WEBVTT 00:00:02.759 --> 00:00:05.600 >> Good afternoon and welcome to 00:00:05.600 --> 00:00:09.280 the 18th annual Schnabel Engineering Lecture. 00:00:09.280 --> 00:00:11.200 My role here is very brief. 00:00:11.200 --> 00:00:12.960 I would like to welcome you here to 00:00:12.960 --> 00:00:16.415 Virginia Tech and to welcome Alan Cadden. 00:00:16.415 --> 00:00:19.630 Alan Cadden is the principal of Schnabel Engineering, 00:00:19.630 --> 00:00:21.920 and a very good personal friend and 00:00:21.920 --> 00:00:25.239 a very good friend of our program. Alan. 00:00:25.239 --> 00:00:28.095 >> Thank you, Adrian. Good afternoon. 00:00:28.095 --> 00:00:29.750 I'm happy to be able to introduce 00:00:29.750 --> 00:00:31.490 the 18th Schnabel Engineering 00:00:31.490 --> 00:00:33.070 Lecture here at Virginia Tech. 00:00:33.070 --> 00:00:35.630 Especially at a time when 00:00:35.630 --> 00:00:38.390 the civil engineering profession is exploding and 00:00:38.390 --> 00:00:41.450 the infrastructure opportunities and environmental needs 00:00:41.450 --> 00:00:43.150 will provide excitement and 00:00:43.150 --> 00:00:46.070 many real challenges throughout your careers. 00:00:46.070 --> 00:00:48.950 We couldn't present this lecture without the help of 00:00:48.950 --> 00:00:51.230 Dr. Rodriguez and Mrs. Atwell, 00:00:51.230 --> 00:00:52.810 as they do the hard work of making 00:00:52.810 --> 00:00:54.890 all the arrangements here on campus. 00:00:54.890 --> 00:00:57.490 We at Schnabel love this opportunity to 00:00:57.490 --> 00:01:00.540 return to Virginia Tech each year and host this event, 00:01:00.540 --> 00:01:03.585 so we thank you for welcoming us back. 00:01:03.585 --> 00:01:06.270 Some of you may know this, but Schnabel is 00:01:06.270 --> 00:01:08.410 approaching 70 years old or young, 00:01:08.410 --> 00:01:10.150 depending on your perspective. 00:01:10.150 --> 00:01:12.810 We have about 30 offices across the country, 00:01:12.810 --> 00:01:14.030 and from these locations, 00:01:14.030 --> 00:01:15.390 we offer services throughout 00:01:15.390 --> 00:01:17.510 the United States and around the world. 00:01:17.510 --> 00:01:20.270 We're excited to have announced that 00:01:20.270 --> 00:01:22.170 JCK Underground joined 00:01:22.170 --> 00:01:24.390 the Schnabel team at the beginning of the month, 00:01:24.390 --> 00:01:27.150 which significantly increased the size of 00:01:27.150 --> 00:01:30.710 our underground engineering and program management group. 00:01:30.710 --> 00:01:34.025 We are a 100% employee-owned company at 00:01:34.025 --> 00:01:37.515 the top and over our nearly 70 years of history. 00:01:37.515 --> 00:01:39.090 We have grown in breadth of 00:01:39.090 --> 00:01:41.370 services as well as geography. 00:01:41.370 --> 00:01:42.370 Growing from 00:01:42.370 --> 00:01:44.510 a traditional geotechnical engineering start, 00:01:44.510 --> 00:01:46.420 to a much broader design firm, 00:01:46.420 --> 00:01:48.810 now including full services around 00:01:48.810 --> 00:01:52.425 specialty foundations, dams, and tunnels. 00:01:52.425 --> 00:01:55.520 For me, some of the most exciting new work 00:01:55.520 --> 00:01:59.000 involves applications of innovation around data science, 00:01:59.000 --> 00:02:00.960 digital twins, and 00:02:00.960 --> 00:02:03.980 advanced visualization within our workflows. 00:02:03.980 --> 00:02:06.420 Given the challenges we face today 00:02:06.420 --> 00:02:08.460 and the opportunities we see in the future, 00:02:08.460 --> 00:02:10.240 we host this lecture each year 00:02:10.240 --> 00:02:11.940 to bring you a different face of 00:02:11.940 --> 00:02:15.620 our profession from outside the academic calls. 00:02:15.620 --> 00:02:17.060 These lectures, many of them 00:02:17.060 --> 00:02:19.340 recorded and available in your library, 00:02:19.340 --> 00:02:21.220 present different aspects of 00:02:21.220 --> 00:02:22.960 a career in civil engineering, 00:02:22.960 --> 00:02:25.380 careers that have evolved over decades. 00:02:25.380 --> 00:02:26.980 They share their stories, 00:02:26.980 --> 00:02:29.100 they also do a little pontificating on 00:02:29.100 --> 00:02:31.800 what you might see as your careers evolve. 00:02:31.800 --> 00:02:35.535 Today we bring you a colleague and a friend of Schnabel. 00:02:35.535 --> 00:02:38.370 Recently, I've had the pleasure to work 00:02:38.370 --> 00:02:41.220 with Dave as a Deep Foundation Institute trustee. 00:02:41.220 --> 00:02:42.750 So without further ado, 00:02:42.750 --> 00:02:45.570 let me introduce our speaker for today. 00:02:45.830 --> 00:02:48.670 David Paul, a Professional Engineer, 00:02:48.670 --> 00:02:49.970 is the managing partner of 00:02:49.970 --> 00:02:53.750 Paul Geotek Engineering LLC in Denver Colorado. 00:02:53.750 --> 00:02:57.370 He retired from the Corps of Engineers after 22 years of 00:02:57.370 --> 00:03:00.310 federal service as a dam safety officer 00:03:00.310 --> 00:03:02.230 for the Mosul Dam Task Force, 00:03:02.230 --> 00:03:04.570 which provided technical assistance 00:03:04.570 --> 00:03:05.980 to the government of Iraq, 00:03:05.980 --> 00:03:07.870 to mitigate dam safety issues 00:03:07.870 --> 00:03:09.650 associated with the Mosul Dam. 00:03:09.650 --> 00:03:11.410 A fascinating case history 00:03:11.410 --> 00:03:13.770 itself for geotechnical engineers. 00:03:13.770 --> 00:03:16.530 He also served as a special assistant for 00:03:16.530 --> 00:03:18.050 dam safety at the Corps of 00:03:18.050 --> 00:03:19.610 Engineers Headquarters in Washington, 00:03:19.610 --> 00:03:21.830 DC, responsible for managing 00:03:21.830 --> 00:03:25.130 the Corps portfolio of 715 dams. 00:03:25.130 --> 00:03:26.970 He is a national specialist 00:03:26.970 --> 00:03:29.050 on critical infrastructure design, 00:03:29.050 --> 00:03:31.450 dam design, levee design, 00:03:31.450 --> 00:03:34.690 construction engineering, engineering risk management, 00:03:34.690 --> 00:03:36.770 interim risk reduction measures, 00:03:36.770 --> 00:03:39.430 and dam and levee safety modifications. 00:03:39.430 --> 00:03:42.190 He was a geotechnical subject matter expert for 00:03:42.190 --> 00:03:44.770 the Orville Dam Risk Assessment in California, 00:03:44.770 --> 00:03:47.590 which is the tallest earth dam in the United States. 00:03:47.590 --> 00:03:50.350 He has been involved in the design and construction of 00:03:50.350 --> 00:03:52.330 11 new dams and over 75 00:03:52.330 --> 00:03:55.270 dam modifications around the world. 00:03:55.270 --> 00:03:58.150 As I noted, Dave is currently a trustee 00:03:58.150 --> 00:04:00.490 of the Deep Foundation Institute and a member 00:04:00.490 --> 00:04:03.030 of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials 00:04:03.030 --> 00:04:05.630 and the American Society of Civil Engineers. 00:04:05.630 --> 00:04:07.630 In addition, as a member of 00:04:07.630 --> 00:04:09.810 the United States Society on Dams, 00:04:09.810 --> 00:04:11.980 he serves as the co-chairman of 00:04:11.980 --> 00:04:15.135 the USSD Committee on Construction 00:04:15.135 --> 00:04:18.210 and is active with the embankment dam committee. 00:04:18.210 --> 00:04:21.910 He is also the USSP representative to 00:04:21.910 --> 00:04:23.610 the International Commission on Large 00:04:23.610 --> 00:04:27.975 Dams Cold Embankment Dam Committee. 00:04:27.975 --> 00:04:29.760 Please join me in welcoming 00:04:29.760 --> 00:04:32.165 David Paul to Virginia Tech, and Dave, 00:04:32.165 --> 00:04:33.710 we look forward to your insights 00:04:33.710 --> 00:04:34.810 on the history of dam and 00:04:34.810 --> 00:04:39.010 levee safety in the United States. Thank you. Welcome. 00:04:48.079 --> 00:04:50.330 >> Thank you, Alan, 00:04:50.330 --> 00:04:53.090 for the kind words of introduction. 00:04:53.090 --> 00:04:57.650 I am sincerely honored to be invited to come 00:04:57.650 --> 00:05:00.510 today and enjoy the beautiful weather 00:05:00.510 --> 00:05:03.030 on this beautiful campus here in Blacksburg, 00:05:03.030 --> 00:05:06.310 and be able to come and speak to 00:05:06.310 --> 00:05:13.250 you on behalf of Schnabel and Virginia Tech University. 00:05:13.330 --> 00:05:17.350 Alan emphasized to me when he invited me 00:05:17.350 --> 00:05:21.270 that he wasn't interested in a technical lecture. 00:05:21.270 --> 00:05:23.150 I definitely took him at 00:05:23.150 --> 00:05:26.790 his word and I assure you that the content 00:05:26.790 --> 00:05:29.450 and my words today are 00:05:29.450 --> 00:05:32.970 definitely not technically oriented. 00:05:32.970 --> 00:05:36.670 But nonetheless, I hope that you find it 00:05:36.670 --> 00:05:40.830 interesting for your career pass. 00:05:40.830 --> 00:05:45.005 The presentation topics that I'm going to cover. 00:05:45.005 --> 00:05:47.980 I'm going to talk about Fontenelle Dam, 00:05:47.980 --> 00:05:50.840 which I don't think many of you have ever heard, 00:05:50.840 --> 00:05:53.040 so precursor to Teton Dam. 00:05:53.040 --> 00:05:55.740 And talk about the development of 00:05:55.740 --> 00:05:58.620 dam and levee safety programs in 00:05:58.620 --> 00:06:02.400 the United States and talk about how it 00:06:02.400 --> 00:06:07.800 impacts infrastructure and as the profession 00:06:07.800 --> 00:06:11.325 migrates towards risk-informed decision-making 00:06:11.325 --> 00:06:14.580 in administering those programs. 00:06:14.580 --> 00:06:17.860 I felt compelled I need to, I think, 00:06:17.860 --> 00:06:23.440 give a bit of carbon dating for myself to you all. 00:06:23.440 --> 00:06:27.620 As Alan said, my career has been federal. 00:06:27.620 --> 00:06:30.960 Started with the Soil Conservation Service 00:06:30.960 --> 00:06:33.805 in Illinois in 1976. 00:06:33.805 --> 00:06:37.500 Went to Denver, Colorado to work with 00:06:37.500 --> 00:06:39.520 the Bureau of Reclamation 00:06:39.520 --> 00:06:42.960 after Teton Dam failure in 1978. 