

A Distinctive Organizational Control Practice: Geographic Personnel Rotation

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ABSTRACT

Organizational control is a fundamental process which ensures organizations achieve their goals. The importance and difficulty increase when the organization is a law enforcement agency. Control within an organization can be implemented in several different ways. Regular rotations and transfers of personnel is one of the control mechanisms employed by organizations to direct, motivate and encourage employees to adhere to organizational standards and objectives. The Turkish National Police (TNP) rotates and transfers police officers geographically while providing security services throughout the country. Geographic personnel rotation (GPR) is a human resource management policy of the TNP which bans home city deployment and obligates officers to transfer regularly for various deployment periods and in differing regions. The research examines geographic personnel rotation policy as an organizational control mechanism.

To help better understand GPR's impact on control, the study examined data collected from interviews with human resource managers and police chiefs who implement the policy, from participant observation, and from documents and archival records. GPR is a distinct control mechanism the TNP employs to maximize personnel performance and minimize police deviance. More significantly, GPR allows the TNP to reward and punish employees depending on their performance, as well as detect and reduce deviation from organizational norms. GPR also affects the formation of police identity, which may increase or decrease commitment to the organization based on the perceived fairness of the practice.

Dedication

I lovingly dedicate this dissertation to my wife, who supported me each step of the way.

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I would like to thank Karen M. Hult for her guidance throughout this journey. I could not have finished this project without your consistent encouragement, thoughtful insights, and unceasing patience. I would also like to thank to my committee members Matthew Dull, Robin Lemaire, and Izzet Lofca for their careful comments and continuous support. To Anna Khademian, Jim Wolf, Patrick Roberts, Joe Rees, Laura Jensen, Adam Eckerd and Tom Hickok those who contributed this research project, thank you for your willingness to share your professional experiences and insights. A special thanks to Matthew Dull for his academic advice and support throughout the program.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

It was the end of the day shift when Lieutenant Tarik got a call about a fight. He, together with his colleague Selim, drove directly to the address to stop the conflict. As soon as he parked the car, Tarik wanted to respond to the group. However, when he checked his colleague, he found Officer Selim hiding under the dashboard. Later he learned that Selim's relatives were involved in the fight, and Selim hesitated to step into the conflict in order to avoid criticism from his family.

It is obvious that Selim's action violated organizational standards and procedures. Keeping employees in accordance with organizational rules is an important task, especially in law enforcement agencies. Practices of organizational control are important activities which aim to increase this consistency.

The purpose of this study is to examine the control effect of a specific organizational practice in a law enforcement agency. It explores the implementation of geographic personnel rotation (GPR) in the Turkish National Police (TNP) from an organizational control perspective. This chapter starts with a brief introduction of the GPR policy and then continues with the research question and significance of the study from control and organization perspectives.

TNP and GPR


The TNP is one of the major, highly centralized national organizations responsible for the security and well-being of citizens in the urban areas of Turkey. The organization consists of a central headquarters, 33 different central departments, and 81 provincial police departments with more than 900 separate district directorates. All of these units are directed by the central

administration in accordance with country-wide laws, codes, rules, and regulations. The TNP's work force includes approximately 250,000 ranked and non-ranked police officers.

Being a police officer in Turkey is an arduous occupation as there are difficult working conditions and complicated policies. One of the hardships comes from the TNP's human resource management and assignment policies. As a member of the TNP, I am not allowed to work in my city of origin at any time during my career. Moreover, I must regularly move among provinces and regions depending on certain deployment periods for the assigned locations. Thus, with the completion of the eighth year of my first assignment, I have had to fill out the official form, "Assignment Preference for Second Region" each year since 2009. This form comes with a 30-plus page annual deployment order, which requests that I indicate my preferences for seven of the 25 provinces in the TNP's 2nd Region, which lies to the east of Turkey (see Figure 1.1). Each year, I submitted my list of preference in January and waited until the second week of June to hear whether I was to be deployed in one of the provinces in the Eastern Region. This obligation has continued even during my leave to go abroad for education, which started in 2011. After repeatedly filling out the form for five-years, I was assigned to Diyarbakir in 2014, one of the cities in the South East Anatolia region, even though I was still continuing my graduate study in the USA.

Geographic personnel rotation is a human resource management policy of the TNP that bans home city deployment and obligates officers to transfer regularly according to various deployment periods; they also must work twice in the 2nd region. The deployment period is from three to 10 years in the 1st region and two to six years in the 2nd region (TNPARR, 1992).

Figure 1.1 GPR Practice within and between Regions.



Source: Adapted from Google Earth

A typical police officer must work in several departments across various regions (in at least three different provinces according to regulations) throughout his/her professional career under this elaborate system of rotation. It likely would be impossible to find even a single police officer who started at and retired from the same place without spending an interim period in another location. A small number of transfers are implemented at officers' requests; however, most take place based on formal personnel policy. Each year, over 20,000 police officers transfer within and between the 1st and 2nd regions. Moreover, around 60,000 police officers are affected directly by being part of the preparation period which goes from January to June. As a result, the policy creates a high level of personnel circulation in the agency.

The TNP has practiced a GPR-like personnel transfer policy under the Civil Servant Act since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. One of the first regulations, the Civil Servant Act (Memurin Kanunu) of 1926, declared that transfers of government officials be done

by consent; however, the “administration shall not wait for the consent of the employee in the case of deviant behavior”¹ or in the case of employees with two consecutive years of low performance² (TGNA, 1926). In 1962, the Turkish General National Assembly approved the first rotation regulation (two-page/34 articles) of the TNP that set geographic regions and made specific arrangements for transfers in the police organization (Ministry of Interior, 1962). Since then, GPR rules have changed several times and become a quite complicated human resource management practice that greatly influences police officers.

The TNP is one of the first national organizations which created its own separate rotation policy. Furthermore, the TNP is not an exception in implementing geographic rotation regulations in the public sector in Turkey. For many years, many national governmental organizations have regularly practiced geographic job rotation and job-related employee relocation. National organizations with departments and units in provinces throughout the country are the primary institutions that practice GPR-like rotation policies. According to 2015 data, 2, 823,760 public servants served in 50 different national organizations, providing services like health, security, education and general administrative services.³ About 2.2 million of these civil servants work under varying geographic rotation regulations. For example, the Turkish Military has five to seven different geographic regions and various deployment periods for these regions (SAAY, 2005), while the education department distinguishes between urban and rural areas as two main regions and practices teacher/principal rotation under six different categories (MEBOAYDY, 2010). Eventually, all provincial/regional governors, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, military personnel, teachers, doctors, social service personnel, and even imams experience some sort of rotation throughout their professional careers if they work for the

¹ Article 35

² Article 77

³ <http://www.bumko.gov.tr/TR,908/kadro-istatistikleri.html> , Access date 6/09/2015

national government. However, the TNP's GPR policy is one of the first, most complicated, and distinctive policies.

The present GPR regulation for the TNP, the "Turkish National Police Appointment and Rotation Regulation - TNPARR" code, has more than 40 pages/60 articles. The "Object" section describes the purpose of the document as being "to regulate TNP members' appointments and rotations in conformance with the service requirements, balanced and objective way" (Article 2). The Regulation details the rules and procedures for appointments and transfers of the TNP members. It includes general and specific procedures and principles of appointment and rotation, service regions and periods, and exceptional practices like postponements, exemptions and mandatory transfers. According to the Regulation, the TNP's Department of Personnel Affairs (DoPA) is responsible for planning and organizing personnel appointment and rotation.

Research Question

Although GPR is one of the most influential and significant personnel policies in the TNP, few studies have examined its implementation and impacts. This study aims to increase understanding of the control dynamics of the GPR policy. Thus, the central question in this dissertation is: "*How has the TNP practiced GPR as a means of organizational control?*" The focus is close examination of the perceptions and interpretations of the human resource managers and middle/high level police chiefs in the TNP who have applied and worked under the GPR policy. Approaches introduced in scholarship on organizational control help in more fully understanding the practices and effects of GPR.

Significance of Research

Organizational control is one of the most critical processes in organizations, which helps ensure they can accomplish goals and desired performance (Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long, 2010; Etzioni, 1965; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Mitchell, 1978; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Sitkin and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2010; Snell, 1992). Despite its importance, organization scholars have neglected it for many years (Sitkin et al., 2010). Organizations in both the public and private sectors employ several different control mechanisms in order to achieve their performance goals and to ensure their members adhere to rules and standards. The importance and difficulty of control increase in law enforcement agencies compared to other government agencies (Maanen, 2010). Control is more important in the law enforcement context because any deviant behavior or police crime most likely affects human rights and may result in serious consequences. Moreover, control in law enforcement agencies is quite difficult, as police officers are dispersed to work across wide areas, and most of the time they work alone under their own discretion and authority. This case study aims to contribute to the organization control literature by providing a deep analysis of a geographic rotation practice from a control perspective.

Control within an organization can be implemented in several different ways. The management and organization theory literature mentions that organizations frequently employ regular rotation and transfers of personnel for control purposes. Although much has been written about control in police agencies, including the prevention of police misconduct or corruption, the capacity and effects of personnel rotation policies as a control mechanism have not been systematically studied. Moreover, little scholarship investigates the GPR policy in the TNP. Thus, this study aimed to fill these gaps.

The study also is significant since GPR is such a major part of working in the TNP. Any rotation that requires geographic transfer has the potential to affect not only the organization but also employees (and their households) who must move from one place to another. The formal and informal impacts of GPR on organizational performance and the conformity of police officers to organizational goals are still mostly unknown.

From a human resource management perspective, more than 60,000 police officers join the rotation preparation process each year in order to ensure better assignments between February and June; eventually one third will rotate. This waiting period for all participants and the transfer period for the personnel who move cause various organizational and individual uncertainties and difficulties. This high level of personnel circulation most likely affects the relationships among police officers, between the police department and the public, and even between the police department and other organizations. When the total staff of the TNP (over 250,000) is considered, the size of the rotation becomes an important indicator of the scope and significance of GPR. Each year one out of four police officers rotates or is affected by GPR. Eventually, all the police officers in a city police department will turn over depending on the service deployment years. Building trust with new members or working with a new chief or superintendent takes time as well. The effect of transfers on the areas that need special expertise like counter terrorism, intelligence gathering and organized crime investigation is another factor also increases the study's significance.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2 examines scholarly literature relevant to organizational control and personnel rotation practices, while Chapter 3 introduces the study's conceptual framework. Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the study's research design, including data collection and data

analysis. Chapter 5 presents the study's findings, based on interview, document and observation data. Chapter 6 discusses the results of the study and examines its implications for both scholarship and practice.

CHAPTER 2: RELEVANT SCHOLARSHIP

Although some Turkish scholars have mentioned GPR policy or examined control in the TNP, few have studied the policy from organizational control perspective. Among those who have examined GPR, some have focused on promotion and transfer problems in the TNP (Özcan and Gültekin, 2000), TNP's personnel appointment and transfer policies (Koçöz, 2005), police officers' geographic preferences (Hekim, 2011), and perceptions of GPR transfers (Duru, 2012). The organizational control studies mostly have focused on deviant behavior among TNP members. Derdiman (2005), for example, evaluated the legal status of proposed assignments⁴ in the TNP, and Cerrah et al. (2009) examined police corruption; however, none mentioned the relationship between GPR and organizational control.

A similar neglect exists in the international literature, where few studies have examined GPR-like practices from an organizational control perspective. Kaufman (1960) was one of the first to discuss the effects of personnel transfers on administrative control. In the literature on human resource management, scholars have focused on personnel rotation and prevention of corruption (Abbink, 2004; Huberts, 1998; Ickes and Samuelson, 1987); they also have examined effects of job rotation in decreasing the risk of accidents in the workplace (Frazer, Norman, Wells, and Neumann, 2003; Jorgensen, Davis, Kotowski, Aedla, and Dunning, 2005; Rodrick, Karwowski, and Quesada, 2006). At the same time, some have argued that rotation causes more deviant behavior (De Zwart, 1993) and that its negative consequences move organizations away from achieving their desired goals and performance (Gannon, Poole, and Prangle, 1972; Green and Canny, 2003; Morris, 1956; Munton, 1990; Pinder, 1989).

⁴ The transfer of police officers upon the request of a director.

This chapter reviews relevant scholarship on organizational control theories and personnel rotation practices. It seeks to develop the basis for the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3. The chapter starts with a brief introduction to control theories. Then, it examines the formal and informal attributions of personnel rotation practices, such as detecting and preventing deviant employee behavior and creating organizational identity as an organizational control mechanism. The chapter also explores unexpected consequences of rotation which may weaken control. The literature review ends with a review of GPR studies in Turkey.

Organizational Control

When you ask a manager what the three most important things about a joint venture are, he or she will likely answer, 'control, control, control' (as cited in Kenis and Provan 2006; 227).

Organizational control has been a recurring topic for organization and management scholars. Discussion of control in organizations can be traced to scholars of classical organization and management theories. Fayol (1949), for example, categorized control as one of the five elements of management. His classification of managerial tasks included forecasting and planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and controlling (p.6). He accepted control as a necessary function which “consists in verifying whether everything occurs in conformity with the plan adopted, the instructions issued and principles established” (p.107). For him, control contained three major steps: creating standards of performance, assessing results according to those standards and making corrections.

Many later scholars after Fayol conducted valuable studies of control and its implementation in organizations. Almost all of these studies noted that control is a necessary process and an important task for any organization to achieve its goals; at the same time, it is a

complex and dynamic phenomenon (Cardinal et al., 2010; Etzioni, 1965; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Mitchell, 1978; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Sitkin et al., 2010; Snell, 1992). Etzioni (1965) highlighted the importance of organizational control by pointing out its crucial function in meeting organizational goals and performing well. According to Etzioni, any organization “requires formally institutionalized allocation of rewards and penalties to enhance compliance with their norms, regulations, and orders” (p.650). Most scholars agreed on defining organizational control as a process that directs, motivates and encourages employees to adhere to organizational standards and pursue organizational objectives (Cardinal et al., 2010; Mitchell, 1978; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Snell, 1992). Mitchell (1978) described the process as planning (setting goals, objectives, and standards); establishing procedures designed to meet the goals and objectives; data gathering and feedback systems to indicate when standards and objectives are being met; and systems of action to reduce deviations from the charted course (p. 292).

The main *purpose* of control is to accomplish better alignment of employees’ capabilities, performance, activities and conformance with organizational goals (Sitkin et al., 2010). Etzioni (1965) believed administrators have to make sure that each member of the organization complies with or conforms to organizational norms, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Many studies discuss ways of realizing such alignment. Fayol (1949) suggested that periodic checks are necessary to detect weaknesses in and deviations from the plan and to prevent recurrence of failure. Davies (1989) noted that controlling processes include directing (set work activities and standards), detecting (monitor progress), correcting (eliminate deviations), and motivating (encourage greater effort) activities implemented by the organizations (p.7). In addition, according to the assessment of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (2012), control has preventative influence that aims to discourage employees from

any kind of deviation, and detective power that finds irregularities after problems have occurred. Each function that Davies (1989) listed plays an important role in encouraging employee conformity with organizational objectives and pursuit of desired performance. From these approaches, administrators of an organization may anticipate that a control mechanism needs to perform all of these functions in order to achieve success. It can also be argued that an organization can employ different practices for different functions. For instance, an indoor surveillance camera system can detect deviant employee behavior. Likewise, one practice may serve different purposes. For example, a computerized monitoring program may detect irregularities in the working hours of an employee (detection) and adjust his or her payment accordingly (correction). Analysis of GPR from a control perspective, then, should include a functional evaluation. The functions mentioned in the literature appear in the framework in Chapter 3.

A number of dimensions for analyzing the implementation of organizational control mechanism appear in organization and management scholarship. First is the degree of *formality* of a control. Control mechanisms can be formal or informal. Formal control mechanisms are written, explicit arrangements such as directives and rules that aim to influence input, behavior or outcome in an organization. Informal control mechanisms, on the other hand, include social structures such as norms, organizational identity, culture, or values that affect employees' actions and behavior (Korsgaard, Meglino, and Jeong, 2010). Although one study (Ouchi 1979) claimed informal and formal control mechanisms are mutually exclusive mechanisms, as Cardinal et al (2004) argued, "individual control mechanisms can exhibit both formal or informal attributes" (p.57).

Another distinction can be made depending on the *source of the control*. Studies of organizational control distinguish between internal and external controls (Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson, 1987; Sitkin and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2010). For Gortner et al. (1987), controls directed from outside of an organization are external controls; they include the influences of policy makers, elected officials, and regulatory agencies that are related to the organization. Internal controls, on the other hand, come from inside of an organization. External and internal control system may influence each other, and most likely external control (e.g., the legislature) leads and shapes the operation of internal control mechanisms.

Although it is not mentioned explicitly in the literature, a source-based approach can include further distinctions. For example, internal controls can be differentiated depending on the origin of the control, including the organization/administration (e.g., discipline committees), employee (e.g., peer control), and culture or profession (identity or cultural control). This distinction is important because as Maanen (2010) underlined, different control mechanisms may function in different ways. One behavior that one mechanism classifies as deviant may not be labeled as deviant under other control mechanisms. For example, a law enforcement agency might consider accepting small gifts from shops (e.g., free coffee) misconduct, while cultural norms among police officers may view it as normal and polite behavior.

In addition, many studies provide more macro-level classifications of organizational control. Etzioni (1965), for example, examined organizational control, emphasizing its coercive, *utilitarian*, and *symbolic (or normative)* features. Edwards (1978), on the other hand, categorized control as *simple*, *technological* and *bureaucratic*. Ouchi's (1979) organizational control approach, one of the best known, includes separation of control mechanisms depending on organizational structure, such as *market*, *bureaucracy* and *clan control mechanisms*. Snell (1992)

highlighted the question of what is or can be controlled and then he introduced target-based control categories. Control mechanisms in this view can be divided into *behavior*, *output*, and *input control*, depending on what the organization seeks to influence. Any control mechanism or organizational practice might be placed into one or more of these classifications.

Snell's target-based categorization (input, output and behavior) has been cited by many scholars (Cardinal et al., 2010; Liu, Yetton, and Sauer, 2010). As each organization has different goals and standards, the subject of the control may vary. Thus, one or more of these controls can be employed to achieve desired performance. Controlling output can be possible in organizations in which the final product can be identified, quantified, and measured. Behavior control mechanisms, on the other hand, regulate employees' activities and procedures in terms of how they conduct tasks. Organizations that provide public services, for example, likely prefer behavior or input control mechanisms, as there are few ways to measure the value of their services (Cardinal et al., 2010; Gortner et al., 1987; Snell, 1992). Input control systems rely heavily on an effective staffing process, which includes selection, training and monitoring of personnel. Some organizations (e.g., the U.S. Department of Defense) depend on input control, as other control options may have limitations. Liu et al. (2010) add that when task uncertainty is high, "experiential learning becomes a crucial part of the development process such as on the job training, job rotation and mentoring" (p.12).

