

Threat Perception, Non-State Actors, and U.S. Military Intervention after 9/11

Luis R. Perez

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Georgeta Pourchot, Committee Co-Chair
Ioannis A. Stivachtis, Co-Chair
Priya Dixit

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ABSTRACT

By some accounts, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) created a paradigm shift in American foreign policy whereby terrorist organizations receive a lot more attention than they did prior to 9/11, especially in terms of U.S. military intervention. Moreover, some argue that this represents a shift in international politics whereby non-state actors have more power than they did before 9/11. However, others maintain that terrorism in the post-9/11 era is indicative of continuity in international politics. They argue that despite any of the immediate consequences of using military force to respond to the 9/11 attacks, the distribution of capabilities among states in the international system has not changed from the pre-9/11 era.

This thesis empirically tests the notion of continuity in international politics through a case study of U.S. military intervention and threat perception. This research analyzes how these two concepts evolve from the post-Cold War era into the post-9/11 era. To the extent that U.S. military intervention and threat perception are comparable before and after 9/11, this is indicative of continuity in international politics. Conversely, contrast across 9/11 indicates change in international politics. Though this thesis finds considerable empirical evidence supporting continuity in international politics in the post-9/11 world, it also finds empirical evidence for change which cannot be ignored.

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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

On September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States was attacked on its own territory for the first time since Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941. The difference on 9/11 was that the aggressors were stateless terrorists and not uniformed military members of a rival nation state. The United States is the most powerful country in the world, and it could not stop a small band of religious extremists from destroying the symbolic World Trade Center towers, causing major harm to the Pentagon, and claiming thousands of innocent American lives. As a result, the U.S. launched two of its largest military interventions in history by sending tens of thousands of troops to Afghanistan in 2001 and then to Iraq in 2003. These interventions were also two of the longest interventions in U.S. history. Does this mean that the U.S. perceives threats to its national security—especially those from non-state actors—to be greater after 9/11? And does this mean that the U.S. will use military intervention more in the post-9/11 era than it did before 9/11?

This thesis empirically measures U.S. military intervention and threat perception from the end of the Cold War to the end of President Obama's first term to determine how they compare before and after 9/11. This research then draws some conclusions from this analysis to determine to what extent the U.S.'s behavior after 9/11 indicates that non-state actors have acquired meaningful power in a way that causes nation-states to worry. This thesis finds ample support for the idea that the U.S.—and all nation states—still retain the overwhelming majority of the political power to be had by all actors, whether state or non-state. However, it also finds support for the notion that non-state actors have wielded real power as measured by the U.S.'s increased threat perception and use of military intervention after 9/11.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Military intervention has been described as the “most contentious issue in international relations in the post-Cold War era.”¹ Part of the reason for this is because of the negative connotations associated with failed U.S. interventions during the Cold War, such as the war in Vietnam, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Unfortunately, “Vietnam was not unique, but rather is indicative of a foreign policy whereby the United States intervened in more than seventeen major Third World civil wars during the post-World War II period.”² But just how long has intervention been a component of U.S. foreign policy? At a minimum, “Direct military intervention ... has been a crucial component of U.S. foreign policy throughout the twentieth century.”³ More generally, military intervention is arguably always an element of U.S. foreign policy, though the degree to which it is implemented fluctuates over time.⁴ In fact, some go so far as to say that “This debate did not suddenly arise during the Cold War nor since it ended, but has instead been the central theme of American discussions of foreign policy since the country was founded.”⁵ The decision to implement military intervention depends on myriad factors, but most notably on the actors and conditions which threaten U.S. national security.

Research Questions

The U.S.’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) consisted of two of the most notable U.S. military interventions to date: forays into Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The former was arguably the first large-scale U.S. military intervention undertaken in response to a threat from a non-state actor; the latter was the first pre-emptive U.S. military intervention through which the U.S. sought to eliminate a rising threat

before it fully materialized. In addition, these are two of the three longest military interventions in U.S. history. Are these instances indicative of future U.S. military interventions? More broadly, does this signal a transformation of international relations and the ways by which states interact with one another? By examining U.S. military intervention after 9/11 it is possible to determine the extent to which 9/11 has affected the U.S.'s willingness and propensity to implement military intervention. This thesis seeks to answer the following questions:

- Has the U.S. used military intervention more or less after 9/11?
- How does U.S. threat perception compare before and after 9/11?
- Does this case study indicate continuity or change in international politics?

The U.S. after the Cold War

The Cold War was characterized by two superpowers maintaining a bi-polar balance of power for several decades. The distribution of capabilities within the international system shifted when the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving the U.S. as the world's only superpower. This left many in the West suggesting that the geopolitical situation at that time had given rise to an era of peace among the world's powerful states.⁶ So dramatic was this change to international politics that the resulting condition was described as "a new world order."⁷ One scholar and policymaker went so far as to characterize this shift in the international system as "the end of history."⁸ The rise of this unique international order led to a discussion about when and how the U.S. should use its newly acquired global dominance to shape events around the world.⁹

Despite achieving a status as the world's only superpower, scholars are careful to note that the U.S. cannot be categorized as a global hegemon "because it cannot physically control the entire globe and thus cannot compel other states to do what it wants."¹⁰ Instead, the U.S. can be

said to have achieved a position of “primacy” in the international system.¹¹ What this means is that the U.S. is the only regional hegemon in the world, and it is the only one with the global reach to influence the balance of power in other regions.¹² In fact, after the Cold War the U.S. increased its influence on regional balances of power, especially in the Middle East, though it limited the extent of the military force it used to do so.¹³ More generally, the U.S. leveraged its position of primacy to achieve relative gains over its adversaries while protecting U.S. national interests.¹⁴ In some cases, the U.S. even used military force to prove that it would not “be pushed around by nasty, tin-pot, small-time, thug dictators and war-lords.”¹⁵ Lastly, the end of the Cold War led to a series of failing states generating humanitarian crises, some of which were followed by U.S. military intervention.¹⁶ Importantly, U.S. military intervention could no longer be cast in light of a great power competition with the Soviet Union, but rather it had to stand alone as a deliberate decision to use force.¹⁷ Terrorism was a national security challenge to the U.S. during this period, but it was not until the 9/11 attacks that the U.S. calculus regarding military intervention in response to terrorist threats appears to have increased considerably.

The U.S. after 9/11

The 9/11 terrorist attacks were perhaps the most direct challenge to U.S. national security since World War II, leaving policymakers determined to seek justice and prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil.¹⁸ Writing a few months after 9/11, Alexander Stille declares, “Clearly, the world has changed” because “Developments in technology have given small groups of people the kind of destructive power once available only to national governments.”¹⁹ Stephen Walt agrees that terrorists are more capable of hurting nation states than ever before.²⁰

So dramatic is this alleged change, in fact, that John Lewis Gaddis advocates “a revolution in strategic thinking”²¹ in order to protect against such threats. According to neoimperialist theorists such as Sebastian Mallaby, this transformation leads to “a world in which readiness to send troops to distant parts of the world to maintain or re-establish order becomes increasingly common.”²² Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani “anticipate that foreign military intervention, not interstate military force, is the type of armed force that will be most common in the coming decades among both major powers and less powerful states. Non-state actors seem to be one of the largest threats to the security of states across the globe in the present period, and they appear to be one of the primary targets of state use of force.”²³ Walt maintains that the nature of this threat requires states “to be willing to put your own forces on the ground. You can't just bomb from 15,000 feet.”²⁴ Even Kenneth Waltz, the pre-eminent neorealist theorist, concedes that “The terrorist acts of September 11 have prompted the United States to enlarge its already bloated military forces and to extend its influence into parts of the world that its tentacles had not already reached.”²⁵

However, Waltz questions whether 9/11 has really led to the transformation in international politics prescribed by Gaddis.²⁶ Instead, Waltz holds that “terrorists contribute to the continuity of international politics. They further trends already in motion.”²⁷ John Mearsheimer agrees that 9/11 “shows that old-fashioned power politics still operates in this new world.”²⁸ Gaddis concedes that, all other implications of empire aside, behaving like an empire “[has] the advantage of maintaining order and suppressing anarchy.”²⁹ Gaddis further adds, “The whole reason we have states is protection against anarchy—9/11 shows that states are rather good things to have around.”³⁰

Relevance of Studying U.S. Military Intervention after 9/11

The need for this research arises from the consensus among scholars that terrorism will continue to pose national security challenges to the U.S. for the foreseeable future, and that U.S. military force will persist as a viable means of dealing with this threat.³¹ U.S. military intervention abroad, however, has the adverse effect of increasing the security dilemma for other political actors. States feeling increasingly threatened by U.S. military interventions might be induced to balance against the U.S. Similarly, U.S. military intervention abroad fuels the convictions as well as the growth of non-state actors determined to counter U.S. influence. Ultimately, the security dilemma dictates that more U.S. military intervention leads to increased threats to U.S. national security, possibly requiring further military intervention by the U.S.

It is interesting to note that even 9/11 failed to produce clarity and unanimity regarding the use of U.S. military power abroad. This indicates that U.S. military intervention will continue to be a contentious matter in the post-9/11 world.³² Indeed, Walt questions whether or not the U.S. needs to keep its military actively engaged abroad in order to maintain the balance of power across all the world's regions. He argues that the U.S.—and the rest of the international system, for that matter—might benefit from scaling down its forward-deployed military forces and using them only when vital interests are at stake or when regional conditions require it to act as an “offshore balancer.”³³ It seems that, regardless of this research finding continuity or change in U.S. military intervention after 9/11, Walt suggests the U.S. might best maintain its primacy in the international system by employing military intervention less than it has in the aftermath of 9/11.

On the other hand, Mearsheimer argues that, while the U.S. may recoil from its recent prolonged conflicts in the Middle East in the short run, in the long run it is quite likely that the

U.S. will remain actively engaged abroad as a result of its position of primacy in the international system.³⁴ In fact, he shows that the U.S. has been heavily involved in fighting wars since the end of the Cold War and that there is no indication this is likely to change going forward.³⁵ Karin Von Hippel agrees that the U.S. will use military intervention frequently, though she foresees these to be geared toward peace-keeping and humanitarian interventions followed by nation-building missions.³⁶ Understanding the conditions under which the U.S. used military intervention before and after 9/11 becomes especially relevant if the U.S. is to maintain a high level of engagement abroad as the means to preserve its primacy.

Additionally, since the U.S. has such a disproportionate effect in shaping international politics, we should strive to understand the conditions under which the U.S. has employed military intervention. Moreover, as the world's sole superpower, the U.S. sets the example for how powerful states should behave and for what behavior is and is not acceptable in international politics. For example, the U.S. capitalized on its primacy—as well as abundant moral support following 9/11—to exert its military power in a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003.³⁷ The first order effect of this intervention was to disrupt the regional balance of power in the Middle East, and this has obvious geo-political consequences. A second order effect—and arguably a more consequential effect—was to embed the notion that it is acceptable to use military intervention pre-emptively to achieve national security objectives. This may come back to haunt the U.S. in the future, and as will be discussed in chapter two, actually serves to *decrease* U.S. national security. These second order effects should be considered prior to deciding to use military intervention.

Lastly, military intervention has monetary costs associated with it. The U.S. has borrowed and spent its way into enormous debt in order to pay for its military interventions since

9/11. The national debt now threatens domestic programs and economic viability. Military intervention thus compromises U.S. national interests at home. Moreover, since the U.S. has a significant influence on the global economy, a weak U.S. economy tends to lead to weakened economies of other states. Weakened states could disrupt the international balance of power, thereby increasing the security burden placed on the U.S.

In brief, the central importance of studying U.S. military intervention after 9/11 lies in attempting to understand how the U.S. will respond to perceived national security threats going forward. This research is relevant to U.S. policymakers so that their understanding of this phenomenon can inform their formulation of national security strategy and policy. This knowledge is also relevant to policymakers in other states as they attempt to account for U.S. actions in their national security strategies. Additionally, this knowledge is extremely relevant to international politics scholars who work every day to understand the phenomena that drive the international system.

Relevance of Studying Threat Perception:

In the post-Cold War era, there was arguably no threat to U.S. national security so imminent as to justify American military intervention.³⁸ In the post-9/11 era, the U.S. may perceive threats from non-state actors more severely than before 9/11. In fact, Karlyn Bowman, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, argues that while “perceptions of the terrorist threat grew slowly before September 11 ... Today that threat is part of everyday life, and Americans expect another attack on our soil.”³⁹ Consequently, the U.S. may be more inclined to use military intervention in response to perceived threats from non-state actors more frequently than it did prior to 9/11. Indeed, Bowman goes on to say that “... policymakers are taking the

terrorist threat much more seriously than they did before September 11 and making some progress in dealing with it. Americans' resolve to address the threat has not waned, and they will continue to give the president and policymakers considerable scope to deal with it."⁴⁰ John Steinbruner and Jason Forrester agree that "After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it is now broadly accepted that there is an imminent threat and indeed an active war."⁴¹ Given the increased focus on terrorism characteristic of the post-9/11 U.S., this thesis seeks to study how U.S. threat perception compares before and after 9/11. Moreover, this thesis seeks to determine if there is a relationship between this concept and any subsequent decisions to employ military interventions.

The Thesis Plan

It is the intent of this thesis to empirically test Waltz's theory regarding continuity and change of international politics. By change, this thesis means the redistribution of capabilities among political actors within the international system from one condition to another, not a transformation of the system's structure. Similarly, continuity indicates that the existing distribution of capabilities within the international system remains at the status quo ante. This thesis will empirically compare U.S. military intervention and threat perception before and after 9/11. Qualitative conclusions about continuity and change in international politics will be extrapolated from a quantitative analysis of the evolution of these two variables. The more that U.S. military intervention and threat perception increase after 9/11, the more these results will support the notion that the distribution of capabilities has changed to emphasize non-state actors more than before. In this case there may be a need to re-evaluate neorealist theory in the post-9/11 era. On the other hand, comparable measurements of U.S. military intervention and threat

perception before and after 9/11 will indicate that there is continuity regarding the distribution of capabilities within the international system. This outcome will most support Waltz's argument for continuity in international politics.

Chapter two first consists of a discussion of the theoretical framework upon which this research is built. Once this framework is established, this chapter will then review existing literature in order to define the concepts central to this thesis: military intervention and threat perception.

The purpose of chapter three is to explain this thesis's research design. First, this chapter identifies the variables associated with the two concepts introduced in chapter two as well as the hypothesis linking the two variables. Next, this chapter introduces the indicators associated with each variable. The thesis' methodology discusses in detail how each indicator will be measured and why these measurements are appropriate and relevant. Finally, chapter three outlines the time period of interest to this research, the data sources from which the indicators are measured, and the limitations of this thesis.

Chapter four focuses on examining the results of the comparative analysis. First, the chapter introduces the results of the measurements of the indicators for the dependent variable. These are followed by the results of measurements for the indicators of the independent variable. These results contain numerous graphs that visually depict the measurements for the indicators of each variable separately as well as superimposed on the same chart. A discussion of findings based on the results captured in these various charts is threaded throughout the chapter.

Finally, in chapter five I discuss the conclusions that we can extrapolate from the analysis shown in chapter four. Additionally, I provide recommendations for further research based on the limitations of this thesis.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Large amounts of literature have been written regarding military intervention and threat perception, and so it is important to focus on the work that is relevant to this research. The first goal of this literature review is to develop the theoretical framework within which the study of U.S. military intervention after 9/11 can be undertaken. In addition, this review will define the key concepts central to this research, namely military intervention and threat perception. This review will explore what characterizes military intervention, why states use it, and when it might be appropriate. The discussion below will also explore the meaning of threat perception, why threat perception is so difficult in practice, and the problems caused by misperception. This literature review will thus allow for a meaningful discussion of this thesis's research design in chapter three.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis first establishes its theoretical framework in the neorealist (or structural) theory of international relations. Though this theory has its limitations, as is the case with most other international relations theories, it has quite powerful explanatory power where the concept of military intervention is concerned. Moreover, since the intent of the thesis is to empirically test Waltz's claim that the post-9/11 era is representative of continuity in international politics, the best way to do this is to use the same theoretical framework on which Waltz based his argument. However, this framework is limited where the concept of threat perception is

concerned. Therefore, this thesis uses a pluralistic theoretical approach with respect to threat perception.

Military intervention can be seen as a primary mechanism by which a state can provide for its own security. But why is military intervention necessary for this end? Why did the U.S. pursue this course of action in response to the attacks by Al Qaeda, which is, by comparison, a tiny and inconsequential terrorist organization? According to neorealist theory, “the ultimate concern of states is ... for security.”⁴² Therefore, a state will do whatever is necessary to pursue and attain its security. This provides some insight, but it still does not explain why a state must pursue its security in the form of military intervention.

