Colorism and Local Policing: Setting the Foundation for More Expansive Research on Racial Discrimination at the Local Level

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of three articles about colorism and its relevance to public administration (PA), with specific focus on local policing. The overarching arguments are: 1) our lack of focus on the nuanced factors related to race have hindered our ability to adequately respond to biased criminal justice (CJ) outcomes; and 2) there are hidden patterns of biased behaviors that originate at the street-level, and these patterns have the propensity to impact every aspect of CJ. Colorism could serve as a more comprehensive approach to addressing racial bias. Colorism is a system of disadvantage and privilege based on skin color, with a bias for lighter skin. Article I introduces colorism to the field of PA, and it uses data on workplace colorism complaints to illustrate how colorism currently intersects with PA. In addition, the article uses scenarios to demonstrate the potential impact colorism might have at the street-level. Article II builds upon the descriptions of colorism provided in Article I by simulating a conceptual model of colorism and local policing. The major finding of this study is that, counter to the expectations of the experiment, those in the middle of the skin color spectrum experienced higher rates of incarceration when aggressive steps were taken to counter colorism. The major contributions from this project include a conceptual model that describes the relationship between the distinct levels of colorism—individual, interactive and institutional. In Article III, I explore two conceptual models of interactive colorism in a local policing context. In the first model, bias behaviors are less likely to receive a challenge. In the second model, biased behaviors are likely to be challenged by counter-behaviors (e.g., fair policing). Subject-matter experts and non-subject-matter experts were used to select the model that most accurately depicts the phenomenon. I used online focus groups and phone interviews with police officers, theorists (e.g., sociologists, psychologists), and non-subject-matter experts to gather feedback. Majority of the informants recommended that future research on interactive colorism be framed as a bidirectional phenomenon. The informants provided additional considerations for future research, such as the variation in police culture across police departments.

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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of three articles about colorism and its relevance to local policing. Two streams of thought informed the research project. The first stream of thought is that our lack of focus on the nuanced factors related to race, racism and racial discrimination have delayed our ability to adequately respond to biased criminal justice outcomes. The second stream of thought is that there are hidden patterns of biased behaviors that originate at the local level of government, and these patterns could impact every aspect of the criminal justice system. I argue that colorism could serve as a more authentic way to address matters related to racial bias and discrimination. Colorism is a system of disadvantage and privilege based on skin color, with a bias for lighter skin. The articles address how colorism currently impacts public administration, how it could specifically impact local policing, and how we can advance research in this area. In the first article, it was argued that accounting for colorism, in our research and practice, will help to address racial disparities. The argument was developed using evidence of colorism in criminal sentencing and colorism in the workplace to highlight some of the current challenges and opportunities associated with colorism. The article calls for a change in how we think about race as a research variable. In the second article, agent-based modeling, a software program, was used to connect and challenge the different descriptions of colorism. The project embraces the change in thought proposed in Article I by subjecting the underlying beliefs of colorism to simulated policing scenarios. Article III extended the work conducted in Article II. This article explored how colorism might be infused in the socialization process of new employees, which is referred to as interactive colorism. Interactive colorism is most relevant to public administration because it offers a way to explain the socialization of the bias within public organizations. Local police, subject matter experts (SME) on organizational socialization and race, and non-subject-matter experts, participated in focus groups and SME interviews to select one of two proposed abstract models of interactive colorism. The data collected from this effort can be used to develop research strategies for future studies on the topic of interactive colorism.

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Hotep!

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This body of work is centered on the concept of colorism. Colorism is a form of racism that is based on a skin color spectrum, with a bias for lighter skin (Russell-Cole, Wilson, & Hall, 2013). Colorism ideology encompasses conscious and subconscious value judgments about skin color (Weaver, 2012; Wilder, 2008). As a behavior, colorism involves discriminatory acts that are based on biased judgments about skin color. Most of the scholarly work that focuses on colorism has been authored by disciplines other than public administration. However, I will argue that colorism has high relevance to public administration, especially at the street-level.

The dissertation consists of three articles that progressively build upon each other. Collectively, the articles can best be described as a proof of concept project. Currently, there is not enough actual data to test theory within the context explored here. Therefore, the project will not test a theory of colorism, but rather explore the plausibility of the proposed arguments associated with colorism and local policing. The arguments set forth here are meant to educate, to explore challenges and opportunities associated with the concept of colorism, and to develop strategies for advancing research in this area. The general context for the dissertation is local policing in the United States. However, some of the arguments and findings could be applicable to other areas of public administration. In the following sections, I will provide an overview of the overarching problem (i.e., pervasive racial disparities in the United States), the gaps in the literature, and the plan of the dissertation.

Racial Disparities in the U.S.

In this review of racial disparities in the U.S., social institutions were selected based on their ability to impact the plight of citizens, which include higher education, housing and

employment.[1] As we will see in the following statistics, many brown and black people face challenges when interfacing with these institutions. One way to observe racial disparities in the United States is to analyze the disparities within the frame of achieving the "good life" (Veenhoven, 2013). Part of the American narrative tells citizens that if they obtain a good education, they will do well in life. We can assume that achieving a good education would involve the attainment of a college degree. Therefore, the overview of racial disparities will start with a summary of educational attainment in the U.S. Then, educational attainment outcomes will be compared to the negative and positive forms of housing and employment.

Educational Attainment in the U.S.

Since the enactment of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the percentage of African Americans with four or more years of college has steadily increased (USCB, 2017). In 1964, the national percentage of Americans 25 years of age or older who had completed four years of college or more was 48 percent (USCB, 2017). During this period, educational attainment for White Americans (50%) was approximately twice as much as that for African Americans (26%) (USCB, 2017). See Figure A.1 for a summary of these statistics. By 1981, the rate of educational attainment for African Americans had doubled (52%) (USCB, 2017). Compared to the national percentage for educational attainment (70%) during this period, this achievement was still subpar (see Figure A.2). However, between 2003 and 2015, the educational attainment percentages for African Americans fell within a range of one to five percentage points of the national rate (see Figure A.3) (USCB, 2017). Part of the rationale for this progress could be explained by the U.S. Census Bureau's adoption of a new racial identity schema that encouraged fluidity between racial and ethnic identification. No matter the reason, there is straightforward

[1] Racial disparities in the criminal justice system will be address throughout the dissertation.

evidence that educational attainment for African Americans has improved since 1964. In addition, when we look at the national percentage for educational attainment in 2015 (88%), we find similar success for Asian (89%) and White Americans (89%).

Figure A.1 U.S. Census: Racial Breakdown of the Percentage of People 25 Years and Over Who Completed College Between 1964 and 2015



Note. The data depicted here were based on two racial categories, White and Black. Since 1964, the rate of educational attainment for both groups steadily increased. While there is a noticeable gap between Blacks and Whites, the gap starts to steadily decrease around 1979. Source: USCB, 2017.

Figure A.2 U.S. Census: Racial Breakdown of the Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Completed College Between 1974 & 2015



Note. The data depicted here were collected using a racial breakdown that assigned Hispanics to an independent category. The data depict an increase in educational attainment for all racial groups. From 1974 to 2015, Whites

maintained the highest rate of educational attainment. Blacks had the most progressive increase in educational attainment, and Hispanics had the lowest rate of educational attainment. Source: USCB, 2017.

Figure A.3 U.S. Census: Racial Breakdown of the Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Completed College Between 2003 & 2015



Note. The data depicted here were collected by the U.S. Census Bureau using a revised set of racial categories. The statistics for Non-Hispanic Whites and Non-Hispanic Whites *alone or in combination* were almost identical. Therefore, the two groups are reported here as one group--Non-Hispanic White alone or in combination. Non-Hispanic Whites alone or in combination had the highest rate of educational attainment between 2003 and 2015. Hispanics had the lowest rate of educational attainment during this period. Education attainment for Blacks increased during this period. The rate of educational attainment for Asians fluctuated but increased over time. Source: USCB, 2017.

Racial Disparities in Employment

There are racial disparities in both the negative (unemployment) and positive (lucrative jobs) forms of employment. The year 2003 marked the first sign of college success for African Americans that was comparable to the national rate for educational attainment. However, from

2003 to 2015, African Americans had the lowest averaged employment-population ratio (55) (BLS, 2016). All other racial groups maintained a ratio in the range of 61 to 62 (see Figure A.4) (BLS, 2016). Based on these data, a high rate of educational attainment for African Americans has no direct bearing on unemployment for the group. Between 2003 and 2015, there was a sustained employment gap between African Americans and all other racial groups. We also see similar racial disparities in the more ideal forms of employment, such as the acquirement of lucrative jobs in the fields like science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) (USCB, 2011; USCB 2013). With an increase in educational attainment, we should expect to see an increase in the more lucrative fields (i.e., STEM). In 1970, African Americans represented 4% of those employed in the STEM fields (USCB, 2013). In 2011, out of all the racial groups, African Americans had the lowest representation (6.4%) in the STEM fields (USCB, 2011), which is only a 2%-point difference from the statistics recorded in 1970. In terms of unemployment, African Americans are consistently overrepresented, and underrepresented in lucrative fields.

Figure A.4 U.S. Census: Racial Breakdown of Employment to Population Ratios, 2003 & 2015



Note. The data depict Blacks having the lowest employment/pop. ratio during 2003-2015. Hispanics had the highest employment/population ratio. Whites had the second highest employment/pop. ratio and alternated with Hispanics for the highest rate between 2009 and 2012. There is also a noticeable decline in ratios for all groups around the time of the Great Recession. Source: BLS, 2016.

Racial Disparities in Housing

Much like employment, there are racial disparities in the negative (homelessness) and positive (homeownership) forms of housing. Here is the racial breakdown for sheltered homeless individuals in 2007: 1) 557,937 African Americans; 2) 513,289 White Americans; 3) 102,554 Multi-Racial Americans; 4) 40,904 Native Americans; 5) 8,991 Asian Americans; and 6) 4,461 Pacific Islander Americans (see Table A.1) (HUD, 2007). While African Americans only made up 12% of the U.S. population in 2007, they were most of the sheltered homeless population (HUD, 2007). In 2015, the number of sheltered homeless Americans was significantly reduced, however, African Americans remained disproportionately overrepresented in this population (HUD, 2017).

We also see similar racial disparities in the more ideal form of housing--homeownership (Taylor, 2012; USCB-HO, 2017). In 2003, the overall homeownership rate for the U.S. was 68, 75 for White Americans, 48 for African Americans, 47 for Hispanics Americans of all races, and 56 for the category of *All Other Races* (USCB-HO, 2017). In 2015, the homeownership rates dropped to 64 overall, 72 for White Americans, 42 for African Americans, 46 for Hispanics of all races, and 54 for the category of *All Other Races* (see Figure A.5) (USCB-HO, 2017). Between 2003 and 2015, homeownership for African Americans dropped by 6 points. Homeownership for Whites Americans remained 7 to 9 points above the national average during this same period, and Hispanics and *All Other Races* maintained a steady--with minimal variation--below-average rate. Despite their educational achievements from 2003 to 2015, African Americans consistently made up most of the homeless population and the minority of homeowners.

Table A.1 *U.S. HUD: Racial Breakdown of the U.S. Sheltered Homeless in 2007 & 2015*

2007 Sheltered Homeless		**2015 Sheltered Homeless**	
Group	**Total**	**Group**	**Total**
White (Non-Hispanic)	41.8%	White (Non-Hispanic)	44.8%
African American	45.4%	African American	45.9%
Asian	0.7%	Asian	0.9%
Native American	3.3%	Native American	2.2%
Pacific Islander	0.4%	Pacific Islander	1.3%
Multiple Races	8.4%	Multiple Races	4.9%

Note. Blacks and Whites make up most of the homeless population, with Blacks having the predominate representation. A racial disparity can be detected when these statistics are compared to U.S. population statistics. In 2015, Blacks represented approximately 13% of the total U.S. population. Source: HUD, 2007; HUD, 2017.

Figure A.5 U.S. HUD: Homeownership Rates Compared by Race for 2003 & 2015



This brief overview of the outcomes of some of our most important social institutions is a demonstration of two things. First, African Americans appear to be achieving college success at a much higher rate than in 1964. However, these data illustrate that African Americans are also consistently overrepresented in the negative forms of these institutions and underrepresented in the positive forms. We could draw the conclusion that college-educated African Americans are among the homeless and unemployed with no desire to own a home or seek "ideal" employment. However, there might be an alternative hidden story in these statistics. Colorism theorists would argue that some African Americans are afforded opportunities while others are denied the same opportunities based on their lack of sameness with White Americans (Heckler, 2017; Kahn, Goff, Lee, & Motamed, 2016; Russell-Cole et al., 2013). In other words, darker-skinned African Americans are more likely to be discriminated against (Baynes, 1997; Harris, 2008) and they might make up the disadvantaged sub-populations that exist in contradiction to the overall achievements of the group. If we study these outcomes within the context of standard racial categories, the story is nonsensical. However, if we purchase the notion that racial

discrimination is not equally experienced among members of the same minority group, then these statistics start to make sense. Throughout the dissertation, I will argue that addressing racial discrimination within the context of colorism, will increase our chances of reducing the racial disparities that stem from our social institutions.

Gaps in the Literature

This project will address three gaps in the literature. The first gap involves how we study racial discrimination. For decades, colorism theorists have argued for a more expansive approach to studying racial discrimination. For example, Baynes' (1997) proposal for the Dark-Light Paradigm (DLP) embraces the notion that discrimination can be based on factors that go beyond racial categories. These factors include physical characteristics like skin color. In his description of colorism, Baynes (1997) states that "a dark-skinned person of color…is likely to encounter more discrimination than his or her light-skinned counterpart." (p. 185). This line of thought has been developed by a group of Critical Race Theorists (CRT) from various disciplines.

Colorism offers an opportunity to be more exact in the identification of the targets of racial discrimination. It is also the type of language that is in alignment with the emerging multi-racial and multi-ethnic makeup of America (Cohn & Caumont, 2016). Baynes proposed the DLP in 1997. Fast forward to 2018, and we are faced with a society that is morphing into something that cannot be solely defined by racial categories. The language that we use to conduct race studies will soon become obsolete, and the categorical approach will limit our ability to produce impactful research. Most important, the public administration literature has not broached the topic of colorism in a meaningful way. This dissertation will address this gap by introducing the

concept of colorism to public administration, and it will provide tools for conducting research on the intersection of colorism and public administration.

The second gap involves the lack of research on how colorism might impact local policing outcomes. There is research that has established a correlation between colorism and prison sentences (Viglione, Hannon & DeFina, 2011) and perceived criminality (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns & Johnson, 2006; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004). However, we have yet to comprehensively exam how colorism might influence the criminal justice system at the street-level. This dissertation will explore the plausibility of colorism as an additional way to explain some of the racial disparities that stem from local policing (Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, 2014; Leitzel, 2001). Epp et al. (2014) conducted an extensive study that highlighted racial disparities in the conduct of investigatory traffic stops. While studies like that conducted by Epp et al. have accomplished the important task of documenting racial disparities based on categorical race, a focus on colorism would help to unearth additional details about racial discrimination. The incorporation of colorism in our research strategies will enable us to conduct studies that will address the variability of discrimination within target groups.

The third gap in the literature is related to the distinct levels of colorism (individual, interactive and institutional). The distinct levels of colorism will be discussed in detail later in the dissertation. What is important to note is that the literature has provided adequate description of individual and institutional colorism, however, there is limited description of interactive colorism. This dissertation will draw upon what we know about organizational socialization to explore interactive colorism within an organizational context. In addition, the research will explore what colorism, at the interactive level, might mean to the function of public organizations.

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation will introduce colorism to the discipline of public administration, offer feasible hypotheses for future research, and provide a valid explanation for the most understudied type of colorism, interactive colorism. The dissertation consists of three articles that are intended to situated colorism within the theoretical and practical setting of public administration. Given the disparate coverage of colorism, the dissertation is inherently an interdisciplinary effort. A concerted effort was made to address what public administrators might want to know about colorism, coupled with an effort to use language that is accessible to multiple audiences. Readers should consider each article as part of an overall effort to advocate for more specificity in race studies and more frank dialogue about how street-level bureaucrats engage the citizenry.

Article I

The purpose of the first article was to introduce the concept of colorism to public administration. While introducing the concept, I wanted to do so in a way that brought order to the discussion. Therefore, the secondary purpose of the article was to clarify terms, definitions and descriptions in a way that would be useful to the broader scholarly community, students, and practitioners. The tone used in this article is meant to be inviting to the general reader. Therefore, if you are interested in this topic and would like a general introduction to the concept of colorism, start your exploration with Article I. In the article, I argue that colorism can add an element of specificity to racism that could help to further define the actual targets of racial discrimination. The article discusses the three levels of colorism—individual, interactive, and institutional, and the distinct types of colorism—intra-racial and inter-racial. In addition, the article discusses how colorism has interfaced with public administration in terms of Title VII colorism complaints and criminal justice outcomes. A portion of the article is dedicated to explaining how colorism might

function at the street-level and what this means to the psychological study of the street-level bureaucrat. The article concludes with some suggestions on how we can address the associated challenges and take advantage of opportunities for research.

Article II

Article II builds upon the psychological considerations and the descriptions of colorism outlined in Article I. For instance, in the first article, I provide descriptions of the three levels of colorism—individual, interactive and institutional along with an explanation of how bias functions within the human mind. In Article II, a conceptual model was designed based on these factors. The conceptual model was then used to create a simulated environment that would subject the tenets of colorism to various policing scenarios. The article explored the theoretical question of--*how might colorism function within an organization;* and the practical question of--*what might occur when managers apply the typical dilemmatic responses to detected colorism*? This thought experiment revealed opportunities to improve how we describe colorism. In addition, it provides an explanation of how colorism might metastasize from the individual level to the institutional level. From a practical standpoint, the article provides a foundation for understanding how varied responses to detected colorism might impact organizational outcomes.

