

**Regional Differences in the Treatment
of Karl Marx by the Founders of American Academic Sociology**

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(ABSTRACT)

Karl Marx has long been perceived as one of the individuals who helped to create and develop the field we now call sociology. Many studies have attempted to show his prevalence over time, but have done so deficiently. The current study is a qualitative content analysis of the manuscripts written by William G. Sumner, Lester F. Ward, Franklin H. Giddings, Albion W. Small, Charles H. Cooley and Edward A. Ross. These individuals are generally considered to be the founders of American academic sociology. Their writings can tell a great deal about the development of Marxian sociology in the United States. The present study supports the theory that those founders working at universities in the Midwest were more likely to discuss Marx than the founders from the East Coast because those in the Midwest were at institutions which were more progressive. The project is based on a thorough analysis of the manuscripts written by the six founders in the time frame of 1883-1915 (the first era of American academic sociology).

As shown in the study, Karl Marx was not entirely ignored by the founders, but many other writers were more influential. Many discussions about Karl Marx were based upon the manuscripts written by he and Engels, The Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital. The founders often addressed Marx's concepts which related to his discussions of class, surplus value, capital, capitalism, historical materialism, class consciousness, and property.

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1.0 Introduction

Karl Marx has profoundly affected the field of sociology worldwide. In the United States there was a surge of Marxian literature starting in the 1960s, and continuing into the present (M:FHY, and SC). His prominence in current United States sociology is illustrated in many ways, including the teaching of Marx's ideas at the introductory level. Examples of his influence are typified in four recent introductory sociology textbooks: Sociology, by Rodney Stark; Sociology, by Light, Keller, and Calhoun; Sociology, by Neil Smelser; and Sociology: The Core by James Vander Zanden. In all four texts, Marx and his concepts receive a great deal of attention. In each of these cases, Marx is at least the third most mentioned individual in the book. Although these four textbooks are not representative of all the introductory sociology texts on the market, they allow the reader to see that Marx holds a position of prominence in current American sociology.

Just over fifty years ago, Marx was mentioned fleetingly in texts and other writings. The lack of receptiveness to Marx can be illustrated by Gouldner's argument that sociology distanced itself from Marxism.

What happened, in short, was that with the Depression and the growing salience of Marxism in the United States, there was greater pressure to develop and fortify the intellectual alternatives to Marxism, and to expel Marxism from consideration as a sociology much like any other (CCWS, 188-189).

Ogburn and Nimkoff's 1940 edition of Sociology is one example of Marx's expulsion from American sociology. Marx is mentioned only once in this text, at the end of the chapter on Status: Social Classes, under the section heading of Selected Readings. Marx appears in the text because of his book Das Kapital. Ogburn and Nimkoff justify the inclusion of Marx in the following way.

One of the most influential books in the field of social science. A ponderous and profound work elaborating the doctrines of "historical materialism" (the economic interpretation of history), "the universal class struggle," and "revolutionary reconstruction." Earlier these ideas had been incorporated in the popularly written **COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, 1848, KARL MARX and FREDERICK ENGELS** (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr), which has become the gospel of revolutionary socialism. *Valuable, not for the correctness of its theories, but for its great influence on practical political movements* (emphasis added) (342-343).

By reviewing the book in such a way, Ogburn and Nimkoff are able to distance Marx from their discussion of sociology. Roscoe Hinkle mirrors this image in American Sociological Theory, World War I World War II.

In speaking about possible European influences, Hinkle asserted that "although a number of textbooks in social and sociological theory included consideration of Marx and Marxism, Marx remained only of minimal or marginal interest to mainstream American sociologists through the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s" (AST, 10/18-10/19). In 1927 Bernard

addressed the lack of consideration toward Marx and Marxism, "Marx was only cited twice as a significant influence among the 52 American sociologists mentioning a European sociologist as an important factor in their intellectual outlooks. . . ." (AST, 10/19).⁰

There was little acceptance of Marx during the second era of American sociology (1916-1945). Writing in 1974, Herman and Julia Schwendinger explain that "it is important to recognize that prior to the most recent period, there were no stable circles of Marxist sociology in the academy that could anchor radical scholarship among left-oriented sociologists" (SC, 563). The second period of American sociology did little to further Marx's influence, and in actuality, "no indigenous Marxist sociological theory emerged during the second period" (AST, 10/20).

If Marx did not take a place of prominence in American sociology during the second era, it must have arisen sometime between the 1950s and 1980s. Bottomore called the second era of sociology "the 'dark ages' for Marxist sociology" (M:FHY, 124). He suggested that:

a profound change began in the mid-1950s. . . . Many thinkers whose work had been neglected or consigned to oblivion during the Stalinist epoch were rediscovered and critically discussed, and at the same time important manuscripts of Marx which had previously been little known - notably the **Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts** (1844) and the **Grundrisse** (1857-8) - were published, translated, and widely diffused (M:FHY, 125).

After the 1950s, many sociologists began to focus on studies of Marx and Marxism in sociology. During the third and fourth periods of American sociology a Marxian awakening occurred. The Schwendingers asserted that:

the surge in radical sociology after 1968 should not obscure the fact that for three quarters of a century since the 1890s, no important examples of a sustained *systematic* defense of Marxist scholarship by *circles* of academic scholars cannot be found in *any* subject-matter area in *any* of the sociological journals sponsored by professional associations of sociologists in the United States (SC, 564).

Bottomore concluded that in the third and fourth eras of American sociology, "Marxist ideas have now regained, or acquired for the first time, an important place in all the social sciences" (M:FHY, 125).

⁰It should be noted that both Bernard and Hinkle are highly exclusionary in their statements. There were a number of lesser known individuals, some at institutions of lesser prestige, that might have held an active interest in Marx. These individuals are not referred to in their samples.

As late as 1981, sociologists debated the position of Marx within the discipline, a stance exemplified by Patrick Gurney. He stated that, "indeed, the absence of a strong critical or Marxist element within sociology today appears to have its roots in the early years of the discipline" (HOID, 201). Shortly after Gurney wrote about the absence of Marx in sociology, the discipline virtually exploded with great amounts of interest in Marx and Marxian sociology. In 1983, Bottomore stated that "it would be surprising indeed if Marxist sociology did not undergo further development and revision - on an even larger scale than in the past, because it is now so widely taught and debated - during the remainder of this century" (M:FHY, 141).

Many sociologists argued that Marx and his concepts were of little importance during the second period of American sociology, a position taken by Bottomore, Gurney, Hinkle and the Schwendingers. As a result, several questions arise, Is there any way to account for Marx's later influence through the first generation of American sociologists, or were they also oblivious to Marx? Is there continuity or discontinuity to Marxian sociological thought in American sociology from 1883 to the present? Further, did all first generation American sociologists deal with Marx in the same manner, or were there regional differences in his treatment?

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The broad sociological foundation for this study is within the sub-field of the sociology of knowledge. Theodorson and Theodorson define the sociology of knowledge as:

the aspect of sociology that is concerned with the relationship between knowledge or systems of thought and social and cultural factors. One problem dealt with by sociologists in this area is the way the culture and society of the present or past shape knowledge and thought (MDS, 405).

The main reason for grounding the present study on the sociology of knowledge model is to find out how the "society" of founding era American sociologists shaped Marx and Marxian social thought for future generations of sociologists. Maslow used the same approach in his article "Academic Sociology as a 'Classist' Discipline." One of the questions the present inquiry wishes to answer is whether or not there was continuity or discontinuity in the transmission of knowledge between American sociologists of different eras.

The current study will explore historicism, a sub-field within the sociology of knowledge, which is defined as:

a theoretical approach that emphasizes the importance of the historical context in the understanding of social and cultural phenomena. According to this approach, in analyzing any aspect of the social organization or culture of a people at a given time, it is necessary to trace its history to show how the particular form developed and then to relate it to other aspects of the sociocultural system within which it occurs. The emphasis tends to be upon the uniqueness of each historical period, rather than upon recurrent patterns or generalizations for all human behavior (MDS, 187).

The main interest of the current research project is in the transmission of knowledge among those individuals working within the first era of American sociology, and how they dealt with the possible influence of Marx and/or Marxism.

Other studies have attempted to investigate American sociology within a framework of period studies. In contrast to past studies, this researcher will study the impact of one individual within a specific period of American sociology, 1883-1915. Texts such as the ones by Hinkle, Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881 -1915 and American Sociological Theory, World War I - World War II, give an overview "explaining or accounting for how contemporary sociological theory has come to be as it is -- to adapt a phrase from the work of F.J. Teggart" (AST, 12/1). Hinkle further suggests that "the understanding can only contribute in part to a much more extended chain of inquires" (AST, 12/1).

The present research is a part of this "extended chain of inquires." Hinkle has done an excellent job of giving an general description of the first, and even the second, periods of American sociology, and has set the stage for an in-depth look at the influence of Karl Marx on American sociology in the period from 1883-1915.

The theory upon which the current study is based is that the founders at universities in the Midwest were more likely to deal with Marx than East Coast founders because the schools they taught at tended to be more progressive, populist, and reformist. I will attempt to support the premise of the study by addressing four questions, (1) How prevalent was Marx during the beginning era of American sociology? (2) Which founders dealt with the works of Karl Marx? (3) How did each of the founders treat Marx / what was the reaction to Marx by the founders of American sociology? (4) What does all of this mean in relation to the current role of Marx in American sociology? The fourth research question will provide a degree of closure about the development of stable Marxian

influences in the United States. These questions will be answered through an analysis of historical documents (books and monographs) from the period of 1883-1915.

Charles H. Cooley, Franklin Giddings, Edward A. Ross, Albion W. Small, William Graham Sumner, and Lester F. Ward are considered to be the most notable founders of American sociology (AS, 75-112; CAS, 21-25).¹ Knowledge of where each of these founders taught, and the academic situation that was associated with each university impacted the development of the project's central premise. Midwest universities for the most part were in the new or developing stage; accordingly, sociology was more quickly accepted into the curriculum. Martindale commented that:

when a new discipline such as sociology is introduced into established universities, it has to fight for a position against academic vested interests. In the Midwest the universities were still new or even, like Chicago, in the process of establishment. Sociology departments were set up with little or no opposition (ASBWW2, 138).

Robin M. Williams stated that "a new field of study is likely to meet with maximum resistance if it seeks to displace an existing set of ideas, practices and practitioners" (SIA, 87). The six primary founders of American academic sociology were at an array of universities. With new colleges and universities came a different set of ideals and understandings of what academia represented. Veysey proposed that "the East Coast was pictured as standing for books, tradition, and culture, in an undesirable sense. The West, in contrast, meant action, practicality, realism and progress" (EAU, 109). Metzger also undertook a similar stance when he asserted "except for Harvard, the older eastern colleges in the early eighties were still provincial and religious in tone" (AFAU, 64-65).

As sociology created a foundation within the university system, William Sumner taught at Yale; Lester Ward taught at Brown; Franklin Giddings was at Columbia; Albion Small was at the University of Chicago; Charles Cooley taught at the University of Michigan; and Edward Ross was associated with the University of Wisconsin.² In the present study, The University of Chicago, University of Michigan, and University of Wisconsin are recognized as the schools of the Midwest. Brown, Yale, and Columbia account for the schools of the East Coast.

¹The reasons for choosing only these individuals are discussed in the methodology section.

²Their academic positions were found in Don Martindale's article "American Sociology Before World War II" and Ellsworth Fuhrman's book The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883-1915.

Several individuals have commented that the type of teaching differed among Midwestern and East Coast schools. In the current study, the predominating idea is that Small, Ross, and Cooley would be the most likely to discuss Marx's writings and ideas. Shils, as restated by Fuhrman, maintained the idea that Midwest schools were more populist, progressive, and reformist.

It also can be pointed out that German historicism, which was one of the main sources of sociology, and the conception of the university as a scene of teaching and research were more readily received in the Midwest - at Chicago, Wisconsin and Michigan (SKA, 40).

In another of Fuhrman's writings, the bond held by certain founders is seen clearly. In keeping with the theme of East Coast versus Midwest, two of the East Coast founders "Sumner and Giddings, maintained that sociologists should not participate in social reform policies" (IDEAS, 105).

The idea that Midwest universities are more progressive, reformist, and populist is also held by Don Martindale:

moreover, the Midwest was the stronghold of populism and progressivism, which were far more receptive to the original Comtian conception of sociology as a science of social reconstruction than was the social Darwinist conservatism of the East (ASBWW2, 138).

Another sense of the Midwest's progressiveness was in the development of social psychology. In the late 19th and early 20th social psychology was associated with individuals such as Cooley, Mead, and even Ross. Robin M. Williams declared: social psychology in America was first created by sociologists: E.A. Ross published the first book in the U.S. to bear the title "social psychology," and Cooley, Mead, Dewey and Baldwin formed a crucial interconnected set in the formative period of the field (SIA, 93).

Again the Midwest emerged as more progressive than that of the East.

The East Coast had many reasons to remain more conservative. The East Coast founders' conservatism may be linked to the fact that East Coast universities were started earlier than Midwestern schools, even as centers for graduate studies (GAT, 569). In order to disrupt existing fields of study as little as possible, most East Coast founders did not rock the proverbial boat with their emerging field of sociology. Martindale exemplified East Coast conservatism with the statement, "Giddings increasingly assumed a position close to Sumner's conservatism" (ASBWW2, 128). As a result, the theoretical propelling this study is that the founders at schools in the Midwest were more likely to deal with

Marx than East Coast founders because the universities they taught at tended to be more progressive, populist, and reformist.

The first question: how prevalent was Marx during the beginning era of American sociology will be answered by reading a given set of literature written by American sociologists during this period. Gurney has shown that many founders mention Marx or his sociology (HOID, 197). In order to answer this specific question it is necessary to read many of the founders' sociological manuscripts.

The second supplemental question, which founders dealt with the writings of Marx will be answered by examining the context of the monographs written by the founders of sociology. Those authors who mention Marx or cite him in text, footnotes, endnotes, bibliographies, and or reference sections will noted as having at least minimally dealt with Marx's writings. Gurney presented the fact that Cooley, Giddings, Ross, Small, Sumner, and Ward at least consider the work of Karl Marx. Gurney traversed the main works of each of these authors, but limited his studies to the observance of specific terms, Marx, Marxism and socialism. By limiting his study to three terms, Gurney might have missed many of the indirect references to Marx which may have been made.

The question of the founders' treatment of Marx, or their reaction to Marx will be explored in order to understand how certain individuals responded to Marx. Each reference to Marxian concepts should be viewed as independent entities. As a result, each founder can have distinct reactions and responses to different Marxian ideas. Although there was a great diversity of writers during the period, especially those who wrote journal articles, only Cooley, Giddings, Ross, Small, Sumner, and Ward will be studied in this project. Although these were not the only authors of American sociology in the first period, they were the most prolific.³ To better understand the reaction the founders had to Marx's writings, it is necessary to read a variety of their writings.

³It should be noted that the works of Cooley, Giddings, Ross, Small, Sumner and Ward are only one source of academic Marxism in America. During the same period of time in Europe, Marx was highly influential. In fact, much of Weber and Durkheim's work was in response to the writings of Karl Marx. The current project is focusing solely on the manuscripts/books written by Cooley, Giddings, Ross, Small, Sumner and Ward. There is a great deal of literature written in the period from 1883-1915 that will not be covered in the current study. This other set of literature was written by individuals who were at the same institutions as the founders, as well as being at other institutions of similar or lesser prestige. These individuals may have discussed Marx in greater detail than the founders, but might not have had the same affect on the development of American academic sociology. The research project has been limited to manuscripts/books and does not focus

The final question concerns the continuity or discontinuity of Marxian sociology between the founding period of American sociology and current American sociology. Continuity is defined as "1. a continuous (going on without interruption) state or quality, 2. an unbroken, coherent whole" (WNWD, 136). Therefore, discontinuity is a state of interruption, or destruction of coherent structures. Marx's influence can be either fluid and increasing over time, continuous, or there can be interruptions to his influence, discontinuity.

The question of continuity will be answered by discovering whether Marx's influence continuous between the first and second periods of American sociology? Hinkle has shown that the influence of Marx during the second period of American sociology was minimal. The Schwendingers and Bottomore have alluded to the fact that Marx does show up very prominently until the third and fourth generations American sociology. By understanding the first era's orientation and reaction to Marx, the researcher should be able to conclude whether or not Marx's use in American sociology has been continuous or discontinuous over time.

on published articles. It is quite possible that the founders only treatment of Marxian concepts appears in this media. Most manuscripts were used as academic textbooks, which may have placed certain implicit restraints on their work. Restraints which may not have had any impact on their journal writings. Although the articles may more truly represent the founders' individuals positions and persuasions, the articles defined the discipline less than their more institutionalized books and manuscripts.

2.0 Introduction to the Literature

The influence of Marx on American sociology receives little attention, and lacks a highly-developed body of literature. Without such a body of literature, this study must construct a firm foundation for this study from the available information. While it is possible to gain an insightful understanding of the topic of Marx and Marxism in other eras of American sociology from the available literature, there is little literature that directly deals with the influence of Marx and Marxism in the opening era of American sociology.

Even without the help of a large highly-specified body of available literature, the existent literature is appropriate for the proposed project. The most important literature deals with one of three topical areas: (1) the influence of Marx on sociological theory past and present, (2) Marx's influence on specific individuals, and (3) approaches to the qualitatively study of Marx's influence. From this literature, it is possible to develop a theory about Marx's use or disuse within the field of American sociology. The primary sources of literature to be reviewed in this study are: Roscoe Hinkle, Patrick Gurney, Dusky Lee Smith, Ellsworth Fuhrman, Tom Bottomore, William D. Maslow, and Herman and Julia Schwendinger.

2.1 State of Marxian sociology from 1883-1915

Of the three areas covered by the relevant literature, this may be the broadest and most subjective. Hinkle (1980) only mentions Marx and/or Marxian sociology on one page in Founding Theory in American Sociology 1881-1915. Bottomore remarks that there is a strong Marxist influence in the field of sociology in the years from the end of the 19th century until about 1915. After a more careful reading, it becomes clear that this perspective holds true primarily for European sociology. The increasing importance of Marx is visible in Europe during the first era of American sociology, but the state of Marxian sociology in the United States during the same period is not mentioned.

In 1916 Small wrote an article entitled "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States (1865-1915)." In this article, Small alluded to the fact that there was little progress made in American sociological theory derived from Europe, and more specifically Germany (FYSUS, 195). The period from 1883-1915 saw very little translation of Marx into English. As Gouldner explained, the Marx-Engels Institute had published only the first volume of (what was expected to be) the complete works of Marx and Engels in 1927, and it was only in this and later volumes that the definitive texts of Marx's earlier writings were first made available (CCWS, 185).

With little of Marx's work published during this period, many of the available copies were original German versions of his work. With little exception, the founders had little problem reading German. Most, if not all, of the founders were able to read German. Further, Albion Small, William Graham Sumner, Charles H. Cooley and Edward Ross all studied in Germany (NTST, 190; DS, 274; SKA, 187; ASBWW2, 130). German was among the twelve languages Lester Frank Ward had learned (SKA, 76). Although the languages Franklin Giddings learned was not specifically stated, one look at his bibliographies showed that he knew German. Gillin remarked that Giddings had done, "wide readings in European sociological writings" (AMSS, 202-203).

The Schwendingers wrote that "the founders of American sociology were aware of Marxian and non-Marxian socialist ideas" (SC, 279). Although they were aware of the ideas, "there is very little by way of references to Marxism in the early writings to suggest that these sociologists had seriously *come to terms* with Marxism, or even comprehended accurately what Marxism was all about" (SC, 279).⁴

This is in stark contrast to European sociologists around the start of the 20th century. Bottomore contended that "during this decade, Max Weber also began his long, but oblique and episodic, encounter with Marxism" (M:FHY, 104). Further, "in France, similarly, the spread of Marxist thought evoked a response from Durkheim" (M:FHY, 105). Gouldner asserted that Marx very definitively shaped the theories of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto, "had there been no Marx, the emphases and character of the work of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Vilfredo Pareto would have been vastly different" (CCWS, 447).

The apparent lack of sociological discussion of Marx and his work in the United States, as well as the difference in sociology between Europe and America during the era from 1883-1915, allow me to bring forth the question of exactly what impact Marx had on sociology during this period.

2.2 Marx's Influence on Individual Sociologists

Although the last section attempted to show that there was no systematic study of Marx in American sociology from 1883-1915, some individuals studied Marx. Marx's influence at least minimally affected the founders of American academic sociology

⁴Unless otherwise noted, all marks for emphasis were made in the original texts.

(ASCD, 260 and 263; HOID, 197-198). Smith discussed the intellectual traditions of the founders of American sociology, and maintained that these sociologists did not promote 'radical' solutions to what they saw as the major problems of their day. They rejected socialism, Marxism, and anarchism-intellectual traditions that were well established in the Western world" (SRCC, 68).

She argued that some founders rejected Marxism more fervently than others; moreover, none of the founders were by any means Marxists.

Among the founders that reacted to Marx and/or his literature, few responses were generated, and even less was flattering. Gurney wrote that:

Ward referred to Marx by name twice . . . Sumner's work contains one brief passing citation of *Das Kapital* . . . In all of Giddings's writings there are only six references to Marx but none to his literature . . . the works of Cooley, Ross, and Small exhibit rare and brief treatment of Marx and his literature (HOID, 197).

This excerpt expressed that fact of the manuscripts studied, there was only meager response to Marx during the first era of American sociology, at least among the founders. Unfortunately, Albion Small wrote most of the positive statements made about Marx, of which there were few. Small and Giddings penned most of the neutral reactions, and at times, all six founders commented negatively (HOID, 197-8).

An early conclusion would be to ask why one would study Marx's influence on American sociology since Gurney has already written about the types and amount of responses/reactions to Marx. Gurney necessarily limited his research to the texts which directly mention Marx, Marxism or socialism. Therefore, Gurney had few resources to look at, two of Charles H. Cooley's three major manuscripts, and none of his articles, six of which appeared in the American Journal of Sociology during the time frame set by Gurney (AJS). For Franklin H. Giddings, he cited only five manuscripts, and again no articles. For Ross, Gurney analyzed only three manuscripts and one journal article. Gurney, studied only one book, two articles, and three book reviews written by Albion Small. Gurney examined three of Lester F. Ward's books, and two articles. Possibly the biggest travesty of all was that Gurney cited only one book of William Graham Sumner's essays. Gurney barely scratched the surface of the information that exists in the other writings available for each author.

Gurney professed that he only examined the books of the seven authors for references to Marx, Marxism, or socialism (HOID, 197). The proposed research would expand on this limited examination of Marx to study the manuscripts/books of each author

for all possible connections (direct and indirect) to the writings of Karl Marx. Although the present study will not focus on the articles the founders wrote, all their books will be studied in detail.

The time frame Gurney used is another short-coming of his work, even though he has good justification for choosing the time period of 1895-1920. In contrast, I am following the periodicization scheme given in Hinkle's Founding theory of American Sociology, American Sociological Theory, World War I-World War II and "Toward Periodicization of the History of Sociological Theory in the U.S.," and Fuhrman's The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883-1915. Hinkle wrote extensively about delineating periods for American sociology. Although Hinkle's work vacillates on the beginning date of the first period, 1881 or 1883, he professed that "a 'founding period' of theory extended from about 1883 to about 1915" (PHST, 86). The majority of Fuhrman's work uses 1883 as the opening date of sociology in the United States. These dates reflect the changes in the greater American society. The first era of American academic sociology was driven by the existence of the progressive era.

The problem of discerning the influence Marx had upon first era American founding sociologists can be at least partially solved by reading the manuscripts of each of the founders. It is imperative to remember that some of Marx's writings were more accessible than others. Possibly of greater importance, Sutherland stresses the fact that: early American sociologists read European sociology, but in a selective fashion. What they gleaned from such sources varied from what the Europeans understood about their work. That such reading was not widespread in part accounts for the lack of influence Europeans exerted on at least significant numbers of early American sociologists (WNRES, 41). In order to best understand Marx's influence on the American founders of academic sociology, it is necessary to read most of the major sociological manuscripts these founders wrote between 1883-1915.

2.3 Qualitative Studies

The majority of literature, relevant to the present study, employs qualitative methods. More specifically, Hinkle and Gurney qualitatively use the content analysis of historical documents to make their arguments and suggest their conclusions. Maslow used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to study the prevalence of Marx in academic textbooks. To answer the present study's research questions, it is necessary to merge the qualitative approaches implemented by the authors. Gurney wrote about the

response to Marx by first era American sociologists, but limited himself to looking for only three key words, Marx, Marxism, and socialism. In contrast, Hinkle has done period studies of American sociology. Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881-1915 and American Sociological Theory, World War I-World War II overviews of the first two periods of American sociology. His other book, The Development of Modern Sociology, written with Gisela J. Hinkle, is the approximation of an introduction to his later volumes. Maslow studied sociology texts from 1890-1965. Although he found that Marx was discussed in the first era, his range of dates went from 1890-1924. Without having access to the titles or publication dates, it is impossible to know how many were actually published prior to 1916. These books have given a well defined overview as to the general state of American sociological theory in both periods. It is from the work of Gurney and Hinkle that the current research project derives its qualitative methodology.

Hinkle's manuscripts, Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881-1915 and American Sociological Theory, World War I - World War II, provide a more than adequate foundation for the qualitative study of the trends and patterns which occur in American sociological theory. From these trends and patterns the current research is striving to find support for the previously stated assumption. Hinkle explains that: this inquiry into the nature of social-sociological theory during a particular time-span in American sociology adopts the same basic objective, the same primary focus of ideas, similarly accepts the indispensability of periodicization and employs the same analytic-classificatory-periodicizing scheme as did its predecessor Founding Theory of American Sociology (AST 12/1).

By focusing on ideas in both volumes, Hinkle is able to generalize about the entire era he is studying. Although the primary focus is different, a similar classificatory-periodicizing scheme will be employed.

The current research centers on one figure's integration into American sociology in the founding era, and can be accomplished in a manner similar to the way in which Hinkle has done his work. Hinkle describes what will be studied in the following way, "it will become imperative to investigate the concrete content of their volumes to ascertain what the major themes, issues, or concerns are and how they are organized and presented" (FTAS, 54). The present study will analyze the manuscripts/books written by the academic founders of American sociology to understand their reactions and discussions of Marx during the opening era of American academic sociology. In a sense, this project is using history to further develop theory (TMSH, 1).

Hinkle does his investigation by studying books, monographs, and articles published during a defined period of time. He studied these publications so that he could study the continuity or lack thereof

to determine the discontinuities, it has been necessary to examine the content of the professional literature (i.e., journals and monographs). Such examination can yield evidence of the influential-impact of theoretical positions from other disciplines in the U.S. and of the views of European figures (AST, 12/1-2).

The present research will strive for the same sort of goals with a more narrow focus.

Although Hinkle's work adequately describes the theoretical foci of each prevailing period in American sociology, he does not give priority to a "famous person" study. A "famous person" focus is not within the scope of his research, but is not dismissed as being unimportant. Hinkle maintains that this sort of research has its own place in the study of sociological theory, but his priorities do not include this type of investigation (PHST, FTAS, AST). Hinkle's works are the main methodological foundation of the present study. His work shows the importance of studying the literature of a certain period in order to make decisions about the prevalence of certain ideas and issues. My derivation is to study the literature of American sociology during the opening era for references to the work of Karl Marx. Karl Marx's prevalence and influence upon the founders of American academic sociology will be determined by reading and analyzing the founder's works written between 1883-1915.

Maslow undertook a major study of sociology text books spanning most of the eras of American academic sociology (1890-1965). He used both quantitative and qualitative methods in his study. The study was deficient from the standpoint that his procedures "consisted of an examination of the author and/or subject index of each of these texts for references to Marx and/or Marxian theory" (ASCD, 258). Although he stated that spot checks were done to determine slippage, the only true way to recognize deficiencies is to read the entire text.

Gurney also undertakes a qualitative study of the "early sociologists reactions to Marx (which are relatively accessible) contained in publications (both books and periodicals) from the past" (HOID, 197). Gurney confines his study to seven major figures in the first period of American sociology. The present study will implement a broader focus than Gurney's earlier study. Although he studies an assortment books and periodicals, the current researcher will study six founders of American academic sociology in greater detail. Although there were dozens of other individuals writing sociology in the

1883-1915 period, six of the founders had the greatest impact on the future of sociology. Gurney knows that his study is of limited scope, and encourages others to study Marx. "This work needs to be performed for the founding era of American sociology. By studying the past, contemporary sociology will better understand itself, particularly its ideological aspect" (HOID, 201).

With a firm foundation for the qualitative analysis of Marx's influence on the founding era of sociology, the present study will proceed to find out whether Marx was more often studied by those founders at universities in the Midwest. Another goal of this research is to discuss the development of academic Marxian sociology in the United States. This entire section attempted to show the known written accomplishments within the field of Marxian sociology, and to give a firm foundation from which to build the current research project.

3.0 Methodology

The current study attempts to qualitatively support the theory that the founders of the Midwest were more likely to deal with the writings and concepts of Karl Marx than were the founders of the East Coast. This exploratory analysis will study the content of the founders manuscripts/books which were written between 1883 and 1915. I will attempt to support this theory by addressing the questions of Marx's prevalence, the extent to which Marx's works and concepts were addressed, the treatment/reaction to Marx, and the development of an academic Marxian sociology in the United States.

The basic orientation of the study is qualitative for the fact that historical documents will be read and discussed in order to support the main premise of the study. Babbie defines qualitative analysis as

the nonnumerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships.

This is the most typical of field research and historical research" (PSR, G6).

The present research attempts to discover the relationship between Marx and founding American sociologists through the analysis of historical documents. These historical documents are one's which the founders had published in the first era of American sociology, 1883-1915 (SKA, PHST, AST and FTAS). The project will give first-hand information as to the extent and position of Marx in the opening era of American sociology.

The study will begin by reading the major American sociological manuscripts written by the founders for the period, 1883-1915. Certain portions of the text will be marked for possible discussions of Marx, his works and/or concepts. The development of academic Marxian sociology in the United States will be discussed as each supplemental question is addressed.

Books/monographs written by the six founders of American sociology will be the only set of literature analyzed in the present study. The sociological book/monograph population for the period of 1883-1915 is fairly large; therefore, the current study will take a purposive sample of the relevant books/monographs.⁵

The authors included in the sample were selected after consulting other relevant literature, which has shown that certain individuals are key to studying American sociology from 1883-1915. The individuals included in this study are considered to be the most

⁵As has been stated previously, the documents utilized in this project represent only one source from which academic Marxian sociology could have been developed.

prominent to the founding and early institutionalization of American sociology.⁶ The unit of analysis for the present study will be each book/monograph. These books were written in the time frame of 1883 - 1915, the first era of American sociology (SKA, IDEAS, PHST, AST and FTAS). In order to lend support to the central premise of the study, the individual manuscript is the preferred unit of analysis.

The books written by William G. Sumner (1840-1910), Lester F. Ward (1841-1913), Franklin H. Giddings (1855-1931), Albion W. Small (1854-1926), Edward A. Ross (1866-1951), and Charles H. Cooley (1864-1929) will be the sources analyzed for this exploratory analysis. These six sociologists were chosen after conferring with texts that discussed sociology in the United States during the era from 1883-1915. Roscoe Hinkle discusses all six aforementioned sociologists in Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881 - 1915. Ellsworth Fuhrman examines the same six individuals in The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883- 1915 and "Images of the Discipline in Early American Sociology." Don Martindale addresses the same founders in his article "American Sociology before World War II." Charles Page writes on the six previously mentioned founders in his book Class and American Sociology: From Ward to Ross. In "Historical Origins of Ideological Denial: The Case of Marx in American Sociology," Patrick Gurney mentions all six sociologists, and includes one additional member, Charles A. Ellwood, to the list. I decided to go with the majority consensus of six early American sociologists.

Hinkle asserts that these individuals were the "major figures of early American sociology" (FTAS, x). Fuhrman maintains that these six sociologists, occupied positions at the important centers of graduate training: Brown, Yale, Columbia, Wisconsin, Chicago, and Michigan. In addition, they each served as president of the American Sociological Association⁷ (SKA, xviii).

Fuhrman also claims that

the role of sociology at that time was not taken-for-granted. These early sociologists had to make clear the value of sociology. In this sense, their arguments about the uses of sociology had to be made explicit (IDEAS, 93).

These early sociologists were the trailblazers in the opening era of American sociology, and their influence upon the discipline had a strong and lasting effect.

⁶More will be stated about the authors later in this section.

⁷Originally, the American Sociological Association began as the American Sociological Society. The association changed its name to the former after the derogatory comments that were associated with the moniker ASS.

The books of interest to the study were published in the era of 1883-1915. Specifically, the books to be analyzed are:⁸

Charles H. Cooley's

Human Nature and the Social Order (1902)
Social Organization (1909)
Sociological Theory and Social Research (1930)⁹

Franklin H. Giddings'

Democracy and Empire (1900)
The Elements of Sociology (1898)
Inductive Sociology (1901)
The Principles of Sociology (1896)
Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology (1906)

Edward A. Ross's

Changing America (1909)
The Changing Chinese (1911)
Foundations of Sociology (1905)
The Old World in the New (1914)
Sin and Society (1907)
Social Control (1901)
Social Psychology (1908)

Albion W. Small's

Adam Smith and Modern Sociology (1907)
Between Eras from Capitalism to Democracy (1913)
The Cameralists (1909)
General Sociology (1905)

⁸This list has been compiled from the sources referenced by Ellsworth Fuhrman in The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883-1915, and Patrick Gurney's "Historical Origins of Ideological Denial: The Case of Marx in American Sociology".

⁹Although this book was published after 1915, four of the articles within this book were written before 1915.

Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1890)¹⁰
The Meaning of Social Science (1910)
An Introduction to the Study of Society written with George E. Vincent(1894)

William G. Sumner's

The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays (1914)
Collected Essays in Political and Social Science (1885)¹¹
Earth Hunger and Other Essays (1913)
Folkways (1906)
War and Other Essays (1911)
What Social Classes Owe to Each Other (1883)

Lester F. Ward's

Applied Sociology (1906)
Dynamic Sociology (1883)
Outlines of Sociology (1897)
The Psychic Factors of Civilization (1892)
Pure Sociology (1903)

The individuals mentioned above are not the only ones who wrote about sociology in the opening American era, but they are the most prominent and central characters to the institutionalization of sociology as an academic discipline. By limiting the sources to the collective founders of American academic sociology, the books will be more accessible than the manuscripts of less well known academicians writing during the same era.

In order to determine the content of each source, they will be read in full. Through the use of qualitative methods, the context will be determined. The quality, not quantity, of

¹⁰This text was unavailable through the Newman Library at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Further, interlibrary loan was unable to find another library which held the volume.

¹¹This volume was in the special collection at Newman Library because it was extremely brittle. Inter-library loan would not order this volume because it physically existed in the library. Since Albion Small's Introduction to the Science of Society was unavailable, I deleted both volumes from the present study.

appearances is of importance for the current study. It then becomes possible to identify the prevalence of Marx in the first era of American sociology through historical document analysis.

Notes will be taken on each book to ensure that all important data is collected. The notes will take the form of either physically writing down all the important information, or photocopying pertinent pages, and will be examined to understand the relationship between Marx and first era American sociology. The relationship will be described in terms of who specifically mentions Marx, the treatment of Marx in the text, where reference to Marx or his work occurs in the text (within the text itself, footnotes, end-notes, and/or references), and what works of Marx are mentioned.

After analyzing each source, a conclusion as to the prevalence and type of influence Marx had on opening era American sociology will be made. These results will allow me to decide the general reception of Marx, which founders dealt most with Marx's writings, and the development of academic Marxian sociology in the United States. From the overall treatment/reaction to Marx, the influence of Marx in the opening era will be determined. From this information, I will attempt to lend support to the theory that founders at Midwestern schools were more likely to deal with Marx than founders from the East Coast because they were more progressive, populist, and reformist.

4.0 William Graham Sumner and Lester Frank Ward

William Graham Sumner and Lester Frank Ward are the first set of American founders to be addressed. These individuals were both born in the 1840s. William G. Sumner was born on October 30th, 1840 in Patterson, New Jersey. Lester F. Ward was born on June 18th, 1841, in Joliet, Illinois. William Graham Sumner is the eldest son of English born parents, Thomas Sumner and Sarah Graham.¹² In the year after his birth, his father explored Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York before settling in Connecticut. In the fall of 1859, he attended Yale university. He graduated with honors from Yale in the spring of 1863. With the help of a classmate's brother, he was able to buy exemption from military duty, and head to Europe. In April of 1864, he attended Göttingen, while there, Sumner became close friends with a group of students studying Hegel. Although he became close friends, Sumner stated that "I never caught the Hegelian fever." In 1866, he was elected tutor at Yale. He returned to the United States in autumn and began his tutoring. On December 27, 1867, Sumner was ordained as a deacon in the Protestant Episcopal church at Trinity Church in New Haven. In 1871, while in Morristown, William Graham Sumner married Jeannie Whittemore Eliot. In the summer of 1872, Sumner was elected to the faculty of Yale College. He returned to New Haven in September of 1872 to carry out his duties as Chair of Political and Social Science. He remained at Yale until his death in 1910.

Although unpopular among many of his contemporaries, he was elected president of the American Sociological Society for the years 1908 and 1909. In sociology, his major contribution was the terms of folkways and mores. By the time of his death in 1910, Sumner knew more than 12 languages, wrote several books, and even more essays.

Lester F. Ward was the youngest of ten children born to Justus and Silence Ward.¹³ Early in adolescence, Ward began to literally devour books, and had a fondness for foreign languages. At sixteen, Ward attempted to support himself through work. In

¹²The sketch of William Graham Sumner is based on the following sources: E. Fuhrman, The Sociology of Knowledge in America, 1883-1915; H. Odum, American Sociology; C. Page, Class and American Sociology; W.G. Sumner, "Autobiographical Sketch of William Graham Sumner," in A. Keller and M. Davie (eds.), Earth Hunger and Other Essays; and A. Keller "Sketch of William Graham Sumner," in W.G. Sumner, The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays, edited b A. Keller.