The primary assumption of neorealist theory is that the structure of the international political system is one of anarchy. Given this condition of anarchy, a state must provide for its own security because no other actor or property of the system will provide for it.⁴³ This condition is what Thomas Hobbes referred to as “a war of all against all.” Indeed, war occurs because the current anarchical system has no mechanism to prevent it.⁴⁴ In other words, states must be self-reliant in their pursuit of security. And since there is no higher authority to referee interactions, then states must use all means available to provide for their own security without regard for rules or morals, to include lying, cheating, and using military intervention.⁴⁵ In short, it is this structure that makes military intervention necessary.

More importantly, the structure of the international system is enduring. To be sure, change occurs within the system. There are several levels of power within the system, to include individuals, sub-state political groups, states, and supra-state institutions and organizations. However, the central actors in the international system are states, i.e., geographically-based units which maintain individual sovereignty and perform the same functions within the system. Each

state maintains its own capabilities, and at any given time there is a certain distribution of capabilities within the system. Therefore, change within the system is commensurate with the redistribution of capabilities among states. However, the structure of the system itself is unlikely to transform, despite any changes that may take place within the system.⁴⁶ Since this structure is the pervasive reason that military intervention is necessary, and since this structure is likely to endure despite any changes within the system, then military intervention itself is also enduring. The important question, then, is not whether a state will use military intervention, but rather under what conditions it will choose to do so.

Robert Gilpin offers some answers to this question by building on Waltz's structural realist theory. Gilpin assumes that: the "international system is stable if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system"; that "A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs"; and that "A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits."⁴⁷ Therefore, a state will embark on military intervention when there is something to be gained from it. Since the primary concern of states is security, we can take this to mean that military intervention will be implemented when it leads to security gains. The problem with this is that policymakers arrive at their decision to use military intervention based on their assessment of its "expected benefits," i.e., their perception of the expected outcome of such intervention. The problem of perception deserves further explanation and will be discussed below.

As we have seen, however, states do not exist in a vacuum, but as part of an anarchical system of states in which each is competing against the rest to maximize its respective security. The nature of this competition leads to the "security dilemma," in which one state's quest for

security results in the insecurity of other states, requiring still further pursuits of security.⁴⁸ A state cannot act without regard for the other actors in the system, but rather must carefully consider how other states will act. A gain by one state indicates that one or more other states must lose. This means that even if a state uses military intervention to achieve security gains, it will trigger a response in which the actor whose security just decreased will take a counter-action—possibly including military intervention—to try to reverse the situation back in its favor. Consequently, it becomes very difficult for one state to achieve security gains at the expense of other states. Additionally, we can see that a state will use military intervention as a means of preventing its security from decreasing.

The redistribution of capabilities within the system, however, is usually not a zero-sum relationship, i.e., one state's gains exactly equals the losses of one or more states.⁴⁹ Rather, given the condition of anarchy, "states become more concerned about relative gains than absolute gains."⁵⁰ This means that it is unlikely that a state will employ military intervention in a case where several states would benefit equally from any security gains achieved this way. This is why it is very challenging to get states to contribute to solving collective security challenges which are common to all, including terrorism. On the other hand, if a state could realistically expect to gain an advantage over its competitors through military intervention, it would surely do so. John Mearsheimer goes so far as to argue that all states maintain an "offensive" mindset and will theoretically continue increase their power relative to other states until they achieve global hegemony—the condition in which a state can be said to be fully secure from its competitors.⁵¹

Since all competitors strive for security gains, it will sometimes be beneficial for states to cooperate with others so as to thwart and offset the successes of another. This phenomenon is what statesmen, scholars, and theorists have long referred to as the "balance of power."⁵²

According to this principle of neorealist theory, when a state seeks to use military intervention, others will balance against it so as to prevent that state from making any gains. Indeed, Waltz tells us that “Where there is nothing to prevent the use of force as a means of altering the forms and the results of competition, the capacity to use force tends to become the index by which the balance of power is measured.”⁵³ We thus learn that a state might also employ military intervention to preserve the current distribution of capabilities within the system of states. Of note, balance of power has proven an effective way to maintain order and prevent wars despite the competition instilled by the anarchical structure.⁵⁴

In short, neorealist theory dictates that states must rely on military intervention as a means to attain security because the structure of the international system does not provide any other means. This theoretical framework is now sufficient for a discussion of the first concept of interest, military intervention. However, this framework will be expanded in the section about threat perception below.

What is Military Intervention?

There are about as many definitions for military intervention in the literature as there are scholars who write about it. Nevertheless, there are several common themes that will enable us to identify key components of military intervention. Generally, both scholars and policymakers agree that intervention usually refers to the use of power.⁵⁵ We can therefore extrapolate that military intervention entails the use of military power. The media also tends to define foreign intervention in terms of employing military power.⁵⁶

It is important to note that the decision to use military power is not necessarily Boolean in nature, but rather it falls at the end of a spectrum of the use of power. Indeed, the U.S. will

employ military intervention in conjunction with other elements of national power, most notably diplomatic and economic power.⁵⁷ Moreover, the U.S. will usually resort to military intervention only when the exertion of other forms of power has failed to produce the desired result.⁵⁸ As Clausewitz said in the 19th century, war—i.e. military intervention—is merely an extension of politics.⁵⁹

The use of military power itself can vary in size and scope from, for example, limited air strikes or Special Forces operations on the low end to a large land invasion on the high end. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer makes a strong argument about why “Armies, along with their supporting air and naval forces are the paramount form of military power in the world.”⁶⁰ In short, land power is what allows states to decisively accomplish their political objectives. Moreover, how the military power is used can be as important as what it is used for. For example, the “Powell Doctrine” of using overwhelming force to quickly achieve the decisive outcome was popular during many U.S. post-Cold War military operations.⁶¹ Additionally, one school of thought holds that military intervention specifically requires the introduction of new military forces to an area in a way that is not routine or pre-planned.⁶² On the other hand, an opposing view maintains that routine shows of force such as “forward deployments and participation in regional training exercises” fall under the umbrella of military intervention.⁶³ Despite these practical differences, Waltz would argue that how a state uses military force or how much it uses does not matter as much as the decision to use force in the first place. As such, this literature review will focus on why states use military force of any kind.

Why Use Military Intervention?

The central controversy underlying the concept of military intervention involves the use of military power to intrude in the affairs of another sovereign state.⁶⁴ This intrusion must be deliberate and not requested.⁶⁵ Additionally, this deliberate incursion into the sovereign affairs of another state is done with the goal of creating or influencing change in the state in which the intervention is committed.⁶⁶ Interestingly enough, despite existing in a condition of anarchy, states have generally upheld the international law against violating each other's sovereignty since it was codified in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.⁶⁷ The problem arises when respecting the right of a state to govern within its borders becomes incompatible with achieving national political objectives, namely security.⁶⁸

One particularly challenging characteristic of the post-Cold War era is the presence of states who cannot maintain order within their borders. Consequently, disorder within one state often spills across national borders, thereby reducing the security of neighboring and even removed states.⁶⁹ Lahneman outlines in detail the difference between "weak," "failing," and "failed" states, but his salient point is that "The events of September 11 have underscored what can happen when law and order are allowed to deteriorate anywhere in the world."⁷⁰ The fact that states can and do violate each other's sovereignty through military intervention reinforces the need for a state to provide for its own security in the absence of a higher, central authority.

This intrusion into the affairs of another state also requires a purpose. To Abrams, the debate surrounding intervention is "about when the United States should risk the lives of American soldiers overseas to solve other people's problems."⁷¹ But since we know that the U.S. must operate with an eye toward 'self-help', military intervention then must be employed not to solve the problems of others, but those of the U.S. itself. Indeed, there is broad consensus that the U.S. is likely to implement military intervention when its national interests are at stake.⁷²

It is clear from the literature that a state's national interests can be categorized as either vital interests or other interests. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find consensus on exactly how those interests are defined. At minimum, neorealist theory dictates that the U.S.'s primary concern is for its own security, and so it should use military intervention to achieve security gains or prevent security losses. Indeed, the only consensus in the literature is that the most vital national interests are those that pertain to the survival of the United States, the defense of the nation's territory, and the security of its citizens.⁷³ Lahneman, for example, notes that "Events in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown how forceful and swift interventions can be when policymakers believe that intervention is required for traditional reasons of national security."⁷⁴

Additionally, a state has "important" interests which may warrant the use of military force, including economic interests, spreading democracy, stopping international crime, building partnerships, and more.⁷⁵ Non-vital interests are less well-defined, and the dividing line between vital and important interests is not always clear. The classical realist view applies a filter of geographic proximity to defining national interests, whereby matters close to a state's borders are of central importance, and matters at or beyond the periphery of a state's sphere of influence are of much less import.⁷⁶ Indeed, Mearsheimer argues that regional hegemony is the most security a state can hope to achieve in practice, and so it will focus the majority of its efforts in becoming the most powerful state in its region.⁷⁷

Finally, there have also been a number of instances since the end of the Cold War where it appears the U.S. used military intervention solely for humanitarian reasons.⁷⁸ The U.S. is less inclined, however, to use military intervention when its national interests are not at stake.⁷⁹ American presidents sometimes discuss using military force for moral reasons such as defending human rights or ameliorating a humanitarian crisis. However, by and large the U.S. has not

employed military intervention solely for moral reasons.⁸⁰ Therefore, though in some cases the U.S. has used military force in conjunction with moralistic presidential rhetoric, there is usually an underlying national interest at stake motivating said intervention. For example, Steven Burg concludes that despite rhetoric justifying U.S. military intervention in Serbia on account of stopping the genocide being committed against the Muslims, the intervention was in fact motivated by “the threats to national interests ... derived from the consequences of the conflict for NATO cohesion and the potential consequences of the conflict for electoral politics in the United States.”⁸¹ This inconsistency between the stated reason for intervention and the actual reason for intervention itself receives a lot of attention in the literature, though it is tangential to this research and so it will not be further discussed in this thesis. Neorealists would agree that most U.S. military interventions are driven by security concerns, regardless of any values-based rhetoric employed by policymakers.

When to Intervene?

It should come as no surprise that the literature fails to produce a clear answer about when a state should use military intervention. In short, it depends. Karin Von Hippel illustrates just how wide and varied the reasons for using military force can be by giving examples from policy-makers in the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. By scanning these various lists the reader can see that Presidents, Secretaries of State, National Security Advisers, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produce significantly different conditions to necessitate the use of force. Indeed it appears that national interests can be defined with a high degree of vagueness and latitude, almost guaranteeing that policymakers can justify just about any intervention on which they wish to embark.⁸²

Based on what we know about why states use force, it follows that once a vital or important national interest is threatened we should observe a corresponding military intervention. However, academics and policymakers agree there are multiple factors to consider before settling on the use of force as a course of action. Anthony Lake goes so far as to say that “Not one of these [national] interests by itself—with the obvious exception of an attack on our nation, people and allies—should automatically lead to the use of force.”⁸³ In fact the decision to use military intervention should be based on a very deliberate calculation of many factors, including the chances of success, the human and financial costs, domestic and international support, and the will to achieve the established political objectives.⁸⁴

U.S. policymakers Linton Brooks and Arnold Kanter discuss this calculus in detail: “The intersection of feasibility, desirability, and costs yields three distinct categories into which a potential intervention might fall.”⁸⁵ These categories are assigned based on the severity of the threat posed to U.S. interests. The greater the threat, the greater the need for intervention. The cases in which a state’s interests are so threatened “that there is no practical alternative to intervention” are labeled cases of “mandatory intervention.”⁸⁶ The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 is likely the best example of this category. On the other hand, when intervening does not secure U.S. national interests, these cases are labelled “unwarranted intervention.” The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq might be the best example of this type of intervention. The more complicated cases are those which do not clearly fall into these two categories. These are labelled cases of “discretionary intervention” and accordingly require a much more “careful calculation of costs and benefits.”⁸⁷ Given the complexity of international politics, most of the military interventions on which the U.S. has embarked after the Cold War could be labeled as “discretionary interventions.”

Regardless of the extent of the intervention pursued, policy-makers will seek to minimize the costs of intervention. However, the lower the necessity there is for military intervention, the greater the flexibility policy-makers will have when deciding which forms of intervention to employ. This presents a problem whereby “the availability of low-cost, low-risk options [...] may tempt us to make the mistake of intervening in unwarranted cases, intervening because we *can*, rather than because we *should*.”⁸⁸ This phenomenon especially caused problems for the U.S. following the Cold War era, where the “CNN Effect” or the “Do Something Effect” caused by constant media coverage of conflict around the world undoubtedly led the U.S. to embark on more military interventions than it otherwise would have.⁸⁹

The literature distinguishes between an instance of military intervention designed to influence the external behavior of another state and one whose purpose is to change the distribution of capabilities within that state.⁹⁰ The immediate post-Cold War era especially saw an increase in military interventions in the internal affairs of states, specifically with respect to the desire to halt human rights violations.⁹¹ For the purposes of this literature review, it is immaterial whether a state employs military intervention to change another state’s external or internal behavior. What matters is that one state feels so driven to change the distribution of capabilities within the international system that—given the lack of a higher judicial authority characteristic of an anarchical system—it chooses to violate the sovereignty of another state with military force, knowing full well that doing so increases the likelihood that its own sovereignty might be infringed upon.

Despite the fact that states are equal to each other in the international system, there is a notion in international politics that military intervention can be bestowed a certain degree of legitimacy based on the specifics of the situation. The amount of legitimacy largely corresponds

to where a given use of military force falls along the spectrum of conflict—with the most legitimacy conferred upon a purely defensive intervention and the least legitimacy granted to a purely aggressive intervention.⁹² For example, Walt notes that the U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003 lacked international legitimacy because of its preemptive character.⁹³ Neorealists would argue that—given the need to operate with a ‘self-help’ attitude due to the structure of the international system—legitimacy is nice to have when embarking on a military intervention, but it is by no means a necessary precondition.⁹⁴ This literature review now turns to a discussion of the second concept of interest, threat perception.

The Theory of Threat Perception

International politics would be a difficult enough endeavor even if, theoretically, policymakers could know the true power and intentions of every other state in the international system. It is even more complicated in practice since policymakers can only know what is observable. This includes both inventorying as accurately as possible a competitor state’s military power as well as analyzing rhetoric employed by that state’s leaders. In short, policymakers establish policy based on what they *perceive* to be true about the distribution of capabilities within the international system. According to Robert Jervis, arguably the authority on the subject, perception refers to “the causes and consequences of the ways in which decision-makers draw inferences from the world.”⁹⁵ A more scientific definition based in psychology holds that “Perception is the process of apprehending by means of the senses and recognizing and interpreting what is processed.”⁹⁶ In essence, perception is the foundation upon which we come to understand and make decisions about the world around us.⁹⁷

Perception of enemy threat, specifically, is crucial when deliberating policy actions such as military intervention. For example, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic perceived sufficient threat to their common interests to use military force in Bosnia in 1995.⁹⁸ Most scholars of perception as a phenomenon in international politics would agree with J. David Sanger that threat perception is a “function of both estimated capability and estimated intent.”⁹⁹ In this regard, there are several different cases policymakers might observe when analyzing the threat posed by each political actor in the international system. First, there is the case where a political actor has significant military capabilities but is benign toward the U.S. This actor would be perceived to pose little to no threat due to its friendly relationship with the U.S.—a characterization which applies to the U.S.’s most powerful military allies. Conversely, there is the case of a political actor who has demonstrated negative intent toward the U.S. but has little military capability to speak of. This actor would be perceived to pose little threat to the U.S. due to its inability to attack U.S. interests even if it wanted to. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime could fit this characterization, especially prior to 9/11. In fact, it was only after the 9/11 attacks materialized—and Al Qaeda proved it had not only malicious intent but also the capability to deliver on that intent—that the U.S. and other states perceived the Taliban regime to pose an imminent threat by harboring Al Qaeda leaders. Once this was the case, military intervention in Afghanistan occurred quickly, with broad participation, and even with prompt UN support.¹⁰⁰ Lastly, there is the case of a political actor with a significant military capability *and* negative intentions toward the U.S. This actor would be perceived to pose the highest threat to U.S. national security. States such as Russia and China could be characterized as such, though in practice states are very careful to not unnecessarily antagonize each other so as to avoid undesired conflict.

It is important to note that in neorealist theory capability is what really matters, whereas neoliberal theory places more emphasis on intent. In this context, policymakers should be concerned about all states with strong military capability, regardless of whether they are allies or not. Here neorealists would remind us that several of the U.S.'s strongest allies today were enemies not a century ago—namely Germany and Japan—and several of the U.S.'s allies during the same time period are today some of its biggest rivals—namely China and Russia. As an interesting aside, this emphasis on capability over intent appears to bear weight with policymakers in practice as was demonstrated when the U.S. was discovered to have spied on the German Chancellor, a close American ally.¹⁰¹

However, the literature shows that intent is important in practice. For example, Walt notes that even though the U.S. arguably has the most military capability in the world, most states—excepting Latin American states that have been the object of U.S. military intervention—do not perceive it to pose a threat because they perceive the U.S. to have benevolent intentions. In this regard, it appears that the neorealism has reached the boundary of its explanatory power. Therefore, it is necessary to include the neoliberal view of threat perception as described above into this research. Consequently, this thesis expands its previous neorealist theoretical framework into a pluralist one that has more explanatory power than does the neorealist view alone. In short, policymakers are likely to consider a rival actor's intent as well as its capability in the context of each individual decision about whether or not to employ military intervention to increase its national security.

