The maximization of discretionary budget: an explanation for the pattern of computer investments in the federal government
Blythe, Earving L.
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Bureaucrats managing federal computer services utilities are acquiring computers based upon obsolete technology. Once acquired, these systems are being utilized years beyond their normal economic life cycle. Because of potential conversion costs, the federal bureaucrat can not be certain that new technology will guarantee increased discretionary profit. The current economic state of the computer inventory is consistent with the fact that the Migue-Bellanger bureaucrat has no incentive to shift to a new technology. I n fact, the primary incentive is to keep and continue to develop old technology. At the point that the old system is worthless in terms of market value, the bureaucrat has maximized his discretionary profit. That this state of the federal governments utilization of computer technology is inefficient is also consistent with the Migue-Belanger model of bureaucracy.
- Masters Theses