00:06:42.960 --> 00:06:44.590 Worked there 32 years, 00:06:44.590 --> 00:06:47.000 and then finished up eight years 00:06:47.000 --> 00:06:49.910 with the Army Corps of Engineers, 00:06:49.910 --> 00:06:53.800 as they stood up their risk management center. 00:06:53.800 --> 00:06:56.240 When I started 78, 00:06:56.240 --> 00:06:57.780 there were no cell phones, 00:06:57.780 --> 00:06:59.520 there were no laptops, 00:06:59.520 --> 00:07:01.940 there were no computers. 00:07:01.940 --> 00:07:04.860 We had one rotary dial phone for 00:07:04.860 --> 00:07:08.960 five people you could smoke at your desk. 00:07:09.020 --> 00:07:15.210 All drawings were done by hand, on linen, 00:07:15.210 --> 00:07:20.565 in a huge room there were 100 oak drafting tables, 00:07:20.565 --> 00:07:25.340 filled with World War II Korean veterans who smoked, 00:07:25.340 --> 00:07:27.900 and the work and the drawings that 00:07:27.900 --> 00:07:31.000 they created were truly pieces of art. 00:07:31.000 --> 00:07:33.250 But everything was done by hand. 00:07:33.250 --> 00:07:36.455 All memos were written, long ham, 00:07:36.455 --> 00:07:38.815 and taken to the steno pool, 00:07:38.815 --> 00:07:45.060 and 25 ladies with typewriters typed out your memos. 00:07:45.060 --> 00:07:50.790 That's carbon dating myself and we ran 00:07:50.790 --> 00:07:52.150 stability analysis 00:07:52.150 --> 00:07:54.690 from computer punch cards and took them 00:07:54.690 --> 00:07:56.630 down to the computer room and slid 00:07:56.630 --> 00:07:59.030 them through the window to run on the IBM. 00:07:59.030 --> 00:08:01.610 Then an hour later, go back and hope that you had 00:08:01.610 --> 00:08:05.210 some output and didn't have an incorrect card. 00:08:05.210 --> 00:08:09.110 My point being, the amount of technology and 00:08:09.110 --> 00:08:13.270 transformation that's happened in my professional career, 00:08:13.270 --> 00:08:15.890 when I pause and reflect on it, 00:08:15.890 --> 00:08:19.890 truly just blows me away. 00:08:19.890 --> 00:08:23.430 You are all to me in this world 00:08:23.430 --> 00:08:27.470 where technology is changing rapidly and frankly, 00:08:27.470 --> 00:08:33.410 it's hard to keep up sometimes, but embrace it. 00:08:33.410 --> 00:08:37.290 It's just unbelievable what you can do these days 00:08:37.290 --> 00:08:42.150 with the power of computer and communications technology. 00:08:42.150 --> 00:08:47.030 My professional career is rooted with the failure of 00:08:47.030 --> 00:08:51.810 Teton Dam that failed June 5, 1976. 00:08:51.810 --> 00:08:55.010 Teton River in Idaho, 00:08:55.010 --> 00:08:59.164 designed, constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation. 00:08:59.164 --> 00:09:02.755 >> As a result of this incident, 00:09:02.755 --> 00:09:10.195 the organization underwent a very rigorous, 00:09:10.195 --> 00:09:16.795 robust evaluation by independent expert engineers 00:09:16.795 --> 00:09:19.060 brought to bear by the US government 00:09:19.060 --> 00:09:21.715 to investigate the accident. 00:09:21.715 --> 00:09:25.135 I have dear friends that were 00:09:25.135 --> 00:09:29.875 involved with the design construction of Teton. 00:09:29.875 --> 00:09:32.710 They were there throughout 00:09:32.710 --> 00:09:35.440 construction and they're standing up by 00:09:35.440 --> 00:09:38.320 the left abutment or the right abutment at 00:09:38.320 --> 00:09:41.650 the spillway when the dam crest fell in. 00:09:41.650 --> 00:09:45.205 They were there that morning, 00:09:45.205 --> 00:09:47.725 started around 06:30 in the morning, 00:09:47.725 --> 00:09:53.740 progressed quite rapidly to the failure at around 11 30. 00:09:53.740 --> 00:09:58.375 Working for Reclamation in 77 and 78, 00:09:58.375 --> 00:10:00.355 they hired about 500 00:10:00.355 --> 00:10:03.310 of young engineers from around the country. 00:10:03.310 --> 00:10:06.445 We repopulated the technical service center 00:10:06.445 --> 00:10:10.120 in Denver and re-established the organization. 00:10:10.120 --> 00:10:13.480 From that, they created 00:10:13.480 --> 00:10:16.510 the actual dam safety office 00:10:16.510 --> 00:10:18.040 within the Bureau of Reclamation. 00:10:18.040 --> 00:10:20.680 I was asked in October 78, 00:10:20.680 --> 00:10:23.890 45 years ago, by Richard Kramer, 00:10:23.890 --> 00:10:25.720 who was running the organization 00:10:25.720 --> 00:10:27.565 Embankment Dams Group at the time. 00:10:27.565 --> 00:10:29.890 We're opening up the dam safety office. 00:10:29.890 --> 00:10:31.570 Dave, we need some help. 00:10:31.570 --> 00:10:36.400 Would you take some time and volunteer and help? 00:10:36.400 --> 00:10:38.275 I said, "Sure". 00:10:38.275 --> 00:10:43.210 I did so, and so I've been immersed with dam safety, 00:10:43.210 --> 00:10:46.645 dam engineering, construction, my entire career. 00:10:46.645 --> 00:10:52.855 It's again, fundamentally rooted in Teton Dam failure. 00:10:52.855 --> 00:10:57.130 I had the great fortune to be blessed to 00:10:57.130 --> 00:11:01.480 have many engagements with Doctor Peck over my career. 00:11:01.480 --> 00:11:04.480 He served on several consulting boards for 00:11:04.480 --> 00:11:08.080 dams that I designed and constructed. 00:11:08.080 --> 00:11:13.450 This is his quote with respect to the failure at Teton. 00:11:13.450 --> 00:11:20.320 Frankly, if you have interest in the damn levee world, 00:11:20.320 --> 00:11:23.470 I submit reading those proceedings 00:11:23.470 --> 00:11:26.620 from the investigation should be required [inaudible]. 00:11:26.620 --> 00:11:28.970 I'm sure you can find it online. 00:11:28.970 --> 00:11:31.185 Again, I had good fortune 00:11:31.185 --> 00:11:38.320 to talk to Doctor Peck 00:11:38.320 --> 00:11:40.720 and others that were involved with the failure. 00:11:40.720 --> 00:11:42.550 The state of the profession at 00:11:42.550 --> 00:11:45.760 that time truly should have dealt 00:11:45.760 --> 00:11:49.450 with the geologic conditions 00:11:49.450 --> 00:11:52.600 that presented themselves at Teton. 00:11:52.600 --> 00:11:58.495 There was truly a situation 00:11:58.495 --> 00:12:03.055 where the organization failed, quite frankly. 00:12:03.055 --> 00:12:07.270 Before Teton, there was actually Fontenelle Dam on 00:12:07.270 --> 00:12:13.210 the Green River in Western Wyoming Earth Dam, 00:12:13.210 --> 00:12:15.130 about 150 feet tall, 00:12:15.130 --> 00:12:17.050 5,000 foot Crest Ling, 00:12:17.050 --> 00:12:20.300 built in the '60s. 00:12:22.980 --> 00:12:27.100 Frankly, instead of Teton Dam, 00:12:27.100 --> 00:12:30.205 it could have been Fontenelle Dam in the '60s. 00:12:30.205 --> 00:12:32.920 This is a picture of the foundation. 00:12:32.920 --> 00:12:38.500 There were vertical open joints, 00:12:38.500 --> 00:12:42.400 very problematic geologic conditions 00:12:42.400 --> 00:12:46.490 upon which to build an embankment dam. 00:12:47.460 --> 00:12:51.550 The design here you can see some of the open joints. 00:12:51.550 --> 00:12:53.530 There was generally not 00:12:53.530 --> 00:12:58.780 a rigorous clean-up program or treatment program and 00:12:58.780 --> 00:13:01.105 the single line of defense to 00:13:01.105 --> 00:13:04.240 mitigate foundation seepage was foundation grouting. 00:13:04.240 --> 00:13:06.880 A fairly conservative section in 00:13:06.880 --> 00:13:09.880 terms of the impervious barrier, 00:13:09.880 --> 00:13:11.500 the impervious core, 00:13:11.500 --> 00:13:14.635 constructed out of silt and gravity silt 00:13:14.635 --> 00:13:17.060 similar to Teton. 00:13:17.130 --> 00:13:19.930 Upon first filling, 00:13:19.930 --> 00:13:23.590 you can see the amount of seepage that 00:13:23.590 --> 00:13:27.805 manifested and reflected itself along the downstream toe. 00:13:27.805 --> 00:13:30.430 It was not expected, 00:13:30.430 --> 00:13:33.340 as you can probably appreciate. 00:13:33.340 --> 00:13:36.850 But what really caused the incident or 00:13:36.850 --> 00:13:40.030 the concern is this is May 1965. 00:13:40.030 --> 00:13:43.300 The spillway is constructed over on the right abutment. 00:13:43.300 --> 00:13:46.360 This is the spillway embankment contact. 00:13:46.360 --> 00:13:49.870 Again, some of the pictures that I showed 00:13:49.870 --> 00:13:52.240 showing the irregularities and 00:13:52.240 --> 00:13:54.445 open joints in the foundation, 00:13:54.445 --> 00:13:59.245 seepage migrated through, created erosion, 00:13:59.245 --> 00:14:02.980 and there was a near failure here. 00:14:02.980 --> 00:14:05.275 They were able to open the gates, 00:14:05.275 --> 00:14:07.090 lower the reservoir, 00:14:07.090 --> 00:14:10.360 and establish safe condition. 00:14:10.360 --> 00:14:13.030 They then excavated this, 00:14:13.030 --> 00:14:15.145 back filled it, reconstructed, 00:14:15.145 --> 00:14:17.410 refilled the reservoir, 00:14:17.410 --> 00:14:19.900 and lo and behold, 00:14:19.900 --> 00:14:22.450 in July, a second event happened. 00:14:22.450 --> 00:14:26.230 You can see the extent of it in the same general area. 00:14:26.230 --> 00:14:28.885 Again, just a few months, 00:14:28.885 --> 00:14:31.135 the same event happened again. 00:14:31.135 --> 00:14:34.930 Emergency evacuation lowered the pool, 00:14:34.930 --> 00:14:40.075 excavated this out, and rebuilt it. 00:14:40.075 --> 00:14:43.570 Re-established the reservoir pool, and lo and behold, 00:14:43.570 --> 00:14:45.580 there was a third incident that 00:14:45.580 --> 00:14:47.995 occurred in September 1965, 00:14:47.995 --> 00:14:51.535 much larger in extent. 00:14:51.535 --> 00:14:53.740 When I see these pictures, 00:14:53.740 --> 00:14:57.370 I'm constantly amazed that the crest didn't 00:14:57.370 --> 00:15:01.210 fall in the damn breach causing release of reservoirs, 00:15:01.210 --> 00:15:05.690 just a miracle that it didn't happen. 00:15:06.030 --> 00:15:10.120 They excavated and rebuilt 00:15:10.120 --> 00:15:12.970 this section and re-established the reservoir. 