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dc.contributor.authorLennon, James Prestonen
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-12T19:12:59Zen
dc.date.available2016-12-12T19:12:59Zen
dc.date.issued2016-07-19en
dc.identifier.othervt_gsexam:7727en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/73678en
dc.description.abstractPhilosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest that assuming cognitive phenomenology does exist, it would have important consequences for other areas of philosophy. In particular, it would have important consequences for moral epistemology – how we come to know the moral truths we seem to know. I argue that adopting cognitive phenomenology and the epistemic principle of phenomenal conservatism can do “double duty” for the moral realist: they provide the moral realist with prima facie grounds for belief in the objectivity of morality, while epistemically vindicating the specific contents of their beliefs.en
dc.format.mediumETDen
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectphilosophyen
dc.subjectcognitive phenomenologyen
dc.subjectmoral epistemologyen
dc.subjectphenomenal conservatismen
dc.subjectconsciousnessen
dc.titleHow Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral Realismen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen
thesis.degree.levelmastersen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
dc.contributor.committeechairTrogdon, Kelly Griffithen
dc.contributor.committeememberKlagge, James C.en
dc.contributor.committeememberMcPherson, Tristramen


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