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Browsing by Author "Schleich, Joachim"

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    Essays on the Political Economy of Domestic and Trade Policies in the Presence of Production and Consumption Externalities
    Schleich, Joachim (Virginia Tech, 1997-08-01)
    This dissertation extends the Grossman-Helpman models of endogenous trade policy formation to incorporate local and global production and consumption externalities, and to allow governments to choose domestic production or consumption policies together with trade interventions. The models presented are among the first to allow environmental quality and the structure of industry protection to be simultaneously evaluated in a political economy framework, when some industry groups lobby their governments for higher output prices. The equilibrium tax and subsidy policies are implicitly expressed as the sum of distinct political support, terms-of-trade, and local and global environmental effects. Whether these effects reinforce or counterbalance each other depends on whether an industry is organized, whether the good is imported or exported, whether the externality is caused by production or consumption, and, in the large-country models, on whether governments set policies noncooperatively or cooperatively. The model results imply a political economy version of Bhagwati's normative targeting principle: governments use the most efficient policy available to satisfy the lobbies, to address the externalities, and, in the noncooperative large-country model, to exploit international market power. All of the initial Grossman-Helpman results (for the small-country model and the noncooperative and cooperative large-country models) are shown to be special cases where governments have only trade policy available and there are no externalities. In the small-country model and the cooperative large-country model, when there are production externalities, the lobbying of a polluting industry usually leads to lower environmental quality than socially optimal, but with terms-of-trade effects or for particular preferences cases the equilibrium policies may induce environmental quality higher than socially optimal. When there are consumption externalities, and the government has consumption (or production) as well as trade policy available, environmental quality will be socially optimal (again, unless governments exploit market power). Thus, depending on the policies available, a local or global consumption externality will be fully internalized, even though polluting industries lobby and production may be distorted. This dissertation also shows that--in contrast to standard economic theory--the use of trade policy alone can lead to higher environmental quality than a more direct domestic policy alone.
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    Three Essays Examining Household Energy Demand and Behavior
    Murray, Anthony G. (Virginia Tech, 2012-06-19)
    This dissertation consists of three essays examining household energy decisions and behavior. The first essay examines the adoption of energy efficient Energy Star home appliances by U.S. households. Program effectiveness requires that consumers be aware of the labeling scheme and also change their purchase decisions based on label information. The first essay examines the factors associated with consumer awareness of the Energy Star label of recently purchased major appliances and the factors associated with the choice of Energy Star labeled appliances. The findings suggest that eliminating identified gaps in Energy Star appliance adoption would result in house electricity cost savings of \$164 million per year and associated carbon emission reductions of about 1.1 million metric tons per year. The second essay evaluates household energy security and the effectiveness of the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), the single largest energy assistance program available to poor households within the United States. Energy security is conceptually akin to the well-known concept of food security. Rasch models and household responses to energy security questions in the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey are used to generate an energy insecurity index that is consistent with those found in the food insecurity literature. Participating in LIHEAP is found to significantly reduce household energy insecurity score in the index. Further, simulations show that the elimination of the energy assistance safety net currently available to households increases the number of energy insecure households by over 16 percent. The third essay develops a five equation demand system to estimate household own-price, cross-price and income elasticities between electricity, natural gas, food at home, food away from home, and non-durable commodity groups. Household cross-price elasticities between energy and food commodities are of particular importance. Energy price shocks reduce food expenditures for low-income households, as indicated by negative cross-price elasticity estimates for food and energy commodities. Additionally, low-income households reduce energy expenditures more than other households, further indicating ``heat or eat'' behavior. Results from all three essays provide policy makers with helpful information to shape future federal energy programs.