a matter of considerable doubt), clearly it has little application to public administration, where technical processes are, on the whole, of quite subordinate importance (p. 6).

The Role of the Unconscious

In the sentence that follows the previous remarks, Dahl writes: "The science of organization has learned too much from industry and not enough from Freud" (p. 6). Simon takes the opposite view. In all his writings, he defines away the unconscious through his view that only conscious rational behavior exists. In the essay, "Rationality and Administrative Decision Making," Simon explicitly details his agenda for research in social science (1957, pp. 196-206). He believes that Freudian theory has held sway for too much of the 20th century and that an effective theory of rationality must claim much of the ground lost to "the side of passion."

Simon writes: "I believe that the return of the pendulum [back from psychoanalytic explanations of human behavior] will begin, and that we will [then] begin to interpret as rational and reasonable many facets of behavior that we now explain in terms of affect. It is this belief that leads me to characterize behavior in organizations as 'intendedly rational'" (1957, p. 200).

Clearly stated, Simon's agenda is to redescribe human behavior in terms of rational action. As a result, *Models of Man* (1957), makes virtually no mention of the unconscious. In *Administrative Behavior*, Simon describes unconscious activity as behavior accomplished by reflex or by rote memorization--behavior that does not require thinking. By abstaining from any discussion of the unconscious, Simon essentially reduces meaningful human activity to two models: the global rationality of economic man and the bounded rationality of administrative man. As a result, Simon presents us with a Hobson's choice because both models emphasize conscious behavior. The larger debate between the Freudians and the cognitive psychologists has been obviated.

Simon's view of the unconscious is further articulated in *The New Science of Management Decision* (1960). According to research conducted both by Simon and Alan Newell, human beings in problem-solving settings examine and dissect a problem until they find a part that is solvable. They then build on this foundation until "[they] gradually begin to assemble results that look as though they will contribute to the solution of the whole problem." Simon continues:

At one level, nothing seems very complicated here--nothing is very different from the white rat sniffing his way through the maze.... But still the feeling persists that we are seeing only superficial parts of the process--that there is a vast iceberg underneath, concealed from our view and from the consciousness of the subject.... *Perhaps this feeling of mystery is an illusion. Perhaps, the subconscious parts are no different in kind from the parts that we observe.... Perhaps the complexity of the problem-solving process that makes its outcome so*

impressive is a complexity assembled out of relatively simple interactions among a large number of extremely simple basic elements (1960, p. 23) (*italics added*).

Simon also outlines his view for the future of management in light of the findings mentioned above. Decisionmaking, Simon argues, had previously been veiled in the mystery of words such as judgment and intuition. However, the view of the problem solving capacities of the mind that are mentioned above, traditional processes of decisionmaking are becoming demystified. The decisionmaking process can be seen as a skill that any rational actor can learn as he/she would learn to play golf. It becomes more and more of a learned skill with the increasing automation and rationalization of decisionmaking.

In presenting his ideas, Simon first discusses traditional decisionmaking techniques. He categorizes decisions into two classes: programmed and nonprogrammed. Programmed decisions are routine activities which happen with frequency. Nonprogrammed decisions are unstructured and complex issues that have idiosyncratic components to them.

The traditional methods for solving programmed decisions include habit, standard operating procedures (SOP's), and other organizational systems that support clerical routines. The modern transposition of these programmed routines is to computerize and systematize the information, so that the tasks are completely automated.

In the area of nonprogrammatic decisions, one finds a more comprehensive discussion of Simon's rational model. Traditional decisionmaking techniques in nonprogrammatic settings employ the language of judgment, intuition, creativity, and the rule of thumb. For Simon, these terms represent skills that can be defined but not operationalized. He notes: "To name a phenomenon is not to explain it. Saying that nonprogrammed decisions are made by exercising judgment names that phenomenon but does not explain it. It doesn't help the man who lacks judgment (i.e., who doesn't make decisions well) to acquire it" (1960, p. 11).

The New Science of Management Decision seeks to explain what was previously unexplained about human behavior. Simon suggests that "making non-programmed decisions depends on psychological processes that, until recently, have not been understood at all" (1960, p. 11). Simon and Newell argue that nonprogrammed decisions are a function of the same instrumental reasoning that is applied to programmed decisions. Based on this point of view, a theory for analyzing nonprogrammed decisions can be developed based on the following two assumptions. First, unconscious processes are exactly the same as conscious expressions of the mind. Second, non-routine problems are exactly the same as routine problems and differ only in their degree of complexity.

Simon and Newell state:

...we can explain these human processes without postulating mechanisms at subconscious levels that are different from those that are partly conscious and partly verbalized. The hunch that

was stated earlier is correct: Much of the iceberg is, indeed, below the surface, but its concealed bulk is made of the same kind of ice as the part we can see (1960, p. 26).

By making the assumption that the verbalized part of the human thought process constitutes the whole of any approach to "problem solving," Simon obviates the primary dynamic of the human experience, that of the unconscious. For Simon the mystery of the unconscious is an illusion. Instead he assumes that all human problem solving is cognitive. To follow through on this assumption one must refer to some external referent that appears unambiguous--such as empirical facts or systems of logic.

The Discourse of Simon's Ontology

To pick up on the point made in the section above, the ontological position taken by Simon is predicated on an external referent, in this case, an external world independent of human existence with empirical facts that explain events in that world. It is further based on the assumption that the human beings in that world are not very complex. They basically respond only to stimuli from the external environment.

The idea of a simple mind that faces a complex external environment is critical to understanding Simon's perspective on human behavior and human interaction. This view is replicated in the structure of all artificial intelligence

systems. The accepted definition of the information processing approach to cognitive psychology is one in which the thinking instrument is very limited but the external environment is extremely complex. Ed Feigenbaum, one of Simon's first students and a leading Artificial Intelligence (AI) researcher at Stanford University, notes the following about an essay entitled "Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment," published in *Models of Man*:

[It] is Simon's first statement of the now-famous theme that the observed complexity of behavior arises not from the complexity of the goal-seeking and problem-solving mechanism but from the responses of an essentially simple mechanism to the task complexities of the environment. Later this viewpoint was to be captured in metaphor as Simon's "ant on the beach" (Simon, 1970) and in this form became enshrined in AI's pantheon of ideas....

Once again, the main theme: the apparent complexity of a cognitive systems' behavior arises from its model of the world, its task environment, its knowledge base. To use the terms currently in vogue, the knowledge base of the intelligent system is large and rich with descriptions of objects, relations among them, and rules pertaining to them. The systems *inference engine* is small and simple (Feigenbaum, 1989, p. 167).

The key aspects of Simon's ontological stance are that the world is external to us and the processes of the human mind are very limited. This limit is manifested in the ability to consciously choose a course of action determined by a complex external environment. That external environment is real and can be apprehended. The more we can know that environment through the gathering of information, the

better our decisions will be. Thus, life is a series of decision points in which human beings must constantly choose point "A" or point "B." The metaphor of an ant on the beach, mentioned previously and detailed in *Sciences of the Artificial* (1981), is another example of the ontology of the decision premise. In the initial section of the second edition of the book (1980), Simon compares the behavior of man with the behavior of ants. Both are "behaving systems" whose actions are not a reflection of one's internal processes but of the complexity of the external environment.

A third example is that life is like an immense maze which human beings are destined to navigate. Simon writes:

This is the form in which I conceive free will: It resides in the fact that I am that which acts when I take a given action. And the fact that something has caused this behavior in no manner makes me (the I who acts) unfree.

So when we reach a bifurcation in the road, of the labyrinth, "something" chooses which branch to take. And the reason for my researches, and the reason why labyrinths have fascinated me, has been my desire to observe people as they encounter bifurcations and try to understand why they take the road to the right or to the left (1989, p. 179).

What seems paramount to the discourses that define Herbert Simon is the notion that Simon seems very much to live this ontological stance. An excellent example of this view and to underscore the idea that this ontology is very much part of the author's lived experience, there is the travel theorem.

In his autobiography, Simon explains this theory:

Theorem: Anything that can be learned by a normal American adult on a trip to a foreign country (of less than one year's duration) can be learned more quickly, cheaply, and easily by visiting the San Diego Public Library. San Diego is not essential; you can substitute any other major city.

On a trip to Europe, the travel theorem is put into practice. Simon and his family toured France in a manner that left no aspects to chance. He writes:

We spent our days visiting every spot we could find where Cezanne had stood when he painted Mont Ste. Victoire. (We had studied the book of Loran (1943), who had photographed all of these places).

Not only did we find the sites, but it was easy to determine within three feet exactly where Cezanne's easel had stood. And when we stood on those spots the mountain looked exactly as it had on Cezanne's glowing canvases: the literalness of his landscapes is almost beyond belief. We learned nothing new; we had already seen the paintings....

An interesting aspect of the travel theorem that seems to undermine its validity is found in the margins. After stating the above theorem, Simon notes that "(t)he theorem holds in spades if the traveler does not have a fluent knowledge of the language of the country visited" (1989, p. 306). As we will see in the next chapter, the stance that deconstruction takes is that reality and in this case, the cultural order of a particular culture which defines that reality, is actually created by the language (the system of signs) of that culture. Deconstruction does not assume that words refer to objects in a way that is cross cultural. Thus the "objective reality" of a particular culture is precisely implicated in the language of that culture.

This can be a real problem for the praxis of public administration because as George Mason pointed out, if one can't "feel as the people feel" then one is ill equipped to speak for the citizenry. Or as Harmon (1986) suggests, one might experience the hubris of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."

Another aspect of Simon's position is a tendency toward a comprehensive explanation of the complex environment in which human beings find themselves. The tendency to articulate a meta-narrative exists because as the environment becomes more complex we need an ever greater quantity and more detailed information about that external environment. Since the capacity of the mind is limited, a complex environment requires a larger amount of information broken down into simple terms so that the information can be understood by the mind.

Concluding Comments

One of the issues for those in the field of public administration to consider is the extent to which the field was swayed by the narrative that we attribute to Herbert Simon. Deconstruction, the methodological approach taken in this dissertation, is explained in the next chapter. It argues that there can be no one true representation of reality. As a result, my argument is not to dismiss theories of cognitive psychology based on complex information processing in favor of or to romanticize the view of the traditionalists. However, from the

poststructuralist/deconstructive stance, science is just one of many narratives that impact on our experience. More importantly, it suggests the fragility of meaning.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES AND METHODOLOGICAL TACTICS

This chapter describes the analytical strategy of deconstruction. In the first part of the chapter, a historical chronology of its roots are given. In addition, the main assumptions of deconstruction are explored. The second part of the chapter introduces the methodological tactics that are used to examine *Administrative Behavior* in Chapter 5.

Deconstruction is an analytical strategy that fundamentally challenges the conceptual framework accepted as the norm in the social sciences. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that in the field of social science theory, four sets of assumptions constitute the basis for a coherent framework of analysis. This framework is commonly called a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) and is comprised of assumptions about ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology. Deconstruction goes beyond the idea of paradigmatic thinking. It questions the positivist notion of objectivity by rejecting the idea of an objective world external to human consciousness. Similarly, it rejects the subjectivist claim of a unique self through which human consciousness can be interpreted.

Deconstruction takes the position that the styles of thinking mentioned above are meta-narratives, i.e., sets of ideas connected by an inner logic which provide a

comprehensive explanation of reality from a specific point of reference. These meta-narratives are metaphorical constructions which mistake language for reality. Writers such as Derrida (1978) and Foucault (1972, 1974) argue that language does not refer to anything outside itself. Instead, what we conventionally call "reality" is a neverending series of representations that are defined by the text or discourse that is being presented. Deconstruction uses this view of language to expose the rhetorical devices by which meaning is created in traditional writing and discourse.

In the 20th century, Western philosophers have studied language in an effort to interpret our experience. The analytic tradition, most closely associated with Moore, Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein, imputes meaning to the words that we speak (Calas, 1987). As Jacques (1990) suggests that "(a)nalytical reasoning is grounded in the assumption that meaning is assigned to pre-existing categories by attaching names--tagging the thing with a metaphorical Post-it note (p. 10). Logical positivism, the theory to which *Administrative Behavior* acknowledges its epistemological commitment, is part of this analytical tradition. Calas (1987) notes:

The Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle--e.g. Schlick, Neurath, Carnap, Ayer--found wide support for their concerns in the writings of the analytic philosophers and in positivism. They placed all their confidence in knowledge through the model of the physical sciences and in attaining verifiable knowledge. They strived to reduce all the science to unity in physics, where the ultimate simples of knowledge could be found. Following the Fregian view, the fundamental assumption was that isomorphism existed between the structure

of scientific language and the structure of the world. Following Wittgenstein on the sayable (and disregarding the unsayable) they strived to attain the pictorial-logical form where the ultimate facts would rest (p. 35).