The problem is that threat perception can sometimes be wrong, and this can have enormous consequences for international politics. This error in perception is called “misperception” in the literature.¹⁰² Misperception occurs because threats tend to be either

overestimated or underestimated.¹⁰³ Indeed, it is possible for a state to perceive a threat when one does not exist, or vice versa.¹⁰⁴ The reasons for misperception are many.¹⁰⁵ Though scholars explain them in considerable detail, they will be briefly discussed below as relevant to a study of military intervention. So pervasive is the problem of misperception that even if policymakers consider capabilities alone, they will likely come to different conclusions about the actual distribution of capabilities among states. This point is emphasized by Henry Kissinger, one of the most prominent statesmen in U.S. history, when he wrote that “In theory, the balance of power should be quite calculable; in practice, it has proved extremely difficult to harmonize a country’s calculations with those of other states and achieve a common recognition of limits.”¹⁰⁶

It is essential that policymakers consider the problem of misperception when contemplating military intervention. Here Jervis offers several recommendations about how to mitigate any misperception that might take hold. First, he suggests that, “Instead of incorrectly believing that he is calling for a dominant strategy, the policy advocate should try to reach the more modest goal of developing policies that have high payoffs if the assumptions about the adversary that underlie them are correct, yet have tolerable costs if these premises are wrong.”¹⁰⁷ Next, he suggests that policymakers try to view the situation from the point of view of their adversary. In doing this, policymakers need to carefully deliberate what evidence they need to see when determining the extent of the threat posed by a rival, being especially careful to avoid a standard for evidence of benign behavior consisting of actions which policymakers would deem too precarious for their own state.¹⁰⁸ Lastly, he warns that “It is not enough to calculate how the other will respond to your action if your image of him is correct. You must also try to estimate how the other will respond if he has intentions and perceptions that are different from those that you think he probably has.”¹⁰⁹ In short, the decision to implement military intervention should

not be based on rigid threat perception which, if inaccurate, would preclude the reason for intervention. It should instead be based on a broader determination of threat which stands even if assumptions are wrong, capabilities are overestimated, and intentions are miscalculated.

The Problems Caused by Misperception

Misperception can present several problems for policymakers. First and foremost, there is the case of when threat underestimation leads a state to be attacked by surprise. This was arguably the case on 9/11 when Al Qaeda unexpectedly turned passenger airline jets into missiles on U.S. territory. In fact, Lahneman argues that “[military] Intervention in Afghanistan was reactive.”¹¹⁰ In other words, U.S. threat perception failed to account for this. Or worse, if American analysts perceived this threat, then policymakers failed to take appropriate action to mitigate the threat. Misperception in this particular case is so pervasive that even in with 9/11 in hindsight, “There is as yet no detailed consensus ... regarding the nature of that threat or the appropriate conduct of the war.”¹¹¹ Though one explanation for this might be that there has indeed been a significant shift in the distribution of capabilities within the international system, political psychologists would argue that there are other explanations for this consistent with continuity in international politics. These will be discussed below. Nevertheless, policymakers are wary of the dangers of underestimating a threat, especially in the post-9/11 era.

Overestimating a threat can be almost as problematic for policymakers. This is because any military intervention based on an exaggerated threat perception is unlikely to receive international support. In fact, it is likely to be characterized—and condemned—as aggression. The best example of this is the U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003. In this case, U.S. political leaders perceived the threat posed by a possible Iraqi nuclear program—as well as

possible ties to Al Qaeda—to be so great that they put military intervention in motion despite the fact that no other state perceived the same threat to be so imminent.¹¹² American policymakers felt justified in characterizing this military intervention as “pre-emptive war,” a defensive form of war.¹¹³ However, since other states did not perceive the threat posed by the Iraqi regime to be imminent, they instead characterized U.S. military intervention in Iraq as a “preventive war,” which is aggressive in nature.¹¹⁴ That the U.S. exaggerated the extent of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime in order to justify military intervention means that the next time the U.S. wants to use military force it will have to go above and beyond to prove that an imminent threat in fact exists if it hopes to obtain international support. Though the U.S. invasion of Iraq without a UN resolution shows that international support is not a requirement for intervention, in practice the U.S. can attain security gains more easily when other states support its actions than when they oppose U.S. actions.

Misperception can cause even further problems for the state employing military intervention as a result of overestimating a threat. In the case of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, one problem is that when other states perceive that the U.S. will use military force in an aggressor capacity, they will tend to balance against the U.S. In other words, threat exaggeration followed by military intervention can actually decrease the security of the intervening state.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, by engaging in “preventive war,” the U.S. essentially validated this as a viable form of foreign policy for other states. Therefore, the U.S. would be unable to condemn a similar military intervention on the part of a rival state, since it essentially acquiesced that this is legitimate state behavior through its example.¹¹⁶ Here again, the U.S. military intervention in Iraq actually served to decrease U.S. national security.

Why is Threat Perception Difficult?

There are several plausible sources of misperception in the literature. First, the rationalist school of thought attempts to explain the causes of misperception without much regard for psychology. This perspective maintains that any misperception that might take hold is due to a lack of information, or conversely, the presence of inaccurate information due to one state's deliberate attempt to mislead its rivals.¹¹⁷ This school of thought attributes the error to the source or "sender" of the signals, and discounts any error on the part of the perceiver.¹¹⁸ In this view, when policymakers have limited information about the capabilities or intentions of a rival state, they fill in the gaps consistent with what they believe to be the rational alternative, thus opening the door for misperception. Policymakers will also be subject to misperception if they draw rational conclusions after being misled as to the true capabilities or intent of a rival state. Jervis adds that policymakers could also arrive at misperception if they employ "irrational consistency," meaning that policymakers make assumptions to cover information gaps in a way that is irrational based on their understanding of normal state behavior.¹¹⁹ In this case, misperception occurs because policymakers extrapolate threat perception in a way that is inconsistent with how a state *should* behave.

To be sure, a non-trivial proportion of the perception error can be attributed to the source of the signals. However, scholars would agree that errors on the part of the perceiver play a much more significant role in misperception than do errors in signaling.¹²⁰ In fact, there are a few problems with the rationalist account of misperception. First, Jervis notes that "Contradictory inferences can be equally rational."¹²¹ This means that policymakers could arrive at more than one rationally plausible conclusion which could have completely different consequences for making a decision about whether to use military force. Also, Walt notes that

deliberate deception is difficult in international relations because policymakers are predisposed to be suspicious of their rival states.¹²² In this view, policymakers will naturally account for a considerable degree of source error when determining threat perception. Lastly, the rationalist view fails to account for the psychological explanations of misperception which are powerful in explaining several abnormalities in threat perception.¹²³

Stein discusses a few other causes of misperception. She acknowledges that, to a certain degree, misperception is rooted in the strategic environment.¹²⁴ The best example of this is what Stein refers to as the “perceptual security dilemma,” in which the security dilemma—described above—leads one state to exaggerate a rival state’s attempts to increase its security as overly aggressive, while at the same time interpreting its own efforts to increase security as defensive.¹²⁵ Waltz and other neorealists would argue that this is simply a by-product of the anarchical structure of the international system. Stein also proposes that emotions play a very real role in threat perception. For example, she suggests that the emotions sustained during 9/11 have caused American policymakers to maintain an elevated threat perception of terrorism, even though no further major attack has materialized since that fateful day.¹²⁶ Lastly, Stein maintains that politics can be a source of misperception. She offers the example of defense and intelligence officials who unconsciously exaggerate threats so as to receive increased funding.¹²⁷ Another example is when political leaders sometimes resort to “fearmongering” as a way of overcoming the difficulties of implementing military intervention when the perceived threat is not clearly imminent.¹²⁸ This was arguably the case in the 2003 U.S. military intervention in Iraq as was previously discussed. While the explanations discussed in this paragraph certainly have merit, they are not the strongest explanations of misperception in international politics.

The most robust explanations of misperception are those rooted in psychology. Scholars refer to these as the cognitive sources of misperception.¹²⁹ There are myriad individual cognitive sources of misperception eloquently discussed in the literature, but the overriding idea here is that policymakers are subject to many predispositions, biases, external influences, beliefs, and other phenomena which affect their ability to accurately perceive threats.¹³⁰ For example, one study shows how people tend to perceive the actions of a foreign state through the lens of friendliness and strength: the less friendly and the stronger a state is, the more threatening its actions will be perceived.¹³¹ On its face this study appears to simply affirm the theory that threat perception is a calculation of capability and intent, but the researchers demonstrated that they could affect the extent of threat perceived by influencing the degree to which test subjects thought of rival states as friendly or hostile, and strong or weak.¹³² That the researchers could do this further supports the notion that threat perception is not simply a rational calculation, but is in fact influenced by a wide variety of psychological factors. This view places the majority of the perception error squarely on the perceiver, and it explains misperception better than any other line of reasoning discussed above. These explanations of misperception further support the requirement to use a pluralist approach to study threat perception.

Conclusion

In closing, this literature review highlights the theoretical framework within which the study of U.S. military intervention and threat perception after 9/11 can be undertaken. This framework holds that states use military intervention because the anarchical structure of the international system places states in direct competition with each other without a central authority who can resolve disputes. In fact, this structure requires that a state can only increase

its security through 'self-help.' A state's primary objective is to increase its security in a way that gives it relative advantage over its competitors. Consequently, the structure of the international system leads to the security dilemma, in which one state's quest for security reduces the security of its competitors, thereby spurring a never-ending spiral of states constantly making their rivals feel insecure. Therefore, states maintain the distribution of capabilities in the international system in their favor through the balance of power, in which weaker states work together to offset the power of a stronger state. In this context, states use military intervention to increase their security relative to other states when an opportunity arises in which they can achieve security gains or prevent security losses on a non-temporary basis.

Next, this literature review discussed the definitions of military intervention, why states employ military intervention, and when military intervention might be used. Military intervention refers to the use of military power, namely land power, to attain political objectives when other forms of power prove insufficient. Furthermore, military intervention implies one state violating another's sovereignty in order to secure its national interests, the most important of which is the security and survival of its homeland and its citizens. The greater the perceived threat to national interests is, the more likely it will be that a state will employ military intervention to eliminate the threat. Moreover, states will use military intervention when its policymakers calculate that the perceived benefits outweigh the costs, and that the intervention will likely be successful. To a lesser extent states will employ military intervention when there is international support for said intervention, although this is not a requirement for the use of military force.

Finally, this literature review employed a pluralistic theoretical approach to explore the concept of threat perception, the problems of misperception, and why misperception takes hold.

Threat perception refers to the process by which policymakers come to know and understand the threats posed to their state by external actors. This perception is based on an assessment of a rival actor's capabilities and intentions. Threat perception plays a very important role in policymakers' decision-making about whether or not to use military intervention. Unfortunately, misperception of threat occurs easily and frequently and can cause serious problems in international politics. Therefore, policymakers should craft policy based on a broad interpretation of threat that allows for error both on the part of the signal sender and the perceiver. While misperception has many causes, including deliberate deception, the structure of the international system, politics, and emotions, the explanations rooted in psychology are best suited to describe why misperception occurs.

The understanding gained from this chapter finally allows us proceed to the research for which this review is intended. The concepts discussed in this literature review can now become the variables central to this thesis's research design.

Chapter 3

Research Design

This chapter explains the research design for this thesis. It will first introduce the variables to be studied as well as the hypothesis linking the variables. Second, this chapter discusses the multiple indicators to be measured for the respective variables. Next, this chapter contains a detailed explanation of the research methodology, how each indicator will be measured, and how the results will be displayed. This chapter will then explain the data sources that were analyzed for each respective variable. Lastly, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of this research.

Hypothesis

Given the literature review discussed in chapter two, this thesis identifies military intervention as the dependent variable to be analyzed. The independent variable to be analyzed is perception of threat to national security. The intent of this analysis is to empirically test the relationship between the two variables discussed in the literature review. Therefore, this thesis hypothesizes that *the less the U.S. perceives its national security to be threatened, the less likely it will be to use military intervention*. According to this hypothesis, the U.S. will not use military intervention to increase its security if it does not perceive a threat to its national security. There may be other factors that drive the U.S. to implement military intervention. However, this thesis focuses specifically on determining if a relationship exists between the perception of threats to U.S. national security and U.S. military intervention.

Indicators

This analysis employs two indicators for the dependent variable of military intervention. The first is a ratio indicator defined as the ‘use of military force.’ This indicator is simply a measurement of the number of instances when the U.S. uses military force in the pursuit of political objectives. The less the U.S. uses military force abroad, the less it can be said that the U.S. is implementing military intervention.

However, not all interventions are the same. Some are limited objective missions that last a short period. Others are much broader in scope and endure for a decade or more. Objectively speaking, an intervention that lasts a matter of days is much different from an intervention that lasts for years. Therefore, the second indicator for military intervention is a ratio indicator defined as the ‘duration of intervention.’ This indicator measures the length of each instance when the U.S. uses military force. The less amount of time military force is used in the pursuit of political objectives, the less it can be said that the U.S. is implementing military intervention.

This analysis also employs two indicators for the independent variable of threat perception. The first is a ratio indicator defined as ‘threat rhetoric’ as measured in presidential speeches. This indicator is a measurement of the amount of threat rhetoric the president conveys. The fewer words the president uses to discuss threats to U.S. national security, the less it can be said that the U.S. perceives its national security to be threatened. This is appropriate because the president, as the head of the executive branch of government, ultimately makes the decision regarding when to use military intervention. To be sure, he needs the support of Congress to carry out these decisions, making Congress an important part of shaping U.S. foreign policy. But the president is the one who gives the order for intervention and manages its

execution through his cabinet. It is the president's perception that matters most when it comes to the relationship between threat perception and military intervention. Therefore, to the extent that the president perceives a threat to U.S. national security, it can be said that the U.S. perceives its national security to be threatened.

The second is also a ratio indicator defined as 'threat reporting' as captured by reports from the intelligence community. This indicator is a measurement of the amount of reporting for a given type of threat relative to the total amount of threat reporting. The less threat reporting there is on a specific type of threat in the intelligence community, the lower the perceived threat to U.S. national security will be. The U.S. intelligence community is the aggregate of all the agencies and departments within the government who are responsible for collecting intelligence related to U.S. national security. This indicator is appropriate because it is derived from the tangible collection of other political actors' manpower, equipment, activity, and the willingness and ability to accomplish political goals through violent means. Moreover, since this collection is resourced by the national budget, it can provide a more thorough assessment of possible threats than can any other entity attempting to determine the disposition of threats to U.S. national security. This is to say that threat reporting from the U.S. intelligence community is the most accurate assessment of threats to U.S. national security short of being able to read the minds of other political actors to know their true intentions.

Methodology

The hypothesis will be tested through historical quantitative analyses of the indicators for both variables in accordance with the time period of interest described below.

1. Use of Military Force:

This indicator was measured to determine the number of times the U.S. used military force abroad by identifying all uses of military force in the data listed below. The data sometimes had several uses of force grouped together into one instance of military intervention. For example, in 2004 the U.S. conducted “anti-terror related activities ... in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.”¹³³ This could be interpreted as one instance of military intervention since this is how it was reported in official statements. Indeed, the author of the report listed this as one intervention in her report of U.S. military interventions. For the purposes of this thesis, however, all such instances of activities in multiple locations were recorded as separate uses of military force to the extent that different interventions could be identified. So in the previous example, this one reference to the use of military force in the data was recorded as six different instances of U.S. military intervention in this analysis.

However, there were instances where separate uses of military force were grouped together to be measured as once instance, specifically when referring to the wide array of counterterrorism operations the U.S. conducted after 9/11. These were categorized as separate interventions to the extent that different operations could be deciphered from the data. But when the U.S. used military force in different locations in response to a common threat or to achieve a common political objective these cases the use of military force was coded as one intervention. There are two notable examples of this exception. The first is when the U.S. deployed forces throughout the Balkans and Europe in its attempt to establish peace in Bosnia from 1996 to 2006. The second is when combat forces deployed to several central African countries to assist regional forces in arresting leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army from 2011 to 2012. Unfortunately, in some cases the necessary details required to decipher separate interventions were either

generalized or hidden in the classified annexes to the initial reports. The incompleteness of data in this regard is certainly a limitation of this thesis. Nevertheless, these measurements account for instances when the U.S. wanted to influence conditions abroad so much that it used military force to do so.

The measurements were first grouped by the year they occurred in order to facilitate a historical analysis. Second, each use of force was subjectively coded as a response to a threat from a state actor, a threat from a non-state actor, or a collective security threat such as a humanitarian crisis. As was discussed in the literature review, it is likely that the U.S. considers and responds to non-state and collective security threats differently after 9/11 than it did before 9/11. Therefore, these categories are appropriate for this study because they allow for a meaningful comparison of military intervention calculus during the time period of interest.

