How Transnational Advocacy Networks Emerge: An Empirical Investigation of a Casualty Recording Network

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ABSTRACT

This research contributes to gaps in the international relations literature explaining the emergence of transnational advocacy networks. Specifically, this research contributes to understanding TAN emergence due to a gap in institutional approaches to casualty recording in conflict and why actors join TANs. This TAN is particularly worthy of investigation because casualty records measure the scope of violence in a conflict and are often highly politicized and contested.

Existing explanations of TAN emergence can be organized into three broad categories of analysis: sociological, political, and economic. The earliest explanations align with a sociological explanation for TANs as a mechanism for changing international norms. Social movement theorists account for TANs as a mechanism for civil society to challenge power structures. While other researchers suggest TANs should be treated like interest groups, and their emergence stems from an economic need for material incentives. This research extends the economic category of analysis and argues that actors join TANs for non-material, intangible incentives. Intangible benefits include knowledge, methodologies, data, or access to data sources.

This research utilized a qualitative case study method to test all three categories of existing explanations using surveys, interviews, and archival records. Testing not only investigated hypotheses relating to the three categories of existing theories but also produced findings describing facilitators of TAN emergence, temporally-bound intangible benefits, and the types of intangible benefits available to actors.

TANs are important to international politics because they influence norms, shape policies, and function as a bridge for local actors with the international community. This research produced findings with central themes about why resource-poor actors may spend their limited resources to join TANs. Further investigation into the intangible benefits available to actors joining TANs in settings other than conflict may provide greater insight into the value of intangible benefits to collective behavior.

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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

While body counts are generally presented as a measure of accountability or to raise awareness about civilian deaths in the public sphere, body counts are fiercely contested and highly politicized. This occurs during the conflict and decades after a conflict is resolved. Civilian body counts serve as political apparatuses for states and political actors to negotiate, challenge, and produce security narratives. Because of this politicization, the number of civilian casualties in violent conflict is not fully known, and their deaths' impact on the overall state's security is not well understood. While International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights laws provide protection for civilians in conflict, documenting casualties is not addressed. International law does not prescribe methods for recording casualties; therefore, there is a gap in how international institutions approach accounting for casualties. In the early 2000s, facilitated by ICTs, civil society began to fill this gap by documenting casualties and collaborating across boundaries.

This research traces the emergence of a Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) that appeared in 2009 to collaborate on recording conflict casualties. This study produced five findings and contributes to understanding how ICTs facilitate TANs and identifying intangible benefits available to actors at network events that motivate their participation. Intangible benefits include knowledge, methodologies, data, or access to data sources.

This research is worthy of investigation because TAN development is poorly understood yet they influence international politics by shaping norms, policies and linking local communities with international organizations.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) matter because they influence international norms, shape policies, and connect local actors to international ones. This research traces a TAN performing casualty recording in conflicts. This TAN matters because it is the first civil-society casualty recording network, and its methodologies remain influential in shaping policies about casualty recordings and, consequently, the understanding of the scope of violence in a conflict. Casualty recording is worthy of investigation because it is a practice that influences diplomacy, promotes alliances, and drives international interventions. Most importantly, casualty records measure the scope, size, and intensity of a conflict and its impact on a civilian population. Casualty records also drive the mobilization of resources, which has an impact on internal and external security issues for a state. This is evident in the delivery of humanitarian aid by international organizations but also in state and troop deployments. In the US, casualty recording policy evolved from not a state activity[1] to the rationale for the troop surge in Iraq in 2007[2] to an executive order in 2016 mandating annual public reports.[3]

Contemporary conflicts are measured in the public domain by casualty numbers. The surge in Iraq States with high civilian casualty records run the risk of intervention, and the context of civilian casualties has real-world legal implications.

[1] Broder, John. "A Nation at War: the Casualties: U.S. Military Has No Count Of Iraqi Dead In Fighting." *The New York Times*, 2 Apr. 2003, pp. 3–3.

[2] United States, Congress, Foreign Relations Committee, and General Petraeus. *Congressional Record*, Congressional Record, 2007. 110th Congress, bill.

[3] Executive, President, and Barack Obama. *Executive Order 13732-United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force*, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2016, pp. 1–5.

Why Casualty Numbers are Important

The Syrian Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC) is a member of the Every Casualty Network, the focus of this research. SJAC was established in Lyon, France, by the Friends of Syria Group, a collective of international diplomats and countries led by the then-French president, Nicholas Sarkozy. The group SJAC has documented the human cost of war in Syria since 2012. SJAC is an NGO composed of activists outside of Syria—in Washington DC, and citizens on the ground of the conflict. In Idlib alone, SJAC has documented more than 250,000 Syrian refugees and casualties since December 2019. An SJAC member illustrates the critical meaning of his work:

> *I live in a small village in the Idlib countryside. I was born and raised in this village. I loved her trees and her olives and swore I would never breathe any air other than hers for as long as I could. But the bombing kept getting closer until it shattered the windows in our home. And the Syrian Army advanced until our entire village was displaced. The roads filled with people fleeing the advancing army. The people were carrying everything they could because the army officers would sell what was left behind—even the electric wiring in the houses. As our village was being displaced, Russian forces targeted a school used as a shelter, killing nine people. Their belongings, still packed in a truck—remained just in the order they had organized. Would there be anything left to acknowledge their life with belongings sold off?*

For many, like this SJAC recorder, documenting lives lost in war is personal and critical for their community to process the violence they are experiencing.

Much of the literature focuses on the claim-making of TANs regarding whether campaigns are successful either domestically or internationally.[4] While the literature looks toward the impacts of networks, little explanation is available on how these networks emerge and under what circumstances. Collaborating across borders requires dedicated resources, which is difficult for casualty recorders, who often work in opposition to a state and compete for limited international funding: "International networking is costly."[5] Existing theories do not explain why actors use their limited resources to collaborate on casualty recording in other states. This leads to the research question investigated in this project: why do NGOs with limited resources join a transnational network to collaborate on recording casualties?

This TAN was launched because institutional gaps in the protection of civilians did not address recording casualties of conflict. Yet the launch of the network does not explain why resource-poor actors would participate in the network. Existing theories suggest TANs form based on shared ideology or to gain material incentives. Those explanations are insufficient because they do not explain inconsistent participation amongst actors or participation without material incentives. This dissertation argues that actors joined the network for intangible benefits such as gaining knowledge, learning methodology, or increasing their legitimacy, professionalization, and governance. This TAN created opportunities for network members and data end-users to gain intangible, otherwise unavailable benefits.

About Casualty Recording

Transnational activist networks are of research interest to human and state security scholars, as well as social movement theorists. New research on how TANs form is needed to fill

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[4] See Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders*: Mekata, Motoko. 2000. "Building Partnerships towards a Common Goal: Experiences of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines"; Donnelly, Elizabeth. 2002. "Proclaiming Jubilee: The Debt and Structural Adjustment Network".

[5] Ibid, pg19.

the gaps in the literature. This study seeks to contribute to the understanding of how TANs form and why actors join collaborative networks.

States, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO), and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) define casualty recording differently. INGOs are non-profit organizations described as international because they "raise funds in developed countries and utilize these funds in other countries."[6] IGOs are established by a treaty that acts as a charter, and examples include the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the World Bank, and the European Union[7]. This project utilizes the definition for TANs used by the International Crescent Red Cross as the "systematic process to record all individuals killed in armed violence." The UN defines casualty recording as a form of international human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL) monitoring. Specifically, the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) defines casualty recording as a "system that seeks to methodically and comprehensively record and verify information on individuals killed (and possibly also on those injured) in a specific set of circumstances."[8] Most states do not produce reports on civilian casualties. However, when reports are published by states, they do not include sources or methods, and they designate casualties as either combatants or non-combatants.[9]

It is important to understand that there are concepts of documenting casualties similar to but different from casualty recording. Casualty recording is not casualty estimation, which is used in the fields of epidemiology or natural disasters to estimate the scope of a potential disease

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[6] Commins, S. (2010). INGOs. In: Anheier, H.K., Toepler, S. (eds) International Encyclopedia of Civil Society. Springer, New York, NY.
[7] Union of International Associations. "Union of International Associations." *What Is an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO)? | Union of International Associations*, uia.org/faq/yb3.
[8] Bachelet, Michelle. UN Publications, 2019, pp. 1–36, Guidance on Casualty Recording.
[9] "Summary of Information Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities." *DNI*, US Government, 2015, www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases.

or disaster.[10] Casualty recording is also not civilian harm tracking, which a warring party performs as part of an assessment process. This is an internal process where the armed actor gathers data on civilian harm, property damage, and destruction caused by its operations.[11] Though casualty recorders will record status and weapon information to the extent that it is available, casualty recording does not differentiate between military or civilian casualty or the type of weapon used. Therefore, casualty recording differs from the type of documenting states often perform.

Casualty Recording History

Over the past thirty years, casualty recording has developed from a marginalized activity performed by relief workers to an accepted—albeit politically contested—approach to measuring violence in conflicts. Casualty recording by TANs is not new. Missionaries, relief workers, and peacekeepers have performed this role across borders on behalf of religious communities, international organizations, and states since the 19th century. Data collection tasks were initially the responsibilities of church missionaries (Figure 1). These tasks shifted to relief workers and then to peacekeepers as the roles of humanitarian organizations became more prominent. This research shows a continued shift facilitated by technology, transferring critical tasks to data collectors and analysts.

[10] Jaiswal, Kishor, et al. "Estimating Casualties for Large Earthquakes Worldwide Using an Empirical Approach." Open-File Report, 2009; and Liang, Nai-Jen, et al. "Disaster Epidemiology and Medical Response in the Chi-Chi Earthquake in Taiwan." Annals of Emergency Medicine, vol. 38, no. 5, 2001, pp. 549–555.

[11] Center for Civilians in Conflict, and Every Casualty. Oxford Research Group , 2014, pp. 1–4, *Examining Civilian Harm Tracking and Casualty Recording in Afghanistan*.

War casualties are not new, and the practice of accounting for the dead in conflict is not a recent phenomenon. In the 19th century, battlefield deaths were recorded by doctors and medical staff as methods of understanding the medical care administered to troops and a measure of the army's health. Protection for civilians in war did not appear until international law developed. Samuel Moyn explains that human rights have been around for centuries but are relatively new as legal languages of justice.[12]

Despite the initial steps of creating humanitarian laws in the 19th century, the inter-state wars of the 20th century left civilians largely unprotected. The devastating war casualties of the 20th century ushered in international humanitarian law (IHL) with the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The new humanitarian laws increased and improved data collection for combat countries. Because the states were responsible for reporting civilian casualties, casualty counts could be inflated, deflated, or hidden as needed for state security.[13] The ability of states to police themselves proved ineffective and unrealistic, with only limited success for international actors.[14]

Meanwhile, universities and institutes embraced data, data collection, and methods. Many programs studying war launched projects collecting conflict data.[15]

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[12] Moyn, Samuel. *Not Enough Human Rights in an Unequal World*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.

[13] Dreyfus, Jean-Marc. Destruction and Human Remains. S.I.: Manchester Univ Press, 2017.

[14] Dadrian, Vahakn N. "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications." *The Yale Journal of International Law*, vol. 14, no. 2, 1989, pp. 221–334.

[15] "Correlates of War Project", University of Michigan, 1963; SIPRI 1966Heidelberg Institute 1991; Uppsala UCDP 1993; and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 1966. The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) EM-DAT Database began recording event data in 1988.

With the 21st century and "new wars"[16] came more data. Academics and public health researchers jumped into casualty studies and began to apply epidemiological methods to estimating casualty numbers.[17] Data collection and data sharing also increased as technology facilitated online collaboration.[18] In addition, a new NGO, the Iraq Body Count, launched. It was different from other efforts because it did not have academic researchers to populate the databases. Instead, the NGO relied on media reports and volunteer activists to sort, validate, and publish the data.

The founders of the Iraq Body Count, Hamit Dardagan and Dr. John Sloboda went on to launch the first casualty recording network, International Practitioner's Network (IPN), in 2009, with twenty NGOs reflecting diverse capabilities, geographies, and conflicts. Their donors included the Swiss Ministry, the Norwegian MFA, Zivik, the Funding Network, and a grant from the USIP. The funding allowed the network to host a conference and create working groups to build standards for casualty recording. The network staff presented at conferences, performed research studies and built influential relationships with international organizations. By 2016, the network had published its standards and received international recognition. The network would go on to consult on other casualty guidelines with IGOs and grow its membership to more than fifty by 2019.

[16] Kaldor, Mary. "Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror." International Politics, vol. 42, no. 4, 2005, pp. 491–498.

[17] See "Humanitarian Initiative", 2005, Harvard; "Cost of War" project, 2011, Brown University.

[18] "Global Conflict Database",UCDP becomes available online, Uppsala University, 2004.

Figure 1: Evolution of Humanitarian Practices on Civilian Casualty Recording

Time Period	Age of Imperial Humanitarianism 1880s–WWII	Age of Neo-Humanitarianism WWII—1990	Age of Liberal Humanitarianism 1990—present	*Age of Globalized Humanitarianism 2012–present
Funding Source?	Church	State	International Orgs	*Private Coalitions (Individual Donors, Corporations, Universities, States)
Humanitarian Agent	Missionaries	Relief Workers	Peacekeepers	*Data Collectors
Who Performs Body Counts?	--------	Media	International NGOs	*Data Analysts
What is the Ideological Approach?	God-centered	Human-centered	Governance (Democracy)	*Data-driven
Purpose	Relief	Development	Security	*Political

Source: Barnett, Michael N. *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*. Cornell University Press, 2013.
Source: *Jeanette Richard-Ruiz

Literature Review

Scholarship on Transnational Advocacy Networks

The concept of Transnational Advocacy Networks was first introduced by Keck and Sikkink in 1998. Keck and Sikkink introduce the concept and describe TANs as driven by shared principles and emerging as a power construct when local groups are obstructed from resolving issues through domestic channels. Keck and Sikkink explain the rise of transnational advocacy networks can be understood as an increase in moral movements, "distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values motivating their formation."[19] Keck and

[19] Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders*. Cornell University Press, 1998, Pg3.

Sikkink's explanation does not make contributions to instances where domestic actors participate in networks to resolve issues in other states or internationally. Yet humanitarian scholars focus research on how norms drive change and the protections for civilians. In 1999, Risse et al argued the "enduring implementation of human rights norms requires political systems to establish the rule of law."[20] In 2001, two scholars,Tarrow and Burgerman, contribute to Keck and Sikkink's theory arguing material benefits are the reason TANs form. Tarrow describes TAN formation as the result of resources and incentives offered by INGOs[21]. While Burgerman traces TANs from the 1980s and argues those TANs formed for the material benefits of logistical support and security. In El Salvador and Guatemala, advocacy from different levels intersected to form a TAN, shaping a new identity that included human rights concerns.[22] In Cambodia, there were no domestic human rights organizations, but advocacy from TANs secured "the final agreement [which] included a broad mandate for promoting human rights and included a human rights component in the peacekeeping operation."[23]

Scholars also examined the impact of TANs on international order. In 2004, Susan Park describes how TANs shape international identities and behavior.[24] R. Charli Carpenter examined what issues emerge as a result of TAN support in 2007.[25]

In 2010, Haufler describes how a TAN developed a governance system regulating the diamond industry and trade in Africa. The TAN sought to prevent diamonds mined in conflict

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[20] Risse, Thomas, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. (1999) *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change.* Cambridge University Press.

[21] Tarrow, Sidney. "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1–20.

[22] Burgerman, Susan. Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action. Cornell University Press, 2001.

[23] Ibid, Pg 125.

[24] Park, S. (2004). The Role Of Transnational Advocacy Networks In Reconstituting International Organization Identitites. *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Volume 5, Number(2 : Summer/Fall 2004), 79-92.

[25] Carpenter, R. Charli. "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks." *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 1, 2007, pp. 99–120.

areas or through violence from entering the market and developed a certification system called the Kimberley Process to regulate the market. The Kimberley Process is a certification system created by transnational actors, implemented by domestic legislation, and enforced by state border patrol: "it is, at the same time, a sanctions regime, a cartel, and a conflict prevention initiative."[26]

The moral underpinnings of TANS and their purpose of challenging domestic political structures described by Keck and Sikkink are not evident in all TAN emergence. This explanation does not explain actors joining for change in other states or shifting principles as described by Noakes.

In 2011, Christina Kiel argued TANs form to gain INGO support[27]. Stephen Noakes challenged Keck and Sikkink's ideas about TANs' emergence through shared beliefs in 2012 as Noakes argues the evolution of TAN principles changes through interactions with states: "successful advocacy is the art of the possible."[28] Noakes describes an actor's dedication as dynamic and changing as the advocacy's target changes. Noakes pushes back on the moral standing of TANs and argues there is an "assumption of moral incorruptibility [that] lies at the very heart of the conventional definition of transnational advocacy networks."[29] Relevant to this research is Tarrow and Della Porta's work in 2013 contend TANs use ICTs to lower costs of mobilization[30]. This research builds on their work of ICTs facilitating TAN emergence.

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[26] Haufler, Virginia. "The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention." *Peace Through Commerce*, 2010, pp. 57–70.

[27] Christina Kiel, "How Transnational Advocacy Networks Mobilize: Applying the Literature on Interest Groups to International Action," Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies 3 (Summer 2011): 77-101.

[28] Noakes, Stephen. "Transnational Advocacy Networks and Moral Commitment." *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, vol. 67, no. 2, 2012, pp. 507–525. .

[29] Ibid.

[30] Porta, Della Donatella, and Sidney G. Tarrow. *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004.

Scholars continued to focus on the success of TAN campaigns and their impact on international community. In 2013, Bloodgood and Clough argue TANs increase the odds of policy change but at a cost the NGOs participating. In 2021, Huimin Cheng argues TANs reinforce existing power disparities and inequality.[31] Consequently, some researchers study the microelements of TANs, such as the social connections producing new norms,[32] while some scholars argue humanitarian organizations are taking a "rights-based approach" within their own arena shaped by language and ascribed meanings.[33] Other humanitarian scholars argue there is power in humanitarianism because it exerts governance over the people it is hoping to save[34].

Most of the scholarship on TANs either examines their ability to shape international politics or how TANs mobilize. Consequently, there are few explanations on why or how TANs emerge. Keck and Sikkink's explanation describes morally-driven domestic actors seeking to change issues within their state for TAN emergence. Other explanations suggest TANs form for material incentives. This research argues TANs form because intangible benefits are available to actors. This research makes a case for actors with organizational needs that are not being met through other channels. Therefore, actors join TANs to meet those needs and gain intangible benefits such as knowledge, methods, data, or access to data sources.

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[31] Cheng, Huimin, et al. "Communities and Brokers: How the Transnational Advocacy Network Simultaneously Provides Social Power and Exacerbates Global Inequalities." *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 65, no. 3, 2021, pp. 724–738., doi:10.1093/isq/sqab037.

[32] See Lipschutz, Ronnie D. "Crossing Borders: Global Civil Society and the Reconfiguration of Transnational Political Space." GeoJournal, vol. 52, no. 1, 2000, pp. 17–23; Bob, Clifford. "Rights as Weapons: Instruments of Conflict, Tools of Power". Princeton University Press, 2019; Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. "Activists beyond Borders". Cornell University Press, 1998.

[33] Hilhorst, Dorothea, and Bram J. Jansen. "Humanitarian Space as Arena: A Perspective on the Everyday Politics of Aid." Development and Change, vol. 41, no. 6, 2010, pp. 1117–1139.

[34] Barnett, Michael N. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Cornell Univ. Press, 2013.

Scholarship on Casualty Recording

Casualty recording matters both morally and politically to scholars because it occurs at the intersection of body, space, and security. Casualty recording is important because it offers metrics for understanding the scope of violence humans experience in a conflict. It can be an invaluable element in the reconciliation process after a war.

As the responsibility for recording civilian casualties shifted from churches to states and then to the international community,[35] scholars investigated the friction of assigning moral obligation: "Humanitarianism is balanced on the knife's edge of various tensions."[36] These tensions include state obligations, ethics of care, transnational action, and prescribed interventions.[37]

Conflict scholars define "just wars" as those with some moral protection of civilians.[38] Yet there are institutional gaps in protection and no formal mechanism for protecting civilians. Before the Every Casualty network began, one of its founders posed a question at a conference in 2008: "Can there be any 'just war' if we do not document the dead and injured?"[39] Since then, conflict scholars have taken hold of the concept: "Unenumerated civilian casualties leave a gap in available knowledge that is critical to evaluating the 'justness' of a war. Measuring civilian casualties engages moral and practical questions."[40] Yet the friction of accountability between citizen and state persists: "It is our moral responsibility as citizens in a democracy to monitor and

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[35] Barnett, Michael N. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Cornell Univ. Press, 2013.
[36] Barnett, Michael. "Humanitarianism Transformed." *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 3, no. 04, 2005.
[37] Barnett, Michael N. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Cornell Univ. Press, 2013, Pg23-33.
[38] Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Basic Books, 1977.
[39] "Can There Be Any 'Just War' If We Do Not Document the Dead and Injured? ." Conference at Cumberland Lodge , 17 Mar. 2008, www.bbk.ac.uk/law/current/undergraduate/cumberland_1day_17march08.
[40]. Stec, Frank J. "Bringing Attention to the Human Costs of War: Grievability, Deliberation, and Anti-War Numbers." Southern Communication Journal, vol. 81, no. 5, 2016, pp. 271–288., doi:10.1080/1041794x.2016.1216159.

hold to account the actions of governmental leaders and institutions when the state makes war. War is undertaken on behalf of the public."[41]Human rights scholars insist it matters who records the casualty, how they record, and how the data is interpreted and used.[42] Stec argues, "Counting is a rhetorical act that can reverse the process of Othering that facilitates death in war."[43] In addition, researchers claim changes in human rights practices can change the international norms for that practice and transform an accepted methodology into an expected one.[44] Some human rights scholars argue NGOs are the main creators of norms and launching new practices.[45]

Human security researchers advocate for civilian protections through a type of security dialogue usually reserved for states.[46] Yet other scholars define human security by the civilian's relationship to the state and contend there is no way to operationalize it.[47]

The literature also reflects considerable disagreement in applying international laws and norms. While most scholars acknowledge the application of IHL to non-state actors, there is disagreement on whether General Human Rights laws (GHRL) can govern non-state actors.[48]

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[41] Crawford, Neta. Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 Wars. Oxford University Press, 2013.

