

Ideological Foundations of Jihadist Organizations: Hizbullah, al-Qaeda, and IS.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the ideological foundations of three jihadist organizations, Hizbullah, al-Qaeda, and Islamic State (IS). All three are categorized as international terrorist organizations but their goals differ. Hizbullah seeks to alter the government within Lebanon, al-Qaeda seeks to eliminate Western influences in Muslim inhabited territories, and IS seeks to create a caliphate within a large portion of the Middle East. The similarities and differences of these three organizations will be illuminated through this examination. The primary focus of the examination focuses on their religious teachings and discourse, as this is a critical aspect of their ideologies. Through this examination, the differences in discourse coinciding with the differing goals of each organization is presented. The discourse of each organization facilitates their goals, recruitment of fighters, and explanation of their actions. Self/other identification is a commonality of all three ideologies but the identification of the other is different according to each organizations goals. This thesis will highlight this aspect and allow for further discussion of the three organizations in future research. The conclusion will allow for discussion as to who gains and maintains power and whether religion is a base or merely a tool for this power.

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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the ideological foundations of three jihadist organizations. The jihadist organizations examined are Hizbullah, al-Qaeda, and ISIS. The ideological foundations are examined by identifying the influences and leaders of the organizations and their contributions to their organizations. The purpose of this examination is to provide the reader with a base understanding of three organizations ideological foundations. This thesis will discuss the varying use of self/other identification by each of the organizations and how it is altered to fit the goals of each group. Understanding how the goals and self/other discourse are related will allow for better understanding of how recruitment is conducted and how each group continues to exist while being battled by more advanced technology and trained militaries.

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Introduction:

This thesis will explore and examine the ideological foundations of three Jihadist organizations, Hizbullah, al-Qaeda, and ISIS. The purpose of this study is to understand their ideological foundations. Preliminary readings lead to the suggestion that the socio-political is based on religious ideology. To clarify, the creation of an Islamic state based on Shari'a law or the restoration or creation of a new caliphate is founded on a particular reading of the Islamic religion and based on fundamental or extremist interpretations of the Qur'an. To further the discussion, the religious ideology is used to legitimize a self-other identification and this identification is created by personal experiences of the primary figures who are instrumental in the creation of the three organizations examined. This thesis will examine this process of how religious and socio-political factors based on self-other identification helped to create the ideological foundations of Jihadist organizations.

These organizations are chosen for the thesis as they are contemporary and internationally recognized jihadist organizations. The differences in these organizations is relevant to their selection. Hizbullah follows the Shi'i sect of the Islamic faith but al-Qaeda and ISIS are Sunni, more specifically followers of Wahhabi or Salafi Islam. A discussion of these forms of the Islamic faith will occur as the groups are discussed. The persons relevant to the establishment of their respective organization will be examined as to experiences that led to their self-other identification. The use of their specific religious ideology will be examined as it pertains to their self-other identification. Then the use of religion to legitimate their socio-political ideology will be discussed. By understanding these concepts, one can gain a clearer understanding as to the goals and reasons for actions by these Jihadist organizations.

The subject of this thesis is the outcome of much misinterpretation by US news and political discussions concerning the reasons for Jihadist movements and actions. The news and political speakers dispute the reference of jihadist groups as “Islamic Extremists.” President Obama addressed not referring to IS or al-Qaeda with the term “radical Islam” in a PBS Newshour interview and later defended this in an interview with USNews.¹ President Trump does refer to radical Islamists and this shift is also seen in the media. USNews itself published an article within four months of the President Obama article using the term Islamic extremist.³ This indicates that religion is the sole reason for their actions. There is some mention, by news outlets in the US, of the restoration or creation of a caliphate, but that also indicates religion as the ideology of the Jihadist actions. This mention is usually only directed towards the discussion of ISIS. Yet, this thesis will show that the creation of a caliphate is found in the ideology of al-Qaeda as well.⁴ Preliminary readings of academic writers concerning these jihadist organizations state that each wanted to create a caliphate or Islamic faith based state but the territory and governmental structure vary. These sources will be discussed and provided in the main body of the thesis. In the discussion of these three jihadist organizations, it is important to understand their foundational ideologies in order to gain a clearer understanding of their goals. The ideologies cannot be focused on religion alone, but must consider the socio-political aspects to gain a clearer understanding. The socio-political ideologies may prove more relevant to the organizations goals as the religious aspect. This hierarchy of relevance is not the goal of this thesis but may present itself nonetheless.

¹ PBS Newshour, Obama explains why he doesn't use 'radical Islam' (<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/watch-live-obama-statement-on-countering-violent-extremism/>),

³ USNews, Islamic Extremists Hail Trump Victory ().

⁴ The discussions of the caliphates and the use of the term “Islamic Extremist” by the media and political press releases are not researched topics but the sources are provided to give a brief example of the discussion.

This thesis analyzes the discourse of the three jihadist organizations to determine if there is a claim of Islamic extremism. Examining the ideological foundations of the three jihadist organizations provides information concerning the claim of Islamic extremism and allows for the discussion of whether these organizations are using a strict, fundamental form of interpretation of Islam for religious reasons or other purposes. If the influences and leaders of these organizations are devout in their beliefs, then a discussion of extremism can occur but if they are not devout, then a discussion of power for political reasons must be conducted. The examination of the ideological foundations is not based solely on a belief but rather the contributions of individual influences and discourses into creating the jihadist organizations goals. The use of self/other identification by each organization presents itself if this thesis and this aspect is utilized to analyze each organizations ideological foundations as to their goals and underlying intentions. Ideology allows for people to understand the world in ways that lead to certain, unavoidable conclusions about what must be done in response to the circumstances of the world.⁵ This thesis analyzes the foundations of the organizations ideologies and allows for examination as to purpose and meaning.

The research for this thesis is being conducted in a qualitative manner. The research process begins with the identification of the influences of the jihadist organizations. This information is gained through research of various writings. The material researched is comprised of books and academic journal publications. Not all books selected may be of academic literature but will have relevance to the topic of the thesis. Examples of this are *Hizbullah* by Naim Qassem and *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* by Lawrence Wright. Naim Qassem is the Deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah. This title is that of second in command for

⁵ Peter Mandaville, *How do Religious Beliefs Affect Politics?*, in *Global Politics: A New Introduction*, ed. Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss (New York: Routledge, 2014). P. 127

Hizbullah. This position indicates his writings may have a bias but his insight to Hizbullah's view as to their founding and goals is valuable for alternative points of view. The inclusion of Qassem allows this study to have input from those that support the ideologies under investigation. Qassem's book provides a proper source that discusses the influences of Hizbullah and is cited by scholarly researchers including Eitan Azani, Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, and Joseph Alagha. Further research, using other academic writings, is utilized to verify and expand the research of the influences and ideologies of Hizbullah, according to Qassem. Research of the identified influences produces additional material for this thesis. This process is replicated in researching al-Qaeda and ISIS. Lawrence Wright is a Pulitzer Prize winning author and a journalist. His book does not have an academic approach but provides historical insight towards figures important to the creation of al-Qaeda and its ideologies. Wright's popular account book is not used for research of ideological foundations but for identification and introduction of influences to al-Qaeda's ideological foundation. Upon identification of the influences, as with Hizbullah, greater research of academic sources is conducted to gain information and insight to al-Qaeda's ideologies. ISIS is the most contemporary of these jihadist organizations, in reference to its emergence. Mass media outlets, TV and internet news sources, discuss the creators and leaders of ISIS and this provides the initial point of examination. Researching Abu Musab al-Zarqawi allows for discovery of his religious influence from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. This provides the initial figures for research and further research is conducted to ascertain all other influences. The research of all three jihadist organizations is conducted in similar manners but the sources concerning Hizbullah and al-Qaeda are more prevalent due to their being longer established organizations which allows for more research to be conducted. Although not all book sources are from academics, they will have noted contributions to this thesis.

This qualitative research is initiated by utilizing resources found through Virginia Tech's library system. Resource sights through the online system include ATLA, EBSCO host, and JSTOR for academic journal writings and summons for books. This resource approach provides abstracts and brief summaries for reading and deciding if the material will provide substantial contributions to the research. Once material is gathered, the reading process is conducted using a hermeneutical approach to understanding the information and any biases applied to the writings. The hermeneutical approach also allows for interpretation of the information gathered concerning the ideological foundations of the jihadist organizations. The hermeneutical approach provides a method of understanding why specific words, religious passages, and tones are presented by the organizations. This understanding and interpretation provides insight into underlying meanings and intentions of the discourse's presenter. This allows for understanding as to the use of religious discourse by each individual organization to perpetuate their goals and facilitate in recruitment. The hermeneutical approach to understand the discourse used by each organization's influences and leaders provides insight into how these individuals gain and maintain power within their respective organizations.

This thesis is organized in three chapters. First, Hizbullah will be discussed followed by al-Qaeda, and finally ISIS. Although al-Qaeda and ISIS could be combined into one section, separate treatment will provide demarcation between the two as their goals are not identical. Each of these sections will discuss the important figures in establishing the organization's ideological foundations. The actions of the groups will not be covered in detail as the ideologies, not the actions themselves, are the topics of this thesis. To begin the examination and discussion of Hizbullah, this thesis will consider the Shi'i Islamic movements of the 1960s as an appropriate beginning. This is due to Hizbullah being a Shi'i organization. This movement began in Iraq,

where “a Shi’i religio-political revival took place in the “circles of learning’ (hawzat al-‘ilmiya) in Najaf.”⁶ This movement influenced the clerics in Lebanon, not just those in Iraq. The section will discuss necessary key terms, such as movement within the political realm and the difference of Imam and Ayatollah. This will be written using Eitan Azani’s *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, From Revolution to Institutionalism* and Naim Qassem’s *Hizbullah, The Story from Within* respectively. Then an examination of Imam Mussa al-Sadr, Ayatollah Shamseddine, and Ayatollah Fadlallah will be conducted. These are the three most influential religious figures in the discussion of Hizbullah, according to Naim Qassem. As stated earlier, Naim Qassem is the Deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah today.⁷

Imam Mussa al-Sadr is credited with expanding the Shi’i Islamic movement to Lebanon from Iraq due to his religious schooling in Qum, Iran and later in Najaf, Iraq during the early 1960s.⁸ The discussion of Imam al-Sadr will include his role in creating two movements in Lebanon which represented the Shi’i population. Such organizations are: “Movement of the Oppressed” and “The Ranks of Lebanese Resistance or Amal”.⁹ Amal was the militant arm of the “Movement of the Oppressed” and its importance in the creation of Hizbullah will be discussed as well. Imam al-Sadr disappeared while in Libya in 1978. This disappearance is credited with creating a martyr that galvanized the Shi’i within Lebanon.

The second cleric is Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine. He is primarily an academic cleric that preached for peaceful, civil resistance to the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon. He was in charge of the Cultural and Charity Association in the Beirut

⁶ A. Nazir Hamzeh, “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 (1997): 47

⁷ It is prudent to use a source within the organization to gain understanding on who they feel are the important influences in the origins of Hizbullah.

⁸ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), p. 14.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

suburb Chiyah. Here he produced a set of educational booklets titled 'Cultural Direction'¹⁰, which gave the Shi'i population a unitary direction for establishing a Shi'i culture community. Although he is not directly accredited with assisting in the creation of Hizbullah, his civic actions and public speeches are considered instrumental in unifying the Shi'i population of Lebanon and creating a unified call to opposing Israel in a civil disobedient style. This unifying call can be credited for being a main reason for the rapid expansion of Hizbullah in the early 1980s.¹¹

The third cleric discussed will be Ayatollah al-Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. Ayatollah Fadlallah is listed as the original and only religious leader of Hizbullah. This fact is found in many writings concerning Hizbullah. As claimed by Naim Qassem:

Cultural work, lectures, and education were his primary concerns, in addition to the publication of any books. The messenger role dominated his activities, with political speeches emerging only after the Israeli invasion.¹²

This beginning in the cultural aspect of Lebanese life, as opposed to violent opposition to Israel and the US, leads to his creation of the Association of Philanthropic Organizations. This organization grouped institutions based on the cultural aspects of society focused on education and religion. When Amal began to fracture, many of its members joined the call under Ayatollah Fadlallah and this gives Hizbullah an experienced fighting arm. Although Ayatollah Fadlallah denied his being the spiritual leader of Hizbullah, it can be stated that his sermons and ideologies were used to grow the organization into a major force against Israel and the Maronite led government in Lebanon.

¹⁰ Ibid., 15.

¹¹ Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb 'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 39.

¹² Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), p. 16.

After a discussion of the three prominent clerics in the establishment of Hizbullah, this thesis will examine the socio-political conditions of Lebanon during the late 1970s to the late 1980s. This period is important due to it being the period of the Lebanese civil war and the beginning of hostile actions against the US presence in Lebanon. Although the main focus will be the 1970s to 1990, an understanding of Lebanon's history as a French mandate in the Middle East. This will not be a lengthy discussion but a glancing exploration to provide background. This is necessary to understand the claims that the Shi'i are the oppressed and disadvantaged majority, compared to the Sunni and Christian sects of Lebanese society.¹³ This claim of being the oppressed majority is important to the rise of Hizbullah as it creates a self-other identification for the Shi'i population to distinguish itself from the other religious sects of Lebanon. This claim will be discussed in greater detail in the main section as census numbers through the UN show that the Shi'i population is the largest religious sect, but not a majority in the total population of Lebanon.

With the discussion of the three clerics and the socio-political conditions of Lebanon completed, the origins of Hizbullah will be examined. This will be conducted by introducing specific documents released by the leaders of Hizbullah in 1985. Although Hizbullah began actions in Lebanon prior to 1985, it did not release its official statements of purpose until that year. Specific documents will be examined and discussed using the compilation created by Joseph Alagha. His book contains all twenty four sections of the open letters but this thesis will only focus on specific sections that represent the call of unity for all Muslims, Hizbullah's identified enemies, and its goals. This will conclude the examination of Hizbullah.

¹³ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 7.

After the discussion of Hizbullah, this thesis will examine al-Qaeda, translated as ‘the base’ or ‘the foundation’. This organization is created by three main individuals, Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman Zawahiri. Two major influences on these men are the Egyptian, Sayyed Qutb, and the 1700s religious leader, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab. The teachings of al-Wahhab is important for the beginning of the al-Qaeda discussion as it is the religious foundation of the organization. For this reason, the second section of this thesis will begin by discussing al-Wahhab then progress to Sayyed Qutb. The reason for this progression is the influence of Qutb on Azzam and Zawahiri. Azzam then has direct influence on bin Laden and this will be discussed in the main section. After the discussion of al-Wahhab and Qutb concerning their ideologies, the discussion will proceed to Abdullah Azzam. This will then be followed by discussions of Zawahiri and finally bin Laden.

The discussion of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab will begin with a brief historical examination of his early years leading up to him becoming a religious leader. His upbringing is important as it provides the foundations of his beliefs, as will be discussed in the main body of this thesis. In his youth, al-Wahhab studied the Qur’an for legal basis but in addition to the jurisprudence, he also studied the Hadith and tawhid.¹⁴ This means he rejects the worship of idols, saints, apostles, or any other that would create a rival to the worship of Allah.¹⁵ Some specific events will be mentioned from al-Wahhab’s later education to allow for clearer understanding as to the formation of his beliefs and religious ideologies for a new land based on Shari’a law. In addition to the discussion of al-Wahhab’s religious ideology, a discussion of his

¹⁴ The Hadith is the writings used to guide ones daily life according to the ways of the prophet Muhammed. Tawhid is the belief of divine unity or monotheism. No specific pages from the listed source were used for this information. It is from the readings in general that allowed for the usage of this specific knowledge of Hadith and tawhid.

¹⁵ Abd Allah Salih al-Utaymin, *Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and his Works* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2009), p. 31.

influence on al-Saud and the land called Saudi Arabia today. This relationship led to al-Wahhab having the opportunity to create an Islamic faith based government, also known as a caliphate. The discussion of al-Wahhab provides the foundation for the religious ideology. From this, the examination can proceed to modern applications of al-Wahhab's teachings and beliefs.