State level threats include instances when the U.S. faced a conventional threat from a nation state actor. This category also includes state level concerns that are not necessarily a conventional military threat to the U.S., e.g., the restoration of democracy in a nation state. Non-state threats include threats from all non-state actors such as terrorists, non-state militias, and domestic violence inside a nation state which threatens U.S. personnel or interests. Collective security threats include threats that were not necessarily caused by state or non-state actors, including natural or environmental disasters, and humanitarian crises more generally. For example, when the U.S. sent military forces to Kuwait in 1992 in response to Iraq's failure to recognize the post-Gulf War borders, this was coded as an instance of military force conducted in response to a state level threat. By contrast, when U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan to find and defeat Al Qaeda following 9/11, this was coded as an intervention in response to a non-state level threat. Finally, the humanitarian assistance mission to the Philippines in 2012 in response

to Typhoon Bopha serves as an example of a military intervention conducted in response to a collective security threat.

This method proved straightforward in most cases, but a few instances required close inspection to determine if the use of force adopted a new objective or purpose other than the initial purpose of the intervention. This generally refers to the interventions which lasted several years in duration. For example, the initial intervention in Somalia in 1992 was a humanitarian assistance intervention, and so it was coded as an intervention in response to a collective security threat. However, in 1993 U.S. forces were engaged in combat operations against a non-state actor, and so this instance was coded as a separate intervention in response to a non-state threat.

The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq also proved quite difficult to code consistently. Both campaigns exhibit elements of using force against a state level threat and a non-state level threat. This was mitigated by assessing the stated purpose of each intervention as reported in the data. The intervention in Afghanistan was consistently reported as a mission to combat terrorism, Al Qaeda in particular, and was accordingly coded as an intervention in response to a non-state threat. Conversely, the use of force in Iraq was framed in state level concerns. At first, force was used to defeat the Iraqi Army and Saddam Hussein's regime. In the following years force was used to "maintain security and stability" in Iraq.¹³⁴ In short, this campaign was framed in terms of political objectives regarding the nation state of Iraq. Therefore, even though U.S. troops engaged non-state actors in combat in Iraq, this intervention was coded as a use of force in response to a state level threat.

Of note, these measurements do not account for U.S. military forces that were already forward deployed prior to the time period which is relevant to this thesis. For example, U.S.

military forces which remain in Europe, Japan, or Korea after World War II are not counted as instances of U.S. military intervention.

The results for this measurement were plotted in two chronological charts. The charts depict the number of initial interventions for each year categorized as either state, non-state, or collective security interventions. These charts enable a visual comparison of the amount of military force used before and after 9/11 to identify what similarities or differences exist.

2. Duration of Military Intervention:

This indicator was measured in two ways. First, it is important to note that measurements of the initial use of force do not include instances when the U.S. used military force for an extended period of time. Therefore, measurements of the use of military force were coded as either initial interventions or ongoing interventions. The first time each use of force appeared in the data, it was categorized as the initial intervention. If the same intervention was ongoing in the years after the initial intervention, then these instances were coded as ongoing military interventions. For example, the deployment of U.S. forces to Kosovo in 1999 was coded as the initial intervention. All measurements of U.S. forces being deployed in Kosovo thereafter—through the year 2012—were coded as ongoing interventions. This is important because if we observe only the measurements of the first instance of use of force, there may be a time when it appears the U.S. is not employing military intervention—as determined by the absence of a new intervention—while in reality there are U.S. military forces abroad still prosecuting an ongoing mission. The exception to this rule pertains to the deployment of additional forces to a location to which U.S. troops have already deployed. Since the addition of troops reflects a conscious decision to use more force to accomplish a political objective, these instances were coded as new

interventions. This approach accounts for both the first instance of U.S. military force as well as the duration of the deployment.

The results for this measurement were plotted on three chronological charts. The first chart depicts the number of ongoing interventions for each year categorized as either state, non-state, or collective security interventions. The next two charts depict a combination of the measurements from the indicator for “use of military force” as well as the measurements for ongoing interventions. These charts essentially show the total number of military interventions the U.S. made, including new and ongoing instances of military intervention. These charts enable a visual comparison of the ongoing and total uses of military force before and after 9/11 to identify what similarities or differences exist.

Second, the duration of an instance of military intervention was defined by the number of continuous years an instance appeared on the report for military interventions. What this means is that if an instance of intervention occurred in year Y, and another instance of intervention occurred in the same location for the same purpose by the same troops in year Y+1, then the intervention has at least two years of duration. More generally, all instances of intervention have a duration D, where $D=X+1$ years, and X is defined as the number of years the intervention was listed after the initial year Y. Even if the intervention was resolved in less than one calendar year, each instance of intervention has a minimum duration of $D=1$. In fact, for most interventions $X=0$, meaning that the intervention was resolved in the same year it first occurred. The analysis for this indicator tabulated instances of military intervention for all cases where $D \geq 2$, i.e., instances of intervention that were reported during at least two consecutive years. Of note, there were a few instances in the data where an ongoing deployment was not reported explicitly, specifically regarding the ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. In these cases,

the intervention was inferred to be ongoing since we know that U.S. troops were deployed in Iraq through 2011 and remain in Afghanistan even now. These instances were accordingly coded as ongoing interventions.

The results for this analysis are depicted on a chronological chart showing the number of years the intervention was reported, i.e. the maximum value of D for each instance of intervention. The results were also categorized by the nature of the intervention, i.e. in response to a state or non-state level threat. This chart enables a visual comparison of the duration of uses of military force to identify any similarities or differences that exist before and after 9/11.

3. Threat Rhetoric:

A quantitative content analysis subjectively measured the U.S.'s perception of threat as determined by the president's use of threat rhetoric in the annual state of the union (SOU) address to Congress. Admittedly, this approach is prone to gaps in threat perception that occurs during speeches other than the SOU address. However, this risk is mitigated by several characteristics of the SOU. First, these speeches are published consistently and can be measured on a yearly basis. This greatly facilitates meaningful empirical comparison from year to year. Second, the comprehensive scope of these yearly testimonies minimizes the risk of missing threat perceptions that might occur throughout the rest of the year. Indeed, the president routinely addresses everything that has happened in the previous twelve months during this annual speech. Lastly, this annual speech is deliberately assembled through multiple drafts with the input of all departments in the executive branch of government. This ensures that the threat rhetoric in the SOU speech is not a kneejerk reaction to a recent crisis, but rather a carefully planned and holistic consideration of the threats to U.S. national security.

Threat rhetoric was first measured by determining the proportion of words used to discuss threats to national security relative to the number of words used throughout the entire SOU speech. The lower the proportion of words used to discuss threats to national security relative to other items on the SOU agenda—namely domestic issues—the less it can be said that the president perceives national security to be threatened. This analysis extended beyond measuring exclusively threat rhetoric because, in practice, the president does not always refer to a threat directly. There are many instances in almost all of the analyzed SOU speeches in which the president discusses ways to prevent or respond to threats. Therefore, this analysis measured the proportion of words devoted to all national security concerns relative to the total number of words used in the SOU speech.

Additionally, a qualitative content analysis subjectively categorized these national security concerns as ‘state’ concerns, ‘non-state’ concerns, or ‘collective security’ concerns. ‘State’ concerns were coded according to the following criteria. First and foremost, all national security references made to nation states fall into this category. Additionally, all references made to actions taken or caused by states fell into this category. This includes references to regional conflicts; democracy and liberty; treaties, alliances, or international support; counterintelligence conducted by states; the role of U.S. power, strength, and government agencies, including the military, in dealing with threats; trade, markets, and the economy; protecting the homeland; and information warfare conducted by states.

‘Non-state’ concerns referenced threats or security concerns due to individuals or groups of individuals. This includes all references made to: non-state actors; terrorism, insurgency, and extremism; organized crime; drug trafficking; mass atrocities, ethnic conflicts, and other violence; and cyber threats.

National security references were coded as ‘collective security’ concerns if they referenced threats that are common to all humanity and whose solutions require collaboration among political actors, namely states. This category includes: access to energy; environmental concerns; food and water access; poverty, unemployment, and income inequality; humanitarian crises and natural disasters; health threats, pandemic diseases, and viruses; and political instability, chaos, and failed states. Additionally, references made to international—supranational—regimes, including the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, etc., fit into this category. Lastly, all references that can be qualified primarily as human rights issues were categorized as ‘collective security’ threats. To the extent that human rights challenges could be associated with a particular nation state or non-state actor, they were coded accordingly. However, even though this phenomenon is certainly produced by human actors—whether at the state or non-state level—human rights was sometimes referenced more generally as a collective security problem facing all humanity. These cases were categorized as ‘collective security’ threats.

It is important to note that throughout the SOU speeches there were many instances where the president discussed some of these concerns without reference to national security. For example, there were several times when the president discussed climate change or fighting drugs as part of his agenda for the next year. However, unless these concerns were discussed directly in relation to U.S. national security, they were not coded under any of the three categories listed above.

The results of these measurements are displayed in several chronological charts. These charts display the measurements of the ratio of all threat rhetoric, displayed by category, relative to the total number of words in the SOU speech against the measurements for the indicators of

military intervention. These charts enable a visual comparison of the quantity of threat rhetoric over time to identify any similarities or differences that exist before and after 9/11. Additionally, these charts enable a visual comparison to determine if there is a relationship between the indicators for threat rhetoric and the indicators for military intervention.

Second, threat rhetoric was analyzed to determine how much the president was concerned about each type of security concern. This was done by analyzing the number of words measured for each category of threat rhetoric—state, non-state, or collective security—as a proportion of the total number of words in the SOU speech determined to be threat rhetoric. The purpose of this analysis is to shed light on which type of threats the president was most concerned about, regardless of how much he perceived U.S. national security to be threatened at any given time.

The results of these measurements are displayed in several chronological charts. These charts display the percentage of the total threat rhetoric measured for each threat rhetoric category against the measurements for the indicators for military intervention. These charts enable a visual comparison of the categories of threat rhetoric over time to identify any similarities or differences that exist before and after 9/11. Additionally, these charts enable a visual comparison to determine if there is a relationship between the indicators for the threat rhetoric categories and the indicators for military intervention.

4. Threat Reporting:

A quantitative content analysis subjectively measured threat reporting. The first part of this analysis consisted of coding the different threats discussed in each annual threat assessment report into the categories of ‘state’ threats, ‘non-state’ threats, or ‘collective security’ threats. This coding was done using the same methodology used to code threat rhetoric into these same

categories as described above, with a few additional steps. In some instances, the threat assessment reports referenced insurgencies or non-state actors that were a problem within another nation state but were not referenced as a threat to U.S. national security. These references were determined to be domestic concerns of the given nation state and were thus coded as 'state' concerns. Additionally, the use of outer space was added as a security concern in the category of 'collective security' threats.

Once all the measurements were coded by type of threat, the second part of this analysis determined the extent of the threat. This was done in two ways. The first step was to count the total number of threat words in each threat assessment report by category. The total word count analysis paints a raw picture that allows us to observe simply how much each type of threat is being discussed from year to year. However, the total word count does not allow for a very meaningful comparison of the threat categories from year to year. Therefore, the second step of this analysis measured threat reporting by threat category as a proportion of the total words used in each threat report. This approach is more meaningful because it allows us to observe the relative weight of each threat category. The threat category that receives the least attention can be said to pose the least perceived threat to national security. In this way, we can compare relative weights from year to year to determine if the proportion of non-state threats relative to state threats varies over time.

The results of this analysis are displayed in two groups of chronological charts. The first group depicts the measurements for total word counts against the measurements for the indicators of military intervention. The second group depicts the measurements for the relative proportion of each threat category against the measurements for the indicators of military intervention. These charts enable a visual comparison of how threat reporting varies over time.

More importantly, it allows us to determine if there is a correlation between the measurements for threat reporting and the measurements for military intervention.

Time Period of Interest

The timeframe with which this research is concerned is the period after 9/11. But in order to truly understand how the events of 9/11 have altered U.S. policy regarding military intervention, we must know U.S. foreign policy regarding military intervention prior to 9/11. Therefore, the starting point for this analysis is the last year of the George H. W. Bush presidency. This is appropriate because it is the first year that can be considered to be part of the post-Cold War era. This allows for analysis and comparison of the post-9/11 era to a period of time during which the distribution of capabilities among states in the international political system was generally the same, i.e., the period during which the U.S. was the world's sole superpower. The end point for this analysis will be the end of President Barack Obama's first term as his second term is ongoing. Moreover, this allows for a comparison of two time periods which are generally the same length in duration: ten years for the period 1992 to 2001 versus eleven years for the period 2002 to 2012.

Data Sources

The primary data source used to analyze both indicators of the dependent variable was the Congressional Research Service Report, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015*, published on October 15, 2015. However, this report does not include use of military force for disaster relief operations. Therefore, this gap in data is addressed by

including instances of U.S. military intervention listed in the Rand Report, *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region*, published in 2013.

The data source used to analyze the threat rhetoric indicator of the independent variable consists of the transcripts of the annual SOU address by the president to Congress for the years 1992 to 2012. The data source used to analyze the threat reporting indicator of the independent variable was the annual worldwide threat assessment report from the U.S. intelligence community to Congress, specifically to the intelligence committees in both houses. These speeches and reports are published consistently and can be measured on a yearly basis. The comprehensive scope of these yearly testimonies to congress minimizes the risk of missing perceptions of threat that might occur throughout the rest of the year.

Limitations

There are numerous limitations to this analysis which leave room for continued research. The first lies in the limited scope of the research design. One indicator for military intervention that is not analyzed in this thesis the number of troops deployed for each instance of intervention. This indicator provides another view into the scope of each intervention, much like the indicator for the duration of each intervention that is used in this research design. This is important because we can objectively understand that instances of military intervention comprised of less than 100 troops are vastly different from those where hundreds of thousands of troops are deployed. Considering Mearsheimer's argument that military power really means land power, future research measuring this indicator would greatly supplement any conclusions reached in this thesis.

The next limitation of this research design lies in its methodology. This is because the qualitative aspects of this analysis are subjective to the researcher. A different researcher might code the data differently and arrive at different conclusions. This research would be strengthened if multiple researchers conducted the same analysis described in this research design and arrived at the same results and conclusions found in this thesis. The measurements of the indicators can be found in the appendices of this thesis so as to allow future researchers to compare their results with the ones found here.

A further limitation of this analysis lies with the selection of data. First, despite efforts made to mitigate these risks, there certainly exists the possibility that important measurements of the indicators were missed due to the choice to use annual speeches and reports as the primary data sources. An analysis which measures the indicators throughout all presidential speeches and intelligence reports throughout an entire calendar year might yield different results than were produced in this research. Secondly, the data used in this analysis consists exclusively of unclassified material. It is entirely possible that an analysis which includes classified reporting might produce different results. Thirdly, the data employed for measuring the dependent variable might still have gaps of instances of U.S. military intervention not listed in either report. Lastly, the annual worldwide threat assessment reports only began in earnest in 1994. There is a report for 1992 even though it was not required by law at that point. This means that there is no data for threat reporting in the year 1993, and this is reflected in the charts displayed in chapter four.

Finally, this thesis only analyzes the actions of the U.S. with regard to military intervention after 9/11. Therefore, despite the stated goal of understanding what effect 9/11 had

on international politics as a whole, any conclusions reached in this thesis cannot necessarily be extrapolated to be representative of the entire international system of states.

This concludes the explanation of this thesis's research design. Though there are certainly many weaknesses present in this research, it is robust enough to provide meaningful results from which we can draw conclusions about the concepts being studied here. We can now observe the results of this analysis in chapter four.

Chapter 4

Analysis and Results

Analysis for the Dependent Variable

This section shows the results of the measurements of both indicators to the dependent variable of U.S. military intervention. The results are analyzed to compare U.S. military intervention before and after 9/11.

1. Results of 'Use of Force' Measurements:

Figures 1 and 2 show the measurements for the initial use of military force categorized by interventions conducted in response to state threats, non-state threats, and collective security threats. Interestingly enough, it is clear that the U.S. implemented military intervention more before 9/11 than it did after 9/11. Moreover, the U.S. used military force in response to state




Figure 1. U.S. Use of Military Force Results

level threats much more frequently before 9/11 than it did after 9/11. This contrast, however, can most likely be attributed to the fact that the U.S. embarked on substantially larger and longer military interventions after 9/11 than it did prior to 9/11. This is reflected in subsequent charts. On the other hand, initial uses of force in response to non-state and collective security threats appear relatively proportional before and after 9/11.




