Virginia Tech
    • Log in
    View Item 
    •   VTechWorks Home
    • VTechWorks Archives
    • Conference Proceedings
    • North American Wind Energy Academy 2015 Symposium
    • View Item
    •   VTechWorks Home
    • VTechWorks Archives
    • Conference Proceedings
    • North American Wind Energy Academy 2015 Symposium
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    A game-theoretic framework to investigate the conditions for cooperation between energy storage operators and wind power producers

    Thumbnail
    View/Open
    6_Bhela_etal.pdf (972.8Kb)
    Downloads: 149
    6_Bhela_etal_Paper.pdf (241.7Kb)
    Downloads: 89
    Date
    2015-06
    Author
    Bhela, Siddharth
    Tam, Kwa-sur
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    Energy storage, has widely been accepted as a means to provide capacity firming service to renewable sources of energy due to its capability to quickly start and shut down and its ability to have flexible ramping rates. Lithium Ion batteries in particular are of interest as their production cost is expected to significantly decrease over the next few years. In addition, Li-Ion batteries have high efficiency, high energy density and high cycling tolerance. These batteries are also used in electric vehicles whose penetration is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. The social benefit of energy storage to provide energy balancing service to renewable producers is evident, especially in the context of a micro-grid where deviations from distributed generation sources can be handled locally. However, co-operation with renewable producers may not be automatically guaranteed and would depend on the amount of revenue generated by balancing such deviations. Storage may derive more benefit from choosing to operate independently. Balancing wind deviations would take capacity away from providing other high value services to the micro-grid community such as arbitrage and regulation service. The decision to enter the market and balance deviations for the wind producer is highly intertwined with the strategy adopted by the wind producer. Interactive problems in which the outcome of a rational agent's action depends on the actions of other rational players are best studied through the setup of a game-theoretic framework. A case-study is presented here using wind and electricity market data for a site in west Texas. Historical data is used to calculate expected pay-offs for the month of January. The columns in the following table are the available strategies for the wind producer and the rows are the available strategies for the energy storage. There are four possible combination of strategies, which are discussed next: The pay-off table provides the net revenues of the wind producer in the upper right corner and the net revenues of the energy storage in the lower left corner of each cell. Note that revenue from Production Tax Credits (PTC) is not included for the wind producer.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10919/54714
    Collections
    • North American Wind Energy Academy 2015 Symposium [82]

    If you believe that any material in VTechWorks should be removed, please see our policy and procedure for Requesting that Material be Amended or Removed. All takedown requests will be promptly acknowledged and investigated.

    Virginia Tech | University Libraries | Contact Us
     

     

    VTechWorks

    AboutPoliciesHelp

    Browse

    All of VTechWorksCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    Log inRegister

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics

    If you believe that any material in VTechWorks should be removed, please see our policy and procedure for Requesting that Material be Amended or Removed. All takedown requests will be promptly acknowledged and investigated.

    Virginia Tech | University Libraries | Contact Us