Article III

The third article is an extension of Articles I and II in that it seeks to validate one of two conceptual models that can best explain how interactive colorism might operate within a police department. Of the three levels of colorism, interactive colorism lacks description in the literature, yet it is most relevant to street-level bureaucracies. The general premise of the two proposed models is that interactive colorism spreads between organizational members by way of organizational socialization. The difference between the two models is that one model considers

junior officers to have enough agency to influence the biased behaviors of their superior officers, and the other model is the counterargument—junior officers have little to no agency to influence their superiors. The input of subject-matter experts (SMEs) and non-SMEs was used to address the aims of the study. The second objective for this project was to gather ideas for future research. The findings from this project provide a solid foundation for future projects in which a conceptual model of interactive colorism has been validated by experts from multiple disciplines.

CHAPTER 2. Article I – An Introduction: Colorism and Its Relevance to Public Administration

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Abstract

Colorism is a system of disadvantage and privilege based on skin color, with a bias for lighter skin. The main objective of this article is to introduce the concept of colorism to the field of public administration (PA), which includes academics and practitioners. The second objective of the article is to bridge contributions from other disciplines to create descriptions of the phenomenon that will be most useful to PA. The third objective is to demonstrate colorism's current and potential impact on public administration, in particular, street-level bureaucracy. These objectives are captured in a three-part argument that challenges public administration to examine racial disparities beyond the standard racial categories. The paper uses data from the EEOC and previous research on colorism and criminal sentencing to illustrate how colorism currently intersects with PA. In addition, scenarios are used to demonstrate the potential impact colorism might have at the street-level.

Introduction

This article introduces the concept of colorism to the public administration literature, and it provides a discussion of colorism's relevance to the practice of public administration. Colorism is "the allocation of privilege and disadvantage according to the lightness or darkness of one's skin, with favoritism typically granted to those with lighter skin" (Burke & Embrich, 2008, p. 17). Colorism is a distinct form of racism. To illustrate this distinction requires an explanation of the relationship between skin color, race, and ethnicity. As described by previous authors, race divides people into categories "based on phenotype or genotype" (Burton, Bonilla-Silva, Ray, Buckelew & Freeman, 2010, p. 1). Ethnicity "refers to a subset of people whose members share common national, ancestral, cultural, immigration or religious characteristics that distinguish them from other groups." (Burton et al., 2010, p. 1). Like race, ethnicity is categorical. Skin color, however, differs from race and ethnicity in that it is not a categorical trait but a physical trait. In a social setting, skin color is only bound to race and ethnicity when a perceiver uses heuristics to establish the association (Kahneman, 2011; Wildavsky, 1987). While colorism is a form of racism, it differs from racism in that it involves bias that is primarily based on skin color (Harrison & Thomas, 2009); instigator(s) of skin color discrimination can act without knowing the race or ethnicity of the target.

The public administration literature lacks an in-depth discussion about colorism, which presents an opportunity for scholars and practitioners to rethink how we address race, racism and racial discrimination. A sole focus on categorical race fails to address the varied degrees of racial discrimination within a target group. For example, some African Americans may rarely experience racial discrimination, while others may be subjected to racial discrimination on a routine basis. A more thorough understanding of these varied experiences might help to inform

how we address racially biased outcomes. In addition, we might be able to improve how bureaucrats engage citizens at the street-level.

By way of three objectives, this article will highlight why the distinction between colorism and the categorical forms of racism--which includes discrimination based on ethnicity--is important to public administration. The main objective of the article is to address the literature gap by introducing the concept of colorism to the public administration (PA) scholars and practitioners. The second objective is to bridge contributions from other disciplines to create descriptions of the phenomenon that will be most useful to PA. The third objective is to demonstrate colorism's current and potential impact on public administration, in particular, street-level bureaucracy.

A deeper understanding of colorism could add more specificity to how we study race as a variable, especially for topics such as shared-race between the public servant and the citizen (i.e., representative bureaucracy), instances of the twofold-recipient of both privilege and discrimination (e.g., those in the middle of the skin color spectrum), vulnerable populations (e.g., dark-skinned individuals of any race), biased decisions by street-level bureaucrats, and racial discrimination. All these topics invoke conceptions of race and racism, but they cannot be properly addressed without detailed information. Our typical approach for exploring race and racial discrimination tends to draw comparisons between Whites and other racial groups. An example of this approach can be found in Loury's (2002) detailed account of racial inequities in the United States in which he draws comparisons between Whites and Blacks in terms of income, types of occupation, poverty, asset ownership, and employment/population ratios. However, this approach fails to capture other forms of racially biased outcomes that might stem from the type of discrimination that transpires between minority groups, or members of the same

racial group. In addition, this approach assumes that members of the same group will experience the same degree of racial discrimination. The inherent limitations of the categorical approach in the study of race may have stifled our ability to address racial disparities in social institutions like criminal justice (Alexander, 2012), housing (HUD, 2017) and various forms of employment (BLS, 2016; USCB, 2013). The article is presented as a three-part argument that challenges us to look beyond categorical race. The first part of the argument is that racial inequities that stem from our social institutions are not just about categorical race. The second part of the argument is that some of these disparities can be explained as skin color discrimination. The third part of the argument is that these disparities involve a street-level bureaucrat's varied reaction to skin color.

For street-level bureaucracy, there are additional factors that may complicate race as a variable. The Pew Research Center projects that "by 2055 the United States will not have a single racial or ethnic minority" (Cohn & Caumont, 2016, p. 1). In short, Americans are becoming more racially ambiguous and diverse. However, scholars and practitioners are guilty of conducting race studies while negating the complex variability that is embedded within the race-variable (Banks, 2000; Baynes, 1997; Edwards, 1973). Colorism offers PA scholars an opportunity to examine street-level bureaucracy with a more authentic lens. In turn, public managers would be empowered to make more informed decisions about who to hire, when to retrain, and when to question the judgement of the rational actor.

The article will follow this sequence. In the first section, a thorough description of colorism will be provided, which will include some historical context about the phenomenon, a description of the distinct levels and types of colorism, and the necessary and sufficient conditions needed to qualify a case as colorism. In the second section, the current impact of

colorism on public administration will be discussed in terms of criminal sentencing and Title VII colorism complaints. The third section will discuss the potential impact of colorism on street-level bureaucracy. More specifically, this section will explore how human cognition and a street-level bureaucrat's use of discretion might contribute to the perpetuation of colorism ideology. The article will conclude with some guidance on how we might advance work in this area.

Description of Colorism

Historical Context

In modern times, colorism is a global phenomenon (Blay, 2011; Dixon & Telles, 2017; Wade, 1996); however, authors have argued that colorism originated from the transatlantic slave trade and the rise of white supremacy (Hall, 2010; Herring, 2002). Different variants of race-mixing took place during the period of the transatlantic slave trade and thereafter (Herring, 2004). Whether by free will or by force, European settlers had children with African slaves and the indigenous people who were located throughout the Americas (Russell-Cole, Wilson, & Hall, 2013). Throughout colonial America, the developing skin color spectrum was used to determine which slaves would work in the fields and which of them would serve as house slaves (Hunter, 2002; Russell-Cole et al., 2013). Typically, slaves with darker skin were field hands, and slaves with lighter skin were house slaves (Herring, 2004). This classification system would engender animosity between the two groups of slaves, and the system perpetuated ill-informed judgements that slave masters held about skin color. One major assumption that developed from a stratified slave labor system is the notion that the closer a slave resembled her/his slave master--whether it be through religion, aesthetic, or speech—the less difficult life would be (Baynes, 1997; Blay,

2011; Hunter, 2002). Hunter argues that during the slavery era and even now, having light skin can be used to garner economic, educational, and social capital (Hunter, 2002).

What we see throughout the world, even in countries with predominantly brown and black populations, is an orientation towards Eurocentric norms (Blay, 2011). Eurocentric dominance is evident in our collective beauty norms, such as skin tone, hair texture, style of clothing, and body structure (Blay, 2011; Russell-Cole et al., 2013). The norms are so engrained that the average person may not realize that their worldview is influenced by a persistent and reinforcing system of white supremacy. This displaced focus on beauty as being not of self, can cause low self-esteem and result in value-judgments of self and others (Blay 2011; Butts, 1963; Coard, Breland & Raskin, 2001; Hunter, 2011). Colorism derives from an extended period when European countries steadfastly rewrote the global human narrative. Even today, contemporaries are subjecting themselves to the same narrative that is laden with unsubstantiated falsities about skin color and racial hierarchies (Bashi, 1998; Bashi & McDaniel, 1997; Hochschild & Weaver, 2007; Hunter, 2002; Marx, 1996). For example, throughout Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and several countries in Africa, colorism and skin-bleaching is prevalent (Blay, 2011; Chavez-Duenas, Adames, & Organista, 2014; de Souza, 2008; Fokuo, 2009; Glenn, 2008; Mahe, 2014; Russell-Cole et al., 2013). The act of bleaching one's skin is tied to the idea that society values light skin more so than dark skin (Blay, 2011; Herring, 2002; Hunter, 2002).

The Levels of Colorism

Much like how we understand the function of racism, colorism can operate at distinct levels, which include the individual-, the interactive- and the institutional level (Wilder, 2008). It (colorism) can also be expressed in two forms or types--inter-racial and intra-racial. First, it is important to mention a few points about the collective body of literature that I am using to

describe colorism. There are many fields of study that have contributed to this discussion, which include sociology, social welfare, psychology, and critical race theory (legal). However, the dialogue is not connected in a way that would be meaningful to public administration. In the following, these varied viewpoints will be synthesized into a streamlined description of colorism. In some instances, additional structure will be added to reorient the descriptions to public administration. To establish some order in how I describe colorism, key terms will be defined and evoked throughout the rest of the discussion. These terms will capture the different levels of colorism—individual-, interactive- and institutional, and the two types--inter-racial and intra-racial--of colorism.

Individual colorism. Individual colorism can best be described in two ways—an internalized negative view of one's skin color or as expressed skin color bias from an instigator to a target (Hunter, 2007; Wilder, 2008). In general, individual colorism is based on perceptions about skin color. If the judgements are internalized by an individual, they could result in self-deprecating acts like skin-bleaching (Blay, 2011; de Souza, 2008; Herring, 2002; Hunter, 2011). If the judgements are externalized by an individual, they could result in a broad range of discriminatory behaviors (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Edwards, 1973; Keith & Herring, 1991). Consider this description of individual colorism in the context of the criminal justice system. Burch (2015) states that "discrimination can arise as individual decision-makers [within the criminal justice system] at various points in the process of formulating opinions about defendants based on their appearance" (pp. 400-401). In short, skin color bias at the individual level can inform how a person treats herself, and it can also inform the interactions that take place between two people.

> **Definition**: Individual colorism is the internalization or externalization of biased judgements that are based on skin color.

Interactive Colorism. There is limited description of interactive colorism. However, literature from the discipline of psychology will be used to fill in the gaps. In reference to African American women, Wilder (2008) describes how rituals have been used to transfer colorism ideology to younger females. For example, through folklore and repeated references to skin color, older women would impress upon younger Black women the relevance of skin color to the [Black] human condition (Wilder, 2008). Psychologists would qualify Wilder's description of these verbal rituals as a function of social contagion. Social contagion is "the spread of ideas, attitudes, or behavior patterns in a group through imitation and conformity" (Colman, 2015; Kravetz, 2017). For interactive colorism, biased thoughts and behaviors are transferred from the affected environment (e.g., individuals, norms) to the once unaffected individual. Interactive colorism is different from individual colorism in that it serves as a form of socialization—transference of the biased way of thinking and behaving. For example, a new federal employee observes how senior employees interact with the public. Most of the senior employees are rude to people with dark skin. For a myriad of reasons—survival, social acceptance (Van Maanen, 1975), or implicit learning (Colman, 2015), the new employee begins to emulate the biased behavior. From this example, we can imagine how colorism might spread like a contagion.

> **Definition**: Interactive colorism is the socialization of skin color bias; it is how skin color bias is transferred from the environment to the individual.

Institutional Colorism. Since previous authors have established colorism as an embedded phenomenon within the larger structure of racism (Wilder, 2008), I used one of the most thorough descriptions of institutional racism to formulate a definition of institutional colorism. Better (2008) defines institutional racism as "patterns, procedures, practices, and policies that operate within social institutions so as to consistently penalize, disadvantage, and exploit

individuals who are members of nonwhite racial/ethnic groups" (p. 11). She further states that the policies can be formal or informal. There are also associated attitudes that support the sustainment of racial inequality, and associated beliefs that presume white supremacy (Better, 2008). Better's description of institutional racism is sound; however, the addition of implicit bias and obliviousness will help to further explain institutional racism. Better describes a system of racism that involves conscious actors. However, some actions that perpetuate racism may derive from the subconscious or even from a keen focus on assigned tasks. Not every actor involved with the maintenance of institutional racism is fully aware of the system, and they may not be fully aware of their role in the perpetuation of the system. Lastly, more so than individual- and interactive colorism, institutional colorism will have obvious artifacts such as skin color disparities in criminal sentencing.

> **Definition**: Institutional colorism is comprised of social institutions whose behaviors and policies result in the discrimination of citizens with darker skin.

To further clarify these descriptions, I have summarized the necessary and sufficient conditions for the three levels of colorism. See Table 1.1 (Goertz, 2006). To qualify colorism at each level, certain conditions must be met. In terms of individual colorism, there must be an instigator (condition #1) and a target/subject (condition #2). In terms of internalized individual colorism, the instigator and the target would be the same person. Externalized individual colorism would require at least one instigator and at least one person who is the target. To qualify interactive colorism, the socialization act must involve someone who is affected by colorism (condition #1) and someone who is unaffected but susceptible to colorism ideology (condition #2). Susceptibility could be based on power dynamics, naiveté or any other factors that would render someone vulnerable to influence. To qualify institutional colorism, it is necessary to determine whether individual- (condition #1) and interactive colorism (condition

#2) are part of the equation. Meaning, an inquiry that is centered on institutional colorism should first establish whether individual and interactive colorism are true conditions. Research designs that fail to qualify these conditions may violate the basic tenets of colorism.

Table 1.1 *The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Three Levels of Colorism*

	Condition #1	**Condition #2**	**Level**
Individual Colorism	Instigator	Target/Subject	Basic-level
Interactive Colorism	Affected by Colorism	Unaffected & Susceptible	Secondary-level
Institutional Colorism	Individual Colorism	Interactive Colorism	Indicator-level

Note. This table was designed based on Goertz's explanation of necessary and sufficient conditions. The primary conditions for each level of colorism are depicted, along with the three-level identifications for how colorism is discussed in this article. However, depending on the structure of other studies, any of the three sub-concepts (individual-, interactive-, institutional colorism) could be discussed independent of the other two sub-concepts and still have a multidimensional structure. Source: Goertz, 2006.

The Types of Colorism

There are two types of colorism, intra-racial colorism and inter-racial colorism. Intra-racial colorism is skin color bias that transpires within group (Banks, 2009; Herring, 2002). To qualify a case as intra-racial colorism, the instigator(s) and the target(s) would need to be from the same racial group. Inter-racial colorism is skin color bias that transpires between two or more racial groups (Banks, 2009; Herring, 2002). A case of inter-racial colorism would mean that the instigator (s) and the target(s) are from different racial groups. What we can gather from these two descriptions is that "persons of all races [can] engage in colorism" (Jones, 2009, p. 229). In addition to the vertical span across racial groups, both types--inter- and intra-racial colorism--can operate at all three levels--individual, interactive, and institutional.

Colorism's Current Impact on Public Administration

Colorism and Criminal Sentencing

Previous studies have found signs of colorism within the criminal justice system. Burch (2015) analyzed the incarceration records for Black and White inmates who were under the supervision of the Georgia Department of Corrections. She analyzed data covering the time span of 1995-2002, which included records of 67,379 inmates--23,840 White inmates and 43,539 Black inmates (Burch, 2015). Burch (2015) found that Blacks received significantly longer sentences than Whites. In addition, she found that sentencing outcomes for light-skinned Black inmates were similar to White inmates. However, medium- and dark-skinned Black inmates had sentences that were significantly higher than White inmates (Burch, 2015).

In a second study conducted by Viglione, Hannon & DeFina (2011), the research team explored the relationship between perceived skin color and length of prison sentences. The authors reviewed 12,158 records of female prisoners in North Carolina during the time span of 1995-2009 (Viglione et al., 2011). At the start of an inmate's incarceration, prison staff notated an inmate's skin color as "non-light" or "light" skin. The study found that women coded as having light skin received shorter prison sentences and served shorter stints of their sentence than their "non-light" counterparts (Viglione et al., 2011). These results echo the findings from similar studies (Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Judd, Blair, & Pizzi, 2005) conducted on male inmates that focused on the influence of Afrocentric facial features (e.g., dark skin, broad nose).

Title VII Color Discrimination Complaints

In the world of work, there are a growing number of colorism complaints. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the grounds of [skin] color (EEOC, 2018). The first Title VII case for color discrimination occurred in 1981, which was *Felix vs*.

Marquez (Russell-Cole et al., 2013). Carmen Felix was a dark medium-skinned female and Joaquin Marquez was a light-skinned female (Russell-Cole et al., 2013). Both the plaintiff and the defendant were Latina, and they worked for the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Hernandez, 2009; Russell-Cole et al., 2013). The claim was that the supervisor, Marquez, withheld a promotion from Felix because of her skin color. However, the court found no reasonable cause and ruled in the favor of Marquez (Hall, 2008; Hernandez, 2009; Russell-Cole et al., 2013).

In 1989, *Tracy Walker vs. the Secretary of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service* was among the earlier Title VII cases that were based on skin color discrimination (Hall, 2008; TVII, 1990). The plaintiff, Walker, was a light-skinned African American female. Walker's complaint was that her supervisor, a dark-skinned African American female, made her the target of scrutiny, reprimand, and unjustifiable termination because of jealousy over her [Walker] light skin color (Hall, 2008; Russell-Cole et al., 2013; TVII, 1990). While the case was recognized by the Court, the plaintiff's claims were overshadowed by evidence of Walker's derelict of duty.

These two cases were selected because they demonstrate how individual colorism might operate within a public organization. They also illustrate the nuanced nature of colorism and its intra-racial properties. Color discrimination cases are less rare than cases based on categorical race, but the volume of these disputes has steadily increased in the past two decades (see Figure 1.1). In 1992 there were 374 complaints of skin color discrimination (EEOC, 2018). By 2017, the number of disputes had increased by approximately nine times (3,240). However, as the number of cases increased, few were found to have reasonable cause. There appears to be a heightened perception of skin color discrimination, however, the Court's response has been consistently incomparable to the number of complaints.