¹³The biographical portrait of Lester F. Ward is based on Ellsworth Fuhrman's The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883-1915, and Howard Odum's American Sociology and American Masters of Social Science.

1861, Ward attended Susquehanna Collegiate Institute. After one year, he enlisted in the Union Army during the Civil War. He married his childhood sweetheart, Elizabeth Vought, only days before leaving for active duty in the Union Army. He served for twenty-seven months, before being wounded three times in the battle of Chancellorsville.

After being discharged from the army, Ward went to work in the U.S. government for the next forty years. He began night studies at Columbian University¹⁴ in 1865. He received a B.A. in 1869, a bachelor of Laws degree in 1871, a diploma in medicine, a M.A. in 1872, and in 1897 was given an honorary doctor's degree. His academic career began in 1906 at Brown University.

Before beginning an academic career, Ward was elected president of the Institut International de Sociologie from 1900 to 1903. In 1906 he was elected as the first president of the American Sociological Society, and was re-elected in 1907. He remained at Brown University until his death in 1913.

4.1 Analysis of William Graham Sumner's Writings

The works to be studied include; What Social Classes Owe to Each Other (1883), Folkways (1906), War and Other Essays (1911), Earth Hunger and Other Essays (1913), and The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays (1914). The three books of essays were edited posthumously by Albert G. Keller. The Science of Society (1927), authored by Sumner and Keller, was mainly written by Albert Keller. Although it is constructed from the notes and lectures of Sumner, it is impossible to determine whether certain portions of the text were written by Sumner, or Keller attempting to clarify and expand upon the notions of Sumner. Becker and Barnes state that this treatise explains not only Sumner's system, but also Keller's (STLS, 957). Because the authorship of this manuscript is ambiguous, it will not be analyzed in this study.

4.1.1 What Social Classes Owe to Each Other

What Social Classes Owe to Each Other is a small volume written by Sumner approximately ten years after joining the faculty at Yale. This book discussed the social problem of class from the perspective of pondering whether any social class does indeed owe anything to any other class. Further, this book looked at whether any social class can demand anything from other classes, and whether "the State" owes anything (12).

¹⁴Columbian University is now known as George Washington University.

Sumner began the manuscript with a discussion of poverty. Sumner viewed not only the poor, but also the laborers in this class of poverty. He contended that "these classes are sometimes discontented, and sometimes not" (13). In Sumner's view, these individuals blame themselves little for their position in society. Rather, they blame other individuals and societies for the "wrongs" committed against them.

This discussion of class rights led directly into Sumner's first use of a Marxian notion.

Now, if there are groups of people who have a claim to the people's labor and self-denial, and if there are other people whose labor and self-denial are liable to be claimed by the first groups, then there certainly are "classes," and classes of the oldest and most vicious type (15).

Although this statement is highly general and neutral in demeanor, it confirmed, at least partially, Marx's notion that conflict between classes has occurred throughout history. After this comment, Sumner continued into the notion that there is no escape from this worst type of class conception.

Sumner then indicted Marx, among others, with being "friends of the working class." Although early in the text, it was possible to see Sumner's belief that individual efforts were unneeded, for people's positions in society were determined by their own efforts.

It is very popular to pose as a "friend of Humanity," or a "friend of the working classes." . . . It is borrowed from England, where some men, otherwise of small account have assumed it with great success and advantage. Anything which has a charitable sound and a kind-hearted tone generally passes without investigation, because it is disagreeable to assail it. . . .that clergymen, economists, and social philosophers have a technical and professional duty to devise schemes for "helping the poor" (16-17).

This passage attempted to discredit the necessity for such individuals. Sumner believed that "the impoverished have brought their situation on themselves" (NTST, 166). The mimicking of Marx and Marxian notions was used by Sumner to begin his attempt to discredit the notion that the rich social classes owe anything to the poor, weak, and working classes.¹⁵

¹⁵Sumner believed that there was no wrong in being rich because all individuals were free to make their own decisions. Those individuals who have not made it in amongst the rich should not blame others for their failure, for they had free will, and further everyone began with equal opportunities. Sumner espoused the notion that being rich is not criminal, but

Although not mentioned by name, Sumner addressed Marx among the group of writers who know not what capital is. "Capital' is denounced by writers and speakers who have never taken the trouble to find out what capital is, and who use the word in two or three different senses in as many pages" (45-46). This negative statement toward Marx and others strived to discredit the notion that capital is bad, and should not be accumulated by a few individuals. In Sumner's view, those individuals who have accumulated capital should be praised, not chastised for their success.

Sumner fought the idea that the question of quality and quantity of men is of great importance. The fact that man should and cannot rely upon anyone else to take care of himself is a more pressing issue. Sumner had faith that people who wanted to succeed would, no matter what stood in their way. Thus individuals must fend for themselves.¹⁶

Once again, Sumner came to the defense of capitalists. He saw that modern government was influenced by those of wealth, and this was to be expected. What Sumner did not appreciate was the fact that those of lower classes were attempting to change government without "paying the price of industry and economy" (101). As a lead into this topic of discussion, Sumner wrote

the history of the human race is one long story of attempts by certain persons and classes to obtain control of the power of the State, so as to win earthly gratifications at the expense of others (101).

I bring this forward for the fact that this opening sounds very similar to another rallying cry, that of Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto.

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes (MR, 23).

that those who want to limit people's earning power is criminal. In defense of this position, Sumner claimed that those who denounce capital should take the time to understand what capital is.

¹⁶Sumner asserted that no one comes to the defense of employers, but many come to the defense of employees. Sumner held that just as there are overly demanding employers, so to are there slothful/lazy employees, being of approximately equal proportion, thus it is illogical to defend either group while sacrificing the other.

Sumner, although not mentioning a change in the government, did state that conflicting classes of interest would try gain control of government.

Throughout the book, Sumner maintained *laissez faire* doctrines and adhered to the old adages of "if you want something done, do it yourself," and "mind your own business." Sumner also concluded that there was a certain unconsidered class of individuals which had no one speaking on their behalf, and were forced to do something for another class of individuals. He called this the case of the "Forgotten Man." The individuals who fell into this category were continuously productive members of society, but were not respected by those in class positions above or below them. These individuals had no voice, and were constantly the brunt of social evils committed by higher and lower classes.

Sumner maintained that "we have now seen that the current discussions about the claims and rights of social classes on each other are radically erroneous and fallacious" (166). He argued that no social class should claim rights over another group, and concluded that:

in the prosecution of these chance we all owe to each other good-will, mutual respect, and mutual guarantees of liberty and security. Beyond this nothing can be affirmed as a duty of one group to another in a free state (168-169).

4.1.2 Folkways

Sumner began Folkways under the premise that "men begin with acts, not with thoughts" (2). Folkways emerged as individuals do things the same way, and "the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena. Instincts were developed in connection with them. In this way folkways arise" (2). Folkways were a societal force because it affected each and every individuals. Unconsciously, humans set folkways into motion, a reaction Sumner likened to the way nature changes and reacts.

The folkways are subject to "the strain of improvement towards better adaptation of means to ends," and the "strain of consistency with each other" (5). The folkways exist as a result of man's need to satisfy and control demons, ghosts, and the otherworld itself.

In-group versus out-group is an important distinction for Sumner. In primitive societies, the stronger and tighter knit an in-group, the higher the intensity of fighting with the out-group. Ethnocentricity grows out of the in-group out-group feeling. In modern society, ethnocentrism is elevated to patriotism, but when patriotism degenerates, it becomes the individual vice of chauvinism. Throughout time there have been four basic human motives: hunger, love (sex passion), vanity, and fear. The fulfillment of these motives through cooperation produced folkways.

The folkways are unconscious, spontaneous, uncoordinated. It is never known who led in devising them, although we must believe that talent exerted its leadership at all times. Folkways come into existence now all the time" (19).

The foundation of mores begins in folkways. Mores are "capable of producing influences, developing into new forms, and extending their constructive influence over men and society" (30). Mores are diverse in nature, to the extent that "each class or group in a society has its own mores" (39). For Sumner, mores are upheld by the masses in society; consequently, institutions arise and are directed by the leaders of the masses. Sumner defined institutions as "a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure" (53).

After discussion what mores consist of, Sumner more clearly defines mores as:

the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them (59).

Folkways and mores help define the group as individualized and differentiated from other groups by specific character traits.

Sumner argued that mores were facts that people learn unconsciously throughout life. Mores were unwritten codes which a society lives by, and can be persistent or changing in character. Although "a stroke of the pen" may change a group's status in society, it disrupts their mores and relations with others. If mores are old or evil in nature, they can be corrected.

Sumner then lost himself in an anthropological/archeological study of artifacts and the cultural facts which surrounded certain societies. He believed that parallelism occurred rather than acculturation because weapon and tool making were invented and reinvented by people. Sumner discussed the use of language among "ancient" groups to show that language was developed in folkways, but then the folkways were molded, shaped, and changed from dialect to dialect and language to language. His discussion of money described the attributes and uses of certain items for inter- and intra- group exchange. Sumner concluded "The Struggle for Existence," by stating that "the struggle for existence takes on many different forms and produces phenomena which are cases of folkways" (157).

Sumner next examined the ideas of labor and wealth. The notion that labor was menial and inferior to a life of thought and contemplation belonged to the classical and medieval periods of history. For Sumner, only modern times have come to accept the necessity of labor. In this section on labor and wealth, he defended the economic theory of *laissez faire*. Sumner also introduced the use of the term bourgeoisie, but not in defense or

criticism of the Marxian notion. The term is used in reference to D'Avenel's (1894, 1898) view of a bourgeoisie. In relation to mores and folkways, Sumner contended that the mores change to conform to the existing life conditions.

Sumner was convinced that any society was able to select the type of government rule, fashion, use of language, and standards of normality which could exist at any certain time. Although society was in control of making decisions about their life condition, the church exerted their influence over society to choose what was deemed moral. Further, Sumner expounded about the persecution of certain peoples in societies throughout time. More specifically, Sumner theorized that Latin Christianity was the only great religion to punish witchcraft with "great torture and painful death" (260).

In "Abortion, Infanticide, Killing the Old," Sumner theorized that adults in their prime of life bared all of society's burdens, one of which was caring for the young and the old. This raised the issue of society's decision about an individual's right to life. The decision about the young and the elderly was not arbitrary, rather, it was regulated by the folkways of society. Through the use of ethnography, Sumner went on to demonstrate how society affected individual decisions about abortion and infanticide. Abortion and infanticide "never got strength in the mores of Christianity until each of those acts was regarded as a high religious crime because the child died unbaptized" (321). The aged were caught in a dialectic which maintained their status as societal burdens and also the need to respect them for their age and wisdom.

Sumner strongly believed that sex mores were "one of the greatest and most important divisions of the mores" (342).¹⁷ The reason for this belief was that sex permeated the relations of men and women and even most institutions. The sexes differed almost completely, except in regard to reproduction. Sumner theorized that marriage was not an institution, unlike the family.¹⁸ The reason for this hypothesis was that the family "was antecedent to marriage" (349). Further, he focused on the issues of endogamy versus exogamy, matriarchy versus patriarchy, and the evolution of patriarchy.

In trying to define what immorality was, Sumner concluded that it consisted of anything that worked in contradiction to existing mores. He then turned the discussion to

¹⁷Under the topic of sex mores, Sumner compared the mores of different cultures.

¹⁸Sumner stated that marriage had always been "made and developed by the mores" (396). Further, he compared different cultures in relation to how marriage was treated. Although different vocations and people had an important impact on marriage throughout time, the clergy of different religions of his day had the greatest affect on marriage and its correlates.

the topics of chastity, decency and propriety. For Sumner, all these characteristics of human life had an existence independent of all the other characteristics. The level of existence for any of these customs differed by society. Many of the customs and symbols existed in relation to chastity, decency and propriety. For Sumner, these and the senses of honor, common sense and conscience were all part of the social codes, which directly influenced public morality.

Incest owed its existence to the folkways, and was regulated by group mores and/or laws. For Sumner, the primitive taboo against incest occurred because inbreeding's affect was observed. Through the use of ethnographic examples, he attempted to show that "incest has a wider definition and stricter compulsion in great tribes, and in prosperity or wealth, than small groups and poverty" (483). Sumner extrapolated from the ethnographic studies that the mores which regulate incest were not universal or uniform. He argued that protection from situations like incest must be done out of necessity, not superstition or tradition.

Kinship was believed to be the primary interest of men, and was reinforced through a spiritual belief in blood revenge and by the supernatural for wrongful death. Blood revenge also reinforced the notion of in-group versus out-group. At a certain point in history, the ties of kinship became secondary to more institutional ties like religion.

Criminal law originated when the government of a group attempted to regulate and control revenge. The mores of any given society had the ability to right wrongs. In this sense, upholding the mores in a given society was viewed as law enforcement. Enforcement of mores helped uphold a society's standards, and stopped individuals from doing things society considered wrong.

Literature and sports mirrored the mores and ideals of the group. Drama and literature helped enforce the mores, many times by depicting what might happen if people deviated from the mores and folkways. Recreation, drama, and exhibitions also helped reinforce the religious beliefs of society, and entertained "uneducated" tastes. Books and plays mimicked and explained the life of different people's in a given society; thus, for Sumner, literature was one passageway to the past. He felt that all amusements needed to be controlled and regulated by a well-educated and informed taste.

Sumner believed that asceticism, or self-discipline, in one era may become a virtue in another era. Again he ethnographically described what standards of asceticism certain societies and cultures held. He argued that the church maintained and upheld the

importance of asceticism until the sixteenth century. Sumner believed that the decline of the ascetic was linked to the rise of rationalism which in time changed into societal mores.

Education was partially justified on the grounds that genius was important to society, but it was impossible to know who had it until they were educated. For Sumner, education positively instilled individual success and group strength, but negatively, education molded all individuals the same way. "Education of the critical faculty is the only education of which it can be truly said that it makes good citizens" (633).

Sumner completed the book with several sections which could stand alone and independent of all others, and these sections were expanded upon in later essays. The book did not contain a summarizing section, but finished the same way he finished all other chapters. The text itself had no discussion of Marxian concepts, so no further detailed discussion is necessary for this manuscript.

4.1.3 War and Other Essays

War and Other Essays was the first of a series of collected essays written by Sumner and edited by Albert Keller. The essays within this book fall into three main categories.

Of the first seven all but one are products of the last years of Professor Sumner's life, and all but two were published in 1909 and 1910; the next group (five) run between 1887 and 1894 and have to do chiefly with the practical applications of sociological principles to problems of the time; the following four come between 1896 and 1900, all bearing upon the "predominant issue" of that period, imperialism (xxv-xxvi).

The title essay, "War," focused on describing what effect war had on humankind throughout history. Sumner concluded that war and conflict occurred when one group or society had something desired by another group or society. Further, Sumner asserted that "war arises from the competition of life, not from the struggle for existence" (9). Sumner professed that peace was important to some societies, in contrast to other societies which focused on war. Thus "what we prepare for is what we shall get" (40).

"The Family and Social Change" focuses on the institution of the family, and its existent members. Over time, mankind evolved from matriarchy to patriarchy, but change has not disappeared from this institution. Although the family is not the central character in society, there is no "cause for alarm." "The family has to a great extent lost its position as a conservative institution and has become a field for social change" (61).

"The Status of Women in Chaldea, Egypt, India, Judea, and Greece to the Time of Christ" and "Witchcraft" were both intended to be chapters in Folkways. "The Status of Women" is an ethnographic essay based on literature written about this time period. "Witchcraft" was an excellent view of the position and persecution of witches in different societies throughout time. Within this essay, Sumner theorized that witchcraft was not dead, but became manifest at different times throughout history. Sumner professed that witchcraft would become manifest "if bad times should come again upon the civilized world, through overpopulation and an unfavorable economic conjuncture, popular education would decline and classes would be more widely separated" (126).

"Religion and the Mores" defended the argument that mores gave birth to and control religion. Sumner focused on the evolution of mores and Christianity. A second essay on mores, entitled "The Mores of the Present and the Future," built upon the previous essay. Sumner stated that "the great utility of studying the origin and history of the mores would be to form judgments about their present status and future tendency" (149). Although he did not predict what mores would exist in the future, he believed that mores would evolve parallel to society. Both essays focused on narrow explanations of the term *mores*.

"Sociology" (1881) was Sumner's argument for the legitimation of the discipline as a science. Sumner defined sociology as "the science of life in society" (167). Sumner was not as comfortable as Spencer in his belief that sociology was the most advanced and most complicated of all sciences, but upheld this position. Sumner outlined the bounds of sociology in this essay, and was quick to define many problems and phenomena as falling under the heading of sociology. Even though Sumner admitted that sociology was still an underdeveloped science, he also stated that "there are, however, not more than two or three other sciences which are making as rapid progress as sociology, and there is no other which is as full of promise for the welfare of man" (191).

Sumner described the purpose of his essay, "State Interference," in the one sentence statement, "I desire, in this paper, to give an explanation and justification of extreme prejudice against State interference" (213). Both this and a second article, "Do We Want Industrial Peace?" were written in defense of *laissez-faire* doctrines.

"On the Case of a Certain Man Who is Never Thought Of" and "The Case of the Forgotten Man Further Considered" are both taken directly from What Social Classes Owe to Each Other. It is for this reason that I will not discuss them here.

"The Proposed Dual Organization of Mankind" focused on the effect of colonization both on the colonizing and the colonized countries. He believed that both initially prospered materially and culturally from colonization. Secondly, in the case of America's revolution against Great Britain, again both prospered because colonization burdened the colonizing country, and America helped lift the burden from Great Britain. "The Fallacy of Territorial Extension" related the fact that the acquirement of new land was also a burden. For Sumner, civilized states could not avoid colonization and territorial extension. "They are the penalty of greatness because they are the duties of it" (292).

"The Conquest of the United States by Spain" promoted Sumner's view that Spain violated the United States. Not only did Spain impinge on our liberty, but also violated the United States right to self government. The essay criticized the citizenry of America for believing that "we have taken our place now amongst the nations of the earth by virtue of this war" (334).

The final essay "Our Colleges before the Country" focused on the fact that older universities must join the new system of education. Sumner's main point was that although the new education system was important for universities to adhere to, classical training could not be left behind.

In this volume there was no reference to Marx and/or Marxism either directly or indirectly. Although his essay, "The Absurd Nature," is written about notions of utopia, there was no link to any specific work. Secondly, some essays mentioned topics such as the division of labor, capitalists, and socialism, but none were specific to any Marxian notion.

4.1.4 Earth Hunger and Other Essays

After the response from the publishers, it became necessary to create at least one more volume of Sumner's more obscure and inaccessible papers. This volume is also split into three main sections: liberty, fantasies and facts, and democracy. Many of these articles are shorter in length, and may be dealt with in a more combined fashion.

The first two articles, "Autobiographical Sketch of William Graham Sumner" and "The Teacher's Unconscious Success" focus entirely upon the life, recollections, and laments of William Graham Sumner's life. "The Scientific Attitude of Mind" is written about what science is and why the scientific method is important. This was an address given to the "initiates of the Sigma Xi Society" (17).

"Earth Hunger or the Philosophy of Land Grabbing" takes a historical view of the use and purpose of land. Additionally, "Earth hunger is the wildest craving of modern nations" (51). Earth hunger is a powerful social force which causes nations to war, and boundaries to be drawn and redrawn.

"Purposes and Consequences" looks at some of the issues surrounding the difference between these two concepts, and clarifies their role in the study of sociology. Purposes are of the mind, whereas consequences are social facts, the matter of study for the science of society. The essays "Rights" and "Equality" are focused upon as sociologically storable concepts. For Sumner, rights are "rules of the game of social competition which are current now and here" (83). Equality is an ideal toward which individuals strain, and exists in the mores of society. "The First Steps toward a Millennium" is an essay about the social policies and reform which will determine the direction and fate of human civilization. These essays lead into the first main section, liberty.

"What is Civil Liberty?" is the opening essay in this section. The purpose of the introductory essay is to show that liberty is the least well analyzed of all the important social conceptions, that it is the thing at stake in the most important controversies, and that it needs to be defended as much against those who abuse it as against those who deride it (109).

In the next essay, "Is Liberty a Lost Blessing," Sumner points out that liberty may have changed by definition, but liberty still exists. In this essay Sumner contests the idea that liberty is associated with lawlessness and normlessness, and was never historically apparent in this context. The rest of the article is written as evidence that natural monopolies do not impinge on liberty the way artificial monopolies do.

The next set of four articles ask the question "Who is Free?" Sumner attempted to find out whether or not the savage, the civilized man, the millionaire, and the tramp were free. Sumner argued that the savage was not free because civilization helped to order life and allow individuals to begin to achieve freedom. The savage must work diligently by himself or within the oppressive rules of a simplistic organization.¹⁹ The civilized man is freer than the savage, but is still restricted in the amount of freedom he can have. The millionaire is not freer than the civilized man, because both are dependent on the conditions

¹⁹The savage has failed to gain control over nature, so he cannot make nature work for him, but is a slave to nature.

of the market in order to maintain or improve their standard of living. The tramp is the only one who is truly free, for he is not constrained by any portion of civilization.

The next set of essays are contained under the heading of liberty and responsibility. For Sumner, the only existent liberty is civil, because it is "a matter of law and institutions. It is not metaphysical at all" (160). Civil liberty would be sacrificed to avoid social disorder if there were no laws to protect it. Civil liberty exists only under law, "law does not restrict liberty; it creates the only real liberty there is - for liberty in any real sense belongs only to civilized life and to educated men" (165). Civil liberty is restricted by responsibility and discipline.

Liberty and property are interrelated to the extent that if separated, property will remain at the expense of liberty. Opportunity gives one the chance at greater or lesser liberty, and civilization allows people more chances to gain or lose liberty. Unfortunately, liberty has never become the revolutionary force which it promised to be. As such, liberty has been a disappointment, because all will unsuccessfully attempt to attain it.

In the section entitled "Fantasies and Facts," Sumner looked at noble sentiments. He focused questions of the value of a fitting human existence, what he termed *menschwürdiges Dasein*. His conclusion was that the whole issue was trite, no matter how noble the sentiment. In "The Banquet of Life," Sumner examined the notion of whether a banquet of life is set for a limited or unlimited number of individuals. Although it was imaginary in nature, the banquet of life referred to an individual's right to existence and knowledge. Sumner concluded that if the banquet were open to all comers, there would be no need for social scientists, and at a more primitive level, no need for the existence of civilization.

In "Some Natural Rights," Sumner described what were believed to be unalienable rights of all individuals. These rights included freedom and independence. These rights were to be protected by the state, as long as wants could be fulfilled. Sumner attempted to disprove the notion that the right to the product of one's labor was a natural right. Sumner approached this topic from an anti-Marxian standpoint. He asserted that this "right" was in contradiction to natural rights. He believed that the argument of individual entitlement was ambiguous and could not be measured empirically. Sumner concluded that the right to the full product of labor would be contradictory to the right to an existence, for, if the full product of the labor of some fall short of what is necessary to maintain their existence, then they must encroach upon the full labor product of the others, that is, impair the right of the latter (226).

Sumner decreed that one's existence is a natural right, which not to be interfered with.

"The Abolition of Poverty," dealt with the notion that it was in society's best interest to put an end to poverty. Sumner determined that if society could abolish poverty, "it would then only remain to abolish disease and death, and all human woes would come to an end at once" (231). Among the other fallacies Sumner attempted to dispel was the fact that there was a benefit to nature. Sumner asserted that "all the blessings we enjoy are the fruits of labor, toil, self-denial and study" (238).

The next set of essays detailed the fact that all monopolies are natural in nature. Harnessing the power of one natural monopoly is a victory for all civilization. Further, monopolies do not cease to exist, but return in modified form.

This section led to Sumner's discussion of the family as a foundation for monopolies. In monogamous form, Sumner argued that the family was the most powerful and influential monopoly in existence. Additionally, the only way to maintain the family was to maintain the rights private property and vice versa. Other family forms were established to deal with specific problems encountered by society. The rise of monogamy was traced to the advance of property, which adversely affected polygamy. The fusion of family and property penetrated the existence of civilization itself. In "The State and Monopoly," the final essay in the Fantasies and Facts section, Sumner declared that the future of the Interstate Commerce Act was fully dependent on its interpretation.

The final section focused on the democracy-plutocracy debate. Sumner viewed the debate to be continuous, and that as society developed, so would the argument. Sumner disapproved of plutocracy because the "real controlling force is wealth" (293). Although democracy was not perfect in practice, it was better than the alternative, plutocracy. Sumner perceived that the only way to preserve democracy was to limit the number of functions it maintained and controlled.

After embarking on the discussion of democracy versus plutocracy, "Social War in Democracy," focused on social class and its effects on democracy. Sumner described the transition from feudal to modern class systems. The development of the modern class system saw the rise of the middle-class or *bourgeoisie*. Those individuals in the middle-class began to accumulate property and wealth by living off of the peasantry. Without invoking the name Marx, Sumner stated that "a land-owning peasant class and a property-owning middle class do not appear likely to go to war with each other" (315). Sumner did not agree with the Marxian notion that revolution between classes would occur; nevertheless, because of democracy's inability to fully stabilize the social order class war was still a possibility.

Lastly, there are three essays not bound by the restraints of any section of the book. The first, "The Power and Beneficence of Capital," defends the notion that capital is what drives civilization, and guides the fate and happiness of individuals. In the second essay "Sociological Fallacies," Sumner defends the position that one should not look at theological, metaphysical, or even teleological problems associated with mankind and civilization. The scientific view states that "human society exists because it is, and has come to be on earth because forces which were present must produce it" (364). Sumner's conclusion is that what sociological fallacies exist are the result of un-scientific thinking. The final essay in this volume is entitled, "What Our Boys are Reading." Sumner examined the fact that what teenagers read during the late 1800s was sensationalist and utterly stupid. This available literature was the source of rebellion and criticism of the existent social order. Sumner does not propose what effect this literature has on youths, but believes that they should be monitored by parents and teachers.

Earth Hunger and Other Essays has several references and discussions of socialists, but because of the broad nature of ideas and authors, it is hard to believe that Sumner was specifically addressing Marx. Sumner took great care to critique all forms of socialism and communism in order to defend the superiority of capitalistic society. Generally, Sumner is at odds with socialists and socialistic doctrines, but believes that in specific instances their ideas do contain merit.

4.1.5 The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays

The Challenge of Facts is the final manuscript of essays written by William Sumner and edited by Albert Keller. Although opening with a biographical sketch, the main section of the book starts with "The Challenge of Facts."²⁰

In "The Challenge of Facts," Sumner asserts that socialism appears when people are dealing with the stark facts nature provides them with. Sumner also states that the use of men in this essay was done consciously, for women were not well equipped to deal with nature. In fact, their position in this facet is not rising, rather it falls as society becomes more civilized. Through the use of capital, the human race has been able to dominate nature. Sumner maintains that in civilized societies, most of the advantage of capital is held by the community, very little is held by individuals. For Sumner, private property is made to be held unequally by all. He claims that those who work hardest to wrest

²⁰Keller retitled the opening section of the manuscript because it would give the book a "more distinctive title" (vii). "Socialism" was the original title of "The Challenge of Facts."

property away from nature should hold the most property. His notion of private property is derived from a social notion of the survival of the fittest. Civil liberty is also important within civilized society, for it makes the competition between individuals productive and non-violent. For Sumner, all social problems arise out of these facts.

Sumner maintained that the "sentimental philosophy" fallaciously attempted to show that man should have rights over his social needs, whether or not it required direct labor from the individual. Socialism was the furthest development of the "sentimental philosophy." Instead of focusing on individual socialists, Sumner lashed out at all of them. He concluded that socialists were trying to artificially re-order society to suit their needs, at the expense of nature, and humans relation to it. As Sumner saw it, socialists attacks on capital were attacks on the roots of civilization itself.

In looking more closely at capital, Sumner invoked the name of Karl Marx. Sumner defined Marx's concept of capital as, "an accumulation of the differences which a merchant makes between his buying price and his selling price" (41). As the discussion continued, Sumner stated that socialist philosophy based on this definition was fallacious because it took capital to make capital. Although critical of Marx and his conception of how inequality has come to exist, Sumner failed to read Marx closely. In Part II of Capital, vol. I, Marx described the fact that it does take money to make money. In looking at his general formula for capital, surplus-value can only be gained when money is exchanged for a commodity which is then sold for money, hopefully at a higher rate than it was bought at. Thus Marx's general formula was "M - C - M', where M' = M + M = the original sum advanced, plus an increment. This increment or excess over the original value I call 'surplus value'" (149).

By challenging the notions of what socialists brought forth, Sumner held that the only way civilization would advance was through increased industrialism. He mentioned socialism in general, and lumped all socialist together, so it is difficult if not impossible to decipher when he is focusing on Marx in this essay. The only certain use of Marx in this essay appeared on page 41, all of the other comments were directed at socialists in general.

"What Makes the Rich Richer and the Poor Poorer?," is Sumner's struggle with the ghost of Marx. Sumner opens the article by quoting a sentence of Das Capital, volume 1. "Karl Marx says, 'An accumulation of wealth at one pole of society indicates an accumulation of misery and overwork at the other'" (65). Sumner maintained that Marx criticized political economy on the basis of cause and effect. Throughout the rest of this article, Sumner attempts to show that wealth does not always lead to misery for those who

do not have wealth. The beginning of the article is a negative reference to Marx. Sumner declares that "whether there are great extremes of rich and poor in a society is a matter of very little significance" (68).

In the same article, Sumner embraced the ideas of Marx when he asserted "*it is the tendency of all social burdens to crush out the middle class, and to force the society into an organization of only two classes, one at each social extreme*" (70). He believed that in the past, there was no way to proportionately incur social burdens. As such, the wealthy became wealthier and either consciously or unconsciously burden the mass of society into a proletariat. The middle class was squeezed because they did not have enough capital to remain well-off in bad times, as a result, their plight became worse. Sumner concluded that the system of capitalism was the only system which would allow differentiation of classes. Capitalism "is the first organization of human society that has ever existed based on right" (76). Further, Sumner was afraid that socialism would in fact rob the existent middle class and once again polarize society. This section of the article should be viewed as a negative reference to Marx because Sumner argued that capitalism was the savior of the middle class.

In his essay entitled "Industrial War," Sumner attempted to demonstrate the capital and labor arguments made by American labor party leaders. Sumner argued that earning a living was an individual question, not one of class or society. Sumner upheld his belief in the wage system, but agreed that employer/employee relations had naturally antagonistic tendencies. He asserted that the existence of industrial war was only natural, because of conflicting interests. None of the writing in this chapter deals with Marxian concepts although Sumner talks about American socialism. American labor leaders merged and meshed many ideas, only some of which were Marxian, and thus perverted Marx's doctrines to the extent that they lost their character.

In "The Demand for Men," Sumner attempted to show that man was not needed on earth. Further, the existence of any one individual was not important. Relatedly, the next article focused on why the demand for men was significant. Sumner argued that men were most valuable when there was a demand for them. The men that industry demanded had an advantage over the market because they could not be easily replaced. Sumner did not understand why there was a struggle over capital and labor, especially when the laborers had the upper hand.

"What the Social Question Is," described the fact that there had always been social questions which society must face. Sumner predicted that all future societies and

civilizations would also social questions. The social question for Sumner was the existence and differentiation of social classes.

The theme of "What Emancipates," centered on the industrial notion that people will strike, boycott and revolt when they have power. Sumner believed that laborers were becoming well-off because they were able to engage in these actions. "In its simplest and most concrete form, social power consists in the power of an individual man to produce by his labor, from the ground, more than the subsistence of one man" (145). Degeneration occurred when societies that develop social power stagnate.

Sumner's essay "What is the 'Proletariat'?", opened with the comment that leaders of social agitation have adopted the philosophical phraseology of Hegel. He then brought to bear Marx's notion of proletariat and bourgeoisie. Sumner did not immediately criticize the use of the terms, but attempted to show that they were useless in America. He argued that the term proletarian had come to objectively describe a certain segment of society, even though the term was initially used derogatorily.

In America, the proletariat was not as interested in social reform as their are in gaining political power. Here, Sumner argued that the proletariat was more interested in pointing out the wrongs of the bourgeoisie than stating their own position.²¹ Although not defending Marx, he showed that Americans used the term in a very specific way. This section was a neutral reference to Marxian ideas, and to a certain extent saved the history and European heritage of the terms.

"Federal Legislation on Railroads" gives the impression that Sumner was a great believer in laissez-faire economics. He worried that legislation was introduced to show the public that government was the friend of all men, as well as the idea that the government is hard at work solving the railroad problem. Sumner maintained that although legislation may be necessary, a non-partisan investigation should decide the necessity of legislation. "Blundering experiments in legislation cannot be simply abandoned if they do not work well' even if they are set aside, they leave their lasting effects behind . . ." (182).

²¹What Sumner described was the notion that American proletarians had of themselves. he condemned the American labor movement for recognizing and disowning those members of the proletariat who gain control of capital as capitalists. What Sumner was defending was the notion that all groups gain from progress. The results of progress included; transportation improvements, the availability of land which over time would pay for itself, a greater demand for labor and the increased value of wages, and lower rent, leading to the downfall of many landlords.

"Legislation by Clamor" was an article which recognized the fact that the political institution was beginning to decay. Legislation was being passed for no other purpose than to appease the most boisterous. Sumner gave examples of how the squeaky wheel got the oil, and decided that legislation by clamor would not result in anything but confusion and societal difficulty.

In "Speculative Legislation," Sumner contended that legislation passed to reach ideals was purely speculative. This type of legislation passed through speculation about the future, and was not based on a rational, knowledgeable analysis of facts. "It is a characteristic of speculative legislation that it very generally produces the exact opposite of the result it was hoped to get from it" (219). Society must be careful not to enact whimsical legislation because society may incur more problems than already exist.

In "Democracy and Responsible Government," Sumner argued that change was not synonymous with improvement. Although each government had inherent problems, Sumner was not ready to give up on America's form of government. Further, as America has grown, it became necessary to modify institutions, and such modifications could solve certain problems. The creators of America's government and constitution "showed their wisdom by throwing aside all political dogmatism and making a plain, practical plan for attaining the necessary ends of civil government for the nation" (252).²²

"Advancing Social and Political Organization in the United States," was a historical ethnography of the birth and revolution of American society. The United States, unlike its European counterparts saw large strides in social organization, which led to restrictive individual liberty. Further, the existent social institutions helped to mold and shape other institutions, and as society became more densely populated, organizations became more rigid. Many people were upset about the rigidity, because America had always been a place in which people had the utmost freedom.

The growth of America also became a period of social, industrial, political and civil growth. Sumner believed that evolution beyond the present would be "one of consolidation and condensation" (333). The economic changes of America helped people

²²Sumner wrote this article, not to have the current system overthrown, but to enforce the idea that even with the existence of faults, the present system of government is the best type for society. The most pressing change Sumner wanted was to make government employees responsible for their actions, instead of hiding behind their offices. The development of government toward better organization must be "held within due limits and harmonious action by responsibility to the representatives of the people and to the people themselves" (286).

gain power, and set up a social system where even without ownership, people had political and social sway. Unfortunately, as society becomes more complex, its institutions become more fragile.

The book concluded with three essays on sociology and social science. The first was his "Introductory Lecture to Courses in Political and Social Science." Society changed dramatically, and Sumner wanted the students to "respect the institutions and the government of their native land" (395). Although speaking of both social and political sciences, he detailed some of the progress and change which took place, such as the class system, patriotism and the economy. Sumner concluded by stating that "the course of study upon which we now enter deserves your most careful application" (403).

In building a program of sociology, Sumner contended that the field should use the same methods that the other powerful sciences use. He maintained that although sociology was not an exact science, the methods would do well to help strengthen sociology as an academic discipline.

The final essay was entitled "The Predicament of Sociological Study." Sumner argued that sociology was being intruded upon in ways which other disciplines would absolutely object to being intruded upon. Sociology was a new science, but was great to the extent that it linked the past and the present together. Sociological analysis could not do justice to social woes if diagnosis and treatment were offered prematurely. Sumner concluded by stating that a department of sociology needed "a scientific method which shall descend to a cold clear examination of facts and build up inductions which shall have positive value" (425).

4.2 Analysis of Lester F. Ward's Writings

The present analysis of Lester Frank Ward's manuscripts includes: *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* (1892), *Outlines of Sociology* (1897), *Pure Sociology* (1903), and *Applied Sociology* (1906). In his early works, there is little doubt that he was largely influenced by Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and many other evolutionists. *Dynamic Sociology* contains many passages and examples which are evolutionist. Ward does not rely upon these sources as heavily in his later manuscripts. The discussion about the existence of social forces is common to all of Ward's texts.

4.2.1 Dynamic Sociology

Lester F. Ward maintained that the study the dynamic processes of society was the most important area of study for sociology. The study of social statics did not contribute to the science of sociology to the extent that social dynamics had. "It has therefore been the *movement* rather than the *status* of society, which it has been sought to explain, the causes of social phenomena and social progress rather than the condition of society itself" (i, 701).²³ For Ward, social dynamics used empirical data and statistical analysis to study the causes of society's progress and change.

Ward firmly believed that all social action was the result of and influenced by feelings, not intellect. Social progress beyond nature's natural rate could only occur through the diffusion of knowledge about the materials and forces of nature. Ward determined that science was made up of knowledge, and its diffusion referred to the education of the masses. Ward held that the material existence of civilization occurred because humans succeeded in controlling the natural forces.

Ward argued that sociologists could be the only true legislators in society, for they alone have the knowledge necessary to do the greatest good for society. He asserted that the universe was full of physical and mental paradoxes, and sociologically the paradox was "the reign of fixed laws in society" (i, 52).

Society is continuously moving and as a result, there is a need for social dynamics to study and create rules for social progress. There are two forms of progress, passive/negative and active/positive. Passive progress occurs when society is acted upon, whereas active progress exists when society acts upon other forces.

²³The small case roman numeral denotes which volume given quotes have been taken from.

