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dc.contributor.authorEstes, Alan W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-14T21:35:50Z
dc.date.available2014-03-14T21:35:50Z
dc.date.issued1996-05-05en_US
dc.identifier.otheretd-05092009-040642en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/42565
dc.description.abstract

Banks have a suspected motivation to engage in window dressing of regulatory Call reports. Through a more structured definition of window dressing and a higher frequency data set, a more robust test of window dressing is adopted than in previous studies. This study focuses on the possible influence that the Basle Capital Accord may have on bank window dressing. The results suggest that banks have not been inclined to alter balance sheet manipulations following the implementation of the Basle Accord. A rigorous sources and uses analysis further indicates that banks in fact are not strategically window dressing, but merely reacting to customer activity.

en_US
dc.format.mediumBTDen_US
dc.publisherVirginia Techen_US
dc.relation.haspartLD5655.V855_1996.E8845.pdfen_US
dc.subjectbankingen_US
dc.subject.lccLD5655.V855 1996.E8845en_US
dc.titleFurther evidence of bank window dressing :the effect of Basle Capital Standardsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentEconomicsen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
thesis.degree.levelmastersen_US
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
dc.contributor.committeechairWentzler, Nancy A.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberReid, Brian K.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberPorter, W. Russellen_US
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05092009-040642/en_US
dc.date.sdate2009-05-09en_US
dc.date.rdate2009-05-09
dc.date.adate2009-05-09en_US


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