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dc.contributor.authorWright, John Curtisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-05T08:01:17Z
dc.date.available2018-06-05T08:01:17Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-04en_US
dc.identifier.othervt_gsexam:15365en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/83456
dc.description.abstractChalmers (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies do share our epistemic situation. In the following paper I aim to show that philosophical-zombies do not share our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness. I will begin with some background material regarding the general dialectic I am addressing in section (I) before outlining the debate between Chalmers (2007) and Carruthers and Veillet (2007) in more detail and its relevance for mind-body considerations in section (II). Next, in section (III) I will suggest a worry related to Carruthers and Veillet’s position: that phenomenal concepts fail to refer in zombie worlds in the first place. Finally, in section (IV) I will argue that even if a zombie’s phenomenal concepts successfully refer, there is still good reason to think that zombies will fail to share our epistemic situation. I will defend this claim by explaining three asymmetries between me and my zombie twin’s corresponding epistemic situations.en_US
dc.format.mediumETDen_US
dc.publisherVirginia Techen_US
dc.rightsThis item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. Some uses of this item may be deemed fair and permitted by law even without permission from the rights holder(s), or the rights holder(s) may have licensed the work for use under certain conditions. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights holder(s).en_US
dc.subjectmind-bodyen_US
dc.subjectphenomenal concept strategyen_US
dc.subjectzombiesen_US
dc.titlePhilosophical Zombies Don't Share Our Epistemic Situationen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
thesis.degree.levelmastersen_US
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
dc.contributor.committeechairKlagge, James C.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTrogdon, Kelly Griffithen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberJantzen, Benjamin C.en_US


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