This procession to modern applications begins with Sayyed Qutb and his influence on Abdullah Azzam and Ayman Zawahiri. The discussion of this Egyptian teacher and member of the Muslim Brothers. The formation of his ideologies will be discussed using brief examples of his experiences while studying in the US. These examples will not be discussed in close detail but are necessary as they have direct relevance to his anti-US sentiment and his belief in the necessity of an Islamic state based on religion. Qutb was in the US to study the American education system and return to Egypt with suggestions on how to upgrade or modernize the Egyptian education system. This experience has strong significance to understanding Qutb's ideologies. A large part of Qutb's ideologies is found in the concepts of Jahiliyyah and Hakimiyyah¹⁶. Jahiliyyah is a life without divine guidance where Hakimiyyah is life based on divine guidance, loosely. These terms will be discussed in detail in this thesis. The conclusion of this examination on Sayyed Qutb will be on his return to Egypt, his joining the Muslim Brothers, his goals for this group, and end with his execution by the Egyptian government.

Following Qutb, the examination will proceed to Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. A Palestinian by birth, Azzam was educated in Egypt and taught in Saudi Arabia. It is here that he meets a student names Osama bin Laden. Then the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan presents an opportunity for Azzam to teach his ideology in a cause of Jihad. His ideologies will be discussed and then the section will transition from the Jihad against the Soviet Union to his influence on

¹⁶ Sayed Khatab, "'Hakimiyyah' and 'Jahiliyyah' in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38 (2002): 145-70.

Osama bin Laden and the creation of al-Qaeda. A main concept created by Azzam is that of global Jihad. This concept will be discussed in detail as it is a foundation of al-Qaeda, as will be presented later in this thesis. Azzam's writings and teachings of how to conduct a successful Jihad against the West will be explored. Among these writings and teachings, the four stages of creating a global Jihadist will be examined.¹⁷ Other writings of how global Jihad is to be conducted will be presented as well.¹⁸ To conclude the section of Abdullah Azzam, the discussion of how he assisted in creating al-Qaeda will be held and will end with his death by car bomb.

The next important figure in the creation of al-Qaeda and its ideologies is Ayman Zawahiri. He is considered the religious leader of al-Qaeda. A brief discussion of how he was influenced by Sayyed Qutb as it gives relation to his beliefs. The discussion will lead to Zawahiri working in hospital camps along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border, on the Pakistani side, to aide those injured in the war between the Mujahideen and the Soviet Union. It is in these camps that Zawahiri and bin Laden first meet. The discussion will proceed to the strengthening relationship between the two men and how Zawahiri gained influence on bin Laden. This is seen in the placement of Zawahiri's Egyptian compatriots being placed in important roles along the side of bin Laden in al-Qaeda.¹⁹ The ideologies of Azzam and Zawahiri will be discussed in a larger aspect as to their relations in forming the ideology of al-Qaeda.

The final part of the al-Qaeda discussion will concern Osama bin Laden. This discussion will occur by beginning with a brief historical narrative of his early life and quickly proceed to his higher education where he meets Abdullah Azzam. This discussion will move through their

¹⁷ Asaf Maliach, "Palestine and Al-Qa'ida's Operational Strategy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44 (2008):365-66.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 363.

¹⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 26.

days in Afghanistan and immediately following the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan. Then the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait will be discussed as it presents the situation that created animosity from bin Laden towards the US. Osama bin Laden had proposed an Islamic fighting force comprised of Mujahideen fighters to protect Saudi Arabia and fight against Saddam Hussein.²⁰ This idea was rejected in favor of a US led coalition. This inviting of infidels into the holy lands disturbed bin Laden and this will be discussed deeper later in this thesis. From this event, the section will proceed to the events that created al-Qaeda as an international terrorist organization. These events will be presented to highlight the ideologies through actions. This will conclude the section concerning al-Qaeda.

The third and final organization to be covered is ISIS. They desire to create a caliphate within the Middle East in a territory comprising Iraq and the Levant, which consists of the lands of Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, northwest Saudi Arabia, and western Iraq. They emerged from the group known as al-Qaeda Iraq and this fact lends to the understanding that their main religious and socio-political ideologies are the same as al-Qaeda. The main actors, apart from al-Qaeda, to influence ISIS are Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Maqdisi is the religious cleric who influenced Zarqawi and Baghdadi assumed the leadership role of al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) after an American airstrike killed Zarqawi. The discussion of Baghdadi will be brief as he has the smallest amount of influence on the original ideologies of ISIS. For this reason, this section will primarily focus on Maqdisi and Zarqawi.

The discussion of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi will begin with a brief reflection on his early years. This includes a short aside concerning his name with use of Joas Wagemakers' writings concerning the cleric. His childhood in Palestine and Kuwait will not be covered in

²⁰ Manfred Steger, "Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism," *New Political Science* 31 (2009): 533.

detail but in a shallow manner to reflect on the influence this had on Maqdisi. Then, a transition to Maqdisi as a young adult and the influences that shaped his ideology will occur. Such influences are the strong Palestinian nationalism amongst those in Kuwait and how this shaped an anti-Israeli sentiment amongst the Palestinians who migrated in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.²¹ His time spent studying in Saudi Arabia will be covered only in relation to his learning the Salafist teachings and his writings concerning this part of Sunni Islam. Then the discussion will examine how Maqdisi and Zarqawi met, particularly the years in a Jordanian prison, and their interactions up to the formation of AQI. Maqdisi's learnings of the Salafist teachings and his interactions with Zarqawi present the formation of the foundational ideologies of AQI and then ISIS. The years in the Jordanian prison are very important to this section as it is the time the relationship between the two men solidified and Maqdisi had the greatest influence over Zarqawi. Maqdisi's form of Jihad will be examined and compared with the traditional form of Jihad. This will allow for a discussion which shows Maqdisi as not another follower but a thinker with his own teachings. The discussion of Maqdisi will clarify his influential role in the Arabian Peninsula despite the fact he was not Saudi.²² The conclusion of this discussion will encapsulate Maqdisi's ideologies and how they are adopted by AQI and eventually ISIS, with differences noted.

The next figure to be examined is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He is the founder of AQI but was killed by an American airstrike north of Baghdad. His early life does have bearing on his involvement and ideology but will not occupy much space in this thesis. It will be used to explain his reputation for being physically brutal. His reputation as a ruthless man is credited with a renewal of global Jihad following the massive retaliatory action taken by the US after the

²¹ Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietest Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 33.

²² Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietest Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 137.

9/11 attacks.²³ He was also unprecedented in his ability to evade capture for over three years in heavily occupied Iraq and with a bounty of 25 million, rivaling Osama bin Laden.²⁴ As most of the influence on his ideology will be covered in the previous section concerning Maqdisi, this section will focus on his structuring of AQI, his goals, and then the transition to ISIS. This point will also include a discussion of Baghdadi with Atwan Abdel Bari and will conclude the thesis.

Upon completing the discussions of the ideological foundations of these three Jihadist organizations, this thesis will conclude by comparing and contrasting the three. The conclusion will offer insights gained from the research as to how these three organizations came into existence and their goals. This will allow for future research to be conducted as to their roles in International society and their effect on International order. This is for future research possibilities.

²³ George Michael, "The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *Defense Studies* 3 (2007): 338.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

Chapter 1

Hizbullah²⁵: Goals and Ideological Foundations

Introduction

This chapter outlines Hizbullah's ideological foundations and its main goals which will allow future discussion of Hizbullah's role in international society and in the context of international order. For this purpose, I utilize the writings of prominent scholars in the field. In this section, I examine Hizbullah, its goals, and its ideological foundations for its actions. I use historical timelines to illuminate the main discussion points concerning Hizbullah's ideologies, goals, and actions. With this historical narrative presented, I analyze the ideologies as they apply to the goals and actions. The main ideological foundation of Hizbullah rests on the division between oppressors and oppressed.²⁶ This examination will highlight this main notion of the oppressor and oppressed identity structure in the establishment of Hizbullah. I begin my examination of Hizbullah with the 1960s, as this decade marked the beginnings of the Shi'i social movement. Then I will transition the timeline to 1979 as this year's importance of the Iranian religious revolution and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to eliminate PLO camps in the southern region of Lebanon. The importance of these two events in creating Hizbullah will be discussed in this chapter. From this point, I progress to 1982 and the first actions of Hizbullah against the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon. I then proceed to 1985 for the discussion of Hizbullah's beginnings as a named organization with the release of their open letter. From this date, I discuss the origins as they translate to their actions, being labeled an international

²⁵ I need to clarify that I will be using the spelling borrowed from Joseph Alagha. This spelling does not infer a position but rather my respect for his detailed work on the organization.

²⁶ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 16.

terrorist organization, and their role in governance in Lebanon. These time periods are the major periods for this thesis but it is acknowledged the emergence of Hizbullah is not confined to only these years. The highlighting of these specific years displays major events in the emergence of Hizbullah in Lebanon. The discussion of Hizbullah will not progress past the turn of the new century as it will not further the discussion of the ideological foundations for this study.

Shi'a Islamist Movement and the Lebanese Clerics:

The examination of Hizbullah begins with the Shi'i Islam movement, which began in 1960s Iraq. It is important to understand the Shi'i Islamist movement, despite the narrative that relates Hizbullah to Iran, it began in Iraq where "a Shi'i religio-political revival took place in the "circles of learning" (hawzat al-'ilmiya) in Najaf."²⁷ This movement was led by Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr²⁸. He was a charismatic religious leader and these "circles of learning" became centers for the Shi'i teachings that created religious activism. This led to Shi'i activism gaining a home base for the Party of Islamic Call (Hizb ad-Da'wa al-Islamiya) which used a revivalist message calling for revolutionary transitions of communities in Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and Lebanon.²⁹ As these centers dispersed and created new centers in the aforementioned communities, or states, they did not immediately establish revolutionary programs. I will focus exclusively on the movement in Lebanon for this section as I am focusing on Hizbullah and not

²⁷ A. Nazir Hamzeh, "Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 (1997): 1.

²⁸ The al-Sadr name is of importance in Shi'i Islam. It is narrated to be traced back to the first Imam and is part of a lineage of religious scholars and teachers. Since it is a historically relevant name and there are more than one Imams with the al-Sadr name in this thesis, I will be using full names to distinguish as to which Imam I am referring.

²⁹ A. Nazir Hamzeh, "Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 (1997): 3.

the overall Shi'i movement that spread to Iran and Syria as well as Lebanon. Also, this movement in Lebanon had strong effect on Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and Subhi al-Tufayli, founding members of Hizbullah, as well as Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, future leader of Hizbullah.³⁰ With the focus on Lebanon, it is important to discuss three particular clerics who became prominent resulting from the movement in Iraq being brought to Lebanon. To clarify the terminology in the discussion of the clerics, I will discuss key terms in the discussion of the clerics and their importance. To begin the discussion of the clerics and their roles in the establishment of Hizbullah resulting from the Shi'i Islamist movement, one must understand the difference between social and ideological movements. For this purpose, I use the description by Neil Smelser (1962) as cited by Eitan Azani:

There are two main kinds of messages: normative and ideological. Movements with a normative message are generally aimed at making limited and specific changes (social reforms) within the existing social order (such as changing the laws regarding the employment of children, outlawing drugs, etc.). In contrast, movements bearing an ideological message intend to create deep, fundamental changes in the existing social order to the point of destroying it and building a new social order by means of a revolutionary act.³¹

The Shi'i Islamist movement is an ideological one. This fact must be kept in mind when discussing the role of the clerics and their message to the Shi'i of Lebanon. Two kinds of religious leaders began the movement in Lebanon. The first is the Imam. As explained by Naim Qassem, "the title of Imam indicates the leading religious figure who pilots the prayers in front

³⁰ Rula Jurdi Abisaab and Malek Abisaab, *The Shi'ites of Lebanon: Modernism, Communism, and Hizbullah's Islamists* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2014), p. 76.

³¹ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 1.

of a group. It is permanently associated with the name of a religious person when he is chosen to be imam by his community.”³² The second leader is the Ayatollah. An Ayatollah is, “a religious title awarded to clerics of high standing who experience deep religious revelations.”³³ In the interpretation of the Quran as it applies to governance and legal enforcement under Shi’i Sharia law, the Ayatollah is the highest authority. This important distinction will be of no further relevance to this study but allows for the distinction between the influences of Hizbullah.

Imam Musa al-Sadr returned from the Islamic Movement gathering in Najaf and started teaching his learnings of the Shi’i Islamic movement in the Lebanese city of Tyre. These teachings were calls to followers of Shi’i Islam to establish their role in leading Lebanon to an Islamic state directed by the Qur’an. Imam Musa al-Sadr did not remain a local preacher of Shi’i Islamic teachings around Tyre. He created the Highest Islamic Shi’ite Council, an official religious institution that oversaw the concerns of Shi’ite congregations in Lebanon state wide. In response to the need to represent all the Lebanese Shi’i in need, Imam Musa al-Sadr founded the ‘Movement of the Oppressed’. This was a socio-political organization whose mission, in the words of the Shi’i, was to alleviate the hardships being experienced by the oppressed Shi’i around Lebanon due to mass urbanization, especially around Beirut and other districts of Lebanon. The Shi’i were the largest single religious sect but did not constitute a majority of the population. The overall population is split between Christian and Muslim faiths. The claim of oppression and hardship around the urban centers is the movement of the population to the cities to gain employment. Many lived on the fringes of the cities and were unemployed. Imam al-Sadr uses this to galvanize the Shi’i population as he held many large public events and was outspoken against the Lebanese government in its poor handling of its citizens, meaning the Shi’i

³² Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), p. 14.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

population. This is due to the government being predominantly Christian which contributed to the perceived oppression of the Shi'i. In 1974, the public declaration of Amal, The Ranks of Lebanese Resistance, was announced. Originally, Amal was a spiritually founded group but the 1978 the Israeli invasion into southern Lebanon caused Amal to become the militant wing of the 'Movement of the Oppressed'. Their mission was to oppose the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon with force. This opposed occupation was a result of Israel's fight against the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO, and it carried into Lebanon due to PLO having bases in Southern Lebanon to carry out attacks against Israel. Imam al-Sadr was anti-Israel himself, as he was the creator of the slogan: 'Israel is an utter evil.'³⁴ This statement is in response to the continued military action of Israel towards Palestine and incursions into Lebanon. Although Imam Mussa al-Sadr wanted the removal of Israeli and US influence in Lebanon, he never called for an Islamic state but rather for equality and social justice among various denominations, especially the Shi'i, within Lebanon.³⁵ Imam Mussa al-Sadr disappeared from Libya on August 31, 1978 and is revered as the missing Imam and prophecy states the missing Imam's return will signal the days that Shi'ites will rule the earth. Although this prophecy is attributed to Imam Muhammed al-Mahdi from the 9th century, the disappearance of Imam Mussa al-Sadr gave the Shi'i a modern example to use as rallying discourse with the Shi'i Islamic followers in Lebanon.

Imam Mussa al-Sadr's actions, based on his consistent call for the oppressed Shi'i to unite against the oppressors, displays his contribution to the ideological foundation of Hizbullah as beginning a push to create a Shi'i controlled state. His creation of the Highest Shi'ite Council and the "Movement of the Oppressed" were to allow for the creation of a Shi'i society that

³⁴ A. Nazir Hamzeh, "Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 (1997): 3.

³⁵ Joseph Alagha, "Hizbullah's Resilience During the Arab Uprising," *Ortodogu Etutleri* 6, no. 2 (2015): 31.

would bring the Lebanese Shi'i population together as one. The two organizations created by Imam al-Sadr are founded in the Shi'i identifying themselves apart from the rest of Lebanese society. This is not solely that of Shi'i against the rest but also those that follow the Qur'an and those Shi'i that have joined other movements, such as the communist party of Lebanon. Imam al-Sadr desired to have all Shi'i joined together within the religious based group and the use of the oppressed versus the oppressor was his main call. This call for the oppressed to rise up against the oppressor does not have a base in the actual census of Lebanon but rather as a 'rallying' call to unite the Shi'i population. This call creates a self-other identification of the Shi'i self being the oppressed and the Christians of Lebanon being the oppressors. This correlates with Imam al-Sadr's goal of replacing the Christian President with a Shi'i faith leader and instilling shari'a law and creating an Islamic led state.

Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine is the second cleric of importance for the Shi'i movement in Lebanon. Ayatollah Shamseddine was not as publicly active as Imam al-Sadr nor did he create any organizations. He served as the Deputy Head of the Highest Islamic Shi'ite Council with Imam al-Sadr. Ayatollah Shamseddine was an intellectual. He was revered for his ability to write very moving and meaningful speeches. He opted out of active roles in organizations because of his desire to "remain at an equal distance from all" – as he famously put it.³⁶ In concern for Israeli occupation, Ayatollah Shamseddine did not pursue a militant resistance but rather attempted to create a large scale civil resistance movement. This did not come to fruition. His true desire was in his intellectual work and this is where he spent his time after the failed attempt to create a non-militant social movement against the Israeli occupation. Ayatollah Shamseddine's also had an ideological desire to have Lebanon governed by Shi'i and

³⁶ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), p. 16

according to the Qur'an. He also promoted a peaceful coexistence between all religions within Lebanon but the Shi'i should be the leading, governmentally, religious sect. This peaceful coexistence may be from the Qur'anic concept where "the concept of oppression is derived from the Qur'an, its usage in the Qur'anic context is essentially humanistic and does not refer to the Muslim believers as such but to all 'those who were being oppressed on earth' (28:5)."³⁷ His academic interests were the primary concern of his pursuits. He failed in his attempt to have peaceful resistance but is considered an influence in uniting the Shi'i population.

The third cleric of relevance is Ayatollah al-Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. He began his preaching and teachings in East Beirut. He founded the Brotherhood Association in Naba'a with a cultural center grouped a mosque, house of worship, school of religion and a dispensary.³⁸ The Brotherhood Association is an organization that served the Shi'i population of Lebanon. It provided schools, medical centers, and places of worship that were strictly controlled by Ayatollah Fadlallah's followers and allowed no influence from the Lebanese government. Ayatollah al-Sayyed Fadlallah was continuously preaching through various Beirut neighborhoods and was widely known and revered in the area. He began by focusing on cultural work and writing but became more politically motivated with the invasion by Israel. His cultural concerns is shown in his founding of the Association of Philanthropic Organizations which grouped religious, educational, and cultural establishments for the betterment of the Lebanese Shi'i. In the beginning days of Hizbullah, Ayatollah al-Sayyed Fadlallah represented the religious ideology of the group. He supported the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and

³⁷ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 17.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

helped guide Hizbullah with a vision of Islam. This support of Ayatollah Khomeini is due to his rule in Iran represents the first Shi'i led government in their era.³⁹

Accordingly, Hizbu'llah's theoretical formulations on the ideal Islamic republic relate to the pre-Mahdist Islamic state. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran 'represents the only Islamic government in our era', which most closely approximates this ideal, much of the party's state theory is borrowed from the Ruhu'llah Khumani, in addition to Islamic scholars such as Sayyids Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr and Muhammad Husayn Fadlu'lla.⁴⁰

He did not officially participate in actions of Hizbullah but rather stayed on course of teaching while remaining a cleric. Before the creation of official leadership positions, Ayatollah al-Sayyed Fadlallah was considered the religious leader of Hizbullah but he repeatedly denied this claim. Due to Hizbullah using his preaching to guide them, it can be argued that Ayatollah Fadlallah is the ideological mastermind of Hizbullah. This consideration of spiritual leader did subside with clear leadership positions being established, although many western sources still list him as the first and only spiritual leader of Hizbullah.⁴¹

These three clerics stimulated the creation of Hizbullah as they created the religious foundations of Shi'i Islam in Lebanon and the religiously backed call for the removal of Israel in Lebanon. Although, with the exception of Ayatollah al-Sayyed Fadlallah, they did not have direct interaction with members of Hizbullah, they did give it the religious beginnings. Ayatollah al-Sayyed Fadlallah was involved in nascent Hizbullah but he did not have direct influence on their militant actions. The importance, as stated, is that they created the foundations

³⁹ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb. *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 34

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

⁴¹ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), p. 17.

of a Shi'i movement in Lebanon and this leads to the ideologies of and the creation of Hizbullah. To gain clarification as to the 'movements' I discuss, one must understand the differences in the Islamic movement from Western discussions of social movements that do not gain similar magnitude or conviction.

Socio-political conditions:

Within the discussion of movements, particularly ideological movements, one must discuss the conditions that allow the movement to arise and grow. In the case of Hizbullah, these conditions are social, economic, and political. Socially, Lebanon was a divided state. Lebanon is religiously diverse; significant sections of the population are Sunni or Shi'i Muslims or Christians. Thus, there were groups of differing social movements besides Hizbullah, such as the Communist movement that sought to change the governmental structure of the state to one resembling those of the Soviet Union. The Shi'i population constituted the more rural segment of Lebanese society and were exposed, due to urbanization, to the affluent and Westernised lifestyles of the Sunni and Christian sects of Lebanese society.⁴² The status of Shi'i being the poor majority created the saying that they represented the proletariat of Lebanese society and this led to many joining the communist based groups in Lebanon. This sectarian structure led to the Lebanese Civil War which began in 1975 and lasted until 1990. The economic sector created mass urbanization through industrialization that created large numbers of poor living in the suburbs of major metropolitan centers such as Beirut. The rich lived well while the poor struggled to survive. Until 1944, Lebanon was under French mandate. The French established a democratic system of government in Lebanon. Due to Cold War tensions, the United States strongly supported the Lebanese Democratic government and sent marines to protect the

⁴² Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 7.

presidency in 1958. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Lebanon did not side with the other Arab states. This can be argued as being due to US influence on Lebanon to not fight against Israel, the US ally in the Middle East. Although Lebanon did not fight against Israel, it did allow Palestinians to use southern Lebanon as a base area for continued attacks against Israel. This led to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel to fight the PLO based in this southern area. The ideological movement of the Shi'i was given a foundation of support due the perception of a non-Shi'i government allowing Israel to invade Lebanon without resistance and not supporting the Palestinians. This led to Shi'i seeking for Muslim representation in southern Lebanon and finding a place in Imam Mussa al-Sadr's 'Movement of the Oppressed'. The movement also had a reason to coalesce against an enemy with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Shi'i revolution of Iran, in 1979, gave great impetus to Hizbullah as it showed that a religiously founded organization could be successful⁴³. This revolution has great importance to Hizbullah beyond creating a belief other religious movements can be successful and this will be discussed later in the paper. These conditions led to the emergence of Hizbullah and allowed it to successfully become a group claiming to be and acting as a representative of the Shi'i faith people.

The Shi'i Islamic movement of the 1960s created the religious foundation of Hizbullah. The social, economic, and political conditions of Lebanon in the 1970s led to civil war and created the opportunity for a revolutionary movement to appear. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel gave Hizbullah the final spark to create its fire of resistance. Hizbullah saw Lebanon being invaded by Israel and was born in a sectarian state engaged in civil war. Their desire to expel the invaders and create a unified state under Shi'i rule gave them a common goal in which to unite its followers and drive its actions. I have discussed the Shi'i Islamist movement of the

⁴³ The civil unrest in Iran had many groups and organizations against the Shah but it was the Shi'i and the Ayatollah Khomeini that seized power.

1960s and it being brought to Lebanon in the 1970s. I will now discuss the social and political aspects of Lebanon's society and how they contributed to the rise of Hizbullah.

As stated earlier, Lebanon was a French mandate until 1944. At the end of World War II, the world became divided between communist Soviet Union and the Western block states led by the United States (US). England and France were two strong allies of the US and they collaborated to contain the spread of communism around the world. France had installed a democratic political system in Lebanon led by the Christian Maronite group. The structure of the government resembled the population of Lebanon. The Christian majority would hold the office of President, a Shi'i would be Prime minister, and a Sunni would be Deputy Prime Minister. The backing of this structure by the US was displayed in 1959, when military forces were sent to Lebanon to protect the government from threats by communist based ideological groups. The differing religions within Lebanon created the sectarian society in which the Christian leadership did not take the entire population of Lebanon into consideration and led to the perceived disenfranchisement of the Shi'i population, as the Shi'i felt they were traditionally the destitute and underclass when compared to other Lebanese community.⁴⁴ The 1978 invasion of Israel into southern Lebanon created a further rift between the Christians and Shi'i. Israel had invaded southern Lebanon to eliminate PLO camps that were based in the region. When the Israeli forces returned to Israel, they placed the Southern region of Lebanon under direct control of military forces belonging to the Christian population. The military engagement of Israel and the subsequent occupation by Christian Maronite military forces furthered the perception of subjugation of the Shi'i population. The Christians non-resistance to the Israeli invasion and occupation of Southern Lebanon in the Israeli absence contribute to the argument that the

⁴⁴ Simon Haddad, "The Origins of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hezbollah," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): 23.

Christians are allied with Israel against the Shi'i. This perceived political and military oppression of the Shi'i majority created the desire for leadership and direction that was to be provided with the rise of Shi'i clerics emerging from the Shi'i Islamist movement in Iraq.

The Shi'i Islamist movement in Iraq and its subsequent spread to other areas, especially Lebanon, combined with poor social and political experiences of the Shi'i in Lebanon created the planted seeds for a group such as Hizbullah to emerge. The final sparks can be attributed to two major events. One is the 1979 Iranian Revolution which created a Shi'i led government under the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the other is the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

Amal and its importance to creating Hizbullah:

Here I digress to the discussion of Imam Mussa al-Sadr's group Amal. The importance of this discussion will become apparent as I progress. The 'Movement of the Oppressed' was created by Imam Mussa al-Sadr in 1974. This movement was to unite the Shi'i population in Lebanon that was not being treated equally by the government with a Christian President. In response to the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in 1978, Amal (hope) rose to fight against the invaders and protect the Shi'i population of Lebanon. The recruitment of members was not difficult as a base population existed in his 'Movement of the Oppressed'. As stated by Imam Mussa al-Sadr: "the defense of the nation is not only the duty of the government, and if the government fails to fulfill this obligation, this should not stop the people (community) from holding arms and defending their nation."⁴⁵ In its beginning, Amal was loosely aligned with the PLO as members of the Palestinian group trained the original members of Amal. The 1978 invasion of southern Lebanon by the IDF created the rise of Amal as a Shi'i force and this

⁴⁵ Rami Siklawi, "The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975-90," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 34 no. 1 (2012): 7.

created a surge in recruitment. This recruitment surge is due to the repolarization and politicization of the Shi'ites against the IDF presence.⁴⁶ From 1978 to 1982, Amal would be a major fighting force for the Shi'i population in Lebanon against the Israelis, the Palestinians, and other Lebanese groups during the civil war. The reason for the turn against the people that helped train Amal fighters, the Palestinians, is due to the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr from Libya in August of 1978. Ali Faisal, representative of Palestinians in Lebanon, is cited by Rami Siklawi in stating:

Amal's relationship deteriorated with some Palestinian organizations, particularly with those who were affiliated to the Arab regimes and were in a close relationship with Libya. The reason behind this is that Amal attributed responsibility to the Libyan regime for the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr. This was one of the most important factors in the deterioration of the relationship between Amal and the Palestinians, and specifically in the shifting of Shi'ites' political views with the Palestinians.⁴⁷

This displays the shift in alliance between the Shi'i population of southern Lebanon towards the Palestinians and the increase in unity among the Shi'ite population. Another reason offered concerning the increased politicization and radicalism of the Shi'ite population in southern Lebanon is offered by Timor Goksil in his interview with Salah Salah, the PLO's political officer and cited by Siklawi:

The whole relationship between Amal and the Palestinians began to deteriorate after 1978, so definitely the turning point was 1978. The true politicization of the Shi'ites in the South was the disappearance of the Imam Musa al-Sadr. The

⁴⁶ Rami Siklawi, "The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975-90," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 34 no. 1 (2012): 9.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

disappearance of Imam Mussa al-Sadr made Amal more local and more radical. That is because the 1978 invasion cost the people of the South very expensively for the war they did not start and because when the Israelis attacked Southern Lebanon, they [the Israelis] did not attack the Palestinian camps rather they attacked Southern Lebanese villages and that was the major turning point.⁴⁸

Amal becoming more nationalistic towards its Shi'i base and more radical has great importance in future events that lead to the emergence of Hizbullah. The disappearance of Imam Mussa al-Sadr created a martyr for the Shi'ites to utilize for a unifying call. His disappearance created a void in the leadership of Amal and the Shi'ite community.

The leadership role of Amal was assumed by Nabi Berry. Though not directly related for events causation but relevant to the timeline, it is important to note that following the Iranian revolution, Nabi Berry had decided to join a 'national salvation committee' under President Elias Sarkis and this group included the Christian ally to Israel, Bashir Gemayel.⁴⁹ With this decision by Nabi Berry, a rift within Amal was created. Amal's second in command, Hussain Mussawi, broke away and along with other Islamists, moved to the Bekaa Valley Region and joined the forces of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) that had set up camps.⁵⁰ This joining with the IRCG is not by coincidence. The Iranian revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers directly impacted the Shi'ites within Lebanon. The installation of a Shi'i based government in Iran gave a renewed political purpose to Amal and the Shi'ites of Lebanon. The new government in Iran was anti-Israeli and this resonated within the Shi'ite population of

⁴⁸ Rami Siklawi, "The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975-90," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 34 no. 1 (2012): 10.

⁴⁹ David Sousa, "Three Phases of Resistance: How Hezbollah Pushed Israel Out of Lebanon," Degree Paper King's College London 2014, p. 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Lebanon. This mutual anti-Israeli sentiment created the importance of Lebanon by Iran. If Lebanon were controlled by the Shi'i and closely allied with Iran, the new religiously based government under Ayatollah Khomeini had in Lebanon a new partner in their fight against Israel. Lebanon gained even more importance in this role when Syria, under Hafez-al-Assad, refused to follow Iran's desire to continue the use of Syrian forces to fight Israel. With the split in Amal and the growing relations between the new Iranian government and the Shi'ites in Lebanon, the conditions are favorable to a new group to emerge in Lebanon.

The Emergence of Hizbullah:

The period of 1982 to 1985 is a period in which the group to be called Hizbullah is more of a loose coalition with various factions within arguing as to goals, tactics, and political vision. The only agreement was that the end created an Islamic State in Lebanon.⁵¹ The Islamic State concept is grown from the goal of the three clerics. Their goal was to have a State that was governed by Shi'i faith peoples and guided by the Qur'an. They did not directly call for an Islamic State but the foundations were by them. Imam Mussa al-Sadr, Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine, and Ayatollah al-Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah are the three clerics discussed earlier that had great impact on the Shi'i Islamic movement in Lebanon. Imam Mussa al-Sadr unified the Shi'i with the 'Movement of the Oppressed' and the creation of Amal. His disappearance made him a martyr and rallying call for Shi'ites in Lebanon. Ayatollah Shamseddine was a teacher and researcher who attempted a movement based on civil action to create change. It can be argued his approach was more aligned with a social movement in action than an ideological one. This can be attributed to his approach to the future of Lebanon. He is quoted as saying, "There is no Lebanon without its Christians and there is no Lebanon without its

⁵¹ David Sousa, "Three Phases of Resistance: How Hezbollah Pushed Israel Out of Lebanon," Degree Paper King's College London, 2014, p. 8.

Muslims."⁵² This approach of coexistence is not lost in Hizbullah's approach to governance in Lebanon. They did not want to have a Shi'i only state but one where the Shi'i led the Islamic State of Lebanon. Those already living in Lebanon were accepted but only the followers of Shi'i Islam could participate in politics. Tolerance of those who do not follow Shi'i Islam can be directly attributed to the teachings of Ayatollah Shamseddine. With the consideration of inclusion, Hizbullah's ultimate goal was to create an Islamic state based on Sharia law. Ayatollah Fadlallah would be considered the spiritual leader of Hizbullah but that was a title he denied. This is the goal of Ayatollah Fadlallah, who believed in Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and spread his word of Wilayat al-Faqih, the belief in the guardianship of the jurist⁵³. The Qur'an is the holy writings of God through the messages from Archangel Gabriel to Muhammad and have not been altered by the hands of man. The Qur'an is to guide the governance and judicial of the Islamic State. It is interpreted by the wisest and this leads to the importance of the Ayatollah as more than just a religious figure. The interpretation of the Qur'an by an Ayatollah for the purpose of decision making in governance and law is what creates the Islamic state based on Shari'a Law.⁵⁴

In 1982, the loosely organized group that would become Hizbullah began to take resistance action against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Israeli leadership understood their role in the creation of Hizbullah. This is seen in a quote by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001). He is quoted saying, "When we entered Lebanon...there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence that

⁵² BBC News, "Lebanon Buries Highest Shia Cleric," (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1114154.stm).