[42] Williams, Paul. War and Conflict in Africa. Polity Press, 2011.

[43] Stec, Frank J. "Bringing Attention to the Human Costs of War: Grievability, Deliberation, and Anti-War Numbers." *Southern Communication Journal*, vol. 81, no. 5, 2016, pp. 271–288., doi:10.1080/1041794x.2016.1216159.

[44] See Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders*. Cornell University Press, 1998; Risse-Kappen, Thomas, et al. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change.* Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[45] Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, pp. 887–917.

[46] Thomas, Nicholas, and William T. Tow. "The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention." Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 2, 2002, pp. 177–192.

[47] Paris, Roland. "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" International Security, vol. 26, no. 2, 2001, pp. 87–102., doi:10.1162/016228801753191141.

[48] Clapham, Andrew. "Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations." International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 88, no. 863, 2006, pp. 491–523; and J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, and Cornelius Wiesener. "Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: An Assessment Based on Recent Practice." International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 195–227; and Kolb, Robert, et al. Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Further Reflections and Perspectives. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022.

The identity of civilian casualties has political implications for human rights actors. Scholars argue it matters whether the casualty was a blue-collar worker, a union member, a single person, or a well-known person.[49] The significance of the identity of the civilian creates specific pressures on "inside" actors performing the counts.[50] Political geographers claim body counts are methods for constructing geopolitical identities where the body is the battleground for "counting wars" and where "citizenship is constructed."[51] Consequently, casualty recording has geopolitical implications.

Foucault introduced the notion of the state having biopolitical power over civilians[52]. But who has control over the dead? Necropolitics is an extension of Foucault's concepts of Biopolitics. Mbembe explains that just as space and resources partition political power, the same happens to the mortality of people to gain power. [53] Mbembe's concepts are visible in the partitioning of casualties when states record soldier deaths but not civilian deaths[54] Just as borders define sovereignty, the casualty becomes a site for power production by defining who counts during a conflict. Judith Butler provides context for considering which lives matter and which lives should count and how these understandings become established as a "reiteration of a set of norms."[55]

Terminology and definitions vary depending on who is doing the counting, how they are counting (methods), and how they interpret the data. Varied methodologies produce conflicting data and promote politicized debates on both methods and casualties. Scholars of geopolitics

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[49] Brysk, Alison. "The Politics of Measurement: The Contested Count of the Disappeared in Argentina." Human Rights Quarterly16.4 (1994): 676.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Mountz, Alison. "Political Geography III." Progress in Human Geography, vol. 42, no. 5, 2017, pp. 759–769.
[52] Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter. Routledge, 2011; and Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, 2016.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Broder, John. "A Nation at War: The Casualties: U.S. Military Has No Count Of Iraqi Dead In Fighting." *The New York Times*, 2 Apr. 2003.
[55] Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter. Routledge, 2011; and Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, 2016.

suggest that the debate over contrasting data obscures the violence of the conflict because data "transforms unnamed dead people into abstract figures that obfuscate their political meanings of the violence, and its social and political consequences."[56] For Hyndman, body counts matter, and "debates on methods and sources" hide violence."[57] Makaremi agrees with Hyndman about a state's ability to hide violence through "the economy of silence" to control the living through the treatment of the dead. It is a "governance of the living by way of the dead."[58] Andreas cites Bosnia, Darfur, and Colombia as examples of manipulating body counts resulting in political or security gains for the state.[59]

Scholars of state security theorize that casualty recording demonstrates security behavior, and by framing death as a measurement of conflict, security is also being defined.[60] Jessica Auchter goes further by calling for casualties to be an explicit category of study rather than an implicit element used in other studies: "Corpses matter for how we define security, and they matter a great deal for a wide variety of security behavior."[61] Seybolt encourages scholars "to make civilian protection an explicit priority" because casualty recording has "the potential to change the social and moral acceptability of tactics used by actors in war by revealing the toll of various tactics on civilians."[62]

Organization and Overview

[56] Hyndman, Jennifer. "Feminist Geopolitics Revisited: Body Counts in Iraq." The Professional Geographer, vol. 59, no. 1, 2007, pp. 35–46.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Makaremi, Chowra. "State Violence and Death Politics In Post-Revolutionary Iran." Destruction and Human Remains, 2017.
[59] Andreas, Peter, and Kelly M. Greenhill. Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict. Cornell University Press, 2011.
[60] Auchter, Jessica. "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies: The Future of Security Studies?" Journal of Global Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 2016, pp. 36–50.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Seybolt, Taylor B., et al. Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict. Oxford University Press, 2013.

The first chapter serves as a blueprint for the dissertation. It introduces the question this project investigates: Why do actors work collaboratively in a casualty recording network? Activist organizations are limited in resources, yet they join together in a transnational advocacy network. Casualty recording is morally and politically important because it illustrates the scope of violence and gives insight into security settings. TANs are important because they impact international politics by shaping policy and serve as negotiators between local and international actors. Nevertheless, little is known about how TANs form. This chapter provides important context for understanding what casualty recording is and what it is not. It also provides context for TANs by understanding their role as moral movements in international politics.

The second chapter examines existing explanations for the emergence of TANs. Traditional explanations do not fully explain why actors choose to collaborate. Early TAN scholarship viewed TAN formation as a moral, collective action. These researchers theorized TANs form due to the shared ideology of actors seeking to change international norms. Other humanitarian scholars claim actors collaborate to rehabilitate the bad behavior of states and international organizations. Yet political scientists conclude actors make collective claims to shift power structures to civil society in order to restructure politics. Still, other scholars contend rational actors work together out of self-interest and opportunities to increase their organizational capacity. This chapter describes three broad categories attributed to TAN emergence: an economic approach, a sociological approach, and a political approach. It also gives details on the advantages technology provides for the development of contemporary TANs.

Finally, the chapter introduces three hypotheses derived from the categories of existing explanations.

The third chapter discusses the selected qualitative research methodology. This research used a case study with process tracing. The case study approach offers substantial benefits for analyzing the network events and interconnectedness of the members. Process tracing allows the evolution of the network to unfold. Process tracing also tests rival hypotheses to consider alternative outcomes. Data collection included surveys, interviews, and archival records.

The fourth chapter describes the origin of the network and provides two precursors that made the network possible. First, the increase in ICTs resulted in increased access to networks by civil society. ICTs facilitated TANs by bridging distances with new, flexible systems of communication. This provided civil society with more opportunities to collaborate and create new connections and meanings through a process called "co-production."[63] The second factor was the early contributors to the network and their deep knowledge. Some contributors had a deep knowledge of collaborative advocacy, while others were legal experts or seasoned journalists. These early contributors' deep knowledge created a foundation for the network to develop methods, sources, and organizational structure from best practices.

The fifth chapter traces the first era of the Every Casualty network, from launch in 2009 to international relationships by 2012. Chapter five describes three key findings for the network's emergence. First, it traces how organizational structure played an important role in the network's development. The second finding describes the intangible benefits offered to participants at network events. Participants gained benefits from network events that served as socio-technical laboratories.

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[63] "Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society." *States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order*, by Sheila Jasanoff, Routledge, 2006, pp. 13–45.

The third finding explains that actors joined the network for benefits. This chapter details the advantages the network enjoyed by incubating within an established organization, the Oxford Research Group, and discusses why actors collaborated and how the network overcame Olson's collective action problem.

The sixth chapter provides two additional findings for this study. The fourth finding of this project invalidates rival explanations: actors did not join for political pressure or to establish an international norm. The fifth finding of this research is that standardization provided network members with intangible benefits. This chapter describes the second era of the network, 2013–2016, and reflects on its strengthening. During this time period, the network solidified its identity through independence as an NGO separate from the Oxford Research Group. It also intensified its relationship with the international community and gained greater authority through consultations on other casualty recording projects. This chapter identifies two findings relating to the motivations of actors joining the network. Rival explanations are unsupported by empirical data, but standardization reveals intangible benefits for members. As 2016 drew to a close, there was evidence of a change in states' attitudes toward casualty recording. Also, the ICRC launched the network's standards for casualty recording on behalf of the international community.

The seventh and final chapter reviews the importance of TANs to civil society and to international ordering. Casualty recording is important for measuring the scope and intensity of violence for civilians. TANs influence processes and shape policies. Through standardization, TANs can also introduce a form of civil society governance. This project contributes to understanding how TANs emerge by offering actors non-collective, intangible benefits. This final chapter also suggests areas of further research as conflicts and networks continue to evolve.

Chapter 2: Theories on the Emergence of TANs

TAN Emergence

Scholars have varied explanations for why actors collaborate. Explanations can be sorted into three broad categories: economic, sociological, and political.

Economic approaches describe TANs as developing from actors seeking non-selective benefits and material incentives from international organizations. This research builds on the economic explanation of TANs and adds to this argument by including non-material incentives as a motivation for actors to join TANs. Actors may seek intangible benefits in TANs but they may be difficult to spot because they are often the result of dynamic interactions that are temporally bound.

The earliest explanation for TAN emergence is the second category: sociological. Keck and Sikkink provide argue activists are "motivated by values rather than material concerns."[64] They described the formation of networks as being driven by actors with shared ideologies working to change international norms and argued, "their goal is to change the behavior of states and international organizations."[65] However, Keck and Sikkink's argument does not explain actor behavior such as inconsistent participation. If actors join TANs based on principles, we expect they will participate in activities promoting the norm. This was not the case when examining this TAN.

The third category of explanations is political and comes from academics who argue that NGOs interact with international norms to restructure world politics. This happens because of the

[64] Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders. Cornell University Press, 1998.
[65] Ibid.

increase in non-state actors, new arenas for action, and a "blurring of distinctions between domestic & global level of politics."[66] Increases in non-state actors and new arenas allow for what Shaw argues is transnational collective action as "defacto governance."[67] Tilly's work gives context for understanding how collective claim-making develops from performances into social repertoires.[68] Tarrow argues, "just as networks of people that form in the heat of a moment of madness diffuse new ideas, they also spread out across society."[69] Tarrow's explanation of political claim-making does not explain actors' behavior in the network. If actors join TANs to challenge power, we would expect actors to participate in activities challenging states and international organizations. This was not the case when examining this TAN.

The sociological category tells us "international networking is costly,"[70] and the political category says: "transnational movements are hard to construct and difficult to maintain."[71] But neither category offers explanations as to why local, resource-poor actors seek to contribute to a transnational advocacy network, nor does it explain inconsistent participation. This research contributes a rational choice, and economic, explanation on why actors limited in resources would join a TAN. This project argues actors join TANs for intangible benefits. Actors have organizational needs that are non-material such as knowledge, methodologies, and connections to knowledgeable people. This was particularly true for the case of a casualty recording network where institutional gaps left casualty recording undefined.

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[66] Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders. Cornell University Press, 1998.

[67] Shaw, Timothy. "'Overview—Global/Local: States, Companies and Civil Societies at the End of the Twentieth Century.' In." Global Institutions and Local Empowerment: Competing Theoretical Perspective, Edited by Kendall Stiles, 2000.

[68] Tilly, Charles. *Regimes and Repertoires*. University of Chicago Press, 2006; and "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834." *Social Science History*, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 253.

[69] Tarrow, Sidney. "Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention." Social Science History, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 281., doi:10.2307/1171283.

[70] Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders*. Cornell University Press, 1998, Pg 19.

[71] Tarrow, Sidney. "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1–20.

Power, Authority, and Legitimacy

Collective action relates to power and is substantial when an actor "gets a large return from others for a small investment."[72] Hobbes argues the only way to build a common power robust enough to offer security is to "confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men."[73] Hobbes proposes a power structure built through a voluntary, rational and necessary covenant. Hobbes' version of authority requires he "give up my right of governing myself to this man, or this assembly of men."[74]

Both Arrendt and Habermas describe power as reified in action but point to discursive power for establishing it. Arrendt describes the "web of human relationships" as being maintained by communication: "that can be discursively redeemed and fundamentally criticized."[75] Habermas advances the discussion of power by arguing legitimate power is visible in the ability to make binding decisions: "Legitimate power permits the occupants of positions of authority to make binding decisions."[76]

Latour extends Habermas' argument about legitimacy to micro actors, which is of particular interest to this research project. Latour argues macro actors are micro actors perched on top of "many, leaky black boxes."[77] Latour's black boxes are descriptions of things that "no longer need to be reconsidered."[78] The tools and processes actors use to identify and

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[72] Tilly, Charles. International Symposium on the Organizing for Women, 1977, p.21, *Studying Social Movements/Studying Collective Action* .

[73] Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679. Leviathan, or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, p.131-132.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition. (Sixth Impression.)*. University of Chicago Press, 1970, 178–9, 184–6, 199–200.

[76] Habermas, Jürgen. "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power." *Hannah Arendt*, 2017, pp.18.

[77] Latour, Bruno, and Michel Callon. "Chapter 10: Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro- Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So." *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology (RLE Social Theory): Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies*, Routledge, 2014, pp. 286.

[78] Ibid.

successfully put items into black boxes become significant. Black box items are beyond scrutiny. They are accepted without further investigation and include habits, processes, objects, and forces. Latour's black boxes as sites of power construction lead to a deeper consideration for understanding how discursive elements contribute to developing habits, objects, forces, and processes leading to a casualty recording network.

Discursive Elements of Power

Gramsci describes power through discussions of hegemony and the negotiated cooperation between political and civil society. While Gramsci bases his hegemony on Marx's views of the ruling class, he argues that the ruling class alone does not have dominant social control. Groups and social patterns create dominant social control through the state's 'coercive control' and civil society's 'consensual control'.[79]

Ernesto Laclau and Chan-tal Mouffe, post-Marxist theorists, scope discourse as "every social configuration as meaningful."[80] Laclau and Mouffe created a more complementary approach to Marxism and a more political one. Laclau and Mouffe leave behind Marx's economic determinism but retain the materialistic organization of society for understanding relations of power. They advocated for the organization of discourse into fields and formations made up of articulatory processes of nodal points with partially fixed meanings. Articulatory practices can be observed as performances of storytelling where the writer or narrator may change, but often, the elements remain consistent. Their theory claims all objects and actions have meaning, but "meaning is conferred by particular systems of significant differences."[81]

[79] Howarth, Erbert. *Discourse*. Open University Press, 2000, p165.
[80] Ibid, p.84.
[81] Ibid, p. 100.

Laclau and Mouffe's explanation of hegemony creates a notion of established, shared systems of meaning between "contingent elements" in discursive fields and their diffusion into "necessary moments" of particular discourses.[82] This shared system across a social field includes numerous divisions and is organized around nodal points. Laclau and Mouffe's theory is significant to this research because it offers an understanding of the importance of meanings, definitions, and processes developed by a heterogenous casualty recording network in a practice that was not yet established.

Collective Moral Action

The standard explanation for the emergence of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) is what Princen and Finger describe as a "global awareness of the need to protect humanity"[83] or more simply as Clara Egger describes as "the moral conscience of a globalized world."[84] Scholars apply different theories to collective action. Different fields bring different definitions, approaches, and terminology to investigating collective action. Social scientists investigate the role of collective action in shaping institutions and norms.[85] Political scientists ask how collective action creates political structures and sites of power.[86] Some scholars apply social

[82] Howarth, Erbert. "Laclau and Mouffe's Theory of Discourse." *Discourse*, Open University Press, 2000, pp. 101–125.

[83] Princen, Thomas, and Matthias Finger. Environmental Ngos in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global. Routledge, 1994.

[84] Egger, Clara. "Just Part-Time Lovers? Competition, Coercive Coordination, and Friendship Among International Ingos." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 4, 2017, pp. 394–414., doi:10.1080/09557571.2017.1422481.

[85] Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; Kriesi, H. (2008). Political mobilization, political participation, and the power of the vote. West European Politics, 31, 147–168; McAdam, D. (1996). The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the civil rights movement. In "Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings" (pp. 338–355). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Opp. K.-D. (2009). Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis. New York, NY: Routledge.

[86] Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., & Latimer, C. W. (2008). Social pressure and voter turnout: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. American Political Science Review, 102, 33–48. Opp. K.-D. (2009). Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis. New York, NY: Routledge.

movement theories to explain how smaller grass-roots protests inform larger challenges.[87] Other social movement scholars consider how factors such as globalization create new linkages between public and private interests.[88]

In a 2018 interview, one of the network's founders--- Dr. John Sloboda, described the network as "like a professional association for casualty recording organizations around the world." This insight points to the network's formation, similar to how interest groups form. Some scholars argue that NGOs are more comparable to interest groups than cooperative, altruistic organizations, as many IR scholars presuppose. More recently, scholars suggest NGO competition will increase as resources, attention, and influence are finite despite their specialization and networking. Additionally, NGOs may seek benefits not through the success of a campaign but rather through their participation in it. Some scholars understand networks as value-based, but their behavior is more strategic. Some social movement research describes actors as 'entrepreneurial' and social movements as driven by the presence of resources as part of a cost and benefits analysis. This view positions collective action as rational, strategic acts to overcome transnational activism challenges. While the logic of collective action as rooted in values and missions is solid, there are gaps in the evidence of this happening. Scholarly thinking shifted and examined NGO behavior more closely for explanations that may be due to motivations other than morality. Scholars began to argue that actors were motivated to join because they wanted to fulfill the needs of their organization rather than reasons associated with network cohesiveness, constituencies, or political settings. Scholars argue that NGOs must

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[87] McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). The dynamics of contention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Opp. K.-D. (2009). Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis. New York, NY: Routledge.

[88] Risse, Thomas, et al. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

choose whom to partner with and make decisions based on the organization's needs. Because of an NGOs dualism between values and needs, academics argue that NGO interactions are "exchanges."

The literature is limited in explaining how civil society builds networks and collaborates across borders. The literature has even less about what motivates actors to participate. When considering the difficulties and obstacles associated with mobilizing groups, a puzzle arises: Why would local actors--with limited resources, join a transnational 'professional organization' to collaborate on recording casualties in conflicts? Olson's collective action problem becomes pertinent: Why do actors join when they could 'free ride'? What noncollective benefits or side payments may be available to overcome the collective action problem?

I apply the broad concepts explaining collective action to investigate why actors join a casualty recording network. This study tests three hypotheses to determine whether the actors joined for political, sociological, or economic motivations.

Economic Approach: Collective Action & By-Product Theory

I situate the first potential explanation for why actors join TANs in Olson's concepts of Collective Action. Olson asserted that rational actors would only contribute to group interests if the group is very small or if the actor is coerced. This became known as the "zero contribution thesis."[89] Olson's work describes individuals in large groups who lack an individual benefit and will have no incentives to voluntarily offer time and resources to the group. Rational individuals will seek to be a 'free rider' and wait for others to contribute resources they can use. Olson suggests that selective incentives must be available to motivate individuals in large groups to

[89] Ostrom, Elinor. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms." Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, no. 3, 2000, pp. 137–158., doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137.

collaborate and contribute to collective action. Olson describes these incentives as either coercion to support the group, a side payment, or some other non-collective benefit. Olson's By-Product theory explains large pressure groups as by-products of organizations that perform a function other than lobbying for a collective good.[90] To uncover the motivation for actors joining the network, I investigate the incentives available.

Material incentives are tangible benefits with a "monetary value or can easily be translated into ones."[91] An example of tangible incentives is evident in the International Network on Small Arms (IANSA) case. Internationalism means "a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system."[92] Internationalism offers opportunities for NGOs to "shift the scale of their activities."[93] Scale shift opens up tangible incentives such as political and funding opportunities for NGOs. UN conference opportunities in 2001 led to a new network in 2001 -- International Network on Small Arms. "It was within the context of this increased attention to micro-disarmament and the rise of UN-sponsored conference diplomacy that IANSA was launched."[94] NGOs working independently created a network because of tangible opportunities available for those participating in the network. The IANSA network receives funding from the UN and the EU. NGOs also gained political incentives by joining a network such as participating in UN-level conferences and policy-making: "IANSA has been the official coordinator of civil society

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[90] Olson, Mancur Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, 1965.
[91] Clark, Peter, and James Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations". *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6(3): 129-66.
[92] Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)pg 25.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Shawki, Noha. "Political Opportunity Structures and the Outcomes of Transnational Campaigns: A Comparison of Two Transnational Advocacy Networks." Peace & Change, vol. 35, no. 3, 2010, pp. 381–411., doi:10.1111/j.1468-0130.2010.00640.x.

organizations in the UN process on small arms since the first official conference in 2001."[95] For an NGO joining a casualty recording network, material incentives may mean funding or increasing its organizational capacity. If members join the network for material incentives, we expect to see members-only engaging with the network when tangible rewards are available.