Progress is accorded by consulting feeling to find out what is advantageous for society, then intellect is used to secure the social forces which will provide societal advancement. Dynamic sociology attempts to study artificial change which occurs when humans harness the natural and social forces. Only three groups assist society's advancement, "there are the mechanical inventor, the scientific discoverer and the philosophic thinker" (i, 78). Dynamic sociology exists to help society overcome hindrances to progress.

In the next two chapters, Ward looked at the systems of Comte and Spencer. He defined Comte's term positive as that which actually exists. Comte used the terms positive and science synonymously. Problems arose for Comte because of his belief that it was futile to study the causes of phenomena. Ward maintained that the central characteristic of Comte's positive philosophy was the creation of a science hierarchy which reflected the complexity of each scientific discipline. Comte's system was also problematic because he did not admit the existence of psychology as an independent science. Comte's discussion of sociology was divided into the fields of progress and order, which he devised as social statics and social dynamics. He then related his theory of stage development to the sociological subdivisions.

The theological stage was the period of order without progress; the metaphysical stage, at least in its later developments, tended to destroy the social order without setting up any new conditions of progress. The positive stage is destined to establish a new order, which, unlike the theological one, shall be in perfect harmony with the greatest degree of social advancement (i, 132-133).

Ward concluded his overview of Comte with a discussion of Comte's idea for universal education.

Spencer, in contrast to Comte, delineated psychology among the hierarchy of sciences. Ward asserted that Spencer's classification was based on logical and ideal relations among the disciplines. He postulated that where harmony was thought to exist between Comte and Spencer, there was variance, and where variance was thought to exist, there was harmony. Spencer divided phenomena into unknowable and knowable; the former being the realm of religion, and the latter the domain of science and philosophy. Spencer theorized that aggregates facilitated change, and as they multiplied and interacted, society became more heterogeneous.

Ward contended that Spencer would be best remembered for his treatise on psychology. A great deal of Spencer's analysis centered on the existence, definition, and

function of feelings. Further, psychology dealt with the processes of reasoning, which were considered to be subjective.

In Spencer's discussion of sociology, he stated that ideas were the primary data of sociology. Spencer rationally explained the existence of religion, by tracing its history and relation to nature. In the second volume on sociology, Spencer began his biological analysis of society, and discussed moral phenomena. Ward argued that his discussion of moral phenomena was deficient because he studied the subjects from an objective point of view.

Ward theorized that the object of all science was truth, and the same should be argued of philosophy. He went to great length to scientifically study the existence of aggregates, of which elements were considered to be the most basic.

As aggregates become more complex, they begin to lose some of their stability. Organic compounds belong to this secondary level of aggregation, with the cell being the primary unit of organization. Higher levels of aggregation come into existence when aggregates interact. Spencer used this line of discussion to trace the history of human/animal development. "Life in its essence results from the organization of matter" (i, 343).²⁴

The mind was the next topic of study in secondary aggregation. In order to be capable of sensibility or feeling, consciousness must exist. Consciousness of feelings only exists when an organism has nerves and a nervous system, which the brain coordinates and controls. In addition, the brain transmits thoughts and experiences which create recollection.

The ability to acquire knowledge was defined by Ward as the "essential quality of intellect" (i, 384). The sensation of pain and pleasure was referred to as emotion, and morals and social emotions exist only when people are in contact with others. Affection, reason and sympathy were the bases of mental development, and could not be reached by animals and uncivilized humanity.

Ward determined that sensations and feelings comprised the subjective component of the mind, while intellect was the center for the objective component. He maintained that mind was immaterial because it was made up of interior processes which people come to know only when manifested by exterior actions (i, 409).

²⁴Ward found it impossible to trace the origin of life, but discovered that the capabilities of organized cells is greater than that of individual cells.

The final section of secondary aggregation opened with a discussion of the similarity of human and simian life forms. Ward discussed the evolutionary origin of man from ape by comparing physical structures. In order to properly evolve, humanoids must have developed skill and cunning which required great brain capacity.

He concluded the chapter by discussing the origins of man. First, there was no complete answer as to whether humans developed out of one stock, or if multiple stocks existed simultaneously. Second, the beginnings of humankind occurred in the tropical areas. Finally, Ward dismissed the question of how long humans inhabited the earth because of the discussions fruitlessness.

The process of human association had been facilitated by nature over time. Each prehistoric society came into existence independently, and developed at different rates.²⁵ The past and present status of society was the topic of study for social statics, whereas social dynamics studies social change and progress. Further, sociology, as a sciences, studied the existence and effect of social forces.

There are two types of social forces, essential and non-essential. Among the essential social forces are the preservative and reproductive forces. The preservative forces are further divided into positive forces which Ward describes as pleasure seeking. The negative preservative forces are designated as the avoidance of pain. In contrast, reproductive forces are direct and indirect. The direct forces include sexual and amative desire, and the indirect forces are the parental and consanguineal affections. The three non-essential forces are aesthetic, emotional and intellectual. All of the social forces have a physiological existence.²⁶

²⁵Basically, society is an association of individuals. Ward theorized that there were four distinct stages of societal development. The first stage of societal evolution consisted of man living independently. The second stage was described as forced association for species continuation. The establishment of basic governmental structures was the third epoch of social progress. The fourth stage has yet to be reached, and consists of the consolidation of all governments. The first stage is theoretical, and the fourth is purely ideal (i, 467).

²⁶Ward concluded that several dozen different areas were to be categorized under the essential social forces. The non-essential forces did contribute to society, but in very specific and secondary ways. The economy came into existence among the preservative forces of nature. Industry, private ownership, and rudimentary government also came into existence because of the preservative forces. Ward theorized that the object of human effort had always consisted in the desire to acquire. Further, humans moved from a state of natural justice to civil justice because of intellectual capabilities. Accordingly, social and

Production is a major component in human life. There are necessarily two types of production, primary and secondary. Primary production deals with the finding of food. The search for clothing and shelter are both secondary forms of production. Clothing and shelter are classified as secondary because surrounding conditions make these needs necessary to a greater or lesser extent. Invention makes humans more efficient at both primary and secondary forms of production, a discussion of which included only those labors associated with the preservation of life.

The class of laborers known as accessories to production were not actually involved in the production process. These individuals linked consumers with producers. The accessories to production did jobs like distribution, transportation, exchange and finance. Ward asserted that financial inequality existed because of the social forces, and could only be overcome by countervailing social forces.

The final class of individuals was termed the parasitic class because they were not in production or industry. These people acquired goods and property through robbery, theft, war, government/statecraft, hierarchy/priesthood and monopoly (i, 583). All these forms of acquirement were recognized, except robbery and theft. The parasitic class was said to add nothing to the wealth or progress of society.

Ward considered the preservative forces to be of utmost importance, but these forces would not exist long term without the reproductive forces. The preservative forces acted "for the *present*, the other (reproductive) for the *future*. The one preserves the *individual*, the other preserves the *species*" (i, 598). The reproductive forces had less potential for societal progress than do the preservative forces.

The first reproductive force discussed by Ward was the sexual appetite. Man was different from other animals because he could use imagination and reason to excite a female. Further, the use of imagination and reason allowed humans to derive pleasure from sex because it was not necessarily linked to the need for reproduction.

For Ward, even love is based on physiology. Love has modified both the physical and social lives of individuals. Socially, love created "1, institutions of marriage; 2, the sentiment called modesty; and, 3, the present comparative relations and conditions of the two sexes" (i, 613).

Most important in this discussion on love was Ward's theory that society manufactured the inequality of genders. Society created barriers to the equality of women

moral codes were restrictions which society placed upon itself to protect individuals and their rights.

in four ways; inequality of dress, duties, education, and rights. Further, Ward maintained that women were subordinate to men throughout history, partly because they permitted men to control certain functions of life, beginning with sexual relations. If equality did exist, he held that women's lives would not be much different from that of men. Unfortunately, the lower sciences defended the subordinate status of women.

Ward concluded volume one with a discussion of the non-essential forces, which also had physical origins. Aesthetic forces were based on the senses of sight and hearing, moral forces on emotions, and the intellectual forces were based on the existence of intellect. These forces, like all others were based on the fulfillment of desires by avoiding pain and seeking pleasure.

Before entering into a discussion of progress, Ward deemed it necessary to discuss the nature of the relationship of man to nature and nature to man.²⁷ Man was knowledgeable of the fact that he was but a part of his environment, and because man had consciousness of his position, Ward deduced that they should be master over nature. As master, man could begin to control the forces which acted upon all people.

Ward then discussed the two different modes of thought, genetic and teleological, both of which could cause change to occur. Further, there was the argument for and against monism and dualism. Ward argued that dualism was widespread because "teleological ideas (or rather the natural attachment to them) are inherited, while genetic ideas are chiefly acquired" (ii, 33).²⁸

The attempt to actively achieve one's desired goals was classified as conation. Direct conation required physical action, and secondary conation dealt with intellectual means to attain desired ends. Attainment occurred when the inventive faculty was used to produce artificial phenomena. Indirect conation was the most efficient and economical

²⁷Nature was the whole to which man was a part, that was produced and developed by nature.

²⁸All physical phenomena are caused genetically, and in many cases, genetic phenomena occur in a series, and move to stages of greater or lesser complexity. Progress is achieved in small increments while the phenomena is perceived to be statical. "In short, all the functions of society are performed in a sort of chance way" (ii, 89).

Teleological phenomena exist in animate organisms for whom desire is the motive for action. These phenomena are consciously produced, and consist of the effort to attain goals. In order to reach a given end, the organism must move through a series of psychological steps.

process to achieve progress. Artificial phenomena "are those that result from such modification and control of natural phenomena by such rational beings" (ii, 126).

The ultimate end of conation is happiness which is achieved through progress, dynamic action, dynamic opinion, knowledge, and education. Education is the most basic means to the goal of happiness. "Happiness consists of the realization of all the positive forms of feeling, attended by a more or less complete absence of the negative forms, known as pain" (ii, 129).

The more complex an organism, the more intensely they feel sensations. Because man is highly complex and has a variety of organs which serve specific functions, and they are able to incur a myriad of different pleasures and pains. Only the individual is capable of reaching a state of happiness.²⁹

At this point, Ward defined social progress as that which increased human happiness. The notion that society could be at a state of equilibrium did not exist because the sum total of happiness was constantly in flux; thus, society was either advancing or receding. Further, the indirect methods to derive happiness created social institutions which developed to meet specific goals. Unfortunately these institutions became so complex that it was hard to tell if they were progressive or non-progressive.

Progress in the animal world is due to physical changes in environment. Progress by way of external causes is objective, and subjective progress is due to individual effort. Human progress is brought about subjectively, and if nature is left to its own devices, progress would occur at a much slower rate. At society's current level of development, there is greater need for communication and subsistence. People need to communicate with others to satisfy desires related to knowledge and intellect. The fulfillment of subsistence needs encompasses the physical demands of a body, and the human use of invention creates "arts" which have allowed them to more efficiently and effectively fulfill preservative needs. Correspondingly,

civilization is essentially artificial and by whatever agency we may suppose other objects created or developed, we find that very few of them are adapted to man's purposes until he so adapts them by his own thought and labor (ii, 206).

The withdrawal of progressive forces (language, literature, art, and science) leads to the degeneration of society.

²⁹Society cannot experience actual happiness, but feels it when individuals are happy.

There are also non-progressive agencies at work within any given society. The first of these is government, which is an institution which restricts the freedom and happiness of individuals, as such, it is opposed to social progress. This is not the only function of government, but is the function which is most exhibited and influential to society. For Ward, government is an invention of the human mind, and ideal governments should be devised and desired by all members of society, not just those who desire power.³⁰ In Ward's time, government did not accept the existence of social facts; furthermore, only through science and scientific legislation can government become truly ameliorative.

Religion was the other institution which greatly affected the progress of society. Ward began by discussing the concepts of religion that others had devised. All of the authors reached an unconscious consensus about what religion was. The central ideas were that of immortality, spiritual existence, and the existence of at least one deity. Wrong or misguided beliefs could lead to the extinction of a society, and as such, progress is not aided by religion. Religion, like government had progressive and non-progressive elements. Unfortunately, the progressive elements of religion only work for those individuals who adhere to the religion. Detrimentially, superstition impeded progress because it blocked rational thought, destroyed and diverted property to non-essential areas, and in many cases was based on pain and suffering.

As Ward has expressed many times, progress was the result of action. Actions were divided into voluntary and involuntary components. The involuntary component consisted of compulsory and automatic actions. Voluntary actions were subdivided into many highly specific categories, which must be exercised by one's will. These desires had two sources, opinions and sensations. These two sources did not necessarily enforce one another, and in the end, the strongest desires win.

The impulsive class of voluntary actions is considered to be more natural than deliberative actions. Impulse in humans resembles the instincts of other animals. All current sub-divisions of action are further divided into the existence and non-existence of moral qualities. Basically, moral quality refers to whether or not there exists an "intellectual judgement respecting right and wrong" (ii, 359).

By deliberately focusing on human conduct in terms of morality and ethics, Ward attempted to help people understand and appreciate social dynamics. Deliberative non-moral actions were sub-divided into static and dynamic actions. Static actions had no

³⁰Ideally, government would not control and protect, but only accommodate because of human imperfection.

propensity for societal change. In contrast, dynamic actions attempted to bring about or enhance social action.

Dynamic actions allow humans to control the natural and social forces. Many dynamic actions are the result of invention and rationality, and the development of the sciences and their domains of study have been facilitated by dynamic action. Dynamic action is further sub-divided into individual and social action. Dynamic social action is relegated to controlling social forces, whereas, dynamic individual action controls the forces of the lower sciences.

Social order and progress are dominated by the opinions of individuals. The settlement of opinions is an intense action in which great amounts of intellectual energy is spent, and may help the sciences discover further truths. Correct opinions must be based on empirical evidence, without which, all opinions are based in subjectivity.

If an individual cannot or will not change an opinion, Ward believed that no other individual could change his opinion. Human opinions were caused by objective and subjective sensation. "Perceptions form the basis of mental judgements, and these constitute ideas and opinions" (ii, 424).

The main source of opinions comes from oral communication. Our opinions are influenced first in quantity, and secondly in quality by way of education and experience. Education and experience are considered to be external subjective influences. Intellect, logic, and rationality are the main objective influences on opinion.

Just as there are ethical and dynamic actions, there are also ethical and dynamic opinions. Ethical opinions are based upon intellectual processes which evaluate the morality and accuracy of opinions.

The only opinions which are of any value to the world are those which promote its progress either directly or by preserving order as the guardian of progress. The latter are the ethical opinions freed from the dross of superstition and convention, and recognizing only positive utility. The former are dynamic opinions properly so called, with which we have now more especially to deal (ii, 458).

Knowledge is the fourth means through which social progress can be achieved. The natural mind is considered to be intellect without knowledge, and the artificial mind combines both intellect and knowledge. Ward asserts that the origination of knowledge, though difficult and slow, is easier and more rapid than any other possible increase of the intellect can be, and may be easily made to keep pace with the latter in the future" (ii, 487).

Knowledge only comes from experiences, and in order to increase it, people need to experience a greater variety of experiences.

There exists both scientific and unscientific knowledge. People who hold scientific knowledge are few in number, and focus on data which will lead to the development of laws. Unscientific knowledge is held by the public, and is not highly differentiated in content. "Knowledge must be regarded as furnishing the data for correct opinions" (ii, 506).³¹

Ward maintained that the success of any given society was bound to the importance placed on scientific knowledge. Inequality among people in a society was "due to the inequality of intelligence, or, what is the same thing, to the unequal distribution of the extant knowledge of the world" (ii, 538). Once knowledge was equally distributed, Ward believed that the only differences that would remain would be due to differences in mental capacity.

Education was the most basic means for achieving happiness, and without education it would be almost impossible to achieve happiness above and beyond a basic level. After looking at certain conceptions of education, Ward concluded that there were five different types of education; experience, discipline, culture, research, and information. There was no natural desire for people to want education, but it should be available to anyone and not be based on competition. If education was differentially offered, uneducated persons would be expensive for society to support.

Under his conception of universal education is the idea that women and men alike should be afforded the opportunities of equal education. Ward went on to discuss the curriculum, means, and methods to universal and equal education. Within this discussion, Ward addresses the differences among laborers and capitalists. This is not a reference to Marxian doctrine because he is not specific as to what groups are included in these classes.

4.2.2 The Psychic Factors of Civilization

³¹Knowledge, like actions and opinions can be of ethical or dynamic character. Ethical actions are based on ethical opinions which are dependent upon ethical knowledge. Dynamic knowledge has potential and actual components. The product of actual dynamic knowledge is "some form of human action that results in social improvement" (ii, 511). Further, diffusion, or the passing of knowledge, decreases the degree of certainty about the original knowledge.

The Psychic Factors of Civilization was written to scientifically discuss the nature and control of the social forces. The first section of the book discussed the subjective psychology of the mind and its relation to the existence of social forces. Ward's second task was to show how individuals can control social forces.

Ward began discussing the philosophical studies of mind and ideas in this manuscript. He stated that the scientific methodology was also known to be an inductive methodology. Ward went on to describe the processes of sensation and perception. He maintained that sensation was a subjective act, and perception was objective.

The psychological process exists as a combination of individual processes. Each person's senses are made up of objective and subjective components, but certain senses are more objective than others. "The order in passing from the subjective to the objective pole is that just given, viz., 1, taste; 2, smell; 3, touch; 4, hearing; 5, sight" (19).

The purpose of subjective psychology is to explain two distinct classes of sensation, intensive and indifferent. Ward argues that the study of emotions is the most important branch of subjective psychology. Emotions are felt to be secondary sensations which an individual's brain elicits. Emotions provide an individual with intensive sensations, just like those drawn from actual nerve stimulation.³²

Ward then discussed the nature of pleasure and pain. Generally pleasure was considered positive and pain negative, but he argued that pleasure and pain were both positive elements. Pain was considered to be positive because it acted as a natural warning system.

Ward discussed the idea that the soul was an existent form in psychology. The soul was not devised as having a teleological definition, instead, was intricately linked with the mind. Ward defined the soul as "the collective feelings of organic beings and their resultant efforts" (46). The soul helped individuals transform from stages of barbarism to the age of enlightenment and beyond.

As individuals became distanced from items which caused certain sensation, they were believed to differentially desire them. Items which people desired to have would be the one's that caused pleasurable sensations, and items that individuals desired to stay away

³²Smell, taste, and touch are considered to be sensation producing senses. Hearing and sight are the senses related to perception. Perception exists in the realm of objective psychology, of which the mind is the key element. The mind allows individuals to start with perceptions which lead to truths and generalizations. If conclusions are to be reached, the mind must be able to draw conclusions from the stimuli or groups of stimuli which it processes.

from caused them to have painful or indifferent sensations. The more essential certain needs and wants were, the more they would be desired.

The development of subjective psychology and its use was partially developed by Schopenhauer. "The will of Schopenhauer is nothing more nor less than the generalized conception defined in the last chapter and denominated *desire*" (61). Ward often stated that the science of sociology rests upon the science of psychology.³³

In every society, individuals who do not uphold the morals and ethics of the society cause friction. Ward states that "social friction is always painful, therefore moral progress, which consists in reducing this friction, is restricted in its popular acceptance to the lessening of pain" (113). Social friction conflicts with what social action attempts to achieve. Social friction is related to pain, and social action is deemed to bring about pleasure. The more active a society is, the more pleasure that can be afforded for action, which is incurred as society progresses morally. "Treating human action as social motion, the forces producing this motion are the desires, and we have a science which may be called social physics" (130).³⁴

The second section of the manuscript dealt with the objective component of psychology. Early on, Ward outlined this general sub-field of psychology, but now attempted to describe it in greater detail. At the beginning of this section, he mentioned that he omitted the factor of intuition. The development of this mental factor allowed individuals to shrug off the control that nature has over all other creatures. The process of intellectual development began with instinctive exploration, followed by incipient intuition, and finally full intuition. Full intuition "is not reached until the creature is capable of perceiving from the outset that only by setting out in a direction different from that of the object to be attained can it succeed" (144).

Cunning and shrewdness are traits of all animals, including humans, but humans are the only animals to reason intuitively. Intuitive reason includes the idea that humans can rationally use strategies and deceive other humans and animals for gain. Society is filled with different forms of deception which exist interdependently.

³³In The Psychic Factors of Civilization, he specified that sociology rested almost directly upon the subjective component of psychology. Society strived toward action, because society was "the beneficiary of the direct results of human action in so far as they are beneficial" (99). Society was deemed to be the product of individual attempts to fulfill desires, and benefitted from individual wants.

³⁴Social physics is the dynamic component of sociology, and primarily deals with the existence of social forces.

Animal cunning is succeeded by human ingenuity and intuitive perception becomes intuitive reason. Both belong to the normal and primary intellectual faculty, both involve the principle of deception which is the essence of the process employed (168).

Sociobiologists believe that humans use of deception is a method which Darwin termed survival of the fittest.

The next form of intuition discussed by Ward was that of intuitive judgement. Intuitive judgement was based on a perception of truth, and was most often used on abstract questions of a philosophic or scientific nature. Because people use common sense in ordinary affairs, this form of intuition is generally not used in day-to-day decisions and interactions. The final type of intuition Ward discusses is female intuition. The reason he defines this intuition as female rather than woman's intuition is that he believes it exists in sub-human creatures as well as human beings. Female intuition is rooted in the need for defense and safety, both for mother and offspring. Female intuition is not based on action or deception as are other forms of intuition. Ward differentiates these forms of intuition as being primarily male and female. The former type is "adapted to the sustentation and continuation, and the other to the protection and conservation of the race" (179).

The next area of objective psychology looked at by Ward was invention. Invention arose as individuals began to use foresight and planning. Ward theorized that the inventive faculty was developed as individuals attempted to fulfill their wants and needs. Once the inventive faculty was found to exist, war spurred the development of new ideas and technologies. Ward held that invention was "the real civilizing agent" (189). Invention was seen to be an objective agent of psychology, because it was able to help society progress.

Creative genius was developed out of people's inventive faculty, and meant that individuals worked with what already existed.³⁵ Creative genius exists in the field of fine arts, for it does not work toward practical ends. At this point, Ward differentiated between creative and inventive genius. "An invention is therefore a compromise between the ideal of the inventor and the hard facts of nature" (212). Creation was not limited to what actually existed, but was represented by what one's mind makes available. Things created "can have no practical value in the popular sense; they can only contribute to esthetic gratification" (213).

³⁵It put the ideas into a new combination which led the making of something entirely different.

Speculative genius is part of the philosophic realm, and is not content with explaining "the phenomena of the universe, it must also seek an explanation of those of mind" (218). Speculative genius also embraces the fields of logic and mathematics. Both fields work in highly abstract ways, but are able to develop to the point that they are considered to be exact sciences.

The final section of The Psychic Factors of Civilization dealt with the combination of objective and subjective factors of the mind. At this point, Ward differentiated nature and mind, to the extent that nature included all phenomena which did not have a rational or intellectual component. While many individuals attempted to show that an economics of nature existed, Ward contended that "it is in rational man, therefore, that the first application of anything worth of the name of economy is made" (256). A main reason for his argument was that nature shaped animals, while man molded the environment.³⁶

Societal progress was achieved through individual achievement as well as institutional change. It could not be said that the government or any other institution alone helped society to progress. Progress for Ward was defined as an increase in human happiness, or a decrease in suffering. The problems which plagued society were "not moral questions, although upon their solution more than upon anything else depends the moral progress of the world" (290).

Ward believed that the government of any society existed to work for the will of a society's individuals. The government worked to fulfill the needs, wants and desires of those individuals who live under its reign, unfortunately, many of its attempts for fulfillment have been unsuccessful. Further, government "is the organ of social consciousness and must ever seek to obey the will of society" (302). Ward asserted that the power of government to enact legislation was completely dependent upon knowing that it was serving the public will.

For long periods of time governments attempted to avoid social evils, and to help society progress. Unfortunately, little happened to help society progress, but Ward believed that much of this was due to the fact that the individual held power. He believed that it was time for a new type of government, a sociocracy. This differed from other

³⁶Competition was both positive and negative for a society, but would only continue as long as weaker forms continued to exist. Ward's purpose for discussing the economic nature of mankind was "to show that any system of economics which is to deal with rational man must rest upon a psychology and not upon a biologic basis" (277).

forms of government in that society would act for self-betterment, not betterment of a majority of individuals living in a society. Further, Ward contended that for a long time to come social action must be chiefly negative and be confined to the removal of evils that exist, such as have been pointed out in these pages, but a positive stage will ultimately be reached in which society will consider and adopt measures for its own advancement (329). In the end, all of society's work would lead society to a stage in which science would dominate and lead the way to the future.

4.2.3 Outlines of Sociology

Outlines of Sociology is written as an attempt to define the realm of sociology, and to differentiate it from other disciplines. The first half of the book is dedicated to defining the position of sociology among other disciplines, especially sciences. Ward entitles this portion of the book Social Philosophy. The second half of the book is devoted to topics that fall under the realm of sociology, which Ward calls Social Science.

Ward opened the book by giving Auguste Comte credit for creating the term sociology, and went on to defend Comte's hierarchy of the sciences. He added other sciences into the hierarchy that were not explicitly mentioned by Comte. Among them, geology, geography, botany, zoology, and psychology. Ward then began to define the limits of sociology, and why it was positioned at the top of Comte's scientific hierarchy. He believed that the sciences should be taught bottom up, and as such, sociology should "perhaps be mainly postgraduate" (17). It is at this point in the manuscript that one first gets a glimpse at what sociology was for Ward. He saw sociology as a highly inductive philosophical science based on facts, not assumptions.

In the chapter, "The Relation of Sociology to Cosmology," Ward maintains that the notions of optimism or pessimism are false. Optimism and pessimism are passive states of mind, whereas the only true state of mind is characteristically active. This state of mind is meliorism, "the perpetual bettering of man's estate" (26). Optimism is based in ignorance, while pessimism is based on social oppression. Further, religion is the basis of human reason and the product of thought. Religion takes on optimistic and pessimistic notions.³⁷ According to Ward, the Protestant Reformation arose as a result of meliorism. Man is able to control his own destiny because nature is an impartial environment. The

³⁷Western religion holds an optimistic view, whereas Eastern religion's view is decidedly pessimistic.

point of this discussion is that man has evolved cosmically, and that "no knowledge of anything can be gained by speculation, and that our only knowledge consists in the actual investigation of facts that lie within our reach" (38).

The relationship between the fields of sociology and biology were strongest when biology focused on the human being. Ward concentrated on the description of biotic organization in order to see if sociology could logically compare society to a biological organism. He believed Spencer to be the first and foremost authority on the biological/social organism comparison. Ward considered Spencer's formulation of organic development by way of differentiation and integration of great importance, except that the integrative comparisons did not correspond.³⁸

In 1879, The Anthropological Society of Washington decreed that sociology was a subdivision of anthropology. Ward responded by stating that anthropology was a concrete science, while sociology was an abstract science. Ward discussed the differences between humans and lower animals, and concluded that essentially the differences were a matter of degree, not absence versus existence. Many animals were truly social, and Ward firmly believed that human society was the result of reasoning, not instinct. Humans were distinctly different from all other animals because (human societies) were "essentially rational and artificial, while animal association is essentially instinctive and natural" (92).

Ward disagreed with Spencer because he believed that sociology was built on psychology not biology. Ward divided psychology into two distinct axes, affective versus perceptive and objective versus subjective. He went so far as to say that affective psychology was subjective and perceptive, and psychology was objective. Ward argued that humans developed a perceptive element by which they were able to dominate all other life. Intellect was not an end in itself, but a means to good, his determined end.³⁹

Ward categorized six different classes of pleasures; "1. Reproductive. 2. Nutritive. 3. Aesthetic. 4. Emotional. 5. Moral. 6. Intellectual" (108). The highest pleasures were the most removed from the senses and physical body. For Ward, the discovery of truth was considered to be the highest pleasure, but most people did not even attempt to attain it.

³⁸Even though body/society comparisons were useful, all were considered to be analogies, except for the nervous system. This system was the only one which was a proper comparison because it "furnishes true *homologies*" (60). Ward found this homology to be of considerable use to sociologists. He concluded the discussion by stating that if society was an organism it would be a simple organism (62).

³⁹For Ward, the good in basic terms was "an agreeable sensation as it was developed for the preservation of life" (100).

Sociology rested upon the pleasures, not upon the intellectual section of psychology. "The social forces are human motives, and all motives in the correct sense of the term, have feeling as their end. To attain pleasure or avoid pain is the only incentive to action" (108-109).

In order to study society sociologically, Ward held that it was important to get a good general scientific education. Further, the most concrete fact of sociology was man. Ward argued that sociologists could study not only the man through his physical characteristics, but also through institutions. He stated that "this vast array of phenomena manifested by man in his manifold relations with the material would constitute the data of sociology" (124).

Ward looked at the development of religion as a process of philosophy and reasoning; furthermore, he looked back at the history of art in similar fashion. Sociology was interested in more than just great/infamous men and their deeds, it was interested in the history of society. Statistics is "one of the chief sources of sociological data" (134).

Ward concluded the first part of the book with a brief discussion of social science. There were many subdivisions of the special social sciences, and each had its own ideas and opinions. Ward maintained that each of the special social sciences were "not themselves the science of sociology, but they constitute the data of sociology" (136). Because sociology was a science based on many others, Ward felt that sociology should not be taken up any earlier than one's senior year of undergraduate work.

Each individual is made up of numerous feelings which hold energy. Ward maintained that the energy was potential rather than kinetic, but it was important that sociology find out how to make the energy kinetic. He developed a chart of social forces which he maintained were the primary or basic social forces.

The first physical force was that of individual preservation, which had positive and negative components. The negative forces "are those that protect him from injury and destruction" (150). The positive side of this social force was directly focused upon nutrition. Race continuance forces were the second physical social force, and referred to the reproductive appetites of humans. The third force was race elevation, which was not as essential to the continuance of humans as were the first two physical forces. The force of race elevation included aesthetic, moral, and intellectual forces.

For sociology to prosper as a science, Ward contended that all knowledge must be systematized. He went on to describe how he helped sociology evolve into a science. His

first contribution was that "the social forces are psychic" (164). The social forces constituted human desires which people were inclined to act upon.

In order to understand the mechanics of society, it was important to separate and understand sociology as social statics and social dynamics. For Ward, the basic notion of social statics was that the social forces were at equilibrium and helped to enforce social order. As long as society's functions were not charged, social statics could include growth and multiplication. Social dynamics included people's motives, moving forces, and will power. The "operation of these social forces causes them to collide and antagonize one another" (175). In basic terms, social dynamics studied social progress.⁴⁰

Chapters ten through twelve dealt with social genetics and the two subdivisions of social telics. Before moving to this area of study, Ward proposed a discussion of the reason that there was a study of sociology. He separated sociology into the fields of statics and dynamics. The difference was that the dynamic school carried the science farther than the static school (194). For Ward, the supreme purpose for sociology was "the betterment of society" (204).

Ward then focused on the idea of social genesis. "The primary characteristic of genetic social progress is that it results from the actions of men that directly flow from their efforts to satisfy their desires" (220). Such progress did not occur rapidly, but the progress that was made benefitted the social forces of preservation and race continuance. The changes which occurred under social genesis continued as unconscious social evolution.

Ward modified Darwin's doctrine of survival of the fittest into "monopoly of the strongest" (225). Although this monopoly had positive consequences for those who existed as part of the monopoly, there were negative effects of such a monopoly. The negatives included the elimination of the weaker, more unfortunate. Society, to a certain extent, was a product of genetics, for even groups of animals had social organization.

Much of the social progress which took place over history was the result of social genesis. "Telic progress depends altogether upon that faculty of mind which enables man to pursue ends which it foresees and judges to be advantageous" (237). The process of telic progress included the use of mind, which Ward deemed central to any discussion of telic progress. Human telic progress allowed individuals to more efficiently maintain superiority over lower animals and plants. Ward held that the use of tools, clothing and shelter were all

⁴⁰Although intellect was not a social force, it was guide by which to harness and use the social forces.

encouraged by human telesis, and lower animals were unable to do these acts because they lacked telesis.

For Ward, the term "collective telesis" referred to "the collective action of society in the direction of restraining, controlling, directing, and utilizing in any manner the natural forces of society" (264). He firmly believed that this was basically a conception of government. Between individual and social telesis was group telesis or basis for organizational studies. Further, if these groups could think and act for a common purpose or goal, Ward held that society could also work for a common purpose. Among individuals, telesis was generally an unconscious act, but in social telesis, people were conscious of the possible good which could be derived from their actions. These actions generally took the form of laws or legislation passed by a governmental body.

Ward concluded the manuscript by showing how collective telesis was the only way to "place society once more in the free current of natural law" (293). Societies started with individualism which was overtaken by individual telesis which created artificial inequality. Socialism would move entirely in the opposite direction by creating artificial equalities. The synthesis of individual telesis would create sociocracy, which would return society to natural law.

4.2.4 Pure Sociology

Pure Sociology was Ward's theoretical treatise on the subject of sociology. His manuscript attempted to describe the existence of social laws, forces, and other phenomena in society, and trace them back to antecedent conditions. Ward was not writing to defend what had occurred, nor to endorse them. In this manuscript, Ward had many organic examples which are used to back-up his ideas and discussions.

Ward believed that sociology had moved to a stage where it could be considered a science, and an attempt was being made to embed the discipline into this position. He argued that when a discovery was made, then criticized, taken up, and improved upon, science was able to advance. Sociology was in its initial stage of development, a stage which was characterized by the notion that an undifferentiated, unorganized group of individuals had begun diligently working in the field. At this stage of development, there were many grand theories of society being presented, and each one attempted to disprove all of the other systems being developed. Ward maintained the idea that all the separate theories would ultimately "unite in one great river that represents the whole science of sociology as it will be finally established" (14).

Ward believed that the subject matter of sociology was the study of human achievement. He focused on the function and actions, rather than structure and being; thus, Ward was interested in the study of social phenomena. Ward narrowed his focus to the products of achievement; means of handling quantities and means of utilizing forces. He believed that these two products made civilization possible. Further, the study of sociology required that one focus upon social continuity, for without continuity, it was nearly impossible to study achievement.

In looking at the subject matter of sociology, Ward discussed the philosophy of historical materialism. Although not mentioning or defending Marx, Ward was not pleased with the current use of the philosophy. He stated that "its defenders dimly perceive the principle, but are unable to formulate it, being engrossed by surface conditions" (20). The comments were not directed as a criticism of Marx or his ideas, nor were they an attempt to defend their existence. For this reason, the remark shall be considered a neutral reference to Marxian ideas.

Sociology was in need of a good and thorough methodology to base its studies on. "The method in sociology is generalization. . . . It is essentially the process of grouping phenomena and using the groups as units" (49). For Ward, society was the most difficult area of study because it was highly complex, and subject to changes due to minor causes. Sociology needed a methodology in order to group phenomena into uniform categories.

Ward believed that there were two primary agents in the development of a society, dynamic and directive. Ward looked only at the dynamic agents, which were seen as agents of force. Specifically, he focused on desire as a psychological force in which men chose pleasure over the possibility of pain. For the sociologist, the study of social forces was more important.⁴¹

For Ward, even the subjective faculties of humans arrived through biological evolution. This section was full of biological parallels and explanations for the existence and occurrence of social phenomena. Societal growth and differentiation was caused by conative faculties. Of these faculties, the will was central to change and development. Change could occur in a society when social will formed.

Before Ward attempted to explain the forces of society which helped to maintain its livelihood, he felt it important that the reader understand the organic manifestations of similar effects. Social structures were

⁴¹For Ward, the sociologist was to understand and tame the social forces so that they would serve man rather than control man.

the product of social synergy, i.e., of the interaction of different social forces, all of which, in and of themselves, are destructive, but whose combined effect, mutually checking, constraining, and equilibrating one another is to produce structures (183).

Social energy was stored in these structures. Ward defined social statics as that area of sociology dealing with social organization. Social order was a product of the existence of social organization. Once social structures had been created, they "become reservoirs of power, and it is through them alone that all the work of society is performed" (193). Social statics, as a subdivision of social mechanics, included the assimilation and differentiation of people in society.⁴² More thoroughly, "social statics has to do with the creation of an equilibrium among the forces of human society" (221).

Social dynamics is generally seen as the sub-field of social mechanics which deals with the disruption of equilibrium in a society. For Ward, the disruption of equilibrium is not necessarily violent, but implies change, progress, and evolution. Social progress is subject to the notion of diminishing returns, and although change may be taking place, it is more difficult to maintain societal stability during these periods of time. For Ward, the leading principles in social dynamics are; difference of potential, innovation, and conation (social effort). "All these principles are unconscious social agencies working for social progress" (232).

As in his book Outlines of Sociology, Ward described and classified the different types of social forces which impacted society. The distinction between the different types of social forces was based on qualitative not quantitative differences. The baser social forces affected nature and were the basis of biology, where the higher social forces affected humans directly, and thus were the basis of sociology. These social forces were referred to as sociogenetic forces.

Ward focused on each of the specific classifications of the social forces beginning with the physical forces which were termed ontogenetic forces. In the section on ontogenetic forces, Ward mentioned the existence of a bourgeoisie, but the term is not related to any Marxian notion. His use of the term bourgeoisie referred to owners of any type, whether or not they employ others.

The phylogenetic forces were based on reproduction, not only among humans, but also on the creation and transformation of social structures (290). Ward spoke of two

⁴²Social mechanics was the term Ward used when stating that sociology should be based on a system of mathematics. The study of social mechanics was interested in social energy which individuals exerted by their actions.

different types of organic schemes, androcentric and gynaecocentric. He did not put value on one over the other, but left it to the reader to decide which theory was correct. Ward differentiated reproduction from sex for the fact that reproduction was important for the transmission of life, and did not imply the use of sex. Ward took great care to offer the reader numerous organic examples of both sex and reproduction to more clearly define the difference in the two forms of phylogenetic forces.