⁵³ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 59.

⁵⁴ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), p. 21.

created Hizbollah.”⁵⁵ This quote illuminates that the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel was the final catalyst in creating Hizbollah. Ali Akbar Motashemi is credited with founding Hizbollah. Motashemi was an Iranian cleric who had entered Lebanon in 1978 with militant dissidents from Iran.⁵⁶ The Iranians, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, established training bases and material and spiritual backing.⁵⁷ The Iranian influence greatly determined Hizbollah’s original goals. The removal of the Israelis was not the only goal set as the broader goal was an engagement of the oppressor by the oppressed. The concept of oppressors (*mustakbirin*) and oppressed (*mustada’afin*) is central to a proper understanding of Hizbollah’s political ideology. This dichotomy translates to a conflict of Hizbollah (Party of God) and Hizb al-Shaytan (The Party of the Devil). Shi’i are the good while the US, Israel, and those allied with them are the incarnation of the devil.

Hizbollah had a strong leadership structure from its beginnings. The first Secretary General was Shubhi al-Tufayli, the Operations Chief was Imad Mughniyah, and the title of spiritual leader was placed upon Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. The announcement of Ayatollah Fadlallah as the spiritual leader was of great importance to Hizbollah. He was the leader of the Lebanese al-Da’wa movement. This meant he had a following in Beirut that was comprised of students eager to follow the Ayatollah. On the urging of Iran, Ayatollah Fadlallah dissolved al-Da’wa and joined with Hizbollah.⁵⁸ This union gave Hizbollah an instant presence in Beirut. Their goal to create the Islamic State based upon Shi’i teachings from Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and the removal of the Israeli and US presence in Lebanon displays structured

⁵⁵ David Sousa, “Three Phases of Resistance: How Hezbollah Pushed Israel Out of Lebanon,” Degree Paper King’s College London, 2014, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto*, (Amsterdam: Pallas, 2011), p. 151.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁵⁸ Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 30.

action by an organized group rather than a loosely organized one. The structure being in place facilitates the coalescing of an organized agenda by Hizbullah as it evolves from its early days of being a loosely organized. In 1983 Hizbullah began military action in Beirut. They had been conducting action against Israeli targets for the previous year but now the action was targeted against US presence. On April 19, 1983, Hizbullah conducted a suicide bombing at the US embassy in Beirut which killed 63 of which 17 were American. On October 23, 1983, a truck bomb exploded outside the multinational force barracks in Beirut in which 241 American Marines and 58 French paratroopers were killed.⁵⁹ In the following year, three attacks occurred against western targets. A bombing of a restaurant in Spain, near a US Air Force Base, killed 18 servicemen, a hijacking of Kuwait Airlines plane resulted in 4 dead, and a car bombing of the US Embassy annex in Beirut killed 24.⁶⁰ In 1985, the TWA flight 847 was hijacked in which a Navy diver was killed. This event, the hijacking and death of the Navy diver were covered on US news sources as the hijacking went for 3 days.⁶¹ The attacks against US targets and oversea Israeli targets ceased from 1985 until 1992. The importance of 1985 is that is the year Hizbullah released its open letter.

The open letter released in 1985 disclosed Hizbullah's goals and ideological to the world in an official manner. The open letter contained 24 sections that outlined Hizbullah's goals, ideologies, and enemies. I will not analyze each section independently here but will highlight main sections. The open letter begins with a quote from the Qur'an.

⁵⁹ "International Terrorist Symbol Database, Hezbollah (<http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/hezbollah.html>).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

“Whoever takes Allah, His Apostle and those who believe as their friends, [must know] that Allah’s party [Hizbullah] is indeed the triumphant”. (5:56)⁶²

This opening quote displays Hizbullah’s belief that they fight for Allah and are righteous and correct in their fight to free Lebanon and instill a Shi’i based government. The letter is dedicated to those that have previously fought against the “Zionist Entity” and the Americans and those in history that were martyred in the jihad for Shi’i causes against Israel and the US. Section one discusses who is Hizbullah and introduces the world to waliyy al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudence)⁶³. It claims that what befalls Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, or elsewhere befalls the body of our Islamic Umma of which we are an indivisible part.

(Placeholder1) The Umma is the world community of the Shi’i Islamists. The letter then goes to discuss the oppressors who fight against the Shi’i and how America is the root of all the catastrophes that have befallen onto the Shi’ite community. Section four is of extreme importance as it lays out the course of action against all who oppose Hizbullah and the Shi’ites. It is short but powerful in statement.

From this perspective we saw that the only way to face aggression is with sacrifice...Dignity can only be upheld with the sacrifice of blood. Freedom is not given; rather, it is regained with costly sacrifices...

We have chosen faith (religion), freedom, and dignity to living under continuous humiliation by America and its allies: the Zionists and the Phalangist collaborators... We revolted to free our land, to throw out the colonialists and the invaders from it, so that we can exercise our right of self-determination.

⁶² Hizbullah Open Letter, 1985, Cover Page, in Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto* (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications 2011), p. 39.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 40.

We could not exercise patience any more; we have already waited ten years and seen only that the situation has deteriorated from bad to worse.⁶⁴

The Phalangist collaborators are the Lebanese Christian military organization that assisted the Israeli's in patrolling southern Lebanon after the invasion of 1978. The next two sections discuss the enemies of America, Israel, and the Phalangists. Section seven discusses the objectives of removal of the Americans and Israelis. The Phalangists are to be tried for crimes against Muslims and Christians with the protection of the America and Israel. Section eight concerns friends and it includes all who fight Hizbullah's enemies. They friends do not have to be Muslim or practice Shi'i Islam but cooperation creates the friendship. The next section discusses how they are followers of Islam but will not force others to do so as long as no side imposes its beliefs on the other. This is followed by several sections that discuss the reasons for Hizbullah's stance and cause for action. Section thirteen is a call to the Lebanese Christians. It claims them as fellow oppressed but the Maronite allied with Israel and the Phalangists lied about Muslim persecution of Christians. Hizbullah states it will work with the Christian oppressed in assisting in their freedom from the oppressors.⁶⁵ The remaining sections, up to number twenty four, are calls for unity of Muslims around the world. Unity of all that are oppressed by the American and Israeli oppressors and that Israel must be wiped away entirely. Section twenty four calls for a change in the UN, the Security Council, and other international organizations. Hizbullah states that the organizations do not have a voice for the oppressed and that they are extensions of the

⁶⁴ Hizbullah Open Letter, 1985, *Section 4: We have no choice except confrontation*, in Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto* (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2011), p. 42.

⁶⁵ This change in the previous claim of the Shi'i being the oppressed at the hands of all Christians to some Christians being oppressed may be an attempt to gain support from all that perceive themselves as oppressed. This would increase the numbers of Hizbullah and spread support in removing the current political leadership and replacing it with a Shi'i based political entity.

few oppressors. They discuss the veto power of members of the Security Council and how this privileges the few. This is directed at the US and its protection of Israel to block votes condemning Israel's actions.

In fighting against the US/Israeli agenda in the Middle East, Hizbullah has been labeled in international terrorist organization. This label is not recognized by Russia or China within the UN Security Council. Since Hizbullah began military action against American and Israeli forces beginning in 1982, there was twenty four years of conflict until Israel's withdrawal in 2006. In the years since, there have been sporadic actions by Hizbullah against Israel and this is in support of Hamas in the state of Palestine.⁶⁶ Yes, the militant arm of Hizbullah has conducted kidnappings of Israeli businessmen and bombings of Israeli government institutions in foreign lands such as in South America. This action can be argued as terrorist in nature or the actions of a weaker group fighting a state with advanced weapons capabilities and backed by a super power.

Conclusion:

The creation of Hizbullah is due to a combination of socio-political reasons in Lebanon and the influence of the three clerics discussed in this section. Lebanon has Christians and Muslims living in a Middle Eastern state and the government has traditionally been led by the Maronite Christians, since the period as a French mandate. The three influential clerics all called for the Shi'i population to unite and create a government that was directed by Qur'an and lived under Shari'a law. The consistent claim that the Shi'i within Lebanon are the oppressed majority provides a unifying call but is not supported by the census numbers of Lebanon. The call still allows Hizbullah to maintain a leadership role for the Lebanese Shi'i as they can still highlight

⁶⁶ I am using the official UN language that holds on the idea of a two state solution.

any event that is perceived as oppression of the Shi'i people. Although a Shari'a law and Qur'an based government has not been established in Lebanon, Hizbullah still attempts to gain control of the government through democratic election processes.

Chapter 2

The Influences and Ideological Foundations of al-Qaeda

Introduction

Osama bin Laden, in 1996, issued his first fatwa declaring war against the US as the occupier of the Land of the Two Holy Places, his beliefs were shared with groups such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Even though these groups shared in their hatred for the US, bin Laden rejected their support. His rejection is based on their participation in parliamentary politics. The participation in western styles of government means that those groups will eventually become influenced by the US. Only Islamists who reject western governments, accept shari'a law, and are hostile towards the US will be allies with al-Qaeda. The Islamic parliamentarians and al-Qaeda grew from the Islamists in the 19th century in response to colonial domination of Muslim lands.⁶⁷⁶⁸ With this fact, it is not enough to have a shared ideological origination. Maintaining a strict Islamic faith and only having government based on that faith is the key to being in-line with al-Qaeda. The other key factor is remaining hostile towards the US. Even though other Muslim states did not desire to have conflict with the US, bin Laden pursued this course with resolve.

In 1998, bin Laden issued a second fatwa urging Jihad against Americans. This fatwa was followed by two attacks on US embassies in Africa. On August 7, 1998, the embassy in Kenya resulted in 213 deaths, while the attack in Tanzania killed 85. These attacks were followed by an

⁶⁷ McCants, William, "The Jihadists' War With Islamist Democrats," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011): 22.

⁶⁸ The colonial domination of Muslim lands refers to the Middle East in a regional context. Al-Qaeda's emergence is in response to US military presence in Saudi Arabia and the colonial past of the Middle East.

attack on the US naval destroyer USS Cole in October 2000. This attack killed seventeen sailors and brought attention to al-Qaeda with coverage by news agencies all around the world. Eleven months later, al-Qaeda attacked the US on its own soil. This attack was the first attack on mainland US since Pearl Harbor in 1941. The attack, now referred as 9/11, was focused on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a failed attempt on the White House or Capitol building.⁶⁹ The attacks of 9/11 resulted in 2996 deaths and over 6000 wounded. Following this attack, people began to study al-Qaeda to determine what justification they had for such a massive attack.

In this section, I will examine the ideological foundations of al-Qaeda (the base or foundation). The examination of al-Qaeda will include their goals, religious ideology, and socio-political ideological foundations. The religious foundation is an examination of Wahhabism, which is named due to it being the teachings of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Another name for those that follow the teachings of ‘Abd al-Wahhab are also referred as Salafi, explained by Christopher Blanchard as,

Believers who adhere to this creed or hold similar perspectives prefer to call themselves “Unitarians” (muwahiddun) or “Salafiyyun” (sing. Salafi, noun Salafiyya). The latter term derives from the word *salaf* meaning to “follow” or “precede,” a reference to the followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ The fourth plane crashed in a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. There are conflicting reports as to its designated target. The consistency in reports of either the White House or Capitol Building is reflected in this section.

⁷⁰ Christopher Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” Paper presented for Members and Committees of Congress, Washington D.C. January 24, 2008, p. 1-2.

I briefly examine the events that led to an alliance between Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud. This alliance will lead to the establishment of Saudi Arabia and allow for an understanding of why Saudi Arabia is the central area of Salafi teachings. Then I proceed to Sayyed Qutb and his concepts in jahiliyyah and hakimiyyah, the meanings of these terms will be discussed in detail later. The importance of Sayyed Qutb to this discussion is his influence on the founders of al-Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam, Ayman Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. The discussion proceeds to Abdullah Azzam and the concept of global jihad. Abdullah Azzam was a university professor who taught Osama bin-Laden in Jeddah. Then I discuss Ayman Zawahiri and his thoughts on the martyr and the use of suicide attackers in the jihad. As a founding leader and successor to Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri holds importance to the discussion of al-Qaeda. The final person, and most famous, is Osama bin Laden. I discuss his aversion to the concept of Islamic democracies, the desire to rid the Middle East of Western influence, and the belief that Israel needs to be removed and a Palestinian state restored.

Following the discussion of the ideological contributions of the above mentioned people, I discuss Osama bin Laden’s service with the Mujahedeen (the martyred) in Afghanistan. This beginning in Afghanistan will discuss the resistance of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan creating an area for Muslims of different areas to fight as Muslim nationals and how it created a confidence that a world super power could be defeated. Following this examination, I discuss Middle Eastern regional events that led to Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri creating an international terrorist organization that orchestrated a massive attack against the United States, on US soil. This attack of September 9, 2001, or 9/11 as it is memorialized and commonly referred, led to the US engaging the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq. I will not engage in a discussion of Iraq of Afghanistan in this examination as it has no relevance

to this particular discussion. To conduct this examination, I will use sources from many of the field's most notable scholars. These sources will be a combination of books and journal publications with limited use of websites.

The origins of al-Qaeda's religious foundation:

To understand the goals and actions of al-Qaeda, one must understand their ideological foundations. The religious and socio-political reasons for what they do. To begin this examination of al-Qaeda, I begin with their religious foundation. The examination of al-Qaeda's religious foundation, begins with a discussion of the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab. His teachings that influence al-Qaeda will be examined and their use as a foundation to al-Qaeda's ideology is presented.

Founded in Sunni Islam, the teachings of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab became what is called Wahhabism or Salafism. Salafism guides al-Qaeda's religious reasoning for its action. Salafism is a puritanical form of Sunni Islam and is practiced in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, although it is much less rigidly enforced in the latter.⁷¹ Salafism is the form of Sunni Islam taught by Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab in the eighteenth century. It calls for a return to the "pure" form of Sunni Islam that existed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This puritanical return means that it will exclude all forms of deviation of the Sunni Islam faith that have occurred over time due to man's interference. As stated by Quintan Wiktorowicz:

Salafis believe that by strictly following the rules and guidance in the Qur'an and Sunna (path or example of the Prophet Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the

⁷¹ Christopher Blanchard, "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya," Paper presented for Members and Committees of Congress, Washington D.C. January 24, 2008, p. 1.

singular truth of God's commands. From this perspective, there is only one legitimate religious interpretation; Islamic pluralism does not exist.⁷²

This statement illuminates the Salafi belief that there is only one true form of Islam. This puts the followers of Salafism against all other Islamic faith, such as Shi'a and Sunnis who follow a less strict interpretation. Salafism is united under a common creed or *aqida*.⁷³ This creed provides the basis, guidelines, and components that the followers need to adhere to properly be true followers of the Islamic faith.

Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (continued to be referenced as al-Wahhab for this discussion) was born in 1703 in the town of al-'Uyayna of the Najd region, of what is now Saudi Arabia.⁷⁴ Young al-Wahhab studied the tradition (Hadith) and the divine unity or the monotheism (*tawhid*) of the Muslim faith. *Tawhid* or the unity of God is the highest concept. Under this concept, there are three parts that the Salafis consider primary to be considered a real or true Muslim. I will offer the three parts as explained by Quintan Wiktorowicz.

The first is that the one God is the sole creator and sovereign of the universe. This is reflected in the *shahada* or testimony of faith. "I testify that there is no God except Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger." Second is that God is supreme and entirely unique. He does not have any characteristics or powers shared with humans or any other of his creations. The Qur'an mentions God as the supreme legislator which means humans are obligated to follow the *shari'a* in its entirety. God's word is not subject to interpretation but to be followed without

⁷² Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): 207.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 208.