Derrida and Foucault also look to language the medium through which human beings structure their experience. However, Derrida and Foucault base their perspective, is based on the Saussurian tradition wherein language is seen as a closed system of signs wherein the words or signs were seen as arbitrary. Meaning was derived through the differences that between the elements of the language system. The following sections describe the tradition in which poststructuralist writers and Derrida in particular, ground their views.

Saussure and Semiology

The idea of language as a closed system is based on the synchronic perspective, which was first developed by Ferdinand de Saussure. His approach goes beyond seeing language as no more than the naming of objects. Instead it depicts language as creating objects. As suggested above, language for Saussure is a system of linguistic signs that express ideas. He argued that meaning is derived from the differences between the elements within that system. This approach is a non-metaphysical one in its emphasis on the metaphorical nature of human thought.

Traditional writing and discourse depicts words and objects as separate and temporally dependent, that is, the word comes after the object. Saussure's perspective is that the linguistic sign is composed of two integral and interdependent elements. He calls these elements of the linguistic sign *signified* and *signifier*. The separation of the sign into the signified (concept) and signifier (sound-image) is artificial in that the recognition of the sound-image and the evocation of the concept occur simultaneously.

Saussure sees the relationship between the signifier and the signified as arbitrary. Take the word "sister," for example. The signified (concept) "sister" has no intrinsic connection to the successive sounds that constitute the signifier (sound-image) s-i-s-t-e-r. According to Saussure (1966), this point is substantiated by the fact that the same signified "sister" is represented by different signifiers in different languages. In Portuguese it is represented by the signifier i-r-m-a, in Spanish h-e-r-m-a-n-a, and in French s-o-e-u-r.

While others such as Jakobson have debated about the arbitrariness of the sign (Hawkes, 1977), the distinction Saussure makes between signified and signifier aids tremendously in demystifying the idea that words have autonomous meanings outside a closed system of signs. In addition, it supports the idea that meaning is derived from difference, not from essence, which is crucial to the approach taken by the deconstructionists.

Temporal distinctions

Saussure argued that language is governed by two mutually exclusive yet intersecting dimensions of time. He proposed that language be understood synchronically, that is, as a system of contrasts at a particular moment, as well as diachronically, that is, as developing over time. In *Course in general linguistics* he stated these ideas as follows:

Synchronic linguistics will be concerned with the logical and psychological relations that bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the collective mind of the speakers.

Diachronic linguistics, on the contrary, will study relations that bind together successive terms not perceived by the collective mind but substituted for each other without forming a system (1966, p. 47).

The synchronic perspective of language has the effect of ungrounding language from the traditional relationship of word to object. Instead, words (signs) in a sentence are seen syntagmatically. That is, the meaning of an individual sign is dependent upon its relationship to all the other signs in that sentence. Thus, the system of language becomes like an endless chess game. Each move is different from the one that preceded it. At the same time, however, each move is related to the position of all the other pieces on the board. Marshall and White (1990) note that the set of contrasts generated by the syntagmatic relationship of the signs in a sentence are much like notes in a bar of music.

From the deconstructionist perspective meaning is never stationary. It is continuously deferred from moment to moment, with each moment containing traces of what is present at that very moment as well as what is missing. There can be no unique correspondence between a mental image (signifier) and the concept (signified) that it evokes. Meaning is elusive. It can only be traced through an unending chain of signifiers and signifieds, which in turn become signifiers for other signifieds.

For example, the dictionary includes not fully formed definitions of words but references to other words, which can in turn lead to other words in an endless chain of interconnected fragments of meaning. To further demonstrate this point, the following page shows the plethora of signifiers that are connected to **discretion**--a common term in the field of public administration.

In Table 4.0 column A lists two sets of synonyms for discretion. At the bottom of that column is its antonym **indiscretion**. Columns B and C give synonyms for **indiscretion**. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display some of the synonyms of discretion. **Judgment** and **inclination** lead to other synonyms, thus demonstrating the idea of an endless chain of signifiers. In addition, this example shows that through the chain of signifiers runs the trace of their opposites. In table 4.2 **judgment** and **bias** are ostensibly both synonyms of **discretion**. Paradoxically, these two terms are equally opposed to one another as they are similar to one another. At every moment in language meaning is deferred, modified, and folded back on its opposite.

TABLE 4.0

Synonyms for Discretion and Indiscretion

A	B	C
discretion	indiscretion	
caution	blunder	foolhardiness
judgment	breach	recklessness
sagacity	faux pas	temerity
sense	gaffe	
wisdom	impropriety	
inclination	naivete	
predilection	tactlessness	
preference	carelessness	
volition	folly	
will	imprudence	
discretion-(antonym)	audacity	
indiscretion	brashness	
	presumption	

TABLE 4.1

Synonyms for Discretion, Judgment, and Decision

A	B	C
discretion	judgment	decision
caution	conclusion	conclusion
judgment	decision	determination
sagacity	ruling	resolution
sense	sentence	settlement
wisdom	verdict	decree
inclination	analysis	finding
predilection	belief	judgment
preference	deduction	ruling
volition	estimate	verdict
will	interpretation	
discretion-(antonym)	opinion	
indiscretion	discernment	
	discretion	
	discrimination	
	sense	
	taste	

TABLE 4.2

Synonyms for **Discretion, Judgment, and Discrimination**

A	B	C
discretion	judgment	discrimination
caution	conclusion	discernment
judgment	decision	judgment
sagacity	ruling	refinement
sense	sentence	taste
wisdom	verdict	choice
inclination	analysis	discretion
predilection	belief	preference
preference	deduction	bias
volition	estimate	bigotry
will	interpretation	favoritism
discretion-(antonym)	opinion	intolerance
indiscretion	discernment	prejudice
	discretion	verdict
	discrimination	
	sense	
	taste	

Binary Oppositions

A common understanding of traditional discourse is that meaning is grounded in underlying oppositions or categories such as good/bad, mind/body, and male/female. In contrast, a deconstructionist reading seeks to reveal the instability of seemingly stable oppositions or categories, thereby highlighting the arbitrariness of the classification. A similar perspective has been taken by Lakoff (1987) and Nye (1990). These authors criticize the Greek tradition of logic and classification.

The well-known anthropologist Mary Douglas also provides a powerful argument showing that traditional categories are based not on stable meanings but on the cross referencing of terms, which ultimately rely on one word that transcends all others. In *How Institutions Think* (1987), based on a series of lectures given at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, she argues that institutions, and knowledge--by extension--are based on social conventions that at their core are arbitrary. Further, a system of knowledge that is supported by oppositional thinking contains no essential truths but merely a system of self-referential terms that validate one another.

Douglas argues that all explanations usually rely on some metaphysical or transcendental signified, which is understood as an *a priori* truth. Upon closer

scrutiny, the metaphysical explanation really amounts to a set of metaphorical analogies that confer the status of "truth" to this arbitrary convention. She notes:

There needs to be an analogy by which the formal structure of a crucial set of relations is found in the physical world, or in the supernatural world, or in eternity, anywhere, so long as it is not seen as a socially contrived arrangement. When the analogy is applied back and forth from one set of social relations to another and from these back to nature, its recurring formal structure becomes easily recognized and endowed with self-validating truth (1986, p. 48).

Douglas' argument harkens back to Saussure's point that words do not have intrinsic meanings in and of themselves. Meaning is given through the overlapping differences within the closed system of language. Moreover, the convention which establishes the elements of that system is arbitrary.

Sarup (1989) notes that binary oppositions represent a style of thought that is typical of ideologies. Strict categories between what is true and what is false, what is included and what is excluded, mark the boundaries of the ideology. These oppositions in turn, can be traced to a term that is beyond definition.

Beyond Saussure

Saussure's most important insight was to show that language is not form but substance. The Saussurian influence led to the study of other phenomena as systems. Structuralism is one such school of thought that has its roots in the Saussurian influence. It sought to explain human behavior by examining rituals

and cultural conventions. For example, the well-known anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1955) studied human behavior by examining the structure of human conventions such as kinship systems, totemism, and myth. Jacques Lacan's (1966) work on Freud shows how the unconscious is structured like language. Barthes (1972) emphasized the structure of cultural artifacts and literary criticism. The most important aspect of these works is that the structuralist perspective refuses to look outside the text for an explanation of the phenomenon.

Sarup (1989) sets forth four basic premises of the structuralist project:

- A shift from conscious linguistic phenomena to unconscious structures.
- A focus on the analysis of a system.
- Terms that are not independent but relational.
- An aim toward discovering general laws.

Authors such as Derrida and Foucault were influenced by the structuralist perspective but have questioned the possibility of attaining universal categories of human behavior. Their views are categorized as "poststructuralist." Hence deconstruction is defined as a poststructuralist strategy.

Jacques Derrida

In the past fifteen years, the writings of Jacques Derrida have had a tremendous impact on literary criticism and the philosophy of social science.

Through his program (pro-gramme) of grammatology, Derrida presents a strategy to re-examine the styles of thought inherited from the Greek philosophical tradition. Three major themes that he addresses are (1) logocentrism, (2) the "death of metaphysics," and (3) *Sous Rature*--placing the concept of meaning under erasure.

Logocentrism

The underlying metaphor of Western culture is the idea that as human beings we can be present to ourselves and as a result can be certain of our own existence. Derrida calls this assumed capacity for being able to transparently represent our inner being logocentrism. Rosenau (1992) defines logocentrism as follows:

logocentric - an adjective used to describe systems of thought that claim legitimacy by reference to external, universally truthful propositions (p. xii).

As argued by Derrida, logocentrism stems from the classical world view that argues for an independent world separate from and prior to human experience (similar to the classical view of language). This independent world has a natural and logically definable order to it. As such, events in the world can be explained through words, knowledge, and beliefs that are understood to have innate properties. Over time, philosophers have seen it as their task to prove that

the processes of the mind mirror the processes of the natural world (Rorty, 1979).

Benhabib (1984) expands on this view. He notes:

The question of classical epistemology from Descartes to Hume, from Locke to Kant was how to make congruent the order of representations in consciousness with the order of representations outside the self. Caught in the prison-house of its own consciousness, the modern epistemological subject tried to recover the world well lost. The options were not many: either one reassured oneself that the world would be gained by the direct and immediate evidence of the sense (empiricism) or one insisted that the rationality of the creator or the harmony of mind and nature would guarantee the correspondence between the two orders of representations (rationalism).

Whether empiricist or rationalist, modern epistemologists agreed that the task of knowledge, whatever its origins, was to build an adequate representation of things. In knowledge, mind had to 'mirror' nature (pp. 106-107).

Descartes' famous quote, "I think; therefore I am," is the seminal example of this concept. Descartes tells us that even when doubting his own existence, his doubting (thinking) assures him that he exists. Thus, the assumption of Cartesianism is that consciousness is assured through an inner voice that tells us we are experiencing a distinct reality that is clear and transparent representation of that natural world. Derrida's completely disagrees with the Cartesian view. In one of his earliest works, *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida critiques this same notion of self-presence that is found in Husserl's work. Pure experience--the essence of the phenomenological stance--is assured through the notion that Husserl can hear his inner voice. In other words, consciousness is assured by the

"truth" of the inner voice (the inner soliloquy). This aspect of Husserl's work derives from Descartes. Thus, both Descartes' search for consciousness and Husserl's search for the pure form of expression are a search for "that which is immediately present." In *Writing and Difference* (1978b) Derrida argues that these views are characteristic of the "metaphysics of presence" that suffuses Western thought.

The Death of Metaphysics

As stated above, Derrida argues that the history of traditional Western thought is suffused with what he calls the "metaphysics of presence." This perspective contains two important points. First, Derrida critiques the Cartesian view that human subjectivity with its capacity for self-reflection is at the center of any explanation of reality. Second, Derrida argues that in the era of logocentrism, speech has been privileged over writing.

Derrida argues that Descartes' proof of existence through the notion of self-presence is not certain at all. Most thinking, Derrida says, falls back on the relationship between certainty and self presence. For example, the word "now" implies that I am talking about the present moment in which I am experiencing the world by seeing, writing, and perceiving. In that "now" moment, the concept of presence signifies a timeless concept in which "I" as human subject am always present to the self. Derrida argues that this is not a function of seemingly

transcendent reality such as a timeless presence, but is merely a function of language. In refuting the transcendent notion of presence, Derrida tells us that traditional thought privileges speech over writing. Speech reaffirms the immediacy of presence and thus reaffirms that spoken meaning is a transparent medium for one's inner voice.

It is a function of language because the sign presence cannot refer to something outside or prior to the closed system of differences. Through an interesting and complicated strategy, Derrida shows that the self-identity that we impute from being present to ourselves can be deconstructed.