Etzioni (1965) examined organizational control under three different structures: coercive, utilitarian, and symbolic (or normative). In *coercive* structures, threat or force is used as a physical control mechanism. Prisons are typical organizations where coercive control predominates. *Utilitarian* control uses rewards as the major means of control. Blue or white collar organizations like factories, banks and the peacetime military have formal structures that

supply utilitarian control. “Identitive” control comes from *symbolic power*, which employs symbols and identity to increase employees’ internalization of directives and commitment. Religious organizations and voluntary associations are entities that use identitive control most effectively (pp. 651-2).

Recent studies of organizational control have concentrated on informal control mechanisms like organizational *identity/culture regulation*, *concertive control*, and *peer control* (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; Barker, 1993; Gortner et al., 1987; Kaufman, 1960; Nair, 2010; Tompkins and Cheney, 1985). Although each of these control mechanisms has its own distinctive characteristics, the common feature is that organizational members (either alone or with managerial influence) play active roles during the creation and continuation of the control mechanism.

Tompkins and Cheney (1985) described identification as an effort to lead employees to behave or decide in a way that complies with organizational values and goals. Members of the organization may have different --even conflicting- goals than the organization (George and Qian, 2010; Gortner et al., 1987; Weibel, 2010). Identification, according to Gortner et al. (1987), is the process of merging or aligning individuals’ and the organization’s ultimate goals. Socialization and loyalty play critical roles in this alignment. Socialization refers to the adaptation process through which employees learn and internalize organizational norms and values from handbooks, orientations, meetings and informal gatherings. Loyalty occurs when trust and commitment create “identitive power” between the organization and employee. From this perspective, routine personnel transfers may provide a type of “on-the-job” socialization, while increasing loyalty to the center by building one organizational identity. Indeed Kaufman’s (1960) assessment of the use of frequent transfers to build a distinctive organizational identity in

the U.S. Forest Service voiced the same argument many decades ago. Gortner et al. (1987) further noted that ideological commitment and identification become more important for some departments like the CIA and FBI, as their areas of service are more sensitive (p.225). As the identity internalized by the by employees, identity control works better and creates a kind of self-censorship among personnel. As a result, members start to hold the organization's interests over their own personal interests. For the organization, control through organizational identity or identity formation becomes one of the most effective control mechanisms (Gortner et al., 1987).

Peer control (Loughry, 2010) and *concertive control* (Barker, 1993) highlight the peer relationship and its influence on control processes. Each worker rewards and punishes others depending on the norms and values created and internalized by the contributions and consensus of all team members. Thus, this type of control does not require managerial or external monitoring. Scholars noted that these sorts of control mechanisms, as they are more likely to be effective and inexpensive, especially in service-based organizations. They stress the effectiveness of the control when goal alignment takes place with the consent of the employee (Barker, 1993; Gortner et al., 1987; Tompkins and Cheney, 1985; Weibel, 2010).

The last input from the organizational control literature can be called the *non-functionality* of control mechanisms. Control activities do not always produce positive results. On some occasions, control becomes problematic for organizations when it produces negative reactions from employees, developing tensions between employees and the organization (Barker, 1993). Mitchell (1978) argued that control activities may generate stress for employees who develop physiological reactions; control also is costly in monetary terms. From an employee's perspective, negative physiological and psychological reactions can reflect perceptions of losing personal freedom, control-based behavior selection, and limitations on creativity and flexibility

(pp. 301-302). This stress may affect employee behavior negatively. As a consequence, instead of helping enhance goal attainment, control may cause deviance in an organization. In other words, controlling action can become a reason for deviant behavior (Delbridge, 2010, p. 88).

Another concern is that conflict of interests between organization and employee may produce negative consequences for an organization. Employees may work normal pace when supervisor on the floor, whereas they may slow down the absence of manager. Not all control mechanisms are capable of handling this conflict, or they may be inadequate to detect, prevent, or correct deviant behavior. Furthermore, another type of conflict can be seen between different control mechanisms. The meaning of a deviant behavior to an employee can be different from the management's perspective. Thus, peer control may function differently from a hierarchically designed formal control mechanism (Gortner et al., 1987; Korsgaard et al., 2010; Maanen, 2010; Weibel, 2010).

Among organizational control studies, little research has specifically focused on personnel rotation policy as a control mechanism itself. The rest of the chapter reviews and seeks to integrate studies which mention personnel rotation and its control impact.

Personnel Rotation as a Control Mechanism

Some studies in the organizational control literature examine different aspects of personnel rotation. Most claim that rotation policies can help organizations and have positive impacts on performance. However, others argue that rotation practices also can produce unexpected results. In this section, I concentrate on studies related to control and rotation in both international and Turkish scholarship.

One of the first studies that focused scholarly attention on regular personnel transfers in public organizations is *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior*. Herbert

Kaufman's (1960) research about the U.S. Forest Service sought to better understand administrative control in the organization and the factors behind the Agency's success in unifying the activities of rangers in widely dispersed locations. One of the issues that he examined was the impact of the personnel transfer policy. Regular transfers of personnel were used to build a distinct organizational identity that increased the conformity of rangers with organizational decisions and policies. Such transfers "neutraliz[ed] the forces of localism" on foresters (p.217). While increasing commitment to the organization, frequent rotations of personnel broke local bonds and connections that might "capture" officers. Kaufman also noted that personnel transfers could be viewed as a "device of the development, adjustment and broadening of personnel" (p.176). Circulation allowed rangers to learn from different locations, help each other adapt, and increase a sense of belonging and commitment to the headquarters, sharing similarities and difficulties like members of a family. Kaufman summarized:

Promotion and transfers are thus far more than methods of staffing. As practiced in the Forest Service, they also foster in each officer identity with the agency— with its survival and welfare, with its goals, with its procedures, with its members (p.183).

The second important aspect Kaufman pointed out is that the personnel transfer policy served as an administrative control mechanism to detect and discourage possible personnel deviation from organizational norms, although it was not designed for this specific purpose. With the implementation of each transfer, the successor became a "natural" inspector of their predecessor. All of the files, diaries, documents and decisions recorded during the previous service were accessible to the next officer. As a result, the rangers who checked the documents were able to reveal any earlier inconsistencies with Forest Service policy and report them. This situation also created constant pressure for current rangers, which motivated them to stay inside appropriate

lines and not take any unacceptable actions. Kaufman (1960) ended his study by touching on a downside of the practice: it prevented rangers from having deep knowledge about an area and to use this accumulated experience over time.

Many other organizations have employed regular personnel rotation as a control tool. Some scholars have examined the control effects of such rotations. Some studies found that personnel rotation reduced the risk of work-related musculoskeletal disorders (Frazer et al., 2003; Jorgensen et al., 2005; Rodrick et al., 2006). More relevant here, others reported that employee rotation can be seen as an organizational control method to prevent and detect fraud in organizations (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012). According to the 2012 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse⁵, for example, mandatory vacation/job-rotation reduced fraud by one-third in industries like banking and financial services, government and public administration, and manufacturing. Moreover, the survey revealed that fraud was detected less in organizations that adopted job rotation/mandatory vacation policies, whistle-blower reward programs and surprise audits (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012).

Ickes and Samuelson (1987) argued that routine personnel transfers “prevent corruption- especially in the foreign services- by ensuring that employees do not occupy a job long enough to reap the benefits of corrupt activities” (p.285). De Zwart (1993) and Huberts (1998) echoed this, stating that administrators can employ functional and geographic personnel rotation as preventive tools to limit bureaucratic corruption and fraud. Spending a long time in a position and having extensive knowledge about a jurisdiction or a task can encourage individuals who wants to benefit unfairly from their status. Regular rotation in some critical positions can

⁵ “The 2012 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse is based on the results of an online survey opened to 34,275 Certified Fraud Examiners from October 2011 to December 2011...The data are based solely on the information provided in these 1,388 cases...occurred and completed between January 2010 and the time of survey participation” (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012, p. 65).

effectively reduce such corruption. De Zwart observed that “transfers enable the government to punish and reward the civil servants and help get the right people in the right places at the right time” (p.148). In the same vein, Abbink (2004) conducted experimental research to examine the effects of staff rotation on corruption in the German public sector. The subjects were recruited from Wirtschaftsforschung at the University of Bonn. The students participated in a game designed to probe “stranger” and “partner” relationships in a bribery scenario. He concluded that staff rotation “reduces the levels of bribes as well as the frequency of inefficient decisions due to bribery” (p. 887). Abbink pointed out that trust and reciprocity are among the vital components of corruption, and they can emerge only after long-term relationships develop between public officials and those who seek to bribe them.

Another study conducted by Gounev, Dzhekova and Bezlow (2012) examined the anti-corruption measures related to control of European Union (EU) borders. They mentioned rotation practices many times in their final report as one of the effective control mechanisms (e.g., pp. 8, 82, 92,101,102). The study included several agencies and units that are responsible for border security in 23 EU countries.⁶ Gouynev et al. found that 75 % of the border agencies practice rotation of team members (12 of them widespread rotation, six limited, and four not implemented); 66% of the border agencies randomly rotated officers among different daily duties (nine widespread use, seven limited, and seven not implemented) (p.134). Such rotation “aims to prevent the establishment of durable corruption networks or personal relations with local communities that may influence an officer’s judgment” (p.101). Some of these agencies use geographic rotation in response to petty corruption or as a disciplinary penalty in cases of insufficient evidence to file charges.

⁶ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, and UK.

Similar personnel rotation practices can be found in law enforcement agencies. Prenzler (2009) recommended personnel rotation as a preventive control mechanism to deal with deviant police behavior. He pointed out the disruption of corrupted networks through regular transfers. In addition, Prenzler reminded police of the need for balance in deployment periods, as excessive frequency of transfers can cause loss of knowledge and low personnel morale (p.130). Ross (2012), another policing scholar, listed “routine transfer of police officers” as one of the organizational controls in place to decrease the possibility of police corruption (p.139). Providing sufficient salaries, better training in ethics, careful personnel selection, and external control mechanisms and commissions are other ways to reduce undesired police behavior. Many commissions that have investigated police misconduct and corruption have recommended regular rotation of police officers to prevent corruption and to minimize police misconduct (Fitzgerald, 1989; Mollen, 1994). The Fitzgerald Report (1989) was one of them. The report of “Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct”, known as the Fitzgerald report produced as a product of two years (1987-1989) comprehensive investigation of a long-term corruption and abuse of power in Queensland, Australia. After 238 days public hearing testimony from 339 witnesses, final report has published as 600 pages and made more than 100 recommendations to deal with corruption in the public sector. The report recommended rotation of officers in sensitive or “high risk” areas on a three year to five year basis:

Local misconduct is constrained by a greater risk of exposure, a relative lack of authority, and periodic dislocation caused by transfers, appointments and promotions. Those constraints all vanish and the opportunities for expansion of criminal activities spread as the police involved gain seniority, influence and the ability to protect themselves (p. 208).

The International Association of Chief of Police (IACP) is a leading organization that has served U.S. law enforcement agencies since 1893. IACP aims to “develop and disseminate improved administrative, technical and operational practices and promote their use in police work... and to encourage adherence of all police officers to high professional standards of performance and conduct” (iacp.com, 2014). In order to achieve these goals, the Association established the National Law Enforcement Policy Center in 1987 to create and develop model policies that seek to assist law enforcement agencies in this critical and difficult task. As of March 2015, 127 different model policies recommend and direct law enforcement agencies in several areas, from personnel management to crime prevention. Two of these policies are about personnel rotation practices: the Personnel Transfer and Rotation policy (1994) and the Corruption Prevention policy (1996). Both recommend a carefully designed transfer policy for the good of the organization and police officers. IACP makes procedural recommendations for successful rotation and transfer policies.

The human resource management literature also provides numerous theoretical and empirical studies that examine the positive and negative consequences of job rotation and employee relocation. These studies have found that frequent personnel transfers help organizations to reveal hidden productivity of employees (Ickes and Samuelson, 1987); strengthen identification of employees with the organization (Casad, 2012); promote employee performance (Rehman, 2011); and increase employee learning, employer learning, and employee motivation (Eriksson and Ortega, 2006).

As mentioned above, not all studies agree about the positive impact of personnel rotation on improved control and goal attainment. Some scholars claim that regular transfer of personnel produces unexpected consequences. De Zwart (1993), for example, argued that a regular transfer

practice may be a source of, instead of a deterrent to, corruption in an organization. Starting with the Mogul empire and continuing to state governments in contemporary India, he described a “grab what you could in the shortest possible time” (p.147) logic, contending that only a short time in control led to more corruption. While describing the destructive effect of frequent transfers, DeZwart distinguished between political and administrative transfers: “Administrative transfers serve organizational ends,-like punishing corruption, whereas political transfers serve to enlarge the power of certain politicians or weaken that of their rivals” (p.150). The promotion of corruption reflected the mutual dependency between politician and bureaucrats that creates a dark network where “transfers were used by politicians to provide bureaucrats with opportunities to earn an illegal income from bribes and to force that to share this income” (p. 148).⁷ This argument highlights the purposes and expectations of rotation policies. As can be seen, one practice in different hands can serve two different purposes: prevention and promotion of corruption

In addition, other negative consequences of rotation and relocation practices may prevent personnel from conforming to organizational goals and achieving desired performance. Some studies of job-related relocation extensively examined the psychological side of transfers, including the stress of relocation, the negative effects on households, and the difficulty of socialization after relocation (Green and Canny, 2003; Munton, 1990; Pinder, 1989; Pinder and Schroeder, 1987). Other studies of job rotation underlined its negative effects from an

⁷ One example appears in the article: “Especially in the cities, the smuggling and illegal brewing of alcohol is a big industry. The police are known to patronize bootlegging gangs in exchange for a share in the profits. For a policeman it can be very profitable indeed to obtain post in a city. But he has to invest. The price for a post such as, say, a Deputy Inspector of Police in Ahmedabad (the capital of Gujarat) is said to be about Rs.75,000 (around \$1,100) and for an Inspector of Police that would be Rs.150,000. Higher posts are more expensive because the yield can be higher. Bootleggers pay low ranking policemen to just leave them be. These policemen then have to share the profits with the superiors, who promise not to have them transferred before their time – i.e. before they have at least recovered their investment. In turn, these superiors have to share their profits or otherwise be shifted out. In this way, money is sluiced upward” (De Zwart, 1993, p. 154)

organizational perspective, finding that job rotation prevents job specialization, causes serious loss of productivity, decreases performance, and causes communication and trust problems among personnel (Casad, 2012; Cosgel and Miceli, 1998; Huang, 1999; Ickes and Samuelson, 1987; Morris, 1956). Moreover, Gannon and his colleagues (1972) mentioned that “involuntary job rotation is related to negative outcomes such as increased employee turnover and decreased productivity... also increased tension, anxiety, loss of self-confidence and decreased job satisfaction” (p.447). Prenzler (2009) acknowledged that serious loss of knowledge and damaged morale can occur with compulsory relocation in police organizations (p.130).

Obviously, these studies have examined a wide range of issues and point to many difficulties with personnel rotation. Relatively few studies, though, have examined geographic rotation policies in law enforcement agencies. While assessing the lack of studies about GPR and GPR-like transfer policies in the world, Duru (2012) concluded that as most police forces in developed countries are located at the local level, it is difficult to find law enforcement agencies with transfer policies that include large geographic areas.

Turkish Scholarship

Nonetheless, some research in Turkey has mentioned GPR policies. Gultekin and Ozcan (2000), for example, investigated the effect of elected officials’ involvement in the promotion and transfer of police chiefs in the TNP. The authors concentrated on the influence of political power- as an external control- on the promotions and transfers of ranked police officers. They analyzed and compared the promotional and rotational history of 300 police directors and the perceptions of 306 ranked police officers about the promotion and transfer practices of TNP police chiefs. Among the results of the study were 1) 70% of the participants agreed on the negative influence of external control on promotion and transfer of police chiefs and 2) 56%

indicated that they might consider quitting the TNP due to political influence and its negative effects on police transfers and promotions. Gultekin and Ozcan concluded that political intervention causes serious deviation from organizational rules and influences the promotion and transfers of police chiefs.

Although the study mentioned control and GPR policy, it had limited discussion of the influence of external control and ranked police officers. TNP's human resource statistics says 93% of TNP employees (around 220,000 officers) are sworn police officers, while 7% of the rest are ranked officers.⁸ The impact of GPR policy as an internal control mechanism still needs to be investigated.

Koçöz (2005) examined structural problems in the TNP and accepted GPR policy as one of the most serious human resource management problems. He criticized excessive changes in the GPR regulation and recommended cancelling restrictions on home city and long term assignments. Koçöz, who served as a personnel investigator for many years, stressed the need for a more practical and rational control mechanism in the TNP. Although he assessed GPR and pointed out problematic sides of the policy, he did not evaluate the capacity of GPR as a control mechanism or the administration's control-related expectations.

Hekim (2011) conducted a quantitative study of the GPR preferences of TNP personnel. He examined police officers' province selection behavior in the GPR process, analyzing data that included police officers' preferences collected in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The results indicated that officers did not choose lesser developed provinces despite the monetary incentives for doing so. Hekim also found a moderate, statistically significant relationship (Pearson $r=0.54$, Spearman $r=0.6$ $p=0.01$) between the officers' preferences and the social and economic levels of the provinces in the 2nd region. Although this study was one of the first empirical studies of GPR

⁸ Number of staff <http://www.egm.gov.tr/EN/Pages/staff.aspx> (date accessed: 5/20/2014).

practice, the scope of the examination did not include an in-depth analysis of GPR from a control perspective.

Duru (2012) conducted another study to better understand the safety perceptions of police officers and their impact on province selection decisions. His survey of 900 ranked and non-ranked police officers assigned to the Diyarbakir Police Department indicated that the perception of safety in provinces in the eastern region affected the police officers' selection process as well as their overall satisfaction and performance. Duru found that the officers' perceptions varied depending on the deployment period, distance of the location from a metropolitan city, crime records and household perception. Again, Duru's GPR analysis was limited to the perceptions of police officers and did not focus on organizational control.

In addition, Derdiman (2005) examined the proposed assignment, a compulsory transfer of an officer at the request his/her director due to unacceptable police behavior.⁹ He criticized proposed assignment and noted that uncertainties in the regulation and the room for subjective assessment needed to be corrected. He also pointed out the immediate need for an independent Police Council that would decide on transfers, promotions, retirements and other assignments in more objective and fairer manner, free from any type of external pressure (e.g., political or bureaucratic).

Cerrah et al. (2009) investigated prevention of corruption in Turkey by surveying civilians in metropolitan cities (Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir) and police officers working in traffic departments. They collected data from 1057 participants (486 citizens and 571 police officers) on the general thoughts about routine corruption among citizens and police officers in traffic services. The study also aimed to discover the role of control over traffic police officers to reduce daily corruption. Cerrah et al. concluded that self or peer control takes place more often

⁹ See transfer of police officers upon the request of police chiefs (Article 34 of GPR regulation).

than supervisor control to prevent corruption among police officers; they found a strong need for better control mechanisms. Although the researchers pointed out the relationship between the length of deployment and bribery (pp. 5, 8, 61, 62), they neither related this to the possible influence of GPR nor mentioned the compulsory transfer of police officers who were connected to bribing activity.