00:15:12.970 --> 00:15:15.610 I point this out in that, 00:15:15.610 --> 00:15:19.490 if you work for larger organizations, 00:15:20.760 --> 00:15:23.890 you shouldn't be complacent. 00:15:23.890 --> 00:15:26.485 You should guard against being complacent. 00:15:26.485 --> 00:15:27.760 The Bureau of Reclamation, 00:15:27.760 --> 00:15:28.990 they built Hoover Dam, 00:15:28.990 --> 00:15:31.960 Glen Canyon, Grand Coulee Dam. 00:15:31.960 --> 00:15:34.480 There was, in all honesty, 00:15:34.480 --> 00:15:37.300 some arrogance within the organization, 00:15:37.300 --> 00:15:40.840 having all of those grand dams in 00:15:40.840 --> 00:15:45.100 their portfolio operating successfully around the west. 00:15:45.100 --> 00:15:48.415 In response to this incident, 00:15:48.415 --> 00:15:51.190 reclamation designers and 00:15:51.190 --> 00:15:54.325 managers heard about Fontenelle, 00:15:54.325 --> 00:15:56.905 but there was in talking to 00:15:56.905 --> 00:15:59.950 engineers working in that era, 00:15:59.950 --> 00:16:01.195 they heard about it, 00:16:01.195 --> 00:16:05.170 but there was not widespread discussion, 00:16:05.170 --> 00:16:09.835 presentation, or conversations about cause and extent. 00:16:09.835 --> 00:16:11.770 This is truly before 00:16:11.770 --> 00:16:17.890 a formal dam safety program was designed and implemented. 00:16:17.890 --> 00:16:20.425 Moving on and again, 00:16:20.425 --> 00:16:25.135 from Teton, 11 lives were lost. 00:16:25.135 --> 00:16:27.550 The dam was essentially tapped 00:16:27.550 --> 00:16:32.420 out and failed upon first filling. 00:16:35.160 --> 00:16:39.445 In all honesty, if you go back to that era, 00:16:39.445 --> 00:16:44.710 the state of the profession was mature and certainly 00:16:44.710 --> 00:16:47.290 had the experience and the wherewithal to be able 00:16:47.290 --> 00:16:50.050 to treat a difficult foundation. 00:16:50.050 --> 00:16:52.270 This was volcanic assault, 00:16:52.270 --> 00:16:54.190 lots of open joints. 00:16:54.190 --> 00:16:57.715 But again, the organization 00:16:57.715 --> 00:17:01.705 did not really heed the state of the practice, 00:17:01.705 --> 00:17:03.040 and lo and behold, 00:17:03.040 --> 00:17:06.535 the damn failed on first filling. 00:17:06.535 --> 00:17:09.460 Again, some of the lessons learned. 00:17:09.460 --> 00:17:13.630 The principal designer for the dam in 00:17:13.630 --> 00:17:18.800 Denver visited the site one time during construction. 00:17:20.040 --> 00:17:23.560 There was essentially little to 00:17:23.560 --> 00:17:25.570 no coordination or communication 00:17:25.570 --> 00:17:27.160 between the construction team 00:17:27.160 --> 00:17:29.980 building the dam and the design team 00:17:29.980 --> 00:17:34.435 that designed it in the Denver office. 00:17:34.435 --> 00:17:37.285 There was no external review, 00:17:37.285 --> 00:17:40.375 no consultant boards at that time. 00:17:40.375 --> 00:17:43.150 Again, the primary defense 00:17:43.150 --> 00:17:45.550 against seepage through foundation defects, 00:17:45.550 --> 00:17:48.400 which were significant at this site, 00:17:48.400 --> 00:17:53.090 was essentially relying on a single line grout. 00:17:55.920 --> 00:17:58.510 Moving on to, 00:17:58.510 --> 00:18:03.350 again the history as it relates to 00:18:03.510 --> 00:18:08.680 dams as a significant piece 00:18:08.680 --> 00:18:11.290 of our infrastructure in this country. 00:18:11.290 --> 00:18:16.705 Where there's dams, there's dam failures. 00:18:16.705 --> 00:18:20.560 I'll talk here in a minute about the NID, 00:18:20.560 --> 00:18:22.240 the National Inventory of Dams. 00:18:22.240 --> 00:18:24.325 In the United States of America, 00:18:24.325 --> 00:18:29.935 there are 90,500 dams in the NID, 00:18:29.935 --> 00:18:32.170 which I continue to find as 00:18:32.170 --> 00:18:34.570 an astounding number of dams that have 00:18:34.570 --> 00:18:39.685 been built and are registered in the NID, 00:18:39.685 --> 00:18:44.125 which is administered by the Corps of Engineers. 00:18:44.125 --> 00:18:49.030 Again, you can see with the NID, 00:18:49.030 --> 00:18:51.130 the federal government, the Corps of Engineers, 00:18:51.130 --> 00:18:52.210 Bureau of Reclamation, 00:18:52.210 --> 00:18:56.620 TVA, has been able to keep track 00:18:56.620 --> 00:18:58.750 of failures or incidents which 00:18:58.750 --> 00:19:02.030 have generated these statistics. 00:19:02.070 --> 00:19:07.010 There's low probability but nonetheless, 00:19:07.320 --> 00:19:10.570 when you impound water and 00:19:10.570 --> 00:19:14.080 create a lot of potential energy. 00:19:14.080 --> 00:19:18.100 If you don't treat the foundation or design it properly, 00:19:18.100 --> 00:19:20.680 certainly you can have a breach and release 00:19:20.680 --> 00:19:23.950 a lot of energy. I apologize. 00:19:23.950 --> 00:19:28.000 I know this is a bit of a hard slide to digest, 00:19:28.000 --> 00:19:32.620 but it's a timeline and the intent here is to document 00:19:32.620 --> 00:19:39.805 some significant failures in the United States. 00:19:39.805 --> 00:19:45.655 There's Baldwin Hills, there's Fort Peck Dam slide, 00:19:45.655 --> 00:19:49.930 Teton, Lower San Fernando. 00:19:49.930 --> 00:19:55.420 There have been in our last 50-70 years, 00:19:55.420 --> 00:19:59.020 some very significant dam incidents 00:19:59.020 --> 00:20:01.870 or failures that have actually caused 00:20:01.870 --> 00:20:04.630 the reservoir to be released and have 00:20:04.630 --> 00:20:09.385 significant damages and loss of life downstream. 00:20:09.385 --> 00:20:16.420 Certainly, the Teton Dam failure in 00:20:16.420 --> 00:20:22.090 1976 generated the impetus within 00:20:22.090 --> 00:20:25.450 congress and the federal agencies to generate 00:20:25.450 --> 00:20:29.840 legislation and create a national dam safety program. 00:20:32.640 --> 00:20:37.960 Again, another slide depicting. 00:20:37.960 --> 00:20:40.720 Ironically at this time the 00:20:40.720 --> 00:20:43.915 ICOLD and the Bureau TVA in the federal world, 00:20:43.915 --> 00:20:46.450 they were self regulated dam owners. 00:20:46.450 --> 00:20:49.900 They have their own portfolio dams. 00:20:49.900 --> 00:20:52.255 The ICOLD has 715, 00:20:52.255 --> 00:20:55.280 TVA has around 200, 00:20:55.620 --> 00:20:59.275 the Bureau has around 400 dams. 00:20:59.275 --> 00:21:00.760 When you compare those numbers, 00:21:00.760 --> 00:21:03.970 sum them up and compare them to 90,500. 00:21:03.970 --> 00:21:08.110 You can appreciate that it's maybe not a high percentage, 00:21:08.110 --> 00:21:11.200 but nonetheless those agencies 00:21:11.200 --> 00:21:17.150 have some very high and very significant dams. 00:21:18.120 --> 00:21:21.430 Again, the turning point for 00:21:21.430 --> 00:21:22.930 the dam safety program 00:21:22.930 --> 00:21:24.430 within the United States certainly, 00:21:24.430 --> 00:21:27.730 Teton was the impetus in '76, 00:21:27.730 --> 00:21:29.005 and as a result, 00:21:29.005 --> 00:21:34.885 the Dam safety Act was developed and passed. 00:21:34.885 --> 00:21:38.140 Some other failure information to give you 00:21:38.140 --> 00:21:42.985 some context of dam failures. 00:21:42.985 --> 00:21:47.665 This record is 1848-2017. 00:21:47.665 --> 00:21:54.490 You can see the number of dam failures is over 1,500. 00:21:54.490 --> 00:21:58.585 All 50 states had a dam that failed. 00:21:58.585 --> 00:22:01.435 The state with the most is Georgia. 00:22:01.435 --> 00:22:03.640 Those states that had the 00:22:03.640 --> 00:22:06.445 fewest were Hawaii and Louisiana. 00:22:06.445 --> 00:22:12.820 Again, having this statistical information is quite 00:22:12.820 --> 00:22:19.030 important in terms of developing the dam safety programs. 00:22:19.030 --> 00:22:23.290 Some other statistics that came out from 00:22:23.290 --> 00:22:26.380 Stanford University in 2018 00:22:26.380 --> 00:22:28.480 are represented in this report. 00:22:28.480 --> 00:22:30.580 Certainly would encourage you to reach 00:22:30.580 --> 00:22:37.250 out and access that information. 00:22:37.770 --> 00:22:41.800 Statistic that I find astounding is since 00:22:41.800 --> 00:22:45.775 1980 so in the last 43 years, 00:22:45.775 --> 00:22:49.930 there's been essentially 24 dam incidents per year. 00:22:49.930 --> 00:22:51.250 That doesn't mean failure, 00:22:51.250 --> 00:22:53.230 but there's been slides or there's been 00:22:53.230 --> 00:22:58.675 stability issues that cause some emergency action. 00:22:58.675 --> 00:23:06.490 It's essentially a two a month for the last 33 years, 00:23:06.490 --> 00:23:09.400 which again, I find to be rather astounding. 00:23:09.400 --> 00:23:13.270 As I said, the National Inventory of Dams was created, 00:23:13.270 --> 00:23:15.100 mandated by Congress as part 00:23:15.100 --> 00:23:17.245 of the Dam Safety Legislation. 00:23:17.245 --> 00:23:20.140 This is the URL for that. 00:23:20.140 --> 00:23:22.810 The ICOLD maintains this database. 00:23:22.810 --> 00:23:26.680 It interacts with each of the 50 states. 00:23:26.680 --> 00:23:29.680 Each of the 50 states does 00:23:29.680 --> 00:23:34.510 have a legislated active dam safety program now, 00:23:34.510 --> 00:23:36.490 Alabama was the last, 00:23:36.490 --> 00:23:39.760 but last year, or maybe the year before, 00:23:39.760 --> 00:23:42.310 they did finally pass legislation and 00:23:42.310 --> 00:23:45.670 fund and started Dam Safety Programs. 00:23:45.670 --> 00:23:48.970 That conglomeration of all 50 states, 00:23:48.970 --> 00:23:53.380 resides under the Association for Dam Safety Officials, 00:23:53.380 --> 00:23:54.865 ASDSO. 00:23:54.865 --> 00:23:58.540 The other organization primarily focused on 00:23:58.540 --> 00:24:02.155 dams in the US is the United States Society on Dams, 00:24:02.155 --> 00:24:06.790 USSD, which is again affiliated with ICOLD, 00:24:06.790 --> 00:24:10.105 which is the International Commission on Large Dams. 00:24:10.105 --> 00:24:16.225 Both USSD and ASDSO meet annually and as Alan mentioned, 00:24:16.225 --> 00:24:20.680 certainly would encourage as you 00:24:20.680 --> 00:24:25.315 move into practice or proceed in your career. 