VTechWorks Repository :: Browsing by Author "Jantzen, Benjamin C."

Browsing by Author "Jantzen, Benjamin C."

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Atheism and Analogy: Aquinas Against the Atheists
Linford, Daniel J. (Virginia Tech, 2014-06-04)
In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas developed two models for how humans may speak of God - either by the analogy of proportion or by the analogy of proportionality. Aquinas's doctrines initiated a theological debate concerning analogy that spanned several centuries. In the 18th century, there appeared two closely related arguments for atheism which both utilized analogy for their own purposes. In this thesis, I show that one argument, articulated by the French materialist Paul-Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, is successful in showing that God-talk, as conceived of using the analogy of proportion, is unintelligible non-sense. In addition, I show that another argument, articulated by Anthony Collins (Vindication of Divine Attributes), George Berkeley (chapter IV of Alciphron), and David Hume (chapter XII of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion) can be restructured into an argument for the position that the analogy of proportionality makes the distinction between atheism and theism merely verbal. Since both of these are undesirable consequences for the theist, I conclude that Aquinas's doctrine of analogy does not withstand the assault of 18th century atheists.
Beliefs in an Opaque Brain
Abugattas Escalante, Juan Andres (Virginia Tech, 2016-06-30)
Peter Carruther's Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge is an interesting account of the opaqueness of our own minds that draws upon a wide range of theories from cognitive science and philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that the theory's assumptions support the conclusion that the available perceptual evidence massively underdetermines all of an agent's second-order beliefs about her own beliefs. Such a result is far more negative than the ISA's well-known pessimism regarding self-knowledge. Furthermore, I also argue that, from the same assumptions, it is possible to build an argument to the effect that cognitive scientists trying to determine an agents' true behavior-causing attitude face similar underdetermination problems. Toward the end of the paper, I suggest that the theory's problems arise from a conflation of two different ways in which terms denoting propositional attitudes, such as 'belief', are used in its formulation. Distinguishing between the two usages of these terms, in turn, leads to a further distinction between two different senses in which we can talk about the 'opaqueness' of our own minds.
Challenges to Effective Realism
Shifrel, Zachary D. (Virginia Tech, 2019-08-20)
That a theory is merely effective has historically counted against it, especially in pro-realism discourse. For example, many realists take the interpretation of a theory to amount to specifying what the world would be like was the theory true (or characterizing the possible worlds picked out by the theory). But effective theories are not true simpliciter. They describe a limited subset of nature and only approximately so, giving the traditional realist little to work with. The effective realist gives up on the traditional realist project, noting that contemporary physical theories tell us nothing, or very little, about what's fundamental. The traditional realist gives us unreliable results for our ontology at fundamental length scales. Effective realism responds by taking effective theories seriously. I have two primary goals in this paper. First, I consider a few responses to arguments provided by Ruetshce (2017). Ruetsche worries that the theory space over which the effective realist quantifies might fail to be comprehensive. I hope to defend the effective realist through the use of first-order scientific evidence and with a response motivated by Fraser (forthcoming). Second, I develop an objection to effective realism similar in kind to one posed by Ruetshce. Rather than a skepticism in the space on which the renormalization group acts, I entertain a more general skepticism with respect to the construction of effective field theories. I then tease out a response grounded in theory space constraints to justify the effective realist's use of effective field theories to guide ontological commitment.
Distinguishing Dynamical Kinds: An Approach for Automating Scientific Discovery
Shea-Blymyer, Colin (Virginia Tech, 2019-07-02)
The automation of scientific discovery has been an active research topic for many years. The promise of a formalized approach to developing and testing scientific hypotheses has attracted researchers from the sciences, machine learning, and philosophy alike. Leveraging the concept of dynamical symmetries a new paradigm is proposed for the collection of scientific knowledge, and algorithms are presented for the development of EUGENE – an automated scientific discovery tool-set. These algorithms have direct applications in model validation, time series analysis, and system identification. Further, the EUGENE tool-set provides a novel metric of dynamical similarity that would allow a system to be clustered into its dynamical regimes. This dynamical distance is sensitive to the presence of chaos, effective order, and nonlinearity. I discuss the history and background of these algorithms, provide examples of their behavior, and present their use for exploring system dynamics.