Figure 1.1 Title VII Color Discrimination Complaints Filed with the EEOC from 1992 to 2017



Note. The figure depicts colorism complaints filed between 1992 and 2017. Over time, the number of cases has increased, however, majority of the cases were found to have no reasonable cause. Source: EEOC, 2018.

Colorism's Potential Impact on Street-Level Bureaucracy

Now that I have provided some examples of how colorism has intersected with public administration, I would like to shift the focus of the discussion towards its potential impact on street-level bureaucracy. First, I will provide a brief overview of how previous research has discussed the decisions of street-level bureaucrats. This overview will be followed by a map that describes how street-level bureaucrats might use granted discretion to make biased decisions. The section will conclude with a few scenarios to illustrate how these biased decisions might impact organizational outcomes.

Previous Research

Previous authors have explored the factors that might influence a street-level bureaucrat's (SLB) decisions, such as state constraints (Marschall, Rigby, & Jenkins, 2011), bureaucratic control (Kelly, 1994; Scott, 1997), supervision (Brehm & Gates, 2002), client characteristics (Keiser, 2004; Scott, 1997), gender (Nielsen, 2014; Portillo, 2012), and individual agency (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012). Some of these influences reside outside the bounds of an SLB's organization, and others are internal to the organization and the individual. While there are many other considerations, this truncated list of factors demonstrates that the sphere of influence can span across the internal to the external environment and the interpersonal to intrapersonal exchange.

In terms of external influence, Marschall et al. (2011) found that state laws, with the intent to control bureaucratic behavior, shaped the behaviors of street-level bureaucrats. Inversely, the vague/symbolic aspects of state law tend to pose fewer constraints on street-level decisions (Marschall et al., 2011). Two examples of internal influence would include bureaucratic control and supervision. Kelly (1994) found that a high degree of bureaucratic control can serve as a constraint to a SLB's authority. In a later study, Brehm and Gates (2002) identified socialization acts like supervision as effective means for guiding the actions of SLBs. Researchers have found that factors other than client need, such as client characteristics (e.g., gender), can influence decisions about the allocation of localized services (Scott, 1997). In addition, a SLB's gender can increase their likelihood to stray from the rules (Nielsen, 2014; Portillo, 2012). Portillo (2012) found that SLBs who were people of color and/or female, tend to rely on formal rules. However, middle-aged and older White men viewed "particular rules as a constraint to their authority." (Portillo, 2012, p. 97). In their explanation of rogue agents and

conservers of institutional norms, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2012) encouraged scholars to shift our "conceptual emphasis from discretion to agency" (p. 518).

Taking a cue from Maynard-Moody and Musheno, I entertain the notion that the granting of discretion authorizes agency, and agency can serve as the conduit for biased behaviors. Previous research has provided a thorough explanation of how SLBs' decision-making models can be influenced, and many of these factors can enable different forms of bias. What our discussion currently lacks is a basic roadmap that illustrates how we shift from a discussion that is centered on discretion to one that incorporates the biased aspects of agency. The remainder of this discussion is an effort to shift our attention from discretion to agency and provide some administrative context for the broader discussions about skin color bias. The combination of the emphasized bias (colorism) and concerned context (street-level bureaucracy) are viewed here as highly relevant to public administration. In the following, I will gradually develop the discussion to illustrate colorism's potential impact on street-level decisions.

Street-Level Bureaucrats and Discretion

In terms of government, it is the SLBs (e.g., teachers) who impart the first form of socialization towards ideal citizenship (Lipsky, 1980). Street-level bureaucrats (e.g., police officers) serve as the first line of enforcement of local, state, and federal laws, and many of them (e.g., social workers) play a key role in the issuance of social services (Lipsky, 1980). In their engagement with citizens, SLBs are afforded a high degree of discretion, which has bearing on the equity of the implementation of laws and policies, the translation of culture, and the allocation of services. Given what we know about the rational actor, self-interests, and bounded rationality, an individual with such discretion is susceptible to making decisions that are impaired by their

personal biases (Downs, 1967; Grafstein, 1948; Kahneman, 2003; Lipsky, 1980; Simon, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

Brown (1981) describes administrative discretion as "the act of making choices in light of policy norms, and [it] involves routine but adaptive choices" (p. 25). He also states that some aspects of the decision-making process are informed by circumstance and individual judgement (Brown, 1981). The scope of discretion afforded to a SLB is dependent upon the specifications of their role and those premises that are not specified (Simon, 1997). Informal organizational factors can influence a workers' rule-following behavior (Oberfield, 2010). In addition, when SLBs "have a significant degree of discretion, where their work is less rule-centered, and where they have more control, their individual theories of justice have an important effect on the final implementation of public policies" (Kelly, 1994, p. 20). Street level judgements are grounded in bounded rationality in which SLBs find themselves trying to balance the rules set by the government and the inputs they received from citizen interactions (LaFrance & Allen, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Simon, 1997), which would include a citizen's skin color.

The reoccurring themes that emerged from the literature pertaining to discretion include: 1) the significant role of an SLB's personal judgement; 2) varied circumstances/ambiguity; and 3) bounded rationality--the balancing act between the internal environment and the external environment (Jones, 1999; Simon, 1996). These themes illustrate how a multitude of complex factors can influence the exercise of discretion. More importantly, we can begin to see how bias might play a role in the decision-making process. A few insights on how SLBs might form the thoughts that inform biased decisions is discussed in the next section.

The Role of Human Cognition and Bias

Automatic and Rational Cognition. Some authors describe individuals as having two cognitive systems (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). System 1, often referred to as the automatic or experiential system, is characterized as implicit thought (Kahneman, 2003). It (the automatic system) is also described as thought that is contextualized, socialized and reliant upon stereotypes, past experiences, or memories (Simon, 1997). System 2, also referred to as the reflective or rational system, is described by some scholars as explicit thought (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). The rational system consists of thoughts that are decontextualized, asocial, and bound to a conscious appraisal of events (Stanovich & West, 2000). See Table 1.2 for a more exhaustive description of these two cognitive systems.

Table 1.2 *Descriptive Properties of the Two Human Cognitive Systems*

System 1 / Automatic / Experiential	**System 2 / Reflective / Rational**
Uncontrolled / Automatic	Controlled
Effortless	Effortful
Associative	Deductive
Fast	Slow
Unconscious	Self-Aware
Skilled	Rule-Following
Mental Shortcuts	Complex Computations
Implicit	Explicit
Holistic	Analytic
Undemanding of cognitive capacity	Demanding of cognitive capacity
Behavior mediated by "vibes" from past experiences	Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events
Highly contextualized	Decontextualized
Conversational and socialized	Asocial
Broad generalization, stereotypical thinking	More highly differentiated thinking
Oriented toward immediate action; rapid processing	Oriented toward delayed action; slower processing
Outcome oriented	Process oriented

Note. The table is a list of descriptors typically used to describe the two human cognitive systems. The list combines contributions from several authors. Sources: Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008.

Circumstances (Kahneman, 2011) and timing (Chin-Quee, 1992) help to determine which cognitive system will be called upon. Kahneman (2011) states that "both systems are active when we are awake, and the automatic system consistently sends suggestions to the reflective system in the form of impressions, intuitions and feelings" (p. 24). Thaler and Sunstein (2008) describe the automatic system as being "our gut" (p. 21). While the gut may be spot on at times, too much reliance on the automatic system may lead to mistakes—outcomes that run counter to an established set of rules (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).

Bias. In his explanation of worker bias, Lipsky (1980) states that a SLB may "prefer some clients over others" (p. 108). This preference, or bias, may operate within a SLBs' automatic system and/or the reflective system. Lipsky (1980) argues that the discriminatory

patterns associated with worker bias are subtle, which would make detection an arduous task. There are two notable features to this part of Lipsky's argument. The first is the need for the bureaucrat to control the [citizen] "in order to process work efficiently" (Lipsky, 1980, p. 111). The second is the possibility of the bureaucrat's moral assumptions having influence on their decision-making process. The combination of these factors can render certain citizens as victims of unfair generalizations at the hands of biased bureaucrats. In such cases, the patterns of discriminatory behavior become more evident when we observe behaviors in aggregate and over time.

Downs (1967) outlines four common ways in which SLBs may express bias: 1) distorting the information passed upward to superiors; 2) biased attitudes towards specific policies; 3) lack of compliance to directives that run counter to his/her self-interests; and 4) avoiding additional risk or responsibilities that run counter to his/her own goals. Downs (1967) also states that these biases can originate from roles that are beyond the work environment, such as family roles or church membership. Lipsky and Downs offered similar descriptions of bias, however, Downs centered his description on the relationship between the SLB and his/her superiors.

Colorism and the Bureaucrat

When we consider how colorism might operate within a public organization, there are several factors that might be involved, such as human cognition, bias and discretion. SLBs can influence the perpetuation of skin color bias at each of the three levels, but this is especially the case with interactive colorism. For example, a newcomer can bring to an organization a set of biased beliefs, attitudes and values that run counter to an organization's culture (Jones, 1983; Perry, 1997). A newcomer who espouses, consciously or subconsciously, to colorism ideology has the propensity to infect the ideology of their colleagues. The alternative notion is that an

organization can infect its members with biased ideology. Given that SLBs have an elevated level of discretion, the spread of colorism throughout a street-level bureaucracy could prove to be problematic for citizens. If citizens are dependent on biased SLBs for the provision of social services and the sustainment of public safety, we should expect that citizens with dark skin will not fare well. In addition, it is not guaranteed that SLBs' use of discretion will be monitored by a supervisor (Downs, 1967; Lipsky, 1980). Therefore, routine discrimination could go unchecked.

There are also psychological considerations that can further compound skin color bias at the street-level. The learning that takes place during an organization's socialization process could be implicit (Colman, 2015) or explicit (Oberfield, 2010), such as formal training programs. However, implicit learning proposes a unique challenge in terms of colorism. For example, police officers often find themselves in situations that call for reliance on their automatic cognition. If within an officer's automatic brain-housing are stored thoughts (Kahneman, 2011), from implicit learning, that associate dark skin with imminent danger, the officer is likely to have a hyper-reaction to dark-skinned citizens. The likelihood of this occurring would increase in high-pressured moments that limit an officer from accessing his or her rationale cognition (Kahneman, 2011; Simon, 1997; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Overtime, a collection of these biased behaviors will result in institutional colorism--outcomes that depict bias against citizens with darker skin. Within the context of local policing, institutional colorism could equate to a significantly higher rate of excessive force being used when interacting with dark-skinned citizens. The following three scenarios are used to further illustrate the interconnectedness between these factors (street-level bureaucracy, discretion, human cognition, and bias) and to illustrate additional features of colorism.

Scenario 1: Individual Colorism

A fourth-grade teacher fully engages majority of her students, most of whom are White or have light skin. However, there is one student who does not receive equal attention from the teacher. He is African American, and compared to the other students, he would be considered dark-skinned. When he raises his hand to participate, the teacher never acknowledges him. She will call upon other students who are Latino, White, Asian, and Black with light skin color. He receives high marks on his quizzes but received a zero for class participation. His participation score prevents him from advancing to the next grade. The child is oblivious as to why he is being held back a grade, and his mother claims that the teacher is a racist.

Colorism as Selective Racism. In this scenario there are two possibilities that might explain the teacher's behavior. She could be consciously or subconsciously discriminating against the child because of his dark skin color (Weaver, 2012). While colorism is a form of racism, it would be difficult to argue the case because she does engage the other African American students. Those who are not aware of colorism would accept the teacher's argument and she would be free to continue to discriminate against dark-skinned students. If she is operating from her automatic mind, this can be more problematic (Epstein, 1994; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). If her behavior is completely automatic, she is completely unaware of her behavior. This possibility is the most difficult to address because the instigator lacks the consciousness that is necessary to address the issue. What should be more concerning is that she has full discretion over a student's matriculation. If the teacher's behavior goes unchecked for an extended period, she could adversely impact the learning process for several students.

Scenario 2: Interactive Colorism

A junior police officer repeatedly observes a senior police officer as he chastises citizens. Typically, the citizens who are subjected to the abuse have dark skin. Neither of the officers verbally acknowledgement the incidents, and it becomes a daily routine. After a few weeks on the job, the junior officer begins to emulate the senior officer's behavior. Eventually, both officers perpetuate the discriminatory behavior without saying a word to each other.

The Stealth Nature of Interactive Colorism. Scenario 2 illustrates the stealth nature of bias transfer. Bias can originate from the subconscious mind of one person and transfer to the subconscious mind of another person. Meaning, behaviors that generate from the automatic mind of one person can influence the automatic mind of another person (Colman, 2015; Kravetz, 2017). Psychologists have described this phenomenon as social contagion, or a more common term is infectious behavior (Colman, 2015). The same possibilities of consciousness and sub-consciousness apply to this scenario too. Humans can be conscious that they are being socialized or they can be unaware of the socialization. What is important here is that the automatic mind records memories for later recall (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). This process of storing information does not require conscious thought. If an officer makes a conscious decision to emulate the behaviors of her/his colleagues, the behavior originates from her/his rationale mind. However, some acts of emulation or assimilation are conscious efforts and others are a result of automatic attunement (Kravetz, 2017).

Scenario 3: Institutional Colorism

For 20 years, a local journalist documented the conviction stories of men incarcerated in a Florida state prison. She maintained the transcripts and photos of the inmates in a large portfolio. One day she started to review her work. She first noticed that most of the inmates were of Latin and African descent. She then noticed that most of the inmates had dark skin, and only a few of the inmates had fair skin. She knew she had stumbled upon something, but she did not have a name for it.

Institutional Colorism as a Tangible Artifact. Unknowingly, the journalist had collected an artifact of biased behaviors. She, like many of us, could see the disparity but she lacked the specific language to call it what it is. Unlike race, colorism and its artifacts can tell an enhanced story about racism. While we can use racial categories to tell the front end of a narrative, we will learn more about the plight of the studied population if we look beyond their assigned racial category. Scenario 3 demonstrates the ease of establishing an initial hunch of institutional colorism when compared to individual and interactive colorism. Both individual and interactive colorism involve a high level of subjectivity, and both are subject to the stealth function of the bias. With institutional colorism, we can review outcomes over a period to make determinations. However, these determinations should be further qualified using the necessary and sufficient conditions outlined in Table 1.1.

Discussion

Whether it be we place people into broad racial categories, or they place themselves in those categories, sole reliance on a categorical approach to studying and managing racial discrimination is not yielding fair results. It is high time that we dissect race as a variable, unpack the many embedded ‘isms and start to take a more comprehensive look at skin color

diversity. Any other approach is complicit in the post-racial ideology that heralds limited success stories (e.g., President Obama) all while ignoring the plight of dark-skinned Blacks who may face a more difficult road to such success (Norwood, 2013). I have provided a few examples of how colorism has impacted public practices, and I have lay the groundwork for a paradigm shift towards more expansive dialogue about race in PA. The paradigm shift that I have made the case for will require some acknowledgements and action items by PA scholars and practitioners.

Acknowledgments and Action Items

First, let us acknowledge that while there are established protections against skin color discrimination (U.S. Senate, 2018), the review of the Title VII cases depicts a court system that is still trying to figure out how to respond to such complaints. We see that there is a significant rise in the number of skin color discrimination cases, but there has been minimal justice for the plaintiffs (Banks, 2009). What might help to address this issue are studies that aim to contextualize the details of the Title VII colorism complaints, and studies that seek to further clarify the descriptions that were developed here. Work along these lines should help the Court to be more responsive to perceived skin color discrimination.

Second, let us acknowledge previous calls for an adjustment in how we view race and public service. Some scholars have challenged public administrators to engage in frank dialogue, which would include coming to terms with past tragedies (Alexander & Stivers, 2014). Witt (2006) challenged public administrators to subject the variable of race to further scrutiny, along with its associated outcomes. Heckler (2017) challenged public administrators to assume a more critical view of whiteness, colorblindness, and white supremacy. Collectively, these authors have asked those concerned with public administration, both scholars and practitioners,

to be more critical of race, racism, and racial discrimination. We can respond to their challenges in a couple of ways. First, there are opportunities to further complicate the study of race by being more critical of race as a variable. We could mirror the efforts of legal scholars who have developed an informative literature on critical race theory (CRT), or we can find ways to use the CRT literature to study public servants and public organizations. The latter of these two recommendations might be the better strategy in terms of time and efficiency.

Third, we must acknowledge that tackling racial issues in a more comprehensive way will require an interdisciplinary exchange. Here I have provided you with information about automatic and rational cognition, and area of study that is not my forte. However, to unearth what is really going on, we must be willing to connect a few dots that are not currently stressed in the public administration literature. We should reach across the aisle to learn what other disciplines have said about colorism. There is a distinct question that we can ask practitioners and scholars from other disciplines, especially those from sociology, psychology and law, *how is colorism relevant to public administration*? Any future research on the effects of race and skin color should attempt to include scholars, within and outside of the discipline of PA, who have conducted comprehensive work on these topics.

In addition to these acknowledgments and action items, we should make a conscious effort to be more meticulous about how we study the interactions between the street-level bureaucrat and the citizen, and how we operationalize representative bureaucracy. First, we must remember to label the behaviors we are interested in and not the people. Second, we should try to create language that will foster collaboration across disciplines, and between academia and the broader world of work. Third, we should continue to study colorism at all levels, but to the degree possible, PA should try to focus on interactive colorism because it might help to further

explain how a collection of organizational behaviors contribute to biased outcomes. However, I would encourage public administrators to study colorism at any level, and concurrently think about what our research questions might mean to practice. From a practice standpoint, I would encourage administrators to take a hard look at the hiring practices of their organization. If the environment resembles diversity based on the grounds of sameness with Whites, there might be an opportunity to address representation within a modified frame of representative bureaucracy (Meier & Bohte, 2001; Wilkins & Williams, 2008). Hiring minorities may not be enough to engender trust and cooperation from communities of color. We may need to be more specific about what representation is in order build better relationships between public servants and citizens.