00:24:25.315 --> 00:24:27.055 You certainly should reach out 00:24:27.055 --> 00:24:30.800 and engage with those organizations. 00:24:32.130 --> 00:24:35.575 Some statistics from NID. 00:24:35.575 --> 00:24:40.510 It's used by the National Dam Safety Review Board and 00:24:40.510 --> 00:24:44.065 Association of State Dam Safety Officials 00:24:44.065 --> 00:24:49.600 to inform legislatures in their states, 00:24:49.600 --> 00:24:53.920 to inform Congress and federal agencies 00:24:53.920 --> 00:24:59.200 to recommend dam safety policies. 00:24:59.200 --> 00:25:03.940 Many of those changes reside in WARDA legislation, 00:25:03.940 --> 00:25:06.235 Water Resources Development Act. 00:25:06.235 --> 00:25:08.545 They're not passed every year, 00:25:08.545 --> 00:25:13.240 but every couple of years WARDA passes through 00:25:13.240 --> 00:25:19.840 Congress changing policies or adding new policies. 00:25:19.840 --> 00:25:23.110 More than 65% of the dams 00:25:23.110 --> 00:25:26.545 in the NID are classified as low hazard, 00:25:26.545 --> 00:25:32.290 50% of them are less than 25 feet in height, 00:25:32.290 --> 00:25:34.240 and almost as I said, 00:25:34.240 --> 00:25:37.420 70% of the dams are privately owned. 00:25:37.420 --> 00:25:40.555 Again, the privately owned dams are regulated 00:25:40.555 --> 00:25:44.320 by the state dams safety programs. 00:25:44.320 --> 00:25:51.800 The average age of the dams are 60 plus years. 00:25:51.910 --> 00:25:54.830 With respect to levees, 00:25:54.830 --> 00:25:59.975 this is a map from ASCE and FEMA showing the counties, 00:25:59.975 --> 00:26:03.185 dark green, that have levees. 00:26:03.185 --> 00:26:09.830 There's 150,000 plus miles of levees in this country, 00:26:09.830 --> 00:26:14.030 and there's about three million miles 00:26:14.030 --> 00:26:15.860 of river in the United States, 00:26:15.860 --> 00:26:20.705 which again, I find this an astounding number. 00:26:20.705 --> 00:26:24.515 But again, there's 150,000 miles of levees. 00:26:24.515 --> 00:26:27.860 The Corps of Engineers is 00:26:27.860 --> 00:26:31.190 the principal federal agency associated with levees. 00:26:31.190 --> 00:26:34.130 They designed and are responsible 00:26:34.130 --> 00:26:37.130 for 15,000 miles of levees, 00:26:37.130 --> 00:26:39.620 so they're about 10%. 00:26:39.620 --> 00:26:43.850 Those that may have grew up or lived around some 00:26:43.850 --> 00:26:48.155 of the major rivers like the Mississippi, Missouri, 00:26:48.155 --> 00:26:53.720 Ohio, all can probably remember 00:26:53.720 --> 00:26:57.890 significant flood hydrologic events 00:26:57.890 --> 00:27:00.935 in your lifetime that caused flooding. 00:27:00.935 --> 00:27:04.130 These are just some numbers and as you can see, 00:27:04.130 --> 00:27:08.030 these damages are significant. 00:27:08.030 --> 00:27:10.220 They're not a couple million dollars, 00:27:10.220 --> 00:27:15.230 this are multiple billions of dollars from these events. 00:27:15.230 --> 00:27:17.990 The last 2017 was over 00:27:17.990 --> 00:27:26.765 $125 billion in damages from extreme hydrologic events. 00:27:26.765 --> 00:27:30.290 This is an interesting figure. 00:27:30.290 --> 00:27:36.275 Again, somewhat difficult to see, but in 1927, 00:27:36.275 --> 00:27:42.950 the flood on the Mississippi generally is the event that 00:27:42.950 --> 00:27:46.430 created legislation and led to 00:27:46.430 --> 00:27:50.870 the Levee Construction Program in the United States. 00:27:50.870 --> 00:27:53.405 Again, there's levees 00:27:53.405 --> 00:27:56.720 both sides of the Mississippi 00:27:56.720 --> 00:27:59.880 from Minnesota clear to the gulf. 00:27:59.980 --> 00:28:04.760 You can see it's constrained 00:28:04.760 --> 00:28:09.260 the river and allowed it to be operated in 00:28:09.260 --> 00:28:13.190 a very efficient manner and certainly has 00:28:13.190 --> 00:28:16.490 reduced and eliminated a lot of 00:28:16.490 --> 00:28:19.700 damages that could have been caused from flooding. 00:28:19.700 --> 00:28:22.730 You can just see between 27 and 00:28:22.730 --> 00:28:27.530 2011 there were over almost 17 million acres 00:28:27.530 --> 00:28:30.170 affected by flooding in 27 and 00:28:30.170 --> 00:28:36.065 somewhere over six million in 2011 floods. 00:28:36.065 --> 00:28:39.440 The amount of damages that were mitigated or 00:28:39.440 --> 00:28:43.040 eliminated by the levees are again very significant. 00:28:43.040 --> 00:28:47.150 Congress passed National Levee Safety Act in 00:28:47.150 --> 00:28:54.395 2007 as part of Water Legislation 2014. 00:28:54.395 --> 00:28:58.505 The Corps of Engineers is taking the lead to 00:28:58.505 --> 00:29:03.125 implement the National Levee Safety Program. 00:29:03.125 --> 00:29:07.460 Again, Corp is responsible for 15,000 miles of 00:29:07.460 --> 00:29:13.310 levees and they are working with each of the 50 states. 00:29:13.310 --> 00:29:16.850 The goal is to bolt onto 00:29:16.850 --> 00:29:20.600 the existing dam safety programs within the states, 00:29:20.600 --> 00:29:23.300 a levee safety program. 00:29:23.300 --> 00:29:26.780 Similar to NID, 00:29:26.780 --> 00:29:30.920 the Corps has created the National Levee Database. 00:29:30.920 --> 00:29:32.510 In the last decade, 00:29:32.510 --> 00:29:37.415 they have been able to assess and populate 00:29:37.415 --> 00:29:41.180 the levee database for the 15,000 miles of 00:29:41.180 --> 00:29:45.590 levees in the country that the Corps is responsible for. 00:29:45.590 --> 00:29:47.720 They're working again with states and 00:29:47.720 --> 00:29:50.600 other private owners to assess 00:29:50.600 --> 00:29:53.150 their systems and to 00:29:53.150 --> 00:29:57.620 get that information into the database. 00:29:57.620 --> 00:30:01.910 As I know you all can appreciate is having 00:30:01.910 --> 00:30:04.520 this historical information is 00:30:04.520 --> 00:30:07.925 the foundation for any safety program. 00:30:07.925 --> 00:30:10.310 Certainly, is quite important 00:30:10.310 --> 00:30:14.780 as the organizations continue to assess 00:30:14.780 --> 00:30:18.470 the performance of their structures and make 00:30:18.470 --> 00:30:20.300 decisions as to whether they're 00:30:20.300 --> 00:30:23.255 safe or unsafe and if they're unsafe, 00:30:23.255 --> 00:30:26.960 what actions are required to 00:30:26.960 --> 00:30:31.115 bring them to acceptable levels of failure, 00:30:31.115 --> 00:30:34.340 as I'll get into here in a minute. 00:30:34.340 --> 00:30:37.700 Again, the levee database is 00:30:37.700 --> 00:30:43.415 summarizing periodic inspections, special inspections. 00:30:43.415 --> 00:30:48.080 It also includes failure modes, 00:30:48.080 --> 00:30:50.285 which I'll get into here in a minute, 00:30:50.285 --> 00:30:53.975 and the general health, if you will, 00:30:53.975 --> 00:30:57.980 of the levees as part of being able to assess 00:30:57.980 --> 00:31:05.340 them and be able to take corrective actions when needed. 00:31:05.980 --> 00:31:12.730 Again, I find some of these statistics fascinating 00:31:12.730 --> 00:31:20.690 in that 75% of the US population was born after 1960. 00:31:21.190 --> 00:31:27.035 I've said it to Alan over breakfast this morning, 00:31:27.035 --> 00:31:34.970 I'm so impressed with the vision of our forefathers, 00:31:34.970 --> 00:31:40.265 those that came before us in the '30s, '40s, '50s, 00:31:40.265 --> 00:31:44.345 their vision to create 00:31:44.345 --> 00:31:47.330 the infrastructure throughout the United States, 00:31:47.330 --> 00:31:51.680 the water infrastructure of locks and dams and harbors, 00:31:51.680 --> 00:31:55.115 ports, levees, hydropower, 00:31:55.115 --> 00:31:59.300 they truly had a vision for 00:31:59.300 --> 00:32:04.160 advancing the standard of living in this country. 00:32:04.160 --> 00:32:08.030 Being able to increase commerce of 00:32:08.030 --> 00:32:12.440 Ag products from the agricultural areas of the country, 00:32:12.440 --> 00:32:15.180 through the rivers, to the ports. 00:32:15.190 --> 00:32:20.150 I say this because I say our generation, 00:32:20.150 --> 00:32:24.650 I'm not sure we've been as visionary as our forefathers. 00:32:24.650 --> 00:32:26.705 We should all I think 00:32:26.705 --> 00:32:29.810 give them the credit where credit is due. 00:32:29.810 --> 00:32:31.760 I think you, 00:32:31.760 --> 00:32:33.455 the younger generation, 00:32:33.455 --> 00:32:38.690 coming out of universities such as Virginia Tech as you 00:32:38.690 --> 00:32:44.015 go forward into practice and working on various projects, 00:32:44.015 --> 00:32:46.775 you're the next generation that 00:32:46.775 --> 00:32:49.865 can make a difference, if you will, 00:32:49.865 --> 00:32:54.800 into keeping our infrastructure 00:32:54.800 --> 00:32:59.280 operating and at a high level of safety. 00:32:59.740 --> 00:33:03.980 Again, I find those statistics 00:33:03.980 --> 00:33:06.485 rather fascinating but again, 00:33:06.485 --> 00:33:10.290 try to give credit to the previous generations. 00:33:10.330 --> 00:33:14.720 Transitioning from the traditional view 00:33:14.720 --> 00:33:16.520 of infrastructure of safety 00:33:16.520 --> 00:33:22.820 was generally fundamental engineering strengths 00:33:22.820 --> 00:33:23.870 of materials, 00:33:23.870 --> 00:33:28.055 geologic characterization, laboratory testing to 00:33:28.055 --> 00:33:30.770 identify engineering properties of 00:33:30.770 --> 00:33:32.570 materials and from there, 00:33:32.570 --> 00:33:37.610 utilize existing materials to design dams or levees, 00:33:37.610 --> 00:33:39.710 and construct them with stable slopes 00:33:39.710 --> 00:33:41.540 and such that they could handle 00:33:41.540 --> 00:33:44.930 the hydrologic and seismic loads 00:33:44.930 --> 00:33:47.735 without failure and this were, 00:33:47.735 --> 00:33:50.705 and still are standards-based. 