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dc.contributor.authorGresham, Brian Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-26T09:03:26Z
dc.date.available2015-12-26T09:03:26Z
dc.date.issued2015-12-10en_US
dc.identifier.othervt_gsexam:6657en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/64369
dc.description.abstractThis research is examines the nuclear arms race that dominated the 20th century, during which the United States manufactured and stockpiled a large number of strategic weapons. Using moral panic theory, the roles of the President of the United States and the media are examined in facilitating public interest in the manufacture of these weapons from 1955-1990. The project uses both time series and historical analyses to determine the extent to which the strategic nuclear weapons crisis was a moral panic created to insure public acceptance of such this massive defense sector expenditure. The time series analysis reveals that the President does have the ability to influence the public via the State of the Union Address, but that influence does not extend strongly to the media. However, what influence the President does have appears to be correlated to the use of substantive rhetoric, and the percentage of the speech dedicated to the issue. Finally, the historical analysis demonstrates that the moral panic moves through three phases. The first phase is characterized by grassroots concern over the technical gap represented by Sputnik 1's launch was utilized by interested actors to accomplish their goals. During the second phase, this concern transformed into an institutional technique utilized for deflecting institutional challenges when the moral panic moved into an interest group model. The final phase occurs during the rise of the "security state", when elites begin using the moral panic to achieve their own ends.en_US
dc.format.mediumETDen_US
dc.publisherVirginia Techen_US
dc.rightsThis Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. Some uses of this Item may be deemed fair and permitted by law even without permission from the rights holder(s), or the rights holder(s) may have licensed the work for use under certain conditions. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights holder(s).en_US
dc.subjectmoral panicen_US
dc.subjectmissile gapen_US
dc.subjectstrategic nuclear weapons crisisen_US
dc.subjectmilitary Keynesianismen_US
dc.titleThe Missile Gap: A Moral Panic for an Atomic Ageen_US
dc.typeDissertationen_US
dc.contributor.departmentSociologyen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh. D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSociologyen_US
dc.contributor.committeechairHawdon, James E.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberRyan, John W.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHughes, Michael D.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberWimberley, Dale W.en_US


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