Conclusion

The main goal of this article was to provide a thorough introduction of the concept of colorism to PA practitioners and scholars. Part of the introduction included a summary of the origins of colorism. I then bridged contributions from other disciplines to provide a detailed description of the various levels and types of colorism. In addition, scenarios were used to further illustrate these details and a few additional subtle features of colorism like its stealth nature. Lastly, I made a case for colorism's relevancy to PA and street-level bureaucracy, which outlined the psychological considerations involved with the interactions that might take place between street-level bureaucrats and the citizenry. The discussion concluded with three recommendations that should help to advance research in this area. Please share what you have read here with your fellow PA practitioners and scholars, but more importantly, share the information with sociologists, social workers, police officers, psychologists, lawyers, and the like. Bring what you

learn from them back to this space, so that we can take a more progressive stance against racial discrimination.

CHAPTER 3. Article II – Operationalizing a Conceptual Model of Colorism within the Context of Local Policing

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Abstract

This thought experiment uses agent-based modeling (computational simulation) to explore how colorism might operate within a local policing context. *Colorism* is the allocation of privilege and disadvantage based on skin color, with a prejudice for lighter skin. I argue that colorism might help to explain some of the racial disparities in the United States' criminal justice system. I use simulated scenarios to explore the plausibility of this notion in the form of two questions: 1) *How might colorism function within an organization;* and *2) What might occur when managers apply the typical dilemmatic responses to detected colorism*? The simulated world consists of three citizen-groups (*lights*, *mediums,* and *darks*), five policy responses to detected colorism, and two policing behaviors (*fair* and *biased*). Using NetLogo, one hundred simulations were conducted for each policy response and analyzed using one-way ANOVA and pairwise comparison of means. When the tenets of colorism were applied to a simulated organizational setting, only some of the tenets held true. For instance, those in the middle of the skin color spectrum experienced higher rates incarceration when aggressive steps were taken to counter colorism, which ran counter to the expectations of the thought experiment. The study identified an opportunity to expand the description of colorism to help describe the plight of those in the middle of the skin color spectrum. The major contributions from this work include a conceptual model that describes the relationship between the distinct levels of colorism and it progresses the notion of interactive colorism. The study also produced conditional statements that can be converted into hypotheses for future experiments.

Introduction

This thought experiment uses agent-based modeling (computational simulation) to explore how colorism might operate within an organizational context. In tandem, the project will explore how our typical responses to dilemmas might fare in an attempt to counter detected colorism. Colorism is "the discrimination of individuals with darker skin" (Hunter, 2013; Russell-Cole, Wilson, & Hall, 2013). Burke and Embrich (2008) describe colorism as a system of privilege and disadvantage that is based on "the lightness or darkness of one's skin, with favoritism typically granted to those with lighter skin" (p. 17). It (colorism) is a nuanced form of racism that can be expressed from the conscious or subconscious psyche, and it is centered on individual decisions that are informed by perceptions of skin color. The phenomenon can occur even when the target's race is unknown (Harris, 2008), and the discriminatory behavior can originate from the target's assigned in-group or from an out-group (Herring, Keith & Horton, 2004; Hochschild & Weaver, 2007). This study will challenge the predominant descriptions of race and skin color, explore the relationship between colorism and rapid decision-making in public service, and explore how colorism might influence organizational outcomes.

The context for this project is local policing in the United States, and there are two primary reasons for selecting this context. First, local policing is an activity that involves rapid policing decisions that can be influenced by individual biases. Second, America has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world (Walmsley, 2015). There are evident racial disparities within the U.S. penal system (Alexander, 2012), and we can surmise that local policing has contributed to these disparities in some way. These two conditions--the propensity for individual biases to influence the rapid decision-making of a street-level bureaucrat and biased criminal justice outcomes--provide an ideal platform for subjecting the concept of colorism to scrutiny. If

the tenets of colorism hold true, this form of discrimination may offer a plausible explanation for some of the racial disparities within the criminal justice system.

Previous studies have found evidence of colorism in criminal sentencing outcomes (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Viglione, Hannon & DeFina, 2011). For example, Viglione et al. reviewed 12,000 prison records of female inmates from 1995 to 2009 in the state of North Carolina. Each inmate's record included a notation of their skin color category--"0" for non-light skin and "1" for light skin. The authors found that inmates coded as having light skin, received significantly shorter sentences and had shorter periods of time served (Viglione et al., 2011). We should expect to see similar evidence of colorism in local policing. However, most of the current studies (Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002; Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, 2014; Leitzel, 2001) explore discriminatory policing at the group level; previous policing studies have not considered the variability of discrimination within a target group (Smart, 2018a) and what this level of specificity might tell us about policing outcomes.

What Motivates the Study?

This project could advance our understanding of the nuanced factors of racial discrimination in three specific ways. First, this inquiry could help to address the limitations of the categorical approach that is often applied when studying racial disparities. Typical race studies use racial categories that disregard in-group dynamics (Smart, 2018a). In addition, how we use statistics to tell stories often fails when it comes to identifying the actual targets of racial discrimination. Case in point: In 2015 there were 693,300 inmates in city and county jails (Minton & Zeng, 2016). Of those local-level inmates, 48% were White, 35% were Black, 14% were Hispanic, and 2% are from other racial groups (Minton & Zeng, 2016). These figures are more alarming when compared to the U.S. population statistics. In the same year, the U.S.

population consists of 61% White citizens, 18% Hispanic citizens, and 13% Black citizens (USCB, 2017). Based on these local incarceration and general population statistics, Blacks are over-represented in local jails by 22 percentage points, Hispanics are under-represented by 2.5 percentage points, and Whites are under-represented by 15 percentage points. However, if Blacks vary in skin tone, and colorism is a system that privileges lighter skin, are all Blacks subject to discriminatory treatment? If we entertain the notion of colorism, it is feasible to believe that there are specific Blacks--those with darker skin--who are the predominant targets of racial discrimination throughout the criminal justice system.

Some authors have discussed the myriad of factors that might contribute to this disparity, such as mandatory minimums (Fischman & Schanzenbach, 2012) and environmental factors (Gabel & Johnston, 1995). However, this work does not seek to debunk existing explanations. The attempt here is to bring a perspective to the discussion that adds specificity to empirical inquiry. Therefore, the assumption embraced by this project is that individuals with the darkest skin color will experience the highest degree of discrimination, and individuals with the lightest skin color will experience the highest degree of privilege, regardless of their racial identification. While this project does not set out to prove this point, it does seek to challenge these assumptions and explore the plausibility of colorism as a contributing factor to local policing outcomes.

Second, a focus on the distinction between racial identification and skin color could provide new insights into the interactions that take place between street-level bureaucrats and citizens. Scholars have studied race within a *Black vs. Whi*te framework (Better, 2008; Blank, Knowles & Prewitt, 1970; Loury, 2002), and some scholars have criticized the limited nature of this approach (Lee, 1994; Pulido, 2000, Smart, 2018a). Baynes (1997) proposes that we shift to a *Dark-Light Paradigm* (DLP). At the core of Baynes' argument is the concept of colorism. If

we combine what we know about racial disparities in the criminal justice system and the tenets of colorism, we should expect that darker-skinned individuals from all racial categories are more susceptible to biased policing than their light-skinned counterparts. In developing this line of thought, we may find that some incidents of racial discrimination in local policing can be more accurately described as skin color discrimination. This project serves as a departure from studying discrimination within the standard racial categories. The focal point here is the potential influence that a citizen's aesthetic--skin color--might have on the rapid decisions made by a street-level bureaucrat. To that end, I will explore the potential influence of colorism on quick decisions made by public servants.

The third motivator for this study has to do with problematic logics, such as, *if there is shared race between the street-level bureaucrat and the citizen, then there are no grounds for racial discrimination*. We have empirical evidence that the condition of shared race may not usurp the influence of individual biases. In a study conducted by Ronquillo, Denson, Lickel, Lu, Nandy and Maddox (2007), the variation in amygdala activity--"arousal triggered by fast unconscious assessment of potential threat" (Ronquillo et al., 2007, p. 39)--was analyzed to determine if skin tone would serve as a moderating factor. The respondents were connected to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machines, briefly (for one second) shown an image of a person and asked to complete the random task of assigning an age to each image/person. When white respondents were shown images of dark-skinned Whites and light-skinned Whites, the images of dark-skinned Whites elicited a significantly higher amount amygdala activity. From this study, we can surmise that the amygdala activity was not triggered by race but informed by a stored memory that associated perceived threat with darker skin (Dasgupta, Banaji & Abelson, 1999; Kahneman, 2011; Simon, 1997; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008;

Wildavsky, 1987). The work here should help to expand how we discuss such subtleties. To that end, I will explore the rapid decision-making process using a lens that places more bearing on the target's skin color rather than the race of the two concerned parties—the instigator and the target.

Aim of the Study, Research Questions and Expectations

The primary aim of this thought experiment is to clarify the underlying theories of colorism, and to explore the possibility of colorism as a contributing factor to the racial inequalities in the criminal justice system. First, I must fill in a few blanks that exists in the current descriptions of colorism. The literature provides description of how colorism might operate at the individual level, and we also have empirical evidence of the institutional artifacts of colorism. What we currently lack is a description of how colorism might function within an organizational context. Therefore, the first research question is: **RQ1 - *How might colorism function within an organizational context?*** There is not a singular discipline that explains how colorism might operate within an organization. Therefore, in the subsequent subsection, available literature will be used to draw connections between the three levels of colorism (i.e., individual, interactive, and institutional). The resultant conceptual model should depict how colorism might function within an organization and how it might metastasize from the individual- to the institutional level.

Prior to starting this work, I had a few informal conversations with police departments about the concept of colorism. Some departments expressed concern for managing the consequences of detected colorism. Their concerns are valid, and yet we do not have an appropriate response to such practice-related questions—*if we detect it, then what*? The second research question is an attempt to lay the groundwork for addressing such practical questions:

RQ2 - *What might occur when managers apply the typical dilemmatic responses to address detected colorism?* The computer simulations designed here are intended to simulate three common change strategies—*incrementalism*, *transitional*, and *transformational* --that an agency might assume when colorism has been detected in their organization. These strategies will be used to explore the conceptual model. Each change strategy will be described in detail in the methods section of the article. The effort to answer this research question should yield some insights about the conceptual model and testable hypotheses for future study in this area.

Sequence of the Article

To provide context for the development of the conceptual model, the article will assume a nontraditional sequence. For example, this subsection will be followed by a detailed appraisal of the key literature that was used to draw connections between the three distinct levels of colorism. An appraisal of the key literature will be followed by the standard methods section. The methods section will describe how the conceptual model was operationalized into a simulation model. This section will also summarize the steps taken throughout the thought experiment. Next, the discussion section will discuss the results, the significance of the research and the limitations of the study. The article will conclude with a summary of the research aims and contributions.

Appraisal of the Key Literature – The Components of the Conceptual Model

Biased Mental Models and Decision-Making. When individuals must make decisions in a short timeframe, they tend to rely on established stereotypes (Olson, 2016) or biased judgments (Chin-Quee, 1992; Pratto & Bargh, 1991). Local police have the arduous responsibility of enforcing the law, and sometimes they must make crucial decisions within a short timeframe. This constraint is further complicated by the condition of heterogeneity between a police officer

and a citizen. Even in instances of homogeneity between a police officer and a citizen, there still exists held beliefs that may run counter to the present reality. The need to quickly react to a crisis or respond to a situation that is laden with unknowns, may cause a police officer to rely heavily on biased mental models. In the following paragraphs, the discussion will gradually draw connections between individual biased decisions and aspects of risk perception, colorism and organizational socialization.

Perceived Risk and Danger. Our ascribed mental models can influence our perceptions of risk. A study conducted by Ronquillo et al. (2007) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology to monitor the brain activity of subjects as they viewed images of people who varied in skin color. They found that dark-skinned Whites elicited greater amygdala activity--"perception of a potential threat" --than light-skinned Whites (Ronquillo et al., 2007). The findings from this study suggests that skin color can inform perceptions of threat. Another study conducted by Eberhardt et al. (2006), reviewed a database containing approximately 600 cases of defendants who were "death-eligible" and eventually moved on to the penalty phase. The authors found that stereotypical Black features was positively correlated to the likelihood of receiving the death sentence (Eberhardt et al., 2006). A third study (Kahn & Davies, 2011) found that perceived stereotypical physical traits (e.g., dark skin, broad nose) of Black people "can increase the accessibility of stereotypes linking Blacks with danger". Lupton (1999) argues that the perception of someone posing a risk can be tied to how we identify people who need to be brought back into control. She concludes that the label of "dangerous" will evoke a natural urge to exert control over the threat to ensure safety. If we combine Lupton's explanation of risk perception with what we know about biased mental models, we should expect the following:

- **If** a police officer perceives *Racial Group A* as more dangerous than *Racial Group B*, **then** the police officer will try to control *Racial Group A* more than *Racial Group B*.

Descriptions of Colorism. This part of the review will briefly summarize the prominent definitions of colorism and the associated dimensions of the concept. There are two definitions of colorism that capture the crux of the available definitions. The first definition captures the social function of colorism:

> "The allocation of privilege and disadvantage according to the lightness or darkness of one's skin, with favoritism typically granted to those with lighter skin (Burke & Embrich, 2008, p. 17)."

The second definition captures the socio-psychological function of colorism:

> "…a system of hierarchical perceptions of value and discriminatory treatment based upon skin tone (Blay, 2011)."

Collectively, these definitions describe a social system that ascribes privilege/value to light skin and subjects people with dark skin to discriminatory treatment. The key component here is Blay's use of the word "hierarchical", which suggests that there exists a scale of privilege and discrimination that is dependent upon a skin color spectrum. In short, the lighter the skin the more privilege one will be afforded, and the darker the skin the more one will be subjected to discrimination (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2. 1 The Conceptual Model of Colorism



Note: The figure summarizes the appraised literature on the topic of colorism.

Previous authors state that colorism operates within the larger context of racism (Hunter, 2002; Norwood, 2013; Russell-Cole et al., 2013; Wilder, 2008). Much like racism, colorism is a structure that functions at the individual and institutional level (Wilder, 2008). For this discussion, individual colorism encompasses internalized perceptions of skin color that can either be projected onto others or serve as an ideological reference for one's self-identity (Burton, Bonilla-Silva, Ray, Buckelew & Freeman, 2010). Previous studies have associated individual colorism to self-deprecating practices such as skin bleaching (Blay, 2011; Herring, 2002; Risman, 2004) and held perceptions of the worthiness of others (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Viglione et al., 2011). Institutional colorism encompasses a sustained system of biased norms, de facto policies, and formal policies that result in more discrimination of people with darker skin (Smart, 2018a). Typically, evidence of institutional colorism is embedded in organizational and/or social outcomes. Previous studies have presented evidence of institutional colorism in the topic areas of socio-economic attainment (Edwards, 1973; Hill, 2000; Hughes, 1990), criminal stereotyping (Dixon & Maddox, 2005), and Title VII cases (Harris, 2008; Russell-Cole et al., 2013, Smart, 2018a).

The literature briefly mentions a third level of colorism referred to as interactional or interactive colorism. To get a sense of how interactive colorism might function, we turn to the work of J. Wilder. It is important to note that her research is set within the context of familial and educational settings. Wilder (2008) describes interactional colorism as ritual behavior that perpetuates the continuum of colorism ideology. She states that young Black girls develop their perceptions of skin color by watching what older Black women do (Wilder, 2008). What we can gather from Wilder's description of *interactional colorism* is that colorism can transfer from the affected to the unaffected. If we were to apply Wilder's argument to the setting of a local police department, we can imagine that colorism ideology would spread in a similar fashion. Behaviors that are affected by colorism would influence the learning process of impressionable police officers, resulting in the spread of colorism ideology.

Herring et al. (2004) expand the definition of colorism with the use of two key adjectives, intra-racial and inter-racial. The authors state that "intra-racial colorism occurs when members of a racial group make distinctions based on skin color between members of their own race" (Herring et al., 2004, p. 3). Inter-racial colorism "occurs when members of one racial group make distinctions based on skin color between members of another racial group" (Herring, 2004, p. 3). Earlier studies of colorism were limited to in-group analysis; however, these two dimensions give license to researchers to explore inequality based on skin color across all racial categories. As it relates to racial discrimination, Herring et al.'s contribution lessens the import of the discriminator's race and the condition of shared race between the instigator and the target.

The Dark-Light Paradigm (DLP). Baynes (1997) argues for a more expansive paradigm for race studies and he proposes that we shift our thinking towards a Dark-Light Paradigm. He offers a departure from the standard *Black-White paradigm*, which is the *DLP*. In Baynes' DLP,

colorism is the central focus. One notable advantage of the DLP is that skin color is viewed along a continuum that can include all racial categories (Baynes, 1997). In the United States, dark skin is typically ascribed to Blacks. However, the DLP acknowledges that other racial categories have dark-skinned individuals who may be subject to skin color discrimination (Baynes, 1997). Baynes (1997) conducted a survey to determine perceptions of discrimination towards Blacks and Latinos. Of the 143 anonymous respondents, 75% identified as *White*, 7% as *Black*, 8% as Latino, 6% as *Asian/Pacific American*, and 3% as *other*. Most of the respondents, in all the racial categories, believed that "Whites treat dark-skinned Blacks worse than light-skinned Blacks" (Baynes, 1997, p. 43). The author asked a similar survey question regarding Latinos and skin color discrimination, and majority of the respondents believed that "Whites discriminate more against dark-skinned Latinos than their lighter counterparts" (Baynes, 1997, p. 182). The approach taken by Baynes added an element of specificity to discrimination that is typically overlooked in race studies.

Given what we now know about colorism, the working example is altered to reflect skin color as the focus instead of racial categories:

- **If** a police officer perceives *dark-skinned citizens* as more dangerous than *light-skinned citizens*, **then** the police officer will try to control *dark-skinned citizens* more than *light-skinned citizens*.

In the following section, we will further the discussion of the least explored level of skin color bias, interactive colorism.

