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dc.contributor.authorLove, Shanonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2001-06-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-14T20:40:27Z
dc.date.available2007-11-06en_US
dc.date.available2014-03-14T20:40:27Z
dc.date.issued2001-06-22en_US
dc.date.submitted2001-06-24en_US
dc.identifier.otheretd-06242001-165950en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/33719
dc.description.abstractIn 1986, David Lewis offered what he thought would be the decisive objection against endurantism, showing it to be an implausible theory. The problem of temporary intrinsics stated that an object cannot have two complementary intrinsic properties while maintaining identity, as endurantists claim. Perdurantism, then, must be the more plausible theory, according to Lewis. The endurantists responded to this objection by formulating different versions of endurantism designed to avoid the problem. Subsequently, the endurantist tried to undermine the perdurantist position by arguing that a perduring object cannot undergo what is considered to be genuine change. As a result, endurantism is the more plausible theory. However, the perdurantist can show that endurantism seems to fail to provide an account of change as well. In what follows, I argue that the implicit ontological commitments of the endurantists and perdurantists have prevented the problem of temporary intrinsics and change from resolving the endurantist/perdurantist debate. I offer examples of plausible ontologies for the endurantist and perdurantist in order to emphasize this problem. I will argue that, in order to resolve the debate, one must ultimately examine the ontological accounts of each theory.en_US
dc.publisherVirginia Techen_US
dc.relation.haspartthesis.PDFen_US
dc.rightsI hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to Virginia Tech or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report.en_US
dc.subjectPerdurantismen_US
dc.subjectPresentismen_US
dc.subjectPersistenceen_US
dc.subjectEndurantismen_US
dc.titleThe Ontology of Persistenceen_US
dc.typethesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
thesis.degree.levelmastersen_US
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen_US
dc.contributor.committeechairJenkins, Eric J.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberFitzPatrick, William J.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberKlagge, James C.en_US
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-06242001-165950/en_US


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