Figure 2. Combined U.S. Use of Military Force Results

2. Results of ‘Duration of Intervention’ Measurements:

Figure 3 depicts instances when the U.S. used military force for an extended period of time. It is clear from the figure that after 9/11 the U.S. has used military force for longer duration to face non-state threats than it did to face state threats. Additionally, whereas before 9/11 there was only one intervention which lasted a year or more in duration, after 9/11 there is an abundance of ongoing interventions regarding non-state threats. This demonstrates a clear shift in U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 regarding the U.S.’s willingness to use force over extended periods of time to deal with non-state threats. The results for ongoing interventions in response

to state threats show that, while the U.S. had more ongoing interventions in response to state threats after 9/11, generally these occurred in a manner which is comparable to those that occurred prior to 9/11. Therefore, the measurements of ongoing use of military force contrast in the use of military interventions after 9/11 with regard to non-state actors, but they are comparable with regard to state actors.




Figure 3. Ongoing Use of Military Force Results

Figures 4 and 5 depict all instances when the U.S. used military force, including the initial introduction of force as well as ongoing interventions which endured a year or more. It is clear from the chart that the U.S. used military force more after 9/11 than it did prior to 9/11. Additionally, it is evident that the U.S. used military force in response to non-state threats much more after 9/11 than it did before 9/11. Moreover, while the U.S. used military force against non-state actors in less than half of all interventions before 9/11, it did so in approximately two thirds of the interventions after 9/11.




Figure 4. Initial and Ongoing Uses of Military Force Results




Figure 5. Total U.S. Military Interventions Results

Figure 6 depicts the results for the second method of measuring the duration of the use of force. This chart clearly shows the almost all the military interventions in response to state

threats lasting more than one year in duration started prior to 9/11. Conversely, *all* of the military interventions in response to non-state threats lasting more than one year occurred after 9/11. This is a clear sign of contrast in the way the U.S. implements military intervention across 9/11. This is a clear sign of contrast in the way the U.S. implements military intervention across 9/11. On the other hand, the two longest military interventions—and three of the top five—are interventions in response to state-level security concerns.¹³⁵ This signals that state-level security concerns are still predominant in U.S. military intervention calculus, and it indicates continuity in international politics. It is interesting to note that no intervention coded as a response to a collective security threat endured long enough to make this chart. This could be attributed to the difficulty of achieving relative security gains as a result of tackling a security challenge common to many political actors as was alluded to in chapter two, and it also signals continuity in international politics.




Figure 6. Duration of U.S. Military Interventions Results

Analysis for the Independent Variable

This section shows the results of the measurements for both indicators of the independent variable of U.S. threat perception. The results are analyzed to compare U.S. threat perception before and after 9/11.

1. Results of ‘Threat Rhetoric’ Measurements:

Figure 7 depicts the results for the analysis of the annual SOU speeches categorized by ‘state,’ ‘non-state,’ and ‘collective security’ concerns regarding U.S. national security. First, it is clear from the figure that threat rhetoric consumed a greater percent of the SOU speech after 9/11 than it did prior to 9/11. Specifically, George W. Bush’s post-9/11 SOU speeches contain considerably more threat rhetoric than any other SOU speeches. However, after 2008 the results for threat rhetoric appear largely indistinguishable from the results prior to 9/11. One reason this might be the case is that Bush was the president when 9/11 occurred. This result is not surprising considering that after 9/11 any American president would likely suffer from the emotional sources of misperception discussed in chapter two. The increased threat rhetoric from 2002 to 2008 demonstrates an increased focus on national security from a president who did not want a second attack to occur during his tenure. And yet after a new president enters office, it seems that perception of threats to national security resumed their status quo ante pattern. Even though 9/11 had an immediate impact on the threat perception of the U.S., this effect seems to disappear starting in 2009. From this perspective, the measurements for threat rhetoric indicate comparable U.S. threat perception between the post-Cold War era and the post-9/11 era.




Figure 7. Threat Rhetoric Percentage of all SOU Words Results

Additionally, it is clear that non-state and collective national security concerns consumed much more threat rhetoric after 9/11 than before 9/11. This is again intuitive considering that the U.S. was attacked by a non-state actor—an actor which was allowed to form, operate, and hide as a result of collective security concerns such as political instability and failed states. What is not intuitive is that *all* national security concerns received more threat rhetoric after 9/11. It is to especially interesting to note that the president appears to perceive state level national security concerns more severe after 9/11 than he did before 9/11, even though no link between Al Qaeda and a nation state has been proven. In other words, 9/11 had the effect of increasing how imminent all threats to U.S. national security are perceived, not just those from non-state actors. These results certainly indicate contrast in threat perception in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, though in the long run the results are comparable to those before 9/11.

It is important to note that the U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003 occurred during this period of increased U.S. threat perception. In fact, 2003 was the year in which threat

rhetoric regarding state level national security concerns was the highest of all years studied. Part of this can certainly be attributed to the “fearmongering” described by Walt and Mearsheimer in chapter two. Still, a lesson of international politics to be learned here is that the U.S. is prone to perceive greater threats to its national security immediately after one of these threats materializes than it otherwise would. This means that in the wake of an event like 9/11, other states would be wise to make their foreign policy moves and intentions as transparent as possible, lest the U.S. act on its increased threat perception as it did in toppling Saddam Hussein. And if this lesson applies more broadly than just to the U.S., then it would be prudent for the U.S. to learn this lesson as well.

Figures 8, 9, and 10 depict the measurements of threat rhetoric with the measurements for military intervention overlaid. We can determine from the results in figure 8 that the U.S. had much higher threat rhetoric after 9/11 but much lower initial instances of use of military force. This is probably due to the fact that many of the post-9/11 interventions turned out to be much longer in duration after 9/11 than they were before 9/11. Before 9/11 the U.S. could use military force more often but for more limited objectives in accordance with perceived threats. In fact, we can see a spike in military intervention after 1992 and 1997, the two years with the greatest amount of threat rhetoric before 9/11.




Figure 8. Threat Rhetoric vs. Initial Use of Force Results

We can determine from figure 9 that generally the number of interventions lasting a year or more increase over time. This is true even before 9/11, though we certainly observe a marked increase after 9/11, peaking at a high of ten enduring interventions in 2005. Thus we see that as threat rhetoric increases in the immediate years after 9/11, so does the prolonged use of force. This positive relationship indicates that the U.S. became more committed to accomplishing its political objectives over time, at least in terms of the amount of time it was willing to have troops forward deployed in the accomplishment of those objectives. However, it is not clear that there is a positive relationship between threat rhetoric and ongoing use of force before 9/11 or after 2007.




Figure 9. Threat Rhetoric vs. Ongoing Use of Force Results

One interesting observation from figure 9 is in regard to the relationship between ongoing interventions and threat rhetoric after 2008. Even though the threat rhetoric starting in 2009 appears similar to the status quo ante present before 9/11, the number of enduring military missions is considerably higher from 2009 to 2012 than it was prior to 9/11. This could represent the U.S.’s acceptance that, even though it does not perceive its national security to be imminently threatened at a given time, committing to long-term military interventions is in the best interest of U.S. national security. At minimum, this certainly represents an increase in the use of military force with regard to the amount of threat perceived at a given time.

Contrary to the results in figures 8 and 9, the results in figure 10 indicate a positive relationship between U.S. use of military force and threat rhetoric over time. There is a spike in U.S. use of military force after increased threat rhetoric in 1992, 1997, and after 9/11. However, there are two notable exceptions. First, the low number of interventions in 2007 and 2008 relative to the high measurements of threat rhetoric do not fit this pattern. Also, the increased

interventions from 2011 to 2012 do not correspond to an increase in threat perception. Here it is worth recalling a limitation of this research discussed in chapter three, and that is the absence of the indicator for the size of each military intervention. Both President Bush and President Obama implemented a surge in Iraq in 2006 and in Afghanistan in 2009, respectively. It is quite possible that an analysis which accounts for the number of troops deployed as an indicator of military intervention would fill the gap found in the relationship between threat rhetoric and use of military force after 2006. Still, more often than not the results in figure 10 indicate similarities in the relationship between threat rhetoric and the U.S. use of military force during the time period under consideration.




Figure 10. Threat Rhetoric vs. All Use of Force Results

2. Results of ‘Threat Reporting’ Measurements:

Figure 11 depicts the total word count of each worldwide threat assessment report by year. It is clear that the number of words used in threat reporting increases after 9/11, especially after 2008. It is possible that this indicates increased U.S. threat perception after 9/11. However,

a more likely reason for these results is simply that there was a new Director of National Intelligence appointed in 2008—J. Michael McConnell—and either he or someone in his chain of command decided that threat assessments reports to Congress would be more detailed and thus contain more words. This conclusion is supported by the fact that all measurements after 2008 are generally as wordy as the 2008 report and considerably lengthier than any report prior to 2008. For this reason, threat reporting as measured in total word counts does not enable a very meaningful comparison from year to year.




Figure 11. Threat Reporting Total Word Count Results

By contrast, figure 12 depicts results which are much more meaningful because they allow for direct comparison from year to year. This figure shows the measurements of threat reporting for each type of threat as a proportion of the total words used in each threat assessment report. We can observe from these results that non-state and collective threats consume a greater proportion of the threat reporting after 9/11 as compared to before 9/11. This reflects a greater appreciation for both the threats posed by non-state threats as well as the dangers posed by

collective threats—including direct threats such as lack of energy security and potential threats posed by the conditions that allow non-state threats to thrive. This pattern represents an evolution in threat reporting after 9/11.

Nevertheless, states still dominate threat reporting both before and after 9/11. In fact, state level threats never consumed less than half of the threat reporting. This shows that the U.S. is by and large mostly concerned about state level threats to its national security, and these results are comparable to those prior to 9/11.




Figure 12. Threat Reporting by Category Results

Figures 13, 14, and 15 depict the measurements of threat reporting with the measurements for military intervention overlaid. Of the three, figure 13 shows the most positive relationship between threat reporting and the use of military force. Specifically, we can observe that the number of ongoing interventions increased at the same time that threat reporting for non-state threats increased. In fact, when viewed together with the results in figures 3 and 4, we can see that there is a direct correlation between increased threat reporting for non-state actors and

increased use of force against non-state threats. Since this relationship generally holds both before and after 9/11, these results indicate a comparable relationship between threat reporting on non-state actors and military intervention in response to non-state threats.




Figure 13. Threat Reporting vs. Initial Intervention Results




Figure 14. Threat Reporting vs. Ongoing Interventions Results




Figure 15. Threat Reporting vs. All Interventions Results

Chapter 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

This thesis established the goal of empirically testing Kenneth Waltz's proposition that terrorism in the post-9/11 era is characteristic of continuity in international politics despite any apparent redistribution of capabilities or the American response to 9/11. As such, this research conducted a case study analysis of U.S. military interventions and U.S. threat perception from the end of the Cold War to the end of President Obama's first term in office in order to achieve this goal. The results produced by this empirical analysis allowed for a meaningful comparison of how 9/11 affected the variables of interest. Indeed, this analysis produced some significant insights into the evolution of U.S. military intervention and threat perception from the post-Cold War era to the post-9/11 era. Based on this analysis, we can reach several conclusions about continuity and change in international politics.

Signs of Continuity

The analysis results depicted in chapter four demonstrate that there are various aspects of both U.S. military intervention and threat perception that evolved over the period of interest, while others were comparable before and after 9/11, including the relationship between the two variables. In general, the analysis shows that after 9/11 the U.S. placed a greater emphasis on the threats non-state actors pose to its national security as measured by both the number of military interventions embarked on in response to non-state threats as well as the increased threat perception of non-state threats.

The increased threat perception regarding non-state actors after 9/11 is intuitive given that a non-state threat actually materialized on U.S. soil. The increased military intervention after 9/11 deserves further consideration, however. What is not intuitive is that even though there was increased threat perception regarding state level threats, at least as measured by threat rhetoric, there was not a corresponding increase in military interventions in response to perceived state level threats. One possible explanation for a lack of increased military interventions against other nation states is that the non-violent traditional levers of power, i.e. diplomacy and trade, are still effective in managing state level threats after 9/11. However, these are not effective against non-state actors. Therefore, in responding to non-state threats the U.S. has to use the only traditional lever of power remaining: military force. A different explanation is that rival states did not tend to pose a threat to U.S. national interests perceived as imminent, and this is why U.S. military intervention did not increase despite increased threat perception. In this regard, U.S. military interventions against non-state actors after 9/11 meet the characteristics for the use of force outlined in chapter two, thereby indicating continuity of international politics.

Still, while this analysis shows that non-state actors have a bigger presence in U.S. national security calculus after 9/11, states still appear to be primary. This is supported by the fact that state level threats dominate U.S. threat perception as measured both by threat presidential threat rhetoric and the intelligence community's threat reporting both before and after 9/11. This certainly indicates continuity in international politics regarding threat perception and, as such, supports the neorealist position that states are still primary in the international system of anarchy even after 9/11.

Additionally, while both threat rhetoric and the use of force peaked in the years immediately after 9/11, the measurements of both of these indicators is largely indistinguishable

from pre-9/11 values starting in 2009. This indicates that 9/11 produced a short-term increase in threat rhetoric and military intervention but that both will return to the status quo ante over time. In other words, once the U.S. succeeded in re-establishing its national security after 9/11, it was able to scale back its use of military force as well as the extent of the threat perceived. This is a further indicator of continuity in international politics before and after 9/11.

Finally, it can be said that the 9/11 attacks demonstrated a change in the distribution of capabilities within the international system in a way that gave a non-state actor the means to cause real harm to the world's strongest state. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda does not possess the capability to seriously threaten U.S. national security. In fact, it has not even been able to muster another attack on U.S. territory since 9/11. This shows that Al Qaeda certainly capitalized on an opportunity to decrease the relative security of the U.S. But if one considers the effect that subsequent U.S. military interventions have had on Al Qaeda, it is not irrational to conclude that Al Qaeda actually has less relative power and security today than it did at the time of 9/11. In this view, the balance of power within the international system remains largely unchanged as compared to right before 9/11.

Signs of Change

On the other hand, it must be reiterated that the measurements for U.S. military intervention and threat perception spiked considerably after 9/11 and throughout the George W. Bush presidency. The 9/11 terrorist attacks had a substantial effect on U.S. foreign policy calculus in no uncertain terms. In fact, the threat posed by non-state actors proved to be central to policymakers' decisions about whether or not to employ military intervention as a response

mechanism. This was arguably the first time in history that a state has been so moved by a non-state actor so as to deploy a large number of forces to the other side of the world.

It is possible that the U.S. foray into Afghanistan to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban occurred only, as Brooks and Kanter told us in chapter two, because the U.S. *could* use military intervention as a response and not because it *should* use military intervention as a response. It is likely that the American people placed enormous pressure on their political leaders to ‘do something’ in response to the 9/11 attacks, even if it might be inappropriate to do so. In this regard, the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan could be considered an anomaly which, had it not occurred, would most support the neorealist position of continuity in international politics. However, the U.S. was not the only state to intervene militarily against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, the United Nations International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan eventually grew to include contributions from more than 40 partner states. This indicates that the phenomenon of nation states worrying about terrorist threats was more of a norm than it was an anomaly after 9/11. The neorealist position fails to account for this behavior, and the need to employ neoliberalism to account for this certainly indicates change in international politics.

Conclusion

This case study found considerable empirical support for Waltz’s proposition of continuity in international politics in the post-9/11 era. This suggests that though terrorism may receive more attention after 9/11, states will not lose any real power to terrorist organizations. States indeed remain the central political actors in international politics and maintain the overwhelming predominance of the capabilities in the international system. This means that U.S.

military interventions and threat perception of non-state actors moving forward should diminish to a level comparable to the time period after the Cold War but before 9/11—especially as the distance between the present and 9/11 continues to grow.

However, this case study also found empirical evidence that contradicts Waltz's dictum. This suggests that, despite lacking tangible power vis-à-vis traditional nation states, terrorist organizations can wield non-trivial power in terms of their abilities to generate threat perception among the citizens of powerful states. This is especially true when the threat perceived is so high that these citizens respond by driving their political leaders to mobilize large-scale military interventions. This means that terrorist organizations will continue to be a factor in policymakers' calculus regarding whether or not to use military intervention to deal with this type of threat. For these reasons, policymakers should adopt a pluralist approach to international politics which incorporates both neorealism's focus on threat capability as well as neoliberalism's emphasis on threat intent.

In sum, the analysis validates the hypothesis outlined in chapter three that less threat perception should lead to less military intervention. The difference in the post-9/11 world is that the perceived threat is much higher, and, therefore, so is the use of military intervention.

Recommendations

The first recommendation for researchers working in this field is to replicate the work shown here to see if similar results are produced. Each time this proves to be the case, the results found in this research become stronger. Moreover, other researchers arriving at similar results would reinforce the validity of the conclusions reached in this thesis and discussed above. If similar research produces different results, it is possible that Waltz's argument for continuity in

international politics might in fact be empirically confirmed. Alternatively, such research might also be even more contradictory to Waltz's theory than was this thesis.