⁷⁴ Abd Allah Salih al-Uthaymin, *Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and his Works* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 28.

question. The third is that God alone is to be worshipped. The example is that worshipping religious figures as intercessors with God (tawassuf) is seen as worshipping something other than God.⁷⁵

In following the three components of Salafism, the true Sunni Muslim must reject all other forms of Muslim religion and all forms of outside the Muslim faith, i.e. Christianity and Judaism. As proclaimed by Salafi teachings that Allah is the only God and Muhammad is His messenger and that only the true believers follow in the example of the messenger, one must understand how to follow in the example of Muhammad. In order to exemplify tawhid, unity under God, a true Muslim must follow the Qur'an strictly and be devout in following the examples of purity lived by the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet lived his life in a way that was the pure form of tawhid. The Prophet's companions, the Salaf, received their teachings and messages directly from the messenger of God and therefore heard the purest of messages and could portray the prophetic model. Therefore the Salafis, followers of the prophetic model of the companions, live by the purest form of the life and teachings from the Prophet and his followers. This is the base understanding of Salafism. With this brief understanding, the view of extreme self/other identification is presented as to the Salafists viewing all others as inferior in religious belief. During his studies, al-Wahhab had observations of the followers of the Sunni Islam faith worshipping at the temple of the Prophet and asking for intercession or helping in their lives. This practice of faith he interprets as Shirk.⁷⁶ This is the practice of ascribing a partner, rival, or equal to Allah, by asking for the Prophet to intercede in one's life and not Allah, and that is not acceptable. Shirk is also attributed to the practice of worshipping Saints in a similar manner to

⁷⁵ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): 208-209

⁷⁶ Abd Allah Salih al-Uthaymin, *Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and his Work*, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 129.

worshipping God. This worship of multiple persons as God is polytheism and breaks away from the true traditions of the Sunni faith. Those that practice shirk are, according to Wahhabis, straying from tawhid and are not true followers of Islam.

Wahhabis believe that tawhid is a strict code and all who do not follow the true form of Islam are takfir⁷⁷ (attributing unbelief).⁷⁸ In the attribution of unbelief, Wahhabis are allowed to violently confront those not strictly following tawhid. This confrontation, qital, provides the reasoning behind the justification of attacks by Muslims against other Muslims. This is reiterated later during the discussion of al-Wahhab and al-Saud. In a letter by al-Wahhab, he states:

“Regarding takfir, I consider to be an infidel the person who has known the religion of the Prophet and yet stands against it, prevents other from accepting it and shows hostility towards those who adhere to it. As for fighting, until today we have not fought anyone except to protect our own lives and honour. It was they who attacked our territories and used all possible means against us. However, sometimes we attacked them in retaliation.”⁷⁹

Although this section of a letter claims self-defense as reasons for the conflict from al-Wahhab, it also labels declares all infidels as targets of attacks. The infidels, who are the enemy of Islam, are divided into four groups by al-Wahhab. They are:⁸⁰

1. Those who know that tawhid is the religion of God and the Prophet and that to have recourse to beings other than God is polytheism, yet refuses to follow the former and renounce the latter.

⁷⁷ Although there is an argument stating that shirk is not against the Islamic faith, I will not engage in this discussion.

⁷⁸ Abd Allah Salih al-Uthaymin, *Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and his Works* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 129.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 133.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 133.

2. Those who accept these two principles but still prefer the common belief in saints to a rigid monotheism
3. Those who accept and practice these principles, but feel hatred for others who do so and affection for those who do not.
4. Those who join their townspeople in war against monotheists.

These described infidels include all people who do not observe a strict following of tawhid within the Islamic faith. This creates a clearly defined self/other identification between those that follow tawhid and those that do not. The ability of al-Wahhab and his followers to decide who is enemy is clearly outlined through these definitions of infidels. There is a list of ten points that excludes a person from following Islam but I will not list those as the four points identifying the infidel provides insight into the self/other determination used by al-Wahhab and his followers.

Tawhid being the belief in one God also dictates that the word of God directs the way man should live. Shari'a law guides the jurisprudence of man and that word is from the Qur'an. If the Qur'an cannot provide guidance, an Imam to interpret the Qur'an and provide an answer to an issue in question. Once an interpretation is determined and agreed upon, it becomes part of Shari'a law itself. This allowance of interpretation of the Qur'an by an Imam and that interpretation becoming law is known as ijihad and taqlid, respectively. Although these concepts are important to understanding Wahhabism and Shari'a law, it is not critical to this paper. They are mentioned as further examples of self/other identification and as part of the goal of the creation of an Islamic state.

Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Sa'ud and the creation of Saudi Arabia :

I will now proceed to the relationship between al-Wahhab and al-Saud. This discussion will lead to a basic understanding of Saudi Arabia as the central area for teaching Salafism. I will

not go through the whole of the history for the region but will begin in 1725 with the emergence of Muhammad ibn Sa'ud. Tribal friction and the death of Zayd ibn Markhan during the failed raid on al-'Uyayna, the birthplace of al-Wahhab, allowed for Muhammad ibn Sa'ud to assume power of his tribe. He led a peaceful reign for 18 years as he had the power and was in position to ensure safety of other leaders. There were violent uprisings in the area but the power of ibn Sa'ud assisted in putting them down and maintaining the order of the region. During this time, 1744 to 1746, al-Wahhab had left his birth place and traveled to al-Dir'iyya. There he was the guest of 'Abd Allah ibn Suwaylim and then moved in with his former student, Ahmad ibn Suwaylim. During this stay, al-Wahhab was visited by Muhammad ibn Sa'ud and granted protection as long as he stayed in al-Dar'iyya. Their meeting ended with an agreement that they would work together in the cause of Islam. This can be argued as the foundation of the relation between the two.⁸¹

As the teachings of al-Wahhab became more predominant in the region, more people of surrounding tribes move to the al-Dar'iyya region creating a larger population base for Sa'ud. This increase in population was giving Sa'ud and al-Wahhab more power in the region. During the first years of this partnership, al-Wahhab sent letters to surrounding chieftains asking for their support in his religious cause. One chieftain desired for partnership by al-Wahhab and Sa'ud was Diham ibn Dawwas, the chief of a large tribe in Riyadh.⁸² The year 1746 presents itself as the time that al-Wahhab ordered his followers to use force in their actions. The followers had been taught that all those that did not follow in the teachings of al-Wahhab were enemies of

⁸¹ Abd Allah Salih al-Uthaymin, *Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and his Works*, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 54.

⁸² His declination was a matter of concern but no support for the reason has been found in my research.

Islam and force was justified and their possessions were to be legally taken⁸³. The expansion of the Sa'ud and al-Wahhab territory showed the intent of al-Wahhab:

It is clear that from the earliest stages of his movement Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was aiming at reviving what he perceived as the true Islam and establishing a community where only the principles of the shari'a, as he interpreted it, would be applied and practiced.⁸⁴

The desire to create a shari'a based caliphate created the foundation of Saudi Arabia in the late 1700s. The association of al-Wahhab and the Sa'ud family lasted until al-Wahhab's death in 1790. His death does not end the influence of his teachings, now referred as Salafism in Saudi Arabia. The reign of the Sa'ud family went until 1891 when they were exiled to Kuwait by the Ottoman Empire. In 1902, 'Abd al-Aziz Bin 'Abd al-Rahman Bin-Faysal Bin-Turki Bin-Abdallah Bin-Muhammad al-Saud (Ibn Saud) reclaimed control of Riyadh and restored the rule of the land to the Sa'ud family. The return of the Sa'ud family required Ibn Saud to create a family unity. This was facilitated by his freeing the imprisoned members of his family and restoring their rights as people of Saudi Arabia. Some of these family members had fought against his family in the past. Once Ibn Saud had gained control of Riyadh and central Najd region, he looked to expand his territory. He wanted to control Northern Najd, controlled by the al-Rashid, the Hijaz in the West, controlled by the Ottoman Empire, and parts of Arab territory that is now Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait.⁸⁵ Ibn Saud was able to expand with a mix of military and diplomatic means. He would boast, "He "won his territories with his sword," or through

⁸³ As mentioned earlier, this allowance of force against those not strictly following tawhid is justified by al-Wahhab.

⁸⁴ Abd Allah Salih al-Uthaymin, *Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and his Works* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 72.

⁸⁵ John Habib, "Wahhabi Origins of the Contemporary Saudi State," in *Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia*, ed. M. A. Kosebalaban (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2009), p. 58.

statesmanship, tact, and wit, and was not beholden to a foreign power for them.”⁸⁶ Ibn Saud revitalized the relationship between the Saud family and Wahhabism by having Wahhabism the sole form of Islam in his territories and then marrying Tarfa bint Abdullah bin Abd al-Latif Al al-Shaik, a descendant of al-Wahhab.

In 1912, the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) was founded and Wahhabism was spread to the nomadic Bedouin tribes of the land. Their strength and support is given to Ibn Saud and he is able to use this in the creation of a standing army. Before this there was no need for a large military as most fighting was tribal and small in scale. Now the Saudi Arabians had a military force to fight against the Ottoman Empire and expand their territory. The years 1928 to 1930 saw the Ikhwan turn against Ibn Saud due to modernization of the state, post WWI⁸⁷, but they were defeated. This did not deter the Saud and Wahhab relationship. In 1932, Saudi Arabia became a unified Kingdom and Ibn Saud is named King. As Saudi Arabia developed, it maintained governmental and judicial processes founded in shari’a law and the Quran was the state’s constitution.⁸⁸ Oil is discovered in 1938 and the US becomes involved with drilling and production. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US has remained since 1938 with broad cooperation militarily and economically. I will discuss the relevance of the Saudi Arabia and US relationship to al-Qaeda’s goals later in this section.

The understanding of Wahhabism for the section relates to the self-other identification created by the teachings. Those that adhere to Salafi Islam consider themselves true believers of the one true religion and this creates the alienation of all other forms of religion, including other

⁸⁶ John Habib, “Wahhabi Origins of the Contemporary Saudi State,” in *Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia*, ed. M. A. Kosebalaban (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2009), p. 60.

⁸⁷ The significance of the post WWI era is the dissolving of the Ottoman Empire which resulted in Great Britain and France colonizing the region, through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, with the US having economic relations with Saudi Arabia later.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

forms of the Islamic faith and non-followers within the Sunni population. When al-Wahhab declared that the non-followers of Wahhabism were subject to raids and having their possessions legally taken, he created an attitude that his followers were superior and able to act in their interest over the others. The importance of this broad self-other positioning of Salafists will be discussed later when I examine al-Qaeda and its beginnings.

The influence of Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb was born in Egypt, 1906 in Musha, Northern Egypt. Qutb moved to Cairo in the late 1920s to attend school where he graduated from Dar al-'Ulum in 1933 and then became a teacher. Qutb focused on literature studies and was an author as well. He worked as an instructor and became a member of Egypt's Ministry of Education. In 1948, Qutb journeyed away from Egypt to the US to learn the educational system there and return to Egypt to update their educational system.

Qutb moved lived in Greeley, Colorado during the summer of 1949. It was here that Qutb had exposure to Midwest American culture and his attitude began to change. Greeley was a quiet and calm town based on family values. On the surface, it seemed the idealistic way of life Qutb had thought Americans lived. But as time passed, he became aware of an area to the south called Garden city or The Gardens to the college students. This is where alcohol was sold and saloons were commonplace. This area caused Qutb to realize that America had lost its morality and religion could not control or prevent the citizens from turning to alcohol and that Islam was the only true religion to do so. The Sunday church dances in Greeley can be argued as a form of final straw for Qutb. Arms around each other, lips and chests pressed against one another as the preachers happily viewed the youth swaying to the music. To Qutb, this is the loss of religion in American youth. America was a land void of religious guidance. The Americans were more

concerned with lawn care and sock hops than the oppression being experienced around the world. This is the view that Qutb had when he returned to Egypt. This discussion of Sayyed Qutb's life provides the background to his ideological approach to the revitalization of Islamic rule in Egypt and the Middle East. His time in the US solidified his view that Egypt and the Middle East needs to be free from Western influences and governed in all aspects through the Qur'an.

Upon returning to Egypt in 1950, Qutb experienced his homeland in turmoil. The one group working to improve the lives of the citizens was the Muslim Brothers. They created hospitals, schools, a welfare society, and had an army that was assisting in the fighting against Israel in Palestine. The next two years saw resistance by the militant arm of the Muslim Brothers in the form of movie theater bombings and the assassination of a judge and members of government. January of 1952 saw a culmination of sorts in the violence between the Muslim Brothers and the British forces occupying Egypt. Fires and bombings destroyed the bases, bars, hotels, and other gathering places used by the British in Cairo. Retaliation by the British was fierce and in one instance resulted in the death of fifty police conscripts.⁸⁹ This resulted in mobs forming and resulted in the destruction of Cairo. January of 1952 is when a military coup ousted King Farouk and saw the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser, a colonel in the Egyptian army. This is claimed to be the first time in over two thousand years Egypt is ruled by an Egyptian. The coup had been partly planned in the house of Sayyed Qutb and he was offered positions in the new government but he refused due to his preference for a different position within the new government.⁹⁰ The new military government under Nasser wanted to establish a secular,

⁸⁹ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 30.

⁹⁰ The specifics of this preferred position are not important to this thesis but the fact he was offered a position shows his status with the new government in Egypt.

industrialized, modern state based on socialism. The members of the Muslim Brothers, including Qutb, wanted to establish an Islamic state where all Muslims could achieve their spiritual goals. Any other form of government went against an Islamic state and amounted to jahiliyya, which is the godless state before the Prophet was given the words of Allah. This ideological difference between the Muslim Brothers and the military government erupted when members of the militant arm of the Muslim Brothers attempted to assassinate Nasser while he gave a speech in October 1954.

The concepts of jahiliyya and of hakimiyyah were central to Sayyed Qutb. As stated earlier, jahiliyya is the Godless state before the Prophet handed down the word of Allah to the people. Hakimiyyah is the governorship; rule; command; dominion, and authority belongs to on but God.⁹¹ Qutb calls for hakimiyyah and that anything other is jahiliyya. This distinction does not leave area for negotiation of the terms or parts to be under the Qur'an. It is a societal system as a whole. I return to a more in depth discussion of jahiliyyah and hakimiyyah shortly.

The revitalization of the Islamic faith is necessary and Qutb states this is necessary as the understandings of Islamic teachings has been convoluted over time. Qutb explains the reason for returning to the first generation as receiving its teachings, inspirations, and guidance from the Qur'an alone.⁹² The first generation was of pure heart, mind, vision, consciousness, and formation. The subsequent generations did not get their guidance from the Qur'an alone. A second reason Islam's first generation is best is that the first generation received information from the Qur'an to receive God's commands regarding personal and societal matters. This daily command is equated to a soldier receiving an order and following it on the battlefield. The first

⁹¹ Sayed Khatab, "Hakimiyyah' and 'Jahiliyyah' in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 3, (2002): 145.

⁹² Aref Nayad, "The Radical Qur'anic Hermeneutics of Sayyid Qutb," *Islamic Studies* 31, no. 3 (1992): 356.

generation would receive a lesson from the Qur'an and would implement that lesson in life. Later generations read the Qur'an for aesthetic reasons or to be cultured and educated in discussion not in life. The third reason the first generation is best belongs to the discussion of jahiliyya. When the first generation received the teachings of the Qur'an, they left behind their godless lives and moved to a better life through the words of God offered in the Qur'an. They moved into a new consciousness and existence of "existential seclusion."⁹³ This seclusion was in Islam with those that made the transformation as well. This Islamic community lived under the guidance of the Qur'an through the Prophet. The newer generations are surrounded by jahiliyya but have not come to the point of leaving it behind to live in "existential seclusion." As Qutb wrote:

Today we live in a non-Islam (jahiliyyah) similar to, or darker than, the non-Islam which was contemporary to Islam. Everything around us is non-Islamic: the concepts and beliefs of people, their habits and customs, the sources of their culture, their arts and literature, and their laws and regulations. And even much of what we consider Islamic culture, Islamic classics, Islamic Philosophy, and Islamic thought is also the product of non-Islam!⁹⁴

This passage from his book, *Ma'alam fi'l-Tariq*,⁹⁵ displays Qutb's desire to have an Islamic state that is solely Islamic, devoid of any and all Western influences. The primary and most crucial shift is to become enlightened by moving from jahiliyyah to hakimiyyah.

As stated earlier, jahiliyyah is a state where man does not have God in his life. With no divine intervention, man is morally corrupt and has no path to follow. This is considered living in

⁹³ Aref Nayed, "The Radical Qur'anic Hermeneutics of Sayyid Qutb," *Islamic Studies* 31, no. 3 (1992): 357.

⁹⁴ Cited in, Aref Nayed, "The Radical Qur'anic Hermeneutics of Sayyid Qutb," *Islamic Studies* 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 357.