To investigate incentives thoroughly, we must broaden the concept to include incentives other than material, tangible rewards available to members, and intangible benefits such as the social benefits of belonging to a group, prestige, respect, or contributions to communities or the environment for ideological reasons.[96]

Intangible incentives are available for NGOs who work collaboratively in ecological settings. Labeling programs offer intangible benefits to a network of producers. The intangible benefit gained by small-scale producers of wood products was the recognition as a member of a network using sustainable methods, with the issuance of a label.[97] Small farm coffee producers gain recognition as providing fair labor practices as a network member through labeling.[98] Labels indicate membership and are endorsements of preferred practices. For farmers in South Africa, intangible incentives of information were the reason they joined networks. Farmers sought to be the best and needed access to information on techniques and fertilizer choices.[99] Farmers in Peru worked collaboratively for the benefit of social interaction. Social interaction

[95] Peters, Rebecca. "UN Preparatory Committee." IANSA, International Action Network on Small Arms Presentation to the January 2006 Preparatory Committee, 2006, pp. 1–3.

[96] Clark, Peter, and James Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 6(3): 129-66.

[97] Evans, Peter. "Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter-Hegemonic Globalization." Contemporary Sociology, vol. 29, no. 1, 2000, p. 230., doi:10.2307/2654947.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Sinyolo, Sikhulumile, and Maxwell Mudhara. "Farmer Groups and Inorganic Fertiliser Use among Smallholders in Rural South Africa." South African Journal of Science, vol. 114, no. 5/6, 2018, doi:10.17159/sajs.2018/20170083.

led to sharing knowledge and a sense of community which was a significant reason for farmers to join small networks.[100]

Considering incentive systems as an explanation for overcoming the collective action problem can bridge the gap between individual NGO behavior and network behavior. Members acquire incentives unevenly, and the impact of incentives is disproportionate because the impact is proportional to an organization's needs.[101]

Casualty recording organizations need funding for projects and resources to pay staff and overhead costs. Other organizational necessities for casualty recorders may include resources for security or expertise.

Purposive incentives, a type of intangible incentive, are often attributed to TAN development because members claim to join for ideological motives.[102] Their reward lies in achieving the organization's goals rather than a direct benefit to members. Members who join the network to challenge the status quo need purposive incentives to continue to engage with the network. If members join the network to challenge the status quo of recording casualties, we should see active member engagement when material incentives are absent.

Collective action in the real world is more frequent and diverse than Olson's theory would suggest for rational actors. Ostrom points out a substantial gap between theorists and empirical studies. This research follows Ostrom's prescription of a two-prong approach of potential theoretical explanations followed by empirical evidence. Ostrom argues this approach

[100] Hellin, Jon. "Agricultural Extension, Collective Action and Innovation Systems: Lessons on Network Brokering from Peru and Mexico." The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, vol. 18, no. 2, 2012, pp. 141–159., doi:10.1080/1389224x.2012.655967.

[101] Clark, Peter, and James Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 6(3): 129-66.

[102] Ibid.

will uncover other factors influencing actors, such as their conceptions of themselves, roles, and behaviors in context.

Understanding the context of the network's emergence is particularly fitting as the humanitarian field has become more professionalized due to increases in state contributions, a growth of emergencies in the 1990s, and changes in sovereignty regimes: "Humanitarianism has become a big business."[103] Aid agencies were restructured and built in the image of popular business of the 1980s and 1990s.[104] This restructuring, along with technocrats, increased mission scope: "Over time, many missionaries shifted from saving souls to saving societies, helped along in part by the development of a scientific, professionalized philanthropic sector that was much more interested in the here and now than the hereafter."[105]

Sociological Approach: International Norms

A second potential explanation for NGOs joining the network is the desire to shape international humanitarian norms. Norms research is influential to IR because "People with principled commitments have made significant changes in the political landscape."[106] The effect norms have on the behavior of states and civil society is important to understand their connections and dynamics. Consequently, understanding how TANs emerge and contribute to norms is significant to IR scholarship.

Keck and Sikkink argue that local actors join to create political leverage, a boomerang, outside their state to utilize domestically. They also argue that actors seek to create networks because of the critical role of information. It is the activists' access to "information and

[103] Barnett, Michael N. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Cornell Univ. Press, 2013; p379.
[104] Ibid. p365.
[105] Ibid. p124
[106] Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, pp. 887–917., doi:10.1162/002081898550789.

technology that creates legitimate players."[107] Consequently, some NGOs may join the network because of a desire to shape the international standards for recording casualties. Changes in human rights practices can change the international norms for that practice and transform an accepted methodology into an expected one.[108] Further, participating in shaping international norms allows NGOs to ensure they address concerns while garnering additional NGO support.

Actors may join a network to create a model of socialization processes that they can broadly apply to other processes and policy areas where global ideas will impact domestic affairs.[109] Some scholars argue actors participate because they understand change is gradual, and their work contributes towards changing global norms. It is "appropriate to talk of these groups as agents of political transformation because they contribute to increasing democratization of world politics by influencing the normative foundations of global governance."[110] Conversely, other scholars indicate actors change global norms to shape domestic policies. While other researchers argue for the growing power and effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks. They claim actors join networks because they are "particularly good at getting otherwise-neglected issues onto the agendas of national governments and intergovernmental organizations."[111] Recent contributions recognize the significance of TAN formation in shaping international norms. Risse contends "diffusion of international norms crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks."[112]

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[107] Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders*. Cornell University Press, 1998; p96.

[108] See Keck, M., and C. Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders*. Cornell University Press, 1998; and Risse-Kappen, Thomas, et al. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[109] Thomas, Daniel C. Boomerangs, and Superpowers: The Helsinki Network and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre, 1999.

[110] Davenport, Christian, et al. *Repression and Mobilization*. University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

[111] Florini, Ann. The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. Brookings Institution Press, 2012.

[112] Risse, T.. Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations: Ideas Do Not Float Freely. Garland Science, 2016, p119-120.

Political Approach

Finally, this research considers whether actors join TANs if there are opportunities to apply political pressure to states and INGOs. Political scholars argue activists may apply political pressure through the effects of transnational collective action. Academics contend NGOs interacting with international norms is the restructuring of world politics. Scholars attribute the phenomena to increases in non-state actors, new arenas for action, and a "blurring of distinctions between domestic & global level of politics."[113] Other researchers argue transnational collective action serves as a type of 'defacto governance.'[114] Performances of collective claim-making give context for understanding how social repertoires produce pressure. These patterns are essential in understanding the behavior of a network of casualty recorders because it offers insight into whether NGOs are sites of power production. Scholars argue NGOs can assemble into political power structures as "resistance from below."[115] Researchers argue that transnational advocacy reveals a new dimension for social movements with a global political process with its own logic that is subject to non-state actors but also links local movements to global political processes. Particularly relevant to understanding this research is whether political power production motivates actors joining the network. TAN campaigns provide significant context because they have specific goals, mobilize a limited number of actors, and are temporally bound.

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[113] Khagram, Sanjeev. Restructuring World Politics Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

[114] Shaw, Timothy. "'Overview—Global/Local: States, Companies and Civil Societies at the End of the Twentieth Century.' In." Global Institutions and Local Empowerment: Competing Theoretical Perspective, Edited by Kendall Stiles, 2000.

[115] Tarrow, Sidney G. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge University Press, 2005; Tilly, Charles. Regimes and Repertoires. University of Chicago Press, 2006.

In addition to the political power of TANs, bodies are sites of political power production with implications for human and state security. Bodies or subjects are constructed "over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter."[116] Consequently, some researchers argue that accounting for casualties is a political negotiation rather than statistical accounting. Seybolt describes casualties used politically to create new collective identities used in casualty framing that contributed to violence, questions of the body counts, land ownership, punishment, and the authority to govern.[117] Makaremi contends that the living population is controlled by governing the dead.[118]

Stephen Noakes' work describes how the lack of cooperation amongst NGOs results in a lack of power for the NGOs to affect change against a powerful hegemon. Noakes' work in China explains how NGOs on their own are unable to mount a significant challenge to the state in legitimacy and power and, therefore, unable to usher in change.[119]

Tilly's earlier work offered the foundation for collective violence resulting from societal forces and shaped by performances comprised of rituals and causal mechanisms.[120] Tilly, Tarrow, & McAdam's theory about the dynamics of contention proposes that smaller contentious episodes develop into larger societal events.[121] These encounters of collective action serve as observable elements of actors and are significant for this research because the Casualty Recording Network is a network publishing standards for casualty recording. Because the

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[116] Butler, Judith. *Bodies That Matter*. Routledge, 2011.

[117] Seybolt, Taylor B., et al. Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict. Oxford University Press, 2013.

[118] Makaremi, Chowra. "State Violence and Death Politics Inpost-Revolutionary Iran." Destruction and Human Remains, 2017, doi:10.7765/9781526125002.00015.

[119] Noakes, Stephen. The Advocacy Trap: Transnational Activism and State Power in China. Manchester University Press., 2018.

[120] Tilly, Charles. "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834." Social Science History, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 253., doi:10.2307/1171282.

[121] McAdam, Doug, et al. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

network acts as an authority or professional organization setting international standards for counting casualties, its ability to create contentious episodes is worthy of investigation.

Influence of Technology (ICTs) and Digital Empowerment

Scholars argue that networks result from the proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs): "The recent expansion of networks is a strategic response by development agencies to changes in the environment and has been facilitated by the expansion of ICTs."[122]

Yet communication offers a predicament for collective action. Media coverage of a social movement validates it, while a lack of coverage can invalidate it.[123] Consequently, ICTs facilitate the development of Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs)[124]. Della Porta et al. argue: "In terms of increased speed and range of communication, it gives the new movements what printing, the postal system, the telephone, and fax represented for movements in the far and more recent past."[125]

ICTs make communication easier, but Tarrow argues ICTs go further ---"when combined with their social implications, digital media has become a partial substitute for traditional forms of social movement organization."[126]

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[122] Henry, Leroi, et al. "Networks as Transnational Agents of Development." Third World Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 5, 2004, pp. 839–855., doi:10.1080/0143659042000231983.

[123] Rucht, D. (2003a) The Quadruple 'A': Media strategies of protest movements since the 1960s, in W. Van de Donk, B.D. Loader, P.G. Nixon and D. Rucht (eds.) New Media, Citizens, and Social Movements. New York and London: Routledge.

[124] Donk, W. B. H. J. van de. (2004). Cyberprotest : new media, citizens, and social movements. Routledge.

[125] Della Porta, D. and Mosca, L. "Global-Net for Global Movements? A Network of Networks for a Movement of Movements." Journal of Public Policy, vol. 25, no. 1, 2005, pp. 165–190., doi:10.1017/s0143814x05000255.

[126] Tarrow, S. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1993;p137-138.

Technology and global collective action are closely tied because technology lowered barriers for groups to collaborate: “New technologies reduce the costs of participating in transnational networks, even for small local groups, helping in the development of global protest campaigns.”[127] By lowering barriers to access and increasing the range and speed of communications, ICTs facilitate TANs and offer opportunities for individual NGOs to organize creatively using the Internet.[128] This creative organization requires greater examination because scholars know little about how transnational advocacy networks develop and why NGOs choose to join.

The first factor enabling the development of the casualty network was the proliferation of ICTs and social networks. IR Scholars argue there is a shift towards "governing without governance" as approaches to solving global problems involve more non-state actors.[129] Researchers reason ICTs are catalysts for change, particularly with transnational advocacy, because they're flexible, work across boundaries and offer new political opportunities for transnational advocacy.[130]

There are examples of ICTs facilitating new connections in human rights through the advocacy of the Feminist Movement. ICTs introduced new ways for transnational advocacy actors to advocate in the Feminist Movement. These new advocacy methods were novel and unexpected.[131] ICTs accomplished this by promoting horizontal communication and replacing

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[127] Porta, Della Donatella, and Sidney G. Tarrow. Transnational Protest and Global Activism. Access and Diversity, Crane Library, University of British Columbia, 2013.

[128] Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. Blackwell Publ, 1997.

[129] Rosenau, James N., and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[130] Livingston, Steven, and Kristina Klinkforth. “Narrative Power Shifts: Exploring the Role of Icts and Informational Politics in Transnational Advocacy.” The International Journal of Technology, Knowledge, and Society, vol. 6, no. 5, 2010, pp. 43–64., doi:10.18848/1832-3669/cgp/v06i05/56145.

[131] Youngs, Gillian. “34: Digital Transformations of Transnational Feminism in Theory and Practice.” The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements, by Rawwida Baksh and Wendy Harcourt, Oxford Univ. Press, 2015, pp. 874–887.

traditional, vertical hierarchies. Researchers infer that ICTs created a new culture of innovation within the Feminist Movement.[132] Another example of ICTs' impact on transnational advocacy is the proliferation of anti-trafficking NGOs in India. The India case occurred because ICTs enabled NGOs to organize independently of the state.[133] Significantly, ICTs also lowered barriers for the anti-trafficking, resource-poor actors to organize.[134]

Conversely, some scholars argue against ICTs as influential in humanitarian activities.[135] These researchers claim the production of big data through ICTs is the latest attempt to produce "statistical truth" and is not as revolutionary as claimed by digital humanitarians.[136] Yet these scholars treat data as a technocratic tool that should produce immediate change and be easily measured.[137] They fail to investigate how data affects collective behavior and changes how humanitarians work together.

For researchers that disagree with ICT as transformational, there is some agreement among them that future research should dig deeper into understanding ICTs within context. Researchers should not view ICTs broadly to assess outcomes but rather as an independent variable within specific contexts of advocacy.[138]

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[132] Youngs, Gillian. "34: Digital Transformations of Transnational Feminism in Theory and Practice." The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements, by Rawwida Baksh and Wendy Harcourt, Oxford Univ. Press, 2015, pp. 874–887.

[133] Amri, Sarah. "Networking for Change: The Impact of ICT on the Political Organizing of Anti-Trafficking NGOs in Contemporary India." Communication Technology and New Media Commons, no. Spring, 2011, pp. 1–50.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Read, Róisín, et al. "Data Hubris? Humanitarian Information Systems and the Mirage of Technology." Third World Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 8, 2016, pp. 1314–1331., doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1136208.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Garrett, R. Kelly, et al. "New ICTs and the Study of Political Communication." International Journal of Communication, vol. 6, no. 2012, 2012, pp. 214–231; Livingston, Steven, and Kristina Klinkforth. "Narrative Power Shifts: Exploring the Role of Icts and Informational Politics in Transnational Advocacy." The International Journal of Technology, Knowledge, and Society, vol. 6, no. 5, 2010, pp. 43–64.

In 2000, immediately after the war in Yugoslavia, humanitarians began "registering" the deaths and disappearances of civilians, but it was not a technical effort. The recorders described the work as field missions where humanitarian workers would go door-to-door collecting information. It was slow, laborious data collection of visiting victims' families for information. This effort would take fourteen years but would document nearly all casualties from 1998-2000. ICTs reduce reporting time to hours rather than years. Within forty-eight hours, the Iraq Body Count publishes "an early impression of events."[139]

During the early 2000s, ICTs transformed how casualty recording by civil society was performed, understood, and adopted by global society. It was the result of relationships, interactions, and interdependencies. The critical juncture was the intersection of the Internet's communication tools with the ideas of experienced human rights advocates. ICTs allow individuals to share more than simple information and create new meanings through collaboration. Jasanoff's theory of co-production illustrates these phenomena "Increasingly the realities of human experience emerge as joint achievements of scientific, technical and social enterprise, science and society are co-produced each underwriting the other's existence." Co-production explains how the simultaneous production of both technical and societal order develops. ICTs enable TANs because they facilitate both technological and societal order. This was particularly needed in casualty recording because there was a lack of structure caused by institutional gaps in addressing casualties. Increased access for the public to ICTs ushered in an opportunity for a TAN to create a new sociotechnical order for casualties.

[139]Iraq Body Count, 2022. https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/recent/

Hypotheses

This project tested three possible hypotheses corresponding to political, sociological, and economic approaches to understanding why actors join TANs. This study tested the following hypotheses:

(H1) If a transnational advocacy network emerges, then actors join for intangible benefits because organizational needs drive actors.

(H2) If a transnational advocacy network develops, then actors join for opportunities to shape international humanitarian norms because shared principles and common values motivate actors.

(H3) If a transnational advocacy network emerges, then actors join for opportunities to apply political pressure to states because changing states' behaviors motivates actors.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Case Study and Process Tracing

Philosophical underpinnings

This research seeks to explain the emergence of a network of casualty recording organizations as a rational, economic choice of transnational advocacy networks in international relations. This approach builds on Mancur Olson's work on collective action..[140]

Mancur Olson argues that explanations of groups "presupposes an interest in which its members all share."[141] While shared interest explains their collectiveness, it does not contribute

[140] Olson, Mancur Jr. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press, 1965.
[141] Ibid, p.9.

to explanations of their behavior, such as participation. Instead, Olson explains, “the combination of individual interests and common interests in an organization suggests an analogy with a competitive market.”[142] This project traces the actors, events, and material elements that facilitated the virtual organizing needed to explain how a transnational network emerges.

This study utilized the best practices of process tracing, as detailed by Bennett and Checkel to identify a hypothesis, consider alternative explanations, identify decision points and alternative outcomes, and employ testing. This is a qualitative study employing case study methodology with process tracing.

Case Studies: When and Why

Substantiating what we know with how we know it is the goal of social researchers as they seek to align ontology with epistemology. It is also the foundational element of rigorous social research methods. Consequently, research reflecting the strongest explanatory efforts has a keen awareness of the significance of aligning these two components.

The development of comparative methods made significant contributions to contemporary social research by highlighting the important role of ontology and epistemology as part of its foundation. Hall asserted, “to be valid, the methodologies used in a field must be congruent with its prevailing ontologies.”[143] “Institutions of the political world were seen primarily as the product of natural histories.”[144]

By focusing on the ontological, social researchers can consider the elements possible for analysis. Ontology is critical to social research because qualitative approaches seek to establish

[142] Ibid.
[143] Hall, Peter A. "Aligning Ontology And Methodology In Comparative Politics." Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences: 373-404.
[144] Ibid.

knowledge of the measurable components and how an individual interprets the social world. We construct the 'social world' in our attempts to understand it and act upon it.

Epistemology and methodology are directly linked. Epistemology includes how knowledge is acquired and verified. How do we know what we know? It is crucial for a social researcher not only to be aware of the specific facts but also to have an understanding of how the facts were gathered, validated, and analyzed. Researchers can gain meaning from how the knowledge is collected and developed. While ontology refers to elements of measurement, epistemology reflects a journey of accepting knowledge as valid.[145]

March and Lave challenge researchers to generalize research components, such as processes and implications, to consider applications and context.[146] Generalization broadens the model's applicability to fit other cases and can bridge the gaps between what we know and how we know it. The richest explanations for social scientists include what we are measuring and how we know our measurement to be true.

Following Hall's advice on aligning ontology with methods, this research utilizes a case study methodology to examine a complex case of network emergence. Researchers use case studies when they want to answer how and why phenomena occurred.[147] Case studies are also useful when researchers seek to include the context of the phenomena because it is relevant to understanding them. The methods must address the complexity that this network's development reflected. The case study approach will allow "inferential leverage on complex causation."[148] Bennett describes the difficulty in testing theories with complex causality using traditional

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[145] King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Design- ing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press

[146] Lave, Charles A., and James G. March. An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993.

[147] Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications, 2003.

[148] Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. "Complex causal relations and case study methods: The example of path dependence." *Political Analysis* 14.3 (2006): 259.

statistical and qualitative methods.[149] The casualty recording network developed from a complex heterogeneity of actors with different organizational goals.[150] The casualty recording network grew from strategic interactions where actors had agency in choosing their interactions and arenas. Their choices shaped the culture: "strategic interactions constitute the very basis of social and organizational life."[151]

The focus of this research, a casualty recording network, investigates the connections of the antecedents, existing NGOs recording casualties, to the outcome of collective action.[152] Contemporary media and technological tools were mechanisms facilitating the network's emergence. These two elements explain why the network emerged at a particular time and under specific conditions. Understanding the context is critical to understanding its emergence. The timing of the network's formation relates to the communication tools available and a need developed for recorders to collaborate.

Case studies offer advantages for analyzing complex interactions.[153] It allows sequential analysis of interactions and developments. In this research, analysis of the network's evolution through three time periods is significant to understanding its development. Case studies also offer opportunities to uncover variables to contingent events that might otherwise go undetected. Finally, case studies allow an analysis of the effects of actors and events interacting.

Bennet et al. describe case studies as being appropriate for explaining phenomena with causal complexities.   The phenomenon has causal complexities because actors from different

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[149] Ibid, Pg 264.

[150] March, James G. "The Business Firm as a Political Coalition." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1962, pp. 662–678.

[151] King, Brayden G, and James M Jasper. "Strategic Interactions and Arenas: A Sociological Perspective on Strategy." *Strategic Organization*, vol. 20, no. 4, 2022, pp. 810–820.

[152] Bryman, Alan. 2004. Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press.

[153] Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. "Complex causal relations and case study methods: The example of path dependence." *Political Analysis* 14.3 (2006): 250-267.

paths produced the same outcome – joining a collaborative network. The actors had varied backgrounds, missions, capabilities, and geographies. Some actors recorded casualties in ongoing conflicts, while others documented past conflicts. At least one actor---Forensic Anthropology Foundation of Guatemala (FAFG), performed forensic work that resembled the fields of archaeology and anthropology more closely than casualty recording. Yet all of these actors arrived at the same outcome of participating in a collaborative network recording casualties.

