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dc.contributor.authorWitmer, D. Geneen
dc.contributor.authorButchard, Williamen
dc.contributor.authorTrogdon, Kelly Griffithen
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-21T23:03:29Zen
dc.date.available2017-01-21T23:03:29Zen
dc.date.issued2005-03en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8205en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/74400en
dc.description.abstractRae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of' notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property."en
dc.format.extent326 - 350 page(s)en
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.titleIntrinsicality without Naturalnessen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.description.versionPublished (Publication status)en
dc.title.serialPhilosophy and Phenomenological Researchen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00530.xen
dc.identifier.volume70en
dc.identifier.issue2en
dc.identifier.eissn1933-1592en
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Techen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/All T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciencesen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciences/CLAHS T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciences/Philosophyen


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