For Derrida, Rorty, and other writers, this critique is related to the logocentrism of Western thought. Derrida makes the argument that writing has existed (before the age of logos) and can expand our possibilities for thought. Derrida's stance emphasizes the iterability of writing, a situation where writing begets more writing. This view is in contrast to the traditional view, which tries to enclose knowledge. Culler (1982) notes that "philosophy characteristically hopes to solve problems, to show how things are, or to untangle a difficulty, and thus to put an end to writing on a topic by getting it right" (1982, p. 90).

Sous Rature

One of the strategies of deconstruction is to call into question words that infer transcendence. This strategy is known as "sous rature" or putting a term

"under erasure." This strategy is introduced by Jacques Derrida, but the intellectual debt is to Martin Heidegger's well-known text *Being and Time* (1962). Heidegger states that when language can be separated from metaphysics, it is possible to see language as a system of signs or marks on a page without metaphysical connotation.

Procedurally, putting a term under erasure is to cross it out but let both the additional markings and the original term stand as part of the text. The classic example for which Heidegger developed this technique was for the term being, which he wrote as ~~Being~~. He did this to show that the definition of this term was not adequate to express its full meaning which, nevertheless, needed to be expressed.

By putting the term under erasure, Heidegger calls attention to the notion that being cannot be discussed separately from the subjectivity (the implied self) that is integral to its definition. In his work Heidegger argued for a separation between the linguistic sign being and the metaphysical subjectivity of the implied self. Heidegger put the term being under erasure to highlight the metaphysical or transcendental aspect of the term. He identified the term ~~Being~~ as a founding word that does not derive from any other word but comes into language fully formed as both word and meaning.

The deconstructionist position holds that there are no such founding words. The reason for putting a term under erasure is to show that it is not fully

formed. Any sign is a combination of the signifier that appears to be there and the trace of what is not there. Other writers have adapted the idea of putting a term under erasure by identifying the "privileged terms" of a text. In the next section this idea will be explored in more detail.

Up to this point, this chapter has addressed the theoretical assumptions of the deconstructive stance. The next section explores some methodological tactics that correspond to the deconstructive stance explained above. These tactics will be used in Chapter 5 to deconstruct *Administrative Behavior*. In presenting these ideas, I rely on the works of Calas (1987); Calas and Smircich (1988, 1991); Culler (1982); Jacques (1990); and Martin (1990).

Methodological Tactics

Privileged Terms

One way to deconstruct the certainty--the idea that there is one unique original interpretation--that is projected in a discourse is to look for privileged terms. Privileged terms define a dominant discourse because they are words or concepts that contain the inner logic for the set of ideas being presented in the text. They serve as an anchor for the explanations that emanate from this "founding" word. These privileged terms define a discourse by presenting themselves as prior to the discourse to which they authorize meaning. In

transcending the discourse presented, they serve as pillars of certainty. Sarup (1989) notes:

Western philosophy has...[relied on] a belief in some ultimate 'word', presence, essence, truth or reality which will act as the foundation of all our thought, language, and experience (1989, p. 40).

Privileged terms are transcendent, beyond definition. In that sense, their meaning carries the illusion of certainty.

Privileged terms also are signaled by their frequent appearance in a text, yet they are introduced without definition. In *Administrative Behavior*, "rationality" is one such founding word. It exists prior to the system which author-izes rationality as the basis for administrative action. Similarly, the terms "choice," "decision," and "expert" are also privileged in *Administrative Behavior*.

The writings of Jacques Lacan provide another example of the identification of privileged terms. His focus on male power (signified by the phallus) in Western civilization suggests that the phallus is a transcendental signifier. In broad terms, the *phallus* serves as the representative of the dominant symbol of patriarchal culture. Silverman (1983) notes:

...the phallus is a signifier for the cultural privileges and positive values which define male subjectivity within patriarchal society, but from which the female subject remains isolated. It is thus closely aligned with two other very privileged terms within the Lacanian grammar, 'symbolic father' and 'Name of the Father.' All three are signifiers of paternal power and potency.

The Lacanian view is well implicated in Chapter VI of *Administrative Behavior* where Simon compares the behavior of children with the behavior of adults. Simon argues that it is rationality--the critical component to his view of organizational life--that distinguishes children from adults. Appropriate behavior in organizations requires a transition from the world of play into the world of law, rationality, knowledge, and power, which are all aspects of the culture represented by the phallus.

It is important to note that the identification of a set of privileged terms emphasizes less the normative implications than the explanatory power that the perspective provides. By highlighting terms that are privileged, one can see the way in which language structures reality.

Column Comparisons

As an additional tactic to highlight the privileged terms of a discourse, this dissertation employs a "column comparison." The column comparison provides a way to see the privileged terms and their opposites. Throughout the next chapter of this dissertation, I compare opposite terms as a way to highlight the structure of the discourse that is presented in *Administrative Behavior*. Below is a brief example from Mary Douglas' *How Institutions Think* (1986).

Analogy with the complementarity of the right and left hand and the complementarity of gender provide great rhetorical resources (Needham, 1973). So the equation 'female is to male as left is to right,' reinforces the social principle with a physical analogy. Though the division of labor in itself is not going to take us far into the organizing of society, this one analogy is a basic building block. For example the following:

female	male
left	right
people	king

...In modern industrial society the analogical relation of hand to head was frequently used to justify class structure, the inequalities of the educational system, and the division of labor between the manual and intellectual worker (p. 49).

Applying the "Logic" of the Supplement

As seen earlier in this chapter, terms which seem irrevocably in opposition to one another are viewed from the deconstructionist perspective as being interrelated and self-referential. Derrida extends this idea by introducing the notion of *supplementarity*. He endeavors to show that given a pair of opposing terms, the term which seems to be subordinated and marginalized both gives meaning to the dominant term and stands alone based on its own definition. Derrida argues that the marginalized term *supplements* its opposite.

Webster's (1973) defines a supplement as "something that completes or makes an addition." Culler (1982) points out:

The supplement is an inessential extra, added to something complete in itself, but the supplement is added in order to complete, to compensate for a lack of what was supposed to

be complete in itself. These two different meanings of *supplement* are linked in a powerful logic, and in both meanings the supplement is presented as an exterior, foreign to the 'essential' nature of that to which it is added or in which it is substituted (p. 103).

The "logic of the supplement," as Sturrock (1977) puts it, is that "the distinguishing characteristics of the marginal are in fact the central object of consideration" (p. 168). The effect is to question the univocal status of any text, which enriches a discourse by reintroducing terms that had been pushed to the margins. In addition, it reinforces the point that words derive meaning not from their relationship to external referents but from their relationship to their opposites.

Chapter IV of *Administrative Behavior* contains a good example of the notion of supplementarity. The text flirts with the suggestion that the ideas emerging from the unconscious serve as a supplement to mathematics, the most logical and rational of languages.

Denotative Language

The emphasis that deconstruction places on writing is one where multiple interpretations of a text are possible. One of the arguments of the analytic tradition and of positivism is that words are denotative. Objective meaning is imputed to words as opposed to connotative language, which refers to an implied or associated idea (Webster's, 1973).

The premise of positivism is that inquiry into the social world can mirror the methods of discovery used in natural science. Special emphasis is placed on scientific language, which is designed to replicate the structure of the natural world (Calas, 1987; Kolakowski, 1968). Yet how sure are we that words have precise and unique definitions? Even the simplest exercise, such as defining a chair, shows that definitions are more ambiguous than some are wont to claim. (Must it have four legs? Are ergonomic platform seats included?) This issue is especially important in *Administrative Behavior* because the preface claims the book's goal is to construct a vocabulary that transparently represents how an administrative organization looks and operates (1957, p. xiv).

Deconstruction emphasizes the instability of language. In many cases, a text includes sections where the writing lays claim to logical arguments and denotative facts but appeals to rhetoric and naturalizing metaphors, which connote a "truth" that is claimed to be empirically verifiable.

Intertextuality

One of the main themes that has been presented in this dissertation is that "nothing exists outside the text." What constitutes a text is not only written documents, but all forms of communication, institutions, and other repositories of ideas, as well as events that occur in the culture. They are all structured by language. As a result, both the writing and the reading of a text are influenced by

previous texts that exist in the culture. The history of other texts structure the expectations and awareness that a reader brings to a text.

Given this point, many postmodern authors employ "reading effects" (Calas, 1987; Calas and Smircich, 1988, 1991). Reading effects incorporate many strategies including the weaving of different texts in a "dialogue" with one another. They have the effect of dislodging one's taken-for-granted orientation to a text. This style is consistent with several of Derrida's works including *Spurs* (1979) and *Glas* (1986). Kamuf (1991) describes the style of reading effects employed in *Glas*:

On its large, squared pages, two wide columns face off in different type: smaller, denser on the left, larger, more spaced out on the right. Thumb through the pages and you will see a third type, the smallest of the three, cutting into the column at various points, forming inscribed incisions either along its outermost edge, or down in the center. There are no notes, no chapter headings, no table of contents. Each column begins in what appears to be the middle of the sentence and ends, 283 pages further on, without any final punctuation.

What is going on here? Clearly many things at once, too many ever to allow anything but a very partial description. On every page, *Glas* demonstrates the borderless conditions of text, and their susceptibility to the most unexpected encounters (p. 315).

In the next chapter, I employ this strategy to highlight the commonalities between the discourse of *Administrative Behavior* with the discourse of the scientific management movement. This tactic is particularly effective in light of

the emphasis Simon places on differentiating his work from earlier perspectives in organization theory (Simon, 1958).

Etymological Analysis

As part of the tactic of intertextuality, the history of a specific word is given along with its definition to clarify the way in which the author is attempting to use that term. Generally, the etymology of two opposing terms is compared. In this dissertation many definitions are highlighted to jar the reader from relying on taken-for-granted meanings.

Unified Subject

"I am who I am!" is an expression of individualism that seems essential to our 20th century consciousness. This individualism has been prominent since the Enlightenment. As we have seen, the idea of the self as a unified, coherent subject is embodied in the Cartesian revelation of self-presence, which seemingly proves that each of us has a unique identity. As an author, this unique identity "author-izes" one authoritative voice that emanates from the text. Yet in most writing, one can find multiple subjects in the text.

I agree with Jacques (1990) who notes that most texts denote a rational actor who has control over his/her environment. Upon closer look one finds many "actors." In *Administrative Behavior*, implied subjectivity is given to: (1) the formal

organization, (2) the researcher, (3) the phenomenon of rationality, (4) the role of the expert, (5) the technology of administration, and (6) science as the legitimating authority.

The lack of a unified subject has also been called the "death of the subject." Postmodernist writers such as Derrida and Foucault argue that since the Enlightenment and particularly since the beginning the 19th century "man appears as an object of knowledge and a subject that knows" (Foucault, 1970, p. 312). Derrida (1978a) argues that the self is the transcendental signifier of the modern era. It is the organizing concept around which we have framed our modern existence. Rorty (1989) writes in opposition to the "general temptation to think of the world, or the human self, as possessing an intrinsic nature or essence" (p. 6).

The deconstructionist perspective argues that as reality is structured through language, so too is the human self or subject a creation of language. In that context the rational, individual agent, the modern subject, recedes in the discourse of language, signs, and symbols. Calas (1987) argues that this view leads not to a deterministic, Skinnerian view but to "the imperative of understanding ourselves and our possibilities past the immediate appearances of 'the self' and its 'unique place and competence'...we are traversed by the multiple discourses of our times. We are these discourses."

Examining the Silences

This tactic asks: What is not being said? Whose voice is not being heard? What parts of the script are being written out? The aim of deconstruction is to let other voices be heard by showing the instability of the prevailing viewpoint.

A reader might ask "What is the central theme that dominates this text?" In *Administrative Behavior*, for example, the dominant view of the text contains epistemological assumptions made about organizational behavior. Conscious thought is presented as the only explanation for the conduct of administrative decisionmaking. The reader should also ask "What is being left out?" By posing this question, debates of the period in which the book was written may be brought to light. In the case of *Administrative Behavior*, Simon's emphasis on conscious thought is presented to the exclusion of the entire psycho-analytic perspective. As a result, a deconstructive reading of *Administrative Behavior* might explore the ways that this psycho-analytic discourse is suppressed.

The Silencing of Women

Before discussing the next methodological tactic, it is important to note that part of "examining the silences" is to consider that the voices of women are generally excluded from traditional writings in organization theory. Even within organizational settings, gender conflict issues are suppressed, obfuscated, and blurred between the lines. It is not uncommon for women to report that during

a meeting their ideas are often ignored, dismissed out of hand, or reinterpreted for them. In addition, scientific or technical work tasks are typically assumed to be out of the normal range of activities that women can perform, regardless of their academic training or professional experience.

In reading *Administrative Behavior*, the lack of women's voices appears in the assumptions that are made about organizational behavior and also in the forms of organizational communication that are described. As a result, one often finds a counter-narrative in the assertions that are made throughout the text. The search for this counter-narrative is part of the examination of the silences.