00:33:50.705 --> 00:33:56.060 You're certainly experiencing all of those factors, 00:33:56.060 --> 00:33:59.090 all of those areas as you continue and 00:33:59.090 --> 00:34:04.160 progress through your education. 00:34:04.160 --> 00:34:09.095 But in the last 30 years, 00:34:09.095 --> 00:34:11.390 at least in the federal world, 00:34:11.390 --> 00:34:14.000 and it's slowly transitioning from federal 00:34:14.000 --> 00:34:18.200 to states and other private owners, 00:34:18.200 --> 00:34:20.105 we're transitioning to get to 00:34:20.105 --> 00:34:24.605 a risk-informed view of the infrastructure. 00:34:24.605 --> 00:34:27.440 In that context, you'll hear 00:34:27.440 --> 00:34:29.740 the word risk almost 00:34:29.740 --> 00:34:33.355 universally in just about every sentence. 00:34:33.355 --> 00:34:37.855 Fundamentally, it's a function of the hazard, 00:34:37.855 --> 00:34:41.570 the loading response to that loading, 00:34:41.570 --> 00:34:44.570 and evaluating the consequences. 00:34:44.570 --> 00:34:48.320 As I said in the early days of dam safety, 00:34:48.320 --> 00:34:50.960 when I was working at the Bureau of Rec, 00:34:50.960 --> 00:34:54.935 we, I think, did a good job 00:34:54.935 --> 00:34:58.955 of evaluating the potential failure modes. 00:34:58.955 --> 00:35:02.255 We might not have used that particular term, 00:35:02.255 --> 00:35:05.660 but we certainly identified the geologic conditions, 00:35:05.660 --> 00:35:09.440 evaluated strengths of materials, 00:35:09.440 --> 00:35:12.800 and decided whether we needed a cutoff wall, 00:35:12.800 --> 00:35:15.980 or whether we needed to grout the foundation or do 00:35:15.980 --> 00:35:19.820 some other special means of foundation treatment. 00:35:19.820 --> 00:35:23.180 We stood on the crest of the dam and said, 00:35:23.180 --> 00:35:25.310 well, there's a lot of people down there, 00:35:25.310 --> 00:35:30.920 but we didn't really exert the analysis to 00:35:30.920 --> 00:35:36.050 categorize and assimilate that information 00:35:36.050 --> 00:35:37.970 as it was part of our decision-making, 00:35:37.970 --> 00:35:41.375 it was not really a formal part of that. 00:35:41.375 --> 00:35:44.165 Again, as we transferred, 00:35:44.165 --> 00:35:46.955 if you will, into 00:35:46.955 --> 00:35:49.760 those risk-informed decision-making process, 00:35:49.760 --> 00:35:51.650 which is the guiding principles for 00:35:51.650 --> 00:35:53.720 our safety programs, again, 00:35:53.720 --> 00:35:55.880 we spent a lot of time and 00:35:55.880 --> 00:35:59.345 rigor to evaluate the loading conditions, 00:35:59.345 --> 00:36:02.840 assessed how the dam or levee would 00:36:02.840 --> 00:36:06.215 perform under those loading conditions, and certainly, 00:36:06.215 --> 00:36:08.150 we've put a lot more rigor in 00:36:08.150 --> 00:36:14.400 assessing the potential consequences. 00:36:16.680 --> 00:36:22.915 It certainly has been well served 00:36:22.915 --> 00:36:29.800 in coordinating in the federal community of dam owners. 00:36:29.800 --> 00:36:32.710 But it's also been very powerful in communicating 00:36:32.710 --> 00:36:35.650 with our legislatures in each state, 00:36:35.650 --> 00:36:38.230 as well as Congress in terms of 00:36:38.230 --> 00:36:41.650 defining the condition of our infrastructure. 00:36:41.650 --> 00:36:46.450 As I said, average age of dams is 65 plus years. 00:36:46.450 --> 00:36:50.590 There's over 600,000 bridges in the United States, 00:36:50.590 --> 00:36:54.040 150,000 miles of levees, 00:36:54.040 --> 00:37:01.075 untold numbers of roads and pavement, and that thing. 00:37:01.075 --> 00:37:02.830 Again, the extent of 00:37:02.830 --> 00:37:05.080 our infrastructure that we all benefit 00:37:05.080 --> 00:37:09.820 from is truly amazing when you consider it. 00:37:09.820 --> 00:37:11.560 Truly, most of it has been built in 00:37:11.560 --> 00:37:15.535 the last 100 years of our country. 00:37:15.535 --> 00:37:18.685 Being able to articulate 00:37:18.685 --> 00:37:22.540 to the legislatures and to Congress 00:37:22.540 --> 00:37:29.470 about our needs as agencies like the Core, Bureau, TVA. 00:37:29.470 --> 00:37:31.540 We have this infrastructure. 00:37:31.540 --> 00:37:33.460 It's in this condition. 00:37:33.460 --> 00:37:35.755 We need these monies 00:37:35.755 --> 00:37:38.650 appropriated so that we can go forth and 00:37:38.650 --> 00:37:41.410 execute modifications or repairs to 00:37:41.410 --> 00:37:45.355 these structures to maintain their serviceability. 00:37:45.355 --> 00:37:48.460 Again, a very interesting graph here. 00:37:48.460 --> 00:37:51.160 This is a chart over 00:37:51.160 --> 00:37:56.215 the last 120 years from 1,900 present, 00:37:56.215 --> 00:37:59.980 showing the number of 00:37:59.980 --> 00:38:03.070 dams constructed in the United States. 00:38:03.070 --> 00:38:07.960 You can see after World War II, '30s, '40s, '50s, 00:38:07.960 --> 00:38:13.330 just a tremendous amount of dams that were designed and 00:38:13.330 --> 00:38:18.580 constructed in the United States by the Bureau, 00:38:18.580 --> 00:38:24.550 core, TVA, other agencies and organizations. 00:38:24.550 --> 00:38:28.420 Since the '80s dam construction with 00:38:28.420 --> 00:38:33.950 the implementation of environmental regulations. 00:38:34.440 --> 00:38:38.800 Certainly, it's more challenging to move forward 00:38:38.800 --> 00:38:42.655 and modify structures, giving those regulations. 00:38:42.655 --> 00:38:45.850 I've had the great fortune worked on the last two dam, 00:38:45.850 --> 00:38:48.385 major dams built in the United States. 00:38:48.385 --> 00:38:50.050 Ridges Base and dam for 00:38:50.050 --> 00:38:52.360 the bureau outside of Durango, Colorado, 00:38:52.360 --> 00:38:56.395 and the core constructed Portuguese dam, 00:38:56.395 --> 00:39:01.645 RCC Dam outside of Ponce, Puerto Rico. 00:39:01.645 --> 00:39:03.340 Again, I've been blessed in 00:39:03.340 --> 00:39:05.425 that I've been able to work on 00:39:05.425 --> 00:39:07.000 a significant number of 00:39:07.000 --> 00:39:10.795 dams around the country and around the world. 00:39:10.795 --> 00:39:15.445 I've been able to also modify and work on several. 00:39:15.445 --> 00:39:18.955 Again, having ended my career with the core, 00:39:18.955 --> 00:39:20.680 I have quite a few statistics 00:39:20.680 --> 00:39:22.390 primarily focused on the core. 00:39:22.390 --> 00:39:28.000 Again, the core in their portfolio has 715 dams, 00:39:28.000 --> 00:39:32.515 almost 90% 86% are embankment dams. 00:39:32.515 --> 00:39:35.830 The average height around 93 feet, and again, 00:39:35.830 --> 00:39:40.520 average age 65 years or so. 00:39:41.070 --> 00:39:44.950 This is just a map of the United States showing where 00:39:44.950 --> 00:39:49.750 the major dams are located within the core inventory. 00:39:49.750 --> 00:39:52.840 Again, the core has 715, the bureau, 00:39:52.840 --> 00:39:56.380 around 400 TVA around 200. 00:39:56.380 --> 00:40:00.385 Burke regulates 2,200 dams or so, 00:40:00.385 --> 00:40:03.250 and then NRCS has approximately 00:40:03.250 --> 00:40:07.630 22,000 dams in their inventory. 00:40:07.630 --> 00:40:12.580 Over the last decade as the cores transitioned 00:40:12.580 --> 00:40:16.810 from two risk-informed decision-making, 00:40:16.810 --> 00:40:19.315 they have assessed each of their structures. 00:40:19.315 --> 00:40:21.040 You'll see this chart, 00:40:21.040 --> 00:40:23.275 this is FM chart. 00:40:23.275 --> 00:40:30.100 The X is annual probability of failure versus life loss. 00:40:30.100 --> 00:40:33.625 Dots that plot above the line 00:40:33.625 --> 00:40:37.510 are pieces of infrastructure dams, 00:40:37.510 --> 00:40:41.440 levees, locks that have high risk. 00:40:41.440 --> 00:40:42.970 They've been assessed. 00:40:42.970 --> 00:40:45.745 Failure modes have been developed, 00:40:45.745 --> 00:40:47.920 and evaluated and judged by 00:40:47.920 --> 00:40:50.995 a multi-disciplinary engineering team 00:40:50.995 --> 00:40:52.540 that the dam needs to be 00:40:52.540 --> 00:40:55.495 modified or the levee needs to be 00:40:55.495 --> 00:40:59.995 modified to obtain or maintain safe operation. 00:40:59.995 --> 00:41:05.470 Almost half of the 3,000 pieces of infrastructure 00:41:05.470 --> 00:41:07.900 that the core maintains and 00:41:07.900 --> 00:41:10.660 operates on behalf of the country, 00:41:10.660 --> 00:41:13.975 about half of that inventory needs 00:41:13.975 --> 00:41:17.860 is judged to be high risk and needs to be modified. 00:41:17.860 --> 00:41:20.800 In addition to dams and levees, 00:41:20.800 --> 00:41:26.335 the core operates about 240 lock structures 00:41:26.335 --> 00:41:31.190 on the major river systems in the country, 00:41:31.710 --> 00:41:37.225 again representing a value of $3 trillion. 00:41:37.225 --> 00:41:42.985 Again, a tremendous portfolio of infrastructure. 00:41:42.985 --> 00:41:45.880 As the core has transitioned, 00:41:45.880 --> 00:41:48.460 they would tell you that it's not 00:41:48.460 --> 00:41:53.305 necessarily the structure of 65 years old it's 00:41:53.305 --> 00:41:57.010 because the major risk drivers that have been 00:41:57.010 --> 00:41:59.035 identified is just there were 00:41:59.035 --> 00:42:01.630 defects or flaws in the design. 00:42:01.630 --> 00:42:03.700 The state of practice, 00:42:03.700 --> 00:42:06.550 material technologies have changed. 00:42:06.550 --> 00:42:09.910 Concrete is iron-trained now, 00:42:09.910 --> 00:42:13.360 with many additives so the durability of concrete 00:42:13.360 --> 00:42:17.005 is much better than it was say back in the '20s or '30s, 00:42:17.005 --> 00:42:18.895 those kinds of things. 00:42:18.895 --> 00:42:20.290 But as you can appreciate, 00:42:20.290 --> 00:42:23.305 the country's population has increased 00:42:23.305 --> 00:42:27.190 dramatically in the last 100 years. 