The benefit of using case studies is what Robert Stake describes as: "information that is holistic and episodic."[154] Case studies are good choices for methods as a tool for understanding. Stake argues for case studies because case studies are compatible with exploration, universality, and experiential understanding: "Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the case."[155] Eckstein argues a case study approach is particularly valuable in testing theories. Eckstein defines 'case' as "a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable."[156] Consequently, Bennett et al. argue the approach is "a process that connects the cause and the outcome." They assert case studies provide episodic data that illustrate causal mechanisms in context.[157]

While case study methodology offers attractive gains for holistic analysis, there are costs to using this method. Case studies are not appropriate for drawing conclusions on incremental

[154] Stake, Robert E. "The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry." Case Study Method, 2009, pp. 18–26., doi:10.4135/9780857024367.d5.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science." Pp. 124 in *Handbook of Political Science* 7, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson W Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
[157] Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence." Political Analysis, vol. 14, no. 3, 2006, pp. 250–267.

elements impacting outcomes. Case studies are also less suited for generalizations for broad populations and are inadequate at identifying outliers.[158]

Process Tracing

The methodology utilized for this project was a case study analysis with process tracing. Process tracing is a systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected by researchers to analyze research questions and hypotheses.[159] This methodology is the most appropriate for this project because the network is a bounded case for examination. Additionally, there was sufficient data on network events for more than a decade for a robust analysis of the network's development.

Process tracing is a qualitative research tool that creates a literature picture and increases the leverage of inferences.[160] Bennett et al. describe the benefits of process tracing as sequencing a causal narrative to show the events interacting. This project examined the precursors leading to the establishment of a network and subsequent events to uncover the motivations of actors joining the network.

For the timeline, this study approaches it as two-time eras. The first era includes events from the network's launch in 2009 to 2013. During this era, the network was part of a larger organization, the Oxford Research Group. This first period provides context by examining the founders, the early joiners, and the events. Next, the study traces the activities, projects, and sentiments of the actors from 2013-2016 involved in the next stage of network development. This second era offered tremendous empirical data on activities, events, and publications (Appendix B).

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[158] Ibid.
[159] Collier, David. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 44, no. 04, 2011, pp. 823.
[160] Ibid, pp. 823–830.

The independent variable investigated was the motivations for NGOs joining a casualty recording network. The dependent variable was the outcome – the formation of a casualty recording network. The research puzzle led to the development of three hypotheses for testing.

- (H1) If a transnational advocacy network emerges, then actors join for intangible benefits because organizational needs drive actors.
- (H2) If a transnational advocacy network develops, then actors join for opportunities to shape international humanitarian norms because shared principles and common values motivate actors.
- (H3) If a transnational advocacy network emerges, then actors join for opportunities to apply political pressure to states because changing states' behaviors motivates actors.

The best practices of process tracing charge a researcher to develop rival explanations and alternative outcomes.[161] We also must juxtapose rival explanations that we intend to test.[162] Process tracing challenges researchers to be just as interested in the rival explanations so that the primary theory is juxtaposed against the alternatives in a "three-cornered fight[163]" Consequently, this project tests a primary hypothesis (H1) and two rival hypotheses (H2 & H3). The rival explanations in this study hypothesis 2 (H2) and hypothesis 3 (H3) are based on the literature explaining TAN emergence as arising from ideology or politics respectively. H2 was developed from the literature on TANs and actors seeking to change international norms. H3 was developed from the literature on social movements and actors seeking to join TANs to create political pressure. The rival hypotheses along with the primary hypotheses will be tested using

[161] Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

[162] See Hall, Peter A. "Tracing the Progress of Process Tracing." European Political Science, vol. 12, no. 1, 2012, pp. 20–30 and Rohlfing, Ingo. 2014. "Comparative Hypothesis Testing Via Process Tracing." Sociological Methods & Research 43 (4):606-642. And Zaks, Sherry. 2017. "Relationships Among Rivals (RAR): A Framework for Analyzing Contending Hypotheses in Process Tracing." Political Analysis 25 (3): 344-362.

[163] Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 170–196.

Collier's Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference: Hoop Tests, Straw-in-the-wind tests, doubly decisive, and smoking gun tests.[164]

This study includes control variables to account for barriers that may affect an NGO's ability to join the network, such as the NGOs understanding of costs, application requirements, and recruiting strategies, as well as external barriers to joining, such as states' behaviors.

Theory & Hypothesis Testing

Theory and hypothesis testing, based on the qualitative method of process tracing and for understanding causal-process observations, was utilized in this research. In particular, this framework offers analytical power through inferences that are specifically applicable to analyzing an actor's motivations. Precise descriptions of activities facilitate the needed foundation for inference-building. Tools for assessing causal mechanisms include four tests that helped confirm and eliminate explanations. These four tests include the "straw-in-the-wind" test, the "smoking-gun" test, the "Hoop" test, and the "Doubly Decisive" test.

Each test offered opportunities to support, substantiate, weaken, or eliminate an explanation. If a hoop test failed, it eliminated a hypothesis, but if a smoking gun passed, it strongly supports a hypothesis. A straw-in-the-wind test is only suggestive but not conclusive. Doubly decisive tests offer a definitive result which is rare, and eliminating a hypothesis is difficult to do in social science. While there is no prescriptive method for determining which test to apply to data, assumptions and interpretations are crucial in deciding which test is appropriate. Analysis of each network event, publication, presentation, interview, and survey response

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[164] Collier, David. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 44, no. 04, 2011, pp. 823.

offered clues for inferences. The clues are causal process observations that lead to inferences of actor motivations.

This study used network membership as a criterion for determining an actor's reason for joining the network. Passing a test was based on whether membership in the network was necessary and sufficient for participation in the activity. A critical point examined was an actor's motivation and whether membership was a prerequisite to participation. This study considered the activities network actors participated in for additional indicators of their motivation. Clues for building inferences about motivation were discovered by analyzing the kind of activity: sociological, economic, or political. Membership was unnecessary if actors could participate in an activity without joining the network. However, membership may be sufficient because members were alerted to network activities and events through their proximity to the network.

Clues for building inferences included the following: members who participated, how many network members participated, the purpose of the activity, whether there was a benefit, and who may have benefited. Each activity offered distinct clues that led to inferences used to determine if the event or publication aligned with a hypothesis of this research and tested against it (Figure 2). The extensive list of activities examined-- along with sources, clues, and inferences, is available in Appendix B.

When network members engaged in an activity without opportunities for increasing capacity, such as funding, it was a clue that increasing capacity was not the goal. Further examination of an activity's description will inform the research if the activity was political or seeking to establish a norm. The clues collected led to inferences about the actor's motivation in that particular activity. A deeper examination of the type of activity should produce clues about whether a political call on states occurred (H3) or if the effort discussed procedures for a new

norm of casualty recorders (H2). The dependent variable is the emergence of a casualty recording TAN and three independent variables were the motivations for actors joining the network. For the first hypothesis (H1), it had an independent variable testing whether actors joined for opportunities to professionalize their staff, research, or increase capacity. There was strong support that actors joined the network for private interests (H1) and not to support norms or produce political pressure.

For the second hypothesis (H2), the independent variable tested was whether actors joined the network to shape international humanitarian norms. There was some support for this but it was not strong. Finally, the third hypothesis (H3), tested was to determine whether actors joined the network to apply political pressure on states and INGOs. This was not supported by the evidence.

When actors participate alone in a casualty recording activity without engaging other members of the network, it follows that the activity is not an attempt to demonstrate widely accepted practices, and therefore not an attempt to establish a norm (H2). It was expected that further examination of this type of sole-actor activity will lead to clues about political efforts (H3) or capacity-building efforts (H1).

In determining which test is appropriate, the researcher's prior knowledge is essential to understanding the context of each activity and whether they aligned with one of the motivations offered in the hypotheses. The expectation is that inferences will lead to network activities aligning with one or more hypotheses.

If inferences indicate evidence for more than a single motivation for participating in an activity, then the researcher utilized the 'Straw in the wind" test. The hoop test was employed if

the inference strongly indicated a single motivation for participation. When there was evidence of an alternate or counterfactual outcome, a doubly decisive test was exercised.

Figure 2 Testing for Causal Inference



Binding the Case: Scope

This project examines a casualty recording network that emerged in the 2000s to record casualties in a conflict. The actors included in this study are those identified as casualty recorders, data end-users, or participants in the network. I excluded other actors who work in humanitarianism, human rights, human security, or state security but are unrelated to casualty recording.

This case focuses on a casualty recording network and not on other types of casualty tracking, such as 'civilian harm tracking' or the protection of civilians in conflict. While casualty recording is a ubiquitous term used for many different types of human security recording, there are fundamental differences between them.

This project defines casualty recording as a systematic process to record all individuals killed in armed violence.[165] It differs from "civilian harm tracking" and from the "protection of civilians in armed conflict" because it includes casualties that may not be civilians and includes contexts of violence other than conflict.[166] There are also substantive differences between different types of recording, such as how it is done, what the data is used for, and who does the recording. The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) performs civilian harm tracking and defines it as "an internal process by which an *armed* actor can systematically gather data on civilian deaths and injuries, property damage or destruction, and other instances of civilian harm caused by its operations.[167]

This project does examine the motivations of actors participating in the network and the factors facilitating their collaboration. Still, it does not seek to evaluate the actors' methods, approaches, or conclusions.

Data Sources

Primary and secondary source data for this project included but were not limited to semi-structured surveys and interviews, archived network reports and documents, interviews, journal

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[165] Dardagan, Hamit, and John Sloboda. "Casualty Recording in and for the Modern Age: Why Standards Matter." International Committee of the Red Cross Law and Policy, ICRC, 8 Nov. 2016, blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2016/11/08/casualty-recording-standards.

[166] Bachelet, Michelle. UN Publications, 2019, pp. 1–36, Guidance on Casualty Recording.

[167] Center for Civilians in Conflict, and Every Casualty. Oxford Research Group , 2014, pp. 1–4, Examining Civilian Harm Tracking and Casualty Recording in Afghanistan.

articles, conference proceedings, newspaper articles, and existing data sets. Archival examples included financial reports, publications, briefings, white papers, newspaper and journal articles, case studies, and other documents.

Interviews

This research study conducted confidential interviews with network staff, leadership, members, and data end-users from October 2020 to January 2021. These interviews occurred over video teleconferencing and were structured based on the questionnaire sent to survey participants. Many of the participants interviewed for this research were no longer engaging with the network. They had moved on to new positions with other NGOs, INGOs, or government entities. Because of the political contestation in casualty recording and the sensitivity of their roles, participants explicitly requested that I treat their contributions as confidential and without attribution.

Twenty-one interviewees elected to participate confidentially and in their personal capacities. Consequently, their views are not attributed directly to them or their organization by name. However, meaningful information about their roles inside and outside the network is being made available about each confidential interview participant in a manner that is not personally identifiable. I interviewed all participants during 2020-2021. All interviewees participated in activities with the network in roles as leaders, staff, advisors, or trustees. Some interviewees led NGO casualty recording organizations, while others were staff members of the network. Seven members from Intergovernmental organizations, one academic, and three members of non-network NGOs participated in interviews.

Profile of Confidential Interviewees

NGO Leadership	Network Staff	IGO	Academic	NGO
5	5	7	1	3

Survey Data

I identified survey participants by their self-identification as casualty recorders or because they participated in the network. I purchased an internet domain name and built a web platform to facilitate data collection and present research participants with assurances of their ability to remain confidential. I mailed surveys to eighty-nine identified participants in October 2020. The email contained information about the research project with a link to the website where the participant could access the survey. I selected this approach to encourage the greatest participation and to avoid any obstructions, such as email filtering systems that could block survey links to participants.

The website landing page, www.casualtyrecording.com, contained information about the research project and a link for participants to take the survey. The website domain www.casualtyrecording.com administered the surveys in all cases. Once participants submitted their survey responses through the web domain, all of their responses were immediately and automatically time-stamped and cataloged in a database for analysis using the online survey tool, Qualtrics.

Twenty-four participants responded to the survey producing a 27% response rate. The respondents were primarily NGO leaders. Ten identified as NGO leaders, and four identified as data recorders. One respondent identified as a conflict researcher, one as an academic, and one as a data analyst. Seven respondents did not self-identify. While there were twenty-four survey

participants, not all participants answered all questions. I sent invitations to participate in the survey to network members and non-network members. Survey questions included membership dates and reasons for joining or abstaining from the network. Additionally, the survey included a Likert scale to determine which side payments, selective benefits, or coercive measures carried the most weight in an NGO's decision to participate in the network. The questionnaire mailed to participants is available for review in Appendix A.

Archival Data

On August 19th, 2020, the Oxford Research Group (ORG) announced they would cease operations in 2020. ORG, the parent organization for the Every Casualty network, donated their files to the London School of Economics (LSE). I corresponded with LSE about my need to access the files. During this research project, the files were digitized, allowing me to access the archived files remotely. These files included documents from 2007-2014 when the network became an independent NGO. The documents included network-specific documents: internal newsletters, discussion papers, and working papers. It also had additional ORG documents that provided insight into the meetings that launched the network at ORG.

Secondary Sources

Secondary sources used in this resource are detailed in Appendix B. These include publications, press releases, and presentations. These sources analyzed, interpreted, retold, or explained events by individuals who were not present at the event. The network produced the majority of secondary sources through their campaigns to promote casualty recording, but the network did not participate in the actual event, publication, data collection, or presentation. The network published a great deal of secondary source material on its website to promote casual recording outside of the work the network performed.

Chapter 4: Network Origins

Introduction

This chapter traces the formation of a casualty recording TAN and argues ICTs mobilized it and deep knowledge of early network contributors shaped it. This chapter describes the conflation of technological tools and the expertise of early actors in the network as the foundation for its development.

Preconditions & Precursors to the network development

Before the network developed, two influential factors preceded the network and created a need for methods and informed a collaborative approach. First, the Iraq Body Count (IBC) served as a "proof of concept" model showcasing the capabilities of an NGO using ICTs to collect and then publish casualty data. The Iraq Body Count (IBC) used ICTs to create data repositories for casualty information and social spaces for methodologies and context. The founders of IBC--Hamit Dardagan and Dr. John Sloboda, established the casualty network in 2009. Dr. John Sloboda is an academic with a background in human rights advocacy. He was the founder of the Institute for Social Impact Research in the Performing Arts, where he led research on the social impact of making music. Dr. Sloboda is also an Emeritus Professor at Keele University. Hamit Dardagan is a researcher and an advocate with technical skills.

The lessons learned from IBC formed the knowledge base of the network. Dardagan brought technical experience, and Sloboda brought advocacy experience and a network of human rights contacts. Interest in Marc Herold's casualty recording work brought them together. Herold connected them, and they met in London in 2002 to discuss shared ideologies. Their subsequent discussions led them to conclude that this was something they could and should do.

The second precursor was a controversy that established the need for legitimacy in the methods used for casualty recording. During the early 2000s, IBC experienced challenges as casualty recording captured headlines and was scrutinized. The Lancet medical journal published two surveys estimating the Iraqi mortality rate due to the first stages of the Iraq War in 2003. The peer-reviewed studies published on October 29, 2004, and October 11, 2006, estimated the Iraqi mortality rate in excess of 98,000 and 654,965, respectively. The Lancet study used traditional methodologies employed in healthcare settings: cluster sampling and estimations, rather than documenting each casualty. Nevertheless, Lancet researchers argued the data produced a blueprint of the violence. The survey data "overlaid onto a map illustrated the details of how the war was carried out – village to village, house."[168] The researchers were resolute that "we could see the war" in the survey data.[169] Yet the sampling methodology produced data that could be challenged and rejected. The studies were controversial and the methodology was challenged. Johns Hopkins suspended the principal investigator from leading human subject research studies for five years.[170]

Consequently, the controversy affected the network: "casualty numbers became a political football."[171] In a 2005 interview, President Bush disputed the Lancet numbers and offered 30,000 as a casualty count, which coincided with the Iraq Body Count data and served as an unofficial endorsement. President Bush's comments caught the network founders unaware: "The most wealthy and technologically advanced nation on earth was relying on our---on our group of barely funded, you know, individuals to come up with a figure, and we were not happy

[168] Interview with G. Burnham 4/2018.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Chen, Cindy. "Johns Hopkins Newsletter ." 26 Feb. 2009.
[171] Interview with John Sloboda 2020.

about it, actually, because he (President Bush) said 30,000 at that time. It was already 37,000. We could have told them it's actually already higher."[172]

Discrediting the Lancet study was significant for defining the field of casualty recording. It was important to casualty recording because it juxtaposed traditional scientific reporting with data accessible to the public through ICTs. By 2015, a study of the field of casualty reporting over ten years claimed the Lancet study "is not even mentioned in mainstream media anymore," and the Iraq Body Count (IBC) had basically "established itself as the standard."[173] Being recognized as a standard is significant because it conveys an endorsement of legitimacy and positions the IBC as an authority to create definitions, processes, and methodologies for the field of casualty recording. Hannah Arendt argued, "Political institutions live not from force but from recognition."[174] Furthermore, Habermas' theory explains how the IBC's recognized power situates the NGO as the legitimate authority for leading a network: "Legitimate power permits the occupants of positions of authority to make binding decisions."[175]

Network Origins

In 2002, Hamit Dardagan, an "experienced and successful minority-rights[176]" activist proficient in technical skills, met Dr. John Sloboda, "an organizer of several effective antiwar initiatives on the public record[177]" in London. They jointly developed a methodology and the set of tasks that needed doing, including constructing a real-time web resource and recruiting volunteers to assist with collecting and analyzing media reports just as Professor Marc Herold

[172] Interview with Hamit Dardagan 2020.
[173] PhysiciansFor Social Responsibility, . 2015, pp. 1–100, *Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the "War on Terror"*.
[174] D'Entrèves Passerin Maurizio. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. Routledge, 2001, pg124.
[175] Habermas, Jürgen. "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power." Hannah Arendt, 2017, pp. 67–88., doi:10.4324/9781315253657-4.
[176] Email correspondence with John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, 2023.
[177] Ibid.

did in Afghanistan[178]. Dardagan notes: “The Iraq Body Count benefitted from Prof Marc Herold, who had done something like a proto-Iraq body count for Afghanistan. It was narrow and just based on NATO bombings…there didn't seem to be that much relevant stuff around that we could draw upon, apart from Marc Herold's real pioneer work that he did in Afghanistan.”[179] Conceptually, this indicates organizations will not collaborate if there are no resources to share. Hamit Dardagan says: “we were the only organization doing casualty recording on a regular basis. There were a few surveys that were done, but they're all snapshots. We were the only organization doing it from the beginning of the (Iraq) war right through.”[180] Dr. John Sloboda describes the conceptualizing process as drawing people together from wide backgrounds with a simple question: “How do we get more of this done? How do we advocate for it? How do we improve it?”[181] This question was one “we began to ask in 2007 at the time of the initial conception of the Every Casualty program. It was not in our minds in 2003. At that point we were focused solely on our own work in Iraq.”[182]

Sloboda describes the early days of casualty recording: “it wasn't really a field when we began. People were doing it, but they didn't see themselves as working in a field. Some people called it ‘documentation.’ Some people put it in a human rights context. Some people put it in a humanitarian context. It was all very jumbled.”[183] Dardagan explains that technology-facilitated collaboration: “The Iraqi Body Count (IBC) work would not have been possible without the Internet.”[184]

[178] Email correspondence with John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, 2023.
[179] Interview with Hamit Dardagan,2020.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Interview with John Sloboda 2020.
[182] Email correspondence with John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, 2023.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Interview with Hamit Dardagan 2020.

Sloboda explains the practice of casualty recording developed at “a moment in time-- a good idea which could be had by just one person and the means to execute that idea. Other people had similar ideas earlier but didn't have the advantages of the Internet. It was much more expensive and required much more for governments to buy into it.”[185]

Chris Woods, the founder of AirWars, describes what was happening in journalism with ICTs before the network was founded: “Civilian harm methodologies was a very live subject. It was a relatively new field. There was nothing comprehensively written. We recognized the critical importance of a trustworthy, dependable methodology but didn't quite know how to get there. I worked with WikiLeaks on the Iraq war logs and the Chelsea Manning documents. There were discussions on what should be shared. One of the organizations brought into the discussion was Iraq Body Count.”[186] Woods described the pilot work as based on pre-connections and informed work at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and later at AirWars: “We were trying to do innovative things at the Bureau like a public database, incorporating the media. We were trying to innovate in pre-social media days.”[187]

Dardagan described the impact of ICTs on starting the network: “based on this new phenomenon of the world's media being available through the Internet; It was burgeoning at that time. So it was possible for this guy [*Marc Herold)*] who speaks German, French, Spanish, and maybe Portuguese, to look at the world's press just sitting at his desk. Before *(the Internet)*, you needed really large resources to access and gather all the world's press and have people to read through all those newspapers.”[188] The Iraq Body Count (IBC) relied on reports written in English though they may have originated in another language. For reports not in English, the

[185] Interview with John Sloboda 2020.
[186] Woods, C. Interview 2020.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Dardagan, H. Interview 2020.