It was not until the existence of early society that man realized that he played an important part in race continuance. According to Ward, it was during this period of time that women were first subjugated. Further, the origin of the family "was simply an institution for the more complete subjugation and enslavement of women and children" (353). When Ward attempted to classify the different types of phylogenetic forces, he put them all under the notion of love. These forces differed to the extent that they were subject to individual will. "Unlike the ontogenetic forces, their suppression in the case of any particular individual does not result in death" (387). Further, the need for sexual satisfaction occurred at the societal level, not the individual level. Individuals could live without reproducing, but society cannot continuously exist without species reproduction.

The final set of social forces are the sociogenetic forces. These forces are described as "the socializing and civilizing impulses of mankind" (417). This social force is further subdivided into three groups; moral, esthetic and intellectual. These three sociogenetic forces are all related to the baser physical forces, but have an added dimension that requires individuals to use their brains. All societies have progressed intellectually and socially, and Ward points to the progress made in science, the arts and knowledge in and of itself.

After looking very specifically at the dynamic agents of society, Ward focused on the directive agents which have molded the development of society. The dynamic agent in societal development was based in the subjective faculties, whereas "the directive agent resides exclusively in the objective faculties" (457). The directive agent was based on the growing rationality of humankind. With the increased productivity and specialization of rationality, society developed both directly and indirectly. The latter of which seemed to be the most common type of development. Nature commanded the dynamic agent, while the directive agent was based on the processes of the mind. Nature took a long time to evolve

and change, but organic changes, which represent the directive agent, progressed quickly and with greater differentiation.⁴³

The second set of faculties is known as non-advantageous faculties, and "may all be included under the comprehensive term *genius*" (493). The motive for genius is not biological but sociological in intent. Non-advantageous faculties grow out of the advantageous faculties and develop along three different lines of genius: inventive; creative; and philosophical.

The inventive faculty has been practically overlooked and the creative faculty has been taken as a matter of course, but the faculty or power of "abstract reasoning," as it is called, this is the great, the worthy, the noble attribute that exalts man above all nature and renders him divine (496).

Philosophical genius helps create social structures and institutions which facilitate further development. Non-advantageous faculties develop biologically, but do not benefit individuals, rather the benefit is felt socially.

Ward turned his attention to how humans began to control nature, instead of living under its control.⁴⁴ This occurred through the invention of tools, shelter and hunting, which led to scientific discovery, and vice versa. This circular orientation of development helped society to progress over time. The main goal of scientific discovery was to dispel the illusions of nature and the errors of the primitive reason based on these illusions, and to substitute them for the truths that lie hidden beneath the superficial appearances and the laws of nature that only reveal themselves to prolonged observation, experimentation, and reflection (525).

By the arrival of the 19th century, many of the scientific disciplines were in existence, and busy studying phenomena within their realm of knowledge.

Ward concluded Pure Sociology with a chapter on what is included in his term human achievement. The chapters preceding this one describe what human achievement actually consists of and how it comes about. Socialization is the first form of human achievement mentioned by Ward, which he defines as conscious, intentional, wished for, and welcomed telic action, not of the individual as such, but of those individuals into whose hands society, by whatever means, intrusts the conduct of its affairs (547).

⁴³The objective faculties which are representative of the directive agent in the development of society are of biological origin. The mind has evolved through a series of four stages: indifferent sensation; intuition; perception; and finally reason.

⁴⁴After conquering nature, man wanted to understand the future as well as the past, and nature left man with one word, evolution (543).

A second area of human achievement is social regulation. All groups needed some form of regulation to be present, without regulation, groups easily faction and degenerate into unrecognizable parts. The state is the main source of social regulation in a society, and has "but one purpose, function, or mission, that of securing the welfare of society" (555).

Collective achievement (collectivism) is the third source of human achievement. Collectivism has taken a long time to rise up, in part because of the loose organization and attachment of individuals. The "universal growth of collectivism *pari passu* with the growth of intelligence is simply the natural and normal integration of functions with the development of social structure" (564).

The fourth source of human achievement exists in the development of social invention. Social invention requires the development and adjustment of situations which will make people act in a way that is advantageous for all of society. One way motivate people to act for the good of society is to enact legislation.

The final form of human achievement is social appropriation. This form of human achievement includes the passing down of knowledge as well as adding to the base of the previously understood knowledge. Much of this occurs through the formal and informal educational systems which exist in a given society.

The action of society in inaugurating and carrying on a great educational system, however defective we may consider that system to be, is undoubtedly the most promising form thus far taken by collective achievement (575).

4.2.5 Applied Sociology

For Ward, Applied Sociology and its predecessor Pure Sociology made up a system of sociology. Whereas pure sociology was the theoretical aspect of sociology, applied sociology was the practical portion of the field. Applied sociology focused on making improvements in society at a societal level, and "from the standpoint of applied sociology all men are really equal" (7). This field attempted to show how sociological principles can be applied to society.

Ward discussed the writings of Karl Marx in the first chapter, and believed that both Marx and Fourier's writings contained many contradictions.

The same may of course be said of nearly the whole social reform movement embraced under the general term 'socialism,' and including the utopian schools as well as the practical ones - Fourier as well as Karl Marx" (10).

The direct reference by Ward argued that both writers attempted to change social structures. He espoused the idea that they did not take into account the fact that social structures were extremely stable, and that institutions would fail to yield their power to the state.

Ward expressed the notion that progress is possible, and applied sociology is a vehicle of change; consequently, social justice would settle matters of inequality among humans. Applied sociology also exists to help solve the problem of implementing social freedom. Ward's solution to the problem is to create a surplus of agreeable feelings (pleasure, happiness, comfort, peace, etc.).

Without a surplus of agreeable over disagreeable feeling existence is worthless or worse than worthless. . . .The purpose of applied sociology is to point out a way of first getting rid of this long-standing deficit, and then of accumulating the maximum possible surplus (36).

Further, as more of a surplus is built, the pessimism which exists among academicians and society will lessen.

In "World Views," Ward attempted to end the debate between the materialist and intellectualist view of history. Ward firmly believed that the world was determined by ideas. He looked at the arguments made by historical materialists, but deemed that in fact, the intellectuals were on the right path. Ward maintained that economics was a field of wants and desires which dealt directly with individual ideas.

Now although the economic impulses - desires, wants, feelings -necessarily precede the ideas - opinions, beliefs, world conceptions -still it is the latter that determine action, and the purely economic interpretation of history is utterly inadequate (48).

The differences which arose between societies and their world views was based on the notion that the societies differed in their level of abstract reasoning.

Ward speaks of "historical materialism" in his chapter entitled "World Views." This indirect reference to a Marxian concept is neutral for the fact that Ward did not seem to know the intellectual origins of the word. He stated that people such as Thorold Rodgers and De Greef spoke and wrote about historical materialism, but at no time did he bring up its use before 1888. For Ward, rationality enforces the existence of spirit, for "religion is a product of reason" (63). Since religion is not based on objective truth, he believes that some error may be useful to society. Not all of the consequences of this type of error are positive because of their nature to inflict pain. The consequences of religion as consist of self-mutilation, superstition, asceticism, zoolatry, witchcraft, persecution, obscurantism and resistance to the truth. These consequences do not necessarily have to exist for there to be harmful effects of an unswerving belief in error. The errors are overcome by science which Ward believes to be synonymous with truth. "All progress in ideas has constituted in the gradual elimination of the error and substitution of truth" (82).

Truth does not necessarily lead to progress, but it does lead to achievement on an individual level. Error and truth both exist in the world of ideas. The conclusions drawn from the facts of the situation determine what is truth and what is error. "Error is false deduction, truth is correct deduction" (90). As long as knowledge and information are not equally held by all members in society, Ward asserts that social reform would not exist on a permanent basis. He suggests that those in the upper and lower classes were intellectual equals, but the lower classes had different knowledge than the upper classes.

The second section of Applied Sociology deals with the matter of achievement. Although it is related to pure sociology, Ward maintains that social improvement is an extension of achievement. The potential of any human exists through both nature and nurture. For Ward, nurture is a form of emancipation of the physically strong. Further, he argues that people must look to what is possible in terms of achievement, and attempt to attain it, for potential achievement is broader in scope than actual achievement.⁴⁵

The main discussion in his chapter on opportunity was to "determine how these agents (men) of civilization have been produced" (149). Ward used maps and statistics to disprove Galton's notion that in order to produce a greater civilization it was necessary to breed greater men. A second possible way to attain greater civilization was to focus on certain ethnic groups. This hypothesis did not hold because "so far as the different so-called races of Europe are concerned they are all about equally capable of literary work" (161).

Ward looked at the hypothesis that certain religions could produce more great men than other religions. Odin statistically demonstrated that protestants were more likely to be men of letters than were Catholics. de Candolle qualitatively attempted to prove that a number of important individuals in science, philosophy, art, and literature who would not have existed if their fathers had been Catholic. The next area of focus was on the local environment, where Ward revealed that eminent persons were more likely to be born in the city than the country.

Ward then followed Odin's focus on the economic condition at one's birth. Odin concluded that there was a greater probability that one would come to greatness if they

⁴⁵People's achievement is hindered by the existence of opposition, a problem which can be overcome. The "generalized form under which they are liberated and enabled to work in the interest of society is opportunity" (130). The environment is the main opposition to achievement, and is passive in nature, but can also help in the production of genius. Achievement in a social form leads to the development of civilization.

came from good economic conditions than if they came from poor economic conditions. Those individuals that were of the leisure classes (nobility, public officials, liberal professions) were more likely to be men of genius than those from the working classes (bourgeoisie and laboring class).⁴⁶ The final environmental factor was education. In following Odin's statistical findings, Ward perceived that good education also makes for men of genius. Overall,

the trend of the whole investigation has been in the general direction of showing that great men have been produced by the cooperation of two causes, genius and opportunity, and that neither alone can accomplish it (220).

Any given society will be full of men that are capable of genius, but Ward states that the research only focuses on mankind. He believes that "we have no conception of the real amount of talent or of genius possessed by women" (232). At a minimum, women add breadth to the amount of societal progress which takes place at any given time. It is the job of applied sociology to find a way to extend the advantages to all people, not just those that have favorable environmental conditions by default.⁴⁷

Societal improvement is the goal for all applied sociology, but it is through achievement for the good of society that improvement can exist. All of the intellectual differences in people are a result of artificial impediments. It is the work of achievement to find possible ways to overcome the barriers, and the work of applied sociology to put the ideas into action. For Ward, giving education to the lowest of classes to help them become good and useful citizens is "the most pressing of all social duties" (313).

The field of applied sociology is charged with the duty of upholding societal ethics. "All ethical systems based on science are at the bottom programs of social reform, and even though they be impracticable they belong to sociology" (318). Further, the field of applied sociology is needed to secure social welfare. The final problem for applied

⁴⁶The combination of a favorable local, economic, and social environment lead to great numbers of genius.

⁴⁷Favorable conditions are what Ward refers to as opportunities. His concern for applied sociology is that it should find ways to give everyone educational, social, and economic opportunities to succeed. There are also forms of opportunity that are consistently labeled as luck, which generally occur by accident.

The equalization of opportunity means the equalization of intelligence, and not until this is attained is there any virtue or any hope in schemes for the equalization of the material resources of society (281).

sociology is to show that it is a science by creating scientific principles from which it can work.

4.3 Summary

Sumner and Ward attempted to define the parameters of sociology. Their main goal was to have sociology recognized as a scientific and academic discipline. Sumner attempted to popularize sociology by writing short essays and articles which were published in many popular magazines. In contrast, Ward wrote long flowing texts that exemplify early American sociological treatises.

Both Ward and Sumner covered a wide variety of topics, and discussed the existence of a scientific hierarchy. Ward spent much of his time explaining and constructing biological analogies for sociological concepts and ideas. Sumner directed most of his effort to the realm of social institutions and the area of work and labor. Sumner and Ward also held different ideas as to what the government should do or not do. What may in fact link the two founders more closely was their insistence that the social forces of society encourage change and progress.

Lester F. Ward dealt with Marx or Marxian concepts infrequently. His main interest was in the definition, causes and effects of the social forces. The discussion of Marx or his concepts occurred only in the later stages of his writing, but even at that time were sparse.

William G. Sumner dealt with Marxian concepts and ideas, but opposed to many of the doctrine. He dealt with Marxian concepts throughout the writings which have been analyzed. Some of the articles lacked publication dates, but the dates were estimated by Albert Keller. In his later writings, Sumner most directly discussed Marx and his doctrines. Sumner had firsthand knowledge of Marx no later than 1887, the publication date of "What Makes the Rich Richer and the Poor Poorer?"

5.0 Franklin Henry Giddings and Albion Woodbury Small

The second set of founders for American academic sociology were Franklin Henry Giddings and Albion Woodbury Small. Giddings and Small were both born during the middle 1850s. Franklin H. Giddings was born on the 23rd of March, 1855 in Sherman, CT. Albion W. Small was born on May 11th, 1854 in Buckfield, ME.

Franklin Henry Giddings was born into a family which had a strict New England Puritan tradition.⁴⁸ His parents were Edward Johnathan and Rebecca Jane Fuller Giddings. Franklin's father was a distinguished congregational clergyman in Massachusetts. In high school, Henry H. Scott introduced Franklin to the intellectual writings of Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, and other English scientists and philosophers. In 1873, he attended Union College in Schenectady, NY, in preparation for a career as a civil engineer. Without the inspiration of a scholarly leader, Giddings left college after two years. He taught school and worked for newspapers before attaining his A.B. in 1877.

During his tenure as a newspaper writer, Giddings wrote academic and non-academic articles which appeared in places like the Political Science Quarterly. The articles attracted a great deal of attention from universities, and in 1888 he was asked to be a lecturer on Politics at Bryn Mawr. The position became available when Woodrow Wilson, associate professor of History and Political Science moved to Wesleyan University. Giddings taught courses in political economy, methods and principles of charity and correction, methods and principles of administration, and development of political institutions. In 1890, he began teaching a graduate seminar on modern theories of sociology.

In 1891, Giddings was asked to give lectures in sociology at Columbia University, which he did for three years while also teaching at Bryn Mawr. Columbia established a chair of sociology in 1894, which Giddings was asked to occupy, a position he held for the remainder of his life. He reached the status of emeritus in 1928.

Giddings had many other activities in which he was involved, from private industry to public servitude. He was one of the founders of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Further, he was twice elected president of the American Sociological Association (1910-1911), and the Institut Internationale de Sociologie. He died in 1931.

⁴⁸This biographical sketch was based on the following sources: H. Odum, American Masters of Social Science; E. Fuhrman, The Sociology of Knowledge in America, 1883-1915; H. Odum, American Sociology; and C. Page, Class and American Sociology.

Albion Small's parents were Reverend Albion Keith Parris Small and Thankful Lincoln Woodbury Small.⁴⁹ He grew up under the strict religious influence of his parents, particularly his father. Albion Small was set to follow his father's footsteps after high school.

Albion Small attended Colby College in 1872, and graduated in 1876. That same year, he enrolled in Newton Theological Seminary, where he graduated in 1879 with training for the Baptist Ministry. From 1879-1880, Small studied at the University of Berlin. During his stay in Germany, Albion met his future wife, Valeria von Massow, daughter of a German general. He was drawn to the social sciences during his stay in Germany. From the University of Berlin, Albion Small studied at Leipzig and worked at the British Museum, from 1880-1881.

Upon his return, Small began teaching at Colby College, where he taught history and political economy for the next ten years. In order to gain the Ph.D. which he had left Europe without so many years ago, he attended John Hopkins University during his sabbatical (1888-1889). He was elected to the presidency of Colby College upon his return, a position which he held for three years. In place of the president's course in moral philosophy, Small began a course in sociology.

Shortly before 1892, Small was recruited to become head of the department of sociology and anthropology at the University of Chicago.⁵⁰ Three years after starting his position at the University of Chicago, he founded the American Journal of Sociology (1895), a journal in which he served as editor until his death. Small was a founding member of the American Sociological Association, and served as president from 1912-1913. He also belonged to the Institut Internationale de Sociologie, where he served as president in 1922. Albion Woodbury Small died on March 24, 1926.

5.1 Analysis of Franklin Henry Giddings' Writings

The study of Franklin Giddings centers on five manuscripts: The Elements of Sociology (1898), Democracy and Empire (1900), Inductive Sociology (1901), The Principles of Sociology (1896), and Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology

⁴⁹The biographical portrait of Albion Woodbury Small is based upon the following sources: George Christakes, Albion W. Small; Ellsworth R. Fuhrman, The Sociology of Knowledge in America, 1883-1915; Vernon K. Dibble, The Legacy of Albion Small; and H. Odum, American Masters of Social Science.

⁵⁰The university did not open until the fall of 1892.

(1906). Giddings relied on numerous examples to help explain and defend his position and theories. Central to much of Giddings' writings was the development of consciousness and the evolution of society.

5.1.1 The Elements of Sociology

Franklin Giddings wrote The Elements of Sociology as a college level textbook. He began with a discussion of population and society, of which he stated that many areas become densely populated when the human needs can be met in the area. Further, he focused on the mixture of individuals who populate any one area. In any society, Giddings maintained that there were four practical activities of life: appreciation, a mental guide for the purposes of everyday life; utilization, the attempt to control, adapt, and use the things of the external world; characterization, a process of building individual character through successes and failures in everyday life, thus adapting ourselves to the world; and socialization, the systematic development of acquaintance and of helpful social relations. More complex activities were built through the collection and/or combination of the four practical activities. Further, he looked at the motives behind and the methods to using each practical activity to its fullest capacity.

In a major sense, Giddings saw that changes include conflict. Even in the most civil cases of friendship/ companionship, socialization was responsible for people's resemblance. Cooperation occurred in a socialized population, and depended on the like-mindedness of the individuals involved.

In looking to social nature, Giddings began with a study of its origination and then discussed the qualities involved in social nature. He asserted that social nature was fair, judicious, sympathetic, companionable, and in the most basic sense, good. Further, he was skeptical of socialistic communism, even if it attempted to be as fair and judicious as possible (103).

In the discussion of class, Giddings held that equality existed, but understood that in any class system, some people are more equal than others. He then described three primary classes, vitality, personality and social. All other types of classes were secondary because they may or may not exist in all societies. The vitality class was split in regards to bodily vigor, mental power and health and death rates. Giddings sub-divided the social classes into four; the social, non-social, pseudo social and anti-social. The social class set most of the examples and standards for mankind.

For Giddings, there was no supreme consciousness, rather there existed what he termed "the social mind." Basically, it was nothing more or less than the simultaneous like-mindedness which people had of an object. The social mind was determined to be both a state of consciousness and a social force. This like-mindedness was fundamental for the creation of organizations, and in compound societies, the family is the simplest organization.

Constituent societies were organized for "carrying on a particular activity, or for achieving some special social end" (193). Constituent societies did not exist in primitive societies, and only increased in existence as societies increased in complexity. In civil societies, the state was the main association of society, for it was constructed into several categories or classes. The actions of the state as an institution affected other institutions, such as religion and the economy. A second type of association, voluntary, also affected all types of institutions. For Giddings, institutions and associations were basically the same.⁵¹

Giddings assumed that all organizations in existence served very specific purposes. An organization was efficient to the point that it existed to fulfill the will of the people involved. The moral qualities and the recognition of superior knowledge also determined the efficiency of organizations. One outcome of an effective and efficient organization was that of wealth. A second outcome was to control the fear that individuals involved in the organization had. "The supreme result of efficient social organization, and the supreme test of efficiency, is the development of the socius, or the personality of the social man" (230).

In detailing how society was organized, Giddings asserted that social evolution occurred. Primitive people had primitive organizations, and as society evolved, so did the organizations. He asked the question: was the race social before becoming human, or vice

⁵¹Giddings looked at political associations, but did not lose sight of legal, cultural, juristic and economic associations. He discussed political associations in order to point out how important and diverse they were. Of the generalizations Giddings made about associations, the primary one was that "governments and private organizations duplicate each other's functions" (213). He further postulated that only the state "embodies and manifests the entire authority and social control of the community" (216). Social control was held either by sovereignty or by all people through the use of government. The social mind allowed individuals to gain high degrees of liberty within the state association, and certain laws existed on the basis of the type of liberty a society had.

versa? His conclusion was that, in fact, the race was social prior to becoming human. Giddings then gave examples to support his conclusion.⁵²

The evolution of the human race, as Giddings theorized, brought about conceptual thought and predicative speech, which made humans different from lower animals (238). Another fact he forwarded was that the social mind was developed by the earliest humans, and that certain traits of human nature were the result of the use of speech. Primary traditions brought rise to economic, juristic and political ideas. Religion, poetics and animism were notions of the intangible world, and were created as secondary traditions. Both primary and secondary traditions were wrought of the social mind.

According to Giddings, the horde was among the most primary of human organizations. Familial distinctions at this level of organization were non-existent or minimal at best. The clan developed out of the horde. In order for the clan to truly exist, it had to last longer than one generation, and had to be more regular in interaction than the horde. Tribes came into existence through the clan's need to migrate and to avoid attack. The division of tribes occurred when they could no longer be effectively overseen, and as a result, phratry originated. Out of all the sub-division and exclusion, federations appeared. For Giddings, the evolution of social types was mirrored by the evolution of religion, the way men found wives and the increasing importance of the family toward greater homogeneity. Only with the evolution of feudalism, did society develop civil organizations over tribal organizations.

When one society conquered another, the conquerors held the positions of power, whereas the conquered became a people working for the conquerors. Under feudalism, land was among the most important categories of wealth. According to Giddings, feudalism worked best when population density was relatively low. Towns arose under feudalism as centers for worship and defense. Further, "the currents of trade begin now to flow steadily toward the centres of religious and social life" (279). For Giddings, the essential spirit of civilization was "nothing more or less than a passion for homogeneity" (283). Religious persecution existed if the homogeneity of religious faith and ceremony could not be brought about simply and peacefully. Civilization consisted of a permanent home, supremacy of the state, social organizations based on mentality and morality, assimilation of population groups, integrated social composition and "homogeneity in politics, religion, manners and habits" (288).

⁵²He redefined Darwin's phrase "the survival of the fittest" as "the survival of those best fitted or adapted to the conditions of life in which their lot is cast" (234).

Giddings made the point that social evolution did not consist of chronological periods. Civil evolution's second stage was characterized by the switch from formal to rational like-mindedness. He also postulated that only certain societies would maintain progressiveness, as a result of survival and selection. These highly progressive nations must also develop a system of "social organization that shall maintain unity and stability, and yet shall guarantee liberty" (295). These second stage societies began to appear after the fall of the Roman Empire.

Societies which attempt to improve their material condition are those which have entered the third stage of civic evolution. Giddings argues that populations existed as societal conditions became better, and went on to revise Thomas Malthus's theory in his essay "Population." Societies reaching the third stage of evolution were characterized by greater complexity, heterogeneity, and quite possibly, a rise in democracy.

Democracy, from a scientific sense, was a "form of government, or a form of the state, or a form of society, or a combination of all three" (314). In ideal democratic societies, all institutions and organizations must be run in democratic fashion, and this could only happen if all men were educated and thoughtful. Democracy did not exist without the possibility of social cost. The four perils Giddings described are: progress, degeneration, disintegration and emotionalism. He maintained that the fear of disintegration could be extremely damaging, especially if the Marxian notion of a class conscious proletariat came into existence.

Many of the poor, although happily not a majority, give ear to anarchism or seek comfort in the socialistic dream. They withdraw themselves as far as possible from contact with the rich, and cherish the hope of organizing the working classes or "proletariat" into an irresistible force, and of taking possession of all the organs of government. This latter form of social disintegration, if it proceeds far, is the most serious of all danger, since it attempts to establish that illegitimate democracy, which consists in the absolute rule of the least competent part of the population, to the exclusion of all remaining portions of the people. This has happened in modern history for short intervals of time: once in the closing days of the French Revolution; and once in the reign of the Commune of Paris in 1871 (319-320).

As seen in this excerpt, Giddings was extremely fearful and critical of the proletariat as a class for itself. To avoid the dangers which could affect democracy, the rational-ethical consciousness "maintains social cohesion in a progressive democracy" (321). Accordingly, the natural aristocracy must remain unselfish in order to uphold democracy's existence.

Giddings concluded with a discussion of the relationship between the social and physical world. As an example, he argued that the quantity of food a society had access to determined the population of the society. Giddings continued to dissect the emergence and differentiation which existed in relation to the social world. All social laws of organization, civilization and progress were inherently related to the fundamental principles of psychology. In conclusion, Giddings stated, "social causation in a process of psychical activity conditioned by physical processes and cosmic law" (353).

5.1.2 Democracy and Empire

In Democracy and Empire, Giddings maintained that both could exist simultaneously for a nation. The social life and institutions of the United States, among other countries, were becoming more democratic, and they were also creating an empire by expanding their boundaries and developing territories. Giddings traced the development of nations through a series of civilization stages. He argued that homogeneity was essential for the development of social cohesion. Early civilizations relied on homogeneity of race and blood, and later civilizations had homogeneity based on ethics.

Giddings continued by discussing ethical motives, which he contended originated in physiology. "The ethical motive is the desire for the varied satisfaction of the entire organism thought continuing time" (19). The ethical motive could be strengthened through education. Ethical behavior extended into the future to the extent that people held that life was better and more desirable in the future. The psychic nature of society was primarily based on sympathy and instinct. Secondly, thought allowed society to become reflexive. Reflexiveness corresponded to the appearance of the perception of kind and to reflective sympathy.⁵³

The scientific goal of sociology is to accurately describe society. Society for Giddings consists of numerous like-minded individuals who strive for common ends through work (51). The introduction of people with different ideas, habits and ways of thinking allow society to change because they do not have consciousness of kind. Society changes either unconsciously and slowly or consciously and rapidly. Rapid social change occurs through deliberation and discussion or social action without reason. Rational

⁵³For Giddings, any discussion of the psychic nature of society is incomplete without his theory of consciousness of kind.

improvement occurs when social values are brought into question, and liberty, equality and fraternity are social functions which sociologists must help to maintain.

For Giddings, one cost of progress was an increase of absolute suffering. If further disequilibrium existed, society would suffer from degeneration and moral evil. These costs would be beared by the most non-progressive elements of society. If social evolution continued in its present course, Giddings believed that social organization would become more complex. Problems like crime, suicide and insanity "are a part of the cost of progress, forms that the cost of progress takes when the rate of social activity exceeds the rate of constructive reorganization" (90). One solution to the problem was to have society take responsibility for the costs of progress. Individuals should also be obligated to society in order to minimize the costs of progress.

Giddings proceeded to study industrial democracy, and concluded that the most important instruments were law and government. He looked specifically at Lassalles "Workingman's Programme" as the way for workers to gain rights. Workers saw their conditions improve as legislation continued to support them. Giddings then addressed the criticisms of such a system, as made by W.G. Sumner. Further, he discussed socialism in general and asserted that men of conscious would fight what they believed to be unethical socialism. Giddings mentioned several names in relation to socialism, the reference cannot be seen as a reference to Marx because he made a point to discuss general socialism, not any specific conception of it. Industrial democracy allowed for cooperation without "endangering social stability or destroying individual freedom" (124).

Giddings attempted to show that trusts were not, as commonly believed, able to change the highest possible price. The owner of a trust would only be able to have people pay exorbitant rates for the small amount of good that was necessary for survival. If the price was outrageously high, the consumer would not purchase the product above and beyond absolute necessity. Further, "if the trust conducts its affairs within the limits of morality, law, and public policy, it cannot long inflict serious injury on the community in consequence of its strictly economic functions" (143).

Giddings then looked at freedom gained by women at the end of the nineteenth century. Beyond legal rights, women had gained most in the area of industry. Women who worked before getting married were seen as enjoying a level of self-improvement. Further, society should help to "raise the standard of living of the self-supporting young women of the wages class" (176).

Giddings observed certain characteristics about political majorities. First, majorities joined together in order to act as a single unit. Unlike some researchers in the area, Giddings maintained that political majorities acted differently due to given social conditions and the level of social evolution. Political majorities were modified slowly by opinions, furthermore, progress occurs slowly. If progress did not occur, the majority would dissipate because it was felt to be passive. Political majorities had sociological and psychological characteristics which made it a prime area of study for the developing field of social psychology.

The next topic for discussion was democracy, more specifically, a critique of William Lecky. Giddings discussed some of the progresses which took place in democracy. He concluded that "the destinies of political democracy's will, therefore, be determined ultimately by the character of the aristocracy that rules the state behind the constitution" (213).

Education is an important aspect of life for Giddings. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he does not believe that his purpose is to popularize learning. Education is important for the mental development of individuals' intellectual facilities, and educated individuals are left with the responsibility to help the world progress. By educating the public, Giddings believes that society is assuring its own progress and development. Intellectual discourse is important for the maintenance of social structures, and education should not be done in school alone, but in every agency.

Governments are allowed to have power by the consent of those individuals who are governed. The government works as an ethical entity which creates policy "which strengthens or broadens civilization, or which in any part of the world displaces a lower by a higher social order" (264). People consent to be governed when experience is combined with reason and conscious approval. The more consciousness is gained, the more willing people will be to be governed.

With the close of the Spanish-American war, some people feared the collapse of social institutions. This point of view was not held by the public, for they believed that civil liberty would still exist for future generations. People's vitality and knowledge of past and present helped to reinforce their faith in the future. At a different level, American society was not like past societies because there had not been continual threats to our

borders or government. Not only would civil liberty continue to exist, it would expand and evolve; moreover, equality would increase.⁵⁴

Nations evolved ethically, and had a variety of moral experiences, not unlike individuals. The central goal to the development of any nation was in its use and control of power. Giddings went on to describe moral development from its earliest stages.⁵⁵ The moral stage of national development reflected upon the level of individual moral achievement within a society. As nations emerged, they placed increasing emphasis on fraternity, liberty and equality. In America, the ideal of perfect equity was being created "in which liberty and equality shall for all time be reconciled and combined" (340).

Giddings completed the manuscript with a discussion of non-resistance, in which he critiqued the ideas put forth by Nietzsche and Tolstoi. Non-resistance was believed to exist most often when people interacted with others to form groups in which all members have common interests. "Only when the democratic empire has compassed the uttermost parts of the world will there be that perfect understanding among men which is necessary for the growth of moral kinship" (357).

In Democracy and Empire, there were several places where Giddings discussed the ideas of communism and socialism. During these discussions, he made a point to discuss them in a general manner as if to deflect criticism. Because he wrote of these concepts in such a general manner, none are truly discussion of Marxian ideas.

5.1.3 Inductive Sociology

Inductive Sociology represents Giddings attempt to introduce inductive methods into the field of sociology. The book itself is a syllabus of how one can use inductive methods in the field of general sociology. Early on, Giddings agrees with Ward's conception of the hierarchy of the sciences, by showing how psychology is greater than biology, and sociology is greater than psychology.

The base level of investigation for sociology occurred whenever two or more people were together. Giddings believed that induction was the proper method of study for sociology. Induction was based on resemblances and differences of certain classes of

⁵⁴Giddings believed that America's supreme contribution to civilization was "the creation of this larger equity and its perfect expression and guarantee in the institutions of civil liberty" (306). Giddings wanted people to strive for a better future, and if they did, civil liberty would continue to have a strong existence.

⁵⁵He believed that nations moved through the cycle of moral development at different rates.

situations defined by time; space; form, colour, state, condition, and circumstance; structure and function; genesis; and magnitude (12). Further, Giddings proposed that sociologists could "make inductions of *Fact, Class, Generalization, Scientific Law and Condition*" (12). Induction of cause went beyond these previous inductions and included both similarities and differences of situations.

Marx is mentioned by name as one individual who did studies of cause. Specifically, Giddings wrote, "studies of cause by Buckle, Marx, Spencer, Ward, Tarde, Durkheim, Fouillee, and Le Bon" (16). The character of the phrase is neutral because nothing further is mentioned. This long section listed individuals who concerned themselves with the different types of induction.

Giddings listed two different types of sociological research; comparative and historical, both of which he considered to be inductive in method. The use of statistical methods was an outgrowth of comparative and historical models, but was considered to be a "quantitative mode of the comparative and historical methods" (20). Giddings looked at some of the different types of statistics which could be used, and how to use them properly. Giddings believed that many classes of observation existed, and that the current job was to rearrange, subdivide, define and coordinate different classes of observation.

The next book in the manuscript explained many of the classes of observation which have already been made, as well as detailing some of the subdivisions which existed in any class of observation. He began by looking at the areas which were inhabited by people and some of the natural and artificial characteristics of the area. The second chapter discussed some of the classes of aggregation which existed, including migration, density, and multiplication. The third chapter covered the physical differences of the individuals in a given area. These differences included age, gender, and kinship (including, race, nationality, and propinquity). Giddings then focused on some of the prevailing likeness of the physical characteristics of individuals living in a given area.

The second part of book two is concerned with the social mind and how people respond to the same or similar stimuli. For Giddings, the social mind basically means that there is "like responsiveness to stimulation, the sympathy and concurrent intelligence, the consciousness of kind, and the concerted volition of two or more individuals" (68). Giddings focuses on motor skills, emotions, appreciation, utilization, characteristics of individuals, and the composition of mental types. This second part of book two is on the social mind, and Giddings starts at the baser level of psychology to bring about his

discussion on the existence of a social mind. The second book itself resembles a code book for a long a detailed survey, which covers every aspect of a person's life.

For Giddings, consciousness only occurred when people became more similar. The more people resembled one another in society, the greater the possibility of consciousness among individuals. Socialization made people similar because they learn the same motives and methods in life. Giddings used the term sympathy to describe all the collective feeling that are involved in consciousness, and then proposed that as "the degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases" (108).

As people become conscious of their similarities, they "combine their activities for the better realization of their common purpose" (111). The voluntary combination of forces is known as concerted volition. Concerted volition involves a great amount of cooperation, which Giddings covers in detail. He discusses the nature, causes, forms, extend, and the public and private nature of cooperation. Giddings went on to discuss the notion that

appreciation, utilization, characterization, and socialization are the simple modes of all the practical activities known to a social population. These simple modes, however, are variously combined in four great groups of complex activity" (120).⁵⁶

When consciousness evolved into concerted volition, Giddings maintained that the total phenomenon of resemblance thus established may be called like-mindedness. According as instinctive, sympathetic, dogmatic, or critical elements predominate in the type of mind, will the mode of concerted

⁵⁶The first class of complex activity was entitled "Cultural Thought and Activity." The main component of which was appreciation, with weaker links to utilization, socialization, and characterization. Development of this complex activity began with linguistics, then animism, and finally scientific ideas. Aesthetic arts and religion were developed under the cultural class of complex activity.

The second class of complex activity is known as "Economic Thought and Activity." Utilization is the main component of this class of activity. "Economic activities, maintained by concerted volition, are developed out of, and coordinated with, the purely organic activities of physical life and the instinctive utilization of the lower animals" (127).

"Moral Thought and Activity" was the third class of complex activity. The main component of this type of activity was characterization. Private notions of moral activity could be either helpful or harmful to a community, whereas public morality generally took the form of "legal or juristic ideas" (129).

The final class of complex activity was "Political Thought and Activity," of which socialization was the main component. Like the other three classes of activity, all four simple modes of activity were interlocked in producing political ideas. Political activity was generally categorized in two areas, aggression or defense. Like all the other types of social activity, political activity was also public and private in nature.

volition vary, from an almost instinctive action up through impulsive and contagious action into formal, or perhaps more or less fanatical, action, or ultimately into deliberative action (133).

Giddings detailed the factors and development of each type of like-mindedness, and how each facilitated greater cooperation and complex activities among the members of any given society. The complex activities were affected by the types of like-mindedness to differing degrees. Dogmatic and deliberative like-mindedness affect complex activities the most, whereas instinctive like-mindedness has no real effect. Deliberative like-mindedness refined the different complex activities which developed in relation to sympathetic and dogmatic like-mindedness.

Giddings concluded the chapter on "Concerted Volition" by looking at some of the general laws which could be formulated because "inductive studies . . . have already been made by statisticians, historians, and psychologists" (175). He developed social laws on: the extent and intensity and the restraint of impulsive social action; social force of tradition; preference and social choice; and on the combination of social choice.

The third section of book two focused on the existence of social organizations. Giddings separated social organizations into five types, "(1) the Private and the Public, (2) the Unauthorized and the Authorized (Institutions), (3) the Unincorporated and the Incorporated, (4) the Component, and (5) the Constituent" (183). He focused on the Component and Constituent organizations in more detail than the other types of organizations.

There are two dichotomous types of social composition, ethnic or tribal and civil or demotic. Ethnic societies are based on genetic similarity, and can either be traced metronymically or patronymically. Further, ethnic societies can be either endogamous or exogamous. Giddings describes three basic different types of ethnic societies; family, horde, and tribe. "All degrees of social composition beyond the family and the horde are products of the deliberative action of the social mind" (196). Larger groups of social composition are in alliance to one another, but do not have to be physically related to each other.

A constituent society is "any association organized for carrying on a particular activity, or for achieving some special social end" (199). Constituent societies differ from component societies in the fact that they are based on structure, not the physical attributes of its members. Giddings then describes different types of organizations and associations which are considered constituent societies. It is important to note that "in the social

constitution either public or private associations can, at need, assume any social function" (222). Giddings concludes the chapter on constituent societies by formulating a general law which states that "*the development of the social constitution is proportional to the growth of an appreciation of the value of variety or unlikeness in society*" (224).

The social institutions of a given society are either coercive or liberal in nature, and the degree of like-mindedness is the main determinant of what social institutions will exist in a given society. Institutions predominated by a great degree of deliberative like-mindedness are the most liberal, while predominantly coercive ones have a greater degree of sympathetic and dogmatic like-mindedness (226-227).

The final part of book two discusses the existence and importance of social welfare. Social welfare "is the sum of the ends for which society exists" (233). The primary goal of social welfare is to preserve society's security, followed by equity, economy and culture. "The supreme result of efficient social organization and the supreme test of efficiency is the development of the personality of the social man" (249). The social man is described as being more rational, sympathetic, and becoming a better human. Both society and humankind evolve concurrently, and to a comparable degree.⁵⁷

5.1.4 Principles of Sociology

In Principles of Sociology Giddings described sociology as "the systematic description and explanation of society viewed as a whole. It is the general science of social phenomena" (5-6). Giddings argued that sociology must use objective and subjective means to understand social phenomena. Tarde and Durkheim were the first to discover the importance of social facts; furthermore, "the original and elementary subjective fact in society is *the consciousness of kind*" (17). To completely understand all the aspects and facets of consciousness of kind was to create the "complete subjective interpretation of society" (19). Aggregates evolved into associations when group consciousness arises.