Contradictions and Disruptions

Contradictions and disruptions appear as words, phrases, or ideas that contradict the flow of the argument of the text that surrounds them. They are akin to an unconscious outburst. As noted earlier in this chapter, any text is a product of different discourses. Traditional writing and discourse seeks to reduce the ambiguity of the set of ideas being presented. It does this through the structure of the discourse. At the same time it censors the "self-errant" ideas that do not fit into the logical scheme (Cooper, 1989).

An excellent example can be found in Chapter V of *Administrative Behavior*. Nestled in the middle of the chapter is a tale ostensibly about statistical correlation and the problem of discovering what factors are and are not important

to any given problem. Instead, Simon recounts a revealing story about "old maids" and "spinsters" in the English countryside. In addition to deviating from the proposed rigor and scientific tenor of *Administrative Behavior*, the story suggests the power of scientists, who in the context of their objectivity, ponder about old maids. The text also suggests the power of scientists (men) over women in the scientists' ability to treat women as "spurious" things or as the cause of "devious consequences." Contradictions or disruptions in a text occur at a point where an underlying tension threatens to "surface" or create instability.

Textual Taboos

In an approach to reading that emphasizes the deferment of meaning in a text, one begins to notice words, phrases, and sentences that are alien to the text. These phrases suggest some of the taboos about the dominant discourse. Typically these words and ideas are at odds with the norms of the mainstream perspective. Martin (1989) notes that in a typical business environment especially at the upper levels of management and in the inner circles of a board room, a "pregnant executive" does not fit in. A strong indication of a term or idea that is "taboo" is that it lacks metaphorical quality. It can never be synonymous nor reinforce the central meaning that is being presented in the text. In the case of the pregnant executive, the term may serve to extend the definition of executive

but not to serve as a term within the discourse of traditional organizational experience.

Examples of textual taboos can be found throughout *Administrative Behavior*. For example, in Chapter VIII, the idea of a natural leader is a textual taboo because he/she is seen as a threat to the formal organization. Simon argues that the "natural leader" relies on an informal communication network and through that network has the power to subvert the plans and goals of the formal organization. A similar distinction is often made between a leader and a manager. While a leader successfully employs persuasion and charisma, he/she may not always have the goals of the organization foremost in his/her mind.

Metaphors, Metonymy, and Multiple Meanings

Deconstruction emphasizes the idea that the meaning of language is constantly being deferred and changed. Calas (1987) notes that the idea of metaphor is a modern notion. Through the use of metaphor, stable meanings are reinforced through different examples that share the same identity as the concept being emphasized.

The postmodern notion of meaning emphasizes metonymy, the contiguity of terms as opposed to the likeness of a shared meaning. Lakoff (1987) notes that in the study of language, metonymic models contradict the positivist idea that words refer to specific objects. He suggests:

According to objectivist cognition, the only true concepts are those that represent external reality, that is, those that mirror nature. *Metonymic models do not mirror nature* (italics added). If metonymic models are real--if they are used to make judgements and draw inferences...then they constitute counter evidence to objectivist cognition. They constitute a kind of conceptual resource that is not objectivist (p. 204).

Calas (1987) argues that metonymy allows one to develop multiple meanings as opposed to reinforcing one stable meaning. As in the example above, the idea of a pregnant executive extends the meaning of executive. Thus the idea of metonymy focuses on the contiguous or syntagmatic relationship between words in a sentence. As Hawkes (1977) notes, in the sentence "'the boy kicked the girl', the meaning 'unrolls' as each word follows its predecessor and is not complete until the final word comes into place"(p. 27).

The following example contrasts the modern idea of metaphor with the postmodern notion of metonymy. An organizational metaphor used in *Administrative Behavior* is the metaphor of a system kept in harmony through a natural equilibrium. This metaphor is representative of the school of thought known as Systems Theory (Harmon and Mayer, 1986). Employing the idea of metonymy, one might conceive of many systems operating simultaneously but not in conjunction with one another. Alternatively, one might see the purpose of an organizational system not achieving an output as the modern metaphor would suggest, but a never-ending cycle of performance.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter I have provided a context through which the deconstructive stance can be understood. The richness of this stance is that it provides a strategy for looking anew at ideas and intellectual positions that have been taken for granted as stable and axiomatic. Deconstruction provides a framework for re-examining taken for granted assumptions, not in order to *destroy* them but to explore the limits that these traditional discourses have imposed, and also to extend the possibility of new meanings and other discourses. In this next chapter, I review *Administrative Behavior* using the strategy of deconstruction. The methodological tactics I have described above will form the basis for the review.

CHAPTER 5

DECONSTRUCTING ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: HERBERT SIMON AS THE WIZARD OF OZ

This chapter is a reading of *Administrative Behavior* that is approached from the stance of deconstruction. A non-traditional format is used where pages are divided into two columns. On the left are key passages from *Administrative Behavior*, chosen with two themes in mind. These themes are: (1) Simon's view of the human subject, and (2) the logic and structure of rational organization. On the right are the *reading effects* created through the use of the methodological tactics described in the previous chapter.

Throughout the chapter, the possibility of multiple meanings is explored by presenting alternative definitions to some of the privileged terms in *Administrative Behavior*. In addition, mimicry and marginal conversations are used to give voice to elements of the text that are taken for granted. Overall, the approach in this chapter is to seek to destabilize the accepted meanings of the text and encourage the reader to reread and re-present it in new ways.

CHAPTER II

SOME PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY

The Diagnosis of Administrative Situations

Before any positive suggestions can be made, it is necessary to digress a bit, and to consider more closely the exact nature of the propositions of administrative theory. The theory of administration is concerned with how an organization should be constructed and operated in order to accomplish its work efficiently. A fundamental principle of administration, which follows almost immediately from the

(Diagnosis: "the art or act of identifying a disease from its signs and symptoms"; [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

In this example a form of etymological analysis is used. Typically, definitions of opposing words are compared to reveal the way in which the definitions of the opposing terms are contained in their opposites. Here I highlight the definition of diagnosis to call the reader's attention to the analogy between medical science and organizational science that is seen throughout Administrative Behavior. These metaphors reinforce the organizational surgery that is proposed through the use of the decision premise.

rational character of "good" administration, is that among several alternatives involving the same expenditure the one should always be selected which leads to the greatest accomplishment of administrative objectives; and among several alternatives that lead to the same accomplishment the one should be selected which involves the least expenditure.

Good character of rational administration and the rational character of good administration. While rationality is an apparently objective construct, only rational administration can be "good" administration.

Since this "principle of efficiency" is characteristic of any activity that attempts rationally to maximize the attainment of certain ends with the use of scarce means,

it is as characteristic of economic theory as it is of administrative theory. The "administrative man" takes his place along side the classical "economic man" (p. 38-39).

For both economics and administration only one solution is possible. The solution is that scarce means must be allocated "efficiently." This view reflects the mindset that science is the most rational inquiry and is central to the way life is structured. Simon based his views on logical positivism, the main premise of which uses scientific inquiry to develop "the solution," that is, the algorithm that explains the one correct way to allocate scarce means. Later in this chapter Simon argues that "two persons given the same knowledge and information can rationally decide only on the same course of action." Thus, the doctrine of positivism is the doctrine of the algorithm.

The writing calls for "examining the silences." Economic man and administrative man are presented as polar extremes of the spectrum of human behavior. But this spectrum is limited to consciously intentional behavior. The role of the unconscious exhibited in "Freudian" man and "Jungian" man, as well as the retrospective sensemaking of "Weickian" man are conspicuously absent from the discourse.

Actually, the "principle" of efficiency should be considered as a definition rather than a principle: it is a definition of what is meant by "good" or "correct" administrative behavior. It does not tell *how* accomplishments are to be maximized, but merely states that this maximization is the aim of administrative activity,

Efficiency is marked as a privileged term which provides administrative behavior with its essential nature.

In this case, efficiency is both a principle and a definition.

After reviewing the definitions listed below, one might conclude that it is the "habitual devotion to the right principle" that defines "the essential nature of administrative behavior."

(Principle: "1 a: comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, assumption; b (1): a rule or code of conduct, (2) habitual devotion to right principles;")

(Definition: "a word or phrase expressing the essential nature of a person or thing;")

(Definitive: "1: serving to provide the final solution; 2: authoritative or apparently exhaustive;" [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

and that administrative theory must disclose under what conditions the maximization takes place (p. 39).

Maximization - stressing the maxim the general truth, the fundamental truth.

Perhaps the simplest method of approach is to consider the single member of the administrative organization, and ask what the limits are to the quantity and quality of his output. These limits include (a) limits on his ability to *perform*, and (b) limits on his ability to *make correct decisions*. To the extent that these limits are removed, the administrative organization approaches its goal of high efficiency.

Two persons given the same knowledge and information, can rationally decide only upon the same course of action. Hence, administrative theory must be interested in the factors that will determine with what

skills, values, and knowledge

the organization member undertakes his work. These are the "limits" to rationality with which the principles of administration must deal (pp. 39-40).

The single member is a single cog with limited rationality. It is around the limited cog-nition of this single member that the decision premise must be designed.

On the one hand, infinite output is assumed. On the other hand human beings have mechanical and cognitive limits. Thus, the way that the mechanical and cognitive limits are removed is by reducing the complexity, or, more appropriately, increasing the simplicity!

Here we see an example of the seemingly unified subject. However, administrative theory is an entity to which subjectivity is attributed. Rationality is presented as a privileged term.

The combination of skills, values, and knowledge strongly represent the view of progress that is at the foundation of modernist thinking. Lyotard is among the most assertive of the postmodernist writers who suggest that the modernist view of progress is a search for something sublime. Simon makes the case that the combination of the correct set of skills, values, and knowledge will significantly advance the progress of administrative theory.

On the one side, the individual is limited by those skills, habits, and reflexes which are no longer in the realm of the conscious. His performance, for example may be limited by his manual dexterity or his reaction time or his strength. His decision-making processes may be limited by the speed of his mental processes, his skill in elementary arithmetic, and so forth.

In this area, the principles of administration must be concerned with the physiology of the human body, the laws of skill-training, and of habit. This is the field that has been most successfully cultivated by the followers of Taylor, and in which has been developed time-and-motion study and the therblig (p. 40).

In this section, intertextuality is employed as a tactic that creates a kind of reading effect. As noted earlier, all texts contain traces of previous texts. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, it was pointed out that as opposed to most of his contemporaries in public administration, Simon's work points back toward the writers of the classical period. The passage below, quoted from The Principles of Scientific Management, suggests one view that Simon and Taylor both share.

"Now one of the very first requirements for a man who is fit to handle pig iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type. The man who is mentally alert and intelligent is for this very reason entirely unsuited to what would, for him, be the grinding monotony of work of this character. Therefore the workman who is best suited to handling pig iron is unable to understand the real science of doing this class of work. He is so stupid that the word 'percentage' has no meaning to him, and he must consequently be trained by a man more intelligent than himself into the habit of working in accordance with the laws of this science before he can be successful" (Taylor, 1947, p. 59).

Here also is another example of the search for a unified subject. Subjectivity is imputed to the principles of administration, which are a surrogate for SCIENCE.

"Decision-making processes may be limited by the speed of his mental processes."

The sentence above is taken from the first paragraph of the left hand column. In that sentence, the linear measurement of the speed of one's mental processes emphasizes a cause-and-effect approach to thinking, planning, and communicating. The hegemony of this view is disrupted by the introduction of such terms as self-reflection, intuition, silence, retrospective sensemaking, or unconscious processes. These terms are conspicuous by their absence.

On a second side, the individual is limited by his values and those conceptions of purpose which influence him in making his decisions. If his loyalty to the organization is high, his decisions may evidence sincere acceptance of the objectives set for the organization; if that loyalty is lacking, personal motives may interfere with his administrative efficiency. If his loyalties are attached to the bureau by which he is employed, he may sometimes make

decisions that are inimical to the larger unit of which the bureau is a part. In this area the principles of administration must be concerned with the determinants of loyalty and morale, with leadership and initiative, and with the influences that determine where the individual's organization loyalties will be attached (p. 40).

On a third side, the individual is limited by the extent of his knowledge of things relevant to his job. This applies both to the basic knowledge required in decisionmaking--a bridge designer must know the fundamentals of mechanics--and to the information that is required to make his decisions appropriate to the given situation...

Below is another example of intertextuality. The discourses of scientific management are so profoundly inscribed in our culture are again interwoven with the discussion on the left side of the page.

"Now in essence scientific management involves a complete mental revolution on the part of the working man engaged in any particular establishment or industry--a complete mental revolution toward their work, toward their fellow men, and toward their employers" (Taylor, 1947, p. 87).

Decisions and decision-making are privileged terms. The power of privilegedness comes in its status as an objectively neutral construct. It is beyond definition. Yet, in this case, decisionmaking is not an objective act. The text informs us that "correct" decisions are made when the mind is in the proper frame of reference, that is, when the mind is "organizationally loyal."