IBC depended on the foreign-language monitoring units of Middle East media or the major Iraqi media.[189] "Later, IBC relied on Google translate, where necessary with confirmation by Arabic-speaking staff, for sources that had no existing English versions."[190]

By 2001, Marc Herold, a professor of Economics at the University of New Hampshire, illustrated the importance of ICTs to conflict when he started writing about a database he created tracking civilian casualties in Afghanistan.[191] Herold describes his methods as avoiding the ethnocentric biases of Western media: "I have sought cross-corroboration, the idea being that if a couple major news agencies report the event, then it is more likely accurate."[192] Herold describes his technique as using newspaper data from India, Afghanistan, France, and the UK for comparative analysis with statistics reported by the Taliban: "When greater detail was given about the specifics of a bombing attack, I lent it greater credibility."[193] Herold described accessing newspapers such as Al Jazeera and the Sydney Morning Press, as well as the Afghan Islamic Press and the Pakistan News Service. Herold discovered that the independent newspaper in Afghanistan often reported lower casualty figures. Still, many of the civilian casualties described by the Taliban were later confirmed by "journalists on the scene, eye-witnesses, survivors, families of victims, U.N. sources, and NGOs."[194] This initial effort by Dr. Herold stimulated ideas in Dardagan and Sloboda about what may be possible in protecting civilians in war. Internet access provided open-source data directly to the public: "suddenly became possible for people to do that[195]. "Dr. John Sloboda described the new capabilities offered by the Internet

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[189] Dardagan, Hamit. "Methods: Data Sources." *Methods :: Iraq Body Count*, Iraq Body Count, 2020, www.iraqbodycount.org/about/methods/2.
[190] Email correspondence with John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, 2023.
[191] "A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan : A Comprehensive Accounting (Revised) / Marc W. Herold." 2002.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Dardagan, H. Interview 2020.

"small volunteer groups suddenly have a tool at their disposal to put these ideas into practice. It meant a team could collaborate online."[196] The Internet offered new opportunities to collaborate: "The (entire) IBC only met in person once. We had people in the USA and in Britain. We met in a tailor-made online forum. From 2003, we were a virtual organization."[197]

As the Iraq Body Count solidified its processes and reporting, Dardagan and Sloboda fielded requests on "whether we would monitor deaths in other breaking conflicts as well as Iraq, and in one or two cases, advice or assistance in setting up similar projects."[198] Other casualty recorders and journalists were being faced with dilemmas of data but lacked a methodology for how to handle the information. Hamit Dardagan noted the Iraq Body Count was the only organization performing casualty recording routinely: "We were the only organization doing it from the beginning of the war right through."[199]

When building the network, the founders, Hamit Dardagan and Dr. John Sloboda, focused on three populations of potential network members. The first population contacted was a broad class: "We assigned a number of young researchers to scan the Internet for every project doing this kind of work. Because there were no existing channels where groups were in contact with one another."[200] There were about fifty organizations doing the recording, and projects' researchers contacted them. The second population the team contacted was policy-focused organizations, international NGOs, and the UN. The founders made a list of more than a hundred organizations and sent them a policy paper on casualty recording: "this is the thing that is happening. Here are some of our ideas. Do you think this is a good thing to be doing?"[201] The

[196] Sloboda, J. Interview 2020.
[197] Ibid.
[198] Email correspondence with John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, 2023.
[199] Dardagan, H. Interview 2020.
[200] Sloboda, J. Interview 2020.
[201] Ibid.

founders received positive feedback from those contacted with encouragement to proceed. Finally, the network founders asked the group of people and organizations performing casualty recording if they wanted to join a 'nascent network.' Sloboda remembers asking: "Would you like to join with others? Would you like to be on a mailing list? Sign a founding declaration – a commitment to this work? That was in 2009."[202]

Deep Knowledge

The network was notable for its contributors' diversity, deep knowledge, and extensive experience. Contributors included seasoned data collectors with publishing experience, while other participants brought legal experience or had decades-long careers in human rights. Some members had long-term working relationships and experience building human rights coalitions, while others brought the tenets of journalism to the network. Contributions to the evolution of the network surfaced in dynamic meetings as experiences, stories, and ideas from previous projects. Lessons learned were shared and distilled. These discussions were opportunities for cultural transmissions of human rights advocacy, data quality, data security, and coalition building.

In thinking about how previous experience informed the practices of the network, early contributors say: "We learned it from each other. And we also transmitted it forward through time a little bit like people who had learned to work in coalition modes on one issue."[203] Participants in early working group meetings transmitted their experience and human rights expertise through attitudes and informal relationships: "in many ways, it's the kind of cultural work and the way that people talk to each other."[204]

[202] Ibid.
[203] Confidential Interview 15, 2020.
[204] Ibid.

Casualty recorders working in the field, end users of data, journalists, legal experts, and humanitarian advocates shaped ideas further with their input. This approach utilizes a view of casualty data from all perspectives and uses. Since casualty recorders were at different maturity models of reporting and different points of a conflict, these efforts provided a longitudinal look at casualty recording data that could inform, shape, and encourage recorders and end users. The artifacts produced by the network shaped casualty recorder behavior: "Elizabeth Minor[205] did a diagram showing what you could achieve at different points. We had it blown up in our office at the Bureau, and we had the diagram hanging over our computers. It was encouraging as well. Sometimes it was so frustrating. There was so little we knew about the allegations. The diagram showed what was possible at a particular point of a conflict cycle[206]. To not be too disheartened that we weren't achieving more in these hot phases of a war and to learn from other organizations who were much further down the line."[207] To further provide transparency to methods recorders used, the network articulated a list of five models based on the data source. The five models reflected data sources as document-based, network-based, a combination, multi-source investigations, and unknown victim identification such as forensics.

The working groups informed casualty recorders on the ground to understand how the international community and court systems could use the data they were collecting. A legal advisor that participated in working groups describes it as an "amazing example of how to bring so many different parties, and stakeholders from different organizations --- from the very tiniest grassroots organizations in obscure places to those at the very center of power—UN

[205] Elizabeth Minor was a Senior Research Officer at the Every Casualty Worldwide network from 2010-2014.
[206] Minor, Elizabeth. "Towards the Recording of Every Casualty Analysis and Policy Recommendations from a Study of 40 Casualty Recorders." *Oxford Research Group* , 12 Oct. 2012, pp. 1–32.
[207] Woods, C. Interview 2020.

representatives, state representatives, and from the ICC."[208] However, the conversations during the working groups were difficult as casualty recorders learned about data quality and integrity. As an end user, representatives from the ICC offered tough criticism of the methods and data collected. Conferences were opportunities for the end users to articulate a problem with data being collected directly to the data collectors. For many end users, they learned their data wasn't necessarily data usable to the international community. Some recorders learned they may have wasted their resources and time in their efforts, "they put themselves, and maybe other people-- at risk to get data of such bad quality that it was not usable."[209] The feedback was offered in a constructive environment and did not dissuade those participating in the working groups and conferences. Rather, the idea of creating standards to improve data quality was a powerful outcome of the conference and created a strong resolve of the members to work together to create a new standard for the best quality of data: "They don't know how to report information because nobody tells them and there's no system in place to report information in a systematic manner."[210]

Participants learned to use terminology and approaches and leverage resources to help their efforts. The idea was to get traction with big organizations to invest in developing a tool. INGOs have ties in local communities where local networks already exist. The idea was to be able to tap into those networks for information flows: "we try to shift the conversation from basically human rights to humanitarian. Why? Because humanitarians speak to everybody."[211]

Legal advocates that participated describe the working groups as particularly helpful to

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[208] Confidential Interview 7, 2020
[209] Confidential Interview 10, 2020.
[210] Confidential Interview 10, 2020.
[211] Ibid.

smaller NGOs: The network had a "human sense to it."[212] "Getting people together was hugely valuable. Bigger, Europe-centric NGOs have other modes of communication and are more easily connected, but smaller NGOs that are more remote, like Sudan or Brazil, can benefit more from the network."[213] Legal advocates also describe the political benefits and moral obligation: "An increasing awareness of the practice as something that's not only important and morally right but something is possible."[214]

Numerous working groups and conferences consulting and contributing expertise and lessons learned resulted in developing standards for casualty recording. Members who collaborated and went on to other organizations brought the methods and ideals gained from being an early contributor of the network with them to new organizations. Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony, which contends meaning is replicated and disseminated through society by traditional and organic intellectuals, offers conceptual understanding for recognizing the importance of network knowledge extending to new systems in NGOs. Gramsci explains that as power shifts, organic intellectuals need to engage with traditional intellectuals to spread ideas effectively.[215] Chris Wood, founder of Airwars: "Even though the standards weren't published, Airwars was probably the first beneficiary organization creating from new because we sought to be conformant--- the best we could be of what we saw the standards coming out."[216]

Chapter Summary

This chapter traced the facilitation of a casualty recording TAN as facilitated by ICTs and shaped by the deep knowledge of early contributors. Just like in other transnational movements, ICTs enabled casualty recorders to connect across geographies, overcome obstacles, and create

[212] Confidential Interview 7, 2020.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Confidential Interview 7, 2020.
[215] Howarth, David. *Discourse*, Open University Press, 2000, pp. 89–101.
[216] Woods, C. Interview 2020.

social spaces for collaboration. The network also developed because of the expertise of the early contributors of the network. Early contributors brought work experiences and relationships built from previous endeavors to contribute to the network. In the early working meetings, participants were already experts in collaborative advocacy or human rights laws in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or INGOs. Other contributors had experienced casualty recorders who brought valuable, real-world experience in collecting, validating, protecting, and publishing data. The confluence of ICTs enabling collaboration and deep knowledge gave the network a solid footing to develop. Other precursors to the network established a need for 'legitimate' methodology and provided a model for capabilities with the Iraq Body count.

This chapter described two factors critical to the network's development. It also described the processes which constructed meaning and shaped processes, definitions, and methods. Knowledgeable contributors—facilitated by ICTs, 'co-produced'[217] new sociotechnical terms, processes, and understandings for casualty recording. ICTs also shaped network engagement because they were flexible, lowered barriers for resource-poor actors, and overcame distance constraints.

Chapter 5: Network Emergence 2009-2012

Introduction

This chapter describes three key findings facilitating the network's emergence. First, it traces how organizational structure plays a critical role. The next key finding is that actors can access intangible benefits at network events. Because events were innovation sites for casualty recording, they also served as laboratories with non-collective benefits for participants and

[217] "Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society." *States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order*, by Sheila Jasanoff, Routledge, 2006, pp. 13–45.

overcoming Olson's 'free rider' problem. Finally, the third finding is that actors joined the network for benefits, confirming the first hypothesis in this study (H1).

Preliminary research used open-source articles and publications to uncover an explanation for the Every Casualty network's emergence. The network changed extensively during Eras I and II. It would grow from twenty members in 2009 to more than fifty. It also changed names at least three times. There were substantive changes in the network's casualty recording requirements, the focus of campaigns, and the complexion of the network. The network changed the criteria for recording casualties from 2010 to 2016. In 2010, requirements for data collection focused on four elements relating to the casualty: the method of death, the time of death, the weapon, and the source/perpetrator. By 2016, the focus would shift from elements causing the casualty to requirements for documenting the casualty and gaining acknowledgment: temporality (recorded promptly), correctly identified, and publicly acknowledged. The focus of the network's campaigns also changed during Eras I and II. In 2009, an article written by Dardagan, Sloboda, and Brigadier General Richard Iron called for a civilian-military collaboration and laid out the benefits to the military for doing casualty recording. Conversely, by 2014, the network published a briefing report "exposing military tactics that result in disproportionately high civilian casualties."[218]

This chapter presents three important findings and compares them to the academic literature on TAN emergence. This chapter focuses on the early days of a transnational advocacy network (TAN) recording casualties in conflicts by investigating the activities, structure, and growth of a casualty recording network from 2009-2012 (Era I). The network was initially

[218] Knittel, Julia, and Elizabeth Minor. Action on Armed Violencce, 2014, pp. 1–9, *How the Counts Reduce the Casualties.*

called the International Practitioner's Network (IPN) from 2009-2011, when the name changed to "Every Casualty Worldwide."

Academic literature identifies political, economic, and sociological factors for transnational advocacy networks (TAN) to form. However, the empirical evidence finds the network's emergence was possible due to the advantages of launching within an established organization, network events offering intangible benefits, and members joining the network for benefits.

The chapter provides strong evidence for understanding the emergence of a network in context--how the network came to be, the supporting mechanisms for its development, and the incentives that fueled its growth. This chapter tests three hypotheses:

- (H1) If a transnational advocacy network emerges, then actors join for intangible benefits because organizational needs drive actors.
- (H2) If a transnational advocacy network develops, then actors join for opportunities to shape international humanitarian norms because shared principles and common values motivate actors.
- (H3) If a transnational advocacy network emerges, then actors join for opportunities to apply political pressure to states because changing states' behaviors motivates actors.

Findings and Discussion

Finding 1: *Organizational structure and ICTs facilitated network emergence and shaped processes.*

The network benefited from its incubation within the Oxford Research Group (ORG). ORG was an established organization with "gravitas" from twenty-five years of human security experience.[219] ORG also developed the "Oxford Process," which brought together people with

[219] Email correspondence from H. Dardagan, 2023.

different viewpoints on contentious political topics for formal and informal discussions. Based on treating complex political topics as two simultaneous levels of dialogue, the process addressed both content and process.[220] While Sloboda and Dardagan brought the expertise for casualty recording, credibility from ORG was beneficial. In describing a network event, an advisor from an IGO stated, "It was a very participatory approach."[221]

The structure of ORG provided an environment where the network could grow in an established human rights organization. ORG's previous projects provided an environment with routine access to human rights expertise and donor relationships. The Iraq Body Count, founded by Dr. John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, had a mature process for documenting casualties and leaders willing to build the network. Dr. Sloboda described how the network became a project at the Oxford Research Group and benefitted from ORGs resources, knowledge, and processes.[222] Sloboda describes three different steps and two different populations that the founders considered for building the network. First, he describes how they used an ICT: "We assigned a number of young researchers to scan the internet for every project doing this kind of work. Because there were no existing channels where groups were in contact with one another."[223] The Every Casualty team at ORG discovered fifty casualty recording organizations and began to contact them. Next, Sloboda describes the first community contacted about the network: "Another constituency we contacted was international-largely NGOs, UN, policy. We made huge lists of more than 100"[224]. The network benefitted from the experience of ORG existing structure but Dardagan and Sloboda hired early career researchers to work on the project.

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[220] The Oxford Research Group "The 'Oxford Process'." *Oxford Research Group*, 2004, oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/aboutus/dialogue.htm.
[221] Confidential Interview 8, 2020.
[222] Interview with J. Sloboda, 2020.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Interview with J. Sloboda, 2020.

Sloboda explains how the Every Casualty team at ORG sent a policy paper casualty recording organizations and said, "this is the thing that is happening. Here are some of our ideas. Do you think this is a good thing to be doing?"[225] The feedback was positive for the Every Casualty team to continue with this project. Finally, Sloboda describes contacting the second group, the casualty recorders themselves. Sloboda describes the Every Casualty staff as soliciting members by asking if they "would join our nascent network? Would you like to join with others? Would you like to be on a mailing list? Would you sign a founding declaration – a commitment to this work?"[226]

After getting twenty NGOs to commit to joining the network, the Every Casualty team applied and won a grant in 2010 from the US Institute of Peace. This grant funded a survey for ORG to research casualty recording work and casualty recorders. "The successful winning of a USIP grant to survey casualty recorders was in part helped by the fact that ORG was an established organization (founded in 1985) with respected senior researchers and a track record of grant-winning success across a range of conflict-oriented topics."[227] The USIP opportunity also produced intangible benefits for members who joined the network and participated in the survey, which Finding 2 examines.

Finding 2: *Network Events Offered Intangible Benefits to Participants*

The second finding suggests that non-material incentives were available to network members and IGO data users at network events (Table 1). Non-material incentives are intangible benefits that do not have monetary value but are inducements.[228]

[225] Ibid.
[226] Ibid.
[227] Email Correspondence with Hamit Dardagan and Dr. John Sloboda, 2023.
[228] Clark, Peter, and James Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 6(3): 134.

The 2011 International Conference of Casualty Recorder Practitioners was the first of its kind for casualty recorders but also for data users. The conference brought together data users (IGOs and NGOs who were not recorders) with local casualty recorders. An IGO advisor described the conference as "passionately professional."[229] Sessions served as encounters of information exchange. "The sense of togetherness that came from it was very powerful. That togetherness is difficult to sustain, but it was designed to offer--- even if it was just a one-time event, to build relationships for more engagements going forward."[230] While these relationships were important to the IGOs in attendance, they were critical for casualty recorders. "Bigger Europe-centric NGOs have other modes of communication and are more easily connected but smaller NGOs, that are more remote—from places like Sudan or Brazil, can benefit more from the network."[231]

As discussed in Chapter 3, IGO (*data users*) stakeholders contributed requirements for understanding data quality and why it is needed. Additionally, data users shared lessons learned on validating data and data security. Systems experts with deep experience analyzing INGO and IGO collection systems attended the IPN conference. Analysts describe data analysis as something external organizations did in the past: "A few private corporations would do in-depth analysis. And then UN agencies and NGOs themselves became more sophisticated in setting up systems themselves for collecting information and standardized way of analyzing that data, instead of relying exclusively on the perceptions of their staff".[232]

The international community was uninterested in casualty recording. Initially, the ICRC was only tangentially interested in the casualty recording network and was interested in overall

[229] Confidential Interview 8, 2020.
[230] Confidential Interview 7, 2020
[231] Confidential Interview 7, 2020
[232] Confidential Interview 19, 2020.

numbers for advocacy purposes.[233] Other IGOs were unaware of casualty recording: "Before going to this conference, I didn't realize there was a difference between civilian harm tracking and casualty tracking."[234] Once they attended the conference, they noted: "I could see the importance of that, but it didn't fit so much with what we were looking for, which was the more up-to-the-minute count of civilian casualties that have happened in the last two months"[235].

At the conference, casualty recorders shared experiences of obstacles and limitations to collecting data that provided context for the data users in attendance. The varied roles and diverse perspectives, from remote casualty recorders to IGO end users, offered material incentives of knowledge that participants could incorporate into their work. Recorders could improve data quality, and data users gained access to the conflict through their new connection with a local resource. "Conversations about difficult points and how to produce data in a way that is perceived as legitimate and usable by end users. In 2011, representatives from the UN attended the IPN conference. They described casualty recording "as a gap we needed to at more closely." UN attendees took what they learned at the conference back to the UN: "we did bring it to the Secretary-General, and we did talk about both of those areas, but we pushed forward on civilian casualty tracking because that fit our purposes"[236].

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[233] Confidential Interview 8, 2020.
[234] Confidential Interview 13, 2020.
[235] Ibid.
[236] Confidential Interviews, 2020.

Table 1: *Hypothesis Testing of Actor Participation at Network Events*

Activity:	Clue:	Inference:	Hypothesis Tested:	Collier's Test for Causal Inference	Sufficient?	Necessary?	Results
Event: Network Formation	20 NGOs become founding members of network	Members joined for information and knowledge	H1	Hoop Test	No	Yes	Pass: Affirms H1
Event: Research Survey	40 NGOs participated and 2 presented at USIP	Members joined to further Casualty recording as a norm	H2	Straw-in-the-wind	No	No	Pass: Affirms H2
Event: Network Conference	23 Network members and 10 other orgs	Members joined the network to build capacity and gain tools	H1	Hoop Test	No	Yes	Pass: Affirms H1
Phase I of Standards Development	22 orgs participated in developing standards, tools, templates	Members joined to gain access to the "resource bank" and tools complementing the standards	H1	Hoop Test	No	Yes	Pass: Affirms H1
Interview	H. Dardagan, Network, and IBC Founder, interviewed about Libyan casualties & lack of methods	Demonstration of methods needed for norm change.	H2	Hoop Test	No	Yes	Pass: Affirms H2
Press Release	Network promotes IBC challenge to UK Chilcot report	Challenges state power.	H3	Hoop Test	No	Yes	Pass: Affirms H3
Charter calling on States	9 members + 47 outside orgs sign a Charter	Membership was not a requirement for political participation	H3	Smoking Gun	No	No	Failed: Weakens H3

Finding 3: *Actors joined the Network for Benefits.*

Survey and interview data collected reflect actors who joined or engaged with the network for benefits, confirming the first hypothesis of the project (H1). Analysis of survey data indicates some actors wanted tangible benefits but expressed disappointment in the lack of opportunities. The most selected reason for joining was to share resources and increase the capabilities of their organization (50%).[237] Meeting tech experts ranked as the most important network benefit (54%), followed by collaborating with experts (43%), and finally, learning new

[237] Survey conducted online 11/20-12/20.

tech (40%) (Table 2). Yet members describe disillusionment with intangible benefits: "The utilitarian nature of the network seemed to reduce over time. I wanted to feel more that my engagement tangibly improved our work - I was not always sure that it did. I felt all the reasons for joining were important. I am not sure that the results of joining were as fulfilling."[238] Another respondent simply calls for members to receive more support for capacity: "It is very important to have funding for members of Every Casualty recording."[239]

The survey data demonstrates members received various intangible benefits for joining the network. Some respondents say they joined to gain access to the best practices in the field. Respondents answered: "for best practices across other conflict contexts" or "learning and reflection."[240] Conversely, other members say they joined for other intangible benefits such as "to share data"[241] or to "work with the media."[242] One network member described the importance of the network to their work:"We heard of other people collecting data and used their data to inform our."[243] Finally, one network member described the network as creating new programs: "It helped in visualizing the importance of creating mechanisms of casualty recording. It also led to new programming avenues in our domestic context where rehabilitation programs for conflict victims exist but suffer from key bottlenecks. Moreover, no international organizations are allowed to operate in conflict-affected areas and cannot do advocacy to improve implementation. Also, the network helped build a public health approach to understanding conflict and documenting conflict and peace processes."[244]

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[238] Survey conducted online 11/20-12/20; Question 20.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Survey conducted online 11/20-12/20; Question 6.
[241] Survey conducted online 11/20-12/20; Question 17.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Survey conducted online 11/20-12/20; Question 17.
[244] Survey conducted online 11/20-12/20; Question 17.