Second, I recommend that future research focus on the limitations of this thesis as outlined in chapter three. The most significant improvement of this thesis would come from a similar research project which includes an analysis of military intervention as a function of the size of the intervention. It is entirely possible that such a project would produce much different results than the ones found here, but it is also possible that it would produce results which, when combined with the results of this analysis, further strengthen the conclusions reached. In any case, a study including an analysis of the size of U.S. military interventions would be more robust than the research conducted here. I also challenge researchers to test the methodology of this research by measuring different indicators for the variables of interest that those studied here, not just an indicator for the size of U.S. military interventions.

Similarly, I encourage future researchers to use a different data set to test the empirical results produced in this analysis. First and foremost, there are other sources of information pertaining to U.S. military intervention which may produce different results even if similarly analyzed. Additionally, there is a vast set of presidential rhetoric and intelligence reporting which can be analyzed to see if the results match those produced here. A significant subset of this data set is classified, and even though there are logistical challenges associated with analyzing and writing about this data set, it has the potential to cause the most significant disruption to the results and conclusions reached in this research.

Additionally, I recommend researchers conduct a similar analysis as the one conducted in this research after there is more separation from 9/11, i.e. with another ten years or so of data. If the conclusions reached above are correct, the more time that passes after 9/11 without another

terrorist attack against the U.S. materializing, the more U.S. military intervention and threat perception should be comparable to what they were between the end of the Cold War and 9/11. This would certainly indicate continuity in international politics, though if a similar study found that the variations in U.S. military intervention and threat perception observed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 persist, then this would indicate change in international politics.

Next, I recommend researchers conduct a similar analysis based on a differing theoretical framework, such as the neoliberal perspective. The neorealist theoretical framework has some explanatory power regarding international politics among states in the post-9/11 world. However, it is clear from the conclusions above that it is lacking in its ability to account for the increased American military intervention and threat perception in relation to non-state actors after 9/11. For this reason, it was necessary to use a pluralistic theoretical framework in this thesis. Accordingly, it is very possible that a project similar to this thesis built upon a different theoretical framework might produce different results and conclusions than those reached here.

Lastly, once enough research has been conducted to the point where the results and conclusions reached appear to be consistent, I would recommend that similar analyses be conducted for other political actors to see how the results compare with those of the American analysis. It would be extremely interesting to find out if the results reached in this research apply to other states, or whether U.S. use of military intervention and threat perception is unique in the international system. Once we have insight into this question, we can better extrapolate general conclusions about continuity and change in international politics. In fact, it may even be worth conducting a similar analysis from the perspective of a non-state actor such as Al Qaeda to see how this compares with the results produced here.

Hopefully, the more insight we develop into why states use military force and how they perceive threats, the more effective American foreign policy will be. The better understanding policymakers have of the conditions under which military intervention becomes a viable way to increase national security, the more effective their decisions about implementing military intervention will be. Therefore, we can hope to avoid the “unwarranted interventions” discussed in chapter two, i.e. the blunder in Somalia and the preventive war in Iraq. Furthermore, the more policymakers understand the challenges inherent in threat perception, the less they will be subject to misperception, and the less likely they will be to craft policy which does not stand up to scrutiny if based on misperception. Finally, we can hope that this understanding better enables policymakers of all states to understand the mechanics of the international system so as to avoid violent conflict where possible.

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Appendix A. Coding of U.S. Military Interventions

1992				
	Intro	Update	Iteration	
Sierra Leone	3-May		1	Military Planes Evacuate Americans
Kuwait	3-Aug		1	Military Exercises following Iraq refusal to recognize new border and refusal to cooperate with UN inspector teams
Iraq	16-Sep		1	Partial no-fly zone; aerial reconnaissance
		27-Dec		U.S. Aircraft shot down Iraqi aircraft in prohibited zone.
Somalia	10-Dec		1	Humanitarian Crisis, UN SC resolution determined the situation constituted a threat to international peace.
1993				
Iraq		13-Jan	2	U.S. + Coalition partners had attacked missile bases in southern Iraq
		21-Jan		U.S. aircraft fired at targets in Iraq after pilots sense Iraqi radar or AA fire directed at them
		9-Apr		U.S. planes had bombed/fired missiles at Iraqi AA sites that had tracked U.S. aircraft
		18-Apr		U.S. planes had bombed/fired missiles at Iraqi AA sites that had tracked U.S. aircraft
		26-Jun		U.S. naval forces launched missiles against Iraqi Intelligence Service HQ in Baghdad in response to assassination attempt against former President Bush in April 1993
		19-Jun		U.S. aircraft had fired a missile at an AA site displaying hostile intent
		19-Aug		U.S. Planes bombed an Iraqi missile battery
Kuwait	17, 18 Jan		1	Further military actions. Deploying a battalion task force to Kuwait to continue to support Kuwaiti independence
Bosnia	28-Feb		1	Airdrop of relief supplies aimed at Muslims surrounded by Serbian forces
Bosnia	13-Apr		1	U.S. forces participate in NATO air action to enforce UN ban on unauthorized military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina
Somalia	10-Jun		1	U.S. QRF participated in military action to quell attacks against UN forces
		12-Jun		Air + ground operations to neutralize military capabilities that had impeded UN efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction, and additional instances occurred in the following months.
		17-Jun		Air + ground operations to neutralize military capabilities that had impeded UN efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction, and additional instances occurred in the following months.
Macedonia	9-Jul		1	Deploy 350 soldiers to former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to participate in UN Protection Force to help maintain stability
Haiti	20-Oct		1	U.S. ships begun to enforce a UN embargo against Haiti
1994				
Bosnia	17-Feb			U.S. expanded participation in UN and NATO efforts to reach peaceful solution to conflict in former Yugoslavia and that 60

				U.S. aircraft were available for participation in authorized NATO missions
		28-Feb	2	U.S. planes patrolling 'no-fly zone' in former Yugoslavia under NATO shot down 4 Serbian Galeb planes
		10, 11 Apr		U.S. planes under NATO had fired against Bosnian Serb forces shelling the "safe" city of Gorazde
		5-Aug		U.S. aircraft under NATO attacked Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone upon request of UN Protection Forces
		21-Nov		U.S. aircraft under NATO attacked bases used by Serbs to attack the town of Bihac
Rwanda	12-Apr		1	Combat forces deployed to Burundi to conduct possible NEO of AMCITS and other TCNs from Rwanda, where widespread fighting had broken out
		30-Sep		All U.S. troops had departed Rwanda and surrounding nations
Macedonia	19-Apr		1	Additional company deployed to augment previous force there
		22-Apr		Report that U.S. Army contingent continued its peacekeeping mission and would soon be replaced by 500 soldiers
Haiti		20-Apr	2	U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement of UN embargo. 712 vessels had been boarded since Oct 20, 1993
Haiti	21-Sep		1	1500 troops deployed to restore democracy in Haiti. Troop level subsequently increased to 20,000
1995				
Somalia	27-Feb	3-Mar	1	1800 combat personnel deployed to Mogadishu to assist in withdrawal of UN forces assigned there to UNOSOM II
Haiti		31-Mar	3	Only 2,500 personnel remain as part of UNMIH
		21-Sep		2400 personnel still participate in UNMIH; 260 personnel assigned to U.S. Support Group Haiti
Bosnia		24-May	3	Continue aircraft enforcing no fly zone. U.S. aircraft available for CAS to UN forces in Croatia. 500 soldiers continue in Macedonia as part of UNPREDEP. U.S. forces continue to support UN refugee and embargo ops in this region
		29-Aug		U.S. aircraft used in a series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were threatening UN declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde. "Some 300 sorties were flown against 23 targets" on the first day of operations
	6-Dec			Deployed 1500 personnel to B-H and Croatia as part of NATO "enabling force" to lay the groundwork for prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led IFOR. Deployed roughly 3000 other troops to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia to establish infrastructure for the enabling force and IFOR
	21-Dec			20,000 troops ordered to deploy to IFOR in Republic of B-H; 5000 troops would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states, primarily Croatia. 7000 support forces deployed to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia and other regional states ISO IFOR's mission
1996				
Haiti		21-Mar	4	309 combat equipped personnel remained as part of UNMIH

Liberia	9-Apr		1	Due to the "deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to American citizens" U.S. military forces evacuated "private U.S. citizens and certain TCNs who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy Compound."
		20-May		Continue deployment of U.S. military forces to evacuate both AMCITS and foreign personnel and to respond to various isolated "attacks on the American Embassy complex"
CAR	23-May		1	U.S. military personnel deployed to Bangui to conduct evacuation of private U.S. citizens and certain U.S.GOV employees and to provide "enhanced security for the American Embassy in Bangui"
Bosnia		21-Jun	4	Update to Bosnia deployment sit. 17k remain under IFOR. 5500 in support. 500 in Macedonia
		20-Dec		Change from IFOR to SFOR. ~8,500 troops remain whose primary mission is to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace in Bosnia. Expected duration of 18 months
Rwanda and Zaire	2-Dec		1	U.S. personnel and aircraft authorized to help in surveying the region in support of humanitarian operations, although fighting was still occurring in the area and U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty. Supporting UN humanitarian efforts regarding refugees in Rwanda and Great Lakes region of Zaire
1997				
Albania	13-Mar		1	U.S. forces evacuated U.S.GOV and private U.S. citizens from Tirana and enhanced security for the embassy
Congo and Gabon	25-Mar		1	Standby evacuation force had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for AMCITS, U.S.GOVs, and selected TCNs in Zaire
Sierra Leone	29, 30 May		1	Military personnel deployed to Freetown to prepare for or undertake the evacuation of U.S.GOVs and AMCITS
Bosnia		20-Jun	5	Update to SFOR. 2800 support troops remain. 500 UNPREDEP troops remain in Macedonia
		19-Dec		Intended "in principle" to participate in security presence in Bosnia after NATO SFOR withdrawal in 1998
Cambodia	11-Jul		1	Deployed Task Force of 550 military personnel to Utapao Air Base in Thailand to ensure the security of AMCITS in Cambodia during a period of domestic conflict there
1998				
Guinea-Bissau	10-Jun		1	Standby evacuation force deployed to Dakar, Senegal in response to Army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau that endangered U.S.GOVs, AMCITS, and the embassy. The deployment continued until the necessary evacuations were complete
Bosnia		19-Jun	6	Update on SFOR
Kenya and Tanzania	7-Aug		1	Deployed JTF to Nairobi, Kenya to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 50-100 personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to enhance the security of the Embassies and citizens there
Albania	16-Aug		1	Deployed 200 Marines and 10 Navy Seals to USEMB Tirana to enhance security against reported threats to U.S. personnel

Afghanistan	20-Aug		1	Airstrikes against camps and installations in AFG and Sudan used by OBL terrorist organization. Convincing info that it was responsible for bombings of USEMB in Kenya and Tanzania
Sudan	20-Aug		1	Airstrikes against camps and installations in AFG and Sudan used by OBL terrorist organization. Convincing info that it was responsible for bombings of USEMB in Kenya and Tanzania
Liberia	27-Sep		1	Due to political instability and civil disorder in Liberia, stand-by response and evacuation force of 30 personnel deployed to augment USEMB security force in Monrovia
Iraq	16-23 Sep		1	Together with UK, conducted a bombing campaign against industrial facilities deemed capable of producing WMD and other military and security targets. Operation Desert Fox.
	Dec			Together with coalition forces enforced no-fly zone, conducted military ops against air defense system on numerous occasions in response to actual or potential threats against aircraft enforcing no fly zone in northern and southern Iraq.
1999				
Iraq		Continue	2	Together with coalition forces enforced no-fly zone, conducted military ops against air defense system on numerous occasions in response to actual or potential threats against aircraft enforcing no fly zone in northern and southern Iraq.
Bosnia		19-Jan	7	Update. SFOR 6900. 2300 support. 350 in FYROM as part of UNPREDEP
		19-Jul		Update. SFOR 6200. 2200 Support. FYROM forces now support KFOR
Kenya		25-Feb	2	Continuing to deploy personnel in that country to assist in providing security for USEMB and AMCITS in Nairobi
Yugoslavia	24-Mar		1	U.S. forces and NATO allies commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to Yugo's gov'ts campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo
Yugoslavia/Albania	7-Apr		1	2,500 soldiers, and aviators deployed to Albania, including RW aircraft, artillery, and tactical missile systems to enhance NATO's ability to conduct effective air ops in Yugoslavia. Deployment of forces to Albania and Macedonia to support humanitarian disaster relief ops for Kosovar refugees
	25-May			Additional aircraft and forces to support NATO's ongoing efforts, including several thousand additional troops to Albania ISO the deep strike force located there. Also directed additional forces be deployed to assist in humanitarian ops.
Yugoslavia/Kosovo	12-Jun		1	7000 troops as part of NATO KFOR in Kosovo. 1500 personnel deploy to other countries in the region as national support element ISO KFOR
		15-Dec		Update to KFOR. 8500 deployed in a sector around Urosevac in eastern portion of Kosovo. Maintaining public security is a key task. Other support forces in the region, 1500 in Macedonia, Greece, and Albania
East Timor	8-Oct		1	Limited number of forces deployed to support UN INTERFET. 31st MEU deployed to provide helicopter airlift and SAR support
2000				

Iraq		Continue	3	Together with coalition forces enforced no-fly zone, conducted military ops against air defense system on numerous occasions in response to actual or potential threats against aircraft enforcing no fly zone in northern and southern Iraq.
Bosnia		25-Jan	8	Update. SFOR 4600. 1500 Support troops.
		25-Jul		Update. SFOR 4600. 1000 Support
East Timor	25-Feb		2	3 observers and 1 JAG ISO UNTAET to maintain law and order, facilitate effective administration, deliver humanitarian assistance, and support self-government. 30 personnel deployment as part of USGET (support group)
		25-Aug		Update. 3 observers as part of UNTAET. Maintain 30 troops in East Timor, facilitate and coordinate U.S. activities, and conduct humanitarian and civic assistance activities
Sierra Leone	12-May		1	Navy patrol craft deployed to support evacuation ops if needed. C-17 aircraft delivered ammo, supplies, and equipment ISO UN peacekeeping ops.
Yugoslavia/Kosovo		16-Jun	2	Update. Reduce to 6000 KFOR. 1000 support in Macedonia, Albania, Greece
		18-Dec		Update. 5600 to KFOR. 500 as part of support element.
Yemen	12-Oct		1	About 50 NAVCENT troops to provide medical, security, and disaster response assistance following attack on USS Cole in port of Aden. Two Navy surface combatant vessels operating in or near Yemeni waters to provide comm and other support
2001				
East Timor		2-Mar	3	Update. 3 observers remain attached UNTAET. U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET) of 12 personnel remains
		31-Aug		Update. 3 Observers UNTAET. 20 USGET
Kosovo		18-May	3	Update. 6000 troops ISO KFOR. 500 troops National Support Element.
		19-Nov		Update. 5500 KFOR. 500 NSE.
Bosnia		25-Jul	9	Update. 3800 SFOR. 500 support troops.
Iraq		Continue	4	Together with coalition forces enforced no-fly zone, conducted military ops against air defense system on numerous occasions in response to actual or potential threats against aircraft enforcing no fly zone in northern and southern Iraq.
Terrorism Threat	24-Sep		1	On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" and "Senate Joint Resolution 23," that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the "deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations." The President noted in efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he might find it necessary to order "additional forces into these and other areas of the world." He stated that he could not now predict "the scope and duration of these deployments," or the "actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States."
Afghanistan	9-Oct		1	U.S. forces began combat action against Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban supporters. Direct response to 9/11. Part of our

				campaign against terror. Designed to disrupt use of AFG as terrorist base of operations.
2002				
Bosnia		21-Jan	10	Update. 3100 SFOR. 500 Support troops
East Timor		28-Feb	4	Update. 3 observers UNTAET. 10 USGET
Terrorism Threat		20-Mar	2	Update. On March 20, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," on U.S. efforts in the "global war on Terrorism." The United States was also conducting "maritime interception operations ... to locate and detain suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban leadership fleeing Afghanistan by sea." The President noted that he was "assessing options" for assisting other nations, including Georgia and Yemen, in enhancing their "counterterrorism capabilities, including training and equipping their armed forces." He stated that U.S. combat-equipped and combat support forces would be necessary for these efforts, if undertaken.
		20-Sep		Update. On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" had been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist, and advise the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities." He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming, or financing of "international terrorists." He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the "counterterrorist capabilities" of their armed forces.
AFG		20-Mar	2	Update. On March 20, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," on U.S. efforts in the "global war on Terrorism." He noted that the "heart of the al-Qaeda training capability" had been "seriously degraded," and that the remainder of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters were being "actively pursued and engaged by the U.S., coalition and Afghan forces." The United States was also conducting "maritime interception operations ... to locate and detain suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban leadership fleeing Afghanistan by sea." The President noted that he was "assessing options" for assisting other nations, including Georgia and Yemen, in enhancing their "counterterrorism capabilities, including training and equipping their armed forces." He stated that U.S. combat-equipped and combat support forces would be necessary for these efforts, if undertaken.
Terrorism/Georgia	20-Sep		1	He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the "counterterrorist capabilities" of their armed forces.
Terrorism/Yemen	20-Sep		1	He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the "counterterrorist capabilities" of their armed forces.