This is perhaps the *terra incognita* of administrative theory, and undoubtedly its careful exploration will cast great light on the proper applications of the proverbs of administration.

This section about virgin territory brings out the notion of the male explorer (Jacques, 1990). This view is emphasized even stronger in Chapter VII. In the passage on the left side of the page, the implication is the superiority of the masculine method of getting to the truth, at least in this particular case.

CHAPTER IV

RATIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR

Definitions of Rationality

A principal aim of this chapter has been to build the foundation upon which a clear understanding of the concept of "rationality" could be erected. Clarity does not necessarily imply simplicity, however. Roughly speaking, rationality is concerned with the selection of preferred behavior alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby consequences can be evaluated. Does this mean that the process of adaptation must be conscious, or are unconscious processes included as well? It has been shown that many of the steps in mathematical invention--than which there can presumably be nothing more rational--are subconscious; and this is certainly true of the simpler processes of equation-solving.

Moreover, if consciousness is not stipulated as an element of rationality, are only deliberate processes of adaptation admitted, or non-deliberate ones as well?

This is an example of a column comparison. Based on the view presented in Administrative Behavior, the preferred system of behavior is based on the terms in the right hand column.

<i>emotion</i>	<i>rationality</i>
<i>ambiguity</i>	<i>clarity</i>
<i>shifting</i>	<i>foundation</i>
<i>passivity</i>	<i>selection</i>
<i>reactions</i>	<i>consequences</i>

I have noted elsewhere that terms which oppose one another actually are contained in their opposites. In any discourse one term will be privileged and its opposite will be subordinated or marginalized. Derrida (1976) argues that the marginalized term actually supplements the dominant term.

In this example, the text flirts with the idea that ideas emerging from the unconscious, serve as a supplement to mathematics, the most logical and rational of languages.

Here a dangerous supplement is played. Perhaps math is not rational, but is subjective, intuitive, magical, and emerging from the unconscious. It is dangerous because it threatens the coherence of the norm.

The typist trains herself to strike a particular key in response to the stimulus of a particular letter (pp. 75-76).

Once learned the act is unconscious but deliberate. On the other hand, any person instinctively withdraws a figure that has been burned. This is "rational" in the sense that it serves a useful purpose, but it is certainly neither a conscious or a deliberate adaptation.

Shall we, moreover, call a behavior "rational" when it is in error, but only because the information on which it is based is faulty? When a subjective test is applied, it is rational for an individual to take medicine for a disease. When an objective test is applied, it is rational only if the medicine is in fact efficacious.

Finally, in terms of what objectives, whose values, shall rationality be judged? Is behavior of an individual in an organization rational when it serves his personal objectives, or when it serves the organizational objectives? Two soldiers sit in a trench opposite a machine gun nest. One stays under cover. The other at the cost of his life, destroys the machine-gun nest with a grenade. What is rational? (p. 76).

Typing is an act that does not require thinking. It is a skill that is an "unconscious" act, generated by the combination of stimulus and response. It is typically done by women.

This passage suggests a "Triangle of Enlightenment" composed of instinct, conscious intention, and adaptation.

Lacan argues that the discourses of Western civilization emphasize male power. Terms such as law, power and rationality are privileged. From the Lacanian perspective the values by which rationality should be judged in this case are self-evident.

Perhaps the only way to avoid, or clarify, these complexities is to use the term "rational" in conjunction with the appropriate adverbs. Then a decision may be called "objectively" rational if in fact it is the correct behavior for maximizing given values in a given situation. It is "subjectively" rational if it maximizes attainment relative to the actual knowledge of the subject. It is "consciously" rational to the degree that the adjustment of means to ends is a conscious process. It is "deliberately" rational to the degree that the adjustment of means to ends has been deliberately brought about (by the individual or by the organization). A decision is "organizationally" rational if it is oriented to the organization's goals; it is "personally" rational if it is oriented to the individual's goals. In the ensuing discussion, the term "rational" will always be qualified by one of these adverbs unless the meaning is clear from the context (pp. 76-77).

THE SIX MASKS OF RATIONALITY

objective
subjective
conscious
deliberate
organizational
personal

Presence and Absence--All the listed terms are subordinated to rationality, yet rationality derives its meaning from all the other terms.

CHAPTER V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

If the psychological environment of choice, the "givens," were determined in some accidental fashion, then adult behavior would show little more pattern of integration than the behavior of children. A higher degree of rationality can however be achieved, because the environment of choice can be deliberately modified. Partly this is an individual matter: the individual places himself in a situation where certain stimuli and certain items of information will impinge on him. To a very important extent, however, it is an organizational matter. One function that organization performs is to place the organization members in a psychological environment that will

adapt their decisions to the organization objectives, and will provide them with the information needed to make those decisions correctly (p. 79).

Determine, integrate, achieve, modify, adapt, and perform." These verbs all signify devotion to a system in which choice, decision, and rationality are given privileged status.

The subjectivity of the individual is acknowledged and then subjectivity is redefined through the organizational member. A transformation in the name of progress is required: the transformation from boy to man. The oppositions are well implied:

<i>boys</i>	<i>men</i>
<i>primitive</i>	<i>advanced</i>
<i>body</i>	<i>mind</i>
<i>penis</i>	<i>phallus</i>
<i>defer</i>	<i>choose</i>
<i>ambiguity</i>	<i>clarity</i>

The innate capacity to adapt is stressed. For Simon evolutionary survival is accorded to those with the highest level of rationality. The most rational are the most successful at adaptation.

Incompleteness of Knowledge

The first limitation upon rationality in actual behavior has been mentioned in Chapter IV.

Rationality implies a complete, and unattainable, knowledge of the exact consequences of each choice.

In actuality, the human being never has more than a fragmentary knowledge of the conditions surrounding his action, nor more than

a slight insight into the regularities and laws that would permit him to induce future consequences from a knowledge of present circumstances (pp. 81-83).

The discourse of boundaries and limitations is employed.

The terms in the right hand column describe the discourse of bounded rationality. While the terms in the left hand column are neither practical nor empirical.

<i>infinite</i>	<i>finite</i>
<i>complete</i>	<i>incomplete</i>
<i>full knowledge</i>	<i>less knowledge</i>
<i>omniscience</i>	<i>predictability</i>
<i>miracles</i>	<i>adaptation</i>
<i>unattainable</i>	<i>pragmatic</i>

A sublime notion of rationality--we can conceive of it, but it is destined to remain unrepresentable (an illusion).

The illusion of objective knowledge legitimates an independent world with natural laws and regularities. The paradox is that if human beings have only incomplete knowledge, then it will always be impossible to know what the "actual" conditions are and if such a world "actually" exists.

The knowledge that we do have is attained through insight. The word "insight" is defined as:

"the power of apprehending the inner nature of things, intuition" (Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971).

This is an example of a privileged term that contains traces of its opposite.

rationality-intuition

knowledge-insight

Even to state the problem in this form is to recognize the extent to which complete rationality is limited by lack of knowledge. If each fire were reported to the department at the moment ignition occurred, fire losses would miraculously decline. Lacking such omniscience, the fire department must devote considerable effort to securing as promptly as possible, through special alarm systems and otherwise, information regarding situations where its action is needed.³

This point has been developed in some detail in order to emphasize that it poses an extremely practical problem of administration - to secure an organization of the decision-making process such that the relevant knowledge will be brought to bear at the point where the decision is made. The same point might have been illustrated with respect to a business organization - the dependence of its decisions, for example, on the correct prediction of market prices.

(pp. 81-82)

Again, the discourse of boundaries and limitations comes to the fore. Complete rationality would require miracles and omniscience. Instead, the modern version of divine intervention--the discourse of science--is employed.

Administration is the business of practical solutions. This statement suggests that the role of administration has been redefined to one of instrumental technique. As a result, only certain knowledge is relevant within the newly defined boundaries of administration. Administration is driven by a theory of performativity. The notion of performativity suggests that efficient system performance is the ultimate criterion by which all other actions and behavior are judged. The vehicles of performativity are efficiency, control, and technical capacity (Benhabib, 1984; Lyotard, 1984). Based on this view, power is accorded to discourses that enhance scientific knowledge. These discourses are legitimated and perpetuated by minimizing risk, unpredictability, and complexity. As a result, homogeneity and functional knowledge are the criteria by which events in the modern world are judged.

The human being striving for rationality and restricted within the limits of his knowledge has developed some working procedures that partially overcome this difficulty. These procedures consist in assuming that he can isolate from the rest of the world a closed system containing only a limited number of variables and a limited range of consequences (pp. 81-82).

At work is the basic opposition of inclusion and exclusion, wherein certain type of knowledge are included and other types of knowledge are excluded. In this vein it is often argued that "knowledge is power." Benhabib suggests that: "not only is knowledge power, but power generates access to knowledge, thus preparing for itself a self-perpetuating basis of legitimacy: (1984, p. 105).

Acceptable knowledge constitutes those ideas variables, concepts, issues, and facts that produce simulated miracles. Whatever elements lead to a decision.

This is a story to the effect that a statistician once found a very high correlation between the number of old maids and the size of the clover crop in different English counties. After puzzling over this relation for some time, he was able to trace what appeared to him to be the causal chain. Old maids, it appeared, kept cats; and cats ate field mice. Field mice, however, were natural enemies of bumble bees, and these latter were, in turn, the chief agents in fertilizing the flowers of the clover plants. The implication, of course, is that the British Parliament should never legislate on the subject of marriage bonuses without first evaluating the effect upon the clover crop of reducing the spinster population.

In practical decision-making, devious consequences of this sort must of necessity be ignored.⁴ Only those factors that are most closely connected with the decision in cause and time can be taken into consideration. The problem of discovering what factors are, and what are not, important in any given situation is quite as essential to correct choice as a knowledge of the empirical laws governing those factors that are finally selected as relevant (pp. 82-83).

More cats - fewer mice - more bumble bees - more clover

Who are these "old maids?" (old maid: "spinster", "a prim nervous fussy person"; [Webster Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

What kind of webs do these spinsters spin? Webs to catch men and kill them just as black widow spiders do to insects such as bumble bees. OR Women who can't "catch" a man? Two categories that are outside the mainstream of women who are willing to capitulate to the male contract. "Good Girls" vs. "Bad Girls"

WARNING: The warning that the author sounds is that women will foul up the purity of rationality.

Q: Why is this passage in the text? It is totally inconsistent with the seriousness, rigor, and scientific tenor of the treatise. A: It is giving voice, albeit unconsciously, to the themes of a different voice--a voice that respects those "devious consequences."

(Devious: "located off the high road", Deviate: "to stray esp. from a standard, principle, or topic"; [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

The causal chain is very logical yet the author states that this is a case that is spurious.

CHAPTER VI

THE EQUILIBRIUM OF ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY

The basic value criteria that will be employed in making decisions and choices among alternatives in an organization will be selected for the organization primarily by the controlling group--the group that has the power to set the terms of membership for all the participants. If the group holds that legal control fails to exercise this power, then, of course, it will devolve on individuals further down the administrative hierarchy.

Whatever group exercises the power of determining the basic value criteria will attempt to secure through the organization its own personal values--whether these be identified with the organization objective, with the conservation objectives, with profits or what not (pp. 118-119).

STABLE STRUCTURES AND PRODUCTIVITY

By using the terms membership and participants, Simon implies that the group has been formed for benign reasons. Membership actually constitutes terms of employment for all wage/salary earners.

Devolution leads to Revolution and the dissolution of the officially sanctioned structure of power. Hierarchy requires orthodoxy.

The tenets of the formal organization upon which public organizations should be modeled are:

(1) the personal is the organizational; (2) conserve the status quo; and (3) profits are a tangible measure of success.

Excluded from this philosophy is the "what not" contingent. Items included in the "what not" group are: dissent, "heterodoxy," "innovation," and "distinctiveness."

To control any social group only one narrative can be dominant.

But their power of control does not in any sense imply that the control group exercises an unlimited option to direct the organization in any path it desires, for the power will continue to exist

Here is an example of how terms contain their opposite. The systems analogy is prominent throughout the text. Hence, equilibrium and balance are stressed. However, in this section of the text, raw power, which produces instability, surfaces as the dark opposite of the image of a smooth self-regulating system. As a result, the stable meaning reinforcing the systems metaphor is rendered unstable.

....so long as the controlling group is able to offer sufficient incentives to retain the contributions of the other participants to the organization. No matter what the personal objectives of the control group, their decisions will be heavily influenced by the fact that they can attain their objectives through the organization only if they can

Incentives for the innocent not to become incensed!

(Con-tribute: "a payment by one ruler or nation to another in acknowledgement of submission," "an exorbitant charge levied by a person or group having the power of coercion";[Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

IMPLICIT MASK: *To implement the organizational objectives, the controlling group in turn views the other "members" as organs and objects.*

maintain a positive balance over inducements, or at least an equilibrium between the two (p. 118).

