I argue that welfare considerations should play an important role in egalitarian thought. Ronald Dworkin, in contrast, has argued that welfare should play no role in a principle of equality of distribution. I explore his discussion of this issue, finding that many of his arguments presuppose the truth of his alternative account, which focuses on resources rather than welfare. His remaining arguments rely on the counter-intuitive nature of compensating for expensive tastes. I argue that if we examine this case more carefully, it is not as counter-intuitive as it first appears.

Having replied to his objections to the welfare account, I turn to his positive argument for the principle of equality of resources, namely, that it is the only principle which respects the equal worth of persons. I explore several examples to demonstrate that pure welfare deficiencies merit compensation. These examples suggest, I argue, that respecting the equal worth of persons requires us to consider welfare in a principle of equality of distribution. Finally, I argue that if we should compensate for welfare deficiencies, we should also compensate for expensive tastes; indeed, considerations of equal worth require this compensation.