A report prepared by the Research Center for Security Studies (GÜSAM, 2014) criticized excessive transfers after an anti-corruption operation conducted in the government and several Ministries in December 2013. The report declared that the TNP executed approximately 210,000¹⁰ transfers with the accusation of police corruption. Finally, Uslu (2012) criticized frequent bureaucratic rotations, which weakened counterterrorism efforts especially in the eastern part of the country as well as the expenses of rotation.

Conclusion

Many other questions about GPR await answers and serious research effort. How do external and internal controls affect GPR implementation? Do members of the organization change the impact of GPR? Does GPR prevent deviant behavior in the organization? How does GPR promote conformity of police officers with organizational norms? What are the effects of GPR on police identity and culture in the TNP?

This chapter summarized many of the consequences that may emerge from organizational control practices and rotation policies. Some studies have argued that personnel rotation is a useful tool to motivate and encourage conformity of employees with organizational goals, to prevent and detect deviant employee behavior, and to address deviance from organizational goals and desired performance. On the other hand, other studies found that personnel rotation policies

¹⁰ This number includes both geographic and department level rotations that do not require geographic moves before and during the regular June circulation. About 50,000 of these transfers were conducted in June 2014.

may cause unexpected consequences, create more deviant behavior and decrease performance. In Chapter 3, I introduce a conceptual framework for developing a fuller understanding of GPR as a control mechanism in the TNP.

CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter introduces the study's conceptual framework, which draws on ideas from existing scholarship. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of where this study can be placed in the contemporary organizational control literature. Then, it describes the content and dimensions of the conceptual framework that I employed to probe the control implications of the TNP's GPR policy. As Chapter 2 suggested, many scholars have been interested in macro-level analysis. Etzioni (1965), for example, preferred focusing on the nature of control mechanisms, pointing out their coercive, utilitarian, and identitive features. Ouchi (1979) classified control mechanisms depending on the sector in which they are located and named them market, bureaucratic, and clan controls. Snell (1992) created a target-based classification, noting that input, behavior, and output are the primary outcomes to be controlled. Unfortunately, however, the organizational control literature has not included many studies that examine a single organizational practice from different control-related perspectives.

From Ouchi's perspective GPR policy can be seen as a bureaucratic control mechanism or one might label the policy as a type of input or behavior control mechanism. When it comes to the nature of the control, on the other hand, Etzioni (1965) provides a more useful approach for understanding GPR policy. As the previous chapter mentioned, a control mechanism can be *coercive*, restricting and punishing undesired behavior; *utilitarian*, rewarding good performance by organizational members; or *identitive/normative*, using symbols, norms and values to increase employee conformity to organizational goals. For Etzioni, one organization or control mechanism may employ all of these in different degrees.

I examined the main question of this study employing Etzioni's broad perspective. Inspired by Etzioni's (1965) control mechanism classification, Davies's (1989) control approach

and Sitkin et al.'s (2010) formality assessments, I created a multi-dimensional conceptual framework (see Figure 3.1) to analyze GPR policy from an organizational control perspective. The conceptual framework includes three dimensions: nature of control, degree of formality and source of control.

The first dimension, nature of the control, is the most important part of the analysis, as it helps one to understand the extent of GPR policy in terms of the kind of control mechanism utilized. Davies (1989) discussed the nature of control in his assessment of administrative staff control systems in the British Civil Service. Adapting Dunsire's (1979) procedural analysis, he classified the administrative staff control into four roles: director, detector, corrector and motivator (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Administrative Staff Control Roles and Practice

	<i>Director</i>	<i>Detector</i>	<i>Corrector</i>	<i>Motivator</i>
Personal	Line manager	Line manager	Line manager	Line manager
		Staff reports and Promotions	Staff reports and Promotions	Suggestion schemes
		Flextime working hours	Disciplinary procedures	Work itself Job Appraisal Reviews and Performance Assessment
Impersonal	Staff inspection Scrutinies	Staff inspection Scrutinizes Establishment control Probation	Staff inspection Scrutinizes Establishment control Probation	

Source: (Davies, 1989, p. 7)

Davies assigned these roles to individual or organizational practices. For example, he placed “Line manager” practices in the director, detector, corrector and motivator roles. One practice may work in several different ways. Which also means line manager executes directive, detective, corrective and motivating task in terms of control at the same time. A line manager in a factory, for example, directs his/her subordinates with certain tasks and orders to complete the production process. In case of a disorder, he/she intervenes in the problems and tried to fix it. Line manager also motivates or punishes his/her subordinates to increase the performance or prevent deviant behavior in a work place.

Building on this approach, I tried to identify and combine various elements of the organizational control literature to produce a comprehensive list of control mechanisms.

Following that, I classified the nature of the control.


- *Directive* control mechanisms determine standards and mandate all employees to comply with organizational goals (Cardinal et al., 2010; Davies, 1989; Mitchell, 1978; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Snell, 1992).
- *Rewarding¹¹ or punitive* control mechanisms rewards or sanction depending on the degree of employee’s compliance with organizational goals (Cardinal et al., 2010; Davies, 1989; Etzioni, 1965; Mitchell, 1978; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Snell, 1992; Weibel, 2010).
- *Detective* control mechanisms uncover deviant behavior and help organizations by revealing where deviance from desired performance has occurred (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2012; Davies, 1989; Kaufman, 1960).

¹¹ “Rewarding” includes “motivating” or “encouraging.”

- *Corrective* control mechanisms are designed to reduce deviation by bringing actions into fuller compliance with rules (Davies, 1989; Fayol, 1949).
- *Preventive* control mechanisms deters deviant employee behavior from occurring (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2012).
- *Cultural/identitive* control mechanisms aim to shape employees' behaviors in ways that are consistent with organizational goals and standards (Etzioni, 1965; Gortner et al., 1987; Kaufman, 1960; Maanen, 2010; Tompkins and Cheney, 1985).

The list could be developed further; however, these types were selected for their relevance to this case and for their frequent use by organizational control scholars.

Figure 3.1 Multi-Dimensional Approach to Understand GPR



The second dimension examines the formality of the control mechanisms. As the previous chapter stated, rules and norms may exist formally or informally in organizations. They also may be complementary or contradictory (Cardinal et al., 2010; Korsgaard et al., 2010; Maanen, 2010). Moreover, formal mechanisms show how the organization explicitly articulates control, may or may not be taken seriously or evenly applied in the organization. The last dimension investigates the primary source of control. Control mechanisms initiated from inside or outside the organization may have different influences (Gortner et al., 1987; Loughry, 2010).

These three dimensions -- nature, formality and source of control-- help in understanding GPR policy. Lastly, the outcomes of implementing control are subject to question. As it is discussed in the literature review, not all control activities produce the expected results for the organization. It is significant to recognize that control-related outcomes of the GPR policy are difficult to measure fully and largely beyond the scope of this project. However, in an effort to better understand the impact of GPR policy, some of the data collected shed light on possible outcomes.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter describes the research design for studying GPR policy in the TNP. I used a qualitative approach to examine the research question. This research is an exploratory case study that employed interviews, participant observation and document analysis. A more complete understanding of how the TNP used GPR as a control mechanism became possible by observing the interactions and communications of individuals who employ this organizational approach as well as by interviewing such individuals.


Case Description

The Turkish national police organization was established on April 10, 1845. The organization was named the “Directorate General of Security” after the Republic of Turkey was created in 1923. The TNP is a nationwide police organization, with more than 250.000 staffers. It protects life and property, enforces laws, and takes measures to combat crimes in Turkey. The TNP is one of three national organizations (along with the Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast Guard Command) that work for public security under the direct supervision of the Ministry of the Interior (TNP, 2012).

Turkey is divided into 81 provinces, and each province is divided into districts. Each district contains one or more municipalities. Municipalities and larger areas are known as “urban settlements.” The TNP is responsible for the security and well-being of these urban areas. The General Command of the Gendarmerie is responsible for rural areas with populations of less than 2000, and the Coast Guard Command is responsible for coastal areas. The TNP is constituted of a central organization located in the capital city of Ankara and hundreds of provincial/district

departments located in the 81 different provinces, which are subordinated under the central organization (See Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Structure of the TNP



Source: TNP's Official website <http://www.egm.gov.tr/EN/Pages/structure.aspx>

Legislation gives the TNP the authority to assign any officer to any place where security is needed (DMK, 1965; DMYDSAIY, 1983; ETK, 1937; TR Constitution, 1982).¹² In particular, articles 4, 5, and 9 of the Regulation on Appointment and Rotation of Civil Servants (DMYDSAIY) require the TNP to follow principles of equal distributions of civil servants and of public services throughout the country.

GPR is one of the TNP's most important managerial processes. First of all, it is compulsory for all police officers. Although there are some exceptions, almost all personnel rotate geographically. The Civil Servants Act of 1967 (Articles 62 and 63) requires that any civil servant who does not officially start his/her next assignment within 15 days face losing government employee status.¹³ Moreover, when rotation combines with promotion, ranked

¹² DMK Article 72 and ETK Article 96.

¹³ This process is also called "automatic resignation."

officers who do not rotate for accepted reasons do not receive the increase in rank until they start their next assignments.

Data Collection

I relied on data and methods triangulation (Denzin, 2009), collecting evidence from multiple sources using different techniques (semi-structured interviews, participant observation and document analysis). Using differing data sources to understand multiple meanings is particularly important in a qualitative study (Gabrielian, Yang, and Spice, 2008, p. 143). Yin (2011), for example, recommends that a researcher gather at least three different reports verbally or in documents to practice data triangulation (p. 81). King (2004) asserts that primary data can be gathered through interviews; however, he adds that comparison of interview findings with other evidence helps researchers confirm and add credibility to results. The primary data of this study were collected through interviews, which described and suggested explanations for the organizational expectations from the GPR policy. Patton (2002) argues that triangulation might help researchers to produce consistent findings, but inconsistencies in findings obtained from different data resources may offer deeper insight (p.248).

The *interview* is the most common method for collecting data in case studies (Yin, 2009, p. 106) and in qualitative research (King, 2004, p. 11); according to Tracy (2013) about 90 % percent of all social science research uses interviews. For example, Kaufman's (1960) study is a concrete example of how interviews can be useful in order to understand an organizational practice. Interviews can reveal respondents' opinions, motivations, and experiences. As some of the key members of the organization developed, implemented, and changed GPR policy, finding out about their perspectives and experiences helped examine the research question. Participants in this study were especially "valuable for providing information and background on issues that

cannot be observed or efficiently accessed” (Tracy, p.132). King (2004) noted that interviews reveal different levels of meaning in practices that organizational studies need to explore. He added that some participants often welcome interviews as a means to clearly express their real thoughts; verification of information in interviews is easier than with other methods, thus reducing possible misunderstanding and misinterpretations (p.21). I employed semi-structured interviews, including open-ended questions. Predetermined questions helped me to collect information, experiences, and perceptions about GPR; however, some interviews turned into in-depth, wide-ranging conversations. For this reason, Noor (2008) finds the semi-structured interview useful, as it provides this flexibility.

Finding appropriate participants and asking the right questions are two of the most crucial parts of interviewing (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; King, 2004; Tracy, 2013). The review of the literature helped me to draft a list of interview questions. Four participants contributed to exploratory interviews in order to tailor the questions and interview flow. In this pilot, I met with one 1st degree superintendent, one 3rd degree superintendent, one Major with human resource management experience, and one Captain. Three of these interviews were conducted face-to-face and one by phone. I realized that face-to-face conversation was more successful method of contact with these participants. Based on these initial interviews, I checked the wording, the order of the questions and decided the phases of interview implementation. I finalized the questions and decided on an interview strategy. At the end of the pilot study, I finalized the interview instrument, which includes 14 questions (and supplementary probes) and directive reminders for me in order to keep the conversation related to the research question. During the interviews, I tried to uncover participants’ understanding of GPR and to distinguish their control-

related statements from each other by asking additional questions designed to probe their thoughts.

Determination of appropriate participants was a critical part of the study. In order to examine GPR as a control mechanism, the first selection criterion was explicit experience of GPR either through a decision-making position or in a human resource management experience. As the TNP's DoPA is one of the first departments responsible for implementing and (when necessary) changing the Turkish National Police Appointment and Rotation Regulation, I first got in touch with managers of the department. I requested a list from the DoPA of current and previous police chiefs who have human resource management experience in department and who lead the organization at the top level; due to official restrictions, however, they could not provide such a list. This difficulty in accessing key information led me to use purposive, strategic sampling (Marshall and Rossman, 2006).

Two additional reasons drove me to contact retired police chiefs and communicate with individuals who were not working as human resource managers at the time of the interview. First was the difficulty of meeting with current officials. Active officials are busy with enormous workloads and limited staffing, especially during the peak time of GPR circulation (May-July, which also was the period for my data collection). The second reason was the official and possibly psychological restrictions that keep current officials from expressing their thoughts freely. Therefore, all of the participants were selected from individuals who had no current connection with the DoPA, either as a police chief or as a human resource manager. This gave me access to key participants and kept responses largely free from possible external pressures. The information and comments they provided were quite valuable.

Starting from the most recent human resource managers who worked in the DoPA, I tried to contact participants and make a possible respondent list by adding these managers' suggestions, a form of snowball sampling. The tentative list included about 30 police chiefs who have long histories with GPR as decision makers or human resource managers. The list could have been longer; however, I excluded individuals who had relatively short appointments (between 2 and 3 years). After securing the list of possible participants, I tried to get in touch with them by phone or email to inform them about the study and request their participation. In order to increase the representativeness of the participants, I included middle-level police officers, non-ranked police officers and guard (bekci) in the participant list.

Eventually, I was able to conduct interviews with 12 participants (see Table 4.1). Contacting the retired police chiefs on the tentative list was quite difficult. Some of these individuals lived in provinces other than the capital city where the DoPA is located. I could not reach 16 of the police chiefs due to limited contact information. These individuals were not using email accounts and their phone numbers were not active at the time of interviews. The ones (five of them) who have email contacts did not answer my request. One respondent could not talk with me due to his cancer treatment. Another participant was part of the pilot study, I had to exclude his comments. Another police chief was conducting a critical investigation and thus he refused my request.

In accordance with Virginia Tech's Institutional Review Board requirements, participants were asked to sign an informed consent form before the interview. I sent the consent form to each participant prior to our scheduled interview and requested that they return it to me either digitally or in hard copy prior to the interview (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Participants, by TNP/GPR Experience, Interview

	Participant Code	Interview Date	Year in TNP	Rank	GPR Experience	Recording type	Interview place /Type
1	PAIG	21-May-14	11 years	Captain	HRM- No transfer yet	Audio recording	Work- Alone face-to-face
2	PHIY	22-May-14	34 year	1st Degree Chief	Decision Maker- 4 transfers	Hand written notes	Home-Alone by Skype
3	PFIM	22-May-14	21 years	2 nd Degree Chief	HRM- 3 transfers	Audio recording	Work – Alone face-to-face
4	PEIT	22-May-14	25 years	1st Degree Chief	Decision Maker- 6 transfers	Audio recording	Café face-to-face
5	PTIY	23-May-14	35 years	1 st Degree Chief	Decision Maker-4 transfers	Audio recording	Café face-to-face
6	PHIM	23-May-14	32 years	1st Degree Chief	Chief Inspector-Decision Maker- 3 transfers	Audio recording	Café face-to-face
7	POIM	24-May-14	18 years	2 nd Degree Chief	HRM - 3 transfers	Hand written notes	Work – Alone face-to-face
8	PTIM	24-May-14	16 years	4 th Degree Chief	HRM - No transfer	Hand written notes	Café face-to-face
9	PNIM	25-May-14	32 years	1 st Degree Chief	Decision Maker - 4 transfers	Hand written notes	Home Alone face-to-face
10	PBIK	7-Jun-14	20 years	Lieutenant	2 transfers	Hand written notes	Work- Alone face-to-face
11	PIIM	8-Jun-14	28 years	Police officer	3 transfers	Hand written notes	Work- Alone face-to-face
12	PSIB	20-Jun-14	25 years	Police guard	No transfer	Hand written notes	Home Alone face-to-face

The TNP work experience of the participants ranged from 11 to 35 years, with an average of 25 years. Other than the police guard and two mid-level police supervisors, all of the participants experienced multiple transfers during their careers.

I conducted the confidential interviews beginning with prepared questions. Additional questions were asked to probe their perceptions. With their consent, conversations were recorded with a digital voice recorder. If a participant refused digital recording, I wrote his/her answers down. Five of the participants allowed me to use an audio recorder. I completed the interviews in Turkey between May 22nd and June 20th, 2014. All of the interviews were conducted in Turkish, and all but one were conducted face-to-face. Interviews were conducted individually at a time and location of the participant's choice. Four wanted to meet in public places, while eight others selected private locations, either in homes or workplaces. The shortest conversation took one hour, while the longest one lasted close to four hours. None of the respondents refused to answer any question, and they also provided the opportunity to ask follow-up and clarification questions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). However, some answers were proportionally shorter than the others.

The interviews sought to probe the organizational logic behind the GPR policy as well as participants' personal thoughts and experiences. Participants responded to some of the questions in terms of the administrative logic, and they mentioned whether they agreed or disagreed with GPR.

These purposefully selected participants were key actors who were able to provide their perspectives as organizational veterans and leaders. Human resource managers and police chiefs are among those who have influenced the TNP's personnel policy over the last 15-20 years. These participants were highly knowledgeable about the subject. Over the course of the data collection process, I learned that the DoPA personnel met with chiefs of city police departments-

several times in seminar and conferences. Revisions of the regulation typically happened after intense discussions among headquarter police leaders and staffers in city and central departments.

A second data resource was *documents*, which included regulations, agendas, announcements, letters, memoranda, reports, and other written items. Documents often help to confirm and augment information obtained from other resources (Yin, 2009, p. 105). I expected that any document related to GPR would help in better understanding the policy. Yin (2009) distinguishes archival records from other organizational documents by stressing their possible quantitative side. I relied on service records, budget records, maps and charts of geographical characteristics, and survey data and personnel records from other studies. Numbers of annual transfers and of police officers by home cities, regional maps, and police crime records helped me analyze, compare, and understand data gathered from interviews and observation.

Another type of document legislation related to GPR. Six major and 26 minor revisions to GPR regulations have been made since the first GPR regulation was released in 1962. I also expected that interview respondents who are responsible for implementing personnel policy would have valuable documents, statistics, or reports. This proved to be the case. Three participants provided additional documents related to GPR, since they had worked for many years as human resource managers. Other documents were received during site observation.

I also used *participant observation* for data collection. I spent four weeks (between May 20 and June 20, 2014) in several workplaces in Turkey, including the DoPA, the Police Academy, the Ilica Police Station, Alacati County, and Ankara. The annual GPR program starts with needs assessment in February and ends with the “General Assignments Order” in mid-June. I observed the DoPA personnel and sought to watch some of their activities such as departmental

meetings. The administration did not allow me to join assignment meetings because of clearance requirements; however, I was able to talk with individuals who attended these meetings about the processes and activities. I observed behaviors and talked with police officers and the public about GPR while they were working, while we were travelling, and while having lunch or dinner.

In addition to participant observation, my 13 years of job experience in the TNP and eight years of related education¹⁴ provided longer term observation data that I tried to use in better understanding GPR.