00:42:27.190 --> 00:42:32.350 Last census, we're somewhere around 330 million people 00:42:32.350 --> 00:42:33.940 in this country so 00:42:33.940 --> 00:42:37.435 the amount of consequences 00:42:37.435 --> 00:42:41.920 the property development houses, 00:42:41.920 --> 00:42:43.810 people living behind dams or 00:42:43.810 --> 00:42:46.525 levees has grown exponentially, 00:42:46.525 --> 00:42:49.195 thereby creating the risk. 00:42:49.195 --> 00:42:54.610 Fundamentally risk inform methodology 00:42:54.610 --> 00:42:57.550 allows organizations such as the bureau 00:42:57.550 --> 00:43:00.940 or the Core to be able to rack and stack. 00:43:00.940 --> 00:43:04.360 If you own 3,000 pieces of infrastructure, 00:43:04.360 --> 00:43:07.645 how do you decide what to work on first? 00:43:07.645 --> 00:43:13.720 Risk has been very powerful in being able to assimilate, 00:43:13.720 --> 00:43:16.420 evaluate the portfolio of infrastructure, 00:43:16.420 --> 00:43:19.885 and be able to decide this is Number 1 priority, 00:43:19.885 --> 00:43:23.245 and this is Number 3,000 priority. 00:43:23.245 --> 00:43:25.780 Again, it's very powerful in working, 00:43:25.780 --> 00:43:28.720 coordinating with legislatures and Congress, 00:43:28.720 --> 00:43:31.540 to be able to tell that story in 00:43:31.540 --> 00:43:34.360 a compelling and persuasive manner such that you 00:43:34.360 --> 00:43:38.350 can solicit and obtain the funding 00:43:38.350 --> 00:43:42.640 so you can go forth and maintain these structures. 00:43:42.640 --> 00:43:44.575 Again, the Core has 00:43:44.575 --> 00:43:48.265 spent a considerable amount of effort, 00:43:48.265 --> 00:43:50.440 money, and labor hours, 00:43:50.440 --> 00:43:56.005 to develop databases and be able to continue 00:43:56.005 --> 00:44:01.750 to track the condition of the infrastructure. 00:44:01.750 --> 00:44:07.870 As I said, having these statistics, this information, 00:44:07.870 --> 00:44:09.610 we've been able to tell 00:44:09.610 --> 00:44:12.970 a very powerful and compelling message 00:44:12.970 --> 00:44:14.710 to the legislature. 00:44:14.710 --> 00:44:18.850 This is just a general graph, 00:44:18.850 --> 00:44:20.410 if you will, or chart, 00:44:20.410 --> 00:44:25.030 being able to identify and depict and show 00:44:25.030 --> 00:44:27.910 a particular failure mode and is 00:44:27.910 --> 00:44:31.390 it a high likelihood and what's the consequences. 00:44:31.390 --> 00:44:33.940 Of course, red being more critical than green. 00:44:33.940 --> 00:44:36.490 But again, this, you might all 00:44:36.490 --> 00:44:39.190 view it as rather straightforward and commonsensical. 00:44:39.190 --> 00:44:40.840 But nonetheless, it still 00:44:40.840 --> 00:44:43.960 becomes a powerful tool to be able to 00:44:43.960 --> 00:44:49.255 communicate this in terms of what do you know, 00:44:49.255 --> 00:44:52.015 what do you not know, what truly? 00:44:52.015 --> 00:44:53.575 Try to be able to 00:44:53.575 --> 00:44:57.310 assimilate information and be able to tell that story. 00:44:57.310 --> 00:45:01.270 You're able to tell where the source of risk is. 00:45:01.270 --> 00:45:05.170 Then through engineering, you're able to be able to 00:45:05.170 --> 00:45:08.110 identify those engineering solutions 00:45:08.110 --> 00:45:10.360 that you're asking money for to go forth, 00:45:10.360 --> 00:45:13.420 so fundamental to any of 00:45:13.420 --> 00:45:16.030 the dam safety levee safety programs 00:45:16.030 --> 00:45:17.605 ongoing in the country. 00:45:17.605 --> 00:45:20.890 Life safety is paramount. 00:45:20.890 --> 00:45:24.340 You'll hear it, and it may sound cliche, 00:45:24.340 --> 00:45:27.520 but nonetheless, it's truly the guiding principle. 00:45:27.520 --> 00:45:31.480 Life safety is the critical aspect of 00:45:31.480 --> 00:45:33.865 decision maker sitting at a table 00:45:33.865 --> 00:45:36.820 evaluating information and trying to make decision. 00:45:36.820 --> 00:45:41.890 Again, somewhat cliche, but we say it all the time in 00:45:41.890 --> 00:45:44.050 our meetings and as we evaluate 00:45:44.050 --> 00:45:47.155 structures and try to make decisions, we do no harm. 00:45:47.155 --> 00:45:49.660 If we need to modify the structure. 00:45:49.660 --> 00:45:53.800 The principle is do no harm let's modify it, 00:45:53.800 --> 00:45:55.870 but let's not increase the risk during 00:45:55.870 --> 00:46:00.500 the construction period to unacceptable levels. 00:46:00.900 --> 00:46:03.835 I think one of the great things 00:46:03.835 --> 00:46:06.280 with the transitioning to risk 00:46:06.280 --> 00:46:08.800 informed is we're now starting to 00:46:08.800 --> 00:46:11.965 really focus on systems approach. 00:46:11.965 --> 00:46:14.590 We're thinking of the Mississippi River or 00:46:14.590 --> 00:46:17.905 the Ohio River as its own system. 00:46:17.905 --> 00:46:20.670 We're not just focused on lock and 00:46:20.670 --> 00:46:23.865 dam 26 outside of St. Louis we're 00:46:23.865 --> 00:46:29.050 truly looking at the river as 00:46:29.050 --> 00:46:31.300 a system similar with like 00:46:31.300 --> 00:46:32.740 the Missouri River that has 00:46:32.740 --> 00:46:36.265 some very significant dams, Fort Peck. 00:46:36.265 --> 00:46:38.710 These are some of the largest Earth 00:46:38.710 --> 00:46:42.925 dams the world on the Missouri River. 00:46:42.925 --> 00:46:47.455 When we go through and evaluate them, 00:46:47.455 --> 00:46:49.990 we're truly looking at it as a system and 00:46:49.990 --> 00:46:53.320 looking at the potential for cascading failures. 00:46:53.320 --> 00:46:55.015 If say, Fort Peck 00:46:55.015 --> 00:46:58.120 released its tremendous volume downstream, 00:46:58.120 --> 00:47:02.090 how would that impact the lower dams? 00:47:02.490 --> 00:47:07.120 Very powerful. It's very periodic and continuing, 00:47:07.120 --> 00:47:10.620 so the regulations policy 00:47:10.620 --> 00:47:13.710 that's been developed every 10 years. 00:47:13.710 --> 00:47:17.475 Every 10 years, a dam or a levee goes through 00:47:17.475 --> 00:47:20.380 a very rigorous inspection by 00:47:20.380 --> 00:47:23.455 a very experienced, multi-disciplined team. 00:47:23.455 --> 00:47:26.740 That information again, is evaluated. 00:47:26.740 --> 00:47:30.325 Failure modes are reevaluated, 00:47:30.325 --> 00:47:32.410 and those that rise to the top as 00:47:32.410 --> 00:47:37.310 the highest risk are those that are worked on. 00:47:38.950 --> 00:47:41.630 Some of the lessons learned as 00:47:41.630 --> 00:47:44.915 we've transitioned over the last decade 00:47:44.915 --> 00:47:48.740 is many would view 00:47:48.740 --> 00:47:53.990 standards-based approach as inadequate. 00:47:53.990 --> 00:47:57.815 Problems typically have been 00:47:57.815 --> 00:48:01.890 shown to be larger than we expected. 00:48:01.900 --> 00:48:06.500 Again, over half of the pieces of 00:48:06.500 --> 00:48:08.480 inventory that the core manager 00:48:08.480 --> 00:48:10.925 has judged to be in need of repair. 00:48:10.925 --> 00:48:12.320 Again, given their age, 00:48:12.320 --> 00:48:14.570 that really probably isn't a surprise. 00:48:14.570 --> 00:48:18.230 But again, being able to evaluate them, 00:48:18.230 --> 00:48:20.630 assimilate them, be able to figure out whether 00:48:20.630 --> 00:48:23.180 it's a concrete deterioration problem, 00:48:23.180 --> 00:48:25.715 or the valves need to be replaced, 00:48:25.715 --> 00:48:29.330 or the gates need to be upgraded again 00:48:29.330 --> 00:48:33.710 are all very important as we move forward. 00:48:33.710 --> 00:48:38.540 Certainly it's not always intuitive what's risky, 00:48:38.540 --> 00:48:41.420 and we have to keep reminding ourselves, 00:48:41.420 --> 00:48:44.885 certainly it's a marathon and not a sprint. 00:48:44.885 --> 00:48:49.750 We've been able to become much more 00:48:49.750 --> 00:48:52.840 intelligent about the status 00:48:52.840 --> 00:48:55.000 of our infrastructure in this country, 00:48:55.000 --> 00:49:00.010 dams, bridges, levees, those things. 00:49:00.010 --> 00:49:03.160 I think those of us in 00:49:03.160 --> 00:49:07.520 the federal agencies being responsible for the portfolio, 00:49:07.520 --> 00:49:09.920 we definitely go to sleep at night believing 00:49:09.920 --> 00:49:12.560 that we're taking care of 00:49:12.560 --> 00:49:14.330 the taxpayers money in 00:49:14.330 --> 00:49:17.090 a very responsible manner and 00:49:17.090 --> 00:49:21.540 definitely serving the citizens of the United States. 00:49:21.970 --> 00:49:25.175 Moving on to some of 00:49:25.175 --> 00:49:30.785 the concepts and practice of risk assessment. 00:49:30.785 --> 00:49:35.840 It started back in the '80s. 00:49:35.840 --> 00:49:40.055 You can see this chart here where dams fall. 00:49:40.055 --> 00:49:46.070 Generally all areas were evaluated, 00:49:46.070 --> 00:49:49.910 chemical engineering, railroads, those things. 00:49:49.910 --> 00:49:54.090 You can see consequence of failure. 00:49:54.880 --> 00:49:59.135 Probability of failure was generally 10^-4. 00:49:59.135 --> 00:50:01.205 One in 10,000 is 00:50:01.205 --> 00:50:05.630 generally the average probability of something 00:50:05.630 --> 00:50:12.470 failing like a dam or levee. 00:50:12.470 --> 00:50:17.390 Again, started in earnest in the '80s, 00:50:17.390 --> 00:50:20.850 certainly with NASA, 00:50:20.850 --> 00:50:25.090 the space program, and the development of 00:50:25.090 --> 00:50:28.640 rocket travel and all of 00:50:28.640 --> 00:50:31.400 the engineering that goes associated with that in 00:50:31.400 --> 00:50:34.220 terms of failure modes certainly 00:50:34.220 --> 00:50:36.050 brought that forward as 00:50:36.050 --> 00:50:41.610 far of other civil infrastructure. 00:50:41.650 --> 00:50:48.035 Again, 1979 Federal Guidelines in 1983, 00:50:48.035 --> 00:50:53.390 Research Council was the pioneering aspect 00:50:53.390 --> 00:50:55.325 for the federal agencies. 