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dc.contributor.authorNehrt, Stephen Royen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-13T14:40:17Z
dc.date.available2014-08-13T14:40:17Z
dc.date.issued1987en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/50071
dc.description.abstractWith the exception of a brief legislative stay of execution, resale price maintenance (RPM), has been illegal per se in the United States since a 1911 Supreme Court decision. The Court has however, afforded vertical territorial restraints the protection of the rule of reason. A growing body of economic literature has proposed numerous pro-competitive uses of RPM by manufacturers. In addition, the literature indicates that vertical territortial and vertical price restraints are both different means of achieving the same end i.e., both are economic tools employed by manufacturers to achieve efficiencies in their distribution system. Opponents of RPM counter this assertion by arguing that if both are identical economic phenominon, then manufacturers have no need to employ RPM since they can use vertical market division in its place. In this paper I will show that under demand conditions characterized by the outlets hypothesis, RPM is Pareto-superior to vertical market division. It is equally possible to imagine market conditions under which the opposite is true. Since the court room is an ill-suited home for such business decisions, the law should not continue to maintain its present artificial distinction between RPM and vertical market division. The economic consequences of both are essentially the same, hence, I advocate that RPM also be brought under the protection of the rule of reason.
dc.format.extentvi, 127 leavesen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.publisherVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen_US
dc.rightsThis Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. Some uses of this Item may be deemed fair and permitted by law even without permission from the rights holder(s), or the rights holder(s) may have licensed the work for use under certain conditions. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights holder(s).en_US
dc.subject.lccLD5655.V855 1987.N437en_US
dc.subject.lcshOutlet stores -- Pricesen_US
dc.subject.lcshPrice maintenanceen_US
dc.titleAn examination of vertical territorial and vertical price restraints under the outlets hypothesisen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentEconomicsen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen_US
dc.identifier.oclc17019456en_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
thesis.degree.levelmastersen_US
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten_US
dc.description.adminincomplete_metadataen_US


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