Indicators of Control

A detailed review of works on organizational control and personnel rotation allowed me to develop ways to look for evidence of control in personnel transfer. First was consideration of formal and informal control mechanisms. Here, formal control is the use of personnel rotation to discourage and detect deviant personnel behavior like corruption or favoritism. Regular personnel transfers discourage and add restraints to personnel deviation from organizational norms, and “deviation cannot long remain hidden under these circumstances, once exposed, cannot long continue” (Kaufman, 1960, p.158).

Thus, rotation, before or after deviant police behavior like bribery or malfeasance, can be seen as a preventive and a detective control practice. Regular geographic rotation of personnel who work in narcotic departments or immediate rotations after a rules infraction are concrete examples of the formal practice of GPR.

¹⁴ I entered Police High School (Polis Koleji) in 1993 when I was 14 years old. It is a four year, residential, government supported high school which educates student for the Police Academy. After graduation in 1997, I continued to the Police Academy and graduated in 2001.

Informal control entails the involvement of many actors (managers, DoPA personnel) and can emerge in an abstract form like identification formation, which promotes self-control through internalization of organizational values. Kaufman (1960) argued that “transfers of personnel is a device for the development, adjustment and broadening of personnel” (p.176). It helps organizations to build identification by the interaction of members with the organization. For Kaufman (1960), regular transfers reinforce a sense of belonging and of being part of an organization because “everywhere, they encounter men with similar interest, similar objectives, similar aspiration, similar complaint and – similar- understanding and appreciation of problems” (p.179).

It was necessary to explore the contribution of personnel rotation as an identitive and concertive control among TNP members. Yet, tapping the rotation - informal control relationship can be more difficult than measuring direct control. In looking for instances of indirect control, I found numerous occasions in which officers who have been transferred several times used similar language in describing those experiences or in discussing their loyalty to the TNP and its values. Information about informal associations (e.g., computer listservs) may be evidence of sharing experiences or routines among those who joined at the same time or served together on multiple occasions. All of these evidently are informal ways of bolstering loyalty and commitment to the job and to the TNP, which I looked for in interviews, documents and observation.

Data Analysis

Scholars suggest several methods to analyze data obtained from interviews (Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). Content analysis is one of the common methods that qualitative researchers employ in their studies (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). The

content analysis in my study started with multiple readings of both the documents and transcripts about GPR. The literature review provided a number of control-related ideas like directive, rewarding, punitive, detective, preventive, and cultural/identitive control mechanisms in addition to the formal/informal control distinction. These perspectives allowed me to create a multi-dimensional approach.

My analysis included two basic phases: preliminary coding and structured coding. In the first phase, I used perspectives in the pre-coding process and manually marked the text in order to get tentative classifications. These broadly defined categories allowed me to identify specific actions that tapped control actions. During this first phase, I followed Miles and Huberman's (1994) recommendations closely. They guide researchers in using raw data for effective content analysis. Their recommendations include three sub processes: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing or verification. Data reduction "refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data" (p.10). Data reduction does not occur only in the analysis phase but also throughout the study. Here, looking for indicators of control was a reduction strategy, leading to exclusion of information not relevant to the research questions. Summarizing, coding, constructing themes, making clusters and partitions, and writing memos served as reduction tools helping decide "which data chunks to code and which to pull out"(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 11). Data displays condense and present information, allowing one to infer conclusions. The last process is conclusion drawing or verification through which interpretation can take place. This part of the analysis helped me to finalize the tentative classifications and groups.

The second phase included detailed coding. During the interview analysis, I used particular codes and sub codes (see Table 4.2). The content analysis process ended by

classifying, grouping, and interpreting GPR as direction, reward and punishment, detection, prevention, cultural/identitive and nonfunctionality. As Chapter 5 will elaborate, some of the control implications received more attention than others when GPR policy was discussed.

Table 4.2 Final Coding Scheme

Codes and Sub codes	Example
Personal	Demographic information about the participants.
Punishment	“If we need to assign someone out of his/her preferences, that person would be an unwanted officer either through the proposed transfer request or by not granting them an extension” (PAIG, May 21, 2014).
Reward	
Detection	“Of course it detects deviant police behavior considering that people are scared by a chief while he has the power but after he leaves they start to fill complain form about him” (PHIM, May 23, 2014).
Prevention	“A police officer can use authority inappropriately against a family member, relatives or friend/enemy due to a conflict” (PEIT, May 22, 2014).
*[Police – family/relatives/friends]	
*[Police – business]	
*[Police – ideology]	
* [Psychological]	
Performance	“Transfers help us to create diverse personnel body which allows young old interaction” (PFIM, May 22, 2014).
Culture/Identity	“Police is the refugee of society” (PEIT, May 22, 2014).
Reverse effect	“While GPP aims to prevent nepotism and favoritism in the organization, it can be a reason for them” (PFIM, May 22, 2014).

Limitations

Like most studies, this study has some limitations. First of all, the qualitative nature of the approach sometimes produces criticisms about the generalizability of the findings (Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Stake, 2005; Yin, 2009, 2011). Although the differing data sources and techniques may well strengthen the validity and reliability of the research, each of these tools (interview, document and observation) has associated limitations. For example, participants may not feel comfortable during interviews if they have negative thoughts about the rotation policy. Moreover, Yin (2009) notes that the availability and accessibility of documents and archival records can produce two types of limitations. On the one hand, limited access can affect the researcher's analysis; on the other hand, an abundance of numeric data can cause a lack of concentration and lead to inefficient use of time. Although relying on three data sources allowed me to triangulate and compare information on different dimensions, organizational resistance and restrictions made it difficult to gain access to entire records, to fully observe, and to reach some important potential interviewees. Moreover, official procedural barriers made it difficult to collect survey data for mixed method analysis.

My position as a member of the organization being studied and working under the GPR regulation was both an advantage and a disadvantage. Although it likely provided greater insight into and access to archival data and interviewees, it also may threatened to increase bias. For example, my recent assignment to the 2nd region while I was still continuing graduate study was a debatable decision. This and similar decisions before and during the study produced some negative perceptions about organizational decisions. On the other hand, my experience in the organization starting from high school allowed me to better understand and analyze the organization and GPR.

Another limitation comes from the scope of the study. In order to be more focused, the study excluded other policies related to personnel management like recruitment, retirement and appointment.

Summary

This chapter reviewed the study's research design, introduction of the TNP organization, data collection, indicators of control, and data analysis. The following chapter addresses the findings on the control aspect of the GPR.

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

This chapter reports the results of the study based on the analysis of the interviews, documents and participant observation. The chapter begins with a brief examination of GPR policy including the history of the regulation and its development of organizational control-related features. It continues with the subtitles which discuss the various organizational control influences of GPR as reward and punishment, detection, and prevention. After the GPR and culture/identity discussion, the chapter ends with assessments of the nonfunctionality of GPR as a control mechanism.

History of the GPR

Rotation of government officials has been practiced for many years in Turkey. Examples of this practice can even be seen in the Ottoman Era before the establishment of Turkey in 1923. “Rotation is a heritage of Ottoman Empire in the public sector; the imperial government was finding inconvenient to assign an official from the same ethnic group as it may difficult to control the group with their leaders” (POIM, May 24, 2014). This government tradition continued in the new state after World War I.

In the early years of the Turkish Republic, the TNP practiced a GPR-like personnel transfer policy under the Civil Servant Act (Memurin Kanunu) of 1926. As one of the first government official laws, the Civil Servant Act declared that transfers of personnel be done by consent; however, administration should not wait for the consent of the employee in the case of deviant behavior (Article 35) or in the case of employees who have had two consecutive years of low performance at the office (Article 77; TGNA, 1926). Another law in 1930, the Interior Civil Servants Act, stated that police chiefs should not be selected from the same jurisdiction in which

they are recorded.¹⁵ The Grand National Assembly of Turkey started to issue more detailed and separate regulations for the national agencies in the 1960s, just after the military coup in 1961.

Directive Nature of GPR: Control in Action

The first designated GPR regulation was published on August 29, 1962 for the TNP. Participants who have human resource management experience mentioned that the TNP has used its organizational autonomy to create, implement and revise its GPR policy, during the entire history of the organization. From this perspective, I can say that the source of these formal rules and regulation is the TNP administration. However, there were few external interventions (e.g., political) on the regulations.

Some examples of the external interventions and formal/informal directives from some bureaucrats can be found in the history of the GPR regulation. Illustrations include the regional placement of the Rize province (from the 1st region to the 2nd region) at the request of the ruling Prime Minister and updating some of the articles related to other regulation changes (e.g., adding a veteran exemption in regard to anti-terrorism laws) (PAIG, May 21, 2014; PFIM, May 22, 2014; POIM, May 24, 2014). The history of the GPR is quite important to understand the formal and informal control impact of the policy. An analysis of the previous GPR regulations reveals that the policy has been revised numerous times over the history of the organization (see Table 5.1).

¹⁵ The term “recorded” refers to the province of origin in which an individual and his/her family are registered.

Table 5.1 History of GPR Regulation

<i>1st GPR Regulation</i> 8/29/1962	Turkish title "Emniyet Mensuplarından Polis ve Komiser Sınıflarında Bulunanların Yerdeğiştirme ve Atanmaları Hakkında Yönetmelik" (5 Regions model)
	05/18/1964 Minor revision - Articles 29, 31, and 32
<i>2nd GPR Regulation</i> 6/18/1965	Turkish title "Emniyet Mensuplarından Emniyet Amiri, Komiser ve Polis Sınıflarında Bulunanların Yerdeğiştirme ve Atanmaları Hakkında Yönetmelik" (3 Regions model)
	05/30/1967 Minor revision- Addition of an Article
	06/11/1970 Minor revision - Province adjustment
<i>3rd GPR Regulation</i> 11/6/1971	Turkish title " Emniyet Hizmetleri Sınıfı Mensuplarının Atanma ve Yer Değiştirmeleri Hakkında Yönetmelik" 2 Regions (2+2 sub regions) model
	02/22/1972 Minor revision - Articles 6 and 49
	04/29/1972 Minor revision - Articles 29,30,33, and 48
	07/20/1976 Minor revision - Article 8
<i>4th GPR Regulation</i> 11/10/1981	Turkish title " Emniyet Hizmetleri Sınıfı Mensupları Atanma ve Yerdeğiştirmeleri Yönetmeliği" 2 Regions (4+4 sub regions) model
	06/16/1983 Minor revision - Article 22
	03/24/1985 Minor revision - Articles 8, 21, 39, and province adjustment
	12/21/1985 Minor revision - Province adjustment
	12/30/1987 Minor revision - Article 16
<i>5th GPR Regulation</i> 8/28/1989	Turkish title " Emniyet Hizmetleri Sınıfı Mensupları Atama ve Yerdeğiştirme Yönetmeliği" 3 Regions (3+3+3 sub regions) model
	06/15/1991 Minor revision - Article 24 and province adjustment
<i>6th GPR Regulation</i> 9/11/1992	Turkish title " Emniyet Hizmetleri Sınıfı Mensupları Atama ve Yerdeğiştirme Yönetmeliği" 2 Regions (3+3 sub regions) model
	05/13/1993 Minor revision - Articles 13, 18, 23, and province adjustment
	08/27/1997 Minor revision - Province adjustment
	01/02/1998 Minor revision - Province adjustment
	05/04/2000 Minor revision - Province adjustment
	01/01/2001 Minor revision Articles 2,3 and province adjustment
	04/08/2001 Moderate revision - 3 Regions (4+3+3 sub regions) model
	03/26/2002 Last revision canceled 2 Regions (7+3 sub regions) model
	09/24/2003 Minor revision - Article 29
	02/06/2004 Minor revision - Article 7
	05/30/2008 Minor revision - Article 43 and province adjustment
	11/04/2008 Minor revision - Articles 1 and 2
	06/29/2010 Moderate rev. - Art. 7, 19, 23, 24, 28, 34, and prov. adjustment
	03/27/2012 Moderate revision 3, 4, 13, 18, 21, 23, 24,29, and 36
	09/09/2012 Minor revision Articles 3, 6, 7, 23, and province adjustment
	04/12/2014 Minor revision Articles 3, 7, and 23

Examination of these revisions reveals that GPR regulation has undergone six major and 26 minor revisions since 1962. If the revision was limited to a couple of articles, the legislative body chose to update only the relevant articles. However, if the revision required a major change like altering a regional organization, the legislature issued a new GPR regulation with a different name, keeping some articles and revising others (PAIG, May 21, 2014; PFIM, May 22, 2014; POIM, May 24, 2014).

GPR regulations refer to organizational control as one of the policy's main purposes in several places. In order to learn participants' initial thoughts, I did not mention that this study was about organizational control while arranging the interviews. For each interview, after a short dialog, I asked the respondent a general question that requested their perspective about the reasons, benefits and drawbacks of GPR. Eight of the participants placed organizational control as the first reason, while three others ranked it second. Only one participant ranked control third. Other reasons included greater organizational equality, better security service and organizational routine.

Document analysis shows that the directive structure and logic of the first GPR regulation (1962) has been maintained for all the following versions. Indeed, this structure and logic constitutes the formal organizational control side of the GPR policy. I summarized the control related structure of the GPR as i) *Provincial prohibition*, ii) *Service length prohibition*, and iii) *Proposed transfers (exile)*.

Provincial prohibition

Starting from the first regulation, the TNP administration did not want to assign police officers to either their province of origin or their province of birth.¹⁶ I elaborate on this below; for now, a closer examination of the evolution of this prohibition is critical. Table 5.2 illustrates the evolution of the province of origin and birth prohibition in detail.

¹⁶ Province of origin is an official term which refers to the province in which an individual and his/her family are registered. Province of birth is the official distinction included by the agency since not all the families live where they are registered.

Table 5.2 Evolution of Provincial Prohibitions

Officer is not allowed to work	1st GPR Regulation 8/29/1962	2nd GPR Regulation 6/18/1965	3rd GPR Regulation 11/6/1971	4th GPR Regulation 11/10/1981	5th GPR Regulation 8/28/1989	6th GPR Regulation 9/11/1992	Revision 03/22/02	Revision 02/06/04	Revision 6/29/10	Revision 04/07/14
If the population of the province less than*	300,000	300,000	500,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	500,000	500,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	750,000
Officer's province of origin (registered province)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Officer's province of birth	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Spouse's province of origin				X	X	X	X	X		
Spouse's province of birth					X	X				
Border provinces of the officer's province of birth			X	X						
Border provinces of the officer's province of origin			X	X						
Officer's province of business relation				X	X	X	X	X		
Spouse's province of business relation				X	X	X	X	X		
Officer's province of 15 year residency						X	X	X		
Spouse's province of 15 year residency						X	X	X		
Marriage with a local person during the assignment	might cause transfer if it affects officer's performance			requires transfer within 2 years			requires transfer within 3 years			

*If more than this population, police officer is assigned to a different county where he/she or their spouse is not recorded. .

Appointment restriction started with the first version of GPR in 1962. Article 3 prohibited an officer from being assigned to his/her province of origin and province of birth. However, there is a population exception. The population exception cancels the provincial restriction if the province has of 300.000 people or more; however, regulation still requires an assignment in a different 'county' than the officer's county/city of origin or birth. In 1971, the rule was revised to include a restriction on provinces which have a border with the province of origin or birth of police officer. This revision also increased the population exception from 300.000 to 500.000 people (Article 5 of 1971 GPR regulation). The next version of the regulation (GPR 1981) enlarged the restriction by adding more conditions. The first condition was about the spouse; officers could not be assigned to their spouses' province of origin (Article 7 of 1981 GPR regulation). The second condition had to do with the business relationships; the provinces and counties where the police officer or his/her spouse had business relationships were excluded from assignment options (Article 7 of the 1982 GPR regulation). The same regulation also increased the population exception from 500.000 to 1.000.000.

Many participants mentioned the influence of the provincial prohibition during their careers. Participant PTIY, for example, described this influence as: "at that time -1970s- we were restricted to working in my place of birth and province of origin as well as my wife's province of birth and province of origin. For my case, when I graduated from the Police Academy, I was limited to working in 17 provinces in Turkey due to that regulation" (May 23, 2014). Records show that there were 67 provinces at the time of PTIY's graduation year. During his career, he was not allowed to work or live in almost 25% of the country because of provinces where his family and friends live.

In 1989, the TNP administration canceled the border provinces restriction, added the spouse's birth and business province while keeping the rest of the prohibition the same. However, in the 1992 GPR regulation, the TNP administration enlarged the prohibition again by adding a restriction on the provinces¹⁷ where the officer or spouse lived more than 15 years. Revision also decreased the population exception back to 500,000 people (Article 5 of 1992 GPR regulation). Revisions of the province of origin and birth prohibition continued in the years after this last version of GPR regulation. The administration canceled the spouse's province of birth from the restriction list in the 2002 revision and increased the population exception to 1,000,000 in 2004.

Another restriction appeared on all the versions of the regulation was that of a marriage between an officer and a local woman or man during an assignment (see Table 5.2, last column at the bottom). Between 1964 and 1981, marriage to a local person was causing a transfer only if this marriage affected the officer's behavior or performance in a negative way. Between 1981 and 2002, however, the TNP administration required compulsory transfer within two years after the marriage whether it affected officers' behavior or not. The administration also extended this two-year-rule to three years between 2002 and 2010. Interestingly enough, in 2010, the TNP administration cancelled all the restrictions regarding spouse, officer's province of birth, 15 year residency and business relationships, but kept the restrictions regarding the officer's province of origin and 1,000,000 population exceptions.

Later, with a legislative change in April 4, 2014 in the Metropolitan Municipality Law, the population exception decreased to 750,000 people. With this last revision, police officers are prohibited only from working in their province of origin or county of origin if the province

¹⁷ If the province was not an officer's or spouse's province of origin or birth, or the provinces where they had business relationships.

population is less than 750,000 people. The implementation of the last revision excluded 29 out of 81 provinces.¹⁸ Participant PFIM (May 22, 2014) motioned that the DoPA tried to refuse the Metropolitan Municipality Law revision and keep the 1,000,000 limits; however, resistance was not possible. Thus, participants PFIM and PTIM believe the possible impacts of the recent changes need to be investigated.

Service length prohibition

The second directive feature of the GPR structure can be termed as the service length prohibition. The TNP administration has been sensitive for the long term officer assignments. Starting from the first regulation, the TNP administration has not allowed long-term deployment in any location. Under the regional arrangement and certain service periods for each province and county, the TNP administration has practiced a constant circulation of personnel for decades. Table 5.1 shows the different regional arrangements over the TNP's history. The TNP administration required each police officer to work in different regions during his or her career. Each region has various durations of assignments determined according to social, economic, cultural, accessibility and security related differences and the similarities of the provinces and counties (TNPARR, 1992). After experimenting with different combinations, the TNP has been using the two region model (Seven sub regions for the 1st region and three sub regions for the 2nd region) since 2002. The deployment period goes from three to 10 years in the 1st region and two to six years in the 2nd region. The service length prohibition also includes a second assignment ban, which means an officer may not be assigned to the same province a second time unless it is necessary. Although the second assignment ban was softened with the five-year rule (TNPARR,

¹⁸ Before the revision (16 provinces): Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Erzurum, Gaziantep, İstanbul İzmir, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Konya, Mersin, Sakarya, and Samsun. After the revision (13 provinces): Aydın, Balıkesir, Denizli, Hatay, Malatya, Manisa, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, Muğla, Tekirdağ, Trabzon, Şanlıurfa and Van (Total 29 provinces)

1992, p. Article 7–c), the TNP administration was not willing to allow a second assignment in the same location, particularly for those who had problems in their previous deployments (PTIM, May 24, 2014; PFIM, May 23, 2014).