00:50:55.325 --> 00:51:00.350 In this Dam Safety Act of '78, '79, 00:51:00.350 --> 00:51:05.810 there was specific language written 00:51:05.810 --> 00:51:08.210 that focused the agencies to start 00:51:08.210 --> 00:51:11.975 thinking in terms of risk and failure modes. 00:51:11.975 --> 00:51:15.620 Again, a lot of this has its root 00:51:15.620 --> 00:51:20.460 in the space world NASA. 00:51:21.010 --> 00:51:24.110 As you can see other countries, 00:51:24.110 --> 00:51:28.910 in Britain, Hong Kong, 00:51:28.910 --> 00:51:31.055 and in particular in Australia, 00:51:31.055 --> 00:51:35.090 those countries also began developing 00:51:35.090 --> 00:51:38.030 the methodologies and the processes 00:51:38.030 --> 00:51:40.610 that we continue to utilize. 00:51:40.610 --> 00:51:47.330 In late '70s transitioning through the '80s and the '90s, 00:51:47.330 --> 00:51:51.080 reclamation probably led other federal agencies 00:51:51.080 --> 00:51:55.730 in developing risk informed decision making. 00:51:55.730 --> 00:52:01.010 The first study was done for Jackson Lake Dam 00:52:01.010 --> 00:52:05.780 in 1976 and was led by Larry Von Thun, 00:52:05.780 --> 00:52:09.470 who really pioneered the development 00:52:09.470 --> 00:52:13.940 of risk analysis along with Dr. John Smart at the bureau. 00:52:13.940 --> 00:52:17.540 There was a team formed and they developed 00:52:17.540 --> 00:52:21.020 the first guidelines, if you will. 00:52:21.020 --> 00:52:24.635 Larry worked with the Canadian hydros, 00:52:24.635 --> 00:52:26.735 BC Hydro in particular, 00:52:26.735 --> 00:52:30.260 and began developing the processes where 00:52:30.260 --> 00:52:35.990 we evaluated the structures, developed failure modes, 00:52:35.990 --> 00:52:40.175 and went through a methodology to evaluate, 00:52:40.175 --> 00:52:42.890 could a dam fail and start assessing 00:52:42.890 --> 00:52:46.160 probabilities of a potential failure mode. 00:52:46.160 --> 00:52:48.830 Parallel to that, we also put 00:52:48.830 --> 00:52:51.560 a lot of rigor into upgrading and 00:52:51.560 --> 00:52:54.320 reevaluating the hydrologic floods 00:52:54.320 --> 00:52:57.245 and the seismic earthquake loadings 00:52:57.245 --> 00:52:59.690 and certainly then there was a lot more rigor 00:52:59.690 --> 00:53:04.470 put into evaluating consequences. 00:53:04.990 --> 00:53:09.170 The bureau has been through their inventory of 00:53:09.170 --> 00:53:14.030 400 structures in the last 40 years. 00:53:14.030 --> 00:53:17.390 They've been through it 4-5 times. 00:53:17.390 --> 00:53:20.375 Essentially, they have fixed 00:53:20.375 --> 00:53:23.720 their highest risk structures in those 40 years, 00:53:23.720 --> 00:53:26.210 but they continue to monitor them through 00:53:26.210 --> 00:53:27.800 the instrumentation and through 00:53:27.800 --> 00:53:30.500 their inspection program, 00:53:30.500 --> 00:53:34.220 and continually re-evaluate failure modes 00:53:34.220 --> 00:53:37.010 and re-evaluate the loading conditions and 00:53:37.010 --> 00:53:40.115 consequences and continually updating 00:53:40.115 --> 00:53:46.170 the risk assessment if you will or the risk category. 00:53:46.600 --> 00:53:51.650 Again moving forward, trying to apply to the timeline. 00:53:51.650 --> 00:53:55.370 You're transitioning from '70s 00:53:55.370 --> 00:53:57.530 through the '80s to the current. 00:53:57.530 --> 00:54:00.890 Now, if you're involved in the business, 00:54:00.890 --> 00:54:04.380 certainly the states are becoming very active. 00:54:04.690 --> 00:54:06.740 Trying to move forward. 00:54:06.740 --> 00:54:09.480 I think I'm pressed for time a bit. 00:54:10.240 --> 00:54:13.850 Again, a busy slide, so I apologize. 00:54:13.850 --> 00:54:15.560 But again, trying to summarize 00:54:15.560 --> 00:54:20.430 the various milestones along the time lines. 00:54:24.550 --> 00:54:27.380 Trying to move forward a bit. 00:54:27.380 --> 00:54:29.645 To give you a bit of context, 00:54:29.645 --> 00:54:31.640 what is damn safety risks? 00:54:31.640 --> 00:54:33.440 It's simply the probability of 00:54:33.440 --> 00:54:37.010 some undesirable event occurring that would 00:54:37.010 --> 00:54:40.910 generate serious economic consequences 00:54:40.910 --> 00:54:43.310 or life loss downstream. 00:54:43.310 --> 00:54:45.620 I said we wouldn't have formulas, 00:54:45.620 --> 00:54:47.390 but here's the risk formula, 00:54:47.390 --> 00:54:51.270 which is again the probabilities of the loading. 00:54:51.940 --> 00:54:55.910 Evaluating the probability of 00:54:55.910 --> 00:54:57.530 the response of the structure to 00:54:57.530 --> 00:55:00.020 the loading by the consequences. 00:55:00.020 --> 00:55:03.110 As I said, considerable amount 00:55:03.110 --> 00:55:06.605 of energy within the federal world 00:55:06.605 --> 00:55:09.440 and in academia around the country 00:55:09.440 --> 00:55:13.790 to evaluate the loading conditions. 00:55:13.790 --> 00:55:19.340 I know those of you in hydraulic engineering, certainly, 00:55:19.340 --> 00:55:20.915 considerable amount of effort 00:55:20.915 --> 00:55:23.150 ongoing at this university with 00:55:23.150 --> 00:55:26.930 seismic research and seismic evaluations, 00:55:26.930 --> 00:55:29.105 trying to do better, 00:55:29.105 --> 00:55:32.315 and get more educated 00:55:32.315 --> 00:55:36.125 on what those loads are and how structures would respond. 00:55:36.125 --> 00:55:39.635 Again, this is a typical event tree. 00:55:39.635 --> 00:55:43.010 Typically there's eight nodes, 00:55:43.010 --> 00:55:45.635 if you will, to a typical event tree. 00:55:45.635 --> 00:55:49.430 Is there a flaw and what is the loading? 00:55:49.430 --> 00:55:51.980 Then stepping through whether that would 00:55:51.980 --> 00:55:55.340 create a failure of 00:55:55.340 --> 00:55:58.560 the structure and release of the reservoir. 00:55:59.020 --> 00:56:04.250 Several software programs have been developed. 00:56:04.250 --> 00:56:06.680 LifeSym and others, continually 00:56:06.680 --> 00:56:09.470 being developed and upgraded to 00:56:09.470 --> 00:56:13.040 evaluate the consequences and with 00:56:13.040 --> 00:56:16.715 today's GIS technology being able to 00:56:16.715 --> 00:56:21.275 truly look at limits of inundation from breach, 00:56:21.275 --> 00:56:24.770 and quickly assessing population 00:56:24.770 --> 00:56:27.860 at risk and assessing potential life loss. 00:56:27.860 --> 00:56:30.560 Again, the rigor and the ability with 00:56:30.560 --> 00:56:34.910 today's technology to do that is just amazing. 00:56:34.910 --> 00:56:38.090 With that there's always uncertainty, 00:56:38.090 --> 00:56:41.090 so we're definitely always trying to 00:56:41.090 --> 00:56:45.425 assess if we make a risk evaluation how certain are we, 00:56:45.425 --> 00:56:48.320 what are the bands of uncertainty and 00:56:48.320 --> 00:56:51.800 certainly factor that into decision making. 00:56:51.800 --> 00:56:57.510 There's aleatoric or statistical uncertainty. 00:56:57.670 --> 00:57:02.480 An example, might be statistical variation in 00:57:02.480 --> 00:57:05.240 a filter boundary that you 00:57:05.240 --> 00:57:08.240 can evaluate from controlled laboratory test. 00:57:08.240 --> 00:57:11.825 Epistemic uncertainty is, 00:57:11.825 --> 00:57:13.745 if you didn't know about it, 00:57:13.745 --> 00:57:17.000 that creates its own level of uncertainty, 00:57:17.000 --> 00:57:23.450 so those things are included in a risk assessment. 00:57:23.450 --> 00:57:27.305 There has been numerous guidelines developed. 00:57:27.305 --> 00:57:29.900 The federal guidelines for dam safety 00:57:29.900 --> 00:57:34.730 was put out in '79 as part of the legislation. 00:57:34.730 --> 00:57:38.420 The bureau's first risk protection guidelines 00:57:38.420 --> 00:57:40.445 came out in '97. 00:57:40.445 --> 00:57:45.605 Core published their dam safety guidelines in 2011, 00:57:45.605 --> 00:57:47.810 and then all the federal agencies put 00:57:47.810 --> 00:57:50.465 out the federal guidelines in '15. 00:57:50.465 --> 00:57:52.205 Most recently fur 00:57:52.205 --> 00:57:55.700 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has issued 00:57:55.700 --> 00:57:58.490 their own risk guidelines which are 00:57:58.490 --> 00:58:01.820 similar to the core and to the bureau's. 00:58:01.820 --> 00:58:07.685 Again, they regulate about 2,200 dams in the country. 00:58:07.685 --> 00:58:09.260 As you can appreciate, 00:58:09.260 --> 00:58:11.270 there's various levels of 00:58:11.270 --> 00:58:15.350 risk analysis from a screening level to a moderate, 00:58:15.350 --> 00:58:18.320 to a very though and complex depending 00:58:18.320 --> 00:58:21.545 on what decision you need to make. 00:58:21.545 --> 00:58:23.960 Certainly the more rigor that goes into 00:58:23.960 --> 00:58:26.645 it with more information allows for 00:58:26.645 --> 00:58:34.210 a robust evaluation and very solid information 00:58:34.210 --> 00:58:37.000 for decision makers to make in terms 00:58:37.000 --> 00:58:39.405 of figuring out what 00:58:39.405 --> 00:58:41.960 structure needs to be worked on first. 00:58:41.960 --> 00:58:45.065 Again, this summarizes those four levels. 00:58:45.065 --> 00:58:47.120 Level 1 being the simplest, 00:58:47.120 --> 00:58:49.055 the screening risk analysis, 00:58:49.055 --> 00:58:51.875 Level 4 being the most rigorous. 00:58:51.875 --> 00:58:54.860 Sometimes like for Oroville 00:58:54.860 --> 00:58:57.935 after the spillway event there. 00:58:57.935 --> 00:59:02.540 To evaluate that structure to a Level 4 screening took 00:59:02.540 --> 00:59:04.880 several million dollars and took 00:59:04.880 --> 00:59:08.960 about six months of about 30 people working on it, 00:59:08.960 --> 00:59:12.800 so it's not a trivial level 00:59:12.800 --> 00:59:15.110 of effort or trivial amount of money. 00:59:15.110 --> 00:59:17.780 When you talk about doing 00:59:17.780 --> 00:59:20.240 a very detailed risk analysis 00:59:20.240 --> 00:59:23.195 for complex structures like Oroville. 