Organizational Socialization and Interactive Colorism

Van Maanen (1975) explores the concept of *organizational socialization* – "the process by which an organizational member learns the required behaviors and supportive attitudes necessary to

participate as a member of an organization" (p. 1). Van Maanen selected 136 new police recruits to participate in a study. He found that recruits were rewarded for *laying low* or not causing disruption to the status quo (Van Maanen, 1975). By the sixth month of the recruits' training cycle, the job-related attitudes of the recruits began to mirror those of their more experienced colleagues (Kravetz, 2017; Van Maanen, 1975). The author states that this behavior served as a recruit's buffer from negative treatment by the department, supervisors, and fellow officers (Van Maanen, 1975).

A similar and more recent study conducted by Oberfield (2012) explores the influence of socialization and self-selection on police' perceptions of force. Oberfield selected 80 police academy graduates who were newly assigned to a police department. Through quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews, the author found that a police officer's views on the use of force are associated with formal organizational influences (e.g., supervision, training) and informal organizational influences (e.g., co-workers, culture and associations) (Oberfield, 2012). Conti (2009) argues that "subscription to or [deviation] from established [policing] rituals is taken as evidence of personal character and assists in driving [police] recruits through a moral career, in which they can evolve to an idealized status of police officer" (p.409). He also associates the mechanisms of shaming and socialization to rituals (Conti, 2009). These studies offer support for Wilder's (2008) description of how colorism ideology might spread by way of observational learning and/or rituals.

All three of these articles highlight the powerful influence that organizational socialization might have on individual behavior within a police department. The subjects in Van Maanen's study were willing to abandon their ideas of good policing to fit in and gain favor in the department. With organizational socialization having this type of influence on the collective

individual behaviors within a police department, the environment is fertile ground for the spread of biases like colorism. More importantly, these studies suggest that if biased behaviors are accepted as the norm, they are likely to morph into shared conventions (Douglas, 1986) and go unchallenged (Smart, 2018a). These mid-level conditions serve as an ideal platform for the spread of colorism—referred to here as *interactive colorism* or the transfer of skin color bias (Smart, 2018a; Wilder, 2008). From this point forward, any mention of interactive colorism will also denote the function of organizational socialization. Now that we have a general understanding of how interactive colorism might operate within a policing context, the working example is adjusted to reflect this mid-level activity:

- **If** a police department maintains a shared convention that *dark-skinned citizens* are more dangerous than *light-skinned citizens*, **then** police departments will try to control *dark-skinned citizens* more than *light-skinned citizens*.

The Conceptual Model

The conceptual model for this project derives from the appraised literature, and it depicts how colorism might metastasize from the individual- to the institutional level. It is important to note that the elements of the conceptual model were designed based on previous findings and well-grounded arguments; no preexisting datasets were used to design the conceptual model for this thought experiment. Previous studies have focused on individual and institutional colorism, and there is limited literature that provides an explanation that describes the relationship between the three distinct levels of colorism. In addition, the body of knowledge has been developed across disciplines, but not in a way that would speak to the internal workings of an organization. The proposed conceptual model is an attempt to bridge this gap in the literature and to link the disparate knowledge.

The conceptual model is depicted in Figure 2.2, and it is conveyed in the following manner. By way of organizational socialization, colorism can change from being an individual phenomenon to an interactive phenomenon; an individual affected by colorism can influence the decision-making model of an unaffected individual. Over time, the spread of the bias will morph into a shared convention, which can lead to biased outcomes. A type of computer simulation, agent-based modeling, will be used to conduct several thought experiments that will simulate each facet of the conceptual model. A description of agent-based modeling and the details of the simulations are provided in the following section.

Figure 2.2 A Conceptual Model of the Three Levels of Colorism—Individual, Interactive and Institutional



Note. This conceptual model combines the different literatures appraised in the literature review. Colorism influences individual decision-making models (DMMs). By way of organizational socialization, those unaffected by skin color bias learn the biased behaviors from the affected members in

their organization. Over time, these behaviors morph into shared conventions and result in biased outcomes. This conceptual model served as the basis for the governing rules of the associated simulation model.

Methods

Agent-Based Modeling

Concurrently, agent-based modeling (ABM) will be used to simulate the conceptual model (Iba, Matsuzawa & Aoyama, 2004), challenge the tenets of colorism and explore potential responses to detected colorism. ABM is a type of software programming that simulates decision-making models that are based on a set of simplified rules (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). These rules can be generated from rules of thumb, empirical evidence, descriptions of a concept, and/or a set of theories. With ABM, we can explore a collection of non-linear behaviors (Bonabeau, 2002) and anticipated macro-behavior (Schelling, 2006). One way to imagine how ABMs operate is to think of a petri dish. Now, place all the theories that you think help to explain a very complex issue into the petri dish. Depending on the issue you have selected, your petri dish could contain hundreds of associated rules. What might emerge from your petri dish (ABM) are: 1) adaptive behaviors that you might not have noticed in a standard thought experiment; 2) anomalies--trends that run counter to the simulated theories; and/or 3) patterns that confirm an initial hunch (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). Just as we can grow a fungus in a petri dish, we can use ABM to further develop (grow) theory.

ABM is appropriate for this project because it can be used to explore disparate knowledge within a safe environment. What can come of ABM thought experiments are plausible explanations for the proposed connections between various schools of thought (Helbing, 2012), which is the case for this project. From the literature, we have a grasp on how to describe individual and institutional colorism. However, the literature has yet to describe

interactive colorism in a meaningful way. In addition, we have yet to explore the relationship between the three levels of colorism—individual, interactive, and institutional. We can use ABM to explore the proposed relationship between the three levels of colorism along with the other linkages that were outlined in the literature review. More importantly, ABM will allow us to conduct this exploration in an environment that will not put humans at risk.

There are a few predominate applications of ABM, which include models that focus on prediction, diffusion, and organizational design (Bonabeau, 2002). The model for this project applies ABM to an organizational context with a variant of diffusion behavior; the simulations will explore how might a collection of biased individual decisions, and the transfer of the bias among police officers, influence organizational outcomes. Concurrently, the experiment will simulate potential policy responses to detected colorism. In short, the ABM models will simulate a policy response to detected colorism while colorism continues to spread between police officers. The decision-making models of police, both fair and biased, will be operationalized using rules intended to simulate individual-, interactive- and institutional colorism. Before we shift to the next subsection, this last point is worth a second mention. The simulations are designed to challenge our descriptions of colorism, while exploring potential responses to detected colorism. These two things will occur at the same time.

Global View of the Simulation

This section is intended to provide a general overview of the simulated environment and how the thought experiment was operationalized. For each run of a simulation, citizens are assigned to a random space in the environment. The only time citizens might move is when they are being arrested, when they are being transferred to temporary detainment or when they are being transferred to permanent incarceration. Police officers randomly move about while seeking to

make an arrest. The simulation will come to a halt when all the citizens have been arrested. Greater detail will be provided in the following subsections.

Model Parameters and Assumptions

The parameters of the model derive from the literature review. For the sake of brevity, only the major parameters will be described in detail. Please see *Table 2.1* to review a complete list of the model parameters and assumptions.

Table 2.1 *Simulation Model Parameters, Variable Descriptions, Assumptions, and Rationale**

Parameters	Context or Variable Description	Assumptions	Rationale/Finding	Reference
Global Parameter: Scenario Type	Initial settings: 1. Do-Nothing Approach (6 *c-police* : 0 *police*) 2. Passive Incrementalism (3 *c-police* : 3 *police*) 3. Counterbalancing (3 *c-police* : 3 *police*) 4. Aggressive Dilution (2 *c-police* : 4 *police*) 5. Utopia State (0 *c-police* : 6 *police*)	Police departments will have varied reactions to detected colorism. Departments will either take an incremental stance, a middle-of the road (counterbalancing) stance, or an aggressive stance.	Contingency model of change. Initial settings are based on the change strategies of incremental, transitional, and transformational change.	Dunphy & Stace (1988)
Citizen-agents	Initial settings: *lights* = 393 *mediums* = 393 *darks*= 393	1. People have varied skin color. 2. People are treated differently based on their skin color.	1. General rule of thumb. 2. Baynes' Dark-Light Paradigm describes a skin color continuum. Finding: "Whites treat dark-skinned Blacks worse than light-skinned Blacks."	1. N/A 2. Baynes (1997); Glenn (2009)
Rap Sheet (RS)	Initial Setting: 0 Range: 0 – 3 Permanent imprisonment occurs when RS = 3 Fair policing - RS increases by 1 w/each arrest of any citizen-agent. Biased policing - RS increases by 2 w/each arrest of a *dark* citizen-agent, by 1 w/each arrest of a *medium* citizen-agent, and by ¾ w/each arrest of a *light* citizen-agent.	After a citizen has reached an established arrest threshold, imprisonment will ensue.	The selected threshold of 3 arrests is arbitrary, however, it is in alignment with the federal three strikes law.	Clark et al. (1997)
Zones	1. Free society zone- initial status for all citizen-agents 2. Detainment zone - temporary status after an arrest 3. Permanent imprisonment zone - permanent status after three arrests.	1. All citizens start out with a clean slate/no arrests. 2. All arrests are associated with other criminal justice processes, causing a delayed return to free society. 3. After a citizen has numerous arrests, imprisonment will ensue.	1. A general rule of thumb. 2. After arrest, one can be held while awaiting other stages (e.g., trial, sentencing). 3. Federal three strikes law.	1. N/A 2. BJS (2016) 3. Clark et al. (1997)
Colorism	Initial settings for each scenario type: 1. individual colorism, hard-coded 2. interactive colorism, diffusion variable 3. institutional colorism, indicator/resultant variable	1. Police officers internalize and project colorism. 2. Over time, unaffected police officers will assume the decision-making model of affected police. 3. Colorism adversely influences policing outcomes.	1. Internalizing light skin as ideal enables victim-group discrimination. 2. Learned behavior: By becoming similar in attitude and behavior to their peers, police avoid censure. 3. Stereotypical black traits magnify associations with criminality.	1. Baynes (1997); Burton (2010) 2. Van Maanen (1975); Wilder (2008) 3. Eberhardt (2004)
Diffusion: *police* to *c-police* conversion	Initial settings for each scenario type: 1. *c-police* convert counter = +2 2. police convert counter = 0 *police* convert counter increases by 1 w/each interaction w/*c-police*, *police* to *c-police* conversion occurs at +2.	After *police* have routine interactions with *c-police*, they will assume the decision-making model of *c-police*.	Police socialization occurs fast and it is powerful. It results in a "don't make waves / maintain the status quo" approach to policing.	Van Maanen (1975); Oberfield (2011); Conti (2009)

Note. *This table was modified from Eckerd's Model Parameters (Eckerd, 2013)

Agents. In ABM, agents are simulated entities that make decisions throughout the course of the simulation. For this project, the term agent will refer to the simulated citizens (citizen-agents) and police officers (police-agents). There are three groups of citizen-agents--*darks*, *mediums*, and *lights*, and these agents represent the complete skin color spectrum of the simulated citizenry (Baynes, 1997; Glenn, 2009). Each simulation will have a total of 1,179 citizen-agents, 393 *darks*, 393 *mediums*, and 393 *lights*. Each simulation will have a total of six police-agents. The *c-police*, with the color assignment of red, are representative of biased policing--police officers who make arrest decisions that are influenced by colorism (see Table 2.2). The *police*, with the color assignment of green, are representative of fair policing--police officers who make arrest decisions that are not influenced by colorism. The ratio of *c-police* to *police* will vary depending on the scenario. In terms U.S. law enforcement officers, one police-agent would be equal to 115,104 police officers (FBI, 2016).

Table 2.2 *Agent Types, Groups and Color Assignments*

Type	Group	Color Assignment
Citizen Agent	Light	Yellow
Citizen Agent	Medium	Brown
Citizen Agent	Dark	Black
Police Agent	*c-police*, influenced by colorism	Red
Police Agent	*police*, not influenced by colorism	Green

Note. The table lists the type of agents included in the simulated model, the group assignment for the agent types, and the color assigned to each group. The color assignments are most useful to the end-users of the agent-based model.

Skin Color. All citizen-agents have an assigned skin color, but racial identity is not specifically assigned to any of the citizen-agents; a citizen-agent's race is not the focal point of the simulations. In addition, the police-agents do not have an assigned racial identity or skin color. Considering the overall skin color spectrum of the U.S, the simulated *darks* represent the

general population of Blacks and dark-skinned citizens who are members of other racial groups. The *mediums* represent the general population of Latinos and medium-skinned citizens from other groups (e.g., Asians, Indians, and Blacks). The *lights* represent the general population of *Whites* and light-skinned citizens from other groups.

Policing and Interactive Colorism. The general assumption for the policing behaviors in the model is based on bias-reliance in moments when a quick decision must be made (Chin-Quee, 1992; Pratto & Bargh, 1991). It is important to state that the policing behaviors expressed in the model are not centered on the type of crime committed, but on how a citizen's skin color influences a police officer's decision-making model (DMM). The model is limited to two discrete types of policing (fair and biased), with the assumption that DMMs will maintain across all incidents of crime. However, the DMM of a *police* (unaffected) can convert to that of a *c-police* (affected) after two random interactions. These random interactions are intended to simulate learned behavior while on patrol (Levitt & March, 1988). The unidirectional flow of the bias transfer is intended to simulate the top-down pressures of organizational socialization in police departments (Conti, 2009; Van Maanen, 1975). The conversion of a *police* to a *c-police* will denote interactive colorism.

The Simulated (Patch) Environment

NetLogo 5.3.1, the selected ABM software program, was used to design the simulation model. The simulated environment was divided into three distinct zones. The 1st zone is designated as free society, which is representative of basic freedom. The 2nd zone is the detainment area, which is an abstraction of all criminal justice functions except for incarceration (Minton & Zeng, 2016). The 3rd zone is reserved for incarceration, which is representative of permanent imprisonment. Each zone contains several patches—segmented spaces, see Figure

2.3. At all times, citizen-agents and police-agents will occupy a single patch within one of the three zones. If we liken a patch to the real world, it would be the space a person is occupying (e.g., the space a person is standing in) at any given moment. The rationale for setting the model up in this manner was to centralize the focus on how biased policing might impact individual freedoms. The three distinct zones were also used to operationalize colorism at the three levels. Individual colorism occurs as police officers engage the citizenry in the free society zone. Interactive colorism takes place by way of socialization (simulated learning) between police officers, and institutional colorism is the simulated outcome of the biased policing and socialization of the bias.

Figure 2.3. The Simulated Environment Divided into Three Distinct Zones, Free Society, Detainment, and Incarceration



Note. The free society zone is a representation of life outside of the criminal justice system. The detainment zone is an abstraction of all justice functions other than incarceration. The incarceration zone is a representation of imprisonment. Each zone contains several patches. A patch is a space that can be occupied by the simulated agents (citizens and police) in the model.

The Rules - How the Simulation Operates

Individual Colorism and Policing. NetLogo uses time-ticks as a general measure of time. At the first time-tick, all agents--citizens and police--are located in the free space. All agents will remain in the simulation for the entire time. Depending on their interaction with police-agents, citizen-agents will move about the three zones (free society, detainment, incarceration). At no time do the police-agents leave the free society zone. At each time-tick, police-agents randomly patrol the free society zone while trying to arrest citizen-agents. If there are no citizens within proximity—a radius of one patch/cell, the police officer will move to the next random patch in the free society zone and attempt an arrest.

At the time of an arrest, the citizen-agents that reside on the four neighboring patches (north, south, east and west) of the arresting officer will receive a charge. It is important to note that this simulated world is only concerned with how biased policing functions and spreads (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). Therefore, all citizen-agents are susceptible to arrest. In addition, factors related to citizen-behavior, such as the type of crime or suspicious behavior, are not relevant to this exercise. To simulate biased policing, a *c-police-agent* (biased DMM) adds two (2) charges to a *dark* citizen's rap sheet, one (1) charge to a *medium* citizen's rap sheet and ¾ of a charge (0.75) to a *light* citizen's rap sheet. To simulate fair policing, a *police-agent* (fair DMM) adds one (1) charge to all surrounding citizen-agents regardless of their skin color. Each time a citizen is arrested, they will move to the detainment area for one time-tick and then return to a random patch in the free society zone. Once a citizen's rap sheet is equal to or greater than three (3) charges, the citizen will be permanently placed in the incarceration zone. The decision to use three charges as the marker for permanent incarceration is arbitrary, yet it is reflective of the federal *three-strikes law* (Clark, Austin, & Henry, 1997). The simulation comes to a halt when

all citizen-agents have been permanently incarcerated. This final state is referred to as *complete incarceration*.

Interactive Colorism. At each time-tick, a *police-agent* checks to see if there is a *c-police-agent* within close proximity--a radius of one patch. If this condition is true, the *police-agent's* convert counter is increased by one (1). Once a *police-agent's* convert counter reaches a tally of two (2), their DMM will convert to that of a *c-police-agent* (biased DMM). This aspect of the model is intended to simulate the transfer of skin color bias.

Responses to Detected Colorism

The following descriptions provide the rationale behind the initial parameters for five (5) simulated policy responses (PR) to detected colorism. The five simulated policy responses represent what a police department might do after they have detected colorism within their organization; the detection is assumed to have occurred prior to the start of each simulation. The *do-nothing* response (PR1) simulates absolute colorism and the *utopian state* simulates absolute fair policing (PR5). The *do-nothing* response might occur when a police department detects colorism but takes no action to address the issue. The simulations for the *do-nothing* response started with a police-agent count of 0 *police* and 6 *c-police*, and this ratio was maintained for the entire simulation run. The utopian state is the ideal state of having no skin color bias within the police department; no action is required by the police department. The simulations for the *utopian* state started with a police-agent count of 6 *police* and 0 *c-police*, and this ratio was maintained for the entire simulation run.

