Game-Theoretic Approach with Cost Manipulation to Vehicular Collision Avoidance
Howells, Christopher Corey
MetadataShow full item record
Collision avoidance is treated as a game of two players with opposing desiderata. In the application to automated car-like vehicles, we will use a differential game in order to model and assess a worst-case analysis. The end result will be an almost analytic representation of a boundary between a "safe" set and a "unsafe" set. We will generalize the research in  to non-identical players and begin the setup of the boundary construction. Then we will consider the advantages and disadvantages of manipulation of the cost function through the solution and control techniques. In particular, we introduce a possible way to incorporate a secondary objective such as sticking to a straight path. We also look a hybrid technique to reduce steering when the opposing player is out of the reach of the vehicle; i.e., is out of the "unsafe" set and less extreme maneuvers may be desired. We first look at a terminal cost formulation and through retrograde techniques may shape this boundary between the "safe" and "unsafe" set. We would like this research, or part thereof, to be assessed and simulated on a simulation vehicle such as that used in the Flexible Low-cost Automated Scaled Highway (FLASH) at the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI). In preparation, we briefly look at the sensor demands from this game-theoretic approach.
- Masters Theses