This dissertation attempts to construct a theory which states that forms of enterprise are determined to a large extent by potential market failure. In the four independent, but closely interrelated chapters, I derive this hypothesis through theoretical reasoning, and suppose it by referring to empirical observations.

Chapter 1, Forms of enterprise as a response to market failure, proposes the main idea that forms of enterprise are determined by market failure. I take three representative types of firms - capitalist firms, worker owned firms, and consumer cooperatives - and consider their relationship with three major causes for failure of markets: asymmetric information, externalities, and market power.

Chapter 2, Firms owned by raw material suppliers: A case of food manufacturing firms run by agriculture cooperatives in Japan, is a case study which complements chapter 1. It deals with food processing farmers' cooperatives. These firms are owned by the suppliers of raw materials, and therefore classified as the fourth type of firms. I consider comparative efficiency of this type of firms from the viewpoint of market power and asymmetric information.

Chapter 3, Asymmetric information on production-related risks and the form of enterprise: Capitalist firms versus consumer cooperatives, considers an efficient enterprise form when there is asymmetric information on accident risks in the market.

Chapter 4, Market power and the form of enterprise: Capitalist firms, worker owned firms, or consumer cooperatives, considers an efficient enterprise form when there is market power in various markets.