Dynamical Kinds and their Discovery
Jantzen, Benjamin C. (2016)
We demonstrate the possibility of classifying causal systems into kinds that share a common structure without first constructing an explicit dynamical model or using prior knowledge of the system dynamics. The algorithmic ability to determine whether arbitrary systems are governed by causal relations of the same form offers significant practical applications in the development and validation of dynamical models. It is also of theoretical interest as an essential stage in the scientific inference of laws from empirical data. The algorithm presented is based on the dynamical symmetry approach to dynamical kinds. A dynamical symmetry with respect to time is an intervention on one or more variables of a system that commutes with the time evolution of the system. A dynamical kind is a class of systems sharing a set of dynamical symmetries. The algorithm presented classifies deterministic, time-dependent causal systems by directly comparing their exhibited symmetries. Using simulated, noisy data from a variety of nonlinear systems, we show that this algorithm correctly sorts systems into dynamical kinds. It is robust under significant sampling error, is immune to violations of normality in sampling error, and fails gracefully with increasing dynamical similarity. The algorithm we demonstrate is the first to address this aspect of automated scientific discovery.
The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific Explanation
Taylor, Kaetlin Diane (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-09)
While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is scientific explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific explanation?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.
Exploring Innovative & Open Educational Resources
Shaffer, Clifford A.; Jantzen, Benjamin C.; Mahin, Bruce; Walz, Anita R. (2014-04-08)
Panelists include: Dr. Clifford Shaffer, Professor of Computer Science, Virginia Tech Dr. Benjamin Jantzen, Asst. Professor Philosophy, Virginia Tech Dr. Bruce Mahin, Professor of Composition and Music Theory, Radford University The Multimedia tour will showcase innovative and open educational resources from Virginia Tech, Radford, and beyond. Panel themes will be further explored in the after-panel hands-on workshop. URLs for two of the live demos: http://algoviz.org (Cliff Shaffer) https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/i-love-music/id575931871?mt=11 (Bruce Mahin)
A General Metric for the Similarity of Both Stochastic and Deterministic System Dynamics
Shea-Blymyer, Colin; Roy, Subhradeep; Jantzen, Benjamin C. (MDPI, 2021-09-09)
Many problems in the study of dynamical systems—including identification of effective order, detection of nonlinearity or chaos, and change detection—can be reframed in terms of assessing the similarity between dynamical systems or between a given dynamical system and a reference. We introduce a general metric of dynamical similarity that is well posed for both stochastic and deterministic systems and is informative of the aforementioned dynamical features even when only partial information about the system is available. We describe methods for estimating this metric in a range of scenarios that differ in respect to contol over the systems under study, the deterministic or stochastic nature of the underlying dynamics, and whether or not a fully informative set of variables is available. Through numerical simulation, we demonstrate the sensitivity of the proposed metric to a range of dynamical properties, its utility in mapping the dynamical properties of parameter space for a given model, and its power for detecting structural changes through time series data.
Geometric Possibility, Ideological Parsimony, and Monistic Substantivalism
Davis, Cruz Austin (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-29)
Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. For the monist, objects either are identical with regions or are somehow derivative from them. Dualistic substantivalists view regions and objects as distinct kinds of fundamental entities. One virtue monists claim over dualists is that their view is more ideologically parsimonious than dualism because monists can do without a primitive notion of location. In this paper I provide an argument that undercuts some of the theoretical edge that monists claim over dualists. The assumption that the monist can provide a reduction of location unique to her position rests on a false assumption about the possible structures spacetime can have. If it is metaphysically possible for two distinct regions to coincide with respect to all their significant spatiotemporal properties and relations (call these 'coincident regions'), then analyses of location unique to monism will turn out to be inadequate.
Holistic Theories of Content and Instability
Ferguson, Ryan Matthew (Virginia Tech, 2014-06-02)
In this paper, I will defend two methodological theses, one negative and one positive, about how to develop a holistic theory of content for mental representations that avoids a problem peculiar to holistic theories, viz., the problem of content instability. The relevant debate between holists and anti-holists has focused on whether this problem provides an in principle barrier to developing a plausible holistic theory. On this front, the holists have won; defenders of holistic theories have convincingly argued that the anti-holists do not have a cogent argument from the problem of content instability to the impossibility of developing a plausible holistic theory. However, beyond this, little has been said about how to develop a holistic theory that avoids the problematic consequences of content instability; all that has been established is that it appears to be, in principle, possible to do so. This paper should contribute to making progress in this area. The two theses I will defend are about how to generate useful constraints on holistic theories so that they avoid content instability. The negative thesis of this paper is that the strategy of generating constraints suggested by the holists' response to anti-holist arguments, viz., appealing to properties of theories' determination functions, is a non-starter. The positive thesis of this paper is that the best way to develop useful stability constraints is to appeal to the explanatory role(s) that representations play in cognitive science theories.