The other three PRs explored three change strategies that might occur after the detection of colorism-- *passive incrementalism* (PR2), *counterbalancing* (PR3), and *aggressive dilution* (PR4). *Passive incrementalism* is meant to simulate incremental/developmental change. In the

change management literature, incremental change has been described as slow, strategic, or evolutionary (Dunphy & Stace, 1988). With passive incrementalism, an organization might seek new hires to offset skin color bias, but the effort might lack adequate capacity to counter adverse policing behaviors. The simulations for the passive incrementalism approach started with a police-agent count of 2 *police* and 4 *c-police*. *Counterbalancing* is meant to simulate transitional change. Transitional change has been described as planned rearrangement, or a *middle-of-the-road* change strategy (Ackerman, 1986). With transitional change, a manager might attempt to match the number of previously hired biased police officers with an equal number of new hires who do not exhibit signs of skin color bias. The simulations for the counterbalancing approach started with a police-agent count of 3 *police* and 3 *c-police*. *Aggressive dilution* is meant to simulate transformational change. Transformational change has been described as radical, revolutionary or traumatic (Ackerman, 1986; Dunphy & Stace, 1988). A manager might decide to outweigh the effects of biased policing. This might be achieved via retraining and/or a hiring process that detects and filters out candidates who would adversely tip the scale (Kindler, 1979). The simulations for the aggressive dilution approach started with a police-agent count of 4 *police* and 2 *c-police*. In terms of countering detected colorism, it was assumed that the policy response of passive incrementalism would be the least effective strategy and that aggressive dilution would be the most effective strategy. To get a sense of what the simulation model looks like with these parameters and assumptions incorporated, see Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4 A Snapshot of the Simulation Model in Action



Note. This figure is a snapshot of the simulation model in action. The three zones (i.e., free society, detainment, and incarceration) are populated by citizen- and police-agents. The buttons to the left are used to set the initial settings for each policy response. The panels to the right monitor the rate of incarceration for the *darks*, the *mediums* and the *lights*. The top panel keeps track of the *police* to *c-police* conversion/interactive colorism.

Conditional Statements

Six conditional statements were formulated to explore the general assumptions about how colorism might function in an organizational setting. Burke and Embrich's (2008) definition of colorism is focused on the two most extreme skin color groups, those who are defined as light- and dark-skinned. Therefore, the experiments conducted here were primarily centered on the citizen-groups of *darks* and *lights*. The following conditional statements were designed to

explore the assumptions about the *darks* and *lights* in the simulated environments for passive incrementalism, counterbalancing, and aggressive dilution.

CS_1 If passive incrementalism is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *darks* will decrease.

CS_2 If passive incrementalism is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *lights* will increase.

CS_3 If counterbalancing is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *darks* will decrease.

CS_4 If counterbalancing is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *lights* will increase.

CS_5 If aggressive dilution is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *darks* will decrease.

CS_6 If aggressive dilution is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *lights* will increase.

We should expect an increase in colorism to have the following result: 1) the *darks* will experience the highest incarceration when compared to the *mediums* and the *lights*; 2) the *mediums* will experience higher incarceration than the *lights* but lower incarceration than the *darks*; and 3) the *lights* will experience the lowest incarceration when compared to the *darks* and the *mediums*. The strategies to counter detected colorism should yield and equalizing effect: 1) lower incarceration for the *darks*; 2) slightly lower incarceration for the *mediums*; and 3) higher incarceration for the *lights*.

Verification of the Simulation Model

Behavior space was used to produce the output for the verification of the simulation model, as well as the output for the analysis. Behavior Space is a built-in analytical tool for NetLogo. Behavior Space can run multiple simulations based on a set of predetermined parameters, and it can capture the current state of each agent at each time-tick for each run of a simulation. Before

conducting the analysis, two verification tests were conducted to ensure the model was able to simulate the two forms of policing--fair and biased (Forrester & Senge, 1980; Iba et al., 2004). First, I ran ten simulations of each policy response—the do-nothing approach, passive incrementalism, counterbalancing, aggressive dilution, and the utopian state. The output from these simulations were used to compare the average time it took each citizen-group to reach complete incarceration. Complete incarceration for a citizen-group occurs when all the citizen-agents from the group (e.g. *darks*) have been incarcerated. Based on the rules of the simulation, the citizen-group with the darkest skin—the *darks*—should reach complete incarceration at a faster rate than the *mediums* and the *lights*. Based on the results of this test, it was confirmed that the model was able to simulate biased and fair policing. Figure 2.5 depicts the results of this first test.

The second verification test served as corroboration for the first test. For the second test, I ran 30 simulations of each policy response and used the output to compare the percentage of incarcerated citizen-agents for each citizen-group. Except for the simulations for the utopian state, *darks* should have the highest percentage of incarcerated citizen-agents. The outcome of this second test provided further support for the results of the first verification test—darks had the highest percentage of incarceration in the simulations for the do-nothing approach, passive incrementalism, counterbalancing, and aggressive dilution. The results for this second verification test are summarized in Figure 2.6.

Figure 2.5 Verification Test #1: The Average Number of Time-Ticks to Reach Complete Incarceration Based on 10 Simulation Runs of Each Policy Response



Note. The figure depicts the results of the first verification test of the simulation model's functionality. This test used the output of 10 simulation runs of each policy response, which is a total of 50 simulation runs. Depicted here are the number of time-ticks it took each citizen-group to reach complete incarceration for each of the policy responses. The purpose of this verification test was to determine if the model was able to simulate biased and fair policing according to the established parameters, which was confirmed by the results.

Figure 2.6 Verification Test #2: The Percentage of Incarcerated Agents for Each Citizen Group Based on 30 Simulation Runs of Each Policy Response



Note. The figure depicts the results of the second validation test of the simulation model's functionality. This test used the output of 30 simulation runs of each policy response, which is a total of 150 simulations. Depicted here are the percentages of incarcerated citizen-groups for each of the policy responses. The purpose of this verification test was to further determine if the model was able to simulate biased and fair policing according to the established parameters, which was confirmed by the results.

The Analysis[1]

Incarceration Outcomes. Two analyses were conducted. The first analysis focused on the variation in incarceration outcomes. Using Behavior Space, data were collected on the

[1] To understand the behavior of the simulation model and the outcomes of the policy responses, I used a combination of graphs and statistical methods. Unlike the traditional use of statistics, the methods employed here, and the results, are not intended to establish inference to the real world. Here, statistics are used to understand the variation between different hypotheticals. The sole dependence on either method--graphs or statistics--would have hindered my ability to examine patterns and degrees of change.

number of incarcerated *lights*, *mediums* and *darks* and the number of *c-police* and *police* for every time-tick for each simulation. One hundred simulations were conducted for each of the five policy responses, which resulted in 500 simulations. The output, generated with Behavior Space, was imported into STATA and structured as a panel. Each simulation run was treated as single panel. The panel data structure was used to compute summary statistics and to draw comparisons across PRs. Incarceration rates were calculated by dividing the sample mean of incarcerated citizens for each citizen-group by the averaged total number of incarcerated citizens: IR = $\frac{\bar{x}}{\bar{x}_1+\bar{x}_2+\bar{x}_3}$. The following steps were taken to observe patterns and anomalies. The first step was to determine which policy response had the most favorable outcome for addressing detected colorism. Then, observed how each citizen-group fared across the three key policy responses (i.e., passive incrementalism, counterbalancing, and aggressive dilution). The last step of the analysis was to identify any outcomes that might have contradicted the general assumptions about colorism.

The strategies of passive incrementalism (PR2), counterbalancing (PR3), and aggressive dilution (PR4) were compared to the do-nothing approach (PR1) to determine if these three change strategies (PRs 2-4) would result in a more favorable outcome than doing nothing at all (PR1). The do-nothing approach served as the control strategy, and PRs 2-4 served as the treatment strategies. To conduct these comparisons, I used the combined methods of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and pairwise comparison of means (PC). The ANOVA and PC analyses helped to determine if the variance between the three central policy responses (PRs 2, 3, and 4) were statistically significant. The simulations for the utopian state were included in the analysis, but this set of simulations did not play a significant role. In addition, the average incarceration rates were compared between the three citizen-groups across the three policy

responses to determine if the six conditional statements ($CS_{1\text{-}6}$) held true; the output was used to determine if the tenets of colorism held throughout each of the policy responses.

I also conducted a sensitivity analysis that mirrored all the steps mentioned in the previous paragraphs. I conducted the sensitivity analysis using three panels with 30, 50, and 100 simulation runs. The data were used to determine if the panel of 100 simulations run had an inflating-effect on the alpha, which was set at 0.01; I used the data from the three individual panels (30, 50 and 100 simulation runs) to determine if the alpha was inflated by the sheer number of simulations involved in step one of the analysis. Poile and Safayeni (2016) state that "statistical power increases with the number of [simulation] runs" involved in an analysis. To address this concern, I completed the analysis of the 100 simulation runs along with two additional panels of 30 and 50 simulation runs. I then compared the results from all three of the panels to see if there were comparable results. For each panel, I also applied the Bonferroni adjustment.

Phase Analysis. The second analysis was centered on the influence of *interactive colorism*, and it was conducted in two parts. In both parts of this analysis, I examined how interactive colorism influenced the incarceration outcomes and I used the panel of 100 simulation runs. From two different vantage points, I examined what happened each time a *police-agent* was converted to a *c-police-agent*. The expectation was that a *police*-to-*c-police* conversion will result in an increase in bias policing. The *police-to-c-police* conversions are treated as phases that occur between the starting point of the simulation and the complete incarceration of each citizen-group. The first phase was the starting conditions of the simulation (e.g., 4 *police* to 2 *c-police*) and the last phase was the last conversion prior to complete

incarceration. At each subsequent *police*-to-*c-police* conversion/phase, a new *c-police* is gained and a *police* is removed from the equation.

For the first part of the phase analysis, I selected one random simulation from the set of 100 runs for each of the five policy responses. I then searched, within all five of the simulation runs, for a time-tick when at least 2/3 of the *darks* were incarcerated. At this time-tick, there were approximately 260 incarcerated darks. I used the count of 260 incarcerated *darks* as the vantage point to observe the effects of at least two phases of interactive colorism. At the same time-tick that 260 *darks* were incarcerated, I made note of the incarceration rates for the *mediums* and the *lights*. See Figure 2.7, in Appendix A, for a depiction of these data.

The second part of the phase analysis took a more substantive approach to observing the effects of interactive colorism from the vantage point of the three key policy responses (aggressive dilution, counterbalancing, and passive incrementalism). For each of the policy responses, Microsoft Excel was used to calculate the average number of incarcerated citizen-agents, the percentage of change in the incarceration rates between phases, the prison population percentages, and the percentage of change in the prison population between phases. To see an abbreviated depiction of these data, see *Appendix A - Figures 8a-c*.

Results

First, I will briefly discuss the summary statistics, which will be followed by the major observations from the ANOVA and PC analyses.[2] Then, the associated conditional statements will be restated along with a report on the outcomes. The section will conclude with the additional observations from the phase analysis.

[2] The ANOVA and PC analyses were used to compare the incarceration outcomes for the three primary policy responses of passive incrementalism, counterbalancing and aggressive dilution.

Summary Statistics

For a moment, let us view all five of the policy responses along a continuum that leads to total fair policing (see Table 2.4 in Appendix A). Within that context, we can see that the plight of the *darks* improved with each increase in the intensity of the policy response; each time there was a lower number of c-police in the scenario, the incarceration outcomes for the *darks* improved. In the case of the *mediums*, there is minimal variation in the incarceration outcomes across all five of the policy responses. For the *lights*, there is no variation until aggressive dilution is the selected strategy. We will discuss these points in more detail in the following subsections.

Major Observations

Passive Incrementalism. As a reminder, the two conditional statements for passive incrementalism were:

- CS_1 - If passive incrementalism is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *darks* will decrease.
- CS_2 - If passive incrementalism is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the lights will increase.

The results of the ANOVA and PC analyses provide support for CS_1, but not for CS_2. When the strategy of passive incrementalism was compared to the do-nothing approach, there was a decrease (Δ -1) in the incarceration rate for the *darks*. However, the incarceration rate for the *lights* did not increase (Δ 0).

Counterbalancing. The two conditional statements for counterbalancing were:

- CS_3 - If counterbalancing is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *darks* will decrease.
- CS_4 - If counterbalancing is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the *lights* will increase.

The results show support for CS_3 but not for CS_4. When counterbalancing was compared to the do-nothing approach, there was a decrease (Δ -4) in the incarceration rate for the *darks*. No change (Δ 0) in the incarceration rate for the *lights* was observed when counterbalancing was compared to the do-nothing approach.

Aggressive Dilution. The conditional statements for aggressive dilution were:

- CS_5 - If aggressive dilution is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the darks will decrease.
- CS_6 - If aggressive dilution is the selected change strategy, then the incarceration rate for the lights will increase.

The results show support for CS_5 and CS_6. When aggressive dilution was compared to the do-nothing approach, there was a decrease (Δ -8) in the incarceration rate for the darks. There was also an increase in the incarceration rate for the *lights* (Δ +2).

Observations from the Sensitivity Analysis. Data from Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 were used to conduct the sensitivity analysis (see Appendix A). For all three panels (30, 50 and 100 simulation runs), the results for counterbalancing and aggressive dilution were statistically significant (p=0.00) for the *darks*. However, the comparisons for the *lights* resulted in only one significant result, which was the aggressive dilution comparison in the panel of 100 simulations.

These last observations are related to the plight of the *mediums*. None of the incarceration outcomes for the *mediums* were statistically significant. In addition, the only variation in the comparisons for the *mediums* that was consistent with the model assumptions occurred in the panel of 30 simulations (see Table 2.7). With this panel, the *mediums* experienced the largest decrease in incarceration with aggressive dilution (Δ -3), the second largest decrease in incarceration with counterbalancing (Δ -2), and an increase in incarceration (Δ +1) with passive incrementalism. In the panel of 50 (see Table 2.6) and 100 (Table 2.5)

simulations, most of the comparisons with the do-nothing approach were contrary to the model assumptions, and the results are inconsistent across the three panels.

Additional Observations - Observations from the Phase Analysis of Interactive Colorism

For the first part of the phase analysis, selecting on 2/3 of incarcerated darks (260) provided the opportunity to observe the effects of interactive colorism prior to complete incarceration. The observations notated here are depicted in Figure 2.7. When compared to passive incrementalism, the *lights* experienced higher incarceration with the do-nothing approach. However, as the intensity of the policy response to detected colorism increased, the *lights* did experience a higher rate of incarceration. Contrary to the assumptions of the model, the *mediums* experienced the highest rate of incarceration with aggressive dilution and the second highest rate of incarceration with counterbalancing. Across all three of the key policy responses (PR2-4), as the intensity of the policy response increased, so did the incarceration rate for the *mediums*. Let us turn our attention to the most intensive policy response, aggressive dilution (AD). For AD, the incarcerated 260 *darks* made up 66% of the total population for *darks*. Yet, at the same time-tick, only 45% (177) of the *mediums* and 24% (97) of the *lights* were incarcerated.

The second part of the phase analysis observed what occurred after each *police*-to *c-police* conversion for each of the key policy responses (PR2-4). The observations notated here are depicted in Figures 2.8a-c and Table 2.8. Phase I is based on the initial settings of the simulations, which is the state (*c-police* to police *ratio*) before the first phase of interactive colorism takes place. Prior to the first *police*-to-*c-police* conversion, we see a drastic difference in the prison outcomes. At the end of Phase I, the *darks* made up 61% of the prison population (pp) in the simulations for passive incrementalism (PI), 61% of population for counterbalancing (CB), and 52% of the population for AD. For Phase I, the *mediums* made up 27% of pp for PI,

27% for CB, and 30% for AD. The *lights* made up 12% of the pp for PI, 12% of the pp for CB, and 18% of the pp for AD. Across all three policy responses, and at different degrees, this notable bias is sustained throughout the simulations. More than half of the *darks*' total population are incarcerated by the end of Phase II for PI (55%) and CB (54%). However, only 32% (PI) and 33% (CB) of the total population of *mediums* are incarcerated at the end of Phase II. Considering each phase and the overall outcomes, *mediums* and *lights* had the most favorable outcome with passive incrementalism, and the *darks* had the most favorable outcome with aggressive dilution.

Discussion

Discussion of the Results

The conditional statements that were designed for this inquiry were based on the rationale that any action taken by a police department to counter detected colorism would result in a more favorable outcome than doing nothing at all. Ideally, these favorable outcomes would resemble an equalizing effect—less incarceration for the darks and more incarceration for the *lights*. This rationale ties back to the definition of colorism authored by Burke and Embrich (2008), which describes a system of privileges and disadvantages afforded to individuals based on their skin color. Based on the results outlined in Table 2.5, I was able to generate proofs for CS_1, CS_3, CS_5 and CS_6. However, I was not able to generate proofs for CS_2--passive incrementalism will increase incarceration for the *lights*--and CS_4 --counterbalancing will increase incarceration for the *lights*. In short, I was able to simulate a reduction in incarceration for the *darks* across the three key policy responses (passive incrementalism, counterbalancing, and aggressive dilution), but I was not able to conclusively simulate a reduction in privilege for the *lights*.[3]

[3] Since this is a thought experiment, the statistical analysis and the proofs only carry meaning in the simulated world; the results cannot be used to infer anything about the real world.

There was the proposed notion that passive incrementalism (CS_1), counterbalancing (CS_3) and aggressive dilution (CS_5) would reduce the incarceration rate for the *darks*. Respectively, each of these policy responses significantly decreased the incarceration rate for the *darks*. The second proposed notion was that passive incrementalism (CS_2), counterbalancing (CS_4), and aggressive dilution (CS_6) would increase the incarceration rate for the *lights*. However, passive incrementalism and counterbalancing had no significant effect on the incarceration rate for the *lights*. Aggressive dilution was the only policy response that increased the incarceration rate (Δ+2) for the *lights*.

The first interpretation of these observations is related to how we think about the relationship between discrimination and privilege. To address this point, Burke and Embrich's (2008) reference to disadvantages is likened to bias or discrimination. Given that all three of the policy responses--passive incrementalism, counterbalancing, and aggressive dilution--significantly reduced the influence on skin color bias for the *darks* and only one policy response significantly reduced signs of privilege (increased incarceration for the *lights*), we should question if the two terms of privilege and discrimination should be used to define colorism. Privilege was programmed into the simulation model with the assumption that privilege might function as favoritism that can carry a less punitive interaction than universal fair policing. The observations imply that privilege is not bound to discrimination, and how we respond to both issues may require separate strategies. If this would hold true in the real world, coupling these two terms in our theory and practice decisions could prove to be problematic.