Implementation of service length prohibition results in at least three transfers during a career for a single police officer. Participant POIM estimated that the average number of transfers will increase due to the increase of retirement age up to 65. He elaborated: “since the retirement conditions are not good enough, police officers will prefer to work till the age limit. Then a typical police officer has to transfer at least four times during his/her 25-30 years career” (May 24, 2014).

Proposed transfers

A third feature of the GPR structure is the proposed transfer practice, which also can be called “exile”. All of the GPR regulations through the organization’s history have designated *Mandatory Transfer Section*. Article 31 (1962 GPR) and Article 29 (1965 GPR) declared that governors may request transfers for police officers who were labeled “unqualified officer” or who displayed immoral and unethical behavior in the province; officers who committed a crime and were punished due to a crime; and officers whose family member(s) had serious moral or ethical problems in the jurisdiction. The 1971 GPR regulation gave authorization of proposed transfer to the police inspectors (Article 46) and department chiefs in addition to governors (Article 45). The 1981 GPR regulation added police officers who were released after suspension, custody, or arrest due to a problem on the job (Article 36) and officers who received low performance scores for two consecutive years (Article 37). The proposed transfer practice stayed quite similar in the following revision. The only addition in 2012 was about the performance score.

If a police officer receives low performance score for the first year, the department shall rotate him/her within the borders of the same province. If an officer receives another low performance score after rotation, the department sends the police officer to an in-service training program. If police officer fails the exam after in-service training or receives a third low performance score despite success on the exam, the department shall transfer the personnel (Article 36).

This punitive use of GPR will be discussed more in the coming section. However, it is important to mention that this rule is one of the least modified and longest-lived rules in the TNP. Related to this rule, it is also important to remember the first Civil Servant Act (Memurin Kanunu) (TGNA, 1926) and its mandatory transfer explanation related to deviant behavior (Article 35) and low performance (Article 77).

GPR as Reward or Punishment

One of the first considerations about GPR from a control perspective is its usage of reward and punishment. The analysis of interview data revealed that the TNP uses transfers as a reward and punishment tool to motivate and encourage employee conformity with the organizational goals and to punish and discourage deviant behavior in the organization. All of the participants agree on that this employment of the policy exists both formally and informally.

Recognizing the inadequacy of this reward and punishment system in the organization and understanding the DoPA's decision-making for process transfers are critical to see how transfers become punishments or rewards for police officers. Many participants shared their feelings and experiences about the reward and punishment approach while describing the process of rotation decision-making behind closed doors in the DoPA. Before reporting their thoughts

about the process, I will start by mentioning one of the first formal examples of reward and punishment implementation and GPR's relationship to education.

The practice of rewarding desired performance and good behavior while punishing low performance and deviant behavior starts at the very beginning of police officers' careers. Participant PHIM (May 23, 2014) mentioned two traditions in police training institutions (the Turkish National Police Academy ¹⁹ and the Police Vocational Collage ²⁰) and an recent important revision of the first assignment rule related to topic.

The first tradition is the "discipline score". Each student receives 100 discipline points when they are accepted to a school. They are told that any time they violate a rule (written and declared discipline rules about certain behaviors), they are subject to a discipline investigation which may end in various punishments like losing points from the discipline score or earning suspensions. The discipline score is important for securing a student's status. Having fewer than 60 discipline points any time during education brings loss of student status, which causes dismissal from the school.

The second tradition is "rewards in graduation". It is a quite old tradition in police training institutions that the best five students in the graduate ranks received several awards as well as the right selection of the first provinces in which to work (starting 1971²¹). The number of students was revised in 1981 so that "5 percent of graduated students, a maximum of 10 students" could select their provinces. The rest of the cadets joined a lottery ceremony in which each student picked a ball from a bag which had one of the remaining provinces' names on it.

¹⁹ This is a bachelor level University that graduates approximately 300 ranked police officers each year.

²⁰ Two year vocational community colleges (in 26 different locations) graduate approximately 1500 non-ranked police officers.

²¹ Article 8 of the GPR regulation of 1971.

These practices were the first examples of rewarding or punishing members of the organization. A recent regulation revision, however, enlarged and modified the influence of these scores. After the revision of March 27, 2012²², the TNP administration wanted to combine the discipline scores with academic grades to determine the graduation rank list. Moreover, the lottery was replaced with an “open selection model”, which allows students to select the city departments in which they are allowed to work from the list depending on their graduation rank. Since then, each student has been evaluated and ranked with the arithmetic mean of academic success over four (Academy) or two (Vocational College) year GPAs (out of 100 points) and discipline scores (out of 100 points).²³

It can be said that the TNP gives its first clear message to its future members by putting academic performance and positive behavior at the center of the first assignment decision. This organizational logic continues after graduation. However, practicing an elaborate and fair reward and punishment system in such a huge organization is not an easy task. The general perception evidently is that the reward/punishment system is not effective at encouraging compliance with the TNP’s goals. Participant PEIT expressed: “there is no need to hide that the TNP does not have a serious, institutionalized, and effective reward/punishment system” (May 22, 2014).

From the reward perspective

There are only two types of formal institutional rewarding practices in the organization:

i) a monetary reward (Maas taltifi) and ii) a certificate of appreciation (Takdir Belgesi).

Participant PHIM mentioned that “it is hard to process the monetary rewards, since it is related to budgetary processes. Although issuing a certification is easier than the monetary reward, a piece of printed paper does not make sense for many officers” (May 23, 2014). Due to the lack of a

²² Article 13 of the GPR regulation of 2012.

²³ Each year the DoPA collects the personnel needs from each city department and determines which city will receive how many new police officers (e.g. 100 for Istanbul, 85 for Ankara, or 30 for Izmir).

comprehensive reward system, the department chiefs use transfers as a reward for “good officers” who internalized the organizational goals and standards and stay away from deviant behavior.

Participant PTIY described this informal use of GPR: “The TNP administration rewards police officers sometimes by accepting their one year extension request or sending them to a good province” (May 23, 2014). As the provinces where officers work or will be deployed affect their lives deeply, transfers are extremely important for police officers and their families. Some families even have to live separately for a couple of years, as they could not move as a family due to several reasons (e.g. spouse’s career, education of children or terrorism threat). Therefore, granting the request of a one year extension in the current province or deployment to the first choices among an officer’s seven preferences becomes a critical decision.

Participant PAIG (May 21, 2014) detailed several factors which influence individual rotation decisions. According to the model, GPR commission members take more than 30 factors into account in deciding about each rotation.²⁴ Police officers’ personal files, performance scores, presence of investigations, and other information play important roles in determining whether a transfer takes place and, if so, where the next destination will be. Participant PAIG added: “we start appointments from the officers who have a high performance score. They are most likely to get their first or at least one of the first three choices at the end of the process” (May 21, 2014). Talking about this, PTIM said:

For the transferring of police officers who have worked in difficult provinces – for example a 2nd region province Sirnak that has two year service time-, the GPR

²⁴ Indeed this is why the process takes about four to five months to arrange around 60,000 rotation decisions (PTIM, May 24, 2014).

commission tries to send them to their first choice in the rotation as long as the province is allowed. This is a long tradition in the personnel department (May 24, 2014).

Similarly, allowing an officer who requests to stay one more year at the same location to do so is another type of reward (POIM, May 24, 2014). All of these are examples of informal control practices.

From the punishment perspective

Punitive usage of GPR also occurs formally and informally. Although many sanctions are attached to written rules and regulations which try to regulate officers' behavior, supervisors typically are not willing at first to take official action against deviant behavior. Participant PTIY used the term "administrative mercy" to describe this occupational conservatism (May 23, 2014). Even for police officers with serious, chronic behavioral and administrative difficulties, police leaders are reluctant to start investigations to address the problems. Instead, they prefer shifting the problem to other locations by using GPR as an "escape" (PTIY, May 23, 2014). Indeed, when evaluated from other officers' perspective, merely transferring officers from one place to another instead of applying other types of serious sanctions in response to disciplinary violations can be seen as a reward. Participants PEIT, PHIM and PTIY stressed that since the TNP does not have an effective system of punishment, department chiefs use transfers as punishments.

Participant PTIY described how transfers are used to discourage officers: "The TNP administration punishes police officers who produce problems for the organization and have low performance scores by exiling the officers, assigning them to difficult places outside their lists of preferences or ignoring their extension requests" (May 23, 2014). Derdiman (2005) defined "proposed transfers" as administrative actions that request a transfer of a police officer to a different location without their consent due to the officer's undesired police behavior. The TNP

administration rotates police officers upon a request for transfer from a police chief or inspector due to officers' immoral or unethical behavior of the officer or that of family members ²⁵ (Article 34), and they also transfer officers following two consecutive years of low performance (Article 36). The implementation of such proposed transfers, however, is difficult, as they require concrete evidence and formal reports about the undesired behavior. Given considerations of the difficulties posed by labeling someone a "bad cop" in personnel files, administrative mercy again often emerges; instead of filing a proposed transfer form, police chiefs use GPR transfers to send a problematic police officer to another province (POIM, May 24, 2014; PTIM, May 24, 2014; PTIY, May 23, 2014). According to PAIG, "if we need to assign someone out of his/her preferences, that person would be an unwanted officer either through the proposed transfer request or by not granting them an extension" (May 21, 2014).

In addition to this formal control practice, police chiefs and the DoPA also have informal ways to use transfer as a punishment. PNIM illustrated this informal use:

Police chiefs, most of the time, do not reject a subordinate's extension request at the beginning; however, if they do not want to work with that officer for the next year, they call the DoPA in person and express their real decision verbally And he/she makes sure that transfer of that personnel will take place. At the end of the day the chief pretends like he has no idea why the transfer happened (May 25, 2014).

As a result, ignoring a one-year extension request and not helping police officers to stay an additional year can be seen as another type of punishment. It is obvious that most of the punitive transfers described take place following undesired or deviant police behavior or after two consecutive years of low performance.

²⁵ An officer's parents and children are considered to be family members.

GPR as Detection

On some occasions, rotation also helps the organization to detect undesired police behavior. This detective influence of GPR is an important means of exercising control in an organization. I asked interviewees to indicate whether GPR works to detect deviance in the organization. They responded that although detection is not the primary purpose of the policy, GPR transfers help the organization discover some irregularities or police misconduct after the transfers are completed. The detective control features of GPR are both formal and informal. (PFIM, May 22, 2014; PAIG, May 21, 2014; PTIM May 23, 2014; PTIY May 23, 2014; PHIM, May 23, 2014).

Participant PFIM used a legal procedure as an example. Article 137 of the current Civil Servant Act (Law No: 657) states that a government official may be suspended from work if he/she is considered to be harmful or a risk for performing a task. Although the Act does not mention rotation, the GPR regulation elaborates this official action with a further step. Article 35 allows the TNP administration to transfer any police officer if they are suspended or arrested due to suspicious activity. The purpose of this procedure is not only to provide a proper environment for a serious investigation, but also to send a message to its members about the negative consequences of being suspended. PFIM observed that “although it is quite a controversial case, a massive transfer wave that started just after the December 17-25, 2013 corruption operation against the government can be placed under this type of practice”. The purpose of a new team was to find evidence of undesired activity by the previous team (May 22, 2014).

Transfers also may reveal undesired police activity in a jurisdiction without an investigation or suspension. One participant talked about possible “dirty relationships” between police officers and business owners: “The arrival of a new ‘honest’ officer can uncover a bribing

relationship between officers and other people” (PAIG, May 21, 2014). PTIY gave an example from his career.

After my assignment to the [X] department, I realized the previous chief [Y] used some of the unregistered revenue of the department for his own expenses by excluding it from the financial control. I first got rid of the Captain [Z] who worked with the previous chief and helped him to use that money illegally. Nobody understood my reaction, because I did not tell or declare what I found out. They also criticized me, when I replaced one of the experienced officers from the department “without a reason”. I could not start an investigation, as I did not want to create problems for my predecessor (May 23, 2014).

This is a telling illustration. Most of the time, transfers help an organization to reveal negative police behavior in the jurisdiction if there is any. However, not all successors take official action in response to existing problems for reasons like the “blue code of silence”²⁶ (PHIM, May 23, 2014) or “administrative mercy” (PTIY, May 23, 2014).

Based on analysis of the interviews and my observation of many years, I listed several types of successors’ reactions to the detection of predecessors’ deviant behavior. They include i) indulgence and continuation of deviant behavior, ii) termination of deviant behavior but no legal action and iii) termination of the behavior and starting an investigation. The majority of the participants agreed with Participant PHIM: “If I had experienced this kind of issue -detected a problem- in my new assignment, I would stop this problem first. However, if the problem was not a big one, I would not prefer to start an investigation into the previous officer.” They asserted that “if the problem was a serious one, of course, there is no other option other than to report it” (May 23, 2014).

²⁶ The blue code of silence refers to an informal rule among police officers that prevents them testifying against each other (Kleinig, 2001)

Participant PTIM observed that detection also happens with the help of citizens. He noted that in the case of oppression by a police chief, pressure on people can disappear with the chief's transfer, and residents who were scared may start an official complaint process (May 23, 2014).

Many actors may shape the use of GPR to detect problems. Formal investigation requires organizational involvement, while more informal criticisms appear through individuals' intervention from both inside and outside the organization.

GPR as Prevention

As the introduction to this chapter pointed out, two of GPR's main prohibitions are those for province selection and length of service. During the interviews, I probed the organizational control concerns behind these restrictions. The TNP administration assumes that allowing officers to work in their registered/related provinces or for long periods of time in a single province generates more undesirable than desirable outcomes. The participants in this study reacted to this expectation in different ways and provided examples and evidence from their experiences. This section starts with general evaluations of the preventive use of GPR policy and detailed descriptions of how prevention works by constant circulation of officers.

The main purpose of restrictions is to weaken the bonds between the police officers and the communities in which they serve, which reflect kinship, friendship, ideology, and business relationships and emerge from long-term assignments. Police chiefs see these bonds as too risky since they might keep police officers from performing professionally (PFIM, May 22, 2014; PHIY, May 22, 2014, 2014; PNIM, May 25, 2014; PTIM, May 24, 2014). From the TNP's perspective, provincial or service length-related prohibitions reduce the possibility of deviant police behavior and weaken factors that affect officers' performance negatively.

Detailed examination of the evolution of the provincial prohibition (Table 5.2) highlights that the restriction based on an “officer’s province of origin” has been in place throughout the history of GPR regulation. Moreover, between 1971 and 1989, other border provinces were added to the restriction list. This addition increased three to five times the number of prohibited provinces. A related change was made to the population exception rule,²⁷ which allows conditional provincial assignment. Starting in 1962, the population limits have increased with the country’s population until the 1992 revision. Such increases from 300,000 to 500,000 in 1971 and 1,000,000 in 1981 and 2004 produced decreases in the numbers of restricted provinces. Similarly, decreases in population size thresholds in 1992 and 2014 increased the number of restricted provinces. Table 5.2 is clear that restrictions on service in officers’ province of birth were among the major serious restrictions between 1962 and 2010. The TNP also has had concerns related to spouses’ provinces of origin (between 1982 and 2004) and birthplace (between 1981 and 2002).

Another important restriction was related to the business relationships of police officers and their spouses. Between 1981 and 2010, the TNP was quite careful not to assign an officer to a province where he/she had a business connection. Furthermore, between 1992 and 2010, the administration included a “15 year residency” restriction for both officers and spouses to prevent officers from working in certain provinces. This rule was designed to include police officers who had lived many years in places other than their province of origin or birth.

Overall, table 5.2 shows that restrictions limiting the number of available provinces for police officers increased exponentially from 1962 to 2010. In particular, it seems that the three decades between 1981 and 2010 were the most restrictive. It is easy to see high levels of delocalization in GPR practice through several formal arrangements.

²⁷ Officers must not be assigned to their registered county.

Yet, how can these prohibition practices be justified from an organizational control perspective? Questions 6 and 7 sought to collect participants' thoughts about prohibitions on provincial assignments and service length. In response, participants mostly mentioned the officers' connections with communities and the negative influences on officer behavior and decisions. Analysis of their statements revealed that they believed that such bonds might either cause deviant behavior or decrease performance.

Prevention of deviant behavior

The first problematic relationships participants noted were bonds related to family, relatives, and friends (PEIT, May 22, 2014; PFIM, May 22, 2014; PHIM, May 23, 2014; POIM, May 24, 2014; PTIY, May 23, 2014). Participant PHIY observed:

Security agencies are critical institutions which have the authority to limit fundamental rights when it is necessary. Therefore, being fair and impartial is the most important issue for an officer. However, family, relatives, or friends may negatively influence an officer's objectivity while he/she works (May 22, 2014).

Participant PEIT added that "a police officer can use his/her authority inappropriately against one of his member of family, relatives or friend/enemy due to a conflict" (May 22, 2014).

Consistent with this concern, the DoPA will not assign a divorced officer to the same province as a former spouse or to the former spouse's province to prevent undesired situations. Participant PAIG described a possible undesirable situation: "a divorced officer (as a son or daughter-in-law) can annoy the other side or vice versa. The worst situation can happen if one of them tries to get revenge using his/her authority" (May 21, 2014).

Participant PHIM noted possible pressures on officers from the outside: "There is a possibility that police officers will not take legal action or will indulge a crime if he/she realizes

the suspect is family, relative or friend” (May 23, 2014). PHIM added, “Some police officers may hope to benefit from this indulgence ‘I will not do anything this time but you got to repay me for this. You know what I mean?’ ” (May 23, 2014). He concluded by saying ; “I do not know how common this deviant behavior -indulgence and officer’s expectation- is in the field, but I am sure, this is the main concern that the police chiefs hesitated about with provincial appointment.” According to PFIM, “No officer wants to have a problem from his/her family or friend, especially when they live together. Thus, in some situations, the rule of kinship or friendship takes precedence over the rule of law” (May 22, 2014). Participant PBIK added: “not for the criminal cases, but for some administrative procedural issues, officers may be quite tolerant of the people whom they know and have connections and bonds already” (June 7, 2014). Participants connected their evaluation with a cultural features of Turkish communities. “People around police officers have many expectations from them as parent, uncle or friends. Especially, when a person has a senior position in the agency, the expectation becomes high” (PTIY, May 23, 2014). These expectations sometimes adversely affect officers’ decisions. Indeed, some incidents that participants reported justified these concerns. Participant PTIY recalled an event from the 1980s:

I was responsible for the county on that night. We got a call about a fight between two groups in a neighborhood. We (my deputy and I) arrived at the area quickly. When we saw the groups, I pulled over the car in order to stop the conflict. My colleague did not come out after me. When I checked on him back in the car, he was hiding behind the dash board. I asked what was going on. He said one group in the fight was his relatives. They were from the next province; however somehow they had come to our province and got into a fight. My friend was shocked when he realized it was them and said, ‘If I do

something to them I might have be serious problem. I'd better not to come' (May 23, 2014).