Here we introduce the term libration which is contiguous to the central metaphor of the system.

(Libration [pp. of librare - to balance]: an oscillation in the apparent aspect of a secondary body as seen from the primary object around which it revolves"; [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

Libration rather than equilibrium. The controlling group determines the oscillation of secondary bodies which orbit the system.

A column comparison highlights the dichotomy between:

*contributions/inducements
mind/body
spiritual/material
stick/carrot*

For this reason the controlling group, regardless of its personal values, will be opportunistic--will appear to

be motivated in large part at least by conservation objectives. It may be worthwhile to illustrate this more fully in the case of widely different organization types (p. 119).

Equilibrium in Commercial Organizations

In business organizations, the control groups can ordinarily be expected to be oriented primarily toward profits and conservation. They will attempt to maintain a favorable balance of incoming contributions over outgoing incentives in two ways: first by modifying the organization objective in response to customer demand; and second by employing the resources, monetary contributions, and employees' time and effort in such a manner as to attain a maximum of inducements to employees, and a maximum of

Here I have introduced another definition of opportunism.

(Opportunism: "the art, policy, or practices of taking advantage of opportunities or circumstance especially with little regard for principles or consequences"; [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

Opportunism as a condition, a condition which must be tolerated for the good of the organization. The opportunism of the controlling group alleviates any requirement to be "responsible."

Equilibrium is presented as a privileged term. Interestingly, the definition of equilibrium must be supplemented by its opposite instability. In the entire section on the left hand side of the page, we find the rhetoric of balance, but the goal is always a "favorable balance" to keep instability at bay.

How and why is the convention of equilibrium in organizations legitimated? As pointed out earlier in this dissertation, social conventions are legitimated through naturalizing myths or metaphors which provide a grounding for that concept in nature. The concept of organizational equilibrium in this case is based on the view that "organizations, conceived as wholes, may be thought of metaphorically as biological organisms, replete with needs or goals that are superordinate to and conceptually separate from the conscious needs, purposes, and goals of individual parts or members" (Harmon & Mayer, 1986).

attainment of organization objectives with these resources. A detailed examination of the way in which this is accomplished leads to the theory of what the economist calls the

Here is another example of privileged terms. Commercial organizations are given transcendent or at minimum "favorable" status. Those in the control group must present themselves as knowing how to design the most rational and the most efficient organization. How do they maintain their status as experts? The postmodern notion of performativity again comes into play. An organization can always be more efficient.

"economics of the firm." Such an examination cannot be undertaken here. One point does require notice, however: the second type of adjustment--that of using given resources as effectively as possible in light of the organization objective--makes efficiency a basic value criterion of administrative decision in such organizations (pp. 119-120).

It might be asked why most commercial organizations, if their basic adjustment is opportunistic, do tend usually to maintain fairly stable objectives. The answer to this is threefold.

First, there are "sunk costs" which make immediate and rapid adjustment unprofitable even from the standpoint of conservation. Second, the organization acquires know-how in a particular field--really an intangible sunk cost, or more properly, "sunk asset."

"Economics of the firm" reinforces the view stated above. It is a theory designed by experts, with efficiency as its ultimate criterion. The quotation marks placed around it give it special status as a privileged term not to be explained to the uninitiated.

Here is another example of the unified subject. The control group now stands in place of the organization.

As pointed out earlier, the postmodern notion of performativity reflects the view that the legitimation of modern scientific knowledge is achieved by minimizing risk, unpredictability, and complexity.

1. sunk costs - undefined expenditure of resources used in pursuit of the organization objectives.

2. sunk costs - "know-how" turns out to be an "asset" of the employee owned by the controlling group (not so intangible).

Third, the organization acquires goodwill, which is also a sunk asset that may not be readily to another area of activity. Stated differently, a change in organization objectives ordinarily entails decreased efficiency in use of resources (sunk costs and know-how) and a loss of incentives otherwise available to maintain a favorable balance (goodwill) (p. 120).

Equilibrium in Governmental Agencies

In the governmental agency the "customer," i.e., the legislative body, is the ultimate controlling group. Since this group can contribute to the organization whatever funds are necessary to attain the organization objective, it is less obvious on casual examination that such an organization is a system in equilibrium. It may be expected, also, that opportunistic modification of the organization objective is less prominent in such organizations than in commercial organizations.

3. *sunk assets - "goodwill" to legitimize opportunistic goals.*

These sunken items act as submerged weights (concrete shoes) which at once stabilize the volatility inherent in maintaining the fiction of equilibrium and also compartmentalize and submerge any possible challenges to the power of the controlling group.

Efficiency is used as the enforcer. Opportunism, once stated is "downplayed." Organizations are opportunistic only to the extent that they consolidate power for the controlling group through the enforcement of efficiency.

Taylor's brand of efficiency was unpopular because it was overt (physically measuring human beings). The decision premise is more subtle. Everything is pre-measured, predetermined and then inscribed, and canonized in Standard Operating Procedures.

Both government agencies and non-profits are compared to business, which is the standard model for other things to be judged against.

Many would argue that the opposite is true.

In any event, efficiency comes forth again as a basic criterion of decision in public organization, since the controlling group will attempt to attain a maximum of organization objectives, however these will be determined, with the resources at its disposal (pp. 120-121).

The organizational form is presented as something natural and universal.

The discourse shifts to the language of performativity. The language of performativity is the language of inputs and outputs, comparative ratios, efficiency, and control.

Decision, choice, and efficiency are privileged terms.

*Emotions/thoughts
politics/administration
values/facts
inputs/outputs
erratic behavior/performativity
chaos/order
volatility/stability*

A column comparison reveals that only the items on the right side are legitimate because they can be measured, and provide tangible empirical evidence of progress.

CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF AUTHORITY

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF AUTHORITY

It is important to note that propositions about human behavior in so far as it is rational, do not ordinarily involve propositions about the psychology of the person who is behaving. Let us explain this rather paradoxical statement. In a given situation, and with a given system of values, there is only one course of action which an individual can rationally pursue. It is that course which under given circumstances maximizes the attainment of value. Hence, psychological propositions, other than descriptions of an individual's value system, are needed only to explain why his behavior, in any given instance, departs from the norm of rationality (p. 149).

Likewise, propositions about the behavior of members of an organization, in so far as that behavior is governed by the system of authority in the organization, do not ordinarily involve propositions about the psychology of the person who is behaving. That is in so far as a person is obedient to the decisions of another, his psychology has nothing to do with his behavior. Hence, psychological propositions are important for determining the area within which authority will be respected, but have no significance for determining what behavior will be within this area.

AUTHORITY AS A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology has nothing to do with rational human behavior?

Rational behavior is:

*apsychological
apolitical
asexual
value neutral*

According to the text, rational people don't have psychologies, just value systems.

"To Simon, 'psychology' seems to be nothing more than a synonym for a regrettable human failing, namely, the inability to act rationally. Psychology, or at least his conception of it, simply helps to explain cognitive impediments to organizational efficiency.... Simon's psychology omits most of what is interesting about individual behavior and leaves us with an excessively narrow conception of the normative importance of psychology to the study of organizations" (Harmon, 1986, p. 151).

It should be added of course, that in many cases it is very difficult for the superior to control the interpretation and application that is given his orders by the subordinate, and in so far as this is true the attitudes of the latter are of very considerable importance. Apart from the actual insubordination, an order may be carried out intelligently or unintelligently, promptly or slowly, enthusiastically or grudgingly. The statement of the previous paragraph might be more cautiously restated: Psychological propositions are important for determining the area within which authority will be respected, and the degree to which the intent of the order giver will actually be carried out; but in so far as the authority is actually accepted they have no significance for determining what the subordinate's behavior will be.

For illustration let us consider the literature on military psychology. The literature is concerned with one central problem--how to enlarge the area within which the soldier, when faced with the dangers of battle and the hardships of campaign life, will he obey his superiors (pp. 149-150).

If the obedience of the soldiers were perfect, then military operations would be limited only by the soldiers' physiological endurance--their marching endurance, and their vulnerability to the effect of bullets. A unit could fail in an attack only through the physical extermination of its members by the enemy, and the only data needed in planning

The good organizational soldier embodies the qualities of the terms in the right hand column.

<i>fearful</i>	<i>fearlessness</i>
<i>unintelligent</i>	<i>intelligent</i>
<i>grudging</i>	<i>enthusiasm</i>
<i>disobedience</i>	<i>obedience</i>
<i>insubordination</i>	
<i>surrender</i>	

Here psychology means, "how can we get the workers to work at the fulcrum between mutiny and extermination?"

One possible interpretation of this paragraph is: "We don't care if they're crazy as long as they accept our authority!"

Reinforcing side #1 of the triangle of limits.

The extermination that he is talking about is the destruction of the Freudian psyche.

operations would be statistical information on the effects of fire under different conditions.

Actually, however, before a unit is exterminated, it will usually reach a point where its members will refuse obedience. They will refuse to advance when ordered to do so, or they will surrender to the enemy. The real limiting factor, then, in an attack are the psychological factors which determine when the soldiers will refuse further obedience to commands. To be sure, behind disobedience or surrender will lie the fear of extermination, but the actual amount of destruction necessary before morale fails varies within wide limits under different circumstances.

Psychology, then, enters into administration as a condition, just as physiological, physical, or other environmental factors may enter in. It is part of the technology of administration, rather than a part of administrative theory itself (pp. 150-151).

*THEY WILL REFUSE TO BECOME
REFUSE*

Human beings are given the status of the environmental conditions which serve to optimize performance.

Human behavior is a factor to be shaped and subordinated to the criterion of efficiency.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNICATION

In this chapter we see that some of the privileged terms identified in Administrative Behavior are the same terms that are privileged in the cultural order of Western society. Hence, the deconstructive reading presented in the chapter highlights the notion that the cultural order and the Simonian view of organization parallel one another

Jacques Lacan's view, presented earlier in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, provides the basis for the approach taken below. As noted, for Lacan the phallus is the dominant symbol of the cultural order in Western society. As a result, in the writings below, I take the approach that accepting the views presented in Chapter VII of Administrative Behavior is analogous to accepting the norms of the cultural order and desiring the privileged terms associated with it.

Chapter VII of Administrative Behavior is also marked by the surfacing of many silences that existed in earlier parts of the text. Identified by its marginalized role, unpredictable structure, the informal communication network represents the voice of the feminine that had been silenced earlier in the text.

The informal communication network is described by Simon as something to be mastered for its instrumental value in helping to accomplish the goals and objectives of the organization. It is viewed as a dangerous supplement that must be co-opted.

In all these cases particular individuals in the organization are possessed of information that is relevant to particular decisions that have been made. An apparently simple way to allocate the function of decision-making would be to assign to each member of the organization those decisions for which he possesses the relevant information. The basic difficulty in this is that not all the information relevant to a particular decision is possessed by a single individual. If the decision is

Are the individuals in the organization possessed or does the organization possess the individuals?

*In order to be of the organization OR to be of the phallus (males, elite organization) OR to be of the word, the individual must be:
possessed of information
possessed by information*

To obtain the phallus we must take possession of the form, we must embody the form.

Information is the password/currency for entrance into the realm of the phallus.

New organizational soldiers stand in formation--individuals ready to have their components dismembered and reconstructed into the meta-form. Metamorphosis.

then dismembered into its component premises and these allocated to separate individuals, a communication process must be set up for transmitting these components from the separate centers to some point where they can be combined and transmitted, in turn, to those members in the organization who will have to carry them out (p. 155).

Another appropriate metaphor: "individual as brain"--we do not want people's bodies we just want to program their brain. A new form of physical labor in the post-industrial age one doesn't have to think just know how to follow instructions or think within the confines of organizational logic.

Informal Communications

No matter how elaborate a system of formal communication is set up in the organization, this system will always be supplemented by informal channels. Through these informal will flow information, advice, and even orders (the reader will recall that, in terms of our definitions, an authority relationship can exist even though the superior is not vested with any sanctions). In time the actual system of relationships may come to differ widely from those specified in the formal organization scheme (p. 160).

The rigidity of the formal organization (the masculine) ultimately must be obeyed as opposed to the informal, which will flow. (Flow: "to deform (deform) under stress without cracking," "menstruate"; [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

The logic of supplementarity is revisited. Informal communication is the supplement to formal communication. In the end, informal communication (the feminine) is marginalized.

The informal communication is built around the social relationships of the members of the organization. Friendship between two individuals creates frequent occasions for contact and "shop talk." It may also create an authority relationship if one of the individuals comes to accept the leadership of the other. In this way "natural leaders" secure a role in the organization that is not always reflected in the organization chart.