The words privilege and discrimination are such complex terms that including them into one description of a complex phenomenon (e.g., colorism) may misinform how we interpret the associated theories. The decoupling of these terms--privilege and discrimination--might help to

streamline how we define colorism. This type of careful thought could help to reduce the chances of unintended collateral damage in studies that focus on bias at the individual and interactive level. Previous studies have taken similar care when selecting their research aims. For example, Blair et al. (2004) examined the relationship between Afrocentric facial features and criminal sentencing. The authors tied physical features to discrimination, not privilege. Within this frame, it can be assumed that privilege is functioning in the same environment. However, we cannot assume that the antecedents and the consequences associated with discrimination and privilege warrant the same treatment. The same care that we apply to field experiments should be applied to the definitions we use to describe the phenomenon of interest.

A deeper look at the results from the phase analysis (see Table 2.8) might help us to understand why a response to discrimination may not equate to a concurrent response to privilege. In Table 2.8, Phase II of the aggressive dilution model shows a 25%-point increase in incarceration for the *darks* and a 13%-point increase for the *lights*. The outcome here should have resembled more of an equalized result, less discrimination and less privilege with the two outcomes collectively depicting equitable policing. This anomaly can best be address by asking questions that challenge the logic that undergirds the description of colorism. It is important to ask what we mean by privilege when we position the term as an alternative outcome to- or as a by-product of discriminatory system. The results have helped to point out some key flaws in how we use terms to describe complex behavior. The take-away here is that, colorism is best described as scaled discrimination based on a skin color spectrum; colorism is not an "either or" phenomenon. In other words, justice for the target group does not equate to a reduction in privilege for outgroups.

The second interpretation is related to the first, but it is more grounded in practice than theory. Let us turn our attention back to Table 2.5. In the three PR comparisons between passive incrementalism, counterbalancing and aggressive dilution, we notice that aggressive dilution significantly outperforms the other two policy responses. The results suggest that our efforts to counter contagion behaviors, in an organizational setting, will require an aggressive response. The simulated responses to detected colorism were up against the continual spread of skin color bias, so the more passive approach had minimal impact. While the observations for counterbalancing and passive incrementalism were favorable, these strategies would take longer to achieve the intended outcome and afford more space for police officers to learn adverse behavior (Van Maanen, 1975).

How about the elephant with the medium skin color? The predominant definitions of colorism create a vague understanding of how to describe those who fall in the middle of the skin color spectrum. Based on the definitions used for this project, we can assume that the *mediums* of the world would benefit from fair policing but also be subject to skin color discrimination. The previous point about combining convoluted terms may have contributed to the lack of focus on the middle of the skin color spectrum. The simulation model was designed to stagger discrimination so that the darks experienced the highest degree of discrimination, the *mediums* the second highest degree of discrimination, and the lights the least degree of discrimination. The results do reflect this staggered application of discrimination. However, it was also expected that the *mediums* would experience a decrease in incarceration, especially with aggressive dilution. Counter to the expectations of the experiment, aggressive dilution had no significant influence on the incarceration rate for the *mediums*. This outcome runs counter to how individual colorism was operationalized in the model, and it stresses the need for further

development of our definitions of colorism. Most descriptions of colorism have focused on the two extremes of the skin color spectrum, the darkest and the lightest of types. Collectively, scholars have made the argument for more inclusiveness, yet our descriptions of colorism have neglected an entire segment of people--those in the middle of the skin color spectrum. Moving forward, I think there should be a conscious effort to address the two points made here about privilege and those who fall in the middle of the skin color spectrum. To that end, I offer a modified conceptual model of colorism which includes a reference to the mediums of the world, and it circumvents the distorted term of privilege. See Figure 2.9 in Appendix A.

Significance of the Research

This effort contributes to our knowledge in two ways. First, it contributes to the conceptual development of colorism. The article provides the reader with an overview of the conceptual dimensions of colorism, and the underlying theories are unpacked and applied to several rigorous experiments. We discovered opportunities to revisit the predominant definitions of colorism and offered a more manageable conception of the phenomenon. In addition, we offered two action items that should inform future research—decouple privilege and discrimination in our descriptions of colorism and construct definitions that are more inclusive.

In addition, the interactive colorism analysis demonstrated how biased individual decisions could metastasize within an organization. Previous research has provided evidence of individual and institutional colorism, but little is known about how we get from individual colorism to institutional colorism. With the help of agent-based modeling, and the contributions of several disciplines, this article offers a roadmap that fills in the conceptual gap between individual and institutional colorism. Wilder's discreet mention of interactional colorism has not been explained in a way that can be measured. Each of the trials performed in this experiment

will equip scholars with a starting point for hypothesizing the interactive aspects of colorism. While there is room for improvement, the conceptual model designed here can serve as a starting point for testing the proposed explanations for individual-, interactive- and institutional colorism.

Second, this project is a demonstration of the usefulness of ABM as a tool for the concurrent development of theory and practical strategy. With ABM, a phenomenon can be subjected to scrutiny while exploring a litany of practical responses to the phenomenon. When practitioners ask scholars tough questions about practice--*if we detect it, then what*? --this modeling approach can be used to add depth to the scholar's response. In the broader field of public administration, discussions pertaining to colorism are rare, and projects that use agent-based modeling to explore policy responses are even more difficult to come by. This project serves as example of how we can use agent-based modeling to reimagine our administrative challenges.

Implications for Research and Practice

Keep in mind that the results of this study are based on simulated data. Any claims made here cannot be used to credit colorism for any portion of the known or the unknown cases of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system. The only argument that can be made with surety is that the inclusion of colorism in our dialogues about race has the potential to account for what is not being counted. A thorough understanding of colorism can only complement our efforts to explain, document and address known racial disparities in the criminal justice system.

There are several opportunities to expand the model and our treatment of the concept of colorism. For example, the description of organizational socialization within a policing context might be difficult to apply to other types of organizations. The simulated unidirectional learning that was embedded in the function of interactive colorism might be unique to police departments.

If we consider organizations that may not have such stringent standards of socialization, we would need to alter how we describe the function of interactive colorism. Future studies should consider the effects of a bidirectional flow of influence on decision-making models. Bidirectional learning could be modeled by coding the police-agents to learn from each other versus the top-down approach assumed here. In the bidirectional model, a biased police officer would be able to adopt a fair police officer's decision-making model and vice versa. In fact, a model that compares both unidirectional and bidirectional interactive colorism would be a valuable contribution.

This experiment explored a limited number of theories and responses to colorism. Scholars should consider other frames, such as the effects of the return to free society, the outcomes of fair policing but biased return to free society or any combination of the available policing and justice theories. The policy responses explored in this version of the model are the first steps toward understanding how colorism might function at the individual, interactive and institutional levels within the context of street-level bureaucracy. Scholars should also try to transport the framework to other organizational settings that require direct interaction with the public (e.g., the provision of social services). In addition, previous studies have focused on the extreme ends of the skin color spectrum. Studies that attempt to explore what happens to those in the middle of the skin color spectrum would add a key component to our discussion.

It would be premature to imply that this work warrants an immediate policy change. However, there are a few potential broader actions that could originate from this exploratory work. With some customization, the conceptual framework can be applied to any public agency that has direct interaction with the citizenry. Agencies that are limited by the current frames we use to discuss racial disparities could use this work to initiate dialogue within their organizations.

In addition, the work could help to inform the design of mechanisms intended to detect colorism within organizations. Such mechanisms could help managers with decisions related to hiring, retraining and retention.

If we were to conduct similar studies based on actual data, we would have to overcome some barriers to collecting data on local policing. Two of the major barriers include: 1) the option for a local police department to opt out of data collection; and 2) the exclusion of skin color variables in the current schema of data collection, which would include information about the skin color of the subject(s) and the involved police officer(s). For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) has been tasked with managing the National Use-of-Force Data Collection, which collects details about the age, sex, race, and ethnicity of subject(s) (FBI, 2017). If we were to enhance the data collection with data on the skin color of the subject(s) and the officer(s) involved with *Use of Force* cases, we might be able to capture the effects of intra-racial-, inter-racial-, individual-, interactive-, and institutional colorism.

To overcome these structural hurdles--optional data collection and inadequate data--, researchers could assume two approaches. The first approach would be to identify police departments that are current participants in the Use of Force Data Collection program, or a similar program, with the willingness to add skin color variables to their data collection. The second approach would be to identify police department(s) that are willing to allow a research team to conduct observational research and in-depth interviews about their practices. With either approach, "practice" data should be compared to the departments' outcome data with specific focus on the skin color of detainees and prisoners. Future research designs that resemble some variant of these two approaches should be able to examine the intersection of local policing and

colorism while using any or all of the explored conditional statements as hypotheses for the study.

As proposed here, future research should expect to find that dark-skinned citizens will experience a higher degree of police force than their lighter counterparts, and experience imprisonment at a higher rate. If this is indeed a finding in future studies, the policy responses explored here should help to inform the initial strategies for addressing detected colorism. Projects that result in the detection of colorism within an organization might entertain a notion that derived from this thought experiment: The intensity of an organization's response to detected colorism could have bearing on organizational outcomes.

Limitations of the Study

A Limited Audience. The project utilized agent-based modeling, a method that is not well-known in public administration. This decision may limit the audience to scholars outside of the discipline. Although there is a sect of public administration scholars who have advocated for the use of agent-based modeling in policy inquiry (Heidelberg & Desai, 2015), and/or provided examples of how to utilize the tool (Eckerd, 2013), it is still an underutilized method. What often accompanies this condition is the critique that questions the notion of learning from simulated data. While the critique is a symptom of the underutilization of ABM, this symptom may limit the reach of this work. The article is also limited to academics. While some might think that the data analysis is basic, some practitioners might find it too far-removed from the world of practice.

Limited Scope. A critique of this work might be that it is too limited in its focus on one single trait. There are several physical traits that have been associated with racial discrimination, such as nose and lip types (Blair, Judd & Chapleau, 2004; Blair, Judd, Sadler & Jenkins, 2002).

While I would agree that these aspects of racial discrimination and physicality are important, not every study requires a complex variable structure. [4]

Conclusion

The primary aim of this project was to explore the possibility of colorism as a contributing factor to racial inequality in the criminal justice system, while expounding upon the underlying theories of colorism. I set out to answer two questions: 1) *How might colorism function within an organizational context*; and 2) *What might occur when managers apply the typical dilemmatic responses to address detected colorism?* The inquiry was motivated by the current racial disparities within the criminal justice system, the potential to advance dialogues about street-level bureaucracy, and the opportunity to challenge problematic logics. A conceptual model was designed to represent the appraised literature, which was then subjected to a simulated organizational setting. I then conducted several thought experiments/scenarios to see if the tenets of colorism would hold true. The simulations revealed opportunities for enhancements to the current descriptions of colorism, especially when organizations are the central focus. The major contributions from this work include a conceptual model for studying colorism within an organizational context, conditional statements that can be converted into hypotheses for future experiments and identified opportunities to improve our collective descriptions of colorism.

[4] See Appendix B for a copy of the code set and instructions for accessing a copy of the agent-based model used for the study.

Figure 2.7 Results of Part I of the Phase Analysis, 260 Incarcerated Darks Were Compared to the Number of Mediums and Lights at the Same Time-Tick for Each of the Five Policy Responses



Note. The selected vantage-point for observing these data was based on the condition of the *darks* reaching a total number of 260 incarcerated citizen-agents, which is approximately 2/3 of the total number of *darks* (393) in each simulation. At this same time-tick, data were collected for the *mediums* and *lights*. In this figure, the plights of all three citizen-groups are compared to get a sense of the overall impact of interactive colorism.

Figure 2.8a. Results of Part II of the Phase Analysis for the Passive Incrementalism Response to Detected Colorism



Figure 2.8b. – Results of Part II of the Phase Analysis for the Counterbalancing Response to Detected Colorism



Figure 2.8c. Results of Part II of the Phase Analysis for the Aggressive Dilution Response to Detected Colorism



Figure 2.9. Modified Conceptual Model of Colorism



Note. This figure depicts a modify model of the concept of colorism. The previous model included privileged treatment and made no mention of individuals who fall in the middle of the skin color spectrum. In this version of the model, the privilege "distortion" is removed and the mediums of the world are included in the spectrum.

Table 2.3 *Average Number of Incarcerated After Two Phases of Interactive Colorism*

Policy Response	Darks		Mediums		Lights	
	Avg. # Inc.	% of Citizen-Agent Pop.	Avg. # Inc.	% of Citizen-Agent Pop.	Avg. # Inc.	% of Citizen-Agent Pop.
Do-Nothing (PR1)	260	66%	154	39%	62	16%
Passive Incrementalism (PR2)	260	66%	124	32%	57	15%
Counterbalancing (PR3)	260	66%	161	41%	84	21%
Aggressive Dilution (PR4)	260	66%	177	45%	97	25%
Utopia (PR5)	260	66%	275	70%	269	68%

Note. The table depicts the data from the vantage point of 260 incarcerated darks, and they reflect the variation in incarceration for *darks*, *mediums* and *lights* at the same time-tick after two phases of interactive colorism.

Table 2.4 *Average Incarcerated Citizen-Agents for 100 Simulations of Each Policy Response*

	Darks		Mediums		Lights	
Policy response	n	μ (*SD*)	n	μ (*SD*)	n	μ (*SD*)
PR1: Total Biased (do-nothing)	393	350 (91)	393	321 (116)	393	293 (132)
PR2: Passive Incrementalism	393	348 (93)	393	322 (116)	393	293 (131)
PR3: Counterbalancing	393	345 (96)	393	321 (116)	393	293 (130)
PR4: Aggressive Dilution	393	342 (100)	393	321 (116)	393	295 (128)
PR5: Total Fair (utopian state)	393	317 (118)	393	317 (118)	393	316 (118)

Note. SD=standard deviation.

Table 2.5 *Results of the ANOVA and Pairwise Comparison of Means of Incarceration Counts for the Five Policy Responses, 100 Runs*

	Darks					Mediums					Lights				
Comparisons	Δ	SE	T	P	99% CI	Δ	SE	t	P	99% CI	Δ	SE	t	P	99% CI
PI vs TB	-1	0.38	-3.15	0.01*	[-2, 0]	1	0.45	1.68	0.45	[0, 2]	0	0.49	0.84	0.92	[-1, 2]
CB vs TB	-4	0.39	-11.31	0.00*	[-5, -3]	0	0.45	0.10	1.00	[-1, 1]	0	0.49	0.91	0.89	[-1, 2]
AD vs TB	-8	0.39	-20.64	0.00*	[-9, -7]	0	0.45	-0.04	1.00	[-1, 1]	2	0.49	4.92	0.00*	[1, 4]
TF vs TB	-33	0.39	-83.51	0.00*	[-34, -32]	-4	0.45	-8.97	0.00*	[-5, -3]	24	0.50	47.18	0.00*	[22, 25]
CB vs PI	-3	0.38	-8.19	0.00*	[-4, -2]	-1	0.45	-1.57	0.51	[-2, 1]	0	0.49	0.08	1.00	[-1, 1]
AD vs PI	-7	0.38	-17.54	0.00*	[-8, -6]	-1	0.45	-1.71	0.43	[-2, 0]	2	0.49	4.09	0.00*	[1, 3]
TF vs PI	-31	0.39	-80.57	0.00*	[-32, -30]	-5	0.45	-10.64	0.00*	[-6, -4]	23	0.50	46.45	0.00*	[22, 25]
AD vs CB	-4	0.39	-9.32	0.00*	[-5, -3]	0	0.45	-0.14	1.00	[-1, 1]	2	0.49	4.00	0.00*	[1, 3]
TF vs CB	-28	0.39	-72.27	0.00*	[-29, -27]	-4	0.46	-9.06	0.00*	[-5, -3]	23	0.50	46.22	0.00*	[22, 24]
TF vs AD	-25	0.39	-63.04	0.00*	[-26, -24]	-4	0.46	-8.92	0.00*	[-5, -3]	21	0.50	42.26	0.00*	[20, 23]

Note. Δ = Contrast. SE = Standard Error; t = t score; P = P value; CI = confidence interval; TB = total biased policing or the do-nothing approach; PI = passive incrementalism; CB = counterbalancing; AD = aggressive dilution; TF = total fair policing or the utopian state.
*p<0.01

Table 2.6 *Results of the ANOVA and Pairwise Comparison of Means of Incarceration Counts for the Five Policy Responses, 50 Runs*

	Darks					Mediums					Lights				
Comparisons	Δ	SE	T	P	99% CI	Δ	SE	t	P	99% CI	Δ	SE	t	P	99% CI
PI vs TB	-2	0.54	-3.11	0.02	[-3, 0]	0	0.63	-0.18	1.00	[-2, 2]	-1	0.69	-1.63	0.48	[-3, 1]
CB vs TB	-4	0.54	-7.38	0.00*	[-5, -3]	0	0.63	-0.46	0.99	[-2, 1]	0	0.69	-0.32	1.00	[-2, 2]
AD vs TB	-10	0.54	-18.95	0.00*	[-12, -9]	-2	0.63	-2.55	0.08	[-3, 0]	0	0.70	0.47	0.99	[-2, 2]
TF vs TB	-33	0.55	-60.11	0.00*	[-35, -32]	-5	0.64	-7.50	0.00*	[-7, -3]	23	0.70	32.18	0.00*	[21, 25]
CB vs PI	-2	0.54	-4.26	0.00*	[-4, -1]	0	0.63	-0.27	1.00	[-2, 2]	1	0.69	1.31	0.69	[-1, 3]
AD vs PI	-9	0.55	-15.81	0.00*	[-10, -7]	-1	0.63	-2.36	0.13	[-3, 0]	1	0.70	2.09	0.22	[0, 3]
TF vs PI	-31	0.55	-56.87	0.00*	[-33, -30]	-5	0.64	-7.29	0.00*	[-6, -3]	24	0.71	33.68	0.00*	[22, 26]
AD vs CB	-6	0.55	-11.58	0.00*	[-8, -5]	-1	0.63	-2.09	0.23	[-3, 0]	1	0.70	0.79	0.93	[-1, 2]
TF vs CB	-29	0.55	-52.72	0.00*	[-31, -28]	-5	0.64	-7.03	0.00*	[-6, -3]	23	0.70	32.42	0.00*	[21, 25]
TF vs AD	-23	0.55	-41.07	0.00*	[-24, -21]	-3	0.64	-4.94	0.00*	[-5, -1]	22	0.71	31.49	0.00*	[20, 24]