Data collected in confidential interviews show network members and not network members engaged with the network to gain intangible benefits. Network members joined the network because they wanted methods and a resource that serves as a repository of skills and knowledge about casualty recording (Table 2). An example of members seeking benefits was the reason given for a network member who stopped engaging in network activities. The NGO pulled away from the network because they felt the network was reducing benefits to members by distilling input into a single methodology. They were seeking a "dynamic methodological landscape" where they could learn from others.[245]

In addition to network members, there were other participants at network events. These participants were members of IGOs or outside NGOs and attended events where they contributed as advisors.

When I asked non-members participants why they attended network events and served as advisors, they described events as opportunities to gain access to local data sources for international organizations (Table 2). They claim their participation was due to a "need for sources."[246] The network was a much-needed resource to access local recorders, their methodologies, and their data. Conversely, their presence and contributions at network events served as intangible benefits to members. They contributed expertise on data quality and data security that local recorders could not otherwise access.

Rival Hypotheses H2 and H3

While the data collected for this project tested whether actors joined to shape international norms (H2) or to create political pressure (H3), the data did not support those

[245] Confidential interview 15, 2020.
[246] Confidential Interviews 11 & 12.

explanations. Table 1 shows two tests for shaping international norms (H2). One was a straw-in-the-wind test, and the other a hoop test. While both activities passed the tests, it is insufficient to confirm them. Table 1 shows two tests for whether actors joined for political purposes (H3). One test is a hoop test, and it passes, but the second test is a smoking gun test, and it fails, substantially weakening H3. When the survey data is analyzed (Table 2), it reflects weak support. Testing the second hypothesis (H2), only 18% of respondents indicated joining with other casualty recorders for representation at the international level for humanitarian activities.[247] In testing H3, only 33% of survey respondents said Calling on States to perform casualty recording was the most important reason for joining the network.[248]

Table 2: *Hypotheses Testing of Survey and Interview Data*

Data Source:	Clue:	Inference:	Hypotheses:	Tests & Results
Non-member Network Participants (Interview Data)	End users on why they joined the network: "I think it was a common need for sources"; "No other sources, at that time– or at least know, that has this wealth of information in conflicts. So it certainly was worth our while for us to be there."	End Users joined the network to gain access to data sources (NGOs).	H1	Hoop Tests (2) - Passed
Network Members (Interview Data)	Members on why they joined the network: • "(Before the network) there wasn't a collective representation of skills, knowledge synthesized, refined and codified and that was of immense value." • "Gaining methods appealed to me" Members on why they did not join: A single methodological approach was too narrow. They wanted a 'dynamic methodological landscape'	NGOs joined to gain access to a knowledge bank. *Counterfactual:* NGOs did not join when they believed the approach was limiting.	H1	Hoop Tests (2)- Passed Smoking Gun (1) - passed
Network Members (Survey Data)	The most selected reason for joining was to share resources and increase the capabilities of their organization (50%). In considering the importance of network benefits, meeting tech experts ranked as the most important (54%) followed by collaborating with experts (43%) and then learning new tech (40%).	Network members joined to increase their organization's capabilities.	H1	Hoop Tests (3) - Passed
Network Members (Survey Data)	33% of survey respondents say Calling on States to perform casualty recording was the most important reason for joining the network	Network members did not join to apply political pressure to states.	H3	Hoop Test - Failed
Network Members (Survey Data)	18% of survey respondents say joining together at the international level for representation is why they joined the network.	Network members did not join to shape international norms.	H2	Hoop Test- Failed

[247] Survey data was collected from 10/19/20-1/10/21 with 12 Respondents answering Question 6.
[248] Ibid.

The Socio-Tech Lab of Negotiation

Madeleine Akrich's argument explains the emergence of the network: "technical objects build heterogeneous networks" because they bring together human and nonhuman components.[249] Building on Latour's Actor-Network Theory, Akrich describes the setting for this type of occurrence as a socio-technical lab. There are considerable negotiations between designers and users in the lab as innovation occurs. Negotiations become increasingly important as innovation develops through technically delegated prescriptions from designer to user and from user to designer.[250] "Technical objects may change social relations, but they also stabilize, naturalize, depoliticize, and translate these into other media."[251] Akrich explains the innovation process is opaque and obscures how actors make meanings and relationships in a socio-technical environment. Once definitions, processes, and standards are complete, "the processes involved in building up technical objects are concealed. The causal links are naturalized."[252]

Technology facilitated early collaboration. It allowed members to contribute across distances and through periods of time. However, events were also significant to the network's development because the events were 'labs' that bridged distances and created new bonds between data collectors and end users. The network's conference in 2011, leading to the launch of the standards working group, was an opportunity for negotiations between network members and data users. This initially happened at the 2011 conference, where 'negotiations' focused on

[249] Akrich, M. (1992) The de-scription of technical objects. In *Shaping Technology/ Building Society*, Pg 206; eds. W. E. Bijker and J. Law. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
[250] Ibid (pgs 209-211).
[251] Ibid.
[252] Ibid (Pg.222).

initial definitions, concepts, and methods. Collaborations, like the 2011 conference, negotiated meanings and are characteristic of Latour's discursive 'black boxes' transforming micro actors to macro.[253] The negotiations moved to a more formalized process as the standards working group collaborated to develop standards for recording casualties. The events bridged gaps between casualty recorders' data concepts for projected uses and *actual* uses. These events shaped the data because, as Akrich argued, it offers an understanding between "the world inscribed in the object" and "the world described by its displacement."[254] The events produced definitions for 'good' casualty data and created norms for data collection and security. The events also made new connections between casualty recorders and the international community. These connections would be the foundation for later work between the network and the UN, ICRC, ICC, and UN missions.

Preliminary research used open-source articles and publications to uncover an explanation for the Every Casualty network's emergence. The network grew from 20 members in 2009 to more than 50 by 2019. It also changed names at least three times during 2007-2016. There were other substantive changes too in the network's casualty recording requirements, the focus of campaigns, and the complexion of the network.

The network changed the criteria for recording casualties from 2010 to 2019. In 2010, requirements for data collection focused on four elements relating to the casualty: the method of death, the time of death, the weapon, and the source/perpetrator. By 2019, the focus would shift from elements causing the casualty to requirements for documenting the casualty and gaining

[253] Latour, Bruno, and Michel Callon. "Chapter 10: Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro- Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So." *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology (RLE Social Theory): Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies*, Routledge, 2014, pp. 277–304.
[254] Akrich, M. (1992) The description of technical objects. In *Shaping Technology/ Building Society*, Pg 206; eds. W. E. Bijker and J. Law. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

acknowledgment: temporality (recorded promptly), correctly identified, and publicly acknowledged.

Chapter Summary

In three short years, the International Practitioner's Network (IPN) emerged and developed. It launched in 2009 when twenty NGOs joined together by design of the Oxford Research Group (ORG) to create the first-of-its-kind casualty recording network. Then in 2011, the first conference for casualty recorders in London brought together casualty recording organizations, data users, and IGO members. At this first conference, the UN was unaware of casualty recording as a practice outside of harm tracking performed by states or reconciliation efforts implemented after a conflict. However, by 2012, the casualty recording network had strengthened relationships with casualty recorders, states, and IGOs, established definitions, and was on its way toward developing standards for casualty recording. Yet the casualty recorders were beleaguered: "they (*casualty recorders*) were incredibly in-country focused: on their project, in their country, recording their dead and usually in huge opposition to their government or powerful people in their own country, and that took up all their bandwidth."[255] Support from states and the international community was non-existent: "the typical response from governments was that it could not be done. It was too difficult. We could respond with a dozen people and, without any funding, could do it. Come on, don't give us that. With all its (*states'*) resources and all its power, of course, it could do it." That was the first level of advocacy—credibility that it could be done."[256]

[255] Interview John Sloboda, 2020.
[256] Ibid.

By May 22, 2012, The UN Secretary-General described the recording of casualties gaining attention as "encouraging."[257] The network established international relationships by holding meetings with UN agencies in New York, Washington, and Geneva.[258] 2012 also saw a change in states' interest in casualty recording. The network received a request from a group of states to provide an overview of casualty recording by states and within the UN system.[259] The network built relationships with other NGOs, such as Oxfam and Save the Children, while contributing to campaigns hosted by Human Rights Watch and the International Network on Explosive Weapons.[260]

By the conclusion of 2012, the international community was more engaged and receptive to the network's efforts. The network staff at ORG ended 2012 with an 'invite only' presentation in Washington, DC, to government, military, and academia leaders. They presented their findings from a two-year USIP survey. The survey analyzed the work of forty casualty recorders and best practices. USIP Abiodun Williams acknowledged the importance of casualty recording as "a vital issue for preventing, managing and resolving conflict, yet no standards for data collection exist."[261] USIP concluded the program by saying: "Counting every casualty is a basic building block of providing such accountability."[262]

Work described as "universalizing[263]" energized the network, and the promotion of it as a "moral point" fueled it.[264] However, the events were critical to the network's emergence because

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[257] Secretary General. United Nations, 2012, pp.7, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict .

[258] Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2009, pp.6, Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31st December 2012 Trustees Report.

[259] Ibid.

[260] I Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2009, pp.6, Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31st December 2012 Trustees Report.

[261] USIP , November 5, 2012, pp. 1–10, Counting Every Casualty Worldwide.

[262] Ibid.

[263] Interview with J. Sloboda, 2020.

[264] Ibid.

they served as "labs" for innovation where negotiations and exchanges could occur. The "labs" were the sites of negotiations between the data recorder and the data user that produced definitions and processes for casualty recording. Furthermore, they served as sites where intangible benefits were available.

Chapter 6: Network Consolidation 2013-16 (Era II)

Introduction

This chapter asserts two additional findings for this study. The fourth finding of this project is that actors did not join for political pressure or to establish an international norm. This finding contradicts traditional explanations of TAN emergence. The fifth finding of this research is that standardization provided network members with intangible benefits.

Literature on the emergence of TANs focuses on how successful the campaigns of TANs are in changing policy and challenging international norms.[265] While existing scholarship on the emergence of TANs[266] combines social movement theories[267] with organizational structure,[268] scholarly explanations are contradictory and insufficient to explain why actors collaborate.

This chapter asserts that TANs form as collective behavior, not because of shared values or political ideology, but instead because of non-collective, intangible benefits available to its members. I apply the literature on collective action theory and incentive systems to understanding TAN formation due to non-collective benefits offered to actors.[269]

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[265]Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

[266] Tarrow, Sidney G. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[267] Tilly, Charles. Regimes and Repertoires. University of Chicago Press, 2006.

[268] Castells, M. (1996). The information age: economy, society, and culture, vol. I, The rise of the network society. Blackwell, Malden, Mass.

[269] Olson, M.: The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. 2. print. ed., Cambridge, Mass. 1971; and Clark, Peter, and James Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 6(3): 129-66.

Olson's logic of collective action requires more than simply joining a group; it includes the production of a good. However, producing collective goods introduces a problem of collective action–free riders. If a collective good benefits everyone, but members feel their individual contribution won't make a difference to the supply available, then members may be unmotivated to contribute. Instead, they will enjoy the benefits but not contribute to its production and become a "free rider."[270] The casualty recording network overcomes the "free rider" problem by offering non-collective benefits, as Olson described in his by-product theory. This chapter presents empirical data for the time period 2013–2016, Era II. It presents findings supported by empirical data and compares them to the academic literature on TAN emergence. The years of Era I, 2009–2012, were years the network incubated, built relationships, and created awareness for casualty recording as a practice. In 2013–2016, Era II, the network strengthened through its independence as an NGO and its publication of standards for casualty recording.

Ronnie Lipschutz argued that an incompetent state and competent non-state actors would facilitate collaboration across borders to create new assemblages. Lipschutz claimed the result would be the social production and reproduction of ideas and connections that would shape international norms. Subsequently, Tarrow claims the Internet is a new mode of contention for civil society and leveraged to challenge states. Tarrow describes incidents of hacking government websites, hacking the Pentagon, and Snowden's Wikileaks as modern acts of contention. Tarrow argues that the use of the Internet in these modern repertoires of contention

[270] Ibid.

reveals “how the state’s infrastructural power can be turned against it.”[271]

It follows that actors joined TANs to establish new international norms (H2) or to apply political pressure to states and INGOs (H3). Considering TAN literature, either H2 or H3 should be sufficient to explain why actors joined a TAN on casualty recording. However, neither of those explanations sufficiently explains the actor’s behavior and participation in network activities.

I used data from network events and activities during Era II, along with survey and interview data, to test the three hypotheses of this study. The data reveals two significant findings from this time period. First, the data shows actors did not join the network to establish an international norm or to apply political pressure to states or NGOs. Secondly, the data shows the actors did join for intangible benefits such as legitimacy, professionalization, and a form of governance to members and participants.

Findings & Discussion

In seeking to uncover the motivations for actors joining the network, it is important to consider the actors making up the network. The network did not have a formal process for members to join or leave. Consequently, analyzing membership within a specific timeframe was not possible.

I examined the activities of at least ninety-two actors who participated in casualty recording activities from Era I and Era II (2009–2016). The actors had a wide range of

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[271] Tarrow, Sidney. “War, States, and Contention: From Tilly to the War on Terror*.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 1, 2016, pp. 1–22., doi:10.17813/1086-671x-21-1-1.

identities, self-descriptions, geographic areas, and advocacy foci. I sorted actors by their self-described identities, found on their websites, mission statements, and advocacy materials. I sorted each organization into a single category of analysis. If an actor was an NGO but did not record casualties, it was labeled NGO. This was applicable for some NGOs that performed work other than casualty recording, such as forensic analysis, research, or peace advocacy.

This research identified at least thirty organizations as casualty recorders and thirty-six as NGOs. Interestingly, four state organizations participated in network events, as did four other networks (Table 3). Of the ninety-two organizations examined, sixty-nine had narrow geographic focuses. Narrowly focused is defined as having one or two geographical areas of interest. For this research, geographical interest does not mean the organization was local or located within the area of interest. Twenty-two organizations were broadly focused, meaning their work included more than two geographical areas of interest—with many of them focused on multiple states. One organization used a regional approach focused on multiple states within a specific region.

Table 3: Actors Disaggregated by Self-Described Identities

Academic	Activist	Associations	IGO	INGO	Network	NGO	Casualty Recorders	Projects	State	Think Tanks
4	2	2	1	2	4	36	30	4	4	3

Of the ninety-two organizations examined, sixty were human rights organizations. Organizations focused on humanitarian, research, and peace advocacy, including four nuclear disarmament groups, were noted and compared to one another. (Table 4).

Table 4: Actors Disaggregated by Area of Advocacy

Human Rights	Humanitarian	Peace/ Disarmament	Weapons	Research	Conflict	Watchdog	Crisis Mapping	Journalism	UN
60	7	7	5	7	2	1	1	1	1

Finding 4: *Actors did not join for political pressure or to establish an international norm.*

Rival Hypothesis (H2)

The opportunity to contribute to standardization is a strong test of H2 and whether actors joined TAN recording casualties to establish an international norm. However, the empirical data does not support this hypothesis. Network members had advocacy opportunities to contribute to establishing an international norm (H2), yet member participation was low (Tables 6 & 7).

The international practitioner's conference in 2011 showed strong support for developing standards. Dr. Sloboda, founder of the network and co-organizer of the conference says: "The conference had unanimous support for standards. Standards to which practitioners could aspire would improve practice and credibility, so there would be more opportunities for recording."[272] Yet two short years later, when working groups began the first phase of developing standards, only eight network members contributed (Table 5). There are an equal number of NGOs external to the network participating in events as there are network members. Additionally, consultants, INGOs, and IGOs participated in Phase I. Funding did not preclude members' participation because there was "an open invitation"[273] for members to apply for the

[272] Sloboda, J. Interview 2020.
[273] Confidential Interview 9, 2020.

organization to cover their travel and expenses. Donors included the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Zivik program of the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (IFA) of the German Foreign Ministry, and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. Funding supported members' travel needs, administration costs of network staff, and even *non-members'* expenses: “These grants cover staffing, administration, travel and accommodation expenses of some external participants.”[274] Weakening H2 further is the interview data that suggests members participated in standards development because of the toolkit that would accompany the standard: “These tools will come as a separate output from the standards themselves but are considered key to making the latter useful for practitioners.”[275] Therefore, network members may have joined for access to a toolkit rather than to contribute to a new international norm.

In further testing of H2, there were at least six presentations and ten publications that the Every Casualty network produced or utilized in advocacy, but network members did not participate in them (Table 6). Consequently, these occurrences failed the test for causal inference. There were two instances where network members collaborated on publications, and those two instances passed testing. In the first instance, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) used data from another network member for a funded project. AOAV collaborated for tangible benefits and funding. The second instance utilizing network members involves a series launched by Every Casualty that used a network member, Nigeria Watch, as a case study. The network received tangible benefits, and funding, for publishing the case study, and Nigeria Watch received intangible benefits of professionalization. (Finding 5 discusses these benefits.)

[274] Casualty, Every. Every Casualty, 2016, pp. 8, Standards for Casualty Recording .

[275] Oxford Research Group . (2015, October 8). Developing standards for casualty recording: plenary meeting in London, September 2015. Every Casualty . Retrieved July 22, 2020, from http://www.everycasualty.org/newsandviews/standards-plenary-meeting.

Table 5: Actor Participation in Phase I of Standards Development[276]

Network Members	Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC)	Documenta	Forensic Anthropology Foundation of Guatemala (FAFG)	Iraq Body Count
	Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM)	Elman Peace	Handicap International	Syria Justice and Accountability Centre
NGOs	Article 36	Human Rights Watch	Security First	Syria Tracker, project of Humanitarian Tracker
	Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG)	Open Society Foundations	Small Arms Survey	The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ)
Project Consultant	LRA Crisis Tracker			
Independent consultant	Technical consultant: Ashraf Kheir			
INGOs and IGOs	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	International Criminal Court	UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)	

Rival Hypothesis (H3)

There were at least three opportunities during Era II for testing H3, whether actors joined the network to apply political pressure to states and INGOs. The first occurred in 2013 with the kidnapping of a network member.

On December 9, 2013, terrorists abducted members of the casualty network in Syria. Armed men kidnaped four members of the Syrian Violations Documentation Center (VDC): the founder of VDC, Razan Zaitouneh, a human rights lawyer, was taken along with two other recorders and her husband, Wael Hamada. In the weeks before their abduction, the VDC casualty recorders had collaborated and worked closely with the Every Casualty team members on a report about Syrian children. The IPN "mobilized" when the VDC casualty recorders went missing.[277] The network issued an international statement of solidarity, hailing the courage of the VDC casualty recorders and demanding their immediate release. The statement also called on all armed groups to recognize their "obligations under international humanitarian law" and

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[276] Casualty, Every. Every Casualty, 2016, pp. 1–76, Standards for Casualty Recording.
[277] Confidential Interview 2 collected during 2020.

refrain from capturing civilians. Because the statement invokes obligations under IHL, it was an act of political pressure and alignment with the second hypothesis (H3). While more than sixty human rights organizations participated in the network, only nine members signed the statement. Why didn't other human rights organizations in the network sign the statement? This is particularly revealing because signing the statement was an opportunity to further human rights law. While IHL applies only during armed conflict, human rights law applies at all times—during peace and war.[278] Under certain circumstances deemed as emergencies, states can suspend IHL.[279] However, states cannot suspend human rights law. This opportunity could have produced pressure on warring parties that could not be limited by conflict or suspended by a state.   In less than a year, the staff at VDC issued a statement with seventy-one signatories from supporting organizations—all external to the network. Signing a statement calling on states was not exclusive to network members and, therefore, cannot be considered a motivation for joining the network. The network produced a Charter calling on states in 2011 to promptly record, correctly identify, and publicly acknowledge casualties. Not all members of the network signed the charter with at least fifteen opting out. Consequently, empirical data does not support H3 as a motivation for actors joining the network.

There were two advocacy opportunities where actors had opportunities to create political pressure during Era II. Both advocacy opportunities occurred in 2013. One of the opportunities was a presentation, "Casualty Recording: Legal Obligations and Current Practice," at the International Society for Military Law. We should expect that network members who joined the network for opportunities to apply political pressure would participate in presentations about

[278] Red Cross, International Committee. "IHL and Human Rights Law." International Committee of the Red Cross, 10 Oct. 2010.
[279] Ibid.

legal obligations for states. Nevertheless, the network presented alone without member participation. Empirical data does not support H3, and it fails empirical tests (Table 7).

Another advocacy opportunity the network staff published was a European Court of Human Rights ruling acknowledging human rights atrocities but stating they had no jurisdiction. The ruling and subsequent publication from the Every Casualty network illustrate the lack of justice available to victims without casualty recording. We would expect actors who joined the network for opportunities to create political pressure would participate in the publication, comment on others, or publish their articles. Yet again, the network published alone: "The Every Casualty Campaign seeks to challenge—and ultimately prevent—states' ability to conceal the victims of conflict by calling for prompt, accurate and publicly available casualty records.[280]" One of the founders described members as "passive" and said that there "there was little 'agency coming back from organizations."[281] Again, H3 fails the empirical data test (Table 6).