⁹⁵ The English translation is *Landmarks on the Road*.

darkness or ignorance. This is the way of the non-Islamic world, including the Muslim countries who do not follow the Qur'an. One becomes enlightened, both intellectually and spiritually when one lives in 'existential seclusion' allowing God to guide all aspects of life. The term hakimiyyah is derived from hakim, which is "the one who exercises judicial authority; a ruler or governor...and there is none but Allah is the Highest Governor, the Ruler, and the Supreme legal authority."⁹⁶ Qutb stated that the word group hakum always expresses the concept that authority and command rest with Allah alone.⁹⁷ Hakimiyyah is more than Shari'a law. It dictates all aspects of governance and jurisprudence. In total, it dictates all aspects of society as a whole unit and not just parts of society. This is stated in the Qur'anic verse 3:26:

Say: Lord, Sovereign (malik) of all sovereignty (al-mulk). You bestow sovereignty on whom You will, and take it away from whom You please; You exalt whomever You will and abase whomever You please. In your hands lies all that is good; You have power over all things.⁹⁸

This is the absolute following of the Qur'an that Qutb desires for Islamic society. This is the pure Islamic state that he wishes to establish in Egypt and the style of Islamic rule the founders of al-Qaeda were determined to establish. For Qutb, those that live in a state of hakimiyyah are obligated to educate the ignorant and enlighten those that live in darkness, jahiliyyah. This is the central ideology of Sayyed Qutb. The concept of hakimiyyah combined with al-Wahhab's ideology of tawhid and the taqir gives al-Qaeda a strong ideological foundation.

Sayyid Qutb was jailed by the Nasser regime for his membership in the Muslim Brothers. Their attempt to assassinate the Egyptian ruler created a permanent divide between the once

⁹⁶ Sayed Khatab, "Hakimiyyah' and 'Jahiliyyah' in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 3, (2002): 145.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 145.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 146.

allies against King Farouk. While in prison, Qutb was able to smuggle out bits of writings that were compiled into a manifesto titled *Milestones*. This manifesto calls for an Islamic jihad against all those that keep the Islamic world in jahiliyya. The jihad called for by Qutb is termed “socio-revolutionary Islamism” and is intended to topple a Muslim government.⁹⁹ Qutb was released and offered sanctuary in Iraq but declined due to Egypt still needing him. He was rearrested in 1966 and tried for plotting a coup against the government. Found guilty, he was hanged on August 29, 1966. The Egyptian government refused to return his body to his family for burial in fear that his grave would become a site of a martyr. His views of Western civilization became soured and he felt the Americans had lost their faith. Christianity was a solely spiritual faith that offered no guidance in governance, law, or daily society. The Americans treated their religion as a gathering event or place to be seen and socialize. This created a fundamental crisis that separated the true believers of Islam from Christians. Islam needed a revitalization to avoid Muslims from following Americans into a loss of faith and guidance. This became a call for jihad against all in the non-Islamic world. This call would be a foundation in the ideology of al-Qaeda.

Abdullah Azzam and the Global Jihad

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam was born 1941 in Palestine. He fled Palestine for Jordan when the Israelis gained control of the West Bank in 1967. This event led to his joining the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and following the teachings of Sayyid Qutb. In particular was the discussion of the conflict between Islamic (hakimiyyah) and non-Islamic (jahiliyyah) worlds that would have to occur for an Islamic state to rise. Azzam studied at the al-Azhar University in

⁹⁹ Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.7.

Cairo, where he gained a doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence in 1973.¹⁰⁰ He began teaching at the King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is here he met Osama bin Laden.

Azzam's teachings and activist attitude gained strength due to three events that occurred in 1979. First was the Iranian revolution which showed that a theocratic movement could take power of a state. The second was the attempt by fundamentalists to take control of the Mosque in Mecca. This event lasted a couple of weeks and showed a small group of fighters standing against the Saudi Arabian government. The third event was the December 25 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. This created a call of Muslims to join together against the super power's use of force against Muslims.¹⁰¹

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan provided Azzam with a cause to direct his teachings. He left Saudi Arabia for Pakistan to participate in the resistance and, more important, the beginning of jihad. The importance of jihad can be seen in Azzam's slogan, "Jihad and the rifle alone; no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogues."¹⁰² In Peshawar, Azzam met leaders of the mujahideen, who were the resistance against the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan.

Azzam's became excited during his early days in Afghanistan. He claimed he felt reborn and viewed the Afghani fighters as the righteous, pious, pre-industrialized people-struggling against the brutal, soulless, mechanized force of modernity.¹⁰³ This talk is similar to that of Qutb in his desire to restore to the first generation of followers. The first generation was pure in belief and void of the corruption brought by modernization in the world. The conflict between the modernized world and the teachings of Qutb and Azzam are brought in direct, physical conflict

¹⁰⁰ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 109.

¹⁰¹ *Abdullah Yusuf Azzam* (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Abdullah_Yusuf_Azzam).

¹⁰² Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York, Vintage Books, 2007), p. 110.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 110.

in Afghanistan. This allows Azzam to participate in the jihad called for by Qutb, the conflict between Islam and non-Islamic or the hakimiyyah against the jahiliyya. Azzam's days in Peshawar were mixed with return visits to Jeddah to recruit fighters and raise funds for the Afghani cause against the Soviet Union. The recruiting meetings would occur in bin Laden's apartment and this allowed him to hear Azzam's speeches to young recruits. These recruiting speeches would speak of the jihad against the jahiliyya and explain how it was their duty to participate in this holy cause.¹⁰⁴ His days in Peshawar were also used for recruiting purposes as Azzam was very influential in this manner. In 1980s Afghanistan, Azzam was by far the most influential and prolific proponent of Arab involvement.¹⁰⁵ This influence and prolific ability to get recruits to join the jihad in Afghanistan made Azzam the single most important individual behind the mobilization of Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁶

The influence of Azzam on bin Laden leads to the creation of al-Qaeda. In support of this statement, I cite Asaf Maliach.¹⁰⁷

It is important to note that it was the Palestinian 'Abdullah 'Azzam who laid the foundations for al-Qa'ida, and who, throughout the entire Afghan war, in fact until his death, served as Usama bin Ladin's spiritual mentor. It was on the basis of the idea of al-Qa'ida al-Sulbah, which 'Azzam formulated during the war and published in April 1988 in the Pakistani monthly al-Jihad, that Usama bin Ladin

¹⁰⁴ This call for all Muslims to perform their duty in the jihad and eventually the call for global jihad will be discussed in greater detail later in this section.

¹⁰⁵ Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad" *International Security* 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/11): 72.

¹⁰⁶ Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 39.

¹⁰⁷ Asaf Maliach is affiliated with the Institute for National Security Studies and the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

declared the establishment of his organization in November-December 1989, in the Pakistani border town of Peshawar.¹⁰⁸

Azzam had taught the necessity for worldwide Islamic jihad in response to the Israeli invasion of Palestine and the backing of Israel by the United States. This teaching is founded in his links to Hamas and his joining the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. These groups directly fought against Israel in Palestine and were against the US backing of Israel in the Middle East. The linkages between Azzam and Hamas are found in the respect shown by Hamas towards Azzam. This is seen by Hamas' embracing of Azzam's belief in militant jihad and dying in the name of Allah. The linkage between Azzam and Hamas was not lost on bin Laden. Statements by bin Laden contained messages of the continued fight against Israel and freeing Palestine from the Zionist mission. The linkage between Palestine, Azzam, and bin Laden displays how the events of 1967, the Israeli taking of the West Bank, led to Azzam fleeing and eventually teaching bin Laden in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This teacher/student interaction led to Azzam and bin Laden forming a friendship and thus, allows for Azzam's messages and teachings to be learned by bin Laden.¹⁰⁹

The call for global Islamic Jihad by Azzam is not the call for fighting around the world but rather the return of all Islamic followers to return and expel the invaders. Global jihad ideology state that Muslims need to defend the entire Islamic world against the US and the West before an Islamic state could be established.¹¹⁰ The second part of verse 97 of the 'Women Surah' in the Qur'an reads, "The second is the individual obligation, which Islam has imposed

¹⁰⁸ Asaf Maliach, "Bin Laden, Palestine and al-Qa'ida's Operational Strategy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 3 (2008): 355.

¹⁰⁹ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 109.

¹¹⁰ Thomas Hegghamer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War," *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 1 (2006): 13,

upon its followers since its earliest days to repel foreign incursions into Islamic territory.”¹¹¹ The return to Islamic territory is not optional. It is the duty of all followers of Islam to partake in the Jihad as it is to partake in all exercises of the Islamic faith. This global call for return is the global Islamic Jihad. The Jihad did not originate against the Soviet Union. The first call to Jihad, by Azzam, was not against the Soviet Union, it was against Muslim rulers who did not base their governments on Shari’a law. This presented a deviation from hakimiyyah and therefore must be corrected by true Islamic followers. In this call, being Muslim did not mean safety or inclusion. Only by following hakimiyyah could one be allowed to rule undisturbed by the jihad.¹¹² Azzam and bin Laden considered militant Jihad the key to success of the Islamic revolution. To have a successful militant Jihad, Azzam establishes four stages. Each stage is an independent but essential part of the process. The four stages are: migration to the place of Jihad, training and preparation, staying or camping along the enemy’s borders, and the fight itself.¹¹³ These four stages for physically fighting the enemy are not the only stages used in Jihad. Azzam also presented four stages in the use of propaganda (Da’wa). These stages are: the call to adhere to Allah, the cold war, the warm war, and victory.¹¹⁴ In both sets of guidelines, Azzam’s influence on bin Laden is clearly presented.¹¹⁵

Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden worked together in establishing a Jihadist organization to create the caliphate and restore a shari’a based Islamic state. A main objective of

¹¹¹ Asaf Maliach, “Bin Laden, Palestine and al-Qa’ida’s Operational Strategy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 3 (2008): 362.

¹¹² Jihad establishes hakimiyyah, so governments that already have this established do not need conversion. To change without violent overthrow would be less strenuous on the jihadists and the society.

¹¹³ Asaf Maliach, “Bin Laden, Palestine and al-Qa’ida’s Operational Strategy,” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 44, no. 3 (2008): 364.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 366-367.

¹¹⁵ This will be discussed further in the examination of Osama bin Laden.

the caliphate is the restoration of the lands obtained by the Abbasid Dynasty¹¹⁶ and extending to Indonesia. This would create an Islamic state that includes areas of large Muslim populations. Abdullah Azzam's influence on bin Laden and his foundational work in creating al-Qaeda cannot be ignored or minimized in the discussion of the Jihadist group. Azzam is the one true influence on bin Laden and set the guidelines which bin Laden followed in conducting the actions of al-Qaeda.¹¹⁷

Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Use of the Martyr:

Ayman al-Zawahiri was born on June 19, 1951. He was raised in the Maadi community within Cairo, Egypt. His uncle was Mahfouz Azzam, an attorney in Egypt. Mr. Azzam was a student of Sayyid Qutb in his youth and became a protégé of Qutb as their relationship continued past school. Mr. Azzam wrote for the Muslim Brother's magazine when Qutb was the editor and later became his personal attorney.¹¹⁸ Mr. Azzam was the last person to see Sayyid Qutb before his execution and was made executor of his estate, plus being given Qutb's personal Qur'an in which he wrote "a treasured relic of the martyr."¹¹⁹ This relationship between the two men transitioned into Ayman hearing countless stories of Sayyid Qutb, his teachings, and socio-political ideologies. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a large shifting point in Ayman's beliefs, as well as those of most Muslims. The crushing defeat of the Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Syrian militaries by Israel in only six days led most Muslims to question their leaders. Not just the leaders were questioned but also the Islamic faith. The defeat of the Muslim states at the hands of the Jews caused many to question as to God's intervention on the side of the Jews during the

¹¹⁶ The Abbasid Dynasty's lands stretched from the Iberian Peninsula, across North Africa, and the Middle East to all of modern day Iran.

¹¹⁷ This relationship will be discussed further in the following discussion of Osama bin Laden.

¹¹⁸ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 43.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

war. This led to a call for the return to a pure form of the religion. These occurrences were important in Zawahiri's ideology of the need for a return to the fundamentalist form of the Islamic faith.

After becoming a doctor, Ayman served in the medical corps of the Egyptian military and then went to private practice. In 1980, Ayman al-Zawahiri traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan with two other Arab medical professionals. There, he worked for the Red Crescent Society, the Islamic arm of the International Red Cross. While he served with the medical aid group, he was able to travel into Afghanistan itself. It was during this trip he witnessed the mujahideen fighting the Soviet Union and was impressed with their courage and determination against a much stronger enemy. He returned to Egypt with tales of the "miracles" he witnessed and began recruiting for jihad against the Soviet invaders. This admiration for the courage of the mujahideen fighters is reflected in his later call for martyrs. Zawahiri's anger about the events in Afghanistan was not directed solely at the Soviet Union, he also advocated jihad against the US. In 1981, after a short second term with the Red Crescent Society, he would write that he viewed the Afghan jihad as "a training course of the utmost importance to prepare the Muslim mujahideen to wage their awaited battle against the superpower that now has sole dominance over the globe, namely, the United States."¹²⁰

Ayman Zawahiri's ideological foundation of an Islamic state and region not influenced by Western culture is very similar to the belief of Abdullah Azzam. This is due to both being influenced by Sayyed Qutb. Zawahiri's central contribution to the ideology of al-Qaeda is found in his belief in the use of martyrs. The use of suicide bombers is controversial in the Islamic faith community. Noted traditional Salafist Scholars, such as Sheikh Naser al-Din al-Albani, Sheikh

¹²⁰ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 54-55.

Ibn ‘Uthaimin, Sheik Abel Aziz bin Baz, and Sheik Abd al-Aziz al-Shaykh, state that the Qur’an strictly prohibits suicide.¹²¹ Jihadi Salafists counter this argument with verses from the Qur’an. A most cited verse condoning suicide attacks reads:

Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return for Paradise; they fight in the way of Allah, kill and are killed. That is a true promise from Him in the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur’an and who fulfills His promise better than Allah? Rejoice then at the bargain you have made with Him; for that is the great triumph (9:110)¹²²

Other verses provide additional support for the jihadist call for martyrdom. “And some people sell themselves for the sake of Allah’s favor. Allah is kind to his servants (2:207).”¹²³ Another verse that justifies the fight is:

Fighting is commanded upon you even though it is disagreeable to you. But it is possible that you dislike something which is good for you and that you love something which is bad for you. God knows, but you know not. (2:216).¹²⁴

These verses are used to argue for Allah’s support and recognition of the martyr in jihad.

Zawahiri uses these verses in his speeches to recruit martyrs for the jihad against all in jahiliyyah. In the case of Zawahiri’s narratives, the martyr’s virtues hovered around four major

¹²¹ Mohammed Hafez, “The Alchemy of Martyrdom: Jihadi Salafism and Debates over Suicide Bombings in the Muslim World,” *Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, 38, no. 3 (2010): 371.

¹²² Tim Huffman, “You Have Atomic Bombs, We Have the Martyrdom-Seekers: Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Narrative Arc of the Martyr,” *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 23, no. 1, Article 3 (2016): 4.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹²⁴ Mohammed Hafez, “The Alchemy of Martyrdom: Jihadi Salafism and Debates over Suicide Bombings in the Muslim World,” *Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, 38, no. 3 (2010): 371.

themes: determination, power, simplicity, and faith.¹²⁵ I briefly examine each of these to conclude the discussion of Zawahiri and the martyr.

Determination is a frame for Zawahiri's political goals as referenced:

I call on this garrisoned, patient, resolute, heroic, Mujahid Muslim people to never concede one sand-grain of Palestine, however great the pressure applied to it, however intense the embargo becomes and however numerous the conspiracies might be. (Zawahiri, 2007)¹²⁶

This portion of a speech by Zawahiri also eludes reference to his admiration for the mujahideen he witnessed in Afghanistan. Determination gives a strong call for martyrs as those recruited feel they are fighters against great odds and therefore have power.

Power is the second virtue of Zawahiri's martyr. Those that join the jihad as a martyr are able to make change in the face of a powerful enemy and become part of a relentless, unstoppable jihad for the glory of Islam. Zawahiri discusses this power when he describes the 9/11 attackers and how 19 men were more powerful than all of the US might. This power is also discussed monetarily by Zawahiri. He discusses how the US spent millions to kill Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda, Iraq. They succeeded in their goal but spent almost 100 million dollars to create a martyr. Although this event occurred decades after the founding of al-Qaeda, it displays Zawahiri's ideology of the martyr.