The informal communication system takes on additional importance when it is remembered that the behavior of individuals in organizations is oriented not only toward the organization's goals but also to a certain extent toward their personal goals, and that these two sets of goals are not always mutually consistent. Hence, when organization members deal with one another, each must attempt to assess the extent to which the other's attitudes and actions are conditioned by personal rather than organizational motives. When a primary relationship has been established between them, it becomes easier for each to make this assessment, and easier for them to be frank in regard to their motives. Requests for cooperation will less often meet the reaction: "You run your department, and I will run mine" (pp. 160-161).

"friendship" vs "camaraderie"

Simon sees a "hidden" illicit network that is taboo. A network that is characterized by "leadership of other."

<i>private</i>	<i>public</i>
<i>natural</i>	<i>artificial</i>
<i>social</i>	<i>artificial</i>
<i>soft</i>	<i>hard</i>
<i>subculture</i>	<i>mainstream</i>
<i>friendship</i>	<i>camaraderie</i>
<i>cliques</i>	<i>departments</i>
<i>woman</i>	<i>man</i>
<i>formal</i>	<i>informal</i>
<i>flowing</i>	<i>rigid</i>

The logic of the supplement surfaces here. Ultimately, cooperation is resolved through the informal network. Requests for cooperation through the formal network always have the potential to return to the level of: "You run your department and I'll run mine" because they are grounded first and foremost at the level of institutional arrangement.

Primary relationships can be unfriendly, of course, just as easily as they can be friendly, although there is what might be called a "presumption of friendliness" in most social relationships in our society. It becomes a major task of the executives, then, to maintain attitudes of friendliness and cooperation in these direct personal relationships so

that the informal communication system will contribute to the efficient operation of the organization rather than hinder it.

The informal communications system is sometimes used by organizational members to advance their personal aims. From this arises the phenomenon of cliques--groups that build up an informal network of communications and use this as a means of securing power in the organization (p. 161).

Social relationships become a mechanism for the contribution to the efficient operation of organization.

The "task" of executives is to master the skill of expressing feelings in an instrumental way "coopting of emotions" (Mumby & Putnam, 1992).

Informal communication is a "dangerous supplement" because it can hinder the efficient operation of the organization. Yet it is necessary to have in order for the organization to function as an autonomous communication network. In fact the informal communication is designated as the primary relationship in the organization.

The informal is marginalized as dangerous. In the juxtaposition between formal and informal, all the classic oppositions are revealed.

<i>brawn</i>	<i>brains</i>
<i>nature</i>	<i>culture</i>
<i>seduction</i>	<i>leadership</i>
<i>subjectivity</i>	<i>objectivity</i>
<i>masses</i>	<i>rational elite</i>
<i>emotion</i>	<i>thought</i>
<i>chaos</i>	<i>order</i>
<i>unpredictability</i>	<i>stability</i>

Rivalry among cliques, in turn, may lead to general unfriendliness in social relationships and defeat the purpose of the informal communications system.

There has been little systematic analysis of the way in which the formal organization structure encourages or hinders the formation of cliques, or of the techniques that can be used by executives to deal with cliques (p. 161)

Coopting strategies that can be used by executives to deal with cliques and minimize their harmfulness.

and minimize their harmfulness. On the first score it may be conjectured that weakness of the formal system of communications and failure to secure an adequate measure of coordination through that system probably encourages the development of cliques (p. 162).

Does this logic obtain, in light of the earlier contradiction, that cliques form because organizational members want to advance their personal aims?

CHAPTER XI
THE ANATOMY OF ORGANIZATION

It is time now to draw the threads of the discussion together, and to see whether they weave any patterns for administrative organization. The reader may wish, first of all, to review Chapter I, which gives something of an overview of the topics that have been taken up so far.

In the present chapter, as in previous ones, no attempt will be made to offer advice as to how organization should be constructed and operated. The reader has been warned that this volume deals with the anatomy and physiology of organization and does not attempt to prescribe the ills of organization (p. 220).

Patterns of description or prescription?

"Just the facts ma'am"

The disclaimer has been posted:

I'm just the scientist, responsible for author-izing the facts. In actuality, though, am I just the pathologist and not the surgeon?

I dissect and dismember that cadaver of an organization into:

<i>right</i>	<i>left</i>
<i>mind</i>	<i>body</i>
<i>mental</i>	<i>physical</i>
<i>intelligent</i>	<i>stupid</i>
<i>scientist</i>	<i>pig (iron worker)</i>
<i>fact</i>	<i>fiction</i>

I identify the compartments for organizational comportment ("the rational character of 'good' administration").

Its field is organizational biology, rather than medicine; and its only claim of contribution to the practical problems of administration is that sound medical practice can only be founded on thorough knowledge of the biology of the organism. Any prescriptions for administrative practice will only be incidental to the main purpose of description and analysis.

The central theme around which the analysis has been developed is that organization behavior is a complex network of decisional processes, all pointed toward their influence upon the behaviors of the operatives--those who actually do the "physical" work of the organization. The anatomy of the organization is to be found in the distribution and allocation of decision-making functions.

The physiology of the organization is to be found in the processes whereby the organization influences the decisions of each of its members--supplying these decisions with their premises (p. 220).

Appealing to a natural metaphor. Giving life to a method for defining structure and/or function. Restoring the lifeblood of rationality to the previously dissected cadaver of organization.

The earlier disclaimer is still in effect.

A complex network of incisional processes.

The surgeon surges forth from its suppressed identity as a pathologist. It marks the incision points.

The patient, lacking the intelligence to merit a lobotomy, awaits a transplant of artificial intelligence to supplement her lack!

Organization when properly studied can be found to have an empirically verifiable truth: ("Two persons given the same knowledge and information, can rationally decide only upon the same course of action" [Simon, 1947, p. 39]).

(Premise: to presuppose or imply as preexistent; Antecedently proven argument that serves as a component of a conclusion"; [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]).

The Degrees of Influence

Influence is exercised in its most complete form when a decision promulgated by one person governs every aspect of the behavior of another. On the parade ground, the marching soldier is permitted no discretion whatsoever. His every step, his bearing, the length of his pace are all governed by authority. Frederick the Great is reported to have found the parade-ground deportment of his guards perfect--with one flaw. "They breathe," he complained. Few other examples could be cited, however, of the exercise of influence in unlimited form.

Most often influence places only partial limitations upon the exercise of discretion. A subordinate may be told what to do, but given considerable leeway as to how he will carry out the task...

A realistic analysis of influence in general and authority in particular must recognize that influence can be exercised with all degrees of specificity. To determine the scope of influence or authority which is exercised in any concrete case, it is necessary to dissect the decisions of the subordinate into their component parts, and then determine which of these parts are determined by the superior and which are left to the subordinate's discretion (pp. 222-226).

(Influence: "an ethereal fluid thought to float from the stars and affect the action of men; a supposed emanation of the occult power from the stars"; [Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1971]) .

While the author-itative voice of the modern era might not be as audacious as Frederick the Great, the message, transmitted under the cover of rationality, allows the soldier to breathe. Control is exercised by the authoritative logic of those who design the parade field.

Rationality as a mask for authority. This is the key myth in Administrative Behavior.

In Chapter III it was shown that rational decision can be viewed as a conclusion from premises of two different kinds: value premises and factual premises. Given a complete set of value and factual premises, there is only one decision which is consistent with rationality. That is, with a given system of values, and a specified set of alternatives, there is one set alternative that is preferable to the others.

The behavior of a rational person can be controlled, therefore, if the value and factual premises upon which he bases his decision are specified for him. This control can be complete or partial--all the premises can be specified, or some can be left to his discretion. Influence, then, is exercised through control over the premises of the decision. It is required that the decisions of the subordinate shall be consistent with premises for him by his superior. The scope of authority, and conversely the scope of discretion, are determined by the number and importance of the premises which are specified, and the number and importance of those which are left unspecified (p. 223).

Facts give legitimacy to authority and control.

APPENDIX

Expectations as Factors in Social Behavior

This does not mean that it is impossible to state valid laws of human behavior. It simply means that one of the variables to be included in the statement of social laws is the state of knowledge and experience of the persons whose behavior the law purports to describe. The more deliberate the behavior which forms the subject matter of science, the more important the role played by knowledge and experience.

This characteristic of purposive behavior, that is, its dependence on belief or expectation, has further consequences in the social field when group behavior is involved.

The modernist view of progress assumes that the "Truth" is attainable in various ways, even if we haven't developed or refined the methods for attaining it. The "progress" in moving toward the Truth about social relationships requires that social science follow the same logic of inquiry as natural science.

Human behavior is suitable for scientific analysis when it is deliberated.

The decision of each member of the group; that is, A's decision may depend on his expectation of B's behavior, while B's decision may depend on his expectations of A's behavior. In this way a certain indeterminacy may arise, as indeed it does in such social institutions as the stock market, where successful behavior involves outguessing other participants in the market with regard to these expectations.

It is a fundamental characteristic of social institutions that their stability and even their existence depend upon expectations of this sort. In so far as behavior of another person can be accurately predicted, it forms a portion of the objective environment, identical in its nature with the nonhuman portions of the environment.

What is the context in which these expectations can be expected?

We must separate:

*irrational from rational
unconscious from conscious
illogical from logical*

*So that we can isolate and join
purpose to behavior.*

"The central task...is not to substitute the irrational for the rational in the explanation of human behavior but to reconstruct the theory of the rational...When we have made some progress with this reconstruction...we will begin to interpret as rational and reasonable many facets of human behavior that we now explain in terms of affect" (Simon, 1957b).

What is the essential nature of "expectations" that both purposive behavior and social institutions are dependent upon them? Both are given their subjectivity/agency through the existence of "expectations."

Expectations are a scientific phenomenon identical to the nonhuman portions of the [objective] environment. This view is embodiment of predictability that one finds in the "natural world."

We may summarize the conclusions we have reached with respect to a science of administration. In the first place, an administrative science, like any science, is concerned with purely factual statements. There is no place for ethical assertions in body of science. Whenever ethical statements do occur, they can be separated into two parts, on factual and one ethical; and only the former has any relevance to science (p. 253).

The body of science cannot tolerate any ethical insertions to corrupt its virgin facts. If an insertion occurs, the contaminated items will be expurgated from the body, banished from the kingdom.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

We are now at the end of a journey through the intellectual history of the field of public administration, the writings of Herbert Simon, the philosophical background of deconstruction, the methodological tactics that were used to perform a deconstructive reading of *Administrative Behavior*, and the results of that reading process. In this concluding chapter, I briefly summarize the line of argument taken in this dissertation, and then expand on aspects of this argument. I will close out the chapter with my conclusions and directions for further research.

Deconstruction Revisited

Line of Argument

In this dissertation, I have used a new method of research based on an ontological stance that is grounded in the view that language structures our view of the world. The position taken is not objectivist because no reference is made to a world independent of and prior to language. Neither is the position that I take subjectivist because reality is not seen to be shaped by a unique self through which human consciousness can be interpreted. The effect of this stance is to offer a different approach for understanding the field of public administration, its

intellectual history, and the issues that face those in the field, particularly theorists whose realm is to understand and articulate how knowledge is produced. The method or analytical strategy that I have used is called deconstruction. It is unique because it operates in a different fashion than traditional discourse and traditional academic research and critique. Two aspects of that uniqueness include: (1) the point of reference of the reader is not defined by the author, and (2) the subject matter under scrutiny is seen as a form of narrative rather than an objective representation of reality. This stance then liberates the researcher to engage the narrative as a textual production. By doing this, the researcher begins to ask different questions and examine basic assumptions that traditionally might be ceded to the author as axiomatic assumptions.

In this dissertation, many different methodological tactics were introduced as ways to demonstrate this different approach to traditional research and critique. The effect of the employment of these methodological tactics on a well-known text such as *Administrative Behavior* was to render uncertain many of the central assumptions of the point of view presented in the text. As a consequence, new intellectual space became available to other narratives in the field of public administration.

Postmodern Ontology?

In the preface of this dissertation, I suggested that a different ontological stance exists in the current social experience. That ontological stance

suggests that being committed to a set of beliefs or belief in the idea of meaning is a distinctly modern notion. This ontological view takes the position that the world is a text. A text includes not only written documents, but all forms of communication, institutions and other repositories of ideas, as well as events that occur in the culture, and they are all structured by language. Derrida, in his explanation of logocentrism, argues that we are caught up in the metaphysics of presence that is supported by the Cartesian view of existence. From the Cartesian view of the world we gain the idea of the modern self, an individual who : (1) has a distinct identity, (2) is aware of his/her existence through the presence of one's inner voice, and (3) experiences a reality that is a clear and transparent representation of the natural world.

Based on this Cartesian view, we have been searching through the perspective of modern science for a representation of what we perceive to be true reality. This true reality refers to an external independent world that has a natural and logically definable order to it. As such, events in the world can be explained through words, knowledge, and beliefs that are understood to have innate properties.

