Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services
Ferraro, Paul J.
MetadataShow full item record
In contractual relationships involving payments for environmental services, conservation buyers know less than landowners know about the costs of contractual compliance. Such asymmetric information reduces the effectiveness of payment schemes and increases the expense to implement them. To reduce these negative effects, conservation agents can take three approaches: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions. Although current theory and empirical work provides practitioners with some insights into the relative merits of each approach, more theoretical work and experimentation in the field is necessary before definitive conclusions can be drawn.
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Development and the upland resource base: economic and policy context, and lessons from a Philippine watershed Coxhead, IanThis paper examines the complex, non-linear relationships between economic growth and environmental degradation that are apparent in the variety of experiences in the recent history of many tropical Asian economies. Numerous ...
The Florida Ranchlands Environmental Services Project: Field Testing a Pay-for-Environmental-Services Program Lynch, S.; Shabman, L.The Florida Ranchlands Environmental Services Project (FRESP) was recently launched, which will field test a program to complement the existing restoration programs such as the Lake Okeechobee Protection Plan (LOPP), which ...
S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff"Direct payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly becoming subject of national development strategies and of actions promoted by large networks of non-governmental conservation organizations as means to ...