On Distinguishing the Meaningless from the Meaningful: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Ruth Millikan\'s Teleosemantics
Slipetz, Lindley (Virginia Tech, 2013-05-03)
What distinguishes a meaningless utterance from a meaningful term? While one might say that, within the context of Ruth Millikan\'s teleosemantics, it is a term\'s having a proper function that distinguishes it from a meaningless utterance, I propose that the distinction can be made with reference to the history of the term. Using evolutionary game theory, I offer a way to clarify the distinction between the meaningless and the meaningful. I reject the possibility of correlating meaning with an evolutionarily stable strategy as this does not seem to be consistent with how communication works or with Millikan\'s theory. Instead, when a term has meaning, the function category of that term corresponds to an evolutionarily stable state composed of both speaker and hearer strategies.
On What We Confront in Perceptual Experience: Old School Ontologies for New School Realists
Thompson, Blake Barrett (Virginia Tech, 2013-05-26)
The focus of this thesis is a certain family of ontological positions. These positions say that there is some class of objects and properties, to which both physical objects and properties reduce and which are the kinds of things we confront in perceptual experience. Though largely absent from contemporary discussions of ontology, there are various reasons to think they deserve consideration. Species of this family, and similar views, have a prominent role in early analytic philosophy. Though endorsement of these views has been systematically de-emphasized in historical work on the period, Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell are among philosophers who endorse such views in their work. Their views were motivated by a number of different considerations. Here, I set to the side the issue of what has motivated these views in the past. I bring them up only for the purpose of giving attribution. I make no claim to ontological novelty nor will I be giving them an all-out defense. Accordingly, many considerations relevant to choice of ontology are bracketed. Instead of an all-out defense, what I offer here is an explanation of how adopting such a view allows us to solve two related problems. This amounts to two related reasons for taking a view like this seriously. One is for those who think that intuitions of a certain sort are a guide to what we should believe is ontologically the case. The other is for those who find merit in a disjunctive theory of perception.
Philosophical Zombies Don't Share Our Epistemic Situation
Wright, John Curtis (Virginia Tech, 2018-06-04)
Chalmers (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies do share our epistemic situation. In the following paper I aim to show that philosophical-zombies do not share our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness. I will begin with some background material regarding the general dialectic I am addressing in section (I) before outlining the debate between Chalmers (2007) and Carruthers and Veillet (2007) in more detail and its relevance for mind-body considerations in section (II). Next, in section (III) I will suggest a worry related to Carruthers and Veillet’s position: that phenomenal concepts fail to refer in zombie worlds in the first place. Finally, in section (IV) I will argue that even if a zombie’s phenomenal concepts successfully refer, there is still good reason to think that zombies will fail to share our epistemic situation. I will defend this claim by explaining three asymmetries between me and my zombie twin’s corresponding epistemic situations.
Problems for Introspection as a Basis for Reasoning about the Self
Bak, Dillon William (Virginia Tech, 2018-08-29)
Through introspection we may gain insight into phenomenology and thereby learn about our own mental lives. One aspect of our phenomenology that we might wish to introspect is our experience of selfhood. In particular, Galen Strawson views phenomenology as particularly useful for reasoning about the self. He expresses this in what he calls the Equivalence Thesis, which states that there are selves if and only if there is something that has properties attributed to the self in every instance of self-experience, where self-experience refers to a phenomenological experience of selfhood. In order to arrive at a phenomenological characterization, any set of properties that characterizes the self via the Equivalence Thesis, one must examine the phenomenology of self-experience through introspection. The Equivalence Thesis can run into difficulties in at least two ways with respect to its reliance on introspection. If introspection is unreliable then the Equivalence Thesis fails as we cannot accurately examine our phenomenology. While some of the consequences of such unreliability will be explored this will not be the main focus. Instead I call into question whether or not introspection provides the information that Strawson says it does. The Equivalence Thesis depends on the ability of introspection to provide us with information about so called mental elements, which give structure to our overall phenomenology. However, this is implausible. When we introspect we can learn directly about the kind of experience we are having, but it will not allow us to form an acceptable phenomenological characterization.
Protein Classification and Natural Kinds
Tolbert, Alexander (Virginia Tech, 2019-07-08)
This project surveys biochemical practice and sets the record straight regarding which parts of protein classification are pluralist. Assuming an approach that attempts to draw metaphysical conclusions by analyzing how multifaceted practices of science work, I tie the results of my survey of protein classification practices to the debate over natural kinds. I address which classificatory practice is likely to pick out a natural kind. I defend the thesis that dynamics is a fundamental description of proteins as kinds. This view is widely held in biochemistry but is absent from philosophical literature on biochemical kinds.