The martyr is a simplistic person. They do not seek glory or honor but are common people who engage in the jihad against the infidels. The simple person hopeful, patient, honest, humble in their nature. The exercise of martyrdom makes these simplistic people memorable and

¹²⁵ Tim Huffman, "You Have Atomic Bombs, We Have the Martyrdom-Seekers: Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Narrative Arc of the Martyr," *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 23, no. 1, Article 3 (2016): 6.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

honored for their deeds but it is not what they seek. In speeches presented by Zawahiri, he discusses martyrs by name but also attributes their simplistic nature as making them memorable to those that knew them. Their deeds as martyrs makes them heroes to the cause. They are heroes that can be known to all.¹²⁷

The final virtue of the martyr is Faith. This faith makes them sacrificial, pious, and righteous. The martyr must be of strong faith as this is the foundation for the other virtues. This connection is stated by Zawahiri:

The virtues of faith are more than mere instruments in the pursuit of martyrdom; they are the ultimate goal. Faith reveals the truth; piety allows a man to live it; righteousness strengthens him to fight for it; and sacrifice enable him to die for it. “Martyrs pour out their blood in the path of Allah” (Zawahiri, 2007). A life in God is both the proximal cause and the teleological cause of martyrdom. It is the instrument and final goal.¹²⁸

This use of faith connects to martyr to Salafism as it states one must believe in Allah to have the other virtues necessary to be a martyr for the jihad. Only those that have a true faith in Islam can be a martyr.

Zawahiri uses four virtues he attributes to the mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan to recruit martyrs. These four virtues allow a person to raise their status and become better than those around them. This is stated by Zawahiri in his description of the martyr with all four virtues:

¹²⁷ Tim Huffman, “You Have Atomic Bombs, We Have the Martyrdom-Seekers: Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Narrative Arc of the Martyr,” *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 23, no. 1, Article 3 (2016): 8.

¹²⁸ Ibid 8.

The one who saw from the inside the patience (simplicity), resolution (determination), sacrifices (faith), and courage (determination) shown by the mujahideen, know that they have never stopped even under the toughest circumstances (power). (Zawahiri, 2007).¹²⁹

This statement shows Zawahiri's martyr is founded in the mujahideen fighter that opposed the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He also discusses the actions and deeds of the martyr in his explanation of the martyr's arc but I it does not contribute to this examination.

Ayman Zawahiri has the same religious ideology of Abdullah Azzam and the two were founders of al-Qaeda as well as influences on Osama bin Laden. The desire to create an Islamic state that is without Western influence is their goal but they have different substantial contributions to al-Qaeda. Ayman Zawahiri's contribution is that of the martyr. His speeches recruited fighters for al-Qaeda and these fighters are willing to sacrifice themselves for al-Qaeda's jihad against the infidels.

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda

The most recognized and discussed figure connected to al-Qaeda is Osama bin Laden. He was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 10, 1957 to an affluent family. His father, Mohammed Awad bin Laden, was a billionaire in construction. Osama enrolled in King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is here he studies under and becomes friends with Abdullah Azzam.

In 1980, Abdullah Azzam traveled to Afghanistan to join the Jihad against the Soviet with his former student when he returned to Jeddah for recruiting purposes. In 1984, Azzam

¹²⁹ Tim Huffman, "You Have Atomic Bombs, We Have the Martyrdom-Seekers: Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Narrative Arc of the Martyr," *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Article 3 (2016), p. 8.

persuaded bin Laden to join him in Afghanistan.¹³⁰ After five years fighting the Soviet Union with the mujahideen and planning for the creation of a pan-Islamic organization, Azzam and bin Laden created al-Qaeda. I will not go into detail of their early days since it does not contribute to this examination. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the following civil war allowed al-Qaeda the opportunity to change its focus to that of global jihad against the US and any enemies of the Muslim world. But withdraw of Soviet forces, bin Laden and other members of the mujahideen lost focus. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden had proposed raising an army of Arabs who had fought in Afghanistan to protect Saudi Arabia from possible invasion by Iraq.¹³¹ The Saudi Royal family did not accept this offer but allowed US led coalition forces to establish bases in their nation to provide security and conduct aerial missions against Iraq. This allowance of foreign troops was supported by the Saudi ulema, which gave religious legitimacy to the presence of non-Muslims in the Land of the Holy Two Sanctuaries.¹³² This allowance of infidels into the holy lands was the catalyst of bin Laden rejoining his colleagues and officially creating al-Qaeda. Zawahiri and bin Laden found a home state to operate in Afghanistan. With the placement of government based on shari'a law, the Taliban created an Islamic state that was patterned from the caliphate following the death of the Prophet. This governmental system gained the pledged allegiance of bin Laden in 1990. Now al-Qaeda has a home state to launch its operations of recruitment and the jihad against the West.

The ideological foundations of al-Qaeda are a combination of influences. The teachings of al-Wahhab and tawhid set the base with Qutb's teachings of jahiliyyah and hakimiyyah

¹³⁰ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 116.

¹³¹ Manfred Steger, "Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism," *New Political Science*. 31, no. 4 (2009): 533.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 533.

providing a definitive self/other identification. Abdullah Azzam's call for global jihad and Ayman Zawahiri's call for martyrs gives al-Qaeda a military recruitment aspect. Osama bin Laden is a student of Azzam and influenced by Zawahiri but he also adds another dynamic to al-Qaeda's ideological foundation. The concept of the "exceptional crisis" elevates the self/other between Islam and non-Islamic peoples to a very high degree. The concept of "exceptional crisis" states the umma, Islamic community, has been subjected to an unprecedented wave of attacks on its territories, values, and economic resources.¹³³ This wave of attacks is not being conducted by specific nation-states or alliances but a much larger expression of an evil, a "Judeo-Crusader alliance".¹³⁴ Example of this alliance and the attack on Islam is elucidated by bin Laden in his citing, what he terms, "Satanic acts of aggression".¹³⁵ Post WWI division of the Ottoman Empire by the European Great Powers, post WWII creation of a Jewish state, and, more currently, the occupation of the holy lands by US military forces are main points bin Laden uses as evidence of the Judeo-Crusader alliance wanting to eliminate Islam entirely. The Judeo-Crusader alliance is not solely a Western or Christian alliance but also includes all Muslims that ally or assist the West in their occupation of the Middle East.

Another steadfast stance of bin Laden was the refusal to accept any Muslim state that engaged in parliamentary politics. His opinion was that all governments patterned after the West would eventually become beholden to the West for support. This was equal to being in a state of jahiliyyah. He used his expulsion from the Sudan in 1996 as evidence of this argument. The Sudanese government's expulsion of a fellow Islamic person due to a request of the US showed

¹³³ Manfred Steger, "Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism," *New Political Science* 31, no. 4 (2009): 534.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 534.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 535.

the Western influence that needed to be eliminated.¹³⁶ To successfully remove Western influence would require the establishment of an Islamic state in the Muslim populated lands. This is claimed to be all of the lands of the original Islamic Empire and beyond to include all lands from Afghanistan to Indonesia.

Osama bin Laden was the most known of the al-Qaeda founders. This is due to him being the face in videos and voice in messages to the world. He was not just the face and voice but contributed to the ideology of al-Qaeda. His main contribution was identifying the other in the self/other identification by stressing the Judeo-Crusader alliance as the ones attempting to eliminate Islam in its entirety. The jihad against the Islamic democracies is a firm stance using the ideologies of the other founders and influences as its base.

Conclusion:

The ideologies and goals of al-Qaeda are traced and researched back to the 1700s with the teachings of al-Wahhab. The establishment of the Wahhabis or Salafi provides the religious base for the influences and then al-Qaeda itself. The self/other identification is created between those that follow tawhid and those that do not. Violent action against those that do not follow tawhid is allowed. Sayyed Qutb taught the belief in jahiliyyah and hakimiyyah. Those that live in jahiliyyah, darkness or ignorance, must be enlightened or educated by those living in hakimiyyah. This self/other identification is clear in those that follow the fundamental Islamic faith must spread hakimiyyah to the rest of the world, beginning in the Middle East. To accomplish this spreading of the fundamental Islamic faith and hakimiyyah, Abdullah Azzam called for a global jihad. It is the duty of all true Muslims following the true Islamic faith to rise up and overthrow their governments to place a Shari'a law society that lives in hakimiyyah. To

¹³⁶ William McCants, "The Jihadists' War With Islamist Democrats," *Foreign Affairs*, 90, no. 5 (September/October 11): 24.

facilitate this global jihad, Ayman Zawahiri calls for martyrs to attack the infidels. Using oneself as a weapon against the infidels is not suicide, according to Zawahiri and Salafi jihadists, but a sacrifice to spread hakimiyyah and Allah to the world. The self of the self/other is identified by the discusses influences and founders as those that live according to Allah's will and those willing to sacrifice themselves in the jihad but bin Laden clearly identifies the other by calling for jihad against the Judeo-Crusader alliance. This other includes all leaders and people who participate in Western parliamentary forms of government. The ideological foundations of al-Qaeda are deeply rooted in the self/other identification process on all levels and by all influences on the organization. This provides them with willing fighters in the jihad and new recruits to maintain their existence.

Chapter 3

The Islamic State and Its Separation from al-Qaeda

Introduction

The Islamic State (ISIS) originally began as al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) during the US occupation of Iraq in 2004. The first leader of AQI was a Jordanian called Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This leader was more radical and followed a more fundamental interpretation of the Islamic faith than those in al-Qaeda. His religious mentor was a cleric named Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The two first met in a Jordanian prison but their views separated when Maqdisi criticized Zarqawi for his extremist sectarian attacks. This section will discuss the religious ideology of Maqdisi and then discuss Zarqawi and how ISIS differs from al-Qaeda.

This section will focus on the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). To discuss the rise of ISIS, this section will examine the origins of their religious and socio-political ideologies. This examination will begin with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Maqdisi) and his religious teachings and ideologies, which he shared with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Zarqawi). Then the focus will shift to Zarqawi. The examination will begin with his early days in Jordan and how he met Maqdisi. Then the discussion will focus on events leading to his placement leading al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI). His beliefs and plans will be examined to illuminate the beginnings of ISIS. After the examination of Zarqawi, a brief discussion of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Baghdadi) will occur. Baghdadi succeeded Zarqawi as leader of AQI and is the leader of ISIS.

The examination of Maqdisi begins with a brief discussion of his life and how events led to his following the teachings of al-Wahhab. The examination then progresses to his ideologies of jihad and Al-walā' wa-l-barā. Maqdisi's role in ISIS is not that of direct leadership or

founding but rather in his influence on Salafi-jihadists. Considered one of the most prolific authors within the Salafi-jihadi movement, and ‘the key contemporary ideologue in the jihadi intellectual universe.’¹³⁷ His relevance to ISIS became known through study of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. To conclude the discussion concerning Maqdisi, his shift in support of Zarqawi and contrasting view of violent Jihad and the terms for loyalty and disavowal will be examined. Following the discussion of Maqdisi, a close examination of Zarqawi will occur. This will begin with his troubles in Jordan during his teenage and early adult years which led to him becoming in trouble with Jordanian law enforcement. This leads to his incarceration and a meeting with Maqdisi. From this point, the discussion will follow the path of Zarqawi’s learning from his prison mentor and leader, Maqdisi, to his joining AQI. After a very brief discussion concerning his actions in Iraq, Baghdadi will be introduced to this discussion of ISIS’ creation. A very brief overview of the leader of ISIS will conclude this section.

After the discussion of the founding members of ISIS and the one who taught Zarqawi of Salafism and Wahhab, Maqdisi, the conclusion of this section will relate the ideologies to the actions of ISIS. This will end the section and the discussions concerning the ideological foundations of ISIS.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and His Religious Ideology:

Maqdisi was born in the West Bank city of Nablus in 1959. In his childhood, his family immigrated to Kuwait, where his father worked as a nurse. Maqdisi states that his parents were not religious people and his influence came from his friends and school. He attended the mosque to pray and listen to Friday prayer as a teenager and this led to him becoming religious.¹³⁸ After

¹³⁷ Nelly Lahoud, “In Search of Philosopher-Jihadist: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Jihadi Philosophy,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10, no. 2 (2009): 205.

¹³⁸ Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 32.

completing his education in Kuwait, Maqdisi wanted to attend a university and study religion but his parents wanted him to study a science such as engineering or medicine. He began his university studies in Yugoslavia but language barriers and the classrooms being of mixed sex caused Maqdisi to transfer to the University in Mosul. The situation in Mosul presented challenges to Maqdisi as the classrooms were still of mixed sex. This distaste for mixed sex universities and the oppressive regime of Iraq, which jailed him for two days because he possessed Islamic books, led to Maqdisi returning to Kuwait.¹³⁹ Maqdisi's return to Kuwait placed him with friends of similar mindsets and reinforced his desire to study religion in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, Maqdisi becomes a scholar of al-Wahhab and his teachings.

Although al-Wahhab was the central influence on Maqdisi, as well as the influences of al-Qaeda, his views of jihad and al-walā' wa-l-barā are what separates him from other Salafi-jihadist scholars, such as Abdullah Azzam. Jihad (struggle) has been discussed but al-walā' wa-l-barā are new concepts to this examination. Al-walā' wa-l-barā translates to loyalty and disavowal, respectively, where walā refers to the friendship, loyalty, and dedication Muslims should show to their co-religionists, whereas barā denotes the distance, disavowal, hatred, and enmity Muslims should show towards non-Muslims.¹⁴⁰ This states that Muslims should be loyal to all Muslims and disavow all non-Muslims. The following of tawhid or fundamental Islam is not the contradiction creating the self/other identification, Muslim against non-Muslim conducts that role. These ideologies will be discussed in detail later in this section.

Maqdisi's view of jihad differs from that of Salafi-jihadists. Interpretation of the Qur'an provides conflicting views on what is appropriate in jihad. Early verses speak of jihad as

¹³⁹ Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 32.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, xxii.

peaceful actions where one strives or exerts oneself. This form of jihad has various meanings according to context which includes military use.¹⁴¹ Later verses concerning jihad discuss the violent or fighting form of jihad. To reconcile the different verses concerning jihad, Muslim scholars adopt a principle that later verses override early verses. This principle places the later ‘sword verse’ of the Qur’an, (9: 5) as the culminating view of jihad.¹⁴² This verse states: “Slay the idolaters wherever you find them and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush.”¹⁴³ This principle of later verses overriding early verses makes jihad a violent act. The different writings of jihad coincide with different areas and time periods of the Prophet Muhammad’s life and conquests. In the early fight against the Meccans, jihad required fighting but after Muhammad’s victory, it is referred as a struggle of faith, peaceful struggle. In differing regions, *dār al-Islām* (where Muslims are in control) and *dār al-harb* (where Muslims are at war), jihad has differing forms. In *dār al-Islām* jihad is a conversion or struggle with faith and against one’s own sins, not violent against others.¹⁴⁴ In *dār al-harb* jihad is a fight against non-Muslims to gain control of new territory. These conflicting forms or interpretations of jihad create a conflict between quietist and Salafi-jihadists.¹⁴⁵ A major difference between quietists and Salafi-jihadists is the use of jihad against Muslim rulers. Salafi-jihadists claim that violent overthrow of the government is allowed if the Muslim rulers show any signs of non-belief in the Islamic faith. The quietest and quietist Salafi-jihadist have differing positions from the Salafi-jihadists. The quietist states that applying man made laws does not clearly display non-belief and

¹⁴¹ Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 52.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁴⁵ Joas Wagemakers clarifies quietist and Salafi-jihadists do not differ in their view of defensive jihad. The war in Afghanistan of the 1980s proves that all Islamic scholars approved of the jihad against the Soviet Union during its invasion of Afghanistan.

further evidence is needed. The quietist calls for support of all Muslims and jihad against a Muslim ruler is not allowed since rulers will be mindful not to present clear evidence of non-belief.¹⁴⁶ The quietist Salafi-jihadists, Maqdisi's position, do not approve of Muslim rulers not following the Qur'an and applying Shari'a law in Muslim states. The application of any secular law overriding Islamic law displays non-belief and therefore is to be removed from leadership. For Maqdisi and the quietist Salafi-jihadist, jihad and takfir are allowed but only against the non-believers and a clear display of non-belief must be in evidence. To attack other Muslims just for differing faiths and to attack Muslim rulers that do not show clear evidence of non-belief is not allowed. The use of jihad to place true Islamic rulers and create an Islamic state is allowed but once the state is created and dār al-Islām exists, jihad is a personal struggle of faith and against one's sins. Maqdisi's view of jihad comes into conflict with that of his protégé Zarqawi and this will be discussed later in this section.