Sciences already exist which each cover an aspect of social life, but none attempt to study society as a whole. While sociology is not the sum total of all the special sciences, it is the basis of them. Giddings deems sociology to be a concrete science, which at times

⁵⁷Giddings focused on human evolution in terms of vitality, mentality, morality, and sociality. "The vitality classes are graded from High to Low, and the mentality, morality, and sociality classes from Low to High, because such roughly is the order of genesis" (255).

deals with abstraction.⁵⁸ As a concrete science, sociology's central methods are thought to be inductive, descriptive and historical.⁵⁹

The first element of society and structure to be discussed by Giddings is the social population. Population is based on the aggregation of individuals controlled by the existent physical conditions. These conditions control all populations, human and animal alike. Long term societies of individuals exist because of bountiful physical conditions. "Aggregation is itself a condition favourable to further aggregation; because it affords protection to individuals, and because it normally is followed by social evolution" (87). In many cases, unrelated individuals begin societies. Further, genetic and congregate aggregation generally occur simultaneously.

Aggregation is the physical foundation of society; moreover, conflict naturally occurs among aggregates of individuals. Consciousness of kind begins to occur when people attempt to differentiate themselves from other individuals. "The consciousness of kind is the primordial subjective fact in social phenomena" (107). When communication occurs on a long term basis, association is said to be firmly established. Although imitation links society together by minimizing old conflicts, it may create new conflicts. Cooperation and mutual aid are established first unconsciously, and social pleasures are not seen as being different from acts of aggression.

Association modifies the activities and personalities of individuals. Social classes are developed to differentiate people living in the same community. Three types of classes exist in a given society; vitality, personality, and social classes. The first two are derived genetically, and the social classes are sub-divided by how well people are prepared to act in and help society.

⁵⁸A concrete science uses all types of methods, not just the ones thought to be central. "As a concrete science, therefore, sociology, like biology and psychology, must usually begin its investigations with observation and must conclude them with deductive confirmation and interpretation" (54). Because sociology is a concrete science and uses all possible methods, Giddings judged it ridiculous to split sociology into static and dynamic parts. The use of biological analogy is also seen as laborious and overused. Giddings reminds the readers that empirical generalizations are only probabilities.

⁵⁹The problems which are the study of sociology can be divided into primary and secondary orders. The primary problems deal with "social structure and growth. In the second class belong the problems of social process, law, and cause" (71). The primary problems were believed to be a group for description, which dealt with aggregates of individuals. Generally, the secondary social problems have been addressed and studied before the primary social problems.

The first result of association is the development of the individual mind. Secondly, the social mind develops, which dominates the individual will. Self consciousness helps individuals relate and understand other humans, and facilitates the development of the social mind.

Social memory is defined as being the knowledge of tradition. There are three levels of memory, each corresponds to deeper and more intellectual processes. Further, "public opinion, tradition, and the combinations of opinion with tradition are intellectual products of the social mind" (147). There are social values which are derived from tradition and public opinion, these social values are the basis for rational social choice. The social mind affects and restricts not only individuals, but also groups of individuals.

Social composition is basic at first, but becomes more complex as it differentiates and expands to involve other people. The lowest social form is the family, a basic level of association that is found among most animals. Giddings then discusses the existence of several different family forms.

There are two types of association beyond the family, demotic and ethnical. Ethnical groups in their lowest form are defined as hordes. The second class of ethnical group is deemed to be a society of linked groups. The most advanced form is termed an ethnic nation. Ethnical groups can be classified as metronymic or patronymic, and metronymic societies are the older form of association. Giddings went on to describe nations which exist at each level of ethnical development. Among demotic societies, Giddings believes that there is little necessity in explaining them in detail. "All degrees of social composition beyond the family and the horde imply the self-consciousness of the social mind" (169).

Social constitutions are developed to help people attain specific goals. Each group within a social constitution has specific social functions it is meant to fulfill. Social constitutions are generally described as being purposive organizations, of which the main one was the state. Among private organizations there are four categories; political, juristic, industrial, and cultural association. Each organization has a constitution which it upholds and the individuals are united by a consciousness of kind. Many purposive organizations serve multiple interests. In contrast, secondary organizations generally exist to serve one specific interest.

Association is one of the main reasons that the world is filled with diversity. Society helps maintain human existence by directly affecting individuals. Animals are

associated on a zoogenic level, which helps enforce a system of survival of the fittest. The zoogenic associations are "preparing the way for man and human society" (207).

The next level of association was termed anthropogenic, and was the level of association for primitive people. These associations were facilitated by an abundance of food. Giddings argued that secondary association "was the chief cause of the mental and moral development, and of the anatomical modifications that transformed sub-human species into man" (221).⁶⁰

Speech developed at the stage of anthropogenic association. Human races developed and differentiated as a result of certain social factors, and the social mind was the pinnacle of anthropogenic association. The social mind was taking account of and understanding certain levels of self-consciousness which animals were believed to be incapable of. Further, many of the traditions society adhered to originated at this level of association.⁶¹ The development of spiritual thought and ideas also developed from this level of association and mental development.

The third level of association is called ethnogenic association. These associations are based on family and other primary relations. For most of history, the family has been traced metronymically. As people come into contact with one another intercourse and cooperation increases. No matter how the family is traced, most marriage is exogamous. When hordes are brought together, the result is the evolution of clans and later tribes. At this stage of social development, the social mind is refined, and social constitution begins to evolve. Economic activity is centered at the household, and government begins to arise at this level of association, because the clan begins to enforce rights and duties. As a result, the clan regulates both public and private spheres of life.

The development of tribes occurs as clans become larger, to the point that they begin to subdivide. At this stage of development, social reason and self-consciousness arise. Giddings proceeds to describe the change of society from metronymic to patronymic organization, which may occur at any stage of social evolution. As wealth becomes important, feudalism develops. "With the achievement of confederation and the establishment of kingship, ethnogenic evolution is completed" (298).

⁶⁰Human progress is traced to this point in evolution. "Human nature is the preeminently social nature. Its primary factor is a consciousness of kind that is more profound, more inclusive, more discriminating, more varied in its colourings, than any consciousness of kind that is found among the lower animals" (225).

⁶¹The traditions of the social mind consisted of three primary traditions; economic, judicial, and political, and three secondary traditions; personal, aesthetic, and religious.

Demogenic association is the highest level of association and exists as the stage of civilization. The first stage is defined by mutually exclusive civilizations which must protect themselves from all neighboring countries and civilizations. In the second stage of civilization, there is more intellectual and personal freedom, but without legal construction and criticism, a level which no society can reach. The final stage is defined by ethics and economy.

In demogenic association, the social mind enters during the political phase. As society evolves further, there is more diversion from the traditions of the past. "The nation that has become protestant and progressive has to face the task of achieving a social organization that shall maintain unity and stability and yet shall guarantee liberty" (329). Once the constitutional government is stabilized, people focus their energies on industry. At this stage of development, society is highly heterogeneous and well differentiated to the extent that there are superior and subordinate classes of individuals. To a certain extent, one's ethnical background influences their decision of occupation.

Societal progress often leads to suffering, as a result, people turn to illegal and artificial means to attain their goals. If too much suffering occurs, societal degeneration may occur. None the less, progress is a natural result of civilizations and society, and is both objective and subjective in nature. "Subjectively, progress is an expansion of both the moral and mental life" (358). Subjective progress expands the consciousness of kind, while objective progress increases the number and types of interactions in society.

Giddings then proposed to study the social processes which occur in social phenomena. The first process was physical, dependent on the transformation of physical energy into social energy. Further, "social activity follows the line of least resistance" (369). Relatedly, social activities recur with great regularity. Differentiation began when people were not equally exposed to different parts of social aggregation. Giddings held that higher mobility and moldability existed in the social population than in any other aggregate. As structures changed, the social function increased in "cohesion, heterogeneity, and definiteness" (369). Giddings believed that social evolution occurred in terms of a moving equilibrium.

Beyond the physical nature of associations of individuals, the aggregates are held together psychically. "The social units are so adjusted to the social relations that they find their chief pleasure in them and desire to maintain and perfect them" (377).⁶² At the most

⁶²Many of the pleasures individuals feel come from spontaneous activity which we decidedly yield to.

basic level, people unconsciously coordinate their actions in a simultaneous manner. As association becomes complex and higher in nature, consciousness becomes necessary for coordinated social activity to occur. Association is constantly changing in strength, and

Giddings contended that

if stronger, it is because the consciousness of kind is becoming both deeper and more comprehensive; because knowledge is ripening and thought is becoming more catholic; because the purposes of men are becoming more serious, and their ideals nobler (394).

The best society is one which promotes individuality as well as the importance of associations.

Giddings turned to a study of social law and social causation. The first social law he described stated that "a community continually endeavours to perfect its type in accordance with the prevailing conception of an ideal good" (408). The first social law dealt with the achievement of certain ends, while the rest of the social laws related to the choice of means and combinations. The second law dealt with the social choice of particular combinations.⁶³ The next social law stated that over time, choices must conform to objective physical conditions (413). These laws explained that sociology was "an explanatory science, fortifying induction by deduction, and referring effects to veritable causes" (419).

Finally, Giddings reflects on the existence of society. Society's parts are related psychically and have a physical foundation. Society exists through a combination of conscious planning and unconscious evolution. Further, society's function is "the evolution of personality through ever higher stages until it attains the ideal that we name humanity" (421).

5.1.5 Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology

After evaluating several different definitions of society at the beginning of Descriptive and Historical Sociology, Giddings concludes that a society is made up of numerous individuals who develop a consciousness of kind while maintaining a degree of individual liberty. Society is divided into instinctive and rational sub-divisions. Human societies, even the most primitive, have some degree of rational comprehension, whereas

⁶³A population with few homogeneous interests will make conservative choices. Next, a population which has many unharmonious combinations of interests will choose radically. Finally, a population that has many harmoniously combined interests "will be consistently progressive in its choices" (411).

instinctive societies exist in the animal kingdom alone. The rational societies are further sub-divided into eight denominations. The three most basic societies are seen as coming into existence spontaneously, and the other five types are based on conscious planning and are heterogeneous in composition. Giddings then validates the evolution of societies through time.⁶⁴

The next section of the book dealt with population, which was seen as the basis of all societies. Within the study of population, Giddings discussed the topics of aggregation, composition, and amalgamation. By aggregation, he meant population density. One determinant of density was multiplication which occurred genetically, or through migration.⁶⁵

"Every phase of growth and of migration exhibited by a population is a mode or a product of conflict" (97). These conflicts could cast between humans and non-humans as well as human to human conflict. Aggregation also occurs through a process of evolution, which involves a measure of survival of the fittest. The only time the evolution of social organisms is upheld occurs when there is an "improvement in individual efficiency" (103).

The second characteristic of social populations seen by Giddings was composition, which was made up of physical differences in organic composition, age, gender and kinship. All together, he termed this characteristic of population demotic composition. Organic composition regarded physical characteristics like weight and height. Age and sex were self-explanatory to the extent that they influenced the size and heterogeneity of a population. Kinship was based on the matter of degree to which people were related to one another. The most basic type of kinship was consanguinity; furthermore, the most complex was remote relation based on the similarity of cranial structure. Further, migration affected composition immediately and directly. The degree of heterogeneity or homogeneity was thought to be based on physical characteristics and population movement. Amalgamation was discerned to create "homogeneity, or demotic unity" (121).

⁶⁴His evolutionary scale covered several different types of society. The most basic of these societies were animal societies and the final form was idealistic society. The order of societal development was: animal, ethnic, sympathetic, congenial, approbational, despotic, authoritarian, conspiritual, contractual, and idealistic.

⁶⁵Migration was divided into inter- and intra-migration. Intra-migration referred to the movement within a country, whereas, inter-migration was migration between countries. Giddings then gave several anthropological examples of aggregation over time.

The social mind is the next topic discussed by Giddings. The most basic psychophysical process is the stimulation of the nervous system.

Thoughts, emotions, voluntary movements, are accompanied by feeling, and often by those states of mind vigorously known as choice, purpose, or will, and mankind is accustomed to interpret voluntary activity, that is to say, conduct in terms of feeling or of will (125).

The goal of voluntary activity is to avoid pain, and if at all possible, achieve pleasure. Where people are in contact, communication is inevitable.

Suggestion molded people regardless of the type of communication used. Giddings discussed some of the positive and negative results that suggestion had on groups in history. Impression was defined by Giddings as the mental power "that one has over another" (154). People influenced one another, and learned how to act through imitation and example.

As Giddings previously stated, conflict pervaded all social interactions. He argued that conflict could be resolved by vanquishing the stronger or weaker party, or by compromise. At the other end of the spectrum, interaction led to association, which began at a personal level and spread by way of expansion, mainly "travel, commerce, diplomacy, and war" (173).

Giddings maintained that the study of causation should be based on psychophysical responses to stimuli. Like-responsiveness existed because people imitate, impersonate, and associate with other individuals. Giddings asserted that like-responsiveness moved through four stages which culminated at a level in which people continually had like-responses to the same stimuli. "Persistent or habitual modes of like-response constitute the mental and practical resemblances which are the chief factors of social phenomena" (182).

The forces of resemblance and differentiation were determined by Giddings to be the focus of socialization. When knowledge was combined with sympathy, the result was appreciation which was generally seen as an unconscious process. The greater one's experience, the more capable they were of appreciating others. People were most similar in instinct, then feeling, and least similar in intellect.

People learn to adapt to the external world through utilization, which has many different degrees, as does appreciation. The different motives for utilization include appetite, or craving for pleasure; the sense of power, and the love of exercising power; and rational desire, or the craving of our entire intellectual and moral nature for the higher satisfactions (207).

Utilization works through four methods, which Giddings defines as the different types of dispositions; aggressive, investigative, domineering and creative (209).

Character was similar in importance to the types of intellect, emotion and disposition. Just like the other factors of society there were different types of character; forceful, convivial, austere, and rational-conscientious (214). Giddings postulated that the forceful and convivial were the most common types of character in any modern society. He argued further that none of the faculties were independent from one another. There were six possible combinations of mind when the faculties were divided into motor reaction, emotion and intellectual aspects. Two of the types, the one's in which intellect held the tertiary position were those that exist among animals and babies only. Adult human development proceeded through four stages; "Ideo-Motor, the Ideo-Emotion, the Dogmatic-Emotional; and the Critically-Intellectual" (237). The most common types of minds at the beginning of the twentieth century were the ideo-emotional and the dogmatic-emotional.

All of the differences in resemblances could be found in any given society. Further, Giddings divided the population into four different categories; Cultural, Economic, Moral and Legal, and Political (240). The cultural differences and similarities of a population included language, literacy, entertainment, arts, religion, and "the mental attitude of the people toward scientific knowledge, investigation, and discovery" (241). The economic category of social population was most closely based on occupation and standard of living. Moral and legal populations had differences and similarities based on conduct, law, and legal procedure. Proof of the characteristics actual existence was shown by ordeal and compurgations (261). The final class of social population included diversities and identities of political sympathy on questions of local, class, and other interest, and the differences and identities that are associated with a differentiation of the population into political ranks, if such exist (263).

The total degree of resemblance was believed to be greater for individuals of the same nationality than for those of different nationalities.⁶⁶

Consciousness of Kind, a subjective phenomena, is the next topic Giddings covers. It refers to people's awareness of similarity to one another. Consciousness of Kind is a socializing force which "tends always to reconstruct and to dominate every mode of association and every social grouping" (275). Organic sympathy is one of the phenomena of consciousness at the base of resemblances. This type of consciousness is found in human and lower animals alike.

⁶⁶The more heterogeneous a population was, the less total resemblances that existed, and the social mind was minimized.

The next stage of consciousness development was based on a person's perception of resemblances and differences. "When the perception of resemblance has risen in consciousness, it reacts upon organic sympathy, and convert or develops it into an Intelligent or Reflective Sympathy" (283). Affection and friendship were one result of recognized resemblances, which people wanted reciprocation based on recognition. The consciousness of kind "is that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy, the perception of resemblances, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition" (289).

Giddings believed that consciousness was evolving toward a general or universal level. Related to this notion was his law of sympathy which stated that "*the degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases*" (298). By sympathy, he referred to all emotions steeped in the consciousness of kind. Consciousness of kind was deemed to be dynamic to the extent that it helped change society and its inner relations.

As minds grow more alike and develop consciousness of kind, Giddings held that assimilation or socialization was taking place. Assimilation occurred through a series of stages beginning with social imitation, then persistence of conflict, toleration and finally subjective toleration. Assimilation was generally thought to be a process of equilibration.⁶⁷

As people recognize their similarities and differences, they "combine their activities for the better realization of their common purpose" (326). Concerted volition generally begins spontaneously and moves to levels of ever increasing constraint. With the existence of concerted volition is a concept Giddings described as being like-mindedness. This like-mindedness develops through a series of stages from instructive to deliberative. Deliberative like-mindedness exists when discussion, reasoning, criticism and public opinion develop. Instinctive like-mindedness occurs in animals and primitive humans. Modern civilization is at the level of sympathetic and dogmatic like-mindedness, but is striving to elevate itself to the level of deliberative like-mindedness.

Concerted volition required cooperation among individuals in a society. Cooperation became conscious when planning was used to achieve desired ends, and could take the form of direct or indirect action. If all of a society worked together, public cooperation existed; however if only part of society worked, only private cooperation

⁶⁷Equilibration was determined by "(1) the extent of the consciousness of kind, (2) the psychological form of prevailing conflicts and agreements, and (3) the extent of intellectual conflict" (323).

remained. As a result of the social mind and cooperation, sovereignty and government developed. Just like consciousness of kind, concerted volition and cooperation developed through culture, economic, moral, and political stages of thought and activity.

The development of policy is the highest stage of cooperation. Internal policies attempt to develop certain relations among people within the same group, whereas external policies attempt to develop specific relations between groups. Internal policies are divided into areas of unity, liberty and equality. Unity attempts to strengthen the solidarity of the group. Policies of liberty are "reactions against the restraints, amounting often to intolerable coercion of excessive unification" (409). Finally the policies of equality attempt to make liberty and opportunity as equal among people as possible.

External policies are also divided into three categories; subjugation, exploitation, and assistance. Policies of assistance occur when the powerful and prosperous classes of the relatively strong peoples extend educational advantages, relief of acute stress, and, to some extent, economic opportunity to the wage-earning classes, to inferior races, and to dependent peoples (415).

The level of development of the social mind is the main determinant of the types of policy used by a society. As different combinations of external and internal policies are used, society evolves and develops.

When people continually associate and cooperate with one another, the development of social organization is possible. Social organization is based on the like-mindedness of individuals in any given society. Organizations come in a variety of forms, "(1) the Private and the Public, (2) the Unauthorized and the Authorized (institutions), (3) the Unincorporated and the Incorporated, (4) the Component, and (5) the Constituent" (431). In most cases, organizations can be divided in terms of public and private.

Giddings focused on the different types of existent social composition. Similar to his other books, he divided societies into family, ethnic, and demotic (civil) composition. The family was the simplest type of social composition, which could be either polygamous or monogamous, of which monogamous was the more evolved. Tracing kinship through time, Giddings began with the horde, then clan, phratry, tribe and confederation.

"The transition from tribal to civil organization is usually preceded by migration, and by settlement in a new environment won by conquest" (473). The development of civil society was previously traced in his Principles of Sociology. The social mind affected the development of a society, and "the social composition develops in proportion to the intensity and the scope of the passion for homogeneity" (500).

Associations organized to carry out social ends are defined as constituent societies, and serve specific social functions. Ethnic and civil societies are both capable of having social constitutions. In ethnic societies, constituent groups have not "separated from the component groups in which they have originated" (504). These associations are called component-constituent, and include the household, clan, tribe, phratry and confederation.

In civil society, "the social constitution subordinates and dominates the social composition" (507). Giddings discussed civil constitution previously in Inductive Sociology. He concluded that "the social constitution, therefore, is the result of a desire to combine variety with homogeneity in a complex unity" (518).

The final section of Descriptive and Historical Sociology discussed social welfare. Ensuring the greatest level of social welfare possible was deemed to be the primary social function of any society. These social functions had proximate and ultimate ends. Giddings described the proximate ends to be the public utilities, and the ultimate ends as social personality.

Among the public utilities, the primary function is security, then equity, economic opportunity, and finally cultural opportunity. Each social function builds on the previous one to create a highly evolved society. In discussing the social personality, Giddings asserts that "the supreme result of efficient social organization and the supreme test of efficiency is the development of the personality of the social man" (541). Comparatively, many societies excel in different areas (polity, equity, economy, scientific discover, religion, art and personality), which affects the type of society which develops.

In Descriptive and Historical Sociology, Giddings did not mention anything of Marxian origin. His manuscript restated many of the propositions which he developed in other texts. Giddings used numerous examples throughout the text, some of which were slightly Marxian in origin, but were written by people other than Giddings. He was using the examples, not for their Marxian influence, but their ability to describe the past.

5.2 Analysis of Albion Woodbury Small's Writings

An Introduction to the Study of Society, written with George E. Vincent (1894), General Sociology (1905), Adam Smith and Modern Sociology (1907), The Cameralists (1909), The Meaning of Social Science (1910), and Between Eras from Capitalism to Democracy (1913) are the manuscripts analyzed in the current study.⁶⁸ Small, unlike many of the other founders, attempted to define the limits of sociology. In his description of sociology, he was not endeavoring to undermine the other social sciences, but to integrate them.

5.2.1 An Introduction to the Study of Society

An Introduction to the Study of Society was a textbook which should not be examined as a book of conclusions, but a methodology by which to study sociology. The manuscript aimed at teaching students how to study society with a sociological methodology. In a very Spencerian way, Small and Vincent argued that the study of sociology evolved from sciences which stressed objectivity.

One of the first stresses of this volume was to show how Comte became known as the developer of sociology. The industrial revolution changed society's focus to the social conditions which shape life itself. During this period, certain thinkers unsuccessfully attempted to construct highly egalitarian societies. In endeavoring to change the face of society by implementing ideas of ideal society, socialists gave rise to the demand for sociology (37).

Small and Vincent argued that "organized philanthropy has both directly and indirectly promoted scientific Sociology" (40). Systematic studies of socialism also increased the need for the development of sociology. In looking at systematic socialism as a general category, they listed the names of those people involved in the subject area. These individuals ranged from "Saint Simon, Rodbertus, Proudhon, Bakunnin, Marx, and their interpreters and imitators" (41). Vincent and Small did not address each individual but returned to a general discussion of socialism. Socialism should be faced as criticisms about society. With the role played by Socialism in nineteenth century thought, sociology appears to have come into existence less from choice than from necessity. In the Hegelian idiom, conventionality is the thesis, socialism is the antithesis, sociology is the synthesis (41).

⁶⁸As stated in the chapter on methodology, Introduction to the Science of Society (1890) was not available.

Thus stated, Vincent and Small left this section as a neutral expression toward Marx.

Sociology found its niche with the help of economics, political economy and even modern historical criticism. The authors examined some of the nineteenth century works which were important to development of sociology. One result of this overview was to show the diversity of people writing about a field of study who are not well-trained or prepared to write within the discipline (52).

Small and Vincent called for a new set of well-trained individuals to develop the field of sociology. For them, "sociology is primarily historical and analytical" (56). Four distinct elements of data for historical and analytical sociology existed; the most basic of which was a knowledge of man as an animal. Secondly, the field examined man as an animal who has the ability to think. Third, man attempted to control natural forces; and finally, people interacted socially.

Sociology as a historical and analytical area of study was known as descriptive sociology.⁶⁹ Although descriptive sociology's main element of study was social facts, sociology also had a critical and ideal side (65). Knowledge of the existence of certain social facts allowed sociology to develop social ideals. These ideals were not to be misrepresented as utopian in nature, but as generalizations about the objective reality of society. The third dimension of sociology was dynamic, the discussion of this section defended the notions of social statics and dynamics. In basic terms, sociology was divided into descriptive, statical and dynamic dimensions (70).

As a fledgling discipline, sociology was detrimentally affected by a number of treatises which hindered sociology's development. Sociology was not a field for amateurs waiting to dabble in the solution of social problems. One of sociology's tasks was to help create more positive conditions for all social classes. Since dependents, defectives and delinquents were not full and proper members of society, they were not to be the center of sociological studies of society (80).⁷⁰ Sociology was termed the science of the social, not the unsocial, and must focus on how to reintegrate the individuals functionally into society.

⁶⁹The historical component was deemed to be qualitative, and the analytic component was quantitative in nature. The analytic component of sociology was likely to "recruit the ranks of social agitators. These men, in turn discredit sociology by making it appear to be merely a collective name for the various schemes by which unscientific optimists expect to organize imperfect men into perfect society" (74).

⁷⁰Interestingly enough, some of the works done at the University of Chicago during the Small era centered on these socially disvalued groups. Some examples of the books

Small and Vincent took the well known organicist position of society, and focused on the traits and definitions of organisms. The organismic view of society had little to do with the cataloging of social facts, rather it served as a guide to discoveries that were social in nature. Social organisms were characterized by their heterogeneous qualities, and the fact that no two societies were going to develop in identical ways. Further, social organisms were based on the psychical not physical relations of people.

Book two of the manuscript dealt with the development of society in an anthropological nature. As described by Small and Vincent, the second book attempted to serve three narrative purposes,

- (1) to exhibit qualitatively, not quantitatively, the various factors of social life as they appear at different stages of social organization;
- (2) to illustrate the tendency toward integration, specialization, and interdependence of parts which characterize a growing society; and chiefly
- (3) to suggest to the student a method of observation which seeks to gain a conspectus of all social activities in their interrelations, not to scrutinize separately one department of life (99).

This section of the book employed a descriptive sociology to focus on the way societies organize themselves. Small and Vincent described what societies value from the characteristic of integration. The various social values and norms were looked at in relation to different types of society, ranging from farms to towns and cities. The authors attempted to develop a method of study based on the development and organization of certain social institutions; the economy, the family, religion, government (political), and education.⁷¹ There was a great degree of subjective interpretation in this section. The development from individual farms to towns and cities was for Small and Vincent evolutionary in nature. Additionally, social institutions became more complex and specialized as society evolved. The whole book was very similar in character to what Durkheim explained as the differences which existed between societies of organic and mechanical solidarity.

The third book, entitled "Social Anatomy," was written in order to give the reader a "systematic examination of social structures as they are presented in contemporary life"

written on these subjects include: W.I. Thomas's Sex and Society(1907) and The Unadjusted Girl (1923), as well as Anderson's The Hobo (1923). After Small's retirement as department head, many other writings of similar social import occurred under Robert E. Park's influence (SG & KYFCS).

⁷¹The social institutions of science and technology were not discussed with regularity and depth to the extent which other institutions were described.

(169). Small and Vincent used the term anatomy to build, not dissect. In the most elementary sense, there were two essential conditions for society to exist; land and population. The sociologist's work was to study humans living in a society, and all people had wants which were expressed in their desires, which the sociologist must observe.⁷²

In returning to the discussion of the two basic elements of society, both land and population varied due to natural, and in the case of population, artificial means. As society became more complex, the ideas of wealth and property were not to be overlooked.

The first social element Small and Vincent discuss is the family, "the simplest permanent group which is discoverable in society" (184). Although power is unequally distributed among the spouses, the children have equal rights, duties and responsibilities. Small and Vincent maintain the idea that family strength varies inversely with social distance. The primary social structure of the family changes when children marry, because a different family structure is now of primary importance to the child.

The relation of a family is originally only economic, but a psychical element soon comes into existence. Since the population existent in a family is known, sociologists must focus on the family's relation to land and wealth, which are both "conditions of its existence and factors in its structure" (193). Finally, income is a necessity for the continued existence of any family.

Small and Vincent's next step was to relate the members of families to wider society. The larger social groups were split into two classes, aggregates and organs. Aggregates were "psychically, through not physically, coherent combinations of persons and goods" (197). These aggregations existed in two ways, spontaneously or voluntarily, neither of which were independent of the other. Spontaneous groups were not considered to be simple because they result from "natural conditions of common birth and geological location" (200). Voluntary aggregation had a volitional element. All aggregates were "composed almost exclusively of personal elements held together in certain relations by various bonds of common interest" (203).

Social organs exist in situations when individuals are interdependent with others, or there is dependence placed upon the organ itself. Social organs are not able to be split without harming at least some of the people who are dependent upon it. A factory is an

⁷²For Small and Vincent, history was a record of people acting in order to fulfill their desires. The personal wants were of six categories, "(a) health, (b) wealth, (c) sociability, (d) knowledge, (e) beauty, (f) righteousness" (175). They were fulfilled by a set of six related personal satisfactions.

example of Small and Vincent's notion of a social organ. If any line member is missing, the organ may suffer or production might be decreased. In Spencerian fashion, the functional combinations of society, or social organs may be classified as (1) the sustaining system, which produces wealth, (2) the transporting system, which conveys wealth and population from one part of society to another, and (3) the regulating system which coordinates and renders efficient local activities and raises to a higher power the psychical forces of men and society (213).

Individuals in society keep track of each other through the use of communication. For Small and Vincent, "every communication in society is transmitted by an agency partly psychical and partly physical" (216).⁷³ Every individual in society is a communication link to several different cells, and is in effect both a means and end link in communication patterns. Communication of all types constitutes a social system. This system is comprised of six components; "(1) the press, (2) the commercial system, (3) public address, (4) the educational system, (5) the ecclesiastical system, (6) the government system" (223). Small and Vincent subdivide these components of communication into smaller, more autonomous units.

The fourth book is "Social Physiology and Pathology." Taking a functionalist approach, Small and Vincent "inquire what the nature of social organic life is, what classes of activities are discernable, and by what agencies these functions are being performed" (237). Changes in knowledge and ideals allow society to modify itself, which is a result of a psychical, not physical forces.

Small and Vincent classify twelve separate social functions. Four belong to Spencer's sustaining system: propagation; location or settlement; defense against nature, animate and inanimate; and production of wealth. Three are part of the transporting system: transportation and exchange; apportionment of wealth; and transmission of wealth, inheritance. The final five are part of the regulating system: discovery, invention, and technical application; communication of psychical impulses; intellectual training, transmission of knowledge; discipline, ethical and social training; and control, coordination of activities (240-241). All twelve functions are discussed further, by their relation to the familial institution.

⁷³The psychical component is characterized by the transmission of ideas through the use of symbols. These symbols are not relegated to face-to-face interaction, instead are even available at a distance.

In the next chapter, the focus changed from the family to the social organism and its relation to the twelve social functions. All members of society belonged to systems of interdependent organs which were "conducive to the support and elevation of life" (259).

Up to this point of book four, the discussion centered on normal relations to the social functions. Small and Vincent then focused on social pathology, "the study of all phenomena which are apparently inconsistent with the best interests of society and the determination of clearly abnormal or unhealthy structures and functions" (267). In many cases, social pathology was a result of abnormal conditions of the social elements. The relationship of pathological people on social elements was reflexive (270). They identified six signs of social disease; (1) poverty, (2) vice, (3) crime, (4) pauperism, (5) physical disability, and (6) social inactivity (271-272). Further, all social functions contained elements of pathology, in relation to individual and the family unit.

Social pathology existent in social functions can and often does result in the dissolution of the family unit. In relation to the pathology of social organs, "the social organism is constantly striving to heal itself" (297). Further, social pathology has certain characteristics, "(1) they are very complex, (2) they are often incidental rather than essential, (3) they are more easily prevented than cured, (4) they can be eradicated only by a slow process" (301-302).

The final book discussed the development and usefulness of social psychology. Social psychology "describes the phenomena that result from the combination and reaction of the cognitions, emotions, and volitions of associated individuals" (306). Social knowledge, judgement and will are produced by individuals observations, reflections and volitions; furthermore, social knowledge exists on both individual and societal levels.

Social consciousness is the study for social psychology, whereas individual consciousness is the subject of study for individual psychology. The social consciousness is collective to the extent that people understand themselves only in relation to others. Social consciousness and unconsciousness is a continuum where the unconscious can become conscious and vice versa (336). Social knowledge derives from the transformation of social observations individuals make. Beyond observing and generalizing, people have feelings and emotions, and activities are based upon the judgements and decisions made by individuals, organic groups and social units (343). As such, all aspects are divided in terms of psychical labor.

Although antagonistic social group's knowledge and feelings can exist simultaneously, their social action cannot exist at the same time. Each social organ has a

political body which allows the group to make collective decisions. Group members have different feelings, motives and understandings of the same situation, and it is important that opposing forces modify their positions in order to compromise. The objective manifestation of social violations is in the existence of customs and laws. As society grows, certain laws and customs are outgrown and replaced with new laws and customs. Finally, "in the apparent conflict between self-interest and collective welfare, the religious motive exerts a most powerful influence in securing social or altruistic conduct" (365).

The final chapter of the volume reconstructs the purpose of each book. Small and Vincent fervently remind readers that what they provided is but a portion of the realm of sociological study. They attempt to introduce sociology in this volume, the science of society, to the reader and interest them in the discipline. In their own words, "we have indicated in elementary form, and within a comparatively restricted field, the method of knowledge and control which science sanctions" (374).

5.2.2 General Sociology

Small began General Sociology by asserting that human association was the proper subject matter for sociology.⁷⁴ Sociology was not infringing upon the individual social sciences, but attempted to synthesize them all into a general form. He then took the time to explain how the subject matter of sociology, while overlapping with other social sciences, did not attempt to occupy their specialized field of knowledge.

Small looked at the possible definitions of sociology, and discussed the definitions in detail, all of which he believed were complimentary. Small concluded the chapter by presenting two additional definitions and deciding that the most concise definition was "sociology is the science of the social process" (35). The impulse of sociology was seen as being purely humanitarian, and attempted to improve human life.

The history of sociology attempted to discover the intimate facts about society and its existence. Modern sociology was learning from the mistakes of past studies, and also tried to refine the methods. Small held that sociology should work toward explaining the present and future. Individuals actively existed and shaped society, but "all social facts are combinations of individual facts" (50). Sociology also studied culture because it was achieved by society, not individuals. The continued molding of past methods would eventually allow sociology to organize its knowledge.

⁷⁴For Small, association was an ongoing process.

Classification was an important method which should be employed by sociologists. Comte was among the first to use this method of study. Small argued that many sociologists working at classification neglect descriptive analysis, and classification was only one stage in the development of a scientific method for sociology.

A second method is the use of biological figures. Small's point is that the organic concept is of more importance than the use of biological analogies.

Other methodological goals included the recognition of dynamic laws and the attempt to develop psychological universals. It was important to combine the existent methods so that sociology could properly develop. The sociological method "tends to undermine the walls of division that have been constructed between the social sciences, and indeed between those sciences and psychology and general philosophy" (96).

Small theorized that the problems to be studied by sociology were innumerable. He maintained that "the task of sociology is to investigate manifestations of the social process under any and all conditions, from the most primitive to the most sophisticated" (101). The study of social problems was divided into those based on nature, and those based on humans.

Small then described the systems of Spencer, Schaffle, and Ratzenhofer in further detail. Central to Spencer's system was the idea that "social *structures* are the cause of coexisting social conditions" (111). Spencer concentrated on the description of the existence of society, not its development. He also split society into a number of institutional categories which looked similar to today's classification of institutions. Spencer described society through the use of biological analogies, even when he looked at social structure, functions, and growth. He further believed that society was evolving.

Small asserted that Spencer would have been better understood if he had been more vague, in part because society differentiated to the extent that it should be considered to be a group of aggregates, not a single organism. Small agreed that the discussion of social structure was important and that "the larger a society becomes, the more will its structure become varied" (146). He also argued that structure should not take as much space in the current study of society as it did in Spencer's system.

Schaffle is included in Small's discussion because he helped refine the conception of social reality held by sociologists, and Small outlined Schaffle's analysis of social functions. Schaffle concentrated on the social functions which society fulfilled, instead of relying on description of their structures. Although structure and function were not ends to

social examination, they were a means through which we pass, in order to understand society.

Sociology narrowed its focus to human association because society did not recognize the existence of individuality. Small argued that "we want an account of the intimate process of their lives, in terms that will assign their actual meaning and value to the chief and subordinate factors concerned in the process" (188). He wanted a system through which he could study the general and specific existence of human associations, and maintained that Ratzenhofer had done this best.

Ratzenhofer began his analysis from the level of primitive societies and the organization of associations between people. Ratzenhofer held that there were specific interests upon which life and existence were based, and these interests were the elements of the entire social process. The interests could be fulfilled individually or in relation and association with other individuals. There are two distinct types of interest, conjunction of and conflict of interests. The former promotes out-group solidarity, and the latter promotes in-group solidarity. Conjunction occurs more often as society gains higher stages of social process. *"The social process is a continual formation of groups around interests, and a continual exertion of reciprocal influence by means of group action"* (209).

Until more complete examination of the stages of human process existed, there were gaps in social knowledge. Human association was not seen as static, but dynamic and constantly changing and evolving, and Ratzenhofer traced the evolutionary stages in conflict development. Further, "the social process will not be understood until the facts about the most significant social stages are verified and interpreted" (223).

The state is another social institution which has undergone differentiation to a stage of more diverse association. Civic society requires that some individual freedom is relinquished so that a common good of the society can develop. "The social process is an incessant dialect of interest, of function and of structure" (240). The state is also based on conflict and sociability, the main good of which is the maximization of cooperation and sociability and the minimization of conflict (245).⁷⁵ At times, there are interests which are antagonistic with the interests of the state. National interests are developed through unity, and secondary interests promote individualism. Many of the secondary interests pit individuals against one another because of class, race, religion and other

⁷⁵Conflict and cooperation occur simultaneously, especially when there is conflict between nations. During these periods of time, people within the nations cooperate and work for the good of the society.

differences. Small proceeds to elaborate on Ratzenhofer's class model, and the relation of the classes to one another.