Participant PHIY shared a similar experience. In his case, his deputy ignored his orders to intervene in a group of protesters. When PHIY asked the deputy why, the deputy replied that he planned to settle in that province and spend his retirement among those people. The deputy defended himself, saying "How will I look them in the face tomorrow? I don't want to get in trouble" (May 22, 2014).

Indeed, two exceptional positions in the TNP allow one to compare the effects of localization and delocalization from a control perspective. One is the guard/night watch (bekci) and the other is the village protector (koy korucusu). These types of officers worked with the police organization, and they were not expected to rotate geographically. Because these institutions are not active today, new members are no longer hired. I interviewed one of the retired guards (bekci). This participant, PSIB (June 20, 2014), agreed that social pressures influenced his work. However, he said "when the case was related to a crime, there is no choice but to follow rule of law for an officer". He added that for small issues, he had to forgive many of his friends and family members or talk with the police chief on their behalf. Even he noted that "one day my chief said to me, 'Guard X, you are good in work and a perfect colleague; however, the only weak side of you is that you protect your fellows too much.'" One controversial incident from the 1970s greatly affected him. PSIB lived in a coastal city in Turkey where he has been his entire life. In the summer of 1971:

I was patrolling when I heard a double gunshot. When I ran out to the sound, I saw one of my distant relatives and my friend sitting in the bar drinking beer. My relative was a police officer in another province (2 hours away from there) and was not allowed to be

home officially at that time. After a short talk in the bar, I decided to let him off by doing nothing, as I did not want to struggle with my friends. However, while I was on the way out, my relative –drunken- shouted at me and said “Heey! Guard X Your gun does not work here” with a disparaging tone. Right after they stepped out of the bar, he again shot his gun twice. Other officers arrived at the scene and wanted to take him to the station. He resisted and attacked the officers and then pointed his gun to me and pulled the trigger. Thankfully, the gun did not fire. I jumped on him and took him down. When we checked the weapon, we figured out that it was a capsule failure that caused it not to fire the bullet... He spent the night in the lock up. Next day, in the early morning, other family members and everyone who heard about the event rushed in to the station and talked with the chief. Of course, everybody mentioned our kinship and tried to offer a middle way to fix the problem. The Chief talked to me, saying “What do you want? Do you want to report this to the center? It is up to you.” And he added, “All good to me. Do it or not. Eventually, you are relatives, if you wanna cover it up, I can understand.” I thought about it, you know he was under the influence of alcohol, nobody was hurt, he has a family, a girl, and he most likely will lose his job due to his illegal presence in the town and use of a gun. I also thought that it would be difficult for me to keep the same relationship with my family and friends if I reported. Finally, I decided not to report it (PSIB, June 20, 2014).

This event is particularly important as it shows the seriousness of the results of bonds that influence officers’ decisions in ways that the organization would not approve. Although PSIB stated that indulgence happens in simple cases, this example was a serious felony (attempted murder) committed by a police officer who should not have acted so irresponsibly. From an

organizational control perspective, the result is devastating. From a judicial point of view, each part raised serious problems: discharging a gun in a public place, assaulting police officers, attempting to kill a guard, covering up and not reporting any of these problems. “Administrative mercy” also can be seen.

Another bond participants mentioned was the possible *ideological bond* between officers and various groups and organizations. Respondents stated that the TNP does not want to leave officers in the middle of a dilemma between commitment to the organization and to other groups of which they are members. Participant PTIY elaborated, mentioning Turkey’s ethnic diversity and the high levels of conservatism of many ethnic groups. He gave the example of the Kurdish community in the eastern part of the country: “there has been an effort not to assign Kurdish police officers to a province where the Kurdish population is high, especially after the increase in terror movements in the 1990s” (May 23, 2014). He justified this organizational sensitivity by focusing on security considerations given separatist terror organizations that claim to represent the Kurdish people. PFIM added: “the TNP administration believes that officers from the same ethnicity will not be able to perform objectively and impartially” (May 22, 2014). He also used United Nations peacemaking practices in some countries to explain this logic: “outsourcing police officers has been used as a method in critical jurisdictions not because local officers are unreliable but to prevent the possibilities of negative situations.” He stated as well that the Turkish case does not require such UN-like sensitivity: “However, the TNP is being careful.” (PFIM, May 22, 2014).²⁸

Participants’ evaluation of provincial assignment focused on relationships between bonds and deviant police behavior. Mentioned as well was that “staying in a jurisdiction for a long time

²⁸ It is important to mention that the conflict in the eastern part started in 1985 and worsened during the 1990 and 93. However, GPR delocalization of officers has a longer history.

makes that place the home city of the officers. Further relationships are emerging and they are building family bonds, friendship, or enmity in the area” (PTIY, May 23, 2014).

They voiced slightly different concerns about *long term assignments*. Long-term assignments most likely create *business-related bonds*, which may cause deviant police behavior as well. Participant PNIM observed: “When police officers stay a long time in a province, they start to use their knowledge and experience for their self-interest -not for the organization’s good” (May 25, 2014). Participant PFIM expected that “long-term contact with criminals and rich individuals increases the possibility of creating a dark network in a jurisdiction. And time plays a critical role for this type of relationship” (May 22, 2014). He added:

After some years of experience, some of the officers are trying to benefit from their position and knowledge by starting a business in their area. Most of them are being car dealers or real estate brokers. Some others are trying to sell some products (honey, olive oil or hazelnut) from their home cities. (May 22, 2014)

Indeed, during my career, I have seen many officers who tried to get extra money in these ways, even though the TNP forbids it. Some police officers even tried to earn money from the gun/ammunition trade by using opportunities and their official identities. Being in business is normally forbidden, so officers use other people (a friend or business partner) secretly to keep their business. Since the length of time in an area affects the possibilities of having a business, the TNP expects that circulation will decrease the likelihood of this happening. In sum, the TNP administration has serious concerns about bonds that increase the possibility of deviant police behavior like neglect of duty, corruption, nepotism, malfeasance of authority and involvement in forbidden business.

Prevention of low performance

Not all influences from family and friends call for deviant behavior; some of them are quite understandable but still hurt officers' work lives. Among the reported difficulties are the needs and demands of relatives, environmental distractions, administrative blindness and long-term hardship.


Most of the participants talked about the general human resource characteristics of the TNP and its negative effects on performance. Participant PHIY mentioned that "families and relatives are a constant distraction for officers with their never ending needs and expectations" (May 22, 2014). Participant PHIM described one example: "As most of the officers come from middle income families that make their living from agriculture or animal husbandry, they always need manpower to finish their work" (May 23, 2014). As a result, over time officers decrease attention to and motivation for their jobs and spend more time doing agricultural work. Participant PTIM used the expression that "policing becomes their hobby" to describe this situation. Due to these concerns, some participants mentioned that they oppose even neighboring province assignments. When it is not possible for police officers to work in their home provinces, they mostly prefer to live in within one and two hours away. This situation causes other negative consequences. PHIM stated:

I criticized the provincial prohibitions a long time, since I believe it was not fair to urge officers to work away from their families. As I moved up in administrative positions, I started to see the necessity of this prohibition. Based on my experience, now I find it inappropriate to assign officers not only to their province of origin but also to neighboring provinces. Most of the officers who work near their hometowns prefer to live next to their families/relatives and commute to work. However, in order to decrease travel expenses, they either use buses without paying money or hitchhike while they are

in uniform. Both situations hurt the TNP's image. Besides, they are late, clocking out early... Furthermore, in case of an emergency, it is impossible to reach them. They turn off their phones, go their garden or field to work. Even when they are reachable it is impossible for them to be ready to go to an address in a short time. That is the main reason why I find neighbor city assignments problematic (May 23, 2014).

Following these conversations, I wanted to see the distribution of police officers depending on their registered provinces of origin. I acquired a personnel list (see Appendix A) which shows the number of police officers and their registered provinces of origin for 2014. I transferred the numbers and created a thematic map that shows the density of personnel based on their provinces of origin (see Figure 5.1).


Figure 5.1 Density Map: Police Officers' Province of Origin



The map shows where the TNP gets the most and the fewest of its members. The darkest blue provinces are places where most of the members join while the lightest blues have the

fewest. Participants' argument about their parents' needs for labor closely matches the picture. Agriculture and animal husbandry are the main sources of income in the middle region. Participant PFIM stated: "if a police officer does not work in his/her province of origin, the possibility of officers engaging in agriculture work decreases to around 1%." (May 22, 2014). Indeed, the result of a survey conducted by the TNP's Education Department in 1997 supports PFIM's comments. Data collected from the police cadets showed that for 84% stated that their fathers were workers, farmers, government officials, or retired officials. Economic data showed that 93 % of the respondents came from lower income families. Residential data revealed that 81.8 % lived in less populous locations like villages, counties or small cities (Çağlar, 2000). Figure 5.2 includes other economic data.

Figure 5.2 Regional Economic Comparisons



The figure includes maps on wheat production, animal husbandry, gross income, and officer province of origin. It is clear that middle to low income households live in central Turkey where agriculture and animal husbandry are the main sources of income. Participant POIM claimed that some officers even wait for weekdays (that is, police workdays), to get some rest. “As physical work in the field is quite difficult and exhausting, our friends who had to help their parents on the farm find office work easier as they do paper work” (May 24, 2014).

Expectations from families and friends influence officers in several different ways. According to Participant PTIY, “No matter what your rank is or how difficult the situation in which you work, it is your responsibility to comply with family requests in the eyes of the community” (May 23, 2014). Officers might work away from their hometowns, but physical distance does not change the expectations of their parents, families and friends. The shorter the distance between an officer and their family, the more visits and work s/he gets. POIM shared an experience to illustrate:

One day, one of my Captains requested his transfer from Istanbul to one of the rural provinces at the west side of the Istanbul, even though it was only his second year in there. His hometown was one of the villages in Izmit province - which is located on the east side of Istanbul, about a two-three hour drive. I was surprised when I heard his request. When I talked with him, he started to complain about his relatives and villagers. He said that since his first day in Istanbul, he had to frequently host many people from his folks. Anyone from his village who has something in Istanbul (e.g., visiting city for a hospital appointment, shopping, government work), he said, was finding him and asking for transportation, company and guidance. Each of these requests needs money, extra energy, time and even a day off. He also said that they were trying to spend nights in his house as hotels were so expensive ...he said that he barely saw his wife’s face because of all these guests. He expected that if he was working in a far place the life will be easier for him (May 24, 2014).

Participant POIM also stressed that many officers who know these problems do not select provinces next to their hometown. These problems, he said, increase burdens on the officers in terms of money, time, energy and stress (May 24, 2014). Participant PTIY mentioned that “time

and people have changed today; however, when we think about the 1940s or 1960s, dependence on agriculture, and family relationships between children and parents are totally different today. Manpower was so important and obedience to the parents was unquestionable” (May 23, 2014). Rural culture and its negative effects on officers’ behavior and work were and are seen as serious problems for the TNP administration.

Another performance-related difficulty that all participants mentioned had to do with the bonds that developed between officers and colleagues and the organization. The primary problems are the negative influences produced by “old officers” and “the administrative blindness” that comes from long-term assignments (PEIT, May 22, 2014; PFIM, May 22, 2014; PHIY, May 22, 2014; PTIY, May 23, 2014). Participant PHIM observed:

We have an “old officer” problem in the agency. As you know, there is a constant change in the body of officers. However, some officers worked long-term in their last destination. As a matter of course, they know more than others. Some of those officers are using their experiences to trap supervisors or produce stress on newcomers (May 23, 2014).

These officers are called “wolf officers,” and chiefs warn new graduates and supervisors to be careful about their recommendations or work.

Participants also talked about administrative blindness as another performance-related problem (e.g., PEIT, May 22, 2014; PTIY, May 23, 2014). Participant PTIY described “administrative blindness” as “losing vision and quality in a jurisdiction due to long term assignment” (May 23, 2014). He believes that as police officers stay longer in a location, they lose their ability to find solutions for chronic social problems. “However with GPR circulation, there always will be fresh ideas and innovative solutions in the department,” added participant

PEIT (May 22, 2014). PTIY also mentioned that four years would be an ideal limit for police officers to keep momentum going. He said that he tried to follow this principle, if not for geographical transfers then at least for departmental change. The latter type of transfer is needed, especially in the 1st region where deployment periods are relatively long (May 23, 2014).

Last but not least, participants talked about serving in “difficult places.” Participant PTIM stated that “when an organization asks its members stay a long time in unpopular/difficult jurisdictions, two things are happening: either they do not work or they hurt themselves” (May 24, 2014). He added:

We have experienced several times in high risk areas (related to terrorism), some of the officers could not handle the stress and hardship that comes from the places. That is the reason why we assigned a 2-3 year service time for some provinces. Even though the terms are shorter, before the end of the rotation, we sometimes heard bad news from city departments like officers committing suicide or having psychological illnesses (May 24, 2014).

Psychological prevention

Another issue that participants raised was “psychological prevention” as an informal control mechanism. Several interviewees described officers’ perceptions of the impact of GPR’s control and its effects on their behavior. In their view, detective, reward and punishment uses of GPR lead police officers to comply with the rules and become less difficult.

Most agreed with participant PAIG about the impact of GPR: “Police officers work more diligently when they know a succeeding officer will detect his/her deviant behavior” (May 21, 2014). Participant PEIT noted that “if I know the next officer after me will report my mistakes, I always try to do my job perfectly. I don’t want to deal with issues related to my old assignments”

(May 22, 2014). It might be said that GPR's detective influence works as a peer control mechanism among police officers even when they are working at different times.

Most participants spoke about future expectations of officers (PEIT, May 22, 2014; PFIM, May 22, 2014; PHIM, May 23, 2014; PTIY, May 23, 2014). Participant PFIM, for example, stated: "we observed, many times, significant increases in the performance of the officers who want to stay an extra year in a province" (May 22, 2014). If an officer is happy with his/her current position, he/she tries to extend the deployment as long as possible. As I mentioned earlier, GPR policy includes a one-year extension opportunity that an officer can request be repeated three times with the approval of the department chief. Thus, interested police officers try their best to get that approval. Participant PFIM added that officers who want to transfer, especially those in a branched department like intelligence or counter terrorism, continue to perform at high levels and keep productive relationships due to expectations about the next destination (May 22, 2014). Most police superintendents get in touch with the previous chief to hear more about the officer than what is in the written records.

Such officers' GPR-related expectations evidently enhance performance. Participant POIM's assessment of the revision of the second rotation to the 2nd region for non-ranked police officers is telling:

Until 2012, only one 2nd region rotation was enough for non-ranked police officers. When they completed their deployment in the 2nd region and returned to the 1st region, they were assuming that they were saved. This feeling was making them impertinent toward their supervisors. Any place in the 1st region would be okay for them if the department wanted them to transfer. With the declaration of a second rotation requirement for non-

ranked officers, their behavior suddenly changed. The possibility of working in a difficult place has affected their behavior (May 24, 2014).

Another psychological effect of GPR is linked to personnel files. Having a clean personnel file is important for an officer because it opens many doors in their career. Officers try to keep their files clear for a better future in the organization, including:

- the possibility of transferring to “better” departments: Some of the units and departments are more popular than the others as they provide better working conditions, better equipment and more satisfaction. For example, Narcotics, Intelligence, and Anti-terrorism units are more popular than police stations. These popular departments check personnel files;
- eligibility for assignment abroad: the TNP supports international forces like the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Selection committees for these assignments evaluate personnel files. A police officer who has a criminal record or a low performance score is unlikely to be accepted.
- eligibility for graduate education: The TNP supports many police officers in pursuing short or long-term education both inside the country and abroad; only those as no criminal record or ongoing investigation can apply to these programs.

The preventive side of GPR policy was one of the major topics that many participants described, elaborated and used as a justification for its continuation. In conclusion, by separating officers from previous connections, GPR aims to decrease the possibility of deviant behavior and cope with factors that negatively affect performance, all while strengthening performance. Discussion turns next to the cultural and identitive attributions of GPR policy.

GPR and Culture/Identity

One of the interview questions sought to reveal the relationship between GPR policy and organizational identity/culture. Since discussions of organizational identity and culture are quite broad, I tried to focus the conversations on control. Thus, my questions were limited to the influence of GPR policy on police culture and identity with an emphasis on organizational control. All participants mentioned the existence of an informal relationship between GPR, police culture/identity, and control. After sharing participants' general perspectives, I discuss the GPR and culture/identity relationship in three categories: police-police, police-TNP, and police-community.

Most participants agreed that GPR policy shapes police identity and culture in different ways. Participant PNIM, for example, expressed that "GPR is the main characteristic of police identity. All the people in Turkey, either police officers or civilians, know that police do not stay in a location for a long time" (May 25, 2014). Participant PEIT used the expression "police officers are the refugees of the society" to summarize this perception (May 22, 2014). Another participant observed that because of this perception, many parents do not approve of marriages to police officers as they mean separation, long distance and less communication (PFIM, May 22, 2014). He also argued that the fair and impartial practice of GPR helps spread desired types of police behavior throughout the organization.

Police-police relationships

One of the most influential interactions takes place among police officers. Participant PTIM stated that "GPR promote the perception of sharing a common fate. Especially in difficult areas, cohesion among the members becomes so strong" (May 24, 2015). Participant POIM used the police dwelling-house service to help explain this closeness. Each province has police

dwelling-house sites established to meet police officers' accommodation needs. These units are government supported apartments which provide cheaper accommodation, although their numbers are limited depending the province's capacity. Some police households live in these sites, while other members try to rent apartments in the same neighborhood for security purposes. GPR transfers typically bring police officers together. In the first place, communication among officers increases when they plan their next provinces. They call each other to hear about the pros and cons of the province and city department. Once the destination is certain, some move furniture together to decrease transportation expenses. Most take over other officers' leases. Once they move to a new city, they help introduce the neighborhood to each other and try to shorten the adaptation process. Families come together, and spouses share their experiences. The professional solidarity that they show increases exponentially in difficult areas (May 24, 2014). Participant PBIK also stated:

Each deployment brings many new friendships. I remember the end of my years in Elazig province. I wanted to extend my assignment three times, just because I loved my team and city department. I was able to extend two times, though. When we needed to leave the area, everybody cried in my family and my friends. We still call each other (June 7, 2014)

Participant PFIM drew the discussion to back to the control impact of GPR. He focused on two major implications of GPR policy.

When I consider control, I see two impacts of GPR; the first one is the positive peer relationship. Officers check and control each other as they are good friends. One officer complete and corrects the other officer's mistakes. The second one, on the other hand, works with the fear of colleagues. When a police team has a new member, they always

try to be careful with the new guy if they do something illegal. Most of the times, officers do not take risk and just give up what they do (May 22, 2014).

As PFIM stated, peer control and support become another version of control among police officers who have close relationships. They keep an eye on each other and an effect similar to social control emerges among police officers. As a result, GPR policy supports relationships among police officers. It strengthens the bonds among personnel; police officers come together under a distinct police identity.