The deconstructive stance that I argue for in this dissertation suggests that the view articulated above with a natural world that is independent of human existence reflects a logocentric style of thinking. Instead, the Derridean stance that I take in this work argues that language is implicated in the structuring of our view of

"reality(ies)." Thus, rather than viewing language as the instrument to point out, describe, and represent "the world," there is an endless set of "worlds" that are constituted through language. Calas (1987) points out that adopting a deconstructive stance "allows one to conceive 'the world' as representation, instead of focusing on how the world is represented. It calls attention to the construction of 'representation' as theory, with as many implications as possible, rather than the construction of 'a stable theory' for the purpose of representation" (p. 128-129).

Reconsidering the Reader and the Author

As noted in the opening section of this chapter, one of the contributions of this dissertation to the field of public administration lies in this distinction about how and what constitutes reality. The deconstructive stance follows the Saussurean tradition, which argues that language is a closed system of signs and that meaning emerges from the differences between elements of this system. As Derrida puts it: "there is nothing outside of the text." Thus, what we consider subjectivity from a modern standpoint recedes from a positive unidimensional thinking self to a ~~self~~ that is the intersection of discourses with an ~~identity~~ that is constituted through language. Adopting this stance is extremely rich. One of the most important aspects of this richness is the ability to suspend judgement and infinitely defer definitive meaning of a text. For example, in reading Simon, it allows for a different

relationship between reader and author. Traditionally, we accept the author's author-ity and for the most part assume that his/her ideas are cogent and meaningful. More importantly, when we do this we acknowledge the ontological and epistemological framework that authors present as being that true representation of the natural world that we referred to earlier. In Simon's case, the view of human beings presented in *Administrative Behavior* is based on logical positivism. Central to this view is that empirical facts exist as neutral and independent of human perception. Once the reader accepts this premise he/she allows his/her subjectivity to be fixed in reference to this position. Even if a reader does not agree with the positions taken in the text, by ascribing the author-ized meaning to them, the reader acknowledges the author's commitment to some external referent and the reader's subjectivity becomes fixed by the logic of the author's discourse. This point has implications not only for the relationship between the reader and the author but for other such "author-itative" relationships. One such analogous relationship that warrants examination is the relationship between the citizen and the administrator.

To return to the discussion of the relationship between the reader and the author, it is clear to see that here is a difference between traditional critique and deconstruction. An excellent example of a traditional critique can be found in Mortimer Adler's famous text *How to Read a Book* (1972). Adler's book describes some of the general tenets of analytic reading and critique. These tenets include:

1. Classify the book according to kind and subject matter.
2. State what the whole book is about in the utmost brevity.
3. Enunciate its major parts in their order and relation, and outline these parts as you have outlined the whole.
4. Define the problem or problems the author is trying to solve.
5. Come to terms with the author by interpreting his key words.
6. Grasp the author's leading propositions by dealing with his most important sentences.
7. Know the author's arguments, by finding them in, or constructing them out of, sequences of sentences.
8. Determine which of his problems the author has solved, and which he has not, and as to the latter, decide which the author knew he had failed to solve.

Some of the rules of critique include:

9. Do not begin your criticism until you have completed your outline and your interpretation of the book.
10. Do not disagree disputatiously or contentiously.
11. Demonstrate that you recognize the difference between knowledge and mere personal opinion by presenting good reasons for any critical judgment that you make.

In adopting the deconstructive stance, one recognizes that *Administrative Behavior* is just one possible narrative among many possible narratives. By suspending judgment one defers bestowing of meaningfulness upon the text. More

importantly, the reader allows himself/herself the recognition that Simon's discourse is a product of other discourses. For example, we saw in Chapter V of this dissertation connections between the discourse of the rational model of administration in *Administrative Behavior* and the discourse of scientific management. In addition, the reader is also the product of other discourse that will affect his/her reading of Simon's text. This emphasizes the idea of intertextuality that I introduced in Chapter 4. Calas and Smircich highlight this point by suggesting:

Intertextuality poses that every text is 'made up' of other texts with which the reader is acquainted. A text can be read only in relation to other texts 'which provide a grid through which it is read and structured, by establishing expectations which enable one to pick out salient features and gives them structure' (1990, p. 205).

Perhaps much of the cognitive dissonance experienced in reading certain texts is created because we feel bound by the rules of traditional critique. We are trying to make the author's representations real in a fashion that is incongruent with the experience that is inscribed upon us. By suspending judgment, the text unfolds in ways that may not have been apparent to the author given the framework that he/she employs.

Knowledge as Textual Production

Administrative Behavior continues to have great significance as a discourse in public administration. It appeals to the distinctly modern sensibility for the

superiority of science, the faith in the idea of progress, and the desire for rational explanation. As pointed out in Chapters II and Chapter IV of this dissertation, science, progress, and rationality are all privileged terms in the discourse of modern Western society. The deconstructive stance acknowledges the status of these terms within the cultural order, and while pointing out their privileged status neither denies their impact, nor seeks to invert their status in favor of another set of privileged terms. Rather, by adopting a stance that emphasizes signification as the play of differences between signs, the iterability of writing, and the commutability of meaning, the search for narrative takes on the notion of play, of grafting, and of openness. This stance contrasts with the emphasis of most narratives that seek to explain more and more, thereby limiting the range of discourse that seems possible.

Deconstruction also encourages the reader to search for those places in the text wherein the logic of the text is overburdened, and folds back on itself. In Chapter V of the dissertation, we saw an excellent example of this when the privileged term of rationality was shaken by the author's juxtaposition of mathematics--the most rational of scientific discourses--with the unconscious, a term anathema to the discourse of rationality. The juxtaposition suggests that perhaps math is not rational, but is subjective, intuitive, magical, and emerging from the unconscious. As suggested by the deconstructive approach, opposing terms contain their opposites. It is important to extend this example because it is implicated in other aspects of Simon's work. In the *New Science of Management*

Decision, the problem solving-model for nonprogrammed decisions, which requires non-rational processes, are designed exactly the same way as the problem-solving model for programmed decisions, which requires rational instrumental routines. Rather than equating the rational with the unconscious, *The New Science of Management Decision* argues that non-rational processes are exactly the same as rational processes--only perhaps a bit more complex. Clearly, as Simon extends the original postulates in *Administrative Behavior*, the "dangerous supplement" revealed above carries even more significance.

As suggested above, the more totalizing the narrative the less room for maneuvering within the prescribed logic of the text. This paradox plays to the strength of the deconstructive approach because much of the discourse that supplements the dominant view can be found in the margins. Deconstruction gives voice to views that are shut out, without naming them or classifying them according to a predefined grand narrative. Instead, the feeling evoked is one that appears out of the text in a way that had not previously been configured. When a meta-narrative is employed, the categories that name and classify knowledge have been predefined. This is precisely the logic of the decision premise central to the model of organization presented in *Administrative Behavior*.

The approach taken in this dissertation suggests that one should suspend judgment and defer acceptance of a specific point of view. The deconstructive stance asks not for skepticism but to doubt. As White and McSwain note:

The skeptic, in order to be skeptical, must believe that there is a way of telling the fraudulent from the true. There must be a faith, either in the accumulated "fact" or in a sacred methodology, that we have hold of something that is solid and reliable as a touchstone for discriminating among competing truths...The only sensible stance is the openness that comes from true and pervasive doubt, of everything including one's own precious beliefs. Only in this manner can common experience be accrued and common purposes be formed. The doubter, unable to trust him or her self, must seek others, who also must be doubted, such that all that can be relied upon is their relationship and the common experiences and common sense of purpose that it produces (1993, p. 33).

It is the skeptic that traditionally brings the charges of relativism against deconstruction. The dilemma of relativism is only a dilemma if one takes the position that there is only one true representation of reality. Epistemology in the postmodern era does not try to mirror nature. The stance of deconstruction suggests that there are only simulacra: copies of copies for which there are no originals.

Reviewing the Methodological Tactics

An important contribution made by this dissertation to the field of public administration is the introduction of the analytical strategy of deconstruction. The methodological tactics that I employ can have broad application in a wide variety of contexts. In the field of organization theory, journals such as *Organization Studies* and *The Academy of Management Review* are publishing and disseminating articles with themes similar to the ones presented in this dissertation. In addition, it is

argued that "poststructuralist analyses are of particular value in understanding the cultural limits of knowledge at times when innovations in theory and research are expected but do not seem to be happening" (Calas and Smircich, 1991, p. 568). Thus, the analytical strategy that I present can be especially useful in presenting and exploring the boundaries of the cultural order in this period when the field of Public Administration seems to be trapped in an "intellectual cul-de-sac." It also provides for the possibility of new understandings of taken-for-granted themes in the seminal texts of the field.

The Impact of *Administrative Behavior*

The Re-inscription of Administrative Man

One of the most popularly recognized excerpts from *Administrative Behavior* is the following:

Since this "principle of efficiency" is characteristic of any activity that attempts rationally to maximize the attainment of certain ends with the use of scarce means, it is as characteristic of economic theory as it is of administrative theory. The "administrative man" takes his place along side the classical "economic man" (1947, p. 38-39).

With this introduction, Administrative Man is born. In comparison with Economic Man, Administrative Man appears to be practical, realistic, and adept at maximizing efficiency. Nevertheless, in contrasting Economic Man and Administrative Man, the

dye is cast for the modern organizational subject. The debate shifted solely to the plane of cognitive behavior. This line of argument was amplified in *Models of Man*, where Simon explicitly stated that the theory of rationality had lost too much ground to the Freudians in the 20th century. He sought to reinterpret behavior that was explained in terms of affect as behavior that was "intendedly" rational.

This reconstitution of the human subject strictly in terms of conscious, instrumentally rational behavior displays the powerful effect of *Administrative Behavior* on the field of public administration. The text also redefines the province of administration by narrowing the range of problems acceptable to the rational model of administration. Both the concept of the public interest and the discretion of the public administrator are placed outside the boundaries of administration. Thus, the administrator's role becomes an instrumental one with theoretically only one calculation required--choosing the appropriate means to maximize efficiency.

The Lost Tension

In Chapter II of this dissertation I argued that the view of human behavior and administration advocated by the model of rationality in *Administrative Behavior* hearkened back to the classical school of Gulick, Urwick, and Willoughby. During this period, the traditionalists were moving away from an over-emphasis on rationalism. The view of the traditionalists was that the province of public administration included not only the instrumental aspect of administration but the

idea of human development and the concept of the public interest. These aspects of the intellectual discourse of public administration were pushed to the margins with *Administrative Behavior's* modernist emphasis on a system of organization to enhance the limited rationality of human beings.

The ontological stance that is advocated in *Administrative Behavior* is the ontology of management, which suggests that the sole purpose for organization is to coordinate human activity to accomplish an instrumental goal/task. While the classical school also embraced this ontology, the concern for the good society expressed in the ideals of the progressive movement was also a part of this earlier tradition. Thus, in the early part of the 20th century, public administration still provided an institutional framework through which government by dialogue on the one hand, and government by distant, instrumental control on the other, could be mediated.

This dissertation argues that the discourse of *Administrative Behavior* effectively dislocated public administration from its traditional role in the governance process. Only ten years after publication of *Administrative Behavior*, this dislocation was no longer in evidence (Schubert, 1957, 1962; Sorauf, 1957, 1962). Frank Sorauf's comments bear witness to this change. Writing in support of the discourse of scientific rationality, he asserts: "perhaps academicians ought to take the lead in drawing up a list of ambiguous words and phrases which 'would never be missed.'"

For such a list I would have several candidates, but it would suffice here to nominate 'the public interest'" (1962, p. 190).

The Narrative of Science

Another taken-for-granted aspect of the ideas presented in *Administrative Behavior* is the grounding of Simon's position in science. The deconstructive stance taken in this dissertation acknowledges that science is a narrative but maintains it is not a privileged narrative in the way used by Simon. The postmodern view of science suggests that power is accorded to discourses that enhance scientific knowledge. The discourse of science stands out as requiring both rigor and neutrality in its method. *Administrative Behavior* rests on this cloak of assumed unbiased, impartial, disinterested pursuit of knowledge.

An example of the heightened status accorded to science and progress in *Administrative Behavior* is found in Chapter II. The reader is exhorted to think of the unlimited human potential that will become available by enhancing the limited rationality of human beings. Instead in 1993, we have found that our current world is hyper-rationalized. The modernist need for sublime, albeit rational, explanation skews the expectations, fragility, and contingency of human experience. The deconstructive stance allows one to point out that the discourse of science is only one narrative, and the logic of its narrative has limitations.

Final Note

The key feature of deconstruction as an analytical strategy its perspective that the world is a text through which meaning is constantly being deferred, reconfigured, and re-presented. In that spirit I invite this dissertation to be deconstructed as well.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'S. M. L.' or similar, written in a cursive style.