The main portion of this book was dedicated to the explanation of Ratzenhofer's system of sociology. After the discussion of interests, Small examined all the ideas of Ratzenhofer's plan to analyze the social process. He believed that each area of the social process "may be regarded as a demand for a specific investigation" (287). Ratzenhofer's first act of social processes covered the phenomena of political parties, followed by political interdependence and the dynamic relations of principle parties. The goal of the sociologist was to encourage progress and help people understand the social process.⁷⁶ Conflict was a temporary problem which the sociologist should work to solve.

Conflict and reciprocity are functions of one another, and as conflict is minimized, helpful reciprocity begins to be maximized. For Ratzenhofer, "struggle is essential to progress toward socialization" (336). Many misjudgments about society come from people looking at the value of culture, not civilization. Civilization is the result of social process and treats individuals as individuals, not as commodities. Small then outlines the essential ideas which give rise to civilization, and "integrates interests, and the groups that represent them, so that they settle themselves into types of association" (361). Small argues that sociologists have not developed their field because they have not reached the stage of objective science.

The social order of a given society is defective if there is an unemployed class of individuals. Illiteracy, a wide gap between rich and poor individuals, as well as social discontent were seen as evils which reinforce the notion of defect in the social order. "The essential conflict today is between the intellectual, the knowledge interest, and all the other interests combined" (387).⁷⁷

Small then reviewed a number of sociological concepts. The first group of sociological concepts centered on the idea of society. He looked not only at its existence, but also its development, shape, form, and other physical and social properties. In order for sociology to properly and accurately study society and individual associations, it must be contained within rational science.

The study of interests is important to the sociologist because they are "*the simplest modes of motion which we can trace in the conduct of human beings*" (426). In contrast to

⁷⁶Some social processes were dependent upon the development of social psychology.

⁷⁷These other interests attempt to uphold the status quo as well as tradition.

popular belief, Small maintains that sociologists understand the importance of individuals better than any other field of study. The interests of an individual are the most basic interests in existence, and have both subjective and objective components which are studied quantitatively as qualitatively. "General sociology is a preparation for judging a concrete combination of interests" (438). People's lives define and are defined by the interests that they have.

The individual is the only social unit because he is the basis of all association and interactions. Individual wants are considered to be the objective possibilities for humans, whereas their desires are subjective. Small designated six objective and subjective interests. Interests attempt to create and mold individuals, and Small designates six objective and subjective interests. Individuals are made up of the six main interests and all that they include, and exist only as a result of social behavior. Society then, "is a whole made up of parts each of which can and does move of itself" (479).

In order to function properly in society and know the act, the person, the episode, the social situation, the social problem, the social movement, in any single case, we must know the thought environment or the spiritual environment in which it occurs (486).

Where contact between individuals takes place, influence is exerted. Further, differentiation of individuals creates different social structures and functions for individuals, because they bring their different situations and experiences with them while they interact with others. People form groups in order to fulfill their interests which they have in common, and the more people interact and group themselves with others, the less chance there is of conflict.

Sociologists study all types of association in order to understand the relationships of individuals. Sociologists assume that there are distinct patterns in any association which must be understood and explained. Small held that the term association was not used to express anything new, but "arranges knowledge so that it may be put to more intelligent use" (509).

People serve their social functions within the realm of social institutions, which exist for all parts of society. Social structures exist and influence people even when social function is no longer present. For discussion of the social forces, Small relies upon the work of Lester F. Ward. Small discusses the existence of social ends which he believes to reflect "the real interests of the persons in the associations" (540). The social point of view relates the meaning of parts to the social whole, and is what distinguishes sociology from other fields, not its subject matter.

For Small, certain generalities could be seen among all human associations. First, it takes more than one person to create and maintain an association. Second, people are drawn together in associations because there is a sense of attraction. These attractions bring people who have similar interests and intentions together. Interdependence is another factor which helps create and maintain associations, for no association exists in a vacuum, and phenomena affect many associations, because people belong to more than one association. Further, there are internal and external forces which affect an association.

Associations are collectivities of heterogeneous people, and their dissimilarity breeds individualism. Socialization allows heterogeneous individuals to form effective associations. People have interests and desires which may or many not be fulfilled by various associations, as such, individuals have existence independent of their group affiliations. Of no less importance is the idea that associations influence individuals, even when they are not in physical existence.

In order to explain social causation, Small traced the social psychological argument made by Gabriel Tarde. He believed that Tarde created some problems and confused his readers; however, he created the notion of imitation. Small maintained that the most significant factors of life are the work of the mind, not the grinding of machinery. At the same time, we must protest against the tendency to accept interpretations in terms of mental action which is merely a process analogous with a mechanical process (639).

Small held that the problems associated with mind and mechanical processes would continue until social psychology properly developed.

In order to know how social actions operate as causes and produce effects, "it is necessary to have description and explanation of the social process, and of the structures and functions involved" (661). The ultimate decision of good and bad hinges on its effect on the social process. Inherent good promotes social process, whereas bad hinders social process. Small then looks at the sociological prerequisites for making ethical decisions, and concludes that good conduct results in a greater realization of life. Moreover, according to Small, any ethical judgement presupposes the existence of sociology.

Sociology's main problem is

to express objectively situations between persons, and the interchange of influence between person and person in the situations, and then to determine the positive or negative effects of those reactions upon some relationship of the situation taken up as a norm (665).

For Small, moral judgments are constructed and upheld through sociologists agreements upon their view of life.

Small perceived that before action could be taken on any social problem, the situation must be analyzed scientifically. Sociologists must weigh the existent and possible good or harm a social action may have before unleashing the action on society. The object of sociology laid, not among abstract and theoretical notions, but in fact, the object was, "intensely and fundamentally practical" (716). Human achievement was the goal of sociology, and Small summarized the different sources and divisions of achievement. Small concluded General Sociology by stating that insight into a situation was of great importance, and that "sociology aims to become the lens through which such insight may be possible" (729).

As Small proceeded to trace the history of sociology back to the work of Plato and other philosophers in General Sociology, he brought up the name of Karl Marx. Small neutrally stated that "sociology is a radically different affair from the philosophy of history, as we find in the abundant literature of that subject from Montesquieu to Marx, or from Bossuet to Buckle, or from Herder to Hegel or Lotze" (40). He argued that they all used reason before they studied the facts, as a result, they were unable to interpret the real world.

Within his discussion of Ratzenhofer, the terms of capitalist, capital, and proletariat are discussed. Many of the ideas are similar to the Marxian position on these topics, but cannot be considered to be Marxian because Small was discussing Ratzenhofer's ideas.

In his chapter on the conflicts of interest in the state, Small negatively discusses Marx's conception of historical materialism. The statement itself exists as a footnote to the discussion of current sociological methods. These methods have rejected any "attempt to reduce the social process to an operation of a single force" (283). Small footnotes the example that a single force is predicated by Marx and his followers.

5.2.3 Adam Smith and Modern Sociology

For Small, Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations focused on human rather than economic principles, and as a result deserved to be studied sociologically. Smith's philosophy argued for the social basis of economics. Further, Small perceived that German economists during the nineteenth century wrote more similarly to Smith than did many later English economists. He proceeded to focus on Smith's propositions in The Wealth of Nations.⁷⁸

⁷⁸Small related each theorem or proposition to the study of sociology. Further, although Smith did not define the subject matter of sociology, many of his discussions took on a sociological tone.

Smith's method, "is to be held up as a model of the scientific order of procedure in arriving at judgements of morals" (20). Small believed that expanding and specializing Smith's procedures was the methodology that sociologists should strive to achieve.

The principal methodological thesis which the exhibit is to support is that a sufficient interpretation of life to be a reliable basis for social programs must express economic relations at last in terms of the whole moral process (24).

Many previous sources traced the history of Smith, classified him, and even compared him to other sources of thought, topics Small did not wish to pursue in his present discussion. In an era of discussing individuality and subjectivity, Smith reversed his thinking in order to accomplish an objective social view on morals. Basically, Small's study of Adam Smith was "purely a contribution to sociological methodology" (65). Small maintained that if Smith were alive today, he would be labeled a socialist, a comment which foreshadowed the content of the manuscript.

In looking at Smith's writings, Small commented positively that "if one did not know the sequel, one might with good reason surmise that an earlier Karl Marx had been discovered" (98). He continued by expressing how similar one paragraph of Smith's writings were to the doctrines of Marx. The relation of the two writers continued for several pages, and in fact, throughout the entirety of the chapter on the economics and sociology of labor. Whereas Smith's discussion of labor and capital was seen as the creation of technological distinction, "in Marx's hands a labor theory of value became directly a class issue" (100). Small avoided the placement of any value judgement upon Marx's work, and as such, the lengthy comparison was neutral.

Smith's discussion of labor evolved deductively, but "failed to make due allowance for the subjective and social factors in value and price" (104). In looking at another segment of Smith's discussion of labor, Small again correlated Smith and Marx. The direct comment was a neutral evaluation of Marx and his doctrines. "Smith certainly had not thought of any such radical injustice as Marx afterward alleged in this connection" (107-108). Small did not critique Marx's writings as being inherently wrong, but instead compared them to Smith's concepts.

After more detailed discussion of labor and wealth, Small directly paralleled Marx and Smith in the discussion of capital, a parallel based on The Communist Manifesto, not Das Kapital. The long discussion centered on how two similar trains of thought came to different conclusions. Smith's contradictions and deficiencies in the discussion of capital

and profits allowed Marx to formulate his own theory on the relationship of capital and profits. If Smith had completed his discussion, Marx's economic doctrine would in all probability never have put in an appearance. If it had appeared, it could hardly, under the supposed circumstances, have been fathered by a man of Marx's intellectual power (111).

Further, if complete formulation of the relationship between capital and labor had been formulated, "Marx might still have become a socialist, but his socialism would certainly have had a different point of detachment from orthodox economic theory" (111). To this point in the discussion of capital and labor, Small made one neutral statement and two positive statements. In neutral terms, Small avoided judging Marx's doctrine.

Although Smith and Marx came to different conclusions about capitalists, they both had "equal intention to represent things as they are" (112). Before this positive statement, Small footnoted a neutral statement centering not on Smith or Marx, but the fact that their followers have reconstructed their theories fallaciously, "I (Small) am aware that neither Smith nor Marx is justly to be charged with deliberately promulgating the extreme errors to which their theories have lent force" (112).

The following describes a negative statement regarding Marx. Small holds that the current job is to ascertain "the elements of truth in both false universals, and combining them into a synthesis that shall more closely approach a true universal" (113). Further on in the chapter, as a footnote, Small neutrally concluded that

here again Smith seems to be declaring not only what is, but what in his opinion should be; thus indicating that he was unconscious of a debatable issue at the point where Marx made his first assault (116).

Small then concerted his effort on Smith's examination of value and commodity. He addressed Smith's conception of natural and market value placed on commodities and the presence of social influence. Small then invoked Marx's name, again neutrally, when he said that he was "not at all sure that socialists of the Marxian or any other type are really nearer in sympathy than Adam Smith was to the practical application of the human measure of value" (126). Small proceeded to lump all socialists together, and thus made no true criticism of Marx or Marxian doctrines in this section of the text.

Smith held that until artificial changes in the conception of property took place, the product of the labor belonged exclusively to the laborer. Smith believed that the wage and property systems were fair and righteous. Placing personal judgement on the next statement, Small negatively exclaimed of Marx that

the inferences drawn by Marx from premises so nearly identical with those of Smith would have seemed to the latter so preposterous that he was under no sort of embarrassment in stating those premises with perfect frankness (128).

Small then discussed the fact that incomplete economic differentiation on the subject of property rights "exploded in the form of Marxian socialism" (130). This neutral statement attested to the fact that contradictions and incomplete formation of principles helped develop Marxian socialism. Continuing in an unbiased and neutral fashion, Small argued that

there is really no difference between Smith and Marx on the economic elements in the principles of profits, nor between Ricardo and Marx on the economic elements in the principles of rent (131).

In conclusion to his discussion of property, Small positively declared that "there would have been no Marxism, except as a political movement, if economic theory, from Adam Smith's time had squarely faced the problem" (132).

Smith related economic theory to a sense of equality. Distribution was fair because all individuals similarly competed in a market which equally affected all. Smith argued that effective legal administration affected property rights favorably, while ineffective legal administration adversely affected property rights. At this point in the discussion Small reintroduced Marx. "Marxian socialism is the extreme antithesis of the smug assumption of the classicists that conventional property rights are the normal standard of public interests" (137). The statement was negative, not because of an antithetical relationship between classical economics and Marxian socialism, but because both were extremes which sociology in Small's era attempted to avoid altogether.

Small argued that Smith's propositions were deficient because they assumed society was static and at equilibrium. Although not a Marxian critique, Small argued that socialistic opposition would have been minimized if Smith's followers had not perverted his doctrines. Positively, Small postulated that "not even Marxians who understand their teacher deny that the Astors and Rothschilds are entitled to a wage for every stroke of labor that they perform" (142-143).

Most of Smith's writings for the remainder of book focused primarily on technology. Improvement in a society's circumstances led to increases of both wealth and costs. Again Marxian socialism was introduced into the discussion. Small neutrally stated the position of classical and liberal economists, the extreme of which was Marxian

socialism, and concluded that both sides enforced the notion that there were existent social problems which could not be solved by economics alone.

Rent is one problem which seemed basically economic, but in reality was also a part of the sociological realm.

The phenomena of rent, like the phenomena of exhaustion of the soil would be invariable in principle, whether a conqueror owned every foot of land, or Plantagenet feudalism prevailed, or nineteenth-century liberalism is developed, or Marxian socialism took possession (146).

This neutral position argued that no matter what type of governmental power was in control, certain laws and properties would exist. Small concluded the chapter's discussion by stating that if Adam Smith saw all the development and traits of early twentieth century society, he "would have pronounced it in principle a tendency in the direction of more just social balance" (154).

Smith surmised that the capitalist class served an important function for society, as did all classes. He felt that it was unimportant to look at the factors which could lead to improvement. Small's purpose was to

discover, first, the extent to which Adam Smith expressly correlated economic facts with other social activities, and, second, how his correlations or failures to correlate left problems in sociological interpretation which must be solved before social theory can be stable (167).

Although there were problems which Smith never felt it necessary to assume, Albion Small addressed many as sociological tasks.⁷⁹

Smith utilized both deductive and historical (inductive) methods in his writings, whereas Small presumed that induction was the only way to study human conduct.

Economic theory, after Adam Smith's time attempted to isolate all economic activity as a separate form of human activity, which Small maintained as ludicrous. Smith attempted to show that economic processes were only a part of the moral processes (201). Unfortunately he did not take into full account the pressure exerted by social processes, which led him in a direction entirely different from that of current sociological analyses.

Smith attempted to discuss the sociological necessity for war and armies, but was only able to defend the need for military budgets. He continually tried to analytically discuss sociological phenomena without great success. At many times, Smith focused on how institutions affected people in terms of structure and function. Smith was ahead of his

⁷⁹Economists had interpreted and critiqued The Wealth of Nations, but Small's purpose was to seek the sociological principles and ideas which lay at the base of Smith's work.

time when he stated his belief that "human conduct is a plexus of moral relations" (231). It took a great deal of time before this implicit notion affected sociological methodology.

In the conclusion, Small argued that without the rule of deliberative logic, Smith's work was unable to immediately impact sociology. He fought the Marxian ideas of why logic did not rule, and negatively proposed that "the Marxian explanation, however, falls very short of the whole psychology of the events" (235). Small's own conclusion, as restated from General Sociology, was that modern sociology was virtually an attempt to take up the larger program of social analysis and interpretation which was implicit in Adam Smith's moral philosophy.⁸⁰

5.2.4 The Cameralists

The Cameralists was a follow-up on Small's book Adam Smith and Modern Sociology. The cameralists were a series of German writers, from the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, who approached civil problems from a common view point, who proposed the same central question, and who developed a coherent civic theory, corresponding with the German system of administration at the same time in course of evolution (vii-viii).

Small maintained that the modern governmental system of Germany is great because of the cameralists work, which also shaped the German social sciences.

Small's discussion began with Seckendorff and ended with Sonnenfels.

Cameralism was employed by rulers in order to more efficiently complete state tasks. The cameralists created sciences which attempted to financially aid their employers. The main concern for the cameralists were to place the interests of community over those of individuals. Among the many fallacies believed of cameralism, Small theorized that "the center of social interest was civic, not economic" (20).

Osse was the first individual examined by Small. Osse was a forerunner of the cameralists, and argued that properly taught and trained men were unable to actively involve themselves in government because of rampant nepotism. Osse offered several solutions to existent governmental problems. Obrecht also proceeded the cameralist tradition; although he was often linked directly to the field. He proposed that money should be made available to prepare the state for war, and taxes should be imposed so as to

⁸⁰This philosophy was "suppressed for more than a century by prevailing interests in the technique of the production of wealth" (238).

financially secure the state. To this point, Osse and Obrecht were described in terms of their civics.

Small designated Seckendorff as the first of the cameralists. Seckendorff maintained that the rulers were the highest in civil law, but not in moral law; furthermore, no-one could punish the princes for their decisions except God. He believed that government should provide an organization of peace and order which would also instill good moral qualities into its citizens. The cameralists as a group attempted to elevate the position of the rulers they worked for, and in general, did not agree that citizens should have more rights or that rulers should be responsible to their subjects.⁸¹

The next set of individuals studied by Small were Becher, Hornick and Schroder. Becher influenced the cameralists, but was generally not perceived to be directly related. He held that rulers had absolute rights over their subjects, but would be summarily punished if they misused their power. What was said of Hornick was written by Wilhelm Roscher and quoted by Small.

The work of Schroder was used in contradictory ways, but often in rebuttal to the cameralists' general school of thought. As with other cameralists, he theorized that rulers gained their position through God's will. Schroder was interested in wealth from the standpoint of practicality, not economic philosophy. None of the cameralists centered their work on the economic concessions of life, politics and wealth. At the time Schroder was writing, he presumed that Germany could overtake England and other leading European countries if the will to do so actually existed. Instead of completely exploiting one source of wealth, he maintained that virgin sources could be more profitable for the state.

Gerhard was an important cameralist from the stand point that he based his work on Seckendorff and made improvements to the previously existing ideas. Secondly, "he gives expression to ideas which were gathering force among the formative influences of his time" (176). Gerhard perceived the science of the state more than a century before it was acted upon.

Rohr postulated that land was most enriched when a ruler took care of his subjects to the extent that "through diligent labor (the subjects) may have their support and means of

⁸¹At the foundation of German society during this era was a quasi-absolutism which influenced existent social structures (78). Much of the rulers' ideologies were based on tradition and the appeasement of local estates. The cameralists deemed that the state was an end in and of itself.

gain" (189). Rohr was another writer who was not a cameralist, but was sympathetic and influential to that particular form of thought.⁸²

With Gasser and Dithmar came the introduction of the study of cameralistics at the university level.⁸³ Dithmar asserted that one could study the sciences related to the economy but he "recommends observation of actual practice in the fields which they severally occupy" (227). Dithmar was a prime example of the point at which the social sciences stood because he was trying to free himself to empirically study phenomena.

Zinke attempted to base cameralism in a fundamental philosophy, and although the endeavor failed, no other cameralist strived to ground the field philosophically. He organized individual components of scientific cameralism into a more coherent system. At the time of Zinke, there were several other cameralistic writers of lesser importance.

Darjes argued that academic studies should not be the only guide in life because people must gain experience. Darjes was one of the few well-known cameralists to discuss problems economically. He attempted to find ways to raise the wealth of a prince and his subjects, not just exploit the citizenry for revenue gain.

Justi outlined the cameral sciences and more generally the social sciences. He surmised that university teaching of the cameral sciences was inept and infrequent. Much of Justi's work described ideal conditions, rather than ideas embraced by actual rulers, which he separated into three classes; monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. He attempted to use objective analysis to understand political phenomena, and tried to related that the happiness of one's subjects was the ultimate goal of any given ruler.

At times, Justi's work is very contradictory; moreover, he occasionally varies his definitions between propositions. Small states that he is the epitome of cameralism because he attempted to unite scholarly ideas into an organized and systematic scientific discipline. Small then summarizes Justi's main ideas into more than four hundred short propositions, which cover the topics of wealth, population and density, power, commerce, mercantilism and taxation.

Justi's political philosophy was flimsy, but an honorable attempt to plan and outline "the best paternalistic government that could be devised" (396). He surmised that the cameral sciences were derived from political philosophy. Further, Justi took a rationalistic rather than theological approach to the development of his major premises. He concluded

⁸²He was not a cameralist to the extent that he did not have a technical background which would support his position as a cameralist.

⁸³Both worked as cameralistic professors.

that the state's ultimate goal was to provide a common good for all people, otherwise known as social welfare.

Justi argued that although the government worked for the greatest good, people did not have rights over the laws they obeyed. Further, the citizenry would not hold the rulers responsible for unjust and oppressive action. Happiness for state and citizens rested on three premises; freedom, inner strength and security (420). Small then outlined Justi's idea of political and social utopia. Although Small points out problems and deficiencies in Justi's work, he does not entirely dismiss the works. Small's idea is to find the parts of Justi's methods that can be implemented into current social science research.⁸⁴

In the final chapter on Justi, Small stated a number of Justi's "disjointed" ideas. Among these ideas was the notion that as population density increased, so did the country's strength. Another topic in this final section covered religion. Justi contended that Christianity was not a good religion for the state because, it is too passive, patient, humble, with respect to the earthly life, and so strongly and openly despises everything which constitutes the welfare of citizens, that a civic constitution could not be maintained among other powers by true Christians only [p. 170] (475).

The last cameralist Small focused on was Sonnenfels. Sonnenfels believed that man had always been social, and society was related and unified in three distinct ways; ultimate purpose, will and force. Although citizens had an active part in deciding the will of society, "the monarch must be accepted as vicariously exercising that right for all the citizens, and must be obeyed because his will is virtually the will of all" (493). Sonnenfels attempted to differentiate and improve Justi's ideas, but encountered the same problems which plagued Justi.

Sonnenfels views social and religious virtue as two mutually exclusive types. People's freedom of action is jeopardized when a ruler abuses his power. Sonnenfels discusses a great number of ideas which specifically relate to the existence of the social sciences.

The second specific idea addressed in Sonnenfels' cameralism is his notion of commerce. Small imports the introductory section of Sonnenfels' discourse on commerce into the methods that should be used by the social sciences. In general, the cameralists

⁸⁴In the discussion of Justi's "policy wissenschaft," Small hypothesized that nineteenth century social science would have learned something from Justi's work had they not been so willing to condemn it as paternalistic. Although some of Justi's ideas were not greatly developed, they held much promise for social science if they were revised and refined.

"were political scientists in whose minds distinct economic categories were not differentiated until the Smithian influence became a variant of German thinking" (530). For Sonnenfels, the goal of commerce is to create advantages for the state and individuals alike.

For Sonnenfels, the state should hold absolute power over society to ensure that all resources are used for the greatest good and financial gain. "The state is under obligation to observe and maintain equality between the members of society according to the degree of their reciprocal contributions to the general welfare" (552). Further, the state should actively regulate prices and commerce because "artificial restrictions of the spontaneous course of trade are likely to work more harm than good" (569).

In Sonnenfel's discussion of finance, he asserted that the individual was a real and integral component of society. He concluded that certain groups of individuals should be exempt from the burden of taxes, and each individual should be taxed relative to the amount of income one has earned.

Small concluded the manuscript by compiling a list of summary statements about the book.⁸⁵ Americans should remember that although benefits differ, there is much to be gained from the civics of the German cameralists. The cameralists defended the position of the princes, and of collective welfare as ultimately decided by the princes. The cameralists believed that society was static, with no possibility for change. The cameralists worked for the protection of their own state's interests, without regard for the condition of other states. They asserted that Germany was underpopulated because the land was under-cultivated, similar to Malthus's conception of population. In order to understand and expand upon past work, "*every system of thought must be interpreted in connection with its peculiar purpose*" (596).

Since Small was dealing with the period of time from the 1500s to the 1700s, the ideas presented in the manuscript represent conceptions which existed long before Marx was born.

5.2.5 The Meaning of Social Science

The Meaning of Social Science was designed as a set of lectures given to social science graduate students. The first lecture discussed the unity of the social sciences, to the extent that Small attempted to introduce non-sociological social scientists to the field of

⁸⁵Small perceived that the cameralists had been mis-perceived and misrepresented. Small considered cameralism to be a "technology, not a philosophy" (591).

sociology. All social sciences attempt to understand reality, and sociology was developed out of the yearning for the truth about reality.

In the development and evolution of societies, Small believed that there were both objective and subjective factors, which work interdependently. Sociology is not synonymous with unified social science, but is an organizing factor of unified social science, which should exist in order to explain human experiences.⁸⁶

Sociology began in the nineteenth century by looking at how all the other lines of study were related. Sociology had two specific lines of study, reactions between man and nature and man and man. There were three types of sociologists; sentimental, mathematical, and biological.⁸⁷ Small spent a majority of the lecture describing the three classic schools of sociology.

Small postulated that much of the knowledge people had was due to the social sciences. If the social sciences did not give people a wide range of experiences, it would be hard, if not impossible, to study and theorize about human experience. Sociology was the proposed medium for the mutual respect of the social sciences.

The combined social sciences allowed individuals to understand life as a coherent whole. Small expected the social sciences to organize their fields around the idea that "men's experience is the evolution of human values" (137). The importance of the proposition was not that it necessarily solved a given problem, but allowed all social science investigation to be viewed in the same spectrum.

Sociologists were seen as nineteenth and twentieth century alchemists, and many social scientists restricted their studies to exclude sociology. Small believed that sociologists were working more for the cooperation of the social sciences than for the development of their own discipline. He gave an example of a cross-disciplinary committee, and how it worked on a descriptive problem. When broken into sub-committees, work overlapped, which Small considered to be a positive outcome of the work. Detailed questions of description should divide a group into numerous sub-committees, all of which have specific tasks.

⁸⁶The social sciences are all guilty of working individualistically, and although each social science has made worthy advances over time, un-united social sciences are unable to explain human interests because there is no knowledge of what the other fields are doing. The unity of the social sciences allows people to come "face to face with the literal facts, and therefore with the actual problems of society" (85).

⁸⁷Small grouped himself as a biological sociologist.

Small held that there was an absence of social science laws because no social phenomena had been completely studied. Any study should move through four different scientific phases:

first, the descriptive with the *facts*; second, the analytic, with the *connections* of facts; third, the evaluative, with the *worth* of the facts; fourth, the constructive, with *control* of the facts (186).

These were considered to be valuations or functional groups, known more specifically as social forces.

The next of Small's lectures dealt with the evaluative phase of science. By looking at the entire spectrum of valuations humans made over time, the social scientist could foresee possible changes. No incident was ever mutually exclusive, instead, all incidents are interrelated. The evaluative phase allowed social scientists to ascertain knowledge of cause and effect in human relations, rather than individual or partisan preferences about human relations, the standard value by which to arrive at decisions of what ought to be in human programs (225).

The use of evaluative methods by social scientists revolved around the notion of change in the future. The social sciences had not yet reached a point to which the present and future purposes of men contains meaning (240). By uniting the sciences and reducing their own presumptions and judgements, Small concluded that the sciences would be ready to study human interests. The end result was that social scientists would be able to make "judgments of desirable or undesirable social conditions or social procedures" (244).

The final scientific stage was known as the constructive phase. Evaluation in social science is a process of arriving at judgements about things worth doing and of ways of doing them; construction is a process of applying human forces to the doing of the things (251).

In a sense, social construction was the same as social action. The transition from evaluation to action could be instantaneous or take hundreds of years. The ideal end of social science investigation was action, but the involvement of others could be necessary for "making these valuations bear the ripened fruits of action" (271).

The final lecture dealt with Small's view of the future for social sciences. He maintained that social science would never take the place of religion. Fortunately, social science could help religion achieve greater realism. Further, the phases of science were built upon one another until culminating in action (construction). For Small, "investigation is the fundamental function of social science" (281).

The social sciences are emerging as full-fledged disciplines which are just beginning to realize the importance of cooperation. Cooperation needs numerous individuals who are willing to work together in order to achieve. In his final analysis, Small argues that both individuality and collectivity are necessary for the proper advancement of the social sciences.

The Meaning of Social Science had no references to Marx or Marxian conceptions, either direct or indirect. One possible explanation was that Small's lectures were meant to be an overview of the social sciences and the way they should relate to one another.

5.2.6 Between Eras: from Capitalism to Democracy

Between Eras: from Capitalism to Democracy is a manuscript written as a novel containing characters and dialogue. The opening chapter focuses on two characters, Barclay and Lyon, discussing the plight of a mutual friend. Within the dialogue, key concepts arise, such as social structure, values and social facts. The purpose of the first chapter is to open a line of reasoning based on the fact that both Barclay and Lyon use capitalist rationality to understand life, "the evolution of an ascending scale of wants in people's minds" (28).

In the second chapter, "The Mediator," Halleck, a minister, was caught between the sides of the labor union and the capitalists. He reached the point where he gave up his focus on individual morality, and redirected his energies into whether or not the world had order (37-38). Further, he believed that until there was compromise in class interests, social peace would not occur.

In "The Crisis," Small gave credence to the notion that many people in the labor unions were interested in a brand of socialism whereby labor would control capital. The adherents to this movement were working against capital. The labor unions, many of which based their fight on Marxist principles, perverted the facts and ideas to suit their own goals. At this point in the text, there was no way to link the ideas discussed directly to Marx.

Returning to Halleck, he proclaims that the labor dispute does not exist in the realm of the absolutely right versus wrong. Instead, capitalists and workers are looking at how they can prosper without viewing the other sides' rights, claims and values.

The president of the company was characterized as an unscrupulous businessman who made the most out of every unit of labor. In short, Mr. Lyon was a capitalist, a true captain of industry. Lyon's son Logan, sympathized with the plight of the workers to the

extent that his father did not object. By the end of the chapter entitled "The Safe and Sane," Logan's attitude changed from that of "an attorney to that of an inquirer" (116).

By the chapter on "The Insurgent," the strike had been in effect for two weeks. Logan and Ernest Edgerly attended the assembly of workers only to find that in appearance, the workers were no different than management (122-123). When the speaker finally brought the crowd to order, he preached for democracy and an end to the norm of power in the hands of the few (125). The speaker believed that each individual must earn rights through work; furthermore, "he had presented it (the issue) as a conflict not of jealousy, but of justice" (128). For the speaker, capitalism made a monkey of true democracy.

In "The Moralist," Edgerly addressed the Patriarch's Club. He discussed the current labor problem from an independent position, not praising the tactics used by either side. In fact, he stated that there will be no secure industrial peace till the conflicts of classes abandon the policy of settlement by clash of hostile force, and substitute the arbitrament of dispassionate inquiry into the conditions of human progress (158).

Although he did not defend the tenets of socialism, he criticized businessmen for their fear of the term. Capitalism made businessmen forget that "wealth is for the sake of life, and falling under the illusion that life is the sake of wealth" (166). After further discussion, the point was made that capital in itself did not inherently cause social problems (185).

In "The Door of Hope," a businessman, Kissinger, is confronted with the proposition of working for the labor movement. To do so, he must leave the company for whom he spent the last twenty years as a member of upper level management. To make such a move would require that he give up the security which he spent so much time trying to build.

The possibility that the Company was debating whether or not to evict the employees on strike led Kissinger to the decision to leave the company and join the labor movement. He might not have carried out this decision if he lacked the support of his daughter and her companion. Kissinger spoke with Logan Lyon about leaving the company because of ideational differences, and the humanitarian purposes of fighting for what he believed to be the morally correct position in the capitalism/democracy dispute.

In the section on "The Novice," David Lyon, president of the Avery Company became involved in a detailed discussion about the nature of capital with his niece. By making the assumption that her arguments would be elementary in nature, he was caught

in a battle which he eventually lost. His niece, Hester, arrived at the conclusion that he could not be convinced of the validity of the opposite points of view because he believed that no new knowledge could be gained from it.

The different aspects of the labor dispute were brought together in hopes of ending the problem. It was believed that Logan, lawyer for the Avery Company; Graham, the advocate of democracy over capital; and Halleck, the mediative party could at least begin to resolve the labor dispute (294). With the influence of the Riffraff, a university-based group, ideas were thrown into the air which made the individuals directly involved think about the situation. After leaving the gathering, Halleck confronted Logan with the notion that he and Graham must meet to end the labor strike (324). Halleck then talked with Graham to set up a meeting between he and Logan.

In the chapter "The Illusion of Capitalism," Logan and Graham finally focus on the business at hand. Graham begins by stating that "the only producers of wealth are nature and labor" (337). He goes on to argue that a productivity theory of capital is absurd. In this argument, Graham states that,

we are exploiting nature, and producing wealth, and every time we turn a ton of goods into capital we add a corresponding amount to the fixed charges on the world's labor. Now where is this extra charge come from? It can come from only four sources: First, new appropriations of nature; second, new technical processes; third, new labor efficiency; fourth, subtraction from one's share in the product. Under present conditions, there is no doubt whose share it will be (342-343).

Graham then moves from the ills of capitalist production to capitalist distribution. By the time the discussion reaches the topic of shifting business theory, Logan is struggling to uphold the business interests of the Avery Company.⁸⁸

As the argument wore on, Graham began to attack capitalism with greater fervor. He was striving to implement democratic processes into business where all interests were fully represented and workers were paid fairly for the work they did. Halleck served a great purpose when he was able to draw up the terms of agreement between the Avery Company and its employees based on what English employers offered the shipyard workers (382-384). Both representatives agreed to the terms, but then came the matter of getting the parties to agree.

⁸⁸He has become very accepting mentally of the changes, but has a duty to the company which must be upheld.

The last chapter "The Old Order Changeth," focused on David Lyon, president of the Avery Company. With a New Jersey company attempting to compete for the Avery Company's market, he was faced with a dilemma, whether to accept the terms of agreement written by Halleck, withdrawal or merge with the New Jersey company. David Lyon discussed the proposed plan with Logan, who explained that the plan was an experiment in the use of democratic ideas in business dealings (427-428). After further questioning, David Lyon saw that there was no other way, and as a result resigned from his position and left the presidency of the company to Logan.

The three indirect statements concerning Marx were neutral because Small was writing a book based on description, not on the accuracy of ideas. Kissinger's traitorous move from the side of capitalists to the side of the workers was a situation which Marx advocated. He believed that by having capitalists switch to the side of the proletariat, they could help lead the workers to victory. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole (MER, 481).

On page 332, Graham made an indirect statement concerning Marx. While discussing with Logan the economic absurdity of the basis of capitalism, Logan asked why economics had not noticed it. Graham retorted that "I am not the first to see through the fallacy of capitalism by any means; but the men who have been in the saddle have been able to run every one off the range who showed signs of getting wise to the system" (332).

The extended argument made by Graham includes another indirect neutral statement of Marxian ideas which comes, at least in part, from Das Kapital, Volume I, Part II. Although Small did not directly call extra charges a form of surplus value, it is the idea he describes.

5.3 Summary

Giddings and Small both attempted to redefine sociology from their earliest conceptions. Both individuals wrote a great deal about the relatedness of all social sciences, and the need for combination. Small was also interested in defining the basis of sociology in economics and political economy.

Small and Giddings overlapped one another a great deal in their ideas about sociology. Although they had different definitions of the discipline, they believed that sociology could be both an objective and subjective scientific field. Additionally, Giddings and Small held that biological analogies had seen the end of their usefulness. Both described society in terms of evolution but avoided the use of biological analogies to support their theories and conclusions. Further, they maintained that social consciousness existed.

Franklin Giddings wrote little about Marx and his propositions. He was more interested in the development of individual interactions and the existence of consciousness of kind. The discussion of Marx that did occur was sparse, and spread through the totality of his writings.

Albion Small wrote a great deal about Marx as an individual, as well as his ideas. Many of Small's references to Marx were of a neutral character, but he was not afraid to use and discuss Marxian doctrine. In Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, Small made it clear that the comparisons he was drawing were derived from Marx and Engel's Communist Manifesto, not Das Kapital. Although he may not have read them extremely closely, at least he had knowledge of both manuscripts.

6.0 Charles Horton Cooley and Edward Alsworth Ross

Charles Horton Cooley and Edward Alsworth Ross are the last two founders of American academic sociology to be discussed. Both individuals were born in the 1860s. Charles H. Cooley was born on August 17th, 1864 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Edward Alsworth Ross was born in Virden, Illinois on 12 December 1866.

Charles H. Cooley was the son of Thomas McIntyre and Mary Horton Cooley.⁸⁹ Thomas was elected to the Supreme Court of Michigan during the year of Charles Cooley's birth. Charles Cooley took seven years to complete his bachelor's degree due to poor health. He began taking graduate courses in residence at the University of Michigan in January of 1889. His residence was short-lived because the Interstate Commerce Commission asked him to do an investigation.

During the summer of 1890, Charles married Elsie Jones. They traveled to Europe for six months during the winter of 1891-1892. They finally settled in Ann Arbor, where Charles accepted an instructorship at the University of Michigan that began in the fall of 1892. Charles Cooley finished his doctorate in 1894, and became part of the faculty. He was president of the American Sociological Society in 1918, and remained at the University of Michigan until his death in 1929.

Edward A. Ross was the son of William C. Ross and Rachel Alsworth Ross.⁹⁰ Edward Ross's father was a pioneer, and Edward was left orphan at age eight. He went to Coe College in Iowa, where he received his bachelor's degree in 1886. He studied for a year 1888-1889 at the University of Berlin in Germany. Edward Ross returned to the United States and received his doctorate in 1891 while at Johns Hopkins. During the same year Edward met Lester Ward's niece, Rosamond Willoughby, whom he eventually married. He taught at Cornell and Indiana University before accepting a chair at Stanford. He was dismissed from Stanford for his views on certain public policy problems.

