Android malware collusion is a new threat model that occurs when multiple Android apps communicate in order to execute an attack. This threat model threatens all Android users' private information and system resource security. Although recent research has made advances in collusion detection and classification, security analysts still do not have robust tools which allow them to definitively identify colluding Android applications. Specifically, in order to determine whether an alert produced by a tool scanning for Android collusion is a true-positive or a false-positive, the analyst must perform manual analysis of the suspected apps, which is both time consuming and prone to human errors. In this thesis, we present a new approach to definitive Android collusion detection and confirmation by rendering inter-component communications between a set of potentially collusive Android applications. Inter-component communications (abbreviated to ICCs), are a feature of the Android framework that allows components from different applications to communicate with one another. Our approach allows Android security analysts to inspect all ICCs within a set of suspicious Android applications and subsequently identify collusive attacks which utilize ICCs. Furthermore, our approach also visualizes all potentially collusive data-flows within each component within a set of apps. This allows analysts to inspect, step-by-step, the the data-flows that are currently used by collusive attacks, or the data-flows that could be used for future collusive attacks. Our tool effectively visualizes the malicious and benign ICCs in sets of proof-of-concept and real-world colluding applications. We conducted a user study which revealed that our approach allows for accurate and efficient identification of true- and false-positive collusive ICCs while still maintaining usability.