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dc.contributorVirginia Tech
dc.contributor.authorEasterwood, J. C.
dc.contributor.authorSinger, R. F.
dc.contributor.authorSeth, A.
dc.contributor.authorLang, D. F.
dc.date.accessioned2014-02-21T14:20:17Z
dc.date.available2014-02-21T14:20:17Z
dc.date.issued1994-08
dc.identifier.citationEasterwood, JC; Singer, RF; Seth, A; et al. "Controlling the conflict-of-interest in management buyouts," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1994, Vol. 76, No. 3, 512-522 doi: 10.2307/2109976
dc.identifier.issn0034-6535
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/25515
dc.description.abstractA controversial aspect of the management buyouts that were popular throughout the 1980s is the potential for a conflict of interest to arise when a manager bids to acquire the firm he manages. This study examines 184 management buyouts and reports three findings. First, returns to pre-buyout shareholders are greater when managers must bid against outside acquirers. Second, bid revisions in the face of competition exceed revisions due to shareholder litigation and negotiations with boards. Third, the incidence of competition is negatively related to the pre-buyout share holdings of managers.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMIT Press
dc.titleControlling the conflict-of-interest in management buyouts
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2109976
dc.date.accessed2014-02-05
dc.title.serialReview of Economics and Statistics
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2307/2109976


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