Police-organization relationships

Participants also talked about the effects of GPR on the relationship between police officers and the TNP. One of the organizational purposes of transfers is to promote organizational learning and improve knowledge transfer. Most of the conversions about administrative blindness mentioned earlier continued with the description of employee learning that emerges as a result of GPR transfers. Participant PTIM confessed that he was hesitant when he thought about the difficulties of transferring from one province to another. However, he said, “I was able to live in a different culture and found a chance to learn about other cultures. This assignment enhanced my skills and capacities to understand and evaluate events and these people” (May 24, 2014). When asked about the loss of experience due to transfers, Participant PEIT explained the primary logic in the minds of police chiefs: “being expert and being experienced are two different issues. Being expert in your area is a must requirement and more important than experience.” He concluded: “a good police officer works perfectly wherever he works” (May 22, 2014). PFIM added that “some crimes and criminals, especially in narcotics and organized crime work as nationwide, even internationally. Thus localization and having

experience in a province lose its priority when we think about transnational crime” (May 22, 2014).

Another feature of employee learning emerges as a requirement. GPR regulation allows postponement of work-related rotation; if the current department needs the police officer as a key staffer, the Chief of the department can request a one year postponement of rotation. The reasons for work-related postponements must be different each year,²⁹ and postponement cannot be repeated more than three times.³⁰ This situation encourages departments and key personnel to train other officers in order not to lose knowledge collected over time (PFIM, May 22, 2014).

Participant PTIM pointed out that best practices can be transferred due to GPR: “there are many projects related to crime prevention spread all over the country just because the practitioner of the projects transfers from one jurisdiction to another one” (PTIM, May 24, 2014). Participant PEIM illustrated this, saying “the new chief of the Ankara City Police Department came from Izmir. We had a taxi cab problem in the city center. They were parking and stopping everywhere. As an experienced chief, he transferred his tactic from Izmir to Ankara. Now, we don’t have that problem anymore” (May 22, 2014).

GPR has affected the commitment of police officers to the organization depending on officers’ perceptions of their transfers. Participant PHIM stated that “if the transfers were done with the officer’s consent, it increases the commitment and loyalty of the officer” (May 23, 2014). To express the TNP administration’s sensitivity about officers’ perceptions, PFIM shared data on appointment percentages. “For the year of 2012, for example, 76 % of the officers from the 1st region to the 2nd region and 96% of the officers from the 2nd region to the 1st region were

²⁹ This means that the agency must provide different reasons to retain individuals. For example, one year the reason might be “Police officer X is the only gun ballistic expert that our department has”; the next year department must find another reason for Police officer X such as “he is working on a critical case.”

³⁰ TNPARR, Article 29.

appointed to one of their first three preferences”. He added that “we, as the DoPA, track and try to increase the percentage as much as possible to make our members happy” (May 22, 2014).

Police-community relationships

Through examination of GPR policy, another line of argument emerged related to officers’ performance. Clearly, it is difficult to build relationships between the community and individual police officers, especially with short term deployments. Indeed, as mentioned above, GPR policy directly and intentionally aims to break some of the connections between officers and the communities that they serve. At the same time, document analysis revealed the willingness of the TNP administration to develop and institutionalize community-based policing all over the country (EGM, 2009, 2012). The 2012 annual report, for example, stated that community police officers organized 158,730 events (e.g., safety in neighborhood meetings, school and home visits) with participation by 1,639,842 citizens. Based on this seeming contradiction, I asked participants how they assessed the practice of community policing and the philosophy of the GPR policy.

From participants’ comments, it seems that the TNP administration favors the fruits of more diverse police forces that are among the results of GPR over the possible positive consequences of stability and localization that community policing and more experience might bring. Issues that participants talked about revealed several types of diversity in the workforce that the TNP administration sought. In order to describe this informal effect of GPR, I summarized the diversity expectations produced by GPR that participants PHIM, PHIY, POIM and PTIY mentioned: variations in officers’ experience, age, work ethic, quality of record, skill, and experience. In addition, they mentioned ideological and cultural diversity from bringing together people of different backgrounds. Participant PFIM mentioned the different types of

rotation types other national agencies employ (e.g., the national Education and Health ministries). These organizations use a score-based GPR policy which pays attention to organizational seniority. In this model, older members typically have more service points and thus are more likely to work in locations they want. According to PFIM,

When we revised the GPR policy, we analyzed many other models practiced by the other agencies. Most of the officers were requesting score-based appointment. However, when we examined that model, we realized that a score based model will increase segregation and prevent diverse distribution of the police officers in the organization (May 22, 2014).

PFIM also referred to possible concerns about having older teachers in central schools and ethnic grouping in certain provinces. He stressed that the “The TNP administration wants neither to separate old and young police officers physically nor to allow ideological or ethnical grouping in certain areas.” He also criticized a performance-based GPR model in the same manner as it would cause good – bad police separation (May 22, 2014).

Participant PBIK pointed out another side of the police-community relationship. “As civilians know police officers transfer and they are exiled on some occasions, they use this possibility against dirty officers” (June 7, 2014). PAIG noted: “Citizens become inspectors of the police agencies. When they have a problem with an officer, they request the officer’s replacement from the department right away” (May 21, 2014).

GPR Reverse Impact

During the interviews, participants also mentioned some of the negative consequences of GPR when its organization control impacts are considered. Analysis of their comments helped provide a general sense of the factors that produce undesired outcomes due to the implementation of transfers.

Most participants talked about the importance of being careful when using GPR as a *reward and punishment* tool. Participant POIM stated that “if a police officer would like to live in his/her province of origin, he/she would not be happy working in other provinces no matter how close it is” (May 24, 2014). From this perspective, the police officer may perceive the provincial prohibition as unfair and punitive for no clear reason (PIIM, June 8, 2014). Thus any transfer decision might lose its motivational impact because of the difficulties of transferring.

The *punitive* use of GPR was another topic that some of the participants criticized. In their view, using transfer as a punishment does not help the TNP cope with deviant behavior. Participant PHIM stated: “if the exiled police officer feels labeled, she or he may not find any motivation to become better” (May 23, 2014). Thus, instead of correcting deviant behavior, the punitive use of GPR may exacerbate the situation and lead to losing the officer. Furthermore, in some cases transferring personnel only leads to transferring the undesired behavior. Even Participant PFIM acknowledged that “some of the officers find new opportunities to continue undesired behavior or affect other police officers” (May 22, 2014).

Connected with the punitive use of GPR, some provinces are undesired places for officers, and the TNP administration tends to assign problematic police officers to such places. However, for diversity purposes, the administration also sends officers who have no behavioral or discipline problems to those areas. This practice negatively affects these officers’ perceptions of the equality and fairness of the organization (PIIM, June 8, 2014; PTIY, May 23, 2014).

Participant PEIT stated that some police chiefs use GPR to keep selected officers out of their departments because they do not like them. He stressed that this type of arbitrary use of GPR may decrease beliefs in the fairness of the organization or can cause undesirable consequences. He also shared an earlier experience: “My supervisor was corrupt and sent me to a

rural area for no plausible reason, when I discovered him doing wrong things. I guess he was scared that I would file a complaint about him.” PEIT called this an “abuse of GPR” (May 2, 2014).

Participants mentioned another misuse of GPR policy as a *detective* mechanism. Participant PHIM described what occurs after an arbitrary personnel transfer: “as a normal reaction, the officer who was arbitrarily transferred goes to court to cancel the transfer. However, the chief may make up an untrue accusation of the officer or try to find some simple issue and make a serious problem to prevent his return to his old position” (May 23, 2014). From this angle it can be argued that GPR creates deviant behavior instead of preventing it. GPR policy provides room for managers to keep those they like with them and to send away individuals that they do not like.

Similarly, when discussing the *preventive* side of GPR policy, participants argued that transfer may cause deviant police behavior or be a reason for low performance. Most of the participants addressed unfair applications of GPR when they talked about this unintended, “reverse” effect. Participant PTIY commented that “if the TNP assigns an officer to a difficult area without of his/her consent, he/she may lose trust in and loyalty to the organization” (May 23, 2014). PHIM added that “officers who are angry about a transfer decision may behave the way that organization wouldn’t desire and then find justifications for their reaction” (May 23, 2014). Participant PAIG illustrated this situation with an event from his own life.

The TNP administration replaced me –in March 2014- unexpectedly due to political reasons, I believe, with many other officers after the 17 December corruption operation. They assigned me under a lieutenant, even though my rank -captain- required a higher position. I did not want to work under a lieutenant. I went to a doctor and asked him to

give me a health report that says I am sick for 2 weeks, although I was not. I know this is not right but I had to do that (May 21, 2014)

Participant PHIM stated: “officers ask this question themselves ‘Why should put myself in a danger for these people?’” (May 23, 2014). Simple deviance is to underperform deliberately.

Even more serious deviance sometimes can occur as well. Participant PFIM commented that “while GPR aims to prevent nepotism and favoritism in the organization, it can be a reason for them” (May 22, 2014). Although merit-based hiring is the formal rule in the Turkish public sector nepotism and favoritism still exist in hiring and appointments. Participant POIM stated that during his time in the DoPA, he received many calls and notes from bureaucrats and politicians requesting appointments for certain individuals. He stressed that in some cases this external pressure became too much for some officers who had negative personnel records and they asked the Department to violate rules for them. For example, a police officer was exiled due to his relationship with prostitutes in Istanbul. He pushed hard to go back the Istanbul and reached many bureaucrats asking to work in Istanbul again by hiding his history (May 24, 2014).

Participant PAIG pointed out officers’ negative perceptions of the DoPA and its decisions (May 21, 2014). Police officers generally accept that if one knows powerful people in government, it is easy to influence the TNP or the DoPA to be assigned to a desired province. Police officers try to find a bureaucrat or politician who might have a connection with the TNP administration to influence transfer decisions. Connected with this problem, Participant PFIM described a warning note that the DoPA added to the annual “Assignment Preference for First and Second Region” in recent years. “The number of calls and notes has increased a lot, making it difficult to organize annual transfers” (May 22, 2014). Thus the Department added the following warning to official documents:

Although there have been warnings in previous years and the DoPA paid careful attention to preference lists, some police officers have tried inappropriate ways to postpone their transfer for one year or to be assigned one of their seven choices by reaching our department through different channels. These personnel will be noted and evaluated as “officer detected favoritism (2012, 2013 and 2014 Appointment declarations).

Human resource managers stated that dealing with this type of pressure has never been easy. It is clear that the practice of GPR policy triggers deviant behavior as police officers try to find someone outside the organization to affect transfer decisions (PFIM, May 22, 2014; POIM, May 24, 2014; PTIM, May 24, 2014).

From a *culture and identity* perspective, most participants pointed out the possibility of injustice and unfair practices with GPR. Lack of fairness and justice in the implementation of the policy does not strengthen communication or relationships among police officers (PTIY, May 23, 2014). If police officers do not believe the administration, GPR may hurt the commitment of officers and their relationships with each other, communities, or work.

Another negative feature of GPR is that transfers may lead to loss of knowledge if transfers are not implemented gradually. Participant PAIG complained about sharp changes in his old department. “Our department has been replaced as a whole. They thought that everything was in the files and computers. However, from my perspective they will need at least two years to understand the system as a whole” (May 21, 2014).

As GPR helps to create a more diverse work force in the TNP, balance within and among units has to be monitored carefully. Otherwise GPR may produce adverse reactions. A newspaper article warned the TNP about this possibility. According to a report in Mardin (one of the eastern provinces), no police officer knows Kurdish in the Intelligence Department which has

to collect intelligence about Kurdish terrorist organizations. “Experts mentioned particularly the absence of personnel who know Kurdish in the technical surveillance unit will cause serious problems in the near future” (www.aktifhaber.com, 2015).

Lack of diversity in some units also may cause serious problems. An event that Participant PIIM mentioned illustrates:

We were doing traffic control in Erzurum, a province in East Turkey in 1995. At that time, security checks were done with a notebook instead of computer check which had the name of wanted people and vehicles on. There were 4 police officers from our unit and additional 4 police officers from counter terrorism unit about 10 meters next to us. We all were from other parts of the country. Only one of us knew Kurdish Language at the intermediate level. That officer was waiting next to a vehicle we just stopped and collected the identity cards in order to check with the notebook back in our patrol car. There was no problem with the IDs; however, it was taking time to check four different names. My colleague who stood next to the car got closer to me and whispered that something was wrong with the passengers. The couple in the back seat was talking Kurdish. Although the passengers were speaking a different version of Kurdish, he heard a word that means “Gun” in their conversation. We secretly called support and organized quickly with the team which already was working there. We neutralized them with a sudden bust. After securing the place, we realized that the car was full of guns and ammo. Moreover, the couple sitting in the back seat was concealing two AKs between them that were ready to use. Later in the day, we understood that the suspects were the attackers who killed and wounded many people in a terrorist attack in Istanbul the day before we caught them. I would not imagine what would have happened if my friend did not

recognize that word “gun” on that day. One word helped save many police officers (June 8, 2015).

GPR also may adversely affect relationships between police and community. Some influential individuals in society use their power and connections to threaten police officers. “Do you know who I am? Pick a province from the map! I will have the TNP send you to the end of the world!” Participant PBIK argued that GPR makes the TNP and its members more open to external pressure than not having GPR (June 7, 2015).

The length of assignments is another factor that may affect the results of GPR in negative ways. During my observation, I talked with residents, drivers and business owners in a small county. When they evaluated transfers they reported an old problem in the region. Since the location is a tourist destination, in summer time the population increases. Therefore, the TNP assigns additional police officers for three to four months during the peak season. The county’s location does not allow officers to commute. TNP’s financial support for short term accommodations means little given the extremely high rents in the region. Officers who were assigned for short periods asked business owners for funds. Although this problem no longer exists, it illustrates how GPR itself can generate deviant behavior

Summary

This chapter examined some of the desired outcomes that affect officers’ behavior in ways that increase their compliance with TNP’s expectations. In the line with the conceptual framework, I analyzed the GPR policy and its directive, motivating, punitive, detective, preventive and cultural/identitive control impacts. I also tried to reveal the factors that may cause negative outcomes from a control perspective when GPR transfers are implemented. The following chapter discusses the implications of these findings.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study examined the organizational control dynamics of GPR policy in the TNP. I focused on the perceptions and interpretations of human resource managers and middle to high level police chiefs who developed, implemented, and worked at the same time under the GPR policy.

Inspired by the approaches of Etzioni (1965) and Davies (1989), I created a conceptual framework that highlighted three dimensions: the nature of the control, the degree of formality and the source of control. Several forms of control were examined including directive, motivating, punitive, detective, corrective, preventive and cultural/identitive. Table 6.1 summarizes the findings.


Table 6.1. Dimensions of Control and Outcomes

	Nature of control mechanism	Formality	Source	Outcome
GPR	Directive	Formal	External → Legislative body Internal → DoPA	N/A
	Rewarding	Formal Informal	Internal → DoPA and Police Chiefs	Positive Negative
	Punitive	Formal Informal	Internal → DoPA and Police Chiefs	Positive Negative
	Detective	Formal Informal	External → Judicial activities and public Internal → Departmental Investigation and colleagues	Positive Negative
	Corrective	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Preventive	Formal Informal	Internal → DoPA and Police Chiefs	Positive Negative
	Cultural/identitive	Informal	Internal → Police officers	Positive Negative

Directive control emerged in GPR's *provincial prohibition*, *service length prohibition*, and *proposed transfers (exile)*, which have existed through the entire history of the TNP. Most of

the control is formal, and it appears in written regulations and rules. The TNP administration is the source of GPR's directive control. The DoPA is the primary department which changes, revises and implements GPR policy. The recent history of the organization has seen many provincial restrictions that have kept police officers away from places where they were born, raised, and lived and where they have business relationships. Summarizing the data presented in Table 5.2, Figure 6.1 shows the evolution in the volume of provincial prohibitions.

Figure 6.1. Numbers of GPR Restrictions by Year, 1960-2015



Beginning in 1960, the TNP administration increased the number of provinces restricted for service. Police officers were especially restricted between 1970 and 1985. They were not allowed to work in their home or birth provinces or in bordering provinces. Moreover, the TNP administration added provinces related to spouses and provinces where officers lived more than 15 years to the restricted places list. Although GPR regulation in 2015 prohibits posting based only on officers' provinces of origin, TNP members and leaders still may believe there are risks from localization, as they worked under intense provincial restrictions for many years. The

directive side of GRP is one of the main components of the TNP's organizational control practices.

As the control literature described, successful organizational control mechanisms discourage deviant behavior while motivating employees for better goal attainment. Yet the interview respondents perceived that the existing TNP's reward and punishment system are not very effective. To compensate for this deficiency, the TNP administration uses GPR transfers as a complementary tool. The first formal use of GPR transfers for reward or punishment occurs in the first assignment after graduation. The TNP administration continues to use geographic transfers informally to reward the officers who have high performance ratings and who work in difficult and least desired provinces. At the same time, transfers serve as formal and informal punishments for low performance or deviant behavior. The DoPA and department chiefs separately or together decide punitive transfers. Transfers as rewards most likely lead to positive results from a control perspective since officers get what they desire. On the other hand, punitive transfers may produce negative results either by not increasing officers' performance or by encouraging more deviant behavior.

The detective use of GPR appeared in legal procedure as a formal practice. At the same time, informal detection occurs through the involvement of individual members and civilians. Both internal and external sources can be effective for using detective transfers. The study also showed that on some occasions, detection of deviant behavior can be inhibited by factors like organizational culture. The blue code of silence and administrative mercy are examples of these exceptions. Members of the organization are selective in their reactions to deviance. Detective transfers may produce either positive or negative results depending on the perceived fairness of the transfer decision.

The conceptual framework included correction as a possible control mechanism. None of the participants, however, mentioned this feature. Although transfers may serve as correctional tools, participant evaluation, documents and observation included little evidence that GPR was used in such ways.

On the other hand, one of the most frequently mentioned features of GPR policy was its preventive side. Efforts to prevent deviant behavior or poor performance appear throughout GPR practice both formally and informally. The DoPA and department chiefs shape the preventive use of transfers. Frequent transfers and provincial restrictions break the bonds between police officers and communities, which come from kinship, friendship, ideology, and business relationships and strengthen with long-term assignment. By delocalizing police officers, the TNP seeks to decrease the possibility of deviant police behavior and to prevent factors that weaken officers' performance. Although it is difficult to measure the GPR's capacity as a preventive control mechanism, restrictions on provincial assignments and on service lengths point to these concerns. TNP's formal directive rules emphasize the disconnection of police officers from others. Moreover, psychological prevention works informally together with detective, rewarding and punitive mechanisms. Participants believe that the preventive side of GPR worked quite effectively in decreasing deviant behavior and enhancing officers' performance.


Finally, GPR policy supports organizational culture and identity as control mechanisms. Analysis of the data revealed that interaction between GPR and police culture/identity appears informally and is mostly shaped by police officers. The interaction emerges in three different areas: police-police, police-organization and police-community. The practice of GPR evidently results in greater solidarity and cohesion among police officers. When it comes to the officer-organization relationship, GPR increases officers' commitment to the TNP at least among those

who stay or are happy about their new appointments. Other positive features of GPR related to organizational culture and identity are reinforcement of good police attitudes, dispersion of best practices, better knowledge transfer and employee learning in a more diverse workforce. The diversity which comes with routine officer circulation evidently brings better understanding of diverse communities.