Terrorism/Philippines	20-Mar		1	600 troops to train, advise, and assist Philippines Armed Forces in enhancing CT capabilities
		20-Sep		U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" had been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist, and advise the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."
Kosovo		22-Jul	4	Update. SFOR 2400. 60 Support troops.
		15-Nov		Update. 4350 KFOR. 266 NSE
Ivory Coast	25-Sep		1	Personnel sent to assist in evacuating AMCITS and TCNs from city of Bouake in response to a rebellion in Cote D'Ivoire
2003				
Bosnia		21-Jan	11	Update. 1800 SFOR. 80 for support.
		22-Jul		Update. No change.
Terrorism Threat		20-Mar	3	Update. On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as well as P.L. 107-40, and "pursuant to" his authority as Commander-in-Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations globally in the war against terrorism. "maritime interception operations on the high seas" in areas of responsibility of the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations.
		19-Sep		Update. On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" continue to be deployed at a number of locations around the world as part of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the Central, European, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to "prevent the movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists." He also noted that "U.S. combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."
AFG		20-Mar	3	These military operations included ongoing U.S. actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area;
Terrorism/Georgia		20-Mar	2	Military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations.
		19-Sep		U.S. combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."
Terrorism/Yemen		20-Mar	2	Military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations.
Terrorism/Djibouti	20-Mar		1	U.S. combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."

Iraq War	19-Mar		1	U.S. Armed Forces, operating with other coalition forces, to commence operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq." He further stated that it was not possible to know at present the duration of active combat operations or the scope necessary to accomplish the goals of the operation "to disarm Iraq in pursuit of peace, stability, and security both in the Gulf region and in the United States."
Kosovo		14-May	5	Update. 2250 KFOR, additional in support.
		14-Nov		Update. 2100 KFO, additional in support.
Liberia	8-Jun		1	35 combat troops to augment USEMB security forces in Monrovia. Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.
	11-Aug			4350 troops enter Liberian territorial waters ISO UN and west African States efforts to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.
Mauritania	8-Jun		1	34 combat troops to help secure USEMB in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.
2004				
Bosnia		22-Jan	12	Update. 1800 SFOR.
		20-Mar		1100 SFOR
		4-Nov		1000 SFOR
Haiti	25-Feb		1	55 personnel from JFCOM to Port au Prince to augment USEMB security forces and protect AMCITS and property in light of the instability created by the armed rebellion in Haiti
	29-Feb		1	200 additional JFCOM troops for a variety of purposes, including preparing the way for a UN MNIF and otherwise supporting UN SC Resolution 1529
	20-Mar		1	1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N. Multinational Interim Force.
Kosovo		20-Mar	6	1900 KFOR
		4-Nov		1800 KFOR
Terrorism/AFG		20-Mar	4	details of multiple on-going United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan),"
		4-Nov		On November 4, 2004, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism." These deployments, support or military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel); and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000

				personnel). Meanwhile, he stated that the United States continued to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq.
Terrorism/Georgia		20-Mar	3	U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
Terrorism/Djibouti		20-Mar	2	U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
		4-Nov		U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
Terrorism/Kenya	20-Mar		1	U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
		4-Nov		U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
Terrorism/Ethiopia	20-Mar		1	U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
		4-Nov		U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
Terrorism/Yemen		20-Mar	3	U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
		4-Nov		U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
Terrorism/Eritrea	20-Mar		1	U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
		4-Nov		U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.
Iraq War		4-Nov	2	The United States continued to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq.
2005				
Iraq War		20-May	3	operations in Iraq, where about 139,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed
	7-Dec			Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed
Kosovo		20-May	7	NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel).
		7-Dec		NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel).
Bosnia		20-May	13	Approximately 235 U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.
		7-Dec		Approximately 220 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
Terrorism		20-May	5	On May 20, 2005, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” as

				well as operations in Iraq, where about 139,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
		7-Dec		On December 7, 2005, the President sent to Congress “consistent” with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” and in support of the Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
AFG		None	5	
Terrorism/Djibouti		20-May	3	U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
		7-Dec		U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
Terrorism/Kenya		20-May	2	U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
		7-Dec		U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
Terrorism/Ethiopia		20-May	2	U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
		7-Dec		U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
Terrorism/Yemen		20-May	4	U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
		7-Dec		U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
Terrorism/Eritrea		20-May	2	U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these nations.
2006				
Terrorism		15-Jun	6	On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress, “consistent” with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. About 131,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaeda and other international terrorists operating in the region.

		15-Dec		On December 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress, “consistent” with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. About 134,000 military personnel are deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaeda and other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen.
AFG		None	6	
Iraq War		15-Jun	4	Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. About 131,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq.
		15-Dec		Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. About 134,000 military personnel are deployed in Iraq.
Kosovo		15-Jun	8	KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel.
		15-Dec		KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel
Bosnia		15-Jun	14	Approximately 250 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
		15-Dec		Approximately 100 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.”
Terrorism/Djibouti/HOA		15-Jun	4	U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaeda and other international terrorists operating in the region.
		15-Dec		U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaeda and other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen.
Terrorism/Yemen		15-Dec	5	U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaeda and other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen.
Lebanon	18-Jul		1	In response to the security threat posed in Lebanon to U.S. embassy personnel and citizens and designated third country personnel, he had deployed combat-equipped military helicopters and military personnel to Beirut to assist in the departure of the persons under threat from Lebanon. The President noted that additional combat-equipped U.S. military forces may be deployed “to Lebanon, Cyprus and other locations, as necessary” to assist further departures of persons from Lebanon and to provide security. He further stated that once the threat to U.S. citizens and property has ended, the U.S. military forces would redeploy.
2007				

Terrorism		15-Jun	7	On June 15, 2007, the President sent to Congress, “consistent” with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the NATO-led KFOR. The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combat-support forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European (KFOR), and Southern Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaeda terrorists and their supporters.
		14-Dec		On December 14, 2007, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combat-support forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and Southern Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaeda terrorists and their supporters.
AFG		15-Jun	7	The United States is currently “pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in Afghanistan currently total approximately 25,945. Of this total, “approximately 14,340 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.”
		14-Dec		The United States is currently “pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in Afghanistan currently total approximately 25,900. Of this total, “approximately 15,180 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.”
Kosovo		15-Jun	9	U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo is approximately 1,584 military personnel.
		14-Dec		The U.S. military continues to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically, the NATO-led KFOR. Currently, the U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo is approximately 1,498 military personnel.
Iraq		None	5	
2008				
Terrorism threat		13-Jun	8	On June 13, 2008, the President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the NATO-led KFOR. The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combat-support forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and Southern Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaeda terrorists and their supporters.

		16-Dec		On December 16, 2008, the President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the NATO-led KFOR. The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combat-support forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and Africa Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaeda and their supporters.
AFG		13-Jun	8	The United States is actively “pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in Afghanistan currently total approximately 31,122. Of this total, “approximately 14,275 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.”
		16-Dec		The United States is “actively pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in Afghanistan total approximately 31,000. Of this total, “approximately 13,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.”
Kosovo		13-Jun	10	The U.S. military continues to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically, the NATO-led KFOR. Currently, the U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo is approximately 1,500 military personnel.
		16-Dec		The U.S. military continues to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led KFOR. The current U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo is about 1,500 military personnel.
Iraq		None	6	
Burma	12-May		1	DoD created JTF-CR directly out of Cobra Gold to coordinate the military response to the crisis. Commander of the Marine Forces Pacific, LtGen. John F. Goodman, who had been leading the exercise, commanded the JTF. DoD announced that the USS Essex Amphibious Ready Group could be deployed to Burma within four days. It carried 23 helicopters that could be used to transport aid supplies. It also included several landing craft units, as well as 1,800 personnel who could participate in the relief effort. The United States also proposed to make available two aircraft carrier groups (led by the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Nimitz), both of which had more helicopters on board, as well as medical teams and personnel that could be deployed to the affected areas.
2009				
Terrorism threat		15-Jun	9	On June 15, 2009, the President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a supplemental consolidated report, giving details of “ongoing contingency operations overseas.”

		5-Dec		On December 5, 2009, the President sent to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report, giving details of “global deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report detailed “ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas.” The United States has deployed “various combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern and African Command areas of operation” in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qaeda actions. In addition, the United States continues to deploy “U.S. combat-equipped forces to help enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies” not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through “maritime interception operations on the high seas” aimed at blocking the “movement, arming and financing of international terrorists.” In addition, the United States continues to deploy “U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies” not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through “maritime interception operations on the high seas” aimed at blocking the “movement, arming and financing of international terrorists.”
AFG		15-Jun	9	The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was “approximately 58,000,” of which approximately 20,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to pursue and engage “remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.”
		5-Dec		The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was “approximately 68,000,” of which approximately 34,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to pursue and engage “remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.”
Kosovo		15-Jun	11	Presently the United States contributes approximately 1,400 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
		5-Dec		U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led KFOR. Presently the United States contributes approximately 1,475 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
Iraq		15-Jun	7	Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. The current U.S. contribution to this effort is “approximately 138,000 U.S. military personnel.”
		5-Dec		The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to “maintain security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is “approximately 116,000 U.S. military personnel.”
Indonesia	4-Oct		1	The DoD response to the earthquakes was coordinated by the Commander, Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet, RADM Richard Landolt. ¹³ Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet/Task Force 76 led the U.S. Navy Response. ¹⁴ The Thirteenth Air Force sent the 36th Contingency Response Group (CRG), which set up a

				HARRT. A JTF was not established for this operation. Table 3.1 presents a chronology of the U.S. military HA/DR operations in response to the Padang earthquake.
2010				
Terrorism threat		15-Jun	10	On June 15, 2010, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The United States has deployed "combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qaeda actions. In addition, the United States continues to "conduct maritime interception operations on the high seas" directed at "stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups."
		15-Dec		On December 15, 2010, the President submitted to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report, detailing "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The United States has deployed "combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qaeda actions. In addition, the United States continues to conduct "maritime interception operations on the high seas in the areas of responsibility of the geographic combatant commands" directed at "stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups."
AFG		15-Jun	10	The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 87,000," of which over 62,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues combat operations "against al-Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban supporters" in Afghanistan.
		15-Dec		The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 97,500," of which over 81,500 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States is continuing combat operations "against al-Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban supporters" in Afghanistan.
Kosovo		15-Jun	12	U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led KFOR. Presently, the United States contributes approximately 1,074 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
		15-Dec		U.S. military operations also continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led KFOR. The United States currently contributes approximately 808 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
Iraq		15-Jun	8	The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to "maintain security and stability" there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is "approximately 95,000 U.S. military personnel."

		15-Dec		The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq in support of Iraqi efforts to “maintain security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is “approximately 48,400 U.S. military personnel.”
Pakistan	31-Jul		1	12 hours after the GoP asked the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan for airlift support, U.S. Army helicopters were en route from Afghanistan, and these were replaced by the 15th MEU from off the coast of Aden within 72 hours. The commander of the HA/DR operation, VADM Mike LeFever, emphasized the importance of responding quickly to Pakistani requests in order to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Pakistan as an ally. In addition to the rapid deployment of aviation assets, DoD responded quickly to the first GoP request it received related to the disaster—as many Halal meals as could be provided. The Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan (ODRP) scoured ARCENT-Kuwait and worked with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to locate meals, arrange airlift and diplomatic clearance, and ensure the delivery of nearly 450,000 Halal meals ready to eat (MREs) within three days.
2011				
Terrorism threat		15-Jun	11	On June 15, 2011, the President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a supplemental consolidated report giving details of “global deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report detailed ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas.
		15-Dec		On June 15, 2011, the President sent to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a supplemental consolidated report giving details of “global deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report detailed ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas.
AFG		15-Jun	11	The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was “approximately 99,000,” of which approximately 83,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to pursue and engage “remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.”
		15-Dec		On December 15, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a supplemental consolidated report, giving details of “deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report detailed ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas. The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was “approximately 93,000,” of which approximately 78,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to pursue and engage “remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.”

Kosovo		15-Jun	13	U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led KFOR. Presently the United States contributes approximately 800 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
		15-Dec		U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led KFOR. Presently the United States contributes approximately 800 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
Egypt	31-Jan		1	A combat-equipped security force of about “40 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Central Command” was deployed to Cairo, Egypt, on January 31, 2011, for the sole purpose of “protecting American citizens and property.” That force remains at the U.S. embassy in Cairo.
Libya	19-Mar		1	On March 21, 2011, the President submitted to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a report stating that at “approximately 3:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, on March 19, 2011,” he had directed U.S. military forces to commence “operations to assist an international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and undertaken with the support of European allies and Arab partners, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya.” He further stated that U.S. military forces, “under the command of Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) began a series of strikes against air defense systems and military airfields for the purposes of preparing a no-fly zone.” These actions were part of “the multilateral response authorized under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973,” and the President added that “these strikes will be limited in their nature, duration, and scope. Their purpose is to support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. These limited U.S. actions will set the stage for further action by other coalition partners.”
		15-Jun		In Libya, since April 4, 2011, the United States has transferred responsibility for military operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement “has assumed a supporting role in the coalition’s efforts.” U.S. support in Libya has been limited to “intelligence, logistical support, and search and rescue assistance.” The U.S. military aircraft have also been used to assist in the “suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone” over Libya. Since April 23, 2011, the United States has supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of “unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets” there. Except in the case of operations to “rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft” on March 21, 2011, “the United States has deployed no ground forces to Libya.”
		15-Dec		In Libya, after April 4, 2011, the United States transferred responsibility for military operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement “assumed a supporting role in the coalition’s efforts.” U.S. support in Libya was limited to “intelligence, logistical support, and search and rescue assistance.” The U.S. military aircraft were also used to assist in the “suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone”

				over Libya. After April 23, 2011, the United States supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of “unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets” there. Except in the case of operations to “rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft” on March 21, 2011, and deploying 16 U.S. military personnel to aid in re-establishing the U.S. embassy in Tripoli in September 2011, “the U.S. deployed no ground forces to Libya.” On October 27, 2011, the United Nations terminated the “no-fly zone” effective October 31, 2011. NATO terminated its mission during this same time.
LRA	14-Oct		1	On October 14, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a report stating that “he had authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony,” leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), from the battlefield. The President stated that on “October 12, 2011, the initial team of U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda.” In the “next month, additional forces will deploy, including a second combat-equipped team and associated headquarters, communications, and logistics personnel.” The President further stated that the “total number of U.S. military personnel deploying for this mission is approximately 100. These forces will act as advisors to partner forces that have the goals of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior leadership of the LRA.”
Iraq		15-Jun	9	The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to help it “maintain security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is “approximately 45,000 U.S. military personnel.”
		15-Dec		The United States continued to deploy military forces in Iraq to help it “maintain security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations were undertaken pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The U.S. force level in Iraq on October 28, 2011, was “36,001 U.S. military personnel.” The United States was committed to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. (This occurred, as scheduled, after this report was submitted.)
2012				
Somalia	24-Jan		1	Small number of joint SOF rescued Ms Jessica Buchanan from kidnap as well as Danish national
Terrorism		15-Jun	12	On June 15, 2012, the President reported to Congress “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report regarding various deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat. With regard to other counter-terrorism operations, the President stated that the United States had deployed “U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the CT capabilities of our friends and allies including special

				operations and other forces for sensitive operations in various locations around the world.” The President noted that he would direct “additional measures against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests.” Further information on such matters is provided in a “classified annex to this report.” He also reported that the United States remained prepared to engage in “maritime interception operations” intended to stop the “movement, arming, and financing of certain international terrorist groups,” as well as stopping “proliferation by sea of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.” Additional details about these efforts are included in “the classified annex” to this report.
Terrorism/AFG		15-Jun	12	In the efforts in support of U.S. counterterrorism (CT) objectives against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and, associated forces, he noted that U.S. forces engaged in Afghanistan in the above effort were “approximately 90,000.”
Terrorism/Somalia	15-Jun		1	He noted that the “U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qaeda, including those who are also members of al-Shabaab, who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests.”
Terrorism/Yemen	15-Jun		1	The President further stated that the U.S. military had been “working closely with the Yemeni government to operationally and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qaeda today.” He added that these “joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests.”
LRA		15-Jun	2	Other military operations reported by the President include the “deployment of U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to Uganda to serve as advisors to regional forces that are working to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and other senior Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leaders from the battlefield and to protect local populations.” The total number of U.S. military personnel deployed for this mission is “approximately 90,” and elements of these U.S. forces have been sent to “forward locations in the LRA-affected areas of the Republic of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic.” These U.S. forces “will not engage LRA forces except in self-defense.”
Libya	12-Sep		1	Security Force from USAFRICOM to support security of personnel in Libya. Response to attack on post in Benghazi, killing 4 Americans including Ambassador John Christopher Stephens
Yemen	13-Sep		1	Additional security force arrived in Yemen in response to security threats there.
Southern Philippines	17-Dec		1	Humanitarian assistance mission following Typhoon Bopha. U.S. forces provided planning, coordination, personnel, water purification teams, and aircraft that flew 24 sorties to deliver

				756,800 lbs of relief supplies, 56 hours of SAR ops, and 60 hours of SAR coverage
Kosovo		15-Jun	14	The President also reported that presently the United States was contributing approximately 817 military personnel to the NATO-led KFOR in Kosovo.