Reframing the reproducibility crisis: using an error-statistical account to inform the interpretation of replication results in psychological research
Parker, Caitlin Grace (Virginia Tech, 2015-06-17)
Experimental psychology is said to be having a reproducibility crisis, marked by a low rate of successful replication. Researchers attempting to respond to the problem lack a framework for consistently interpreting the results of statistical tests, as well as standards for judging the outcomes of replication studies. In this paper I introduce an error-statistical framework for addressing these issues. I demonstrate how the severity requirement (and the associated severity construal of test results) can be used to avoid fallacious inferences that are complicit in the perpetuation of unreliable results. Researchers, I argue, must probe for error beyond the statistical level if they want to support substantive hypotheses. I then suggest how severity reasoning can be used to address standing questions about the interpretation of replication results.
Revealing the Determinants of Acoustic Aesthetic Judgment Through Algorithmic
Jenkins, Spencer Daniel (Virginia Tech, 2019-07-03)
This project represents an important first step in determining the fundamental aesthetically relevant features of sound. Though there has been much effort in revealing the features learned by a deep neural network (DNN) trained on visual data, little effort in applying these techniques to a network trained on audio data has been performed. Importantly, these efforts in the audio domain often impose strong biases about relevant features (e.g., musical structure). In this project, a DNN is trained to mimic the acoustic aesthetic judgment of a professional composer. A unique corpus of sounds and corresponding professional aesthetic judgments is leveraged for this purpose. By applying a variation of Google's "DeepDream" algorithm to this trained DNN, and limiting the assumptions introduced, we can begin to listen to and examine the features of sound fundamental for aesthetic judgment.
Scientific Variables
Jantzen, Benjamin C. (MDPI, 2021-12-13)
Despite their centrality to the scientific enterprise, both the nature of scientific variables and their relation to inductive inference remain obscure. I suggest that scientific variables should be viewed as equivalence classes of sets of physical states mapped to representations (often real numbers) in a structure preserving fashion, and argue that most scientific variables introduced to expand the degrees of freedom in terms of which we describe the world can be seen as products of an algorithmic inductive inference first identified by William W. Rozeboom. This inference algorithm depends upon a notion of natural kind previously left unexplicated. By appealing to dynamical kinds—equivalence classes of causal system characterized by the interventions which commute with their time evolution—to fill this gap, we attain a complete algorithm. I demonstrate the efficacy of this algorithm in a series of experiments involving the percolation of water through granular soils that result in the induction of three novel variables. Finally, I argue that variables obtained through this sort of inductive inference are guaranteed to satisfy a variety of norms that in turn suit them for use in further scientific inferences.
The Substance of Ontological Disputes
Lamb, Richard Campbell (Virginia Tech, 2016-07-06)
There is a large philosophical literature focused on what sorts of things can be said to exist. This field is called ontology. Ontological disputes have sometimes been accused of being merely verbal disputes: that they are concerned only with language and not with facts. Some think that if this accusation is correct, philosophers should give up doing ontology. However, whether the accusation is correct and whether it is so serious depends on what is meant by verbal dispute. Eli Hirsch in particular has argued that ontological disputes are merely verbal in one specific sense. In this paper, I first argue that his accusation fails to show that ontological disputes are not substantive. Even if we admit that ontological disputes are verbal in Hirsch's sense, they may still be substantive in a variety of other senses. Second, I argue that even though ontological disputes are substantive, the reason for this will not support stronger claims about the nature and role of ontological disputes.
Understanding Wikipedia Practices Through Hindi, Urdu, and English Takes on an Evolving Regional Conflict
Hickman, Molly Graham (Virginia Tech, 2022-02-01)
Wikipedia is the product of thousands of editors working collaboratively to provide free and up-to-date encyclopedic information to the project's users. This article asks to what degree Wikipedia articles in three languages — Hindi, Urdu, and English — achieve Wikipedia's mission of making neutrally-presented, reliable information on a polarizing, controversial topic available to people around the globe. We chose the topic of the recent revocation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, which, along with other recent events in and concerning the region of Jammu and Kashmir, has drawn attention to related articles on Wikipedia. This work focuses on the English Wikipedia, being the preeminent language edition of the project, as well as the Hindi and Urdu editions. Hindi and Urdu are the two standardized varieties of Hindustani, a lingua franca of Jammu and Kashmir. We analyzed page view and revision data for three Wikipedia articles to gauge popularity of the pages in our corpus, and responsiveness of editors to breaking news events and problematic edits. Additionally, we interviewed editors from all three language editions to learn about differences in editing processes and motivations, and we compared the text of the articles across languages as they appeared shortly after the revocation of Article 370. Across languages,we saw discrepancies in article tone, organization, and the information presented, as well as differences in how editors collaborate and communicate with one another. Nevertheless, in Hindi and Urdu, as well as English, editors predominantly try to adhere to the principle of neutral point of view (NPOV), and for the most part, the editors quash attempts by other editors to push political agendas.

Browsing by Author "Jantzen, Benjamin C."

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