00:59:23.195 --> 00:59:25.880 The Core and the Bureau of collaborated and 00:59:25.880 --> 00:59:28.790 developed the best practices training course. 00:59:28.790 --> 00:59:30.545 It's 40 hours, 00:59:30.545 --> 00:59:33.860 given at various locations around the country, 00:59:33.860 --> 00:59:38.600 transitioning that to USSD to be able to 00:59:38.600 --> 00:59:42.830 broaden the exposure of that training to the 00:59:42.830 --> 00:59:46.010 profession. This is from FERC, 00:59:46.010 --> 00:59:48.140 this is the different levels 00:59:48.140 --> 00:59:52.490 of failure categories that you might use as 00:59:52.490 --> 00:59:54.755 a guide when you're making your evaluations. 00:59:54.755 --> 00:59:59.630 These are, again, several categories that are used 00:59:59.630 --> 01:00:05.075 in assessing life safety as well as those economics. 01:00:05.075 --> 01:00:08.075 Again, screening level is the simplest, 01:00:08.075 --> 01:00:09.980 may take a day, 01:00:09.980 --> 01:00:11.480 may take several days. 01:00:11.480 --> 01:00:15.845 A moderate one might take 40 hours and something 01:00:15.845 --> 01:00:18.230 like a Level 4 may take 01:00:18.230 --> 01:00:22.260 several months and several million dollars. 01:00:22.900 --> 01:00:27.830 Again, it allows in 01:00:27.830 --> 01:00:31.220 combination with standard based typical factors 01:00:31.220 --> 01:00:33.350 of safety and strength of materials, 01:00:33.350 --> 01:00:37.985 we're able to bring into play the failure modes. 01:00:37.985 --> 01:00:41.555 Are they risky, are the loading conditions correct? 01:00:41.555 --> 01:00:43.490 Be able to make 01:00:43.490 --> 01:00:47.810 a better informed decision on behalf of the taxpayers and 01:00:47.810 --> 01:00:50.420 the citizens of the country to be able to invest 01:00:50.420 --> 01:00:52.340 our tax dollars in 01:00:52.340 --> 01:00:55.680 the most effective and efficient manner. 01:00:55.930 --> 01:00:59.090 Comparing standard based to 01:00:59.090 --> 01:01:02.950 RIDM if you can read the table there, 01:01:02.950 --> 01:01:04.930 so standard base with 01:01:04.930 --> 01:01:07.585 definitely more focused on the loading, 01:01:07.585 --> 01:01:10.150 reaction, strength of materials, 01:01:10.150 --> 01:01:14.440 stability, those evaluations. 01:01:14.440 --> 01:01:16.810 Same applies under RIDM, 01:01:16.810 --> 01:01:20.030 but we're looking at a wider range of 01:01:20.030 --> 01:01:23.840 loadings and we truly do assess and try to 01:01:23.840 --> 01:01:27.515 put probabilities to those events 01:01:27.515 --> 01:01:29.390 in order to be able to rack and 01:01:29.390 --> 01:01:32.420 stack and to be able to determine 01:01:32.420 --> 01:01:33.890 which has the highest risk and 01:01:33.890 --> 01:01:36.450 which should be worked on first. 01:01:39.550 --> 01:01:42.770 Again, these are all the components 01:01:42.770 --> 01:01:45.845 associated with utilizing RIDM. 01:01:45.845 --> 01:01:52.265 Over the last 20 plus years where it's been used in a 01:01:52.265 --> 01:01:54.455 detailed and part of 01:01:54.455 --> 01:01:58.430 the organization's operation of their infrastructure. 01:01:58.430 --> 01:02:01.460 It's definitely improved our understanding 01:02:01.460 --> 01:02:05.615 of that structure and the pieces of it 01:02:05.615 --> 01:02:11.510 and be able to bank better in decisions financially 01:02:11.510 --> 01:02:14.760 and from an engineering perspective. 01:02:15.310 --> 01:02:18.740 This again summarize the elements 01:02:18.740 --> 01:02:21.215 of dam safety risk management. 01:02:21.215 --> 01:02:23.300 You have the risk assessment, 01:02:23.300 --> 01:02:25.520 and then trying to make decisions, 01:02:25.520 --> 01:02:28.805 typically displayed in an FN chart. 01:02:28.805 --> 01:02:34.280 Again, probability of failure versus loss of life, 01:02:34.280 --> 01:02:40.730 and the line there is those summary probabilities. 01:02:40.730 --> 01:02:43.235 The plot above result in action. 01:02:43.235 --> 01:02:46.820 There higher risk and those below would be lower. 01:02:46.820 --> 01:02:48.920 The goal is with 01:02:48.920 --> 01:02:52.100 the expenditure of money and implementing 01:02:52.100 --> 01:02:55.730 engineering solutions would be to reduce that risk and 01:02:55.730 --> 01:02:59.510 get your failure modes to below the line. 01:02:59.510 --> 01:03:02.540 You'll hear that term quite frequently. 01:03:02.540 --> 01:03:06.690 Just some final thoughts. 01:03:07.300 --> 01:03:10.610 Unfortunately, I think in our country, 01:03:10.610 --> 01:03:14.270 particularly in my lifetime professional career, 01:03:14.270 --> 01:03:18.020 we seem to struggle as a country 01:03:18.020 --> 01:03:22.700 to develop a long term vision, 01:03:22.700 --> 01:03:26.720 if you will, or long term policy. 01:03:26.720 --> 01:03:32.075 Unfortunately react to catastrophic events. 01:03:32.075 --> 01:03:35.525 Key term is catastrophic event 01:03:35.525 --> 01:03:39.530 that resulted in the dam safety legislation, 01:03:39.530 --> 01:03:42.530 which forced federal agencies to start taking 01:03:42.530 --> 01:03:45.770 a more robust evaluation of their infrastructure. 01:03:45.770 --> 01:03:49.625 Katrina cause the Corps to look at levees 01:03:49.625 --> 01:03:53.915 and to look at flood walls and coastal protection. 01:03:53.915 --> 01:04:00.965 Unfortunately, I think we 01:04:00.965 --> 01:04:04.040 react to catastrophic events 01:04:04.040 --> 01:04:06.155 as a country and as a nation. 01:04:06.155 --> 01:04:10.385 I think as you go forward in your continued education, 01:04:10.385 --> 01:04:12.140 as you move into the workforce 01:04:12.140 --> 01:04:15.185 and become part of our profession, 01:04:15.185 --> 01:04:18.950 hopefully you'll leave a lasting impression and be able 01:04:18.950 --> 01:04:22.520 to advance policy and be able to 01:04:22.520 --> 01:04:27.320 advance our profession to a point where we do 01:04:27.320 --> 01:04:29.615 less reaction and maybe 01:04:29.615 --> 01:04:33.200 look forward and try to do more planning. 01:04:33.200 --> 01:04:38.000 Again, tremendous amount of damage 01:04:38.000 --> 01:04:43.230 is done by hurricanes or by dam failures, levee failures. 01:04:45.010 --> 01:04:49.100 We all need to be cognizant of 01:04:49.100 --> 01:04:53.135 that as we continue our education, and again, 01:04:53.135 --> 01:04:56.780 move in and be able to help everybody associated 01:04:56.780 --> 01:04:58.850 with maintaining what we 01:04:58.850 --> 01:05:02.100 have built and our forefathers had built. 01:05:04.330 --> 01:05:08.675 Some summary statistics of 01:05:08.675 --> 01:05:11.090 civil works value to the nation. 01:05:11.090 --> 01:05:14.600 I've again impressed for 01:05:14.600 --> 01:05:17.600 $1 that spent by the government on 01:05:17.600 --> 01:05:19.880 flood risk management prevented 01:05:19.880 --> 01:05:25.085 over $8 return in flood damages reduction of that. 01:05:25.085 --> 01:05:29.405 Again, our forefathers over the last 100 years, 01:05:29.405 --> 01:05:31.970 this country has built some of 01:05:31.970 --> 01:05:38.290 the world's most robust complicated infrastructure 01:05:38.290 --> 01:05:39.670 that we've all benefited 01:05:39.670 --> 01:05:42.055 from and certainly as you go forward, 01:05:42.055 --> 01:05:46.130 I think you all have that responsibility, 01:05:46.130 --> 01:05:50.840 if you will to take that on in maintaining that. 01:05:50.840 --> 01:05:56.075 Again, ASCE puts out their report card, 01:05:56.075 --> 01:05:59.300 as you can see, for 2021 for 01:05:59.300 --> 01:06:03.260 the various categories we're not doing the greatest. 01:06:03.260 --> 01:06:07.580 Again, as Alan said at the beginning, 01:06:07.580 --> 01:06:10.520 become involved in these professional societies. 01:06:10.520 --> 01:06:12.110 In these organizations, we 01:06:12.110 --> 01:06:15.050 are the profession's mouthpiece to 01:06:15.050 --> 01:06:17.900 our legislatures and to our Congress 01:06:17.900 --> 01:06:21.350 in order to increase our funding, 01:06:21.350 --> 01:06:25.370 to be able to make infrastructure a priority. 01:06:25.370 --> 01:06:28.040 This administration has been able 01:06:28.040 --> 01:06:29.930 to pass the infrastructure bill, 01:06:29.930 --> 01:06:32.390 which has secured funding, 01:06:32.390 --> 01:06:35.510 and it's certainly a step in the right direction. 01:06:35.510 --> 01:06:38.270 But as you can see by our report card, 01:06:38.270 --> 01:06:41.080 we still have a long ways to go 01:06:41.080 --> 01:06:45.565 to get up to acceptable marks I think. 01:06:45.565 --> 01:06:48.790 Lastly, again, I had the good fortune in 01:06:48.790 --> 01:06:54.215 my career to be associated with some phenomenal people. 01:06:54.215 --> 01:06:57.530 This is a picture of Dr. Don Deer, Dr. 01:06:57.530 --> 01:07:01.460 Skip Hendren, Ralph Peck, and Spike Underwood, 01:07:01.460 --> 01:07:03.830 who was the Corps of Engineers chief 01:07:03.830 --> 01:07:07.925 geologist at headquarters for about 20 years. 01:07:07.925 --> 01:07:10.955 They were the consulting board for New Adel Dam, 01:07:10.955 --> 01:07:14.975 which I was responsible for outside of Phoenix. 01:07:14.975 --> 01:07:17.375 I was telling Alan again at breakfast, 01:07:17.375 --> 01:07:19.820 just tremendous memories of 01:07:19.820 --> 01:07:23.045 the impact that those gentlemen had 01:07:23.045 --> 01:07:26.210 on myself as a person and certainly 01:07:26.210 --> 01:07:29.975 on my professional career going forward. 01:07:29.975 --> 01:07:32.600 Best of luck to you in 01:07:32.600 --> 01:07:37.220 your education and your professional career. 01:07:37.220 --> 01:07:38.465 I wish you the best. 01:07:38.465 --> 01:07:40.610 Again, thank you for your courtesy 01:07:40.610 --> 01:07:42.170 and for your taking time 01:07:42.170 --> 01:07:44.000 out of your busy lives to come 01:07:44.000 --> 01:07:47.070 and listen to me ramble, so I appreciate you.