Confidential interviews conducted from October 2020 to January 2021 offer further insight and testing for H3. An NGO indicated they did not join the network because it did not offer enough opportunities to pressure states because it was too focused "on survivors" (Table 2). Not only does this fail the test for H3, but it shows actors who wanted opportunities to apply political pressure to states could not find them in the network. The network founders had a different experience: "our memory was that it was quite difficult, simply on practical grounds, to find network members who would accompany us on our advocacy visits to Geneva while offering this opportunity widely."[282]

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[280] "Accepting Truth, Acknowledging Loss: Casualty Records from Katyn to Afghanistan ." *Every Casualty* , Oxford Research Group, 28 Oct. 2013, www.everycasualty.org/newsandviews/casualty-records-from-katyn-to-afghanistan.
[281] Sloboda, J. Interview 2020.
[282] Email correspondence with John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, 2023.

Table 6: *Hypothesis Testing of Network Activities Era I*

Activity:	Clue:	Inference:	Hypothesis Tested:	Collier's Test for Causal Inference	Results
6 Presentations	ORG presented alone or member presented alone and ORG advocated for it.	Members did not join to create international norms	H2	Hoop Tests	Failed (6 tests)
1 Presentations	ORG staff presented alone: without network members.	Members did not join to create political pressure	H3	Hoop Tests	Failed (1 test)
3 Publications	Member received intangible benefits of data, and 1 case where network received tangible benefits (funding)	Members joined to professionalize their orgs, research, or increase their capacity.	H1	Hoop Tests	Passed (3)
12 Publications	Members did not participate. Network used members' cases, and data to advocate.	Members did not join to create international norms.	H2	Hoop Tests	Failed (10) Passed (2)
2 Publications	Only 8 members signed a call on states; ORG published advocacy based on historical case	Members did not join to create political pressure	H3	Straw-in-the-wind Tests	Failed (2)

Finding 5: *Standardization provided network members with intangible benefits.*

Why did NGOs collaborate if actors did not join for ideological or political reasons? Digging deeper into the actors' behavior uncovers intangible benefits available for those in the network or participating with the network (Tables 6 &7). While eight network members participated in developing standards, others participated *after* the standards were published. Empirical data shows these actors engaged with the network for intangible benefits made

possible due to standardization. The intangible benefits available to these actors were legitimacy, professionalization, and a form of governance.

In interview and survey data, members spoke of "the standards" as the greatest contribution and said that the standards were appealing to them (Table 2). Without examining deeper, it would be difficult to ascertain why the standards were so important. From the outset, standards appear important for establishing a new norm. However, that is not what the empirical data support. Survey and interview data produced at least seven incidences where members discussed standards as necessary for joining the network. Members described standards as a "benefit."

Consequently, this resulted in seven passing tests of H1 (Table 2). The casualty recording network offered non-collective benefits similar to those described in Olson's example of the American Medical Association (AMA). The AMA offered its members non-collective benefits such as expert witnesses to fend off malpractice, a medical journal, and educational medical conferences. Similarly, through a standardized methodology, the network offered non-collective benefits such as legitimacy, professionalization, and governance.

Legitimacy was an intangible benefit available to members through standardization. Understanding the significance of standardization to legitimacy in recording casualties, we must consider what Rosenau describes as governance without government: "Governance refers to activities that are backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities."[283] The network spent years advocating its methodology within the international community and vying for legitimacy against other actors. Thomson argues, "International regulation can be imposed only if the legitimacy of a practice is successfully

[283] Rosenau, James N., and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2010;(Pg 4).

challenged at the international level."[284] Thomson further argues that states are the arbiter: "State leaders and state powers, and their material needs, determine which practice is legitimate or illegitimate."[285] The challenge was making the methodology legitimate to states.

For the Every Casualty network, the challenge for legitimacy began in 2003, when the Lancet Medical Journal and researchers from Johns Hopkins published casualty numbers based on health science methodology. The Lancet numbers diverged so much from the Iraq Body Count (IBC) that they challenged the IBC methodology. When President Bush indicated casualty numbers were more aligned with the IBC numbers, his statement served as a pseudo-endorsement by a powerful state. The Iraq Body Count methodologies were the basis for the Every Casualty network methods. Scholars define legitimacy as resulting from "an interaction of the community of actors affected by the regulatory institution."[286] This allows each community to create precise requirements for legitimacy specific to the issue area. Acknowledgment of the methodology by the UN and states, and its adoption by casualty recorders are indicators of its legitimacy. The network used the methodology to gain legitimacy and then used the methodology to develop a standard that serves as a form of governance. Cohen argues that network-and-standards-based governance is a legal institution because it fits the criteria. Networks-and-standards-based offers procedural means to mitigate the power of the law, and it conforms with the principles of public reason: "The shift to a networked-and-standard-based governance structure reshapes modes of lawmaking and enforcement, patterns of contestation over lawmaking authority, and structures for participation and accountability in ways that pose

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[284] Thomson, Janice E. "Explaining the Regulation of Transnational Practices: a State-Building Approach." Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 197.
[285] Ibid.
[286] Bernstein, Steven. "Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State Global Governance." *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2011, pp. 17–51.

important challenges both to the realizability of traditional rule-of-law values and to traditional conceptions of the institutional forms that those values require." [287]

When ICRC presented the network's standards in 2016 as THE standard for casualty recording, the ICRC's endorsement served as a form of governance without government[288]. Bartley defines governance as "a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority."[289] The network transformed the legitimacy of its methodology into a standard, a modality for "structuring, supervising, and certifying information"[290] through casualty recording. Cohen argues similar cases of network-and-standard-based legal institutions emerged in world trade, transnational business regulation, and internet governance.[291]

An example of legitimacy was an invitation for network staff to join the UN's pre-SDG consultations: "It was a working group, a consultation event, and a document."[292] The international community held their knowledge and subsequent methods as valuable expertise, "another form of recognition."[293] Conversely, NGOs working on the standards describe deliberate intentions of creating legitimacy: "the information collected needed to reflect certain standards and certain elements for them to serve their purpose."[294] The network consulted with many international organizations on methodology. One of their contributions, when consulted on collecting homicide data, was how to handle the data: "we recommended that this information be disaggregated."[295] The network staff defended their methodologies against existing databases

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[287] Cohen, Julie E. *Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism*. Oxford University Press, 2019.
[288] Bartley, Tim. "Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and Private Standards." Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, doi:10.2202/1565-3404.1278.
[289] Ibid (Pgs 4-5).
[290] Cohen, Julie E. *Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism*. Oxford University Press, 2019.
[291] Ibid.
[292] Confidential Interview 9, 2020.
[293] Ibid.
[294] Confidential Interview 12, 2020.
[295] Confidential Interview 9, 2020.

viewed as established sources. Their knowledge, critical thinking, and articulation of what defines a casualty furthered their position as a legitimate authority: "the baseline that they [the UN] are using is the Upsala database (UCDP). It's the easiest thing to follow, and they continue to do it consistently. The problem is that UCDP's definition is very narrow. The UN SDG says 'all conflict-related deaths' and UCDP uses only battle-related deaths[296]."

Professionalization was a second intangible benefit that emerged from the network's standards on casualty recording. The standards benefitted network members because standardization professionalized members' casualty recording methods. An example of this occurred in the case study the network produced on network member Nigeria Watch in 2015: "Two members of the Every Casualty Team spent two weeks observing and interviewing staff of the project as well as meeting with key end-users."[297] By spending two weeks with the network staff, the staff from Nigeria Watch learned how to write a study and what to include, and the importance of end-user requirements. Network staff also demonstrated how to interview end-users to capture their requirements. Because the publication detailed the methods used by Nigeria Watch in the context of a greater network utilizing these methods, the report is an endorsement: "it implements its activity in a systematic way through set methodological steps which are designed to ensure the accuracy of the data."[298] The network discusses the evolution of Nigeria Watch, from an academic project launched remotely in France to relocating to Nigeria in 2013. The case study argues Nigeria Watch is a "best practice" casualty recorder for its high standards for impartiality, transparency, accuracy, and protection of victims and their families. Evidence of the professionalization of Nigeria Watch is its increased funding and the increased

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[296] Confidential Interview 9, 2020.

[297] Minor, Elizabeth, and Annabelle Giger. Every Casualty Worldwide, 2015, pp. 1–26, *Learning from Casualty Recording Experience.*

[298] Ibid, p6.

use of its data by the international community.[299] Nigeria watch had two donors from 2013 to 2017. However, since then, their donor list has increased to include funding from agencies in Japan, France, and Nigeria and a four-year contract from the British Council with funding from the EU. Nigeria Watch reports that international researchers rely on their data more than officials from within the state: "the database has become more popular among policy-makers, journalists, and activists."[300] This professionalization offered through the network's case study serves as a foundation for the legitimacy of the methodology. As the Boko Haram crisis came to the forefront of human rights news, the international community increased their attention towards Nigeria and its casualty records. An article by Apard and Reinert, speaking of the writing of the article, endorsed Nigeria watch and explained that "the manner in which data were collected for this article, using the Nigeria Watch database, has the merit of being transparent and of admitting limitations."[301]

Another example of professionalization was the network member AirWars. The outcome of numerous working groups and conferences resulted in the development of standards for casualty recording. Members collaborating in standards development took the network's methods to new organizations. According to Chris Wood, founder of Airwars, "If we'd had the standards in 2010 or 2011, our work at the Bureau [*of Investigative Journalism]* would've been quite different. By the time Airwars methodology was drawn up, I had seen the [*network's]* standards in draft. And the standards, even in draft, actively informed the methodology we

[299] Maazaz, Ismaël, Abiola Victoria Ayodokun, Victor Chinedu Eze, Vitus Nwankwo Ukoji. 2021. "The Nigeria Watch Project and the Challenges in the Study of Lethal Violence in Nigeria". Sources. Materials & Fieldwork in African Studies no. 2: 223-236.

[300] Ibid.

[301] Et Élodie Apard, Manuel Reinert. "Body Count and Religion in the Boko Haram Crisis: Evidence from the Nigeria Watch Database." Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security, & the State in Nigeria, by Gérard Chouin, Tsehai, 2015, pp. 212–236.

created at Airwars."[302] This is indicative of an NGO modeling its methods, becoming more professional, based on the network's standards. Also, the fact that NGOs had an idea that they should conform to the network's standards illustrates a recognition of the network's authority in developing standards and, consequently, the legitimacy of the standards.

Finally, we consider how the network's standards development is an intangible benefit for members because it serves as a form of governance. Thomson tells us norms and transnational regulation is different than what scholars describe as a tool of the weak against the powerful.[303] Thomson argues international governance can be achieved under conditions when there is no international regulation and when political and moral entrepreneurs put it on the international agenda: "it is not societal beliefs about the morality of a practice, but its impact on state material interests which calls its legitimacy into question."[304] Bartley concurs and maintains that the rise of transnational governance fills a "governance gap" with the intersections of state and civil regulations as sites of opportunity for transnational standardization.[305] Regulations are mechanisms that represent an "alternative channel for communities to legitimate their claims."[306] Network members relied on standardization for legitimacy and became frustrated that it was not an enforceable form of governance:

> The major drawback was that several members of the network, even after joining the network and working with the network, continued to publish poor analysis and recordings

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[302]Woods, Chris. Interview 2020.
[303] Thomson, Janice E. "Explaining the Regulation of Transnational Practices: a State-Building Approach." Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 219–249.
[304] Ibid.
[305] Bartley, Tim. "Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and Private Standards." Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, doi:10.2202/1565-3404.1278.
[306] Ibid.

> based on very weak methodologies (if any.) The network can't be the "police" over its members, but it made us question the value of continuing the cooperation.[307]

Standards development was an effort to create data “usable” for the international community. End users from the international community described how recorders learned they may have wasted their resources and time: “they put themselves, and maybe other people—at risk to get data of such bad quality that it was not usable.”[308] The mission of creating a new standard for the best quality of data prescribed behavior for casualty recorders: “They don’t know how to report information because nobody tells them and there’s no system in place to report information in a systematic manner.”[309]

To understand how norms perform as governance, we can consider Thomson’s description of transnational norms as state-building that privileges norm entrepreneurs: “new state-builders are denied the opportunity to exploit these activities.” Standardization, including the network’s casualty standards, is also an ongoing practice of international governance:

> It becomes customary, international law, and then we forget about the civil society. It becomes the norm, and that’s probably the objective. Right now, leading up to the political declaration of explosive weapons, civil society is very active because there isn’t yet a declaration but as soon as there is one. With the controlled arms treaty, the UN doesn’t see it that way. We don’t consult the arms trade treaty monitor. We take an assessment from the state and make a statement on that.[310]

[307] Survey Data collected 10/20-1/21.
[308] Confidential Interview with Participant 10; 2020.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Confidential Interview 9, 2020.

Furthermore, summaries of the standards for casualty recording summaries were translated into thirty languages and made available on the Every Casualty Counts website.

Standardization also embeds principles and practices of data security, which enacts governance through standardization. Data security practices were developed at the standards working group meetings and included experts from the Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG)[311]. HRDAG is an NGO of data experts with thirty years of experience recording violence and currently teaches cryptography techniques to recorders through a program at the UN. The practices for data security in casualty recording have become standardized and serve to prescribe data handling techniques for casualty recording. There is a consideration for "peer mentoring or accreditation" to incentive members to conform to the standards.[312]

Table 7: *Hypothesis Testing of Network Activities Era II*

Activity:	Clue:	Inference:	Hypothesis Tested:	Collier's Test for Causal Inference	Results
6 Presentations	ORG presented alone or member presented alone and ORG advocated for it.	Members did not join to create international norms	H2	Hoop Tests	Failed (6 tests)
1 Presentations	ORG staff presented alone: without network members.	Members did not join to create political pressure	H3	Hoop Tests	Failed (1 test)
3 Publications	Member received intangible benefits of data, and 1 case where network received tangible benefits (funding)	Members joined to professionalize their staff, research, or increase their capacity.	H1	Hoop Tests	Passed (3)
12 Publications	Members did not participate. Network used member's cases, data to advocate.	Members did not join to create international norms.	H2	Hoop Tests	Failed (10) Passed (2)
2 Publications	Only 8 members signed a call on states; ORG published advocacy based on historical case	Members did not join to create political pressure	H3	Straw-in-the-wind Tests	Failed (2)

*Source: Survey Data collected October 2020 to January 2021; Confidential Interviews 10/2020-1/2021

[311] Casualty, Every. Every Casualty , 2016, pp. 1–76, Standards for Casualty Recording.
[312] Confidential Interview with participant 17, 2020.

Network Consolidation

In the era 2013–2016, the network strengthened through organizational independence, contributions, and exchanges with the international community on methodology and the production of standards for casualty recording.

Standards development was a three-year process, beginning with the first meeting in Bogotá in 2013 and concluding with publishing of the standards in 2016. First, the group articulated the purpose of setting standards for practitioners and end users. The objectives included setting the scope for measures, defining casualty recording as a field with different practices for documenting casualties, explaining how standards can help the field, and short and long-term strategies for developing standards and their adoption: "Our standards were about data collection and trends from the data that were replicable. They were rigorous, objective, replicable methods. That is the vision. Only if it was seen that people were using these standards that governments can know that it can be trusted."[313]

The process, which began in April 2014, to separate Every Casualty from ORG was described as "amicable" by ORG. Every Casualty Worldwide was incorporated on June 11, 2014. By July, the network named directors: Eiri Ohtani, a charity consultant; Susan Breau, a legal expert; Dr. Michael Spagat, an economics professor; and Maurice Wren, a chief executive. The network focused on legal separation from ORG between April and September.

By September 2014, the Every Casualty program separated from ORG to become an independent NGO, Every Casualty Worldwide. It was one of only two projects in ORG's history to achieve independent NGO status. The reasons for becoming independent were the broad

[313] Sloboda, J. Interview 2020.

interest of the UN Secretary-General, member states, civil society, and intergovernmental bodies.[314] ORG described the Every Casualty NGO as increasing capacity for institutions and consolidating legal requirements but also to "build the *political will* for every single casualty of armed conflict throughout the world to be recorded in this way." ORG indicated it would continue to support the NGO by providing office space and administrative support.

By 2014, network membership had grown to 50 members. The network renamed itself during this transitory year to the Casualty Recorder's Network (CRN). Network leadership attributed the name change to increasing the network's name recognition to those outside casualty recording.[315]

The network experienced resource, organizational structure, and funding changes during Era II. It tremendously from only Sloboda and Dardagan at the start in 2007 in their roles at ORG to dedicated staff: "first interns, and then - when the funding came from a number of sources, culminating with USIP - full-time salaried junior research and advocacy staff."[316]

Having dedicated, skilled staff allowed the network to produce and present quality studies, data, and expert analysis and specialize in casualty recording which would be impossible with only ORG resources. It also allowed the program to have dedicated staff to attend conferences and build relationships with UN officials and staff. The network continued its advocacy efforts in Era II on legal requirements, UN Protection of Civilians working groups, and humanitarian conferences.

By 2015, discussions in the working groups creating standards turned to tools as a practical way to implement the standards: "These tools will come as a separate output from the

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[314] Every Casualty Worldwide. Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2014, pp. 1–5, *Abbreviated Accounts June 11-December 31, 2014*.
[315] Confidential Interview 2, 2020.
[316] Email correspondence with John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, 2023.

standards themselves but are considered key to making the latter useful for practitioners."[317]" However, the tools did not materialize. Instead, the focus remained on the standards, and by 2016, tools were still desirable but not yet developed: "These resources, which are needed to promote the effective implementation of the standards, will require further support to be fully developed." [318]

Considerable effort went into developing the standards: "There were six workshops since 2013, attended by a range of practitioners and end-users of casualty data."[319] The network member leading the standards work was the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC). The work was a boost to its mission "to be one of Latin America's leading centers for research and training in social sciences and a key reference for methodological, theoretical, and analytical matters related to the study and measurement of phenomena related to collective and armed violence in multiple manifestations."[320]

Chapter Summary

This chapter presented two key findings of this research. The first is the rejection of H2 and H3 as motivations for actors' joining the casualty recording network. Actors did not join to create an international norm or to apply pressure to states or INGOs. The second finding reveals standardization as a source of intangible benefits for members. Some network members

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[317] "Developing Standards for Casualty Recording: Plenary Meeting in London, September 2015." Every Casualty, Every Casualty Worldwide, LLC, 8 Oct. 2015, www.everycasualty.org:80/newsandviews/standards-plenary-meeting.

[318] Casualty, Every. Every Casualty , 2016, pp. 3, Standards for Casualty Recording .

[319] "Developing Standards for Casualty Recording: Plenary Meeting in London, September 2015." Every Casualty , Every Casualty Worldwide, LLC, 8 Oct. 2015, www.everycasualty.org:80/newsandviews/standards-plenary-meeting.

[320] Restrepo, J. (n.d.). *Everything About CERAC*. CERAC. Retrieved August 12, 2020, from https://www.cerac.org.co/en/aboutcerac/mision-vision-objectives.html

participated in or joined network activities for the intangible benefits standardization provided: legitimacy, professionalization, and a form of governance.

These findings are significant because they contribute to understanding why actors collaborate in transnational advocacy. The results offer insight into how non-collective and intangible benefits are causal mechanisms enabling collective behavior.

The collective behavior of the network resulted in other important developments for casualty recording. The international community changed its position on casualty recording from the first casualty conference, where UN officials did not think casualty recording aligned with their mission, to the UN SDG 16.1 goals, including casualty recording as a measurement in 2015. The ICRC also supported casualty recording efforts in the spring of 2016. Dr. Helen Durham, the director of International Law and Policy for the ICRC, admitted, "Yes, there is a big gap between the law on paper and its implementation."[321] ICRC would launch and adopt the network's casualty recording methods in 2016. This endorsement was another recognition of the network's authority and the legitimacy of its standards.[322]

States dramatically changed their position on casualty recording. An example is the US change of position from 2002, when a US general famously stated, "We don't do body counts,"[323] to a 2016 presidential executive order.[324] In 2016, the US president called for government and civil society to collaborate on documenting casualties "by considering relevant

[321] "ICRC Launches New Guidance Bolstering Relevance of Geneva Conventions." ICRC, 21 Mar. 2016, www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-ICRC-launches-new-guidance-bolstering-relevance-geneva-conventions.

[322] "International Launch of Standards for Casualty Recording: Putting Principles into Practice." ICRC.org, 23 Nov. 2016, www.icrc.org/en/event/international-launch-standards-casualty-recording-putting-principles-practice.

[323] Broder, John. "A Nation at War: the Casualties: U.S. Military Has No Count Of Iraqi Dead In Fighting." The New York Times, 2 Apr. 2003, pp. 3–3.

[324] Executive, President, and Barack Obama. Executive Order 13732-United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2016, pp. 1–5.

and credible information from all available sources, such as other agencies, partner governments, and nongovernmental organizations."[325]

This chapter found intangible benefits to be powerful mechanisms for motivating actors to collaborate. It revealed the power of intangible benefits by examining participants' activities, events, survey data, and interview data. Finally, it traced the intangible benefits from working group–level processes to formal publications and standardization, resulting in real-world change. The intangible benefits brought actors together to collaborate. Their collective behavior brought awareness through advocacy, offered codified methodology, and produced standards with observable changes for casualty recording in the international community.

[325] Ibid.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Areas of Future Work

This research investigated a transnational advocacy network (TAN) that emerged due to gaps in institutional approaches to recording conflict casualties. It investigated why actors with limited resources would invest valuable time and means to collaborate outside their own conflict.

By starting with existing theories of TAN emergence, three broad categories were established for analysis and investigation: sociological, economic, and political.