From 1901-1906 Edward Ross taught at the University of Nebraska. He then moved permanently to the University of Wisconsin in the fall of 1906, where he remained

⁸⁹This biographical sketch is based on the Introduction to Sociological Theory and Social Research written by Robert Cooley Angell, Ellsworth Fuhrman's The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883-1915, and Lewis Coser's Master's of Sociological Thought.

⁹⁰The biographical portrait of Edward A. Ross was based on Edward A. Ross's Seventy Years of It, Don Martindale's The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory, Ellsworth Fuhrman's The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883-1915, and Howard Odum's American Sociology.

for over thirty years before his death in 1951. He was the last individual to be president of the American Sociological Society for two terms, 1914 and 1915.

6.1 Analysis of Charles Horton Cooley's Writings

The current analysis focuses on two books: *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902) and *Social Organization* (1909), and a manuscript of collected essays *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (1930).⁹¹ *Human Nature and the Social Order* is the first of Charles H. Cooley's main works. It is in this work that Cooley introduces the reader to his concept of social psychology, and more specifically his theory of the "Looking Glass Self." *Social Organization*, like most of his work, focuses on the interrelatedness of self and society (STLS, 985). More specifically he looks at how the individual relates to democracy, class systems, the family, institutions, and even the church. The four essays in *Sociological Theory and Social Research* written before 1915 are: "The Theory of Transportation," "Genius, Fame and the Comparison of Races," "Personal Competition," and "A Study of the Use of Self-Words by a Child."

6.1.1 Human Nature and the Social Order

Human Nature and the Social Order forwarded the idea that the individual and society were interrelated, and that the single-minded focus on one topic or the other was fallacious. Cooley saw the individual and society as parts of the same whole. The book attempted to show the importance of treating the two subjects as one in the same. He held that point of view separated the two concepts, not their function in explanation. Society and the individual were reciprocal in nature, and both made up human nature. The book focused on the individual, whereas *Social Organization* focused on society level analysis.

After debunking some common fallacies about the study of individuals and society, Cooley opens with the subject of suggestion and choice. In this discussion, he argues that "the distinction is one of degree rather than kind" (16). Cooley distrusts the assumption that children can be controlled by suggestion more than adults. He fleshes out this argument by describing his own observations of child "R." and child "M.". He extends the idea that "popular attention should fix itself upon voluntary thought and action, and tend

⁹¹Although this book was published after 1915, 4 of the essays within the book were written before 1915.

to overlook the involuntary . . ." (30). His conclusion is that suggestibility depends on the "efficiency of the higher mental organization" (43).

Cooley continues his micro level analysis with the topic of sociability. He believes that sociability is just like any other individual instinct, "it is a process of organization, involving progressive differentiation and integration, such as we see everywhere in nature" (51). After discussing personal observations of R., M., and other individuals, Cooley comes to the conclusion that "*self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive social facts*" (92).

Cooley argues that sympathy is a special way of looking at the social order. Sympathy is important to several distinct functions; it is a measure of an individual's personality; it is a requisite to social power; goodness, justice and right occur because an individual can be sympathetic to the situation of another individual; and sympathetic life reflects and implies the state of society, helping us to discern principles and processes that we see at the macro level study of human beings.⁹²

Throughout the next two chapters, Cooley examines the idea and meaning of "I" and phases it goes through. Cooley maintains that the analysis of children is the best way to realize "I"'s essential meaning. He does not believe that the "I" is located only in our material body, but permeates our entire lives. By discussing the usages and limitations of self-feeling, Cooley develops the concept of the "looking-glass." Cooley concludes that self-feeling is important because, "with all normal and human people it remains in one form or another, the mainspring of endeavor and a chief interest of the imagination throughout life" (177).

Cooley holds that people who do not believe in the existence of things that cannot be seen or touched should not venture into the study of persons and society. In looking at leadership, he concludes that

all leadership has an aspect of sympathy and conformity, as well as one of individuality and self-will, in that every leader must also be a follower, in the sense that he shares the general current of life (321).

Cooley postulates the idea that doing right is social as opposed to sensual.⁹³

Cooley also discusses personal degeneracy, "the state of persons whose character and conduct fall distinctly below the type or standard regarded as normal by the dominant sentiment of the group" (376). Cooley believes that this problem exists on an individual

⁹²This section justifies the next two sections dealing with the social self.

⁹³By this he means that higher, more rational, and moral impulses hold far more weight in our consciences than do sensual impulses.

level, and should be remedied by way of "prevention, reform or cure, and isolation, according to the stage of development the evil has reached" (390). The problem of personal degeneracy must be remedied, otherwise significant portions of society may be at risk.

In Human Nature and the Social Order, Cooley does not once mention Karl Marx by name; furthermore, the secondary references which mention socialistic ideas do not deal with socialism in a Marxian sense. For Cooley, socialistic means and relates to society, not the economically driven message of the importance of the means of production. Becker and Barnes argue that Cooley's writings focus on the fact that "self and society are simply two sides of the same thing, inasmuch as selves are social products and society is the result of their organic, continuing interrelation" (STLS, 985).

6.1.2 Social Organization

Cooley broadened his vision and writing in his second book Social Organization. Cooley focused more on societal level organizations like the family, democracy, and religion. He related organizational ideas to the actions of the individual. Cooley changed his position so as to look at the "enlargement and diversification of intercourse." Throughout the book, Cooley focused on groups and their importance to the functioning of society. He did not discard the importance of the individual, but explained how social organizations affected individuals. Cooley examined the importance of both aspects through the individuality of Human Nature and the Social Order, and the collectivity of Social Organization.

For Cooley, social organization should be looked upon as "the total expression of conscious and subconscious tendency, the slow crystallization in many forms and colors of the life of the human spirit" (22). The process of relating how social organizations affect individuals is seen immediately when Cooley states that "primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity" (26-27). Within primary groups, "human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature or primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind" (29-30).

Primary ideals arise and are understood from our position within primary groups. These primary ideals do not develop completely without primary groups that we can learn from and those individuals within the group that with whom we can associate. For Cooley, all large social institutions derive from the knowledge and use of primary ideals.

The second section of Social Organization is about communication and its effect on both individuals and society. Cooley defines communication as "the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop—all the symbols of the mind, together with the means of conveying them through space and preserving them in time" (61). Further, the lack of communication does not allow the mind develop a true human nature. Although primary groups exist and help us, only through communication can we attain higher development of the mind. As communication progresses over time, so has individual development of the mind. In an anthropological sense, Cooley traces the evolution of communication from pre-verbal societies to modern societies.

In societies that acquired the ability to write, writing "made possible a more certain, continuous and diversified growth of the human mind" (72). Although writing allowed advancement of the entire society, only printing permitted civilization to enter the modern world.⁹⁴ Cooley forwarded the idea that advances in communication exerted a positive nature on all of human society. The enlargement of communication between societies or nations was not always positive, but he felt that communication must "be, in a sense, sympathetic, involving some consciousness of the other's point of view" (88). Communication spurred individuality by allowing the further differentiation of individuals. Better communication meant that support networks existed for one's ideas. Cooley then examined two drawbacks to advances in communication, superficiality and strain.⁹⁵

Cooley asserts that in present day society, secondary (non face-to-face interaction) leads individuals to gain greater consciousness. He believes this to mean "that each one of us has, as a rule, a wider grasp of situations, and is thus in a position to give a wider application to his intelligence, sympathy and conscience" (116). By gaining greater consciousness, people will have Democracy. Public opinion becomes of great importance as people become more knowledgeable on the societal values of right and wrong. When

⁹⁴Printing allows access to most individuals, whereas learned individuals maintained the records of a race without printing capabilities.

⁹⁵By superficiality, Cooley meant that individuals would not become as passionately involved in anything as communication was more easily facilitated. For Cooley, the problem could be overcome by giving people thorough educations. Strain focused on an individual's mental capacities. There was a great deal of information in a world with modern communication, and people must learn how to deal with it. Those who do not cope with the existence of information would develop mental strain, which could only be overcome at an individual level. Cooley felt that people learned to cope with the bombardment of information, and as they did, he saw them maturing to a greater extent than past generations.

people discontinue their practice of judging ideas, and begin to judge people, Cooley contends that "democratic society is representative not only in politics but in all its thought" (146). Importantly, Cooley argues that undistinguished masses contribute greatly to general thought. "They contribute sentiment and common-sense, which gives momentum and general direction to progress, and, as regards particulars, finds its way by a shrewd choice of leaders" (148).

Cooley worried about the condition of the individual in the rise of democracy, partly because the action of crowds suppressed the will and spirit of the individual. Haste, superficiality, and strain were destructive to society, and lent themselves to keeping society disorganized. Further, until society organized better, the trend toward individualism would not support the rise of great individuals. As the trend toward sentiments increased, society would become better organized. Cooley believed that the basis for all sentiment was "the sense of community, or of sharing in a common social or spiritual whole, membership in which gives to all a kind of inner equality, no matter what their special parts may be" (180). Thus greater consciousness broadened sentiment, which led people to empathize with others and make social organizations more cohesive.

Social classes were the next topic of study for Cooley. He saw that there were two central principles to the study of class, inheritance and competition, both of which determined an individual's membership in certain classes. Caste systems embody the idea of inheritance which was strengthened by: the lack of similarity among people in the population, lack of social change and a low state of communication and enlightenment. For Cooley, these characteristics embodied "complex, stationary societies of low mental organization" (227). Although Cooley did not believe that inheritance would ever be abolished, he felt that minimizing its influence would help society move beyond caste systems into open class systems.

Central to the open class system is the idea of individual opportunity. Although there may be disadvantage in inheritance, this is of minimal importance to a person's position. People strive to become better knowing that they have the opportunity to change their situation. Cooley contends that wealth, occupation, and power determine one's position in an open class system. At this point of the text, Cooley uses the terms income and wealth interchangeably, therefore avoiding the possible contradiction that wealth is a form of inheritance.

Cooley then looks at three classes, capitalists, the ill-paid, and those in poverty. He asserts that the capitalist class should not be considered the rich class because it does not

have wealth, but is in a position to attain it. Cooley then contradicts his belief that inheritance is not an important determinant of class position, for he says that the rich do not contribute to society but live off their accumulated wealth.⁹⁶

For Cooley, the ill-paid classes need to be organized to overcome the force and pressure other classes assert. He holds that labor unions serve important functions for this class of individuals, beyond fighting for fair wages, they also act as lobbyists to stop unfair labor practices, such as child-labor. He believes that labor unions are defensive associations of individuals. Although he mentions little about the class of people themselves, he maintains that ill-paid individuals are "simple, honest people, as a rule, with that bent toward integrity which if fostered by working in wood and iron and often lost in the subtleties of business" (289). They also bring forth a fellowship that helps keep organizations together.

Cooley asserts that those in poverty do not have psychical organization compared to those in the ill-paid classes. For Cooley, poverty means people who cannot manage their health and laboring efficiency because they lack sufficient income. He believes the problem is to be found in social causes and within the individual. Poverty is "without a doubt some sort of maladjustment between the individual, or the family or neighborhood group, and the wider community"(293-294). For Cooley, the way out of poverty is to give the children of those individuals the right start in life. By doing such, Cooley assumes that they will gain the motivation to climb the social class ladder.

For Cooley, an institution is a "mature, specialized and comparatively rigid part of the social structure. It is made up of persons, but not of whole person." (319). He asserts that individuals learn language, morals, and even knowledge through institutions; thus, individuals and institutions are both inexorably related. Consequently, Cooley claims that the individual is not better than the institution.

Cooley then looks at the formalism of institutions, and comes to the conclusion that the higher the degree of formalism the less differentiated an individual's personality becomes. The opposite of formalism for Cooley is disorganization. He does not confirm the idea that disorganization is similar to individualism for the fact that "the full

⁹⁶It is in this section on the capitalist class that Cooley defines what he deems social power. "Evidently the essence of it is control over the human spirit, and the most direct phases of power are immediately spiritual, such as one mind exercises over another by virtue of what it is, without any means but the ordinary symbols of communication" (264). The capitalist differs from other classes of people because they are able to possess social power.

development of the individual requires organization" (347). In looking at certain institutions, Cooley perceives a state of disorganization. In the institution of the family, he claims that psychologically, individuals are attempting to become better-off by having smaller families. Rapid changes occur within the family as a result of decaying traditions, namely a rise in individual standards of living, within the structure of the family. Not all the change that exist in institutions are negative. Cooley contends that education is becoming more important because democracy demands a well-informed populace.

In Social Organization, Cooley does not mention Marx by name, but he does focus on ideas that have a Marxian influence. In this book he speaks about the topics of materialism, class consciousness and socialism.

In the preface, Cooley does not dismiss the use of studying a subject from a materialistic point of view.

It will be seen from my title and all my treatment that I apprehend the subject on the mental rather than the material side. I by no means, however, overlook or wish to depreciate the latter, to which I am willing to ascribe all the importance that any one can require for it (preface).

Cooley further mentioned that each student of society should study the parts of society with which they feel comfortable. He leaves the reader with the impression that there is no absolute way to study society. Although he has no qualm with materialism, he is not comfortable in studying society from that view.

The next couple of passages deal with Cooley's conception of what class-consciousness, which he believed was not stronger in the United States than the feelings of national unity.⁹⁷ Furthermore, Cooley stated that in one society, the United States, the conception of a separating class-consciousness does not exist, but observed that a particular type of class-consciousness did exist.

If we mean that along with an underlying unity of sentiment and ideals there are currents of thought and feeling somewhat distinct and often antagonistic, the answer is that class-consciousness in this sense exists and is more likely to increase than diminish (241).

He asserts that this class-consciousness will increase "with growing interest in the underlying controversies" (241).

With an understanding of class-consciousness, Cooley went on to critique a Marxian notion of the result of class consciousness. He claimed that:

I do not anticipate that this increase (in class-consciousness) will prove the dreadful thing which some imagine. A "class-war" would indeed be a

⁹⁷For Cooley, there was a right and wrong way to define class consciousness.

calamity, but why expect it? I see no reason unless it be a guilty conscience or an unbelief in moral forces. A certain sort of agitators expect and desire a violent struggle, because they see privilege defiant and violence seems to them the shortest way to get at it; and on the other hand, there are many in the enjoyment of privilege who feel in their hearts that they deserve nothing better than to have it taken away from them . . . (241).

The beginning of the quotation expressed the idea of revolution or "class-war," a highly recognizable Marxian idea. Cooley may have received an understanding second-hand, none-the-less, it is a Marxian concept. As to the last section depicting certain actors in the social order, the end simply identified those individuals of privilege taking sides with the under-privileged. Again this is a restatement of the Marxian notion that certain members of the bourgeoisie would "see the light" and help lead the "revolution."

In another chapter, Cooley expressed "it is quite apparent that an organized and intelligent class-consciousness in the hand-working people is one of the primary needs of a democratic society" (284). For Cooley, the "hand-working people" were working class individuals, a crude description of a proletariat. Cooley confirmed that the "hand-working people's" need for class consciousness was for "self-assertion against the pressure of other classes, and this is both most necessary and most difficult with those who lack wealth and the command over organized forces which it applies" (284). With the exception of classes being plural, this excerpt mirrored Marx's notion about the importance of class-consciousness for the proletariat, or in this case "hand-working people."

In reference to socialist philosophy, Cooley declined to comment in detail. Although not wholly impressed by the socialist doctrines, on the topic of class-consciousness, Cooley contended:

regarding the latter (philosophical socialism) I will only say at present that it includes much of what is most vital in the contemporary working of the democratic spirit; the large problems with which its doctrines deal I prefer to discuss in my own way (285-286).

As asserted earlier, Cooley's interpretation of class-consciousness followed closely to Marx. Although Cooley did not agree with socialist doctrines, he finds little fault on the topic of class-consciousness.

6.1.3 Sociological Theory and Social Research

The final text to be considered is Sociological Theory and Social Research. This book is a collection of articles written between 1894 and 1928. Although the articles

written after 1915 were not included in this research, the other articles bring to life Cooley's combined aspirations of the individual and the social.

The first article "The Theory of Transportation," focused on macro level analysis of how transportation impacted society and collectivities of individuals. One characteristic of transportation was that progress in one mode of transportation was dependent on advances made in other forms of transportation. Another fact of transportation was that old modes of transportation were not eliminated with the introduction of new transportation for the same situation. Rather, the old transportation was relegated to very specific tasks in certain areas and times.

Further, the character of transportation as a whole and in detail, at any particular time and throughout history, is altogether determined by its inter-relations with physical and social forces and conditions (39).

All institutions and organizations determined and were determined by social development and progress. One observation was that roads and passage ways were originally used for the express purposes of transporting military personnel and supplies quickly, and also for communication. Although the military determined the development of roads and other modes of transportation, their development was truly dependent on the dominant social forces and organizations of the times. The development of transportation was also dependent on the consolidation of political power (52). Thirdly, transportation depended on religious organizations. Certain organizations facilitated transportation's progress, for either economic, political, or even religious purposes.⁹⁸

In the realm of institutions, prices, rates and even competition are determined by the speed and availability of existing transportation. The easier it is to gain the necessary goods and services, the more reasonable the cost will be to the consumers. Cooley asserts that government intervention is most necessary in areas where uniform prices are to be held.

In "Genius, Fame and the Comparison of Races," Cooley tries to answer the question of whether genius always leads to fame, and if not, why? For Cooley, genius is a biological trait, and fame is a social product of history. Cooley's main reason for writing this article is to disprove Francis Galton's theory of genius and fame. Cooley feels that

⁹⁸Cooley asserts that without the development of transportation, there would be an equal distribution of individuals all over the world, with no distinct centers of concentration. With the development of transportation, certain industries and economic organizations determine where people concentrate for employment. Thus, economic determinism is at the basis of the growth of cities.

Galton put no emphasis on social and historical conditions that he believes affect genius. Cooley insists that access to education, adaptive social structures and literature all help people become geniuses, whereas Galton believes that genius develops independently of these factors. For Cooley, the rate of social progress can help or hinder the development of genius; consequently, genius occurs more frequently in modern democracies. Cooley asserts that history is just as, if not more, important than race in determining the amount of fame and genius, which exists in any given society.⁹⁹

"Personal Competition," did not focus on specific occupations or the economy itself, but looks at what role personal competition plays on social life. Personal competition assigns people their spot in the social system, with one exception, that of status, or a rule of inheritance. Status is a static process, whereas competition is an active process.

Written ten years before Social Organization, this article contains the basis for his argument on the existence of social classes and the development of society. In this article, Cooley perceives the difference between status and competition to be a continuum on which both concepts exist, society may fall at any point on the continuum.

Cooley also places value on cooperation to achieve certain goals and interests, although it lags behind its need. Thus competition may breed organization. In concluding his discussion, Cooley maintains that competition "promotes individuality, self reliance and earnestness" (220). Thus Cooley holds an optimistic view of what competition will do for society now and in the future.

The final essay, "A Study of the Early Use of Self-Words by a Child," is a micro oriented study of self-feelings and words which Cooley perceives among children. This article verifies certain hypotheses developed in Human Nature and the Social Order. In this article, he looks at how young children come to understand and use the word "I".

Since it is a book of readings, I will focus on each essay as an individual entity. In "The Theory of Transportation," there is no mention of Marx, nor any Marxian concepts. The same can be said about the second and fourth essays "Genius, Fame and the Comparison

⁹⁹He relates genius and fame to a farmer sowing seed. "Here many come up and flourish, there none, and there again only those of a certain sort. The seed-bag is the race, the soil historical conditions other than race, the seeds genius, and the crop fame" (188). Although all seeds contain genius, it is only historical and other non-race conditions that can truly decide the amount of fame any race will attain.

of Races," written in 1897; and "A Study of the Use of Self-Words by a Child," written in 1908.

In the third essay "Personal Competition," written in 1899, Cooley wrote about the case of competition harboring bad feelings.

The more effective utterance, however, the bitter protest which is a very distinct and penetrating note in the literature of the day, comes from a class of refined and sensitive men, of strongly emotion type, who have been near enough to this experience to understand it, to taste its bitterness, without actually going under. . . . It is also plentifully represented among writers upon political economy and socialism. I would not be understood as deprecating this protest: on the contrary there is good ground for it, and when containing something beyond mere accusation, something hopeful and reconstructive, it is beneficent and a spur to progress (215).

Cooley did not embrace the doctrines themselves, but found them to be just, as long as they were more than mere utterances. Although it is not spelled out, I believe Marx to be in this category of unnamed writers. Even though this may be true, the quote cannot be seen as a Marxian statement because of its generality.

6.2 Analysis of Edward Alsworth Ross's Writings

For the purposes of this study, the following writings of Ross have been examined: Social Control (1901), Foundations of Sociology (1905), Sin and Society (1907), Social Psychology (1908), Changing America (1909), The Changing Chinese (1911), and The Old World in the New (1914). Ross was interested in the field of social psychology, which he defined as the branch of knowledge that deals with the psychic interplay between man and his enviroing society, falls into two sub-divisions. One of these, Social Ascendancy, deals with the domination of society over the individual; the other, Individual Ascendancy, -embracing such topics as invention, leadership, the role of great men, -deals with the domination of the individual over society (SC, vii).

Edward Ross spent much time writing in and developing the discipline of social psychology.

6.2.1 Social Control

Social Control is based on a set of articles written for the American Journal of Sociology from 1896-1898. The main premise of the book deals with the social forces that cause the order individuals see around them (SC, viii). Ross maintains that order and peace are different ideas. Although peace may be maintained to avoid conflict, order cannot exist until both sides agree to cooperate. Order is preserved by the "control that society exercises over him" (5).

Sympathy is one component in the perpetuation of order. Further, sympathy "preserves and renews from generation to generation the family relations" (10). Sympathy helps people feel a degree of equality. Sociability is the second component of order, and keeps people in close contact with one another, and helps them tolerate others. Humans learn to interact so as to initiate and continue associations with others because they are social creatures.

The third component of order is a sense of justice. The basis for this component exists in how individuals come to understand a sense of self. Justice is based on intellectual perception and overrides many basic impulses, and occurs most often among people considered as equals. The sense of fair play cannot create order, but generates a law abiding populace.

Sympathy, sociability and a sense of order are three of the four "pillars of natural order" (36). The three already mentioned are traits of the acting person. The fourth pillar is "the resentment of the person acted upon" (36). Resentment relates to a sense of injustice felt by the person who is the object of another's actions. Revenge forms from feelings of resentment, but is not constructive for society. These four components create a natural

order, and are the basis upon which society and social order are constructed. For people raised with a sense of self-control, most of the natural order is preserved.

Social growth can strain the impact of natural order, and control must be enforced over everyone.

In complex cooperation even the willing need an authority over them, for success implies such a delicate poise of numerous individual performances that the Word must go forth and with power (50).

Control is something that must continue, otherwise society may deteriorate.¹⁰⁰

Social control includes any restriction society enforces, but emerges from the centers of society the populace has the most confidence in. "The location of social power expresses much more truly the inner constitution of society than does the location of political power" (79). The State is not a source of social control, but a channel through which social control passes. Ross formulates several laws about the character and types of social controls a society can use.

In part two, Ross looked at the means by which control is upheld. When public opinion is involved, the community has different forces and sanctions that are in place. Public opinion includes both positive and negative sanctions, rewards and punishments. Public opinion is a general type of social control that upholds the moral ideas and standards of a society. "The growing rage for publicity and the craving for notoriety shows that the men of to-day respond warmly to praise and wilt quickly under general disapproval" (104).

Laws are created to maintain social order. Further, "it is more vital to prevent the mutual interference than to enforce cooperation" (106). Laws protect society from possible offenders, and also prevents individuals from repeating offenses. At the time Ross was writing, sentences were not determined according to the harmfulness of the offense, but its detestableness (116). The law is most important as a deterrent from crime. "The law, therefore, however minor its part at a given moment in the actual coercion of citizens, is still the cornerstone of the edifice of order" (125).

Social and legal sanctions are not without their inadequacies and belief attempts to overcome some of these shortcomings. One conviction that helps enforce social order is

¹⁰⁰Three different groups are involved in any given social action: the giver, the receiver, and those not directly involved. "The first service of sentiments is to enable a man to control himself. Their next service is to stir him up to control others. But in the social field this latter service is much the greater, seeing it employs far more of the total moral sentiment abroad in the community" (63). Further, the more society is organized and acts as a single collectivity, the greater the possibility that a social ego will emerge.

supernatural beliefs. Although religion can help keep social order, Ross found that it had some faults. First, "legal religion *gets in the way of newer and higher forms of social control*" (137). Secondly, religion may not bring people together mentally. Third, social control through religion focuses on long term punishment for offenses. Finally, "*it is hard to manage*" (139).¹⁰¹

Social suggestion is the ability to influence a person's will to do something, in this case, uphold the social order. Social suggestion makes people feel obligated to maintain and uphold the social order. People are influenced by way of example, expectation, word and deed. Social suggestion is also implemented through education.¹⁰²

The final type of social suggestion is custom. People learn customs of their society through many years of direct and indirect learning. Customs can be accepted passively, or fought against, but in both cases, customs continue to exist. Unfortunately, "custom now holds things together less than ever before" (194).

To keep control in society it is necessary to use both sanctions and feelings. The first feeling Ross addresses is social religion. He defined social religion as the "*conviction that there is a bond of ideal relationship between the members of a society and the feelings that arise in consequence of this conviction*" (199). The conviction one has in their social religion is highly variable. Social religion is based upon the emotions which make up natural order. People must be constantly stimulated by religion for it to have a lasting effect. Social religion is not necessarily based on theology, but is typically based on idealism. "No longer a pillar of social order, it (social religion) will take its unquestioned place with art, and science, and wisdom, as one of the free manifestations of the higher human spirit" (217).

Each individual has goals, wants and desires that differ from other individuals. Although these individual characteristics could eventually be called personal ideals, presently they are known as social types.

It is the bringing up to love and imitate *generalized* social qualities and *generalized* social character that, more than any other improvement in this department of social evolution, has given control the elasticity necessary to progress (227).

¹⁰¹Religion pits individuals against the society they live in.

¹⁰²Social control is upheld best when education is equally offered to everyone. Although individuals and past educational systems differed, equal public education for all is an effective means of social control.

Associations and organizations consciously and unconsciously attempt to make its members more similar and subservient to the ideals of the association.

Social control is also upheld by ceremony. Ceremonies have the capability of bonding people in a society together, in part because it gives them commonalities and common interests. Ross believes that "the age of ceremony is nearly over, and we have nothing so effective to put in its place" (256).

Art can help keep social control in several different ways, and includes any type of expression that emphasizes certain ideas. Art brings people together through sympathy and passion, but certain forms of art are created for pleasure not elevation of the human spirit and societal good. Artists can provide a sense of morality in their work by showing goodness as beautiful and badness as ugly (261). Art and artists create symbols which society comes to relate to, and with which they can create group identity. Although art can aid social control, society can still censor art according to current moral standards.

Personality has a great deal to do with the amount and type of social control that exists in any given society. People who possess the most desirable traits of a given society are often looked upon as heroes of and for the people. Social order through adoration of heroes begins to fail as society becomes more individualistic. In the United States, "social control through self-mastery lessens both the mood and the need for hero worship" (285). Ross holds that the importance of personality was permanently waning.

Ross theorized that it was possible to influence not only a person's feelings, but their judgement. By enlightening people, he contended that a person would look not only at short term gratification, but would also consider the long term consequences of certain actions. Enlightenment alerted people to the possible consequences of specific actions. Through enlightenment, people came to see themselves as a part of society, not just as individuals. Many shortcomings of enlightenment were similar to those expressed in the attempt to influence people's feelings and wills. Even with these drawbacks, Ross contended that social control through enlightenment "is more effective than modifying the conduct of individuals" (302). Further, enlightenment "will always remain the foundation of a system of social control" (302).

Society can also be controlled through illusion.¹⁰³ People are misled by conceptions of pseudo-consequences, solidarity, and moral philosophy.¹⁰⁴ For Ross,

¹⁰³Ross used this term to describe the misconceptions which people believe to be true.

¹⁰⁴The use of the term solidarity was only effective for social people, not individualists.

moral philosophy is partially analogous to consciousness, but he feels that getting people to do right this way did not give them social feelings (319). Moral philosophy requires looking inward, whereas Ross surmises that society holds the answer to many problems. What an individual deemed proper may be entirely contrary to society's beliefs, values and laws.

Social valuations existed as people fulfilled desires that helped the public good. To these values was the added aspect of tradition. As values were ingrained in society, they became part of a tradition which was passed on and upheld. These values allowed people to interact without much conflict.

Ethical elements also played a role in helping social control. Most ethics were forwarded by superior people who "see farther than the rest into the consequences of conduct and the laws of well-being" (349). A group of individuals who associated with each other often generated the early social ethos. Ethical elements were safely embedded into society where they were written down and used as traditions. Many different groups worked to uphold the social ethos of a society, different religious groups perverted the social ethos to mesh with their own interests. Effective social control degenerated as a result of perversion..

The final section of the book dealt with the system of control. The first system was class control, which existed when a certain class exercised power over others. This occurred often throughout history. The class in power maintained social control through "*law, belief in the supernatural, custom, ceremony, and illusion*" (381). Parasitic class rule usually did not exist over long periods of time, and was generally overtaken by invaders or small concerted group efforts from within society. The parasitic ruling class profited most by "*force, superstition, fraud, pomp, and prescription*" (382).¹⁰⁵

Social control changed over time, and Ross focused on some of the reasons why they changed. Ross postulated that:

there is no fixed cycle of changes through which a system of social control normally passes. A phase of control is determined, not by the previous phase, but by social facts of a more primary order. Law and morality have no career of their own, but yield at every moment to the shaping pressure of other forces in social life (406).

¹⁰⁵The difference between social control and parasitic class control was that poor people under parasitic control were held down by the ruling class.

Individualism was the result of the deterioration of social control. This happened when new or borrowed knowledge came into existence, exotic wants and desires were fulfilled, people experienced new situations and war occurred.

According to Ross, two separate systems of control existed, ethical and political. He examined how and when each type of social control came into existence. Social control or order changed from period to period, and at times ethical order would exist while at other times political order existed.

Social control should respect and support the natural order, and should not attempt to exterminate those individuals with little morality. Effective social control restrains people from inside. Simplicity and spontaneity are the good agents of social control because they are current and easy for common people to understand. Diffusion keeps control out of the hands of the few, who would excessively use control.

In conclusion, Ross postulated that "in the *community* the secret of order is not so much *control as concord*" (432). He maintained that social control would always be necessary because people needed to feel obligated to do right for one another. "The better adaptation of men to one another is brought about . . . by the improvement of the instruments that constitute the *apparatus of social control*" (437).

In his first book, Social Control, Ross did not mention Marx by name. Ross came into contact with the phraseology of Marx secondarily through the use of certain subjects and terms. Edward Ross's conception of private property was the first real indication that he may have had Marxist tendencies. He understood private property to be a great transforming force which acts almost independently of the human will. It has an evolution of its own, and the time comes at last when it violently thrusts men apart, in spite of all their vows to draw closer together (53).

This conception of property related closely to Marx's definition of property, for property had an active effect on the class system. For Marx and Engels, property could impact, or even change society, an argument that Ross made in this quotation, and throughout the rest of the paragraph.

In his section on the system of control, Ross defined class control as "the exercise of power by a parasite class in its own interest" (376). He then described social situations in which this parasitism occurred in societies. The entire section followed closely with a Marxian view of the class system. The following passage exemplified the similarity.

Finally, the institution of property is so shaped as to permit a slanting exploitation under which a class is able to live in idleness by monopolizing land or other indispensable natural means of production (377).

Ross carried the discussion further when he differentiated between two classes of people "the exploiting and the exploited classes" (378). Ross contended that "as unlikeness of interests, education, and mode of life forbids exploiters and exploited to share intimately a common life, . . ." (380). Throughout the chapter on class control in Social Control Ross's interest in a Marxian notion of property and class was apparent. The only point of deviation from Marx's notion of class in this chapter occurred in the final paragraph. Ross did not follow the idea that the proletariat will rise up in revolution. Ross described: a class of beaten people, a proletariat from which the industrially fittest have escaped or are escaping, has neither the will nor the strength to strain against the social system with the vigor of a resentful proletariat held down and exploited by means of artificial social arrangements (394).

From the final paragraph of the chapter, the question does arise of whether this chapter adhered to Marxian ideas or critiqued them. Clearly, Ross had no qualms with Marx's ideas of class and property. Ross's biggest objection to the entire discussion was in terms of the possibility of revolution.

Ross continued the discussion of social class in the next chapter of Social Control, "Vicissitudes of Social Control." Ross attempted to explain why society fractures into different groups. Ross defined four necessary conditions under which fracturing would occur.

The first condition, of course, is *sharp conflict of interest* (his emphasis). But this alone is not enough; there is conflict of interest between merchants and farmers, between taxpayers and taxeaters, yet these do not form true sects. The second condition is *great contrast of means*, resulting in extremes of misery and luxury. Especially important is this when the misery or uncertainty from which a class suffers appears to rise out of the social organization, rather than to flow from Nature. Still this is not enough. Such contrast does not always beget class consciousness and solidarity. The third and decisive condition is *a great inequality of opportunity* coinciding with a great inequality of possessions (401-402).

The argument again resounded of Marxian influence. Ross asserted that one escape from both class conflict and proletariat living conditions was to move into frontier areas where little social structure existed. At the time he wrote this, there was still land available in the "West." Ross maintained that with the ownership of land, escape from the proletariat was possible, but in older countries, "good places are occupied, escape from one's lot is more hopeless, and social order implies formidable enginery" (402).

6.2.2 The Foundations of Sociology

Ross began The Foundations of Sociology by focusing on what different people centered their own sociological studies. Ross concluded that the proper subject matter of sociology was social phenomena because it "embraces beliefs and feelings as well as actions" (6). He deemed that sociology was not developed to lay all the other sciences to rest. It was created as an understanding of social phenomena that differed from the focus of other sciences, of which sociology was the most general. Although sociology was central to all the special social sciences, "each of the great branches from the main trunk (sociology) throws down shoots which take root and give it independent support in human nature" (27).

For Ross, economics was a field that took up separate roots, but remained highly related to sociology. Economics treated specific ideas with certainty, and others with great uncertainty. According to Ross, economics often pushed their "inquiries over into an adjoining tract of knowledge, that covers human action and yet is not jurisprudence or ethics or political science" (40).¹⁰⁶

Ross turned to the existence of social laws. Philosophers hastened sociology into existence, but left the field with two faulty methods: the importance of objectivity over subjectivity; and "the excessive reliance upon superficial analogies between social facts and other facts" (42). Because of these methods, the social laws were not built upon the study of sociological data. The first set of laws Ross discussed were those of Herbert Spencer. Ross disagreed with Spencer's laws of social evolution for either their existence or their explanations. He then tackled social laws written by von Lilienfeld and De Greef, which again he opposed for many reasons.

Ross asserted that the foundations of sociology be established by the laws of Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Buckle, Tarde, Durkheim, Patten, Ward, Giddings, and Veblen.¹⁰⁷ After compiling several social laws, he professed that "sociology is not so much a sister science to politics or jurisprudence, as a fundamental and comprehensive discipline uniting at the base of all the social sciences" (70).

Instead of focusing on the macro level resemblances of different societies, Ross theorized that "we (sociologists) ought to generalize on the basis of numerous minute and exact resemblances" (74). For Ross, collectivities of individuals were the focus of

¹⁰⁶This field was the science of sociology.

¹⁰⁷Gumplowicz defined seven general areas of universals that held for all sciences, all of which Ross willingly accepted. These universals were developed by first-hand observation, not borrowed from other sciences.

sociological studies. Beyond looking at resemblances and differences, he believed in the study of causation.

Ross theorized that sociology would move into a stage of quantitative analysis, which would allow sociologists to more accurately and precisely study sociological problems. He took sociological products and processes to be the proper unit of sociological investigation, and studying one without the other would lead to awkward and incorrect assumptions and analyses.

Ross defined a mob as "*a crowd of people showing a unanimity due to mental contagion*" (103). The mental aspect of a crowd was termed suggestibility. Mobs generally were not brought together by a single leader, but came about over time by the similar orientation of minds. Mob mind produced crazes and fads, topics that were best described in his book Social Psychology.

Crowds allow people to act more enthusiastically and intensely because there is a high degree of anonymity; moreover, ideas, virtues, and intellectual traits are not. Feelings are the basis for most crowd behavior, further, the crowd is the simplest form of a group. The mass-meeting is a step up from a crowd. The group is heterogeneous, and has structure and a formal set of rules. The next stage is the deliberative assembly, and finally the representative body, such as councils, conventions, and legislatures. These groups are known as "*associations with presence*" (133). Associations without presence (public, sect, corporation) are similar, and have many parallels to crowds, assemblies and representative bodies.

In Ross's discussion of social forces, he addressed some errors that came into existence after Ward proposed the existence of social forces. After examining Ward's social forces proposition, Ross explained how instincts and impulses came into existence before the actualization of society. Next, he challenged Small's classification of human cravings, Ratzenhofer's classification of interests, and Stuckenberg's grouping of social forces. Each was wrong for Ross's purposes, but Ward and Stuckenberg came closest to his delineation of the social forces. He divided social forces into natural desires, cultural desires, and interests. Ross ended this discussion by declaring "*the corner-stone of sociology must be a sound doctrine of the social forces*" (181).

The next section dealt directly with social change, or social dynamics. Ross affiliated social dynamics with change, but not with evolution because people adapted and changed without necessarily progressing. Human desire drove society, and if it caused social change, it happened by chance. Ross argued that there were two schools of social

change, development and stimulus. Development focused on social change as a process of becoming, and was continuous, whereas stimulus was discontinuous, being constructed of sub- or extra-social forces (197-198). Further, he charged that development and stimulus causes are either qualitative or quantitative. Science was just one area which had arisen due to both continuous development and stimulus. Beyond these statico-dynamic processes were transmutations and stimuli.

Even more important to social change was extra- or sub-social factors. Population growth brought a greater number and diversity of people into contact with one another. The accumulation of wealth existed as latent social power and could be caused by changes in tastes and resources. Migration to a new environment was another extra-social factor for change. Migration brought changes in population density and people's relations with one another.