Before 9/11	36
After 9/11	31
Total	67

Appendix B. Use of Force Analysis

Year	State	NonState	Collective	Total Int	Ongoing S	Ongoing NS	Tot Ongoing	Grand Total	New + Ongoing State	New + Ongoing Nonstate
1992	2	2		4	0	0	0	4	2	2
1993	4	1	1	6	1	0	1	7	5	1
1994	3	1		4	0	0	0	4	3	1
1995	2	1		3	1	0	1	4	3	1
1996	0	2	1	3	2	0	2	5	2	2
1997	0	4		4	1	0	1	5	1	4
1998	2	6		8	1	0	1	9	3	6
1999	4	1		5	2	1	3	8	6	2
2000	0	3		3	3	0	3	6	3	3
2001	0	2		2	3	1	4	6	3	3
2002	0	4		4	2	3	5	9	2	7
2003	1	4		5	2	4	6	11	3	8
2004	0	6		6	3	4	7	13	3	10
2005	0	0		0	3	7	10	10	3	7
2006	0	1		1	3	4	7	8	3	5
2007	0	0		0	2	2	4	4	2	2
2008	0	0	1	1	2	2	4	5	2	2
2009	0	0	1	1	2	2	4	5	2	2
2010	0	0	1	1	2	2	4	5	2	2
2011	1	2		3	2	2	4	7	3	4
2012	0	6		6	1	3	4	10	1	9
	19	46	5	70	38	37	75	145	57	83

	Before 9/11	After 9/11
State	17	2
NonState	21	25
Collective	2	3

	Before 9/11	After 9/11
State	31	26
NonState	22	61
Collective	2	3
Total	55	90

		Duration					
		State	NonState		State	NonState	
<=1	13	31		15	35		
1	1	8		2	16	Haiti	
2	2	1		6	3	Haiti	
3	1	1		4	4	Iraq 98-01	
4		2			10		
5							
6							
7							Kenya2, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, S Sudan, CAR, DRC
8		1			9	Iraq 03-11	Georgia
9							East Timor
10							Yemen, Djibouti
11		2			24	AFG, Terrorism	
12	1			13		Bosnia	
13	1			14		Kosovo	
				Total	54	101	

Intervention	Duration
Iraq 1992	2
Bosnia 1993	14
Haiti 1993	4
Iraq 1998	4
Kosovo 1999	14
East Timor 1999	4
Terrorism 2001	12
AFG 2001	12
Terror/Georgia 2002	3
Terror/Yemen 2002	5
Terror/Djibouti 2003	4
Iraq War 2003	9
Terror/Kenya 2004	2
Terror/Ethiopia 2004	2
Terror/Eritrea 2004	2
LRA 2011	2

Appendix C. Threat Rhetoric Analysis

Year	Total Words	Threat Words	%	State Level Threats													
				Nukes/WMD/Proliferation	State Threats + Failed States	Supporting Democracy + Freedom + Liberty + Human Rights	Regional Conflict / Stability	Nation Building	Border Security + Homeland defense	Alliances + Treaties+ Military Cooperation + Relationships + Diplomacy + Partners	US Military + Strength + Use of power + Gov't Agencies helping in defense + Legislation & Budgets	Engagement + Values + Lead + Responsibility	Trade/Economy/Markets	Education at Home	State Threats Totals	State Threats % of Threat Words	% State of All Words
1992	5075	1418	27.94%	342	218		19				607	100			1286	90.69%	25.34%
1993	7000	207	2.96%	8		5					142	27	4		186	89.86%	2.66%
1994	7389	1060	14.35%	113	47	169	154			95	163	201	40		982	92.64%	13.29%
1995	9175	930	10.14%	172	15	14	48		45		198	58	163		713	76.67%	7.77%
1996	6336	764	12.06%	119	16	21	103			34	156	190	32		671	87.83%	10.59%
1997	6752	1513	22.41%	190	31	179	79			198	295	178	227	27	1404	92.80%	20.79%
1998	7298	1000	13.70%	251	64		157			156	151	74	12		865	86.50%	11.85%
1999	7488	1163	15.53%	166	61	99	197		19	38	203	62	11	7	863	74.20%	11.53%
2000	9076	1916	21.11%	148	99	133	131		8	14	379	81	204		1197	62.47%	13.19%
2001	4362	348	7.98%	42	14	21	7			11	127	36	70		328	94.25%	7.52%
2002	3828	2592	67.71%	155	192	231		7	200	92	245	160	31		1313	50.66%	34.30%
2003	5372	3391	63.12%	1075	387	209	42	20	92	90	284	56			2255	66.50%	41.98%
2004	5170	2119	40.99%	156	251	331		112	100	183	206	28			1367	64.51%	26.44%
2005	5080	2128	41.89%	40	109	686	84	154	85	176	313	43			1690	79.42%	33.27%
2006	5361	2366	44.13%	37	46	538		83	183	49	324	384	4		1648	69.65%	30.74%
2007	5591	2933	52.46%	8	90	312	46	291	134	138	241	178	13		1451	49.47%	25.95%
2008	5704	3053	53.52%	52	244	306	97	316	197	25	646	30	2		1915	62.73%	33.57%
2009	5490	541	9.85%	3	41		23			14	108	173			362	66.91%	6.59%
2010	7234	1021	14.11%	120	131	10	14	90	69	38	137	53	48		710	69.54%	9.81%
2011	6879	909	13.21%	63	58	150		60		88	173	46			638	70.19%	9.27%
2012	7033	1028	14.62%	54	77	155	9			63	347	135	5		845	82.20%	12.01%
				3314	2191	3569	1210	1133	1060	1502	3530	1403	377	34	5344		

Appendix D. Threat Reporting Analysis

		State Level Threats + Concerns																																
Year	World Count	Regional Conflicts	Democracy + Liberty	Proliferation + WMD	Treaties + Allies + Intl Support	State	Counterintelligence	Iran	Iraq	Afghanistan	N Korea	China	Russia	Pakistan	India	Haiti	Venezuela	Cuba	Mexico	Lebanon	Libya	Tunisia	Yemen	Syria	Somalia	Nigeria	Ukraine + Belarus	US Military + Strength + Use of power + Gov't Agencies	Economy	Protect the Homeland	State Information Warfare	TOTAL STATE	% STATE	
1992	2898	129	24	820	12	67		603	664																								2771	95.62%
1993																																		
1994	4665	81		23		22			3		7		193														76	2952	31	151		3539	75.86%	
1995	3914	242		219		621	2	123	169		244	175	510														325				2630	67.19%		
1996	5878	199		1114		455		104	138		318	235	331		113			136	106		55						134				3438	58.49%		
1997	5495	1000		527		45		339	348		350	494	706																		3809	69.32%		
1998	4997	836		716		137		349	226		327	255	307														37			42	3232	64.68%		
1999	5880	1164		1185		35		346	528		295	368	461																	167	4549	77.36%		
2000	7622	1688		1027		561		438	298		394	511	772														70			5759	75.56%			
2001	7673	1820		1198		122		432	375	53	416	522	557		32																5527	72.03%		
2002	6632	470		1313		137		381	287	116	256	708	626	189			42														4525	68.23%		
2003	6872	224		1210		245		518	338	375		546	625				120															4201	61.13%	
2004	9251	216		1936		392		588	1371	346	249	319	456		144															3	6020	65.07%		
2005	3106	114	1	458		132		198	182	105		234	231				24													3	1682	54.15%		
2006	8182	61	233	478	31	611		538	602	132	101	326	125	98	234	84	147								110	118		53	27		4150	50.72%		
2007	6202	509	292	436		335		516	456	129		449	213	195	86		172	82	72						84	124	77	101			4328	69.78%		
2008	14843	400		1800	24	1344		729	862	462		972	533	194			590	322	248	250				256	56	160	89	425		32	9748	65.67%		
2009	22110	1877	52	1229	48	1429		1127	670	619	760	1184	378	268			755	329	505	311				443	160	185		39	4	34	12406	56.11%		
2010	21351	1465	675	1573	180	696	179	665	795	748		756	584	463	646	71	436	144	196				48	270	70	166				2	10828	50.71%		
2011	15736	848	142	1412	55	759	66	689	426	615	429	612	711	328	498	164	227	227	489	99			106		86	225		69		43	9325	59.26%		
2012	13686	2017	2	857		93	303	449	228	558	54	558	771	197	1	273	150	226	266	145	152			161	147	88	183	145			46	8070	58.97%	

Year	Nonstate Threats + Concerns								Collective Security Challenges												
	Nonstate Threats + Concerns / Transnational Issue	Terrorism + Extremism + Insurgency	Organized Crime	Drugs	Mass Atrocities + Ethnic Conflicts + Violence	Cyber Threats	TOTAL NONSTATE	% NONSTATE	Collective + UN + Alliances + International Issues	Energy	Space	Global Economy	Water + Food Shortages	Environment	Humanitarian Crises + Natural Disasters	Poverty + Unemployment + Income Inequality	Corruption + Human Rights	Health Threats + Disease	Instability + Chaos + Failed States	TOTAL COLLECTIVE	% COLLECTIVE
1992		20		13			33	1.14%				13								13	0.45%
1993																					
1994		4		7	72		83	1.78%	250					12					64	326	6.99%
1995	484	6		1	32		523	13.36%						146			130	99	375	9.58%	
1996	41	631	141	417	2	184	1416	24.09%				132		337	3		31		503	8.56%	
1997	44	383	162	228		109	926	16.85%						423					423	7.70%	
1998	91	264	117	309	2	117	900	18.01%	57			255		243					555	11.11%	
1999	2	394	29	282		187	894	15.20%	26										34	60	1.02%
2000	38	557	163	290	40	252	1340	17.58%	69			33					9	200	311	4.08%	
2001		676	3	624	40	198	1541	20.08%			83						19	154	256	3.34%	
2002		1515		3	4		1522	22.95%						19	22		29	284	354	5.34%	
2003		1821	2	2			1825	26.56%	158					142	81		200	184	765	11.13%	
2004		2605	2	137		23	2767	29.91%	21					113	60		83	97	374	4.04%	
2005		830		3	14		847	27.27%						2		1		91	94	3.03%	
2006	2	2267	16	260	17		2562	31.31%	198	279		108		2	13	2	269	161	1032	12.61%	
2007	23	757	2	2	6		790	12.74%	225	187		6		23	2			239	682	11.00%	
2008	29	2771	4	83	8	406	3301	22.24%	30	621	74	27	237	49	38		321	59	1456	9.81%	
2009	117	3380	279	522	66	1190	5554	25.12%	130	240	2	1350	101	1011	58		6	684	338	3920	17.73%
2010	46	3915	706		254	1307	6228	29.17%	39	531		1033		841	282			1196	98	4020	18.83%
2011	36	2022	381	154		796	3389	21.54%	207	439	132	896	231					631	92	2628	16.70%
2012	21	2059	509		338	480	3407	24.89%	54	258	199	318	371		3	23	1	241	216	1684	12.30%

Notes

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 60. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 135.
 61. Von Hippel, 63.
 62. Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*, (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 19-20.
 63. Lahneman, 174.
 64. Brooks and Kanter, 15; James G. Roche and George E. Pickett Jr., "Organizing the Government to Provide the Tools for Intervention" in L. F. Brooks, & A. Kanter (Eds.), *U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses*, 1st Ed., (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1994), 196; Schraeder, 2; David Chandler, "Foreign Interventions in Cambodia, 1806-2003" in *Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century*, Ed. William J. Lahneman, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 90.
 65. Roche and Pickett Jr., 196-197; Von Hippel notes a distinction here between the ruling government requesting a foreign intervention and a disenfranchised government requesting the intervention. In fact, she maintains that an intervention is more likely to occur and be supported when it is supported by at least one faction of the state in which the intervention is to occur, 100.

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66. Eighty-Fifth American Assembly, 1994, 227-228; Brooks and Kanter, 15; Schraeder, 2.
67. "The original formula stated *cuius regio eius religio* (to each prince his own religion). An updated version was legally enshrined in the UN Charter, Article 2 (7), and its precise meaning appears to be definitive: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any state.' Yet an appeal to Chapter VII of the UN Charter is permitted -- the Security Council can advocate military intervention in the interest of international peace and security." Von Hippel, 4.
68. Lahneman, 173.
69. Kumar, 125-126.
70. Lahneman, 168-169, 178, 190.
71. Abrams, 1.
72. David J. Rothkopf, *The Price of Peace: Emergency Economic Intervention and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), 11; Steven L. Burg, "Intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Bosnia," in *Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century*, Ed. William J. Lahneman, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 53; See also Lahneman, 166.
73. In addition to the definition of vital interests found in the theory, see, for example, Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, and General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in Von Hippel, 7-9; and Lahneman, 171.
74. Lahneman, 172.
75. Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, and General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in Von Hippel, 7-9; Eric Schwartz, "Intervention in East Timor," in *Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century*, Ed. William J. Lahneman, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 154.
76. Steinbruner and Forrester, 11.
77. Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 40-41.
78. Von Hippel, 5, 55-56; Lahneman, 169.
79. Von Hippel, 23.
80. Walt, 55.
81. Burg, 64.
82. Von Hippel, 8.
83. Anthony Lake quoted in Von Hippel, 8-9.
84. See Anthony Lake and General Shalikashvili in Von Hippel, 7-9; Von Hippel, 169; Lahneman, 169; Abrams, 140; Jerel A. Rosati, "The Domestic Environment," 160; Stephen Daggett, "Government and the Military Establishment;" Harry Piotrowski, "The Structure of the International System;" and Christopher C. Joyner, "International Law," all in *Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World*, Ed. Peter J Schraeder, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989); Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 412.
85. Brooks and Kanter, 17-18.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid, 19.
89. Burg, 55; Von Hippel, 124, 170.
90. Lahneman distinguishes between "interstate wars" and "military interventions in internal conflict." Interestingly, he notes that the U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were examples of both types of interventions. 167.
91. Lahneman, 175.
92. Most of the International Relations theorists discuss this spectrum in more detail. See, for example, Morgenthau, Waltz, and Mearsheimer. For a discussion of the spectrum as it relates to internal conflict, see Lahneman, 175.
93. Walt, 162.
94. See Kerton-Johnson for an extensive discussion of legitimacy as it pertains to post-Cold War U.S. military interventions.
95. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 13.
96. Janice Gross Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations" in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd ed., Ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.

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97. Ibid.
98. Burg, 59.
99. J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (March 1958), 93; Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 12.
100. Lahneman, 171.
101. "U.S. Spy Agency Tapped German Chancellery for Decades: WikiLeaks," (Reuters: July 9, 2015), <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-usa-spying-idUSKCN0PI2AD20150709>.
102. See, for example, Jervis, Stein, and Emanuele Castano, Simona Sacchi, and Peter Hays Gries, "The Perception of the Other in International Relations: Evidence for the Polarizing Effect of Entitativity" in *Political Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (International Society of Political Psychology, Sep. 2003), 465.
103. Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," in *Political Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 2, (International Society of Political Psychology, Jun. 1988), 246-248.
104. Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, Ed. Klaus Knorr, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 78.
105. See especially Jervis and Stein for an in-depth discussion of the sources of misperception.
106. Kissinger, 371.
107. Jervis, 111.
108. Ibid, 112.
109. Ibid, 113.
110. 172 Lahneman.
111. Steinbruner and Forrester, 1.
112. Lahneman, 172.
113. Mearsheimer, *Why Leaders Lie*, 62; Lahneman, 176-177.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid, 225.
116. Ibid.
117. Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 3; Jervis, 117-127.
118. Ibid.
119. Jervis, 117-118, 128-142.
120. See Jervis and Stein.
121. Jervis, 119.
122. Walt, 100.
123. Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 9.
124. Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 259-261.
125. Ibid.
126. Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 25-41
127. Ibid, 6-7; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 261-262.
128. Mearsheimer, *Why Leaders Lie*, 61-62; Walt, 102; Von Hippel, 169.
129. Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 248-257; Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 10-23; and Jervis, Chapter 4.
130. Ibid; Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 6.
131. Emanuele Castano, Simona Sacchi, and Peter Hays Gries, "The Perception of the Other in International Relations: Evidence for the Polarizing Effect of Entitativity" in *Political Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (International Society of Political Psychology, Sep. 2003), 450.
132. Ibid, 455-465.
133. From the Congressional Research Service Report, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015, published on October 15, 2015 for U.S. military intervention in 2004.
134. Several instances listed in Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015.
135. The military intervention against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan has since become the longest running military intervention in U.S. history at almost 15 years.