The earliest theories claim TANs emerge because actors share beliefs and seek to change norms. The data in this study did not support such a sociological explanation for TAN emergence. Social movement theorists claim TANs emerge as civil society seeks to challenge the power structures of the state or international organizations. The data in this study did not support such a political explanation for TAN emergence. In fact, actors seeking political opportunities did not participate because they perceived a lack of political opportunity. The third category for analysis was economics. Some researchers suggest actors join TANs as a rational choice for their own benefit of gaining material incentives. The data in this research supports the economic approach of TAN emergence due to rational choice by actors. It extends the economic explanation by identifying intangible benefits as incentives for actors to join TANs. Actors join TANs to meet their needs and seek intangible benefits such as knowledge, methods, data, or access to data sources.

It should be noted that while the data in this research did not support the explanation that actors participated in network activities for ideological reasons, this does not mean the actors did not share an ideology. Actors may share beliefs and principles of the TAN and its mission, but the ideology was not a motivation for actors to join or participate in activities.

It should also be mentioned that while the data in this research did not support the explanation that actors join TANs for political reasons, casualty records are highly politicized. Casualty records produce effects that can disrupt the recognition of political institutions by disrupting their power, authority, and, ultimately-- sovereignty. In this way, casualty records challenge the state: "sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority."[326]

Intangible Benefits

This research provided evidence of intangible benefits such as knowledge, data, access to data sources, legitimacy, professionalization, and governance as incentives for actors joining TANs. There is evidence of the pattern continuing where members selectively participate in network events. During the Human Rights Council Regular Session in 2022, Every Casualty Counts and two network members: SNHR and Airwars, engaged with the International Commission of Inquiry on Syria. The engagement offered resources to the Human Rights Council, which would translate into an intangible incentive of authority for Airwars and SNHR. When network members engage with INGOs, and the INGOs use their data, then an inherent endorsement is bestowed upon the recorders, their data, and their methods.

The network continues to offer opportunities for members to engage with knowledgeable people, methodologies, and gain the intangible benefits of standardization. The network publishes a newsletter that discusses casualty reporting news, INGO approaches, and new members and promotes Every Casualty Counts' offerings for its members. In 2021 Every Casualty Counts produced a free online training course called "Accounting for Death in War:

[326] Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen. The evolution of international security studies. Cambridge University Press, 2015, Pg 22.

Separating Fact from Fiction." The online course serves as a knowledge bank for network members. It provides historical context for casualty statistics in war and argues the advantages of the network's current standards. New training is under development to teach members about data management, how to build forensic capacity, and psychological support for staff. The network has not yet created tools for recorders but suggests future plans exist: "would like to roll out support to help new casualty recorders who are setting up new operations – a toolbox."[327] However, the network has facilitated relationships amongst network members: "there has been some exchange that we've helped 'midwife' in the network"[328].

The network also continues to be influential in shaping international policy through standardization. On September 22, 2020, the Human Rights Council endorsed casualty recording with a joint statement endorsed by fifty states. The HRC statement "was drafted almost word-for-word from a research analyst at Every Casualty.[329]"

Central themes of TAN Emergence

The findings of this research contribute to the understanding of how TANs form and why actors choose to spend valuable resources to collaborate across borders and conflicts. Traditional explanations of ideology or political pressure were not supported by empirical evidence of data collected in this study. This research contradicts traditional sociological and political reasonings and argues that TANs emerge because of actors' rational choices and the availability of intangible benefits.

Casualty recording remains important because of its relevancy in shaping contemporary conflicts. A member of the Every Casualty network is currently documenting casualties in the

[327] Confidential Interview 4, 2020.
[328] Ibid.
[329] Ibid.

ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) is a regional association of twenty-six public human rights organizations. On April 14, 2017, the UHHRU presented a 'memorial map.' [330] The event was funded by USAID and is a continuation of "the international practice of documenting facts." The presentation included references to the Bosnian work, the "gold standard" described in this research, as well as the work in Iraq and the network's 2012 Charter calling on states.[331] The casualty recording in Ukraine explicitly acknowledges the foundational work of the Every Casualty network: "These requirements, developed on the basis of experience and information of the international network of non-governmental organizations and research institutions, are extremely important for Ukraine, where there is no single database of persons, who died during the conflict."[332] When Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, the UHHRU was already established and advanced in casualty recording knowledge and methodologies because of the foundational work of the Every Casualty network. The UHHRU staff understands what the UN and the ICC need in the collection of "good data" to demand justice. Consequently, the UHHRU can serve as an expert in casualty recording in Ukraine and with international leaders: "We are grateful to the Ukrainian Helsinki Union for Human Rights for its incredible work. The Council of Europe stands with its partners!" Mr. Nørlov.[333] Soon after the meeting between UHHRU and the Council of Europe, the EU launched a military assistance mission in Ukraine, committing 16 million Euros in two

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[330] "UHHRU Presented the Memorial Map, Which Records Information about Victims in the Course of the Military Conflict in the East." *Https://Helsinki.org.ua/*, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 2022, helsinki.org.ua/en/articles/uhhru-presented-the-map-of-memories-which-records-information-about-victims-in-the-course-of-the-military-conflict-in-the-east/.

[331] Ibid.

[332] Ibid.

[333] "Meeting of Head of the Council of Europe Office in Ukraine and Chairman of the Management Board of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union for Human Rights." *Council of Europe*, 1 Nov. 2022, www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/meeting-of-head-of-the-council-of-europe-office-in-ukraine-and-chairman-of-the-management-board-of-the-ukrainian-helsinki-union-for-human-rights.

years. Methodology experts connect the Center for Civil Liberties (CCL) to the Every Casualty network through shared methodology from the network member UHHRU. Oleg Martynenko, head of the analytical department of UHHRU, also serves as an expert with CCL.[334] CCL won the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize for recording casualties in the conflict with Russia. Oleksandra Matviichuk, a human rights lawyer at CCL, in her acceptance speech, echoed the sentiments the founders of the network made: "War turns people into numbers. We have to reclaim the names of all victims of war crimes."[335]

Implications

Transnational advocacy networks matter because they influence international norms, shape domestic policies, and connect local actors to international ones: "Political institutions live not from force but from recognition."[336] This project illustrates how TANs offer collaboration opportunities to negotiate meanings and processes, create 'black boxes,'[337] and transform micro actors into macro ones. This research explains how TANs establish meanings and processes that shape international policies through consultations on methodology and creating a standard for casualty recording. Evidence of the casualty recording network's influence is apparent in the use of the term—*casualty recording*. The term was an innovation of the network,[338] but international organizations and politics now use it as a description of their methodology of recording every

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[334] Center for Civil Liberties. "Experts." *Центр Громадянських Свобод*, 21 Nov. 2022, ccl.org.ua/en/team-2/.
[335] Matviichuk, Oleksandra. December 10, 2022. *Time to Take Responsibility*. Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony, Stockholm, Sweden.
[336] Habermas, Jürgen. "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power." *Hannah Arendt*, 2017, pp. 67–88.
[337] Latour, Bruno, and Michel Callon. "Chapter 10: Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro- Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So." *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology (RLE Social Theory): Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies*, Routledge, 2014, pp. 277–304.
[338] Confidential Interviews 4, 8,15, and 18; 2020.

casualty in conflict.[339] Also, this project explained how intangible benefits such as knowledge, methodologies, professionalization, legitimacy, and governance motivate actors to join TANs.

Casualty recording matters because it measures the violence civilians experience in conflict and serves as a reconciliation tool. Gaps in institutional approaches left casualties vulnerable to manipulation or omission. Casualty recording matters because it is a process that can hide or illustrate the violence of a conflict.

Contemporary Network Events & Intangible Benefits

The Every Casualty network continues to evolve and offer intangible benefits for its members. In 2019, Every Casualty launched a pilot project to measure network members' conformance to the standards published in 2016. The study, called "Practitioner Conformance with the Standards for Casualty Recording," sought to identify barriers to practitioners implementing the standards. The study notes that this work may be the basis for a "future process of accreditation."[340] The study used four members of the network. A member's dynamic relationship with the network was a requirement for selection. Other requirements included a member's capacity to do a field study with the network and a location where network staff would be safe to travel. Fifty-eight standards made up the Standards for Casualty Recording, published in 2016. A significant finding in this study of conforming to the standards—particularly in publishing data, is how members' organizational capacity constraints work: "all find that their biggest challenge about publishing is capacity. Decisions about what to publish and for whom are often constrained by the reality of constraints on time and funding."[341] Significantly, the

[339] Bachelet, Michelle. UN Publications, 2019, pp. 1–36, *Guidance on Casualty Recording*.
[340] Brealey, Kat. Every Casualty, 2020, pp. 1–30, *Practitioner Conformance with the Standards for Casualty Recording: A Study of Four Casualty Recording Organizations*.
[341] Ibid, p22.

study concludes that the casualty data is underutilized -- locally, nationally, or internationally due to the limited resources of the network members[342].

In May 2021, the Standards for Casualty Recording summaries were translated into thirty languages and made available on the Every Casualty Counts website.

Future Work

This research suggests opportunities for future work in TAN emergence and development. Additional research is needed to uncover the array of available intangible benefits for actors joining transnational advocacy networks. As discussed previously, organizations have varied needs, and researchers should consider a broad scope of intangible benefits that motivate actors to collaborate. Further research would provide insight into how intangible benefits may differ in different settings: conflict, humanitarian, economic, etc.

Additionally, researchers should closely examine "labs" where socio-technical innovation is occurring. Empirical research would be beneficial to uncovering mechanisms and developing processes and policies. Sociotechnical innovations are temporal events that can offer insight into the interactions, hierarchies, and behavior of actors from civil society, states, and IGOs.

Finally, future research should explore civil society's use of standardization as a form of governance. Since civil society does not have the same tools as a state, how does standardization prescribe behavior, administer rules, and regulate compliance? Research investigating the implications for state and human security may provide insight into how civil society participates in the international order by using standardization.

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[342] Brealey, Kat. Every Casualty, 2020, pp. 1–30, *Practitioner Conformance with the Standards for Casualty Recording: A Study of Four Casualty Recording Organizations*.

Appendices

Appendix A

Interview Questions: Casualty Recording Network

A Virginia Tech Research Study IRB 20-692
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Interview Questions:

Section I. General Observations: Organizations performing Casualty Recording

1. Have you been involved in casualty recording in an intra-state conflict, either directly as a non-governmental (NGO) official or indirectly by analyzing data, or providing advice and technical assistance to casualty recorders? If yes, please share your role, how you participated in casualty recording, and the size of organization you represented.

2. Did you join a network of casualty recorders? For the purpose of this research, network refers to: International Practitioner's Network (IPN), Casualty Recording Network (CRN) and Every Casualty Worldwide (ECW). If yes, please indicate how you heard about network membership.

3. When did you join the network?
   1. Founding member of the network
   2. 2009-2012
   3. 2012-2016
   4. 2016-present

Note: Please answer questions 4-15 based on joining the network.

4. When you joined the network, which statement best represents the number of contacts you had in humanitarian organizations outside of the state you were performing casualty recording in:
   1. Our NGO had no contacts with either international humanitarian or other state-based organizations outside of the state.
   2. NGO had few contacts with state-based organizations but no international organizations outside of the state.
   3. NGO had some contacts with other state-based organizations outside of the state.

4. NGO had many contacts with other state-based organizations outside of the state.
5. NGO had many contacts with both international humanitarian organizations and state-based organizations outside of the state.

5. Thinking of only your organization, what factors impacted your decision to join the network? (Please select all that may apply or list as many as need in the space below)

1. For peer support
2. For opportunities to learn new methods and train with new technology
3. To increase capabilities for your organization
4. For access to new technology and experts
5. To contribute to casualty recording methodology
6. To build new relationships outside of state conflict
7. To join others in efforts to call on states to perform casualty counts
8. For opportunities to publish research
9. For opportunities to partner with other experts
10. To gain representation internationally
11. To join with others to gain support of international governing organizations
12. To raise awareness internationally for casualty recording as a practice
13. To contribute to an internationally accepted standard for casualty recording
14. Other (please elaborate)

6. If you were a founding member of the network, what was the main reason for establishing a network?

7. If you were a founding member of the network, did you contribute to the effort of creating international standards for casualty recording? If not, why not?

8. If you signed the "Every Casualty Charter", did you participate in other network activities? If not, why?

9. If you signed the "Every Casualty Charter" did you also join the network? If not, why not?

10. If you joined the network to increase your organization's capabilities, what type of opportunities were you hoping to find? Did you have opportunities to learn new technology or gain access to experts you wouldn't have met otherwise?

11. If you joined the network for research opportunities, did you have opportunities to do projects and publish or to partner with experts?

12. Generally speaking, to what *primary* factors do you attribute *other* NGOs joining the network? You may choose more than one. If you choose more than one, to which factor do you give greatest weight?

a. For peer support
b. For opportunities to learn new methods and train with new technology
c. To increase capabilities for your organization
d. For access to new technology and experts
e. To contribute to casualty recording methodology
f. To build new relationships outside of state conflict
g. To join others in efforts to call on states to perform casualty counts
h. For opportunities to publish research
i. For opportunities to partner with other experts
j. To gain representation internationally
k. To join with others to gain support of international governing organizations
l. To raise awareness internationally for casualty recording as a practice
m. To contribute to an internationally accepted standard for casualty recording
n. Other (please elaborate)

13. Were there network's requirements or terms for membership? If yes, please explain. What did 'membership' mean to you?

14. In your view, were NGOs recruited the same or differently in the process to join the network?

15. In joining the network, what was explained as the initial goals of the network? What was the long-term plan for a casualty recording network?

Section II. Specific Observations

Note: Please answer questions 16-20 based on an NGOs continued participation in the network.

16. Once NGOs became members, how was participation encouraged?

17. Did attitudes of network membership change over time? How?

18. Did your participation in network activities change over time? How/Why?
19. What do network members share? Has that changed over time

20. Has being a member of the network impacted the way your organization performs casualty recording? If so, how?

Section III. Evaluation of Network Trajectory

21. There are different reasons NGOs may have for joining a network. We are interested in your views on how that decision might affect the activities of the network, if at all.

- In humanitarian advocacy, the focus prescribes rules, standards, and norms. For example: All casualty recorders must utilize "X" methods for a casualty to be recorded in conflict.
- In political advocacy, the focus aims at mounting political pressure on states to change behavior. For example: All states will provide transparent casualty records.
- In capacity building, the focus prescribes increasing capabilities for those performing casualty recording including shared resources, increased research opportunities, and social media promotions. For example: NGOs will increase their capabilities by gaining new technology to perform casualty recording.

Do you believe any of these above-referenced provision affected the projects and activities the network has undertaken thus far? Why or why not?

22. Do you believe the projects and activities of the network has shaped casualty recording and its development into an international practice? Please explain.

23. Is there any additional information you'd like to offer?
24. Is there anyone else to whom we should speak?

Appendix B

Source	Clues	Quotes	Inference	Aligned Hypothesis	Sufficient for affirming causal inference	Necessary for affirming causal inference	Collier's Tests for Causal Inference	Results	Finding
Event	20 casualty recording organizations joined ORG's efforts as a founding member of the first casualty recording network	"learn new tools;" "learn new methodologies and tools"; "to find out what they are using, what analysis they are using, and what we can learn from each other"; I came to learn and to build our own capacity"; "to see how the tools that they use can be adapted into my environment and which can't". "we find our 'common ground'. Today was spent finding the minimum common ground that unites us". "improve our own methodology".	Members joined the network to build capacity and gain tools	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3 but does not confirm it.	**CONFIRMED H3**: Actors did join the network if there were opportunities for staff professionalization, research or increase capacity. When ORG (the network admin NGO) presented or published, they did so to produce advocacy materials on 'logic of appropriateness' (Finnemore stages of norms) Counterfactual case: when an NGO saw standards development as reducing capacity (only one way to record), the NGO did not participate.
Event	22 organizations participated in Phase 1 of the development of Standards for Casualty Recording which included standards but the creation of tools & templates. However, no tools and templates were ever created.	"A growing resource bank will complement this document. This will assist casualty recorders to develop and refine their practice and ensure that it corresponds to the standards."	Participation was based on institutionalizing casualty recording practices. Because no tools or templates were created, the participants of this event were focused on building the norm and not on professionalization.	**H1**	**No**	**No**	**Straw-in-the-wind test** (Tools were supposed to be included and that would support H3. However, no tools were created.)	**Pass:** Affirms relevance of H1 but does not confirm it. Slightly weakens rival hypothesis.	**H1 is affirmed for relevance but not enough evidence to confirm:** *Actors join the network if there is a desire to shape international humanitarian norms .*
Event	9 network members and		Participation with the charter was	**H2**	**No**	**No**	**Straw-in-the-wind test-**	**Pass:** Affirms H2	**FAILED H2: Actors did not join the**
Presentation at	ORG Presented on		ORG's advocacy practices built	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Presentation "On	ORG Presented alone on	E. Minor, M. Spagat, &	ORG's advocacy towards	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Presentation at	ORG Presented alone on	"Working relationships have	ORG's advocacy increased its	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Interview: Iraq Body Count with German paper about casualty recording in Syria.	IBC did an interview but on another conflict. Network could have used a Syrian NGO.		ORG used resources of 1 network member to demonstrate methodology in another conflict	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1 but does not confirm it.	
Presentation at	ORG works with an		ORG used resources of non-	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Presentation at	Promoted on ORG		Every Casualty used network	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Presentation at	ORG aligns casualty		ORG presents alone on casualty	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Presentation at	Member of the network		ORG used resources of network	**H1**	**Yes**	**No**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Publication:	8 members of the network		It was not a benefit exclusive to	**H2**	**No**	**No**	**Straw-in-the-wind test-**	**Pass:** Affirms H2	
Publication:	Network member project		ORG used resources of network	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Publication: The UN and Casualty Recording: Good practice and the	ORG publishes with AOAV a report because it was requested at 2012 UNSC POC debate		UN should implement network's methodology on casualty recording.	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3 but does not confirm it.	
Press Release:	ORG uses Network		ORG used network member's	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Book Project:	Network member (and		Network member participates to	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Publication:	ORG researched and		ORG used resources and contacts	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Publication:	ORG researched and	"The Libyan case illustrates	ORG used their methodology and	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Press Release: Libya's Government Announces Significant Revision of its own Casualty	ORG uses network member, ICMP, signing an agreement with Libyan gov for advocacy. ORG and the network had no involvement		ORG used resources of network members to increase its advocacy for standards adoption.	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1 but does not confirm it.	
Press Release:	ORG wrote and published	"The Every Casualty	ORG used a historic case that	**H1**	**No**	**No**	**Straw-in-the-wind test**	**Pass:** Affirms	
Publication:	"Stolen Futures". ORG		ORG used resources of network	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Publication: 2013	AOAV presented at a 'side		ORG used resources of network	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1	
Publication: (2014) The Internationalisation of Nigeria's Boko Haram Campaign.	Another program at ORG--Sustainable Security Program used data from network member Nigeria Watch data. Network member did not participate in report.		ORG used resources of network members to increase its own capacity.	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3 but does not confirm it.	
Publication: "Casualty Recording: Assessing State and United Nations Practices"	1 network member participated who already had a relationship with donors.		ORG collaborates with network members to increase its funding.	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3 but does not confirm it.	
Publication: Contentious Casualty Counting: Coming to terms with the Baga massacre	Network member wrote a report but EC promoted it on their website as work by one of their members		EC used network members independent successes to promote the NGO.	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1 but does not confirm it.	
Publication: Counting the Cost: Casualty Recording Practices and Realities Around the World.	AOAV wrote report and cited CERAC & gave 'thanks' to ORG. But ORG promoted it on website.		Network members use resources of other members to increae their own capacity.	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1 but does not confirm it.	
Publication: "How the Counts Reduce the Casualties"	1 network member & ORG wrote report & used data from network members but did not involve them in the report & funding was available.		ORG collaborates with network members to increase its funding.	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3 but does not confirm it.	
Press Release: Three Casualty Recording Organisations Work with UN in Gaza to Provide Detailed Casualty Data	Only 2 of the 3 orgs were members but Every Casualty still promoted on their website.		Every Casualty used network members independent successes to promote the NGO.	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1 but does not confirm it.	
Publication	ORG launched a		ORG used resources of network	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Survey data	50% chose "To share		Members joined to increase	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Survey data	For most important network activity considered when joining, 71% chose "raising awareness of casuaty recording as a practice"		Members joined to increase advocacy for casualty recording.	**H1**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H1 but does not confirm it.	
Survey data	54% chose "meeting tech		Members joined to meet tech	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Survey data	33% say Calling on States		Members joined to call on states to	**H2**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test-Failed**	**Fail:** Eliminates H2	
Survey data	42% Members say		Members joined to gain tools and	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Interview data	"I really didn't recognize		Members did not participate	**H2**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Doubly Decisive --**	**Fail:** Eliminates H2	
Interview data	"The greatest contribution		Members joined to improve their	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Interview data	"I think it was a common		Participated to gain access to local	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Interview data	"No other sources. At that		Participated to gain access to data.	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Interview data	My work with a human		Members participated to gain tools	**H3**	**No**	**Yes**	**Hoop Test**	**Pass:** Affirms H3	
Interview data (Network member)	And they didn't share my understandings of how you need to work in a coalition structure. It was good to start seeing some articulation of a methodological landscape that started to recognize, actually, you can have all these methodologies and they all can function. that was a dynamic that I appreciate it, saying, was a sort of sense of Building a community based on some methodological openness, not based onThe idea there is one way to Record casualties.		Members did not join because they did not want a single standardization of methods (standardization approach was too narrow). They wanted a "community" **Case of counter-factual**	**H3**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Doubly Decisive - Pass**		