Most of the data explained how transfers were designed and served to produce better goal attainment, less deviance and more performance. The findings also revealed several negative outcomes of GPR policy. Participants highlighted its seemingly arbitrary use, officers' negative perceptions of the transfer decision making process, external forces that influence the administration, excessive use of transfers, and the hardship of some postings.

Officers' negative perceptions about transfer decisions was one of the primary problems. Based on the participants' comments, I concluded that the perception of injustice in the organization and the tendency of nepotism and external power to shape GPR decisions have reciprocal/reinforcing relationships that produce a vicious cycle (see Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2 Vicious Cycle of Perceived Injustice and Deviant Behavior/Low Performance.



Police officers also may use such negative perceptions to justify some deviant behaviors. For example, a displeased police officer may decide not to work as hard or as efficiently as possible. Consistent with De Zwart (1993), GPR may produce deviant behavior in some situations, although it was designed to reduce such activity. Participants in this study agreed with Gultekin and Ozcan (1999) that on some occasions, external powers (elected officials) use GPR policy to hide nepotism or ideological promotion and transfers.

As seen in Table 6.1 most of the instances of control rely on formal mechanisms except for cultural/identitive control. In addition, GPR transfers serve formally and informally as tools of reward and punishment, detection, and prevention. Analysis of the data showed that informal control practices may conflict with formal practices. Although more study is needed to reveal the exact relationship between formality and outcome, this study suggests that the possibility of reverse effects is more likely for informal control practices. Negative perceptions of transfer decisions, which help produce negative outcomes, mostly follow informal practices. Formal actions, on the other hand, are more likely to be subject to external and internal control and to aim for fairness. Personal intervention in GPR policy by either external or internal sources decreases officers' trust in DoPA management and transfer decisions. Most of these interventions stem from informal relationships, further complicating control.

Contributions to Scholarship

This study contributes to scholarship on organizational control, human resource management, policing, and employee rotation. This is the first study that focused on a geographic personnel rotation practice in a single organization context. Many studies and scholars in the control literature have been undertaken macro level analysis or sector centered approaches. When it comes to better understanding the control effects of an individual practice in

an organization, existing work could not provide a complete framework. The framework that I modified for this study was useful in revealing varied control dynamics in an organization. By focusing on multiple dimensions of control, one could examine other organizational practices from a control perspective, including work distribution, work arrangements, physical or technical surveillance, or budgetary controls.

This study supports a view emphasizing the coexistence and interaction of multiple control mechanisms in one setting. As the results suggest, different types of control mechanism can operate in one organization. The formal and informal use and effects of such mechanisms may support or conflict with each other in a single organizational setting.

The results also supported Kaufman's (1960) argument that geographic personnel rotation serves as a tool to detect deviant behavior. The second topic that Kaufman highlighted was the positive influence of geographic transfers for building an organizational identity which improves goal attainment and serves as a self-control mechanism for employees. This study indicated that rotation may support the creation and maintenance of organizational identity and culture in ways the organization desires; however, the implementation of transfers is critical, since perception of injustice may produce negative results.

Consistent with De Zwart (1993), the study also supported the reverse effect argument. An organization has to seek high levels of consensus and convince its employee to prevent undesired consequences. Otherwise members' perceptions may cause more deviant behaviors or open spaces for more nepotism.

The study also contributes to understanding control in the context of law enforcement agencies. Security organizations have enormous power, and exercise discretion in dispersed areas that make control of individuals difficult. Scholars long have recommended using rotation

to prevent corruption and increase performance; however, no studies until this one specifically examined rotation and control together. Analysis of GPR in the TNP suggested that geographic personnel rotation may help the organization to deal with police misconduct and low performance. However, the practice may also cause negative consequences, if transfers are done without employee consent.

Last but not least, the results highlighted the positive results of geographic rotation compared to community policing practices. The findings suggest that the TNP favors the more diverse police forces that are among GPR's results over the possible positive consequences of greater stability and localization of community policing. Nonetheless, the study also found revealed that despite numerous transfers, the TNP refers to community policing principles.

Practical implications

The findings also have practical implications. Control mechanisms have to be practiced carefully in order to increase positive outcomes. During discussion of the negative side of the policy, I asked participants their thoughts about ways to improve the practice of GPR. In response, PAIG stated: "It is difficult to apply the general rules of the GPR policy due to the numerous exceptions" (May 21, 2014). To deal with this problem, participant PTIY (May 23, 2014) recommended that having fewer rules and limited exceptions would make transfers easier. Participant PFIM (May 22, 2014) argued that instead of having restrictions of years of service, GPR might set minimum and maximum years of deployment by province. In this way, officers who perform better could stay longer, and the organization would benefit from employee experience.

Some other participants (POIM, May 24, 2014; PIIM, June 8, 2014; PBIK June 7, 2014; PEIT May 22, 2014) suggested more flexibility on province prohibitions and service length. Basically, they described a model which would allow police officers to work in their selected provinces and to stay as long as they wanted. In supporting these contentions, they noted that conditions differed from the past. Bonds between officers and their families/relatives, economic dependence on agriculture, and the social structure of the country are quite different than they were in the 1980s or 1990s. However, participants underlined that mandatory transfers could still be used to prevent possible deviant behavior and deter low performance. Moreover, the TNP needs to improve its reward/punishment and discipline systems. GPR as punishment should be implemented with caution. Similarly, the Commission report about corruption also asserted that “The transfer system, which has been abused to punish troublemakers, should be formalized and regionalized, informed by adequate data on officers abilities and aptitudes. Transfers should not be used as punishments” (Fitzgerald, 1989; p.365).

Many studies recommend more incentives and better support systems for personnel and their families who have to rotate geographically (Jervis, 2011; Morris, 1956; Munton, 1990). These types of supports would increase acceptance and the number of voluntary rotations.

Another recommendation is to improve communication between the TNP administration and personnel. In my view, most of the perception of injustice emerged from lack of communication. The TNP administration might more fully explain the needs for policy to its members. At the same time, making rotation more transparent would reduce suspicions of possible nepotism.

Generalizability

As the first chapter mentioned, most of the national organizations in Turkey have GPR-like rotation policies. As a first study on the control-rotation relationship, the findings here can help organizations to better design and implement transfers.

Although it is difficult to find a similar geographic personnel rotation policy like the TNP's in other countries, rotational practices are common in both the public and private sectors. By considering cultural similarities and differences, the results of this study may provide useful approaches for other organizations.

Future studies

Many areas of GPR policy would benefit from additional systematic analysis. The scarcity of research on GPR may be seen as a particularly important problem. The costs and benefits of transfers need to be studied thoroughly, taking differing perspectives into account. In particular, studies that examine the employee perspective are important to find the best implementation of policy. From this perspective, recent changes in provincial prohibitions (decreasing restricted provinces) would be a good opportunity to evaluate the effects of localization of officers. In addition, the ideas and comments of other national and local agencies, non-government organizations, and varying publics should be involved in discussing GPR, focusing on improved coordination, enhanced crime prevention and many other aspects. Through this exchange, the TNP would be able to decide whether GPR should persist. If GPR does continue, ways of building on its positive aspects while diminishing negative ones will be crucial.

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[%C4%B0nsan-Kaynaklar%C4%B1-Uygulamalar%C4%B1-%C3%9Czerine-Etkisi1.pdf](http://gusam.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/G%C3%BCsam-Raporu-17-25-Aral%C4%B1k-S%C3%BCrecinin-Emniyet-Te%C5%9Fkilat%C4%B1n%C4%B1n-%C4%B0nsan-Kaynaklar%C4%B1-Uygulamalar%C4%B1-%C3%9Czerine-Etkisi1.pdf)

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
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Appendix A: List of TNP Personnel (Province)

No	Province	Population	# of Police officers registered that province
1	Adana	2 149 260	11476
2	Adıyaman	597 184	4414
3	Afyonkarahisar	707 123	5112
4	Ağrı	551 177	1392
5	Amasya	321 977	3606
6	Ankara	5 045 083	9542
7	Antalya	2 158 265	1519
8	Artvin	169 334	1704
9	Aydın	1 020 957	3303
10	Balıkesir	1 162 761	4749
11	Bilecik	208 888	797
12	Bingöl	265 514	689
13	Bitlis	337 156	1282
14	Bolu	283 496	1162
15	Burdur	257 267	1706
16	Bursa	2 740 970	2491
17	Çanakkale	502 328	1717
18	Çankırı	190 909	2933
19	Çorum	532 080	6228
20	Denizli	963 464	3082
21	Diyarbakır	1 607 437	2326
22	Edirne	398 582	1236
23	Elazığ	568 239	6509
24	Erzincan	219 996	1474
25	Erzurum	766 729	6155
26	Eskişehir	799 724	3252
27	Gaziantep	1 844 438	6974
28	Giresun	425 007	2898
29	Gümüşhane	141 412	1458
30	Hakkari	273 041	60
31	Hatay	1 503 066	7766
32	Isparta	417 774	2773
33	Mersin	1 705 774	6387
34	İstanbul	14 160 467	1392
35	İzmir	4 061 074	3823
36	Kars	300 874	2228
37	Kastamonu	368 093	1674
38	Kayseri	1 295 355	6975
39	Kırklareli	340 559	946
40	Kırşehir	223 498	4273
41	Kocaeli	1 676 202	733

No	Province	Population	# of Police officers registered that province
42	Konya	2 079 225	11369
43	Kütahya	572 059	2765
44	Malatya	762 538	7155
45	Manisa	1 359 463	4505
46	Kahramanmaraş	1 075 706	9698
47	Mardin	779 738	1545
48	Muğla	866 665	1409
49	Muş	412 553	1110
50	Nevşehir	285 460	2320
51	Niğde	343 658	3313
52	Ordu	731 452	4160
53	Rize	328 205	1149
54	Sakarya	917 373	1882
55	Samsun	1 261 810	6998
56	Siirt	314 153	549
57	Sinop	204 568	1009
58	Sivas	623 824	6345
59	Tekirdağ	874 475	923
60	Tokat	598 708	4858
61	Trabzon	758 237	5504
62	Tunceli	85 428	456
63	Şanlıurfa	1 801 980	2604
64	Uşak	346 508	1476
65	Van	1 070 113	1123
66	Yozgat	444 211	7412
67	Zonguldak	601 567	1765
68	Aksaray	382 806	3011
69	Bayburt	75 620	767
70	Karaman	237 939	1495
71	Kırıkkale	274 658	4624
72	Batman	547 581	698
73	Şırnak	475 255	167
74	Bartın	189 139	695
75	Ardahan	102 782	1419
76	Iğdır	190 424	664
77	Yalova	220 122	178
78	Karabük	230 251	1252
79	Kilis	128 586	1437
80	Osmaniye	498 981	6684
81	Düzce	351 509	1096
	Total	76 667 864	257805

Appendix B: VT IRB Approval



Office of Research Compliance
Institutional Review Board
North End Center, Suite 4120, Virginia Tech
300 Turner Street NW
Blacksburg, Virginia 24061
540/231-4606 Fax 540/231-0959
email irb@vt.edu
website <http://www.irb.vt.edu>

MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 21, 2014
TO: Seref G Onder, Karen Hult
FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA00000572, expires April 25, 2018)
PROTOCOL TITLE: A distinctive organizational control practice: Geographic personnel rotation in the Turkish National Police
IRB NUMBER: 14-576

Effective May 21, 2014, the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (IRB) Chair, David M Moore, approved the New Application request for the above-mentioned research protocol.

This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents.

Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report within 5 business days to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others.

All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at:

<http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm>

(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:

Approved As: Expedited, under 45 CFR 46.110 category(ies) 5,6,7
Protocol Approval Date: May 21, 2014
Protocol Expiration Date: May 20, 2015
Continuing Review Due Date*: May 6, 2015

*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:


Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals/work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee.

The table on the following page indicates whether grant proposals are related to this IRB protocol, and which of the listed proposals, if any, have been compared to this IRB protocol, if required.

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Appendix C: VT IRB Approval Extension



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300 Turner Street NW
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website <http://www/irb.vt.edu>

MEMORANDUM

DATE: April 30, 2015
TO: Karen Hult, Seref G Onder
FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA00000572, expires April 25, 2018)
PROTOCOL TITLE: A distinctive organizational control practice: Geographic personnel rotation in the Turkish National Police
IRB NUMBER: 14-576

Effective April 30, 2015, the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (IRB) Chair, David M Moore, approved the Continuing Review request for the above-mentioned research protocol.

This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents.

Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report within 5 business days to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others.

All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at:

<http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm>

(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:

Approved As: **Expedited, under 45 CFR 46.110 category(ies) 5,6,7**
Protocol Approval Date: **May 21, 2015**
Protocol Expiration Date: **May 20, 2016**
Continuing Review Due Date*: **May 6, 2016**

*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:

Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals/work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee.

The table on the following page indicates whether grant proposals are related to this IRB protocol, and which of the listed proposals, if any, have been compared to this IRB protocol, if required.

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Appendix D: Consent Form

Consent to Participate in Research

Introduction and Purpose

My name is Seref Onder. I am a graduate student at the Virginia Tech University in the Center of Public Administration. I would like to invite you to take part in my research study, which concerns an exploration of the practice geographical personnel rotation.

Procedures

If you agree to participate in my research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and location of your choice. The interview will involve questions about the geographic personnel rotation and organizational control. It should last about 60-90 minutes. With your permission, I will audiotape and take notes during the interview. The recording is to accurately record the information you provide. If you choose not to be audiotaped, I will take notes instead. If you agree to being audiotaped but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, I can turn off the recorder at your request. Or if you don't wish to continue, you can stop the interview at any time.

Benefits

There is no direct benefit to you from taking part in this study. However, it is hoped that the research will allow you to express your ideas and share your experiences that you have accumulated over years in policing area. Results of study may also be beneficial for the TNP to serve as a better organization.

Risks/Discomforts

Some of the research questions may make you uncomfortable or upset. You are free to decline to answer any questions you don't wish to, or to stop the interview at any time. As with all research, there is a chance that confidentiality could be compromised; however, I am taking multiple precautions to minimize this risk.

Confidentiality

Your study data will be handled as confidentially as possible. If results of this study are published or presented, individual names and other personally identifiable information will not be used unless you give explicit permission for this below.

To minimize the risks to confidentiality, I will destroy the hand notes upon transfer of data to computer on a word document. Participant names will not be provided on the interview transcripts; only participant identification numbers. The interview transcript will be kept in separate files form master list which shows participant names and identification numbers. Both interview transcript document and master list will be kept separate from all other documents data in a secured file by different passwords. The electronic data base will contain no identifying Information. The computer on which I keep the data will be secured by another password that allows access only for me.

When the research is completed, I may save the tapes and notes for use in future research done by myself or others. I will retain these records for up to 4 years after the study is over. The same measures described above will be taken to protect confidentiality of this study data.

Rights

Participation in research is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to take part in the project. You can decline to answer any questions and are free to stop taking part in the project at any time. Whether or not you choose to participate in the research and whether or not you choose to answer a question or continue participating in the project, there will be no penalty to you or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Questions

If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me. I can be reached at +1 703-624-2826 or serefonder@gmail.com

CONSENT

You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep for your own records. If you wish to participate in this study, please sign and date below.

Participant's Name (please print)

Participant's Signature

Date

Appendix E: Interview Questionnaires

Interview Questions

Q1- Tell me about your jobs, where you've been stationed?

Q2- How long have you been assigned as a human resource manager or Police Chief?

Q3- Have you ever worked anywhere where GPR was not used?

Q4- What are your thoughts about reasons, benefits and drawbacks of the GPR?

Q5- How has the GPR policy changed over time? Why do you think that has been?

Q6- What is the reasoning under regulation that restricts the assignment of personnel to his/her city of origin?

Q7- Have you ever witnessed negative consequences from long term deployment of one police officer in one place?

Q8- Does GPR helps the TNP to detect and/or prevent corruption or abuse of power among police officers? How? Example?

Q9- How the possibility of personnel deviance or record of deviant behavior in personnel files affects the reassignment and implementation of GPR?

Q10- Does GRP support perceptions of oneness with and belongingness to the TNP? If yes/ if no, how?

Q11- Demographic data: Age/Rank/Gender/ rotation history (if yes) Marital Status/Spouse job-transfer/ Children -ages and education

Appendix F: TNP Research Approval

T.C.
İÇİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI
Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü
Dışilişkiler Daire Başkanlığı

SAYI : B.05.1.EGM.0.76.04.02 / 2939
TARİH : 07/06/2007
KONU : Genel Akademik Araştırma Onayı.
İLGİ : a) 23.03.2007 tarih ve B.05.1.EGM.0.76.04.02.
(31004).871/1501 sayılı yazı.
b) 12.04.2007 tarih ve B.05.1.EGM.0.72.02.03-
857-1480 sayılı yazı.

Faks No : 00 90 312 466 90 22
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GÖNDEREN : Dr. Recep GÜLTEKİN
Dışilişkiler Dairesi Başkanı
1. Sınıf Emniyet Müdürü


GİDECEĞİ YER : Samih TEYMUR (ABD), İsa ÇİFTÇİ (ALM), Fatih YAMAÇ (FR),
Fatih ÖZGÜL(İNG),Murat GÜLVER (BELÇİKA)

E-MAIL ADRESİ : tipscontact@gmail.com, yamacfatih@yahoo.fr, isaciftci@yahoo.com,
fatih.ozgul@gmail.com ve muratgulver@yahoo.com

İlgi (a) kayıtlı yazı ile mastur ve doktora yapmakta olan personelimizin eğitim gördüğü kendi alanlarıyla ilgili tez, akademik çalışma, makale gibi akademik araştırmalarda kullanmak üzere; Teşkilatımız bünyesindeki birimlerden gerekli istatistikî bilgilerin alınması ve bazı anket ve mülakat gibi akademik çalışmaların uygulanabilmesi için Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Makamından genel bir onay alınması Eğitim Daire Başkanlığı'ndan talep edilmiştir.

Adı geçen Daire Başkanlığı'ndan alınan ilgi (b) kayıtlı yazı ile "Yetiştirilmek Amacıyla Yurtdışına Gönderilecek Devlet Memurları Hakkındaki Yönetmelik" hükümleri çerçevesinde yurtdışındaki üniversitelere mastur ve doktora yapmak üzere gönderilen personelin Genel Müdürlüğümüze bağlı birimlerde ve taşra teşkilatında akademik çalışma yapma talebinde bulunması halinde tez çalışması yapabilmesi uygun görüldüğü belirtilmiş olup Genel Müdürlük Makam Onayın bir sureti ekte gönderilmiştir.

Bilgi ve gereğini rica ederim.


Dr. Recep GÜLTEKİN
Dışilişkiler Dairesi Başkanı
1. Sınıf Emniyet Müdürü

Ek:
İlgi (b) kayıtlı yazı. (2 sayfa)

ADRES: Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Dışilişkiler Daire Başkanlığı
İlkadım Cad. 89/10 (S.Blok) 06100 Y.Ayrancı /ANKARA