The innovating individual did not occur in any fixed pattern, and could not be predicted, but was a sub-social factor for change. The contact and cross-fertilization of culture was another form of social change, a type of social change called borrowing. The interaction of different societies was the sixth form of social change, which caused the modification of a society toward mutual agreement and solidarity. Societal conflict also caused societal institutions and groups to interact with greater frequency and cooperation.

Another social factor was the conjugation of societies, a change due to the incorporation of two formerly distinct societies together into one collective society. Conjugation occurred in one of two ways; juxtaposition and superposition. Juxtaposition occurred through alliance or conquest. In superposition, a new group arose at a higher level of social evolution than either of the previously existing societies. The final stimuli was the alteration of the environment.

Ross looked at some of the recent trends that occurred in the field of sociology. The first was the process of socialization, which Tarde and Ward believed to be based on inter-societal assimilations. Part of people's actions toward one another were built on their perceptions of similarities and differences. The more similarities two societies had, the greater their association and involvement with one another. Families were a great source for socialization, but at its base was the factor of control. There was an ongoing battle over whether assimilation or growth of common interests was the socializing process.

The second trend of Ross's time was group-to-group struggles. Ross postulated that there were four types of groups in any given society, and each had strong in-group solidarity. "Each group faces other groups on behalf of its own interests solely, and knows

no standard of conduct but success" (278). The greater one's identification with a given group, the stronger their feeling for the group would be, especially in terms of protection. The government did much to quell the group-to-group conflict that existed in society. In the West it occurred because groups were gaining their own voices in government.

Next was the trend to account for group membership interaction and opposition "*by original differences in persons*" (290). Not only was a society made of different races and nationalities, but also of characteristic differences in individual genders. Thus people belonged to, interacted with, and opposed various groups because of differences in their individual characteristics. Ross concentrated on Giddings, Patten, Addams, Ratzenhofer, and even Lombroso's definition of human characteristics to show how people differentially associated.

The fourth recent tendency of sociology was to "show how well-marked types are created by place, work, social environment and institutions" (309). People began to form a sense of self-identity through their place of birth, relationship to the economy, and how they related to existent social institutions. Each person developed a different relationship with these sources and as a result, developed differently from other friends and family members. For women, the part of their self-concept based on economic relations showed that their "economic fate depends on her being able to win and hold man" (324). Of all the sources of self-conception, relationship to the economy most defined by individuals. The final trend of study was to "*recognize that institutions and policies work selectively upon a people, and may profoundly modify its destiny*" (327). This section discussed the fact that society acted differentially toward certain groups, and that these societal selections differentiated groups, and encouraged homogeneous marriages.¹⁰⁸

Next, Ross focused on "The Causes of Race Superiority" (353). Physical traits of race superiority and inferiority were decreasing as people's diets and ways of life became more similar, yet certain stocks of individuals flourished in different conditions. The level of energy was one area in which one race could gain superiority over another. A second factor was self-reliance, those who were self-reliant were superior to other races of

¹⁰⁸Among primitive groups, war was the most important factor of social selections. Ross wholeheartedly believed that the doctrine of selection would maintain importance for a long time, but could falter unless the process of social selection was recognized and reviewed. Selection exhausted its qualitative qualities, and moved into the realm of quantitative science.

individuals. Foresight was a characteristic that led to economic greatness for certain races of individuals. Another economic quality of superior races was that of value sense.

Ross postulated that marital traits had no relation to the superiority of one race over another. Looking at moral traits, he found that "the chief moral trait of a winning race is *stability of character*" (376). The most reliable, altruistic and overall stable race was superior to the existent races. Finally, race superiority would not continue unless a race placed great pride in their blood lines.

In Ross's time, people flocked to America in hopes of economic gain. People born and bred American, according to Ross, were superior in physical and mental characteristics. "Guile is the resource of the feeble, the weapon of the downtrodden. The born American, on the other hand, feels able to win without stooping" (391). Ross maintained that Americans would no longer dominate and be superior if they did not awaken and continue to labor.

The Foundations of Sociology is an introduction to sociology. As Ross states, "the writer has ventured on little beyond the laying of foundations" (ix). In this volume, Ross covers topics such as; mobs, social forces, factors of social change and race superiority.

In this manuscript, Ross mentions Marx by name three times. First he discusses Marx in a very neutral manner, the second time is an unintelligible sentence, and the third is in defense of Marx. Concerning the neutral mention to Marx, Ross writes, "Loria, developing and exaggerating Karl Marx, . . ." (279). Ross had to have known at least a little of Marx's writings to make such a comment. The second reference to Marx is in relation to "crude attempts at the differentiation of social phenomena" (76). Ross stated, "even the keen-eyed Marx opposes to a social Past dominated by class struggle, a classless, strifeless Future under the collectivist regime" (77). The comment is a positive statement about Marx, and more importantly, a criticism of the Communist interpretation of Marx.

The last direct reference to Marx is in defense of Marx's economic materialism.

Ross claimed that:

Giddings, then, agrees with Buckle that the tap-root of social progress is intellectual progress. He holds with Comte against Marx, and his "four modes of likemindedness" is a good substitute for Comte's "three stages" of theological, metaphysical and scientific thinking. At a time when his brethren are precipitately striking their colors to the economic materialists, he sturdily flies the flag of intellectualism. Rightly, to; for there is a movement of the human intellect which has nothing to do with economic facts. The increase of knowledge and the alteration of economic conditions are independent causes of social change. Let intellectualism and

economism be the Urim and Thummim of the sociologist. Both are needed, if our science is to move on an even keel (306).

Although it may seem that parts of the paragraph are against Marx's materialism, the last sentence justifies the sociological necessity of materialism.

Other than these direct references to Marx, The Foundations of Sociology does not offer much else to the research. As always, there are references that are just too general to file under the heading of Marxian ideas.

6.2.3 Sin and Society

In his book Sin and Society, Ross attempted to show the sins that were occurring in society. In his own words, the book was written to, "influence men *in their attitude toward the conduct of others*. Its exhortation is not *Be good*, but *Be rational*" (1).

Modern sin lacks the familiar signs in clothing, for the individuals tend to wear more immaculate clothing. Crime does not take place in the dark alleys and dead ends of the past, rather it lurks everywhere.¹⁰⁹ Ross wanted people to be graded according to the sin they commit, not the quality of their character.¹¹⁰ "Chastisement according to their *character* rather than according to their *deeds* lets them off far too easily" (31).

Although not a book on the evils of white collar crime, Ross noted that sinners should not be judged only on direct harm to individuals. He accorded the term criminaloid to those individuals who were of strong moral character, and were not anti-social, but made up the fringe of crime. These individuals were not hardened, but took advantage of certain situations, and located themselves within legitimate society.

Ross also looked at the sins committed by corporate owners. One result of corporate sin was the alienation of social classes. Ross did not want corporations to be blamed for the sin that corporate owners did. Finally, he believed that morality would not increase until the rules of the game were upheld.

In this book there is but one reference that relates to Marx. Although the discussion does not mention Marx by name, it deals with class, class conflict and to an extent class consciousness. Ross maintains that no progress would come of class war, similar to his position in Social Control.

¹⁰⁹For Ross, sin was equated with crime.

¹¹⁰Throughout the book, Ross attempted to dispel errors of belief about sinners. Such errors include: punishment of sinners only by their betters; the non-conformist being the real peril to society; and repress of the vicious is more important than the repression of sinners.

Thus springs up the delusion of progress by class war, and the mischievous policy of appealing solely to the class of interests of workers instead of chiefly to that sense of right and justice which is found at every level and in every quarter of society, and which is the only power that can settle things so that they stay settled (115).

He holds that many individuals who work for the corporation stock owners, officers and managers, are likely to represent a skewed picture of the owners of stock. Ross opposes the misrepresentation and hatred shown toward the owners of corporation stock, which becomes generalized to all capitalists. As a result, the reference is indirect and negative.

6.2.4 Social Psychology

Social Psychology is a textbook written by Ross in 1908. In this text, Edward Ross covers the topics of custom, conventionality, imitation, conflict, suggestibility, crowds and mobs. I deem this to be a textbook since the end of each chapter contains a summary and exercises. The problem incurred is that this manuscript has become part of the **Perspectives in Social Inquiry** library. On the sides of the columns, there are notes of unknown authorship. Unfortunately, I am unable to match this against an original version of the book to know if the column notes are of Ross's authorship.

Ross began this manuscript by defining the nature of social psychology, which he explained that "it seeks to understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition - and hence in action - which are due to the interaction of human beings" (1). He described social psychology as primarily focusing on human interaction, and how these interactions bring people together in groups or into conflict. Ross divided social psychology into two areas, social ascendancy and individual ascendancy. The former was "the moulding of the ordinary person by his social environment" and the latter is "the moulding of the social environment by the extraordinary person" (5).

All people are prone to the power of suggestion, but certain groups are more susceptible than others. Ross describes some characteristics of the individuals who are most open to suggestion. The people closest to nature are the most susceptible to suggestion, but among civilized races, the Celts and French most vulnerable. Of the different ages and genders, children are the most open to suggestion, as are women. Suggestive thoughts are best implemented to people while they are absent minded. Repetition of the same thought repeatedly in different forms helps one properly implant suggestive ideas.

Ross maintained that in large crowds, people lost their sense of individuality. Further, crowds did not allow people to move voluntarily. "An excited throng easily turns mob because excitement weakens the reasoning power and predisposes to suggestions in line with the master emotion" (45). Ideas became lost in a crowd, because they were run by emotions; consequently, crowds were unstable, credulous, irrational and immoral.

Ross argued that mobs only came into existence over the last 100 years as a result of the advent of simultaneous communication.¹¹¹ The craze and the fad are two manifestations of the mob mind which could be defined as "*that irrational unanimity of interest, feeling, opinion, or deed in a body of communicating individuals which results from suggestion and imitation*" (65). crazes develop and influence people over time, whereas the fad moves quickly. Both the craze and the fad rely on the fact that people are susceptible to suggestion.

Ross attempted to find ways in which to overcome the possible occurrence of the mob mind, because the mob mind could ruin the social stability of a society. He developed thirteen different ways to possibly overcome the mob mind. One area of protection from the mob mind centered on education and knowledge.¹¹² Under education, familiarity with classic literature and philosophy, as well as being influenced by good teachers was important. Other areas of protection included: activism in sports; country living; a sense of familialism; ownership of property; and involvement in vital religion. According to Ross, these different forms of attachment expanded a person's sense of obligation as well as their intellect, which made them less susceptible to the mob mind.

For Ross, fashion is not progressive, but allows people to feel that they are individualizing themselves from others.¹¹³ Imitation and differentiation are the two component parts of fashion. Imitation refers to the idea that "the inferior asserts his equality with the superior by copying him in externals" (99). Although inequality still exists, it gives the former a feeling of self-efficacy to be similar in appearance to the latter. As stated previously, people attempt to differentiate themselves from others to gain a sense of individuality. In concluding his discussion on fashion, Ross asserts that "the growth of

¹¹¹Ross interchangeably used the terms mob and public, in part because mobs have a mental element that may not exist in a crowd.

¹¹²This included the development of a critical element in one's mind as well as gaining knowledge of the sciences that exist at the top of the hierarchy.

¹¹³Ross agreed with Thorstein Veblen's analysis of fashion and dress in general.

intelligence causes the desire for self-individualization to seek satisfaction in other ways than fashion".

For Ross, conventionality was an integral part of a person's life. It influenced individuals in several ways, such that the values of the leisure class were embraced by the lower classes as authoritative judgement.¹¹⁴ One result was a loss of individual sense and pride. People began to embrace values and judgements which stress class inequality.

Ross went on to define a few laws about "conventionality imitation." The first is that movements and actions readily influence people who watch others. Everything from styles of walking to our baser appetites are infectious to the greater population. Ross focuses on the fact that convulsions, stuttering, lisping, and even eating habits readily affect many individuals. "The feelings are more contagious than the appetites, probably because they depend less upon the condition of the body at the moment" (126). Tarde's law of conventionality imitation decrees that "imitation proceeds from within outward, from internals to externals" (137). Personal ideals are the easiest to pass on, followed by beliefs. Religion, language, and other institutions are the slowest to change, because they hold power over great masses of people.

Other features of conventionality include the fact that the socially superior will be imitated to a certain extent by the socially inferior. Although there are exceptions to the idea, this is the general flow of imitation. Ideals, customs, beliefs, values, and judgements are all generally adopted by the lower classes of individuals from the leisure classes. In a society that is not socially tiered, natural centres and routes for the rapid, automatic diffusion of culture are lacking, and hence this social type presumes unusual intelligence and progressiveness in the ordinary man. Otherwise, you get stagnation or fatuity (162).

When certain roles and professions come into existence to care for customs and arts, the importance of the upper class will decline.¹¹⁵

In the final section on conventionality, Ross maintained that people living in the country imitated those dwelling in the city. The idea of living in the city was glamorous and prestigious, and Ross stressed the idea that people believed the city to be of higher rank

¹¹⁴Again in this chapter, Ross relied heavily on the work of Veblen, and follows it very closely, adding comments only when necessary.

¹¹⁵If the source of imitation is not known, it can be traced back to the seat of power. In democratic societies, successful people are generally the models that everyone studies and imitates. Imitation of successful individuals is more rational and productive than the imitation of the ruling class.

than the country. In societies that were based on notions of social equality, the majority held prestige and was imitated.

Custom imitation is a direct rival of conventionality. Imitation of ancestors is the basis of custom imitation whereas the imitation of contemporaries is the basis of conventionality imitation. Custom transmission is only possible when different generations are living simultaneously. Customs can be modified by different generations, but this is minimized when the generations live together for a long time. The more adherence to custom there is in a society, the harder it is for the society to change. New communities progress much faster and are more prosperous than older more established communities because there is not an overwhelming set of customs in existence.

Ross held that custom would be important to societies which stressed the importance of ancestor worship and the wisdom and knowledge of the elder members of society. Physical, linguistic, and social isolation also favored custom over progress and prosperity. On the other hand, literacy, school education and free discussion were factors that adversely affected the adherence to custom. Equality, individuality, and focus on the young exist in opposition to custom. For Ross, freedom and societal linkages disrupted the transmission of custom from one generation to the next.

Custom exists in certain areas of life, until it comes into competition with other ideas and technologies.¹¹⁶ Customs are most likely to exist in the private sphere, in part because they are inaccessible to a large heterogeneous group of individuals. Further, collective notions are slower to die than are individual notions, because there must be greater agreement in the stoppage. Among competitive cultures, they will borrow manners of work more readily than standards of living.

Custom and conventionality exist as the ends of the same continuum. There are certain periods of time when customs are central to society, just as there are times where conventionality is at the forefront. In times of custom, new ideas and innovations attempt to appear old. In times of conventionality, old ideas and innovations try to appear as being new. "If, however, the old cannot assume the guise of youth, it strives to discredit the new by making it out to be old" (283).

Ross argued that once society was able to rid itself from the notion of prestige in ideas and innovations, rational imitation could take place. Rational imitation facilitated

¹¹⁶Ross gives the example that warfare is not conducive to the transmission of culture. People fighting with spears will be annihilated by people using guns, and with their death will be the death of their customs of warfare.

progress, and the people involved in this type of imitation were thought to be scientific. These individuals were thought to be scientific, in part because they relied on authority to show them the way to progress. Science rose and was diffused because it had practical application and verification.

Different ideas, beliefs and actions all come into conflict with one another at some point in time. The conflict exists in one of two different forms, either silent conflict or discussion.¹¹⁷ These silent conflicts are resolved by means of "*authority, persecution, example, observation, and trial*" (299). Usually, these silent struggles become verbal, and pass into the realm of discussion.

Ross believed that discussion brought conflict to a close much quicker than did silent struggle. Discussion required some form of mental contact between people, and generally was capable of changing people's opinions. Discussion was deemed sterile by Ross when reason could not be used to decide a matter that involved passions or prejudices. When people were part of social groups which isolated themselves, discussion could not be productive because people were under the influence of others.

Conflicts are terminated in three possible ways. First, some conflicts end because the opposition is destroyed. Other conflicts end because a compromise is reached. Finally, conflict can terminate when neither side will back down from their position. Ross holds that no conflict is ever completely settled in full.¹¹⁸

Compromise of conflict is often reached to break deadlocks, but does not usually end a conflict. Rather, compromise brings conflict to a state of provisional agreement. Although there are certain costs and benefits to compromise, it is an important step in the alleviation of conflict.

Public opinion is introduced into a situation that has a certain deadline. Although both groups are sure of their position and unlikely to change, public opinion helps people either justify or change the positions they hold. Elections and votes are the major forms of public opinion. Further, public opinion may become social tradition.

¹¹⁷Silent conflict exists among prestiges and merits or a combination of prestige and merit.

¹¹⁸ Cultures have two different component parts, one dominated by conflict, the other by union and accumulation. The part dominated by conflict will only progress when one idea is replaced by another. The other component progressed by when a group adds the new and the old together. "Growth is easier on the plastic than on the resistant side of a culture fabric; but in every case the latter is the superior and controlling side" (336).

The resolution of conflict generally does not bring a society back into a state of equilibrium. Influence and social changes continually disrupt agreements and short term states of equilibrium. The future course of a culture is likely " to be determined by the character of the inventions and discoveries that will be made" (365). In times of disequilibrium individuals predominate, because they are able to more freely choose from society's offerings.

In this book, Edward Ross does not speak of Marxian ideas, but holds one reference directly toward Marxists. Although he directly names Marxism among social philosophies, he mentions Marx informally.

In social philosophy, we meet with Fourierites and Owenites, St. Simonians and Marxists, authoritarians and anarchists. In all these, the prestige and authority of the great man come into play. But the genuine scientist wins no disciples, founds no schools, leaves no personal impress. Nothing is taken on his *ipse dixit*. The obituary notice of him in the journals of his science is cold and impersonal (291).

The quotation is neutral in regard to Marx, although it speaks to Marxists more generally. Ross contends that these philosophers had followers who preserved the sayings of their founders, something a genuine scientist does not have. He did not speak ill of these actions, but said nothing good of the disciple-like quality of philosophers.

6.2.5 Changing America

Among common people today there is no longer a tendency toward masses or mob behavior, for they moved to a stage of individualism. In the opening chapter, Ross maintains that democracy will survive and will actually help the situation of common people. Internationally he concedes that democracy and democratic ideas are becoming more prevalent, and interaction between East and West is helping the Orient accept the fundamental institutions of the Western world.

Birth rates everywhere are falling, but since death rates are falling even more rapidly, there is no decline in the total population. The reduction in both rates is due to different causes. "Births are rarer owing to enlightenment, the ascent of women and individualistic democracy" (36). The death rate fell due to better medicine, health and sanitary conditions. Declining birth rates result in the greater diffusion of ownership, and people begin to save money.

The divorce rate is highest in the United States. Ross does not agree that legislation and depravity help increase the divorce rates. One of Ross's explanations is economic;

women can better solve bread-winner problems on their own, and are thus less dependent on their spouse. Rising marital age allows women to develop and to have opportunities she would never know if she married young. The intellectual progress of women also helps the divorce rate climb, thus increasing the amount of individualism one can experience. Ross is correct in his prediction that "in forty years one marriage in four will end by divorce, and in eighty years one marriage in two" (61). Ross proposes that one remedy to this problem is to instruct youths in ethics and ideals of families. Further, father desertion of families needs to be detected and punished. Further, pure women need protection from viceful men. Ross worries about women in industry for the fact that burden and strain in the workforce may prevent them from fulfilling roles as wives and mothers. He argues that restrictions should be placed on female labor to save their stamina and vitality.

Commercialism caused exploitation and the waste of life and limb, all in the name of economic profit. Money became the driving force in many people's lives. For Ross, commercialism and print media were both determined by the economic institution. Of great importance to Ross was the fact that news was controlled by the dollar, not only by advertisers, but other financial powers, and even the political arena. The job of the newspaper was no longer to report news, but to uphold the interests of those who invest most deeply in the paper. Ross's solution was to make newspapers endowed so that they were run by the "chief apexes of moral and intellectual worth in the city" (135).

In differentiating the middle West from the East, Ross looked not only to immigration but also to physical features. The pioneering type was decidedly moving to the middle West. This fronteering experience may have strengthened the will of Americans. As people moved West, they had to rely on themselves much more than in the highly settled East. Ross said that the East was deteriorating because of "finer folk" moving West. For Ross, the middle West included the area west of the Mississippi river all the way to California.

The sense of community lost in the East was arising in the West, and the position of women improved the farther West one went. Ross believed that this could at least partially be explained by the ratio of men to women (11:10), whereas the East had a female to male ratio. Ross also maintained that the individualism and self-reliance of the middle West was changing the face of American democracy.

Universities in the middle West got their start with government assistance, rather than waiting for rich investors. This approach led to the age of the state university, and

allowed many individuals access to higher education. Coeducation was also more prevalent in the West than in the East. Universities raised communities as well as individual promise. The state owned institutions became servants of the state and her people.

This manuscript contained an indirect reference to Marx. At the end of his chapter on "The World Wide Advance of Democracy," Ross discussed the rise of socialism. This socialism was based on a working class philosophy. Ross further explained that the working class philosophy included:

press, literature, program and propaganda - which is dignified by the support of scholars, scientists, artists, prelates, publicists, journalists, and statesmen. This philosophy calls black that which the reigning business-class philosophy calls white, and calls white that which the other calls black. It declares that the workers, not the idlers, are the cornerstone of society and insists that the first thing to be considered is livelihoods, not profits (30-31).

Although Ross did not embrace the philosophy of the working class, he stated that it did allow individuals to become "critical, self-assertive and demanding" (31). Thus, socialism allowed workers to some power in an attempt to get government to work for their benefit.

The closer we come toward 1915, the less and less Ross seemed to support the writings of Karl Marx. Granted, he said little directly of Marx, but the indirect assertions became more cynical and guarded. This cynicism was seen in Edward A. Ross's Changing America.

The final passages concerning Marx was lengthy, and sided against the economic philosophy of socialism. Ross saw that there was a positive side to this philosophy, in what it said, not what it did.

The advance of socialism in Western countries is simply the later phase of the world wide drift toward democracy. Although possessed of the ballot, the working class has so far done little for itself because laborers have persisted in accepting and acting on the economic philosophy of their employers. But now there exists a full-fledged, working class philosophy - with press, literature, program and propaganda - which is dignified by the support of scholars, scientists, artists, prelates, publicists, journalists and statesmen. . . . It declares that the workers, not the idlers, are the cornerstone of society and insists that the first thing to be considered is livelihoods, not profits. However biased and wrongheaded this economic philosophy may be, it does give the working man courage to take a line of his own and develop his own attitude toward the social system the possessing class have framed. Through his own organs and orators he learns of damning facts once kept from him and becomes critical, self-assertive and demanding. The spread of socialism, then, is but the latest phase of the universal

tendency for the people to endeavor to control government for their own benefit (30-31).

Although he disagreed with the philosophy, Ross gave credence to the fact that it helped the working man. Marx would be part of the literature of such a philosophy, which Ross deemed to be "biased and wrongheaded." This passage addressed more than just Marx for the fact that he mentioned the philosophy "now" existing. Thus he was not just against the work of Marx at this point, but the socialist program in general.

6.2.6 The Changing Chinese

After an initial overview of the condition of the country and the ways of life, Ross began to detail different parts of Chinese people's lives. The discussion opened with a look at the physical condition of the Chinese, from patterns of recovery to child birth. Taking an ethnographic look at China, Ross was amazed by their healing capabilities and their resistance to disease. After conversing with approximately thirty doctors, Ross concluded that the Chinese had a special race vitality. He believed that their vitality would fade when conditions changed, or when the people migrated to places like the United States.

As a race, Ross believed that the Chinese were inferior in several aspects, especially the fact that their mental capacity stagnated. After talking with missionaries and educators, he found that the Chinese were just as intelligent and knowledgeable. Ross maintained that Western individualism was far superior to Chinese familialism. In terms of economic progress, he held that the Chinese would develop to a point that would rival the economic situation of Western cultures.

In looking at their struggle for existence, Ross found that comfort was just as scarce as food. Additionally, he found that brides must be younger than grooms, and thus early marriage is highly prevalent. The Chinese also had a passion for having children, and although Ross did not use the term infanticide, he described the prevalence of female infanticide.

When looking at China's level of industrialism, Ross found that, they had only petty agriculture and industry. He postulated that the influx of industrialization would be slow, and then focused on the problem incurred by opium. Part of the reason for the opium problem, according to Ross, dealt with the government's inability to change the situation. The opium problem had been controlled by the passage of resolutions with Britain.

The next topic of focus for Ross was footbinding, and its effect on China. He surmised that footbinding was only prevalent among the wealthy, and went on to say that in China the woman's world was much different from a man's. In fact, women were rarely seen outdoors, and should never even think about shaking hands. Brothers and sisters were separated around age eight to ten and could only see each other during formal occasions.

Marriages were arranged, and neither spouse knew the other's name nor looks upon their face before the marriage. Among the Chinese, females committed suicide at rate of five to ten times higher than males.

As far as missionaries went, American missionaries were doing more to Christianize the Chinese in all social aspects than their English counterparts. Christianity gained many converts from the lower and middle classes, but few from the upper classes. Ross deemed that the Chinese would accept Christianity when they saw how inferior their own culture was.

Ross then descended back into his ethnographic study of the regions and how they looked physically. The book did much to show the impoverishment of China. Finally, Ross noted that their system of education changed from more traditional history and literature to a system much closer to our own. There was no mention of Marx or Marxian doctrines within this manuscript.

6.2.7 The Old World in the New

The Old World in the New described the different European nationalities that immigrated to the United States during the 1800s and early 1900s. Ross focused only on immigrants coming from Europe, and discussed topics such as: intelligence; morality; physical traits; and criminality. Ross detailed who, how many, and which jobs were usually taken by each different immigrant group.

After detailing the position of no less than seven immigrant groups, Ross discussed the economic and social consequences that immigration had on American society. He further spoke to the topics of politics and how Americans and immigrants were mixing and what kept them separate.

The Celtic Irish were the first to come over en masse. The first of this race were easily assimilated, and were of good standing. The famine brought over many less desirable individuals, and although most immigrants did not bring over economic virtue, they were loyal and courageous (30). One problem for these immigrants was their drinking nature. Unlike others, Celts often became quarrelsome when they were drunk. In

terms of criminality, most Irish convicts were sentenced for offenses against public order. Ross maintained that the Irish were among the most loyal to family. Another distinction among Celtic immigrants was their intergenerational ability to climb in status. Ross contended that Celts were not philosophically or scientifically oriented due to their dependence on authority, and a lack of ability to think for themselves, but were superior at eloquence and poetry.

The Germans were the most widely spread of the immigrant groups. They brought their own culture and language, but were still easily assimilated, and played a valuable role in our Civil War. Alcoholism was not very problematic for Germans, and in terms of crime, Ross contended that they were just as problematic as any other immigrant group. Germans brought much in the way of industrial skill and training, and many others were farmers, but ill suited for sports and other outdoor activity. Finally, Germans put little belief in short cuts to riches, instead they climbed the ladder of success slowly.

Scandinavians settled in the northern Midwest, and were the most literate stock of the world. Alcoholism was not a significant problem for this group of immigrants. Many Scandinavians were farmers and heavy laborers. Of non-English speaking immigrants, Scandinavians were the most quickly assimilated. Self-improvement was an important trait among these peoples, although they were not considered a brilliant group. Ross believed that they were of the right psychology to be self-governed.

Italians stayed mainly on the East coast, especially in the New York and Boston areas. Italian immigrants were more migratory in character, partly because there were fewer women among them. Northern Italians tended to crimes like fraud, whereas Southern Italians committed more violent crimes. Northern Italians were more settled, reliable, and even earned more than the average Southern Italian. Italian immigrants were doing the heavy unskilled work that used to be primarily Irish, and although liquor problems were minimal, many Italians were addicted to gambling. The earning power of Southern Italians was the lowest of immigrant groups. Generally, Italians were not well educated, and their children often did not attend school regularly. They were believed to be among the most emotionally unstable immigrant groups.

Ignorance and illiteracy ran rampant among Slavic immigrants. Slavs had a fatalistic attitude toward work, and lost less time from work than other immigrant groups because of intoxication (128). Wife beating was normal among this immigrant group; moreover, if a man did not beat his wife, he was looked down upon as bad. Slavs were slow to assimilate, and many felt that they had little to contribute.

East European Hebrews rarely took up physical jobs in manufacturing. In fact, many gained entrance into higher level opportunities, such as medicine and law. Although Hebrews were of sympathetic nature to their family, they were always looking for something extra, and a way to do it. Hebrews committed little in the way of violent crime, but quite often were arrested for crimes of economic gain. Hebrews' main traits included intellectual ability, tenacity of purpose and abstractness. Prejudice toward this group was extremely high.

Ross spent little time on Magyars, Finns, Portuguese, Greeks and Levantines, and it is not possible to gain an overall picture of the situation that they attempted to prosper in.

Some economic consequences of immigration included cheap labor and a willingness to do more dangerous jobs. Additionally, immigration overstimulated the growth of factories. Southern European immigrants showed Americans and other immigrant groups much in the way of agricultural innovation. Labor unions had a tough existence with the introduction of immigrants, for immigrants were willing to accept lower wages than unionized workers, and many immigrant women were taking jobs that were at once relegated to men.

One social effect of immigration was the extraordinary illiteracy because many immigrant groups came to America illiterate. Another social problem was the effect of a caste spirit. This spirit portrayed immigrants as lowly, and among industrialists, they were labeled as strike breakers. The position of women increased, and many were looking for and finding employment outside the home. Housing was also a problem for immigrants, especially among immigrant populations in industrial centers. This was mainly due to the lack of social attachments and the lack of desire to build new housing. Ross believed that foreign born people were more likely to suffer from mental illness, which may be caused by the importance placed on adapting and learning new ways of life.

Ross went on to evaluate the physical differences among "Americans" and immigrants. Immigrants from Southern Europe were smaller in stature, and some groups like Hebrews were small and weak. In terms of vitality, immigrants were strong initially, and could resist many diseases that were due to infection, but soon after arriving they were no better than those who lived in the United States. Southern Europeans were believed to be less moral than those from Northern Europe.

In the chapter on East European Hebrews, Ross neutrally discussed a form of Marxian exploitation. Ross associated Hebrews with Marx's notion that capitalism exploited workers. Ross stated "as exploited worker he is the first to find his way to a

theory of his hard lot, viz., capitalists" (158). Later in the same chapter, Ross mentions Karl Marx in neutral terms, almost as if he chose a name by random. Speaking of Hebrews, he mentioned, "he loves man rather than men, and from Isaiah to Karl Marx he holds the record in projects of social amelioration" (160).

When looking at the economic consequences of immigration, Ross, keeping in true Marxist form, refers to those individuals who own factories or businesses as capitalists. Further, he focuses on the fact that capitalists are able to make a great deal of profit while "a constantly diminishing part leaks down to the wage-earners" (201). Throughout this section of the book, it seemed that Ross willingly embraced Marx's doctrines on class.

The final tie to Marx in this manuscript is a short description on exploitation in his chapter on "American Blood and Immigrant Blood." This final statement speaks of those immigrants who began as exploited masses and work their way up into the capitalist class. Ross links this occurrence to mainly Greek immigrants. "The Greek boot-black who has freed himself from his serfdom, instead of showing up the system, starts a place of his own, and exploits his help as mercilessly as ever he was exploited" (295).

6.3 Summary

Cooley and Ross focused much of their attention on the social psychological perspective that arose in American sociology. Both individuals dealt with the perspective of Marx in different ways. For Cooley, he felt it best to avoid Marx as much as possible. Ross, on the other hand, dealt directly with Marx.

One problem with the readings for Cooley is that he wrote many individual paragraphs which he later fused as publishable papers and books. By doing this it is impossible to know how much of what he wrote down never got published, and is sitting in archives. Another shortcoming with Cooley is that there were only three books to analyze before the end of 1915. Had he written more before this, who knows what he would have dealt with. His primary interest was in social psychology, and that is where he focused his writings.

Edward Ross directly dealt with the ideas of Marx in a systematic fashion. Ross's ideas changed over time, so his early works tended to be more in favor of Marx's writings than his later works. Later, Ross became more cynical of Marx's writings and critiqued them a little less kindly.

7.0 Analysis of Results

The previous chapters attempted to garner support for the theory that the Midwestern founders of academic sociology would be more likely to deal with the writings and concepts of Karl Marx than their East Coast counterparts. All six founders of American sociology dealt with the work of Karl Marx, but mention of Marx or his concepts did not exist in every monograph. Each supplemental question will be discussed in order to support this theory.

The first research question attempted to ascertain the prevalence of Marx in the first era of academic sociology in the United States. Marx was not one of the most influential writers who affected the founders views. Academically, the founders focused on the writings of Spencer, others, such as: Comte, Ratzenhofer, Gumplowicz, Darwin, Schaffle and Tarde also influenced their writings and teachings (CAS, 20). Ward and Sumner were the least influenced by their European ancestors (DS, 227). Cooley's writings were also somewhat independent of his European ancestorship, but he took the time to critique the use of Spencer. In contrast, Small concerned himself with the writings of Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz. Giddings and Sumner focused a portion of their work on the writings of Herbert Spencer and *laissez faire* economics (CAS, 20). Although familiar with the writings of Karl Marx and Henry George, much of Ross's work was a direct outgrowth of Ward's sociology (CAS, 214).

The purpose of the present study was not to compare the relative prevalence of the founders influences. As shown in the earlier chapters, Marx was not entirely ignored by the founders, but many other writers were more influential. As explained by House, Page, Hinkle and White, the founders were not the only academic writers of sociology. Thorstein Veblen, Charles Beard, John Dewey and James Harvey Robinson dealt with the work of Karl Marx (STA).¹¹⁹

Quite often the founders spoke of Marx in relation to other socialistic and communistic scholars. Many of the discussions about Marx were based upon the manuscripts written by he and Engels, The Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital.¹²⁰ The founders often addressed Marx's concepts which related to his discussions of class. The notion of class was a topic for discussion that all of the founders engaged themselves in. Although the term social stratification was not used, they often critiqued Marx's

¹¹⁹These individuals were to some extent considered to be marginal sociological academicians.

¹²⁰Sumner and Small both made direct reference to these texts within their own work.

conception of class, a process that many sociologists still engage in. The topics of surplus value, capital, capitalism, historical materialism, class consciousness, and property were also discussed by Cooley, Giddings, Ross, Small, Sumner and Ward.

Without exception, the founders invoked the concepts and manuscripts which pertained to Karl Marx. It is nearly impossible to tell if they were responding directly to Marx, or if they were responding to second-hand information about Marx. Ross, Small and Sumner all alluded to the fact that they were reacting directly to Marx.

Attempting to quantify the results of the study would unnecessarily detract from what has been found. In the case of Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology could be seen as a completely Marxian tract, as could Sumner's article "What Makes the Rich Richer and the Poor Poorer?" Each of these could be seen as one long reference to Marx, or many separate discussions of Marx, and to quantify the results of the study would take away from what has been found. Further, many of the discussions about Marx are not quite as openly aired as the two previously cited cases.

On the macro level, the founders from the Midwest dealt with Marx more consistently than the East Coast founders. This lends support to the theory that Midwest founders would discuss Karl Marx more than East Coast founders. The Midwestern founders were less likely to initially discredit Marx than were Sumner, Ward and Giddings. Small, Cooley and Ross were also more likely to address Marx directly. In this regard, it is true that they were more progressive. A position defended by Martindale, Williams, Veysey, Metzger, Fuhrman, and many others.

The study itself brought up further questions about the first era of academic sociology in the United States. (1) Was the present theory supported because more Midwestern founders attended school in Europe than did the East Coast founders? (2) Was there a micro level temporal phenomena occurring in relation to the discussion of Marx since all three East Coast founders were born before any of the Midwestern founders? The present study also demonstrated that there are numerous directions available for the further study of Marxian sociology. The most promising areas of research are, (1) the study of scholars in the third and fourth eras which established Marxian sociology. (2) The study of Veblen, Beard, Dewey, Robinson and others who might have developed a systematic study of Marxian sociology in America.

In the final analysis, the development of an academic Marxian sociology in the United states has developed gradually among the central characters to the discipline's development. At the macro level, among the six founders focused on in this study, no true

Marxian scholar existed. Additionally, development of a stable school of Marxian sociology slowly developed in the mainstream. Unfortunately, Roscoe Hinkle, Tom Bottomore, and Herman and Julia Schwendinger do not look at the people who would make up the fringe of academic sociology during the second period. On the micro level, the three East Coast founders minimally discussed Marx in their manuscripts/books. In contrast, the Midwest founders discussed Marx with greater consistency. At both levels, the development of academic Marxian sociology in the United States gradually developed.

8.0 Conclusion

This study has shown a lot about the founders of academic sociology in the United States during the first era, 1883-1915. Through their books, the founders had shown their views not only about the world, but also about the development of the discipline. At times it was clear that some founders were diametrically opposed to what other founders had to say about certain issues. The more interesting fact about this disagreement was that publicly, the founders stood in support of one another in order to present a more united front in the battle for the continued development of academic sociology. No matter how disparity existed, they all banded together and fought for the need of academic sociology in the United States. Further, they could collectively be seen as defenders/supporters of the United States.

The founders had a highly theoretical and idealistic view of the discipline. In fact, if sociologists had carefully followed the trail they had mapped, sociology would be an esoteric discipline that would have held a position more nearly aligned with religion and philosophy. Even though sociology is not a scientific discipline in the same way that physics and chemistry are, but it is none-the-less a scientific discipline in its own right. It is interesting to note that the founders all wanted to see sociology become a discipline which resembled biology and to a certain extent psychology. Had sociology followed the vision of Cooley, Giddings, Ross, Small, Sumner and Ward put forth, sociology would be an elitist science based almost entirely on classification. Further, many of the current sub-disciplines were seen by the founders as inappropriate areas of study. In particular, Small and Vincent thought that the "less desirable" individuals in society were not worthy of study (ISS). These specialties have become an important part of sociology as an academic discipline.

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VITA

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Peace.

