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dc.contributor.authorParker, Den_US
dc.contributor.authorDull, Men_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-13T16:54:13Z
dc.date.available2017-02-13T16:54:13Z
dc.date.issued2013-01-01en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/75011
dc.description.abstractScholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention tooversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees,partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigatedexecutive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committeescharacterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unifiedgovernment dampen Congress’ investigatory vigor. The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to producegood government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.en_US
dc.titleRooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004en_US
dc.typeArticle - Refereed
dc.description.versionPublished (Publication status)en_US
dc.description.notes< REFEREED: Yes >< PUBLICAVAIL: Yes >< FULL_TEXT: mdull/intellcont/Parker_Dull_2013-1-1.pdf >< USER_REFERENCE_CREATOR: Yes >< PUB_END: 2013-01-31 >< DTx_PUB: 01/2013 >en_US
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/All T&R Faculty
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Architecture and Urban Studies
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Architecture and Urban Studies/CAUS T&R Faculty
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Architecture and Urban Studies/School of Public and International Affairs


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