Maqdisi's view of jihad and its use against other Muslims also directs his position on al-walā' wa-l-barā. As defined earlier, this concept applies to the loyalty one must show fellow Muslims and when disavowal is allowed. In social and political aspects, Muslims must follow the Qur'an and apply its teachings in all aspects of life and society. If this is done, full loyalty of all Muslims is demanded. This makes jihad against any Muslims and Muslim leaders that do not show signs of non-belief forbidden. To kill fellow Muslims because of being from differing sects is not allowed, unless they show practice of non-belief in Islam. In military conflict, Muslims must always support other Muslims. The definition does state that Muslims must always side with their fellow-believers against non-Muslims,¹⁴⁷ so opportunity for argument is present. The

¹⁴⁶ Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 65.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, xxii.

view of al-walā' wa-l-barā is another contestation point with Zarqawi, and this will be discussed later. Maqdisi's main contribution to al-walā' wa-l-barā is the application of this concept to all aspects of society and life in the Muslim states.¹⁴⁸ Prior to Maqdisi's writings, Saudi Arabia's rulers and scholars applied al-walā' to political issues but wa-l-barā to social issues. Socially, Muslims were not to have contact with infidels but politically, they must accept the ruler's decision to allow US military personnel to occupy territory within Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁹ Maqdisi's writings and teachings applied the concept to political and social aspects equally. The discussion of Maqdisi and his views of jihad and al-walā' wa-l-barā is an extensive one but a basic understanding is necessary for this examination.

Maqdisi's interpretations and belief in jihad and al-walā' wa-l-barā diverged greatly from his protégé Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi's leadership of AQI began with attacks on US forces in Iraq. Soon the attacks would include the Shi'i population and any who did not fight against the new government in Iraq. The divergence between Maqdisi and Zarqawi became a public difference in 2004 when Maqdisi, while in prison, wrote a letter showing good will towards Zarqawi but condemning his actions.¹⁵⁰ He accused Zarqawi's followers of exploiting his religious status to gain false religious legitimacy. Maqdisi criticized the jihadist tactics used by AQI and other jihadis were conducting, especially those that killed fellow Muslims. Zarqawi responded to his teacher's criticism by acknowledging Maqdisi's contribution as a Salafi-jihadist scholar. Zarqawi followed this light praise with criticism stating that he did learn from Maqdisi because his teaching corresponded to the Qur'an but he did not follow his views blindly. Zarqawi

¹⁴⁸ Joas Wagemakers, "A Purist Jihad-Salaf'i: The ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 36, no. 2 (2009): 287.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 287.

¹⁵⁰ Nelly Lahoud, "In Search of Philosopher-Jihadist: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Jihadi Philosophy," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10, no. 2 (2009): 207.

shows this independence of thought in his statement, “If I were interested in imitating blindly the teaching of others, I would have imitated the teachings of those who have a higher religious standing than Maqdisi.”¹⁵¹ This public divergence continued until 2006, the year of Zarqawi’s death. To understand the difference in Maqdisi’s teachings and Zarqawi’s ideology and actions, I now examine Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI, and the Emergence of ISIS

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was born October of 1966 in the town of Az Zarqa with the given name, Ahmed Fadel al-Khalaylah.¹⁵² His youth was marked with legal troubles which led to his arrest for drug possession and sexual assault in 1984. An attempt to correct his illegal lifestyle, his mother sent him to a mosque for religious based instruction. It was at the al-Hussein Ben Ali Mosque where he heard stories told by Jordanian mujahideen fighters.¹⁵³ These stories led to Zarqawi traveling to Afghanistan in 1989 but was too late to join the jihad against the Soviet Union. It was this travel to Afghanistan that created the meeting between Zarqawi and Maqdisi. The two returned to Jordan and began to organize a jihadist group but were arrested for organizing the group and spent 5 years in jail. During this time, Zarqawi assisted in sharing the Maqdisi’s teachings and eventually became a leader of the jail cell. Upon their release in 1999, Zarqawi returned to Afghanistan in an attempt to join al-Qaeda.

Joining al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Zarqawi began to criticize the Taliban for and bin Laden’s support for them. Zarqawi’s argument against the Taliban is his claim they killed fellow

¹⁵¹ Nelly Lahoud, “In Search of Philosopher-Jihadis: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Jihadi Philosophy,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10, no. 2 (2009): 207.

¹⁵² He later changed his name to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi reflecting a commitment to the Islamic faith and to honor his birth place.

¹⁵³ George Michael, “The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” *Defense Studies*, 7, no. 3 (2007): 339.

Muslims and were therefore un-Islamic.¹⁵⁴ This contradicts Zarqawi's allowance for killing Shi'i but he explains this as the Shi'i were apostates and heretics. This claim is repeated in Iraq where the Shi'i are said to be aiding and working for the US. Zarqawi continued to fight for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan until 2003 when he traveled to Iraq.¹⁵⁵ Using the no fly zone over imposed by the US over Northern Iraq, Zarqawi began establishing an al-Qaeda cell. Originally named Ansar al-Islam, it changed to Al-Tawheed wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad)¹⁵⁶ but was known as al-Qaeda Iraq. In Iraq, Zarqawi's ideology presented itself. His asymmetric warfare against the US was considered a successful strategy. When the Coalition Provisional Authority began a de-Ba'athification process of the Iraqi government, hundreds of thousands of Sunni faith Iraqis became unemployed. These former Ba'athists were the bureaucrats of the government, officers of the military, and others responsible for the operation of state institutions. The jihad against the US became a war against all non-Sunni fundamentalist Islamists. Attacks against US forces, the Shi'i population, and non-state actors, such as the UN, escalated into numbers of more than one attack a day on average. Zarqawi showed, in his actions, that Sunni Islamists were in jihad against everyone else. The large number of former Ba'athists may not have shared in the religious ideology but were attacking those they blamed for their plight and therefore allied with AQI. Events such as the exposure of abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison camp solidified the Sunni opposition to the US and its allies. Zarqawi's attacks on all non-believers, non-Sunni Islam followers, drew condemnation from Zawahiri, Maqdisi, and other Islamic leaders but this did not stop or dissuade Zarqawi from his jihad against all. This continued until his death in 2006.

¹⁵⁴ George Michael, "The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *Defence Studies*, 7, no. 3 (2007): 340.

¹⁵⁵ Some sources state he fled to Iraq following the battle at Tora Bora between al-Qaeda and US forces. It is rumored he narrowly escaped death at the battle.

¹⁵⁶George Michael, "The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *Defence Studies*, 7, no. 3 (2007): 341.

The Rise of ISIS

Zarqawi's death did not eliminate the jihadist organization named AQI. A new leader emerged and with him, a new organization. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi replaced Zarqawi and rebranded AQI as Islamic State. In this rebranding, Baghdadi claimed the territory it controlled was a new caliphate and he was to be named Caliph Ibrahim. The new caliphate is to resurrect the Abbasid Caliphate and redraw the colonial era borders.¹⁵⁷ Many local socio-political conditions occurred to aid the rise of IS. The power vacuum created by the US withdraw from Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's repression of Sunni political opponents, and the Syrian civil war allowed for a sectarian war to begin.¹⁵⁸ The entry into Syria by IS was forbidden by Zawahiri but the ignoring of this declaration added to the tensions between IS and al-Qaeda. The tensions between IS and al-Qaeda increased until Zawahiri claimed that IS and its followers were no longer part of al-Qaeda.

The leaders of IS were not dissuaded in their goals. They continued their attacks on Shi'ite and Alawite populations with extreme prejudice. Justification for these attacks was provided through Zarqawi and his use of old claims by Ibn Taymiyya that the non-Sunni were apostates, idolaters, and non-believers. The use of the Qur'an allows IS to argue their actions as holy and allowed. They use an extreme form of self/other identification that puts all that do not adhere to strict fundamental Sunni Islam teachings as the other and can therefore be met with violence. The killing of other Muslims with extreme prejudice places IS outside the realm of other jihadist organizations. It is this that separates and alienates them from al-Qaeda.

¹⁵⁷ Anthony Celso, "Zarqawi's Legacy: Al Qaeda's ISIS 'Renegade'," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (2015):21.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

Conclusion:

IS formed from AQI and their original religious ideology comes from the same sources. Maqdisi taught Zarqawi his religious ideology but they were taken to very extremist interpretations and used against all that did not adhere to the AQI and the IS religious beliefs. Although IS has a different form of global jihad, the lone wolf attacker, their tactics are rooted in al-Qaeda. Azzam's global jihad and Zawahiri's use of the martyr provide the operational foundation of IS. The killing of fellow Muslims with apparent support from the Qur'an has led to their being ostracized by other jihadist organizations. They use a most extreme form of self/other identification in which they only accept those that follow the same extremist interpretation of the Qur'an, are of Muslim descent, and pledge an oath of loyalty to their cause. This extreme form of self/other identification allows for no understanding or acts of mercy to all those deemed the other. This makes them a most dangerous organization that encourages attacks against all.

Conclusion:

The examination of the ideological foundations of three international jihadist organizations, Hizbullah, al-Qaeda, and IS, has provided the religious discourse of each. Using a hermeneutical approach towards the subject allows for analysis of the use of the Islamic religion to obtain a specific goal. The three jihadist organizations, Hizbullah, al-Qaeda, and IS, all use religious discourse to create the self/other identification necessary to galvanize the self to fight the other. This is explained by M. N. Roy;

Civilized mankind is asked to choose between modern barbarism promising material well-being and security in a socially regimented and spiritually enslaved life, or a return to mediaeval obscurantism in search of an illusory safety in the backwaters of faith. This conflict of ideologies, which may any day plunge the world headlong in a titanic clash of arms.¹⁵⁹

Although this passage eludes to ideologies such as Communism against Capitalism, it is applicable to the creation of the self/other identity structure created by the influences and leaders of the discussed jihadist organizations.

Hizbullah was formed due to the influence of three clerics that shaped the self/other discourse that led to an ideology. Hizbullah against Hizb al-Shaytan gives the clear identity of righteous against evil or oppressed against oppressor. The Shi'i are the self-perceived oppressed after Imam al-Sadr returned from Iraq and the Shi'i Islamic movement. This perceived oppression combined with conflict between Shi'i from Palestine¹⁶⁰ and southern Lebanon against the Israelis allows the clerics to call for a return to faith and safety, as eluded by Roy's quote.

The urbanization of Lebanon created a situation of many Shi'i living on the fringe of the major

¹⁵⁹ M. N. Roy, *Radical Humanist* (New York: Prometheus, 2004), p. 22.

¹⁶⁰ I use the official language of the UN in mentioning the State of Palestine.

urban centers but not able to be part of the more financially stable members of society. This allows Imam al-Sadr to establish his 'Movement of the Oppressed'. This begins the self/other identification of Shi'i against non-Shi'i equated with righteous against evil. Ayatollah Shamseddine and Ayatollah Fadlallah follow and their preaching strengthens this identification process. The socio-political situation within Lebanon during the 1980s assisted in the identification process due to the ongoing civil war. Hizbullah's goal was the attainment of a Shi'i led government that ruled according to the Qur'an. The socio-political aspects of Lebanon assisted in their creation with the religious discourse providing the identification of good against evil. This discourse justified Hizbullah's actions as they were on the side of God fighting against all that is evil, the non-Shi'i. Understanding Hizbullah's goals and their discourse seeking to create self/other identification within Lebanon alone, it can be argued that their actions affirm the state structure of society. Being such eludes to the possibility of political solutions being available if all parties involved agree.

Al-Qaeda is varies in many aspects from Hizbullah. Although both use religious discourse to create self/other identification for political purposes, al-Qaeda does not have a strong socio-political foundation as Hizbullah nor does it operate or seek change within a defined state. The religious discourse of al-Qaeda approaches the entire Islamic faith. The writings and teachings of Ibn Wahhab create a foundation for their discourse. Sayyed Qutb's concepts of hakimiyyah and jahiliyyah create a defined self/other identification structure. Abdullah Azzam's call for global jihad uses the right of a true follower of Islam to attack any and all non-believers and this justifies overthrow of perceived non-believing governments within the Middle East as well as all non-Muslim states. Only those that follow hakimiyyah are safe from jihad. Ayman Zawahiri calls for martyrs to attack the non-believer and justifies his call by emulating his

viewed honor of the mujahideen fighters of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden is influenced by Azzam and Zawahiri and calls for attacks against his perceived greatest threat, the US and its allies. This self/other of devout follower of Islam against all others is a wide range that indicates al-Qaeda has goals of regional or international society alteration. If Azzam's global jihad occurs, Muslims would rise to overthrow the governments in states that were part of the first Islamic Empire and continues west to Indonesia and the Philippines.

Understanding al-Qaeda's goals and broad self/other identification creates other points of discussion. Hakimiyyah is the enlightenment or education of those in jahiliyyah and teaches the ignorant to live in Allah's light and guidance. The fact that it is altered to include violent attacks leads to a conclusion that the leaders of al-Qaeda are either distorting their Islamic faith or just using its discourse to recruit fighters for their fight and place them in positions of power. If Azzam's call for global jihad occurred and were successful, a territory greater than the first Islamic Empire would be created and that allows for bin Laden or Zawahiri to become a leader of a massive territory and then become a Caliph. Control of this territory would place al-Qaeda in control of massive oil fields, shipping lanes, and other trade routes which would make them a world economic power.¹⁶¹ This international society changing event would give the leaders of al-Qaeda great international power. This thought creates the question as to whether bin Laden and Zawahiri create their religious discourse to further Islam or distort Islam for their personal gain.

Islamic State (IS) uses an extreme form of religious discourse. Their self/other identification is those who follow an extremely fundamental understanding of Sunni Islam, Wahhabism, and those who do not. Even other Sunni who do not adhere to their strict

¹⁶¹ According to OPEC data, control of this area would equate to control of 65% of the world's oil reserves. Various maps of shipping lanes all show the territory in discussion as being part of major shipping lanes. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves (http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm).

understanding are subject to death. Unlike Hizbullah and al-Qaeda who both show a degree of toleration for non-believers, they are not put to death, IS does not show any form of understanding or tolerance. Imam Maqdisi influenced Abu Zarqawi while in a Jordanian prison but quickly distanced himself from Zarqawi once al-Qaeda Iraq began its attacks on Shi'i and Western forces alike. The emergence of IS from al-Qaeda Iraq following Zarqawi's death shifted the groups goals and tactics. Abu Bakr Baghdadi announced the creation of a new caliphate and began a military style campaign to gain territory in Norther Iraq and Wester Syria. IS has posted videos to social media sources displaying their brutality to those who do not follow or convert to the strict adherence to Wahhabism. This combined with their goal of creating a new state by taking territory from existing states creates a dilemma for international society. If they are successful in their endeavor there could be repeat occurrences in other regions of the world. Their form of self/other identification does not allow for political resolution as they have a strict mentality that follows a victory or death aspect. Their total victory mentality is equivocal to that of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan at the onset of WWII.

In understanding the ideological foundations of these three jihadist organizations, one gains an understanding of their impact on regional and international society. Their discourse in allows for understanding their goals and how they are organized. Whether it is a local, regional, or international goal can be ascertained by the discourse in their self/other identifications. This use of self/other identification through religion can be explained by understanding that a constant in human nature is not to believe but find reasonable explanations of everything.¹⁶² The use of religious discourse does not call for believing but in providing an 'other' to blame for one's perceived or real problems in life. The use of their discourse in creating self/other identifications

¹⁶² M. N. Roy, *Radical Humanist* (New York, Prometheus, 2004), p. 110.

will facilitate their continued existence as it is a way, which always makes us blame somebody else, and which always compels us to be against something, somebody, whether it is the foreigners, the government, or this whole material universe.¹⁶³ This quote displays that the use of self/other identification will perpetually create an 'other' to confront. This concept applied to the ideological foundations of the jihadist organizations implies the organizations will be difficult to defeat with weapons alone.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 50.

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