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dc.contributor.authorParker, David C. W.en
dc.contributor.authorDull, Matthew M.en
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-13T16:54:13Zen
dc.date.available2017-02-13T16:54:13Zen
dc.date.issued2013-01-01en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/75011en
dc.description.abstractScholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention tooversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees,partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigatedexecutive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committeescharacterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unifiedgovernment dampen Congress’ investigatory vigor. The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to producegood government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.en
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.titleRooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004en
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.description.versionPublished (Publication status)en
dc.description.notes< REFEREED: Yes >< PUBLICAVAIL: Yes >< FULL_TEXT: mdull/intellcont/Parker_Dull_2013-1-1.pdf >< USER_REFERENCE_CREATOR: Yes >< PUB_END: 2013-01-31 >< DTx_PUB: 01/2013 >en
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Techen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/All T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Architecture and Urban Studiesen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Architecture and Urban Studies/CAUS T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Architecture and Urban Studies/School of Public and International Affairsen


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