Note. Δ = Contrast. SE = Standard Error; t = t score; P = P value; CI = confidence interval; TB = total biased policing or the do-nothing approach; PI = passive incrementalism; CB = counterbalancing; AD = aggressive dilution; TF = total fair policing or the utopian state.
*p<0.01

Table 2.7 *Results of the ANOVA and Pairwise Comparison of Means of Incarceration Counts for the Five Policy Responses, 30 Runs*

	Darks					Mediums					Lights				
Comparisons	Δ	SE	T	P	99% CI	Δ	SE	t	P	99% CI	Δ	SE	t	P	99% CI
PI vs TB	0	0.68	0.65	0.97	[-1, 2]	1	0.79	1.49	0.57	[-1, 3]	2	0.87	2.42	0.11	[0, 4]
CB vs TB	-5	0.69	-7.46	0.00*	[-7, -3]	-2	0.80	-2.35	0.13	[-4, 0]	-1	0.89	-1.06	0.83	[-3, 1]
AD vs TB	-9	0.69	-12.84	0.00*	[-11, -7]	-3	0.81	-3.47	0.01*	[-5, -1]	-1	0.89	-1.06	0.83	[-3, 1]
TF vs TB	-32	0.70	-46.38	0.00*	[-34, -31]	-5	0.81	-5.76	0.00*	[-7, -2]	22	0.90	24.52	0.00*	[20, 24]
CB vs PI	-6	0.69	-8.16	0.00*	[-7, -4]	-3	0.80	-3.84	0.00*	[-5, -1]	-3	0.88	-3.47	0.01*	[-5, -1]
AD vs PI	-9	0.69	-13.57	0.00*	[-11, -7]	-4	0.80	-4.96	0.00*	[-6, -2]	-3	0.88	-3.46	0.01*	[-5, -1]
TF vs PI	-33	0.69	-47.31	0.00*	[-35, -31]	-6	0.81	-7.25	0.00*	[-8, -4]	20	0.89	22.30	0.00*	[17, 22]
AD vs CB	-4	0.70	-5.36	0.00*	[-6, -2]	-1	0.81	-1.11	0.80	[-3, 1]	0	0.89	0.00	1.00	[-2, 2]
TF vs CB	-27	0.70	-38.75	0.00*	[-29, -25]	-3	0.82	-3.42	0.01*	[-5, -1]	23	0.90	25.40	0.00*	[20, 25]
TF vs AD	-24	0.70	-33.4	0.00*	[-25, -22]	-2	0.82	-2.31	0.14	[-4, 0]	23	0.90	25.37	0.00*	[20, 25]

Note. Δ = Contrast. SE = Standard Error; t = t score; P = P value; CI = confidence interval; TB = total biased policing or the do-nothing approach; PI = passive incrementalism; CB = counterbalancing; AD = aggressive dilution; TF = total fair policing or the utopian state.
*p<0.01

Table 2.8 *Incarceration Outcomes for Each Phase of Interactive Colorism for Policy Responses (PR) 2, 3 and 4*

Passive Incrementalism (PR2)												
		Darks				Mediums				Lights			
	Police Ratio [C:P]	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ
Phase I	[4:2]	25%		61%		11%		27%		5%		12%	
Phase II	[5:1]	55%	30%	53%	-8%	32%	21%	31%	4%	17%	12%	16%	4%
Phase III	[6:0]	96%	41%	35%	-18%	91%	60%	34%	3%	85%	68%	31%	15%
Counterbalancing (PR3)													
		Darks				Mediums				Lights			
	Police Ratio [C:P]	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ
Phase I	[3:3]	21%		61%		9%		27%		4%		12%	
Phase II	[4:2]	54%	33%	50%	-11%	33%	24%	31%	4%	20%	16%	18%	7%
Phase III	[5:1]	73%	19%	46%	-5%	52%	19%	33%	2%	34%	15%	21%	3%
Phase IV	[6:0]	97%	24%	35%	-11%	93%	41%	34%	1%	87%	53%	31%	10%
Aggressive Dilution (PR4)													
		Darks				Mediums				Lights			
	Police Ratio [C:P]	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ	% in Prison	Δ	% of PP	Δ
Phase I	[2:4]	21%		52%		12%		30%		7%		18%	
Phase II	[3:3]	46%	25%	47%	-5%	32%	19%	32%	2%	21%	13%	21%	3%
Phase III	[4:2]	68%	21%	44%	-3%	51%	19%	33%	1%	35%	15%	23%	2%
Phase IV	[5:1]	81%	13%	41%	-2%	66%	15%	34%	1%	48%	13%	25%	2%
Phase V	[6:0]	98%	17%	35%	-7%	95%	29%	34%	0%	90%	42%	32%	7%

Note. C:P = the number of *c-police* to *police*--the number of affected police officers to unaffected police officers at the start of each simulation. PP = prison population. Δ = change. Each phase, after the initial starting phase (Phase I), represents an increase of 1 *c-police* and a decrease of 1 *police* as a result of interactive colorism. From this data, we can observe changes in the incarceration rate for each citizen-group (*darks*, *mediums* and *lights*) based on an increase in biased decision-making models. The conversion from *police* to *c-police* took longer with the aggressive dilution approach, which resulted in a slowing-effect on the incarceration of *darks* and it increased the rate of incarceration for *lights*.

Appendix B – *Instructions on Accessing the Agent-Base Model and the Code Set*

Instructions on Access the Agent-Based Model: To access the agent-based model that was used for this project, you may download the program using this link: https://goo.gl/vjVSJM. For the program to run, you must also download and install a copy of NetLogo 5.3.1, which can be found via this link: https://goo.gl/qiLWvy. Instructions on how to use the model can be found under the "Info" tab.

Code Set:

```
;; models the transference of colorism in one direction, police learn from c-police.
;; Written in NetLogo
;; Creation Date: April 9, 2016
;; Last Update: December 6, 2017

globals [
  free-patches            ;; space, group of patches that represent the ideal (free) space for citizen-agents
  detainment-patches      ;; space, group of patches that represent the detainment area for citizen-agents
  incarceration-patches   ;; space, group of patches that represent the incarceration area for citizen-agents
]

;;citizen agents
breed [darks dark]        ;;representative of dark skin color
breed [mediums medium]    ;;representative of medium skin color
breed [lights light]      ;; representative of light skin color

;;police agents
breed [cpolices cpolice]  ;;police officers influenced by colorism
breed [polices police]    ;;police officers not influenced by colorism

;;rap - represents a citizen-agent's rap sheet, increases with each detainment
darks-own [rap]
mediums-own [rap]
lights-own [rap]

;;convert counter - keeps track of the interactions between police and cpolice. Once a police covert-counter reaches a count of 2, the decision-making model coverts from police to cpolice.

polices-own [convert]
cpolices-own [convert]

to setup
  clear-all
```

```
;; create free-patches
set free-patches patches with [pycor >= 1 and pycor <= 30]
ask free-patches [ set pcolor white ]

;; create detainment-patches
set detainment-patches patches with [pycor >= -9 and pycor <= 0]
ask detainment-patches [ set pcolor orange ]

;; create incarceration-patches
set incarceration-patches patches with [pycor >= -30 and pycor <= -10]
ask incarceration-patches [ set pcolor red ]

;;create citizen-agents (darks, mediums and lights) and police-agents (polices and cpolices)

create-darks #-of-darks [          ;;creates citizen-gents with dark skin color
  set shape "person"
  set rap 0
  set size 1
  set color black
  set label rap
  set label-color red
  move-to one-of free-patches with [count turtles-here = 0]
  ]

create-mediums #-of-mediums [      ;;creates citizen-gents with medium skin color
  set shape "person"
  set rap 0
  set size 1
  set color brown
  set label rap
  set label-color red
  move-to one-of free-patches with [count turtles-here = 0]
  ]

create-lights #-of-lights [        ;;creates citizen-gents with light skin color
  set shape "person"
  set rap 0
  set size 1
  set color yellow
  set label rap
  set label-color red
  move-to one-of free-patches with [count turtles-here = 0]
  ]

create-cpolices #-of-cpolice [     ;;creates police-agents influenced by colorism
  set shape "police"
```

```
    set size 1
    set color red
    set convert 2
    move-to one-of free-patches with [count turtles-here = 0]
    ]

  create-polices #-of-police [       ;;creates police-agents not influenced by colorism
    set shape "police"
    set size 1
    set color green
    set convert 0
    move-to one-of free-patches with [count turtles-here = 0]
    ]

  reset-ticks

end


to go

  ask darks [
    set label rap
    set label-color red
    ]

  ask mediums [
    set label rap
    set label-color red
    ]

  ask lights [
    set label rap
    set label-color red
    ]

  ask cpolices [                                    ;;starts cpolicing of the free-patches
    move-to one-of free-patches
    ]

  ask polices [                                     ;;starts policing of the free-patches
    move-to one-of free-patches
    ]

  ask polices [                                     ;;increases polices convert counter by 1
    if any? cpolices
```

```
    in-radius 1
    [set convert convert + 1]
    ]

  ask polices [                                        ;;converts police to cpolice after two
interactions
    if convert >= 2 [
    set breed cpolices
    set shape "police"
    set color red
    ]]

  ask darks                                            ;;procedure for detainment of darks by
cpolice and initiation of rapsheet tally
    with[pcolor = white] [
    if any? turtles with [shape = "police" and color = red and pcolor = white]
    in-radius 1
    [move-to one-of detainment-patches set rap rap + 2]
    ]

  ask mediums                                          ;;procedure for detainment of
mediums by cpolice and initiation of rapsheet tally
    with[pcolor = white] [
    if any? turtles with [shape = "police" and color = red and pcolor = white]
    in-radius 1
    [move-to one-of detainment-patches set rap rap + 1]
    ]

  ask lights                                           ;;procedure for detainment of lights by
cpolice and initiation of rapsheet tally
    with[pcolor = white] [
    if any? turtles with [shape = "police" and color = red and pcolor = white]
    in-radius 1
    [move-to one-of detainment-patches set rap rap + 0.75]
    ]

  ask darks                                            ;;procedure for detainment of darks by
police and initiation of rapsheet tally
    with[pcolor = white] [
    if any? turtles with [shape = "police" and color = green and pcolor = white]
    in-radius 1
    [move-to one-of detainment-patches set rap rap + 1]
    ]

  ask mediums                                          ;;procedure for detainment of
mediums by police and initiation of rapsheet tally
```

```
   with[pcolor = white] [
   if any? turtles with [shape = "police" and color = green and pcolor = white]
   in-radius 1
   [move-to one-of detainment-patches set rap rap + 1]
   ]

  ask lights                                          ;;procedure for detainment of lights by
police and initiation of rapsheet tally
   with[pcolor = white] [
   if any? turtles with [shape = "police" and color = green and pcolor = white]
   in-radius 1
   [move-to one-of detainment-patches set rap rap + 1]
   ]

  ask turtles                                         ;;returns detained citizen-agents to free-
society
   with [pcolor = orange and shape = "person"][
   move-to one-of free-patches forward 2]

  ask turtles                                         ;;incarcerates citizen-agents based on a
three-strike rule
   with [pcolor = white and shape = "person"][
   if rap >= 3 [
   move-to one-of incarceration-patches]
   ]

if not any? turtles with [pcolor = white and shape = "person"] [stop]

tick

end
```

CHAPTER 4. Article III – Interactive Colorism: Directions for Future Research with Specific Focus on Police Departments

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Abstract

The primary aim of this article is to advance the study of interactive colorism. Interactive colorism occurs when skin color bias transfers from the environment to the individual. The research question-- *How might skin color bias (colorism) spread throughout a police department*?--was explored within the context of local policing in the United States. Organizational socialization literature was used to explain how interactive colorism might spread in a police department. However, it is unclear if interactive colorism is best described as a unidirectional process or as a bidirectional process. In a unidirectional model of interactive colorism, bias behaviors are less likely to receive a challenge. In a bidirectional model, biased behaviors are likely to be challenged by counter-behaviors (e.g., fair policing). To explore these two explanations of interactive colorism, input from subject-matter experts and non-subject-matter experts were used to select the model that most accurately depicts the phenomenon. The data collection involved online focus groups and phone interviews with police officers, theorists (e.g., sociologists, psychologists), and non-subject-matter experts. Majority of the informants recommended that future research on interactive colorism be framed as a bidirectional phenomenon. The informants provided additional considerations for future research, such as the influence of societal factors, racial identity, time in the job role, and the variation in police culture across departments.

Introduction

This project uses focus groups and subject-matter-expert (SME) interviews to explore how interactive colorism might function in a police department. Interactive colorism is the socialization of skin color bias (Smart, 2018a); it is how skin color bias is transferred from the environment to the individual (Colman, 2015; Wilder, 2008). The primary objective of this project is to provide a valid conceptual model that can help to explain how interactive colorism might function in a police department and to gather ideas for future research; the work conducted here will provide a foundation for conducting further research on this topic.

What Motivates the Study?

Two major factors motivate the study. The first factor pertains to a gap in the literature. The collective literature on colorism has provided in-depth coverage of individual and institutional colorism (Baynes, 1997; Blair, Judd, Sadler & Jenkins, 2002; Blair, Judd & Chapleau, 2004; Blay, 2011; Burch, 2015; Devaraj, Quigley & Patel, 2018; Russell-Cole, Wilson & Hall, 2013). However, there has been limited inquiry on the topic of interactive colorism. This is certainly the case for the public administration (PA) literature. A deeper understanding of interactive colorism will benefit the study of public servants and organizations. To address this gap, the project will draw upon what we know about organizational socialization to describe how interactive colorism might function within police organizations.

The second factor that motivates the study is based on the notion that the socialization of colorism ideology can serve as a contributing factor to racially biased outcomes (Smart, 2018b). Additional knowledge about interactive colorism might help to explain how detected and undetected patterns of biased administrative behaviors contribute to racial disparities. To address this factor, I will solicit the input of SMEs and non-SMEs regarding two conceptual

models of interactive colorism. In addition, respondents will be asked to provide considerations for future research on this topic.

Aim of the Study, Research Question and Expectations

The primary aim of the study is to advance the study of interactive colorism. The research question for this project is—**RQ-*How might skin color bias (colorism) spread throughout a police department*?** The two proposed conceptual models are based on two streams of thought. The first model (Model 1) assumes that interactive colorism is a unidirectional process in which a junior police officer is susceptible to learning biased behaviors from a superior officer, but the direction of the influence only flows from the superior to the junior officer. The second model (Model 2) assumes that interactive colorism is a bidirectional process in which both junior and superior police officers can learn biased or just behaviors from each other, which is based on the condition of mutual influence. The expectation is that respondents who have close ties to the policing profession will purchase the logic behind Model 1, and those with loose ties to policing will purchase Model 2.

Sequence of the Article

The article will follow this sequence. This section will conclude with an overview of the relevant literature on organizational socialization and local policing, the unique features of police socialization, and an outline of the conceptual models. The following section will summarize the methods used to conduct the study, which include the research design and the plan for the data analysis. The subsequent sections will summarize and discuss the results of the focus groups and the SME interviews, and the article will conclude with a summary of the project and its contribution to scholarship.

An Overview of Organizational Socialization and Local Policing

Van Maanen (1975) defines organizational socialization (OS) as "the process by which an organizational member learns the required behaviors and supportive attitudes necessary to participate as a member of an organization". Socialization is also a way to relay the organization's values and culture to newcomers (Hatmaker, 2015; Schein, 1988). Van Maanen provides further explanation of OS with a set of eight strategies/tactics that organizations can employ to acclimate a new employee (newcomer) to its culture (Hatmaker, 2015; Van Maanen, 1978). These tactics, are dichotomous descriptions of different forms of socialization, which include formal/informal, individual/collective, sequential/non-sequential, fixed/variable, tournament/contest, serial/disjunctive, and investiture/divestiture (Van Maanen, 1978). For the sake of brevity, the summary below provides a description of the tactics that are most relevant to police socialization.

Formal and Informal Socialization. Formal socialization processes explicitly state the expectations of the job role, and there is a clear distinction made between the newcomer's role and other job roles (Van Maanen, 1078). Van Maanen (1978) states that there is a positive correlation between elevated formality and influence on the newcomers' values and attitudes. Informal socialization can contradict formalities. Learning within an informal context can involve nuance and cause newcomers to disregard anything they might have learned during a period of formal socialization (Van Maanen, 1978).

Sequential and Non-Sequential Socialization. Sequential versus non-sequential strategies relate to the order of socialization processes (Van Maanen, 1978). In sequential socialization, newcomers learn in stages. Some professions may require that employees go through extensive training before a newcomer can officially join the organization (e.g., military, police), which

would be the first stage in the socialization process. When the tacit is non-sequential, the learning process is not intended to build upon preceding processes like the transition from military boot camp to active duty. In fact, non-sequential socialization may not follow a script at all.

Serial and Disjunctive Socialization. Van Maanen (1978) states that serial socialization "is perhaps the best guarantee that an organization will not change over long periods of time" (p. 13). With the serial strategy, new employees are groomed by "insiders"—existing members of the organization. Serial tactics stifle innovation but they ensure continuity (Van Maanen, 1978). Disjunctive socialization typically involves a lack of mentorship or structured guidance for the newcomer (Van Maanen, 1978). However, this form of socialization would cultivate an environment that is open to a proactive newcomer.

Investiture and Divesture Socialization. Investiture and divesture serve as a character assessment of the newcomer. Investiture tactics are confirmatory in nature in that they encompass an attempt to identify and capitalize on the newcomer's strengths (Van Maanen, 1978). The investiture strategy encourages innovation and proactive behavior. With divesture, the organization seeks to "deny and strip away certain entering characteristics of a [newcomer]." (Van Maanen, 1978). Divesture is sometimes achieved by demeaning the newcomer and/or isolating her/him from people in their past who do not fit in with their current situation (Van Maanen, 1978).

Additional Socialization Factors. Authors state that the application of the socialization tactics is dependent on the type of organization (Moyson, Raaphorst, Groeneveld, & Van de Walle, 2017). Some organizations are more regimented than others, and even organizations of the same type may vary in the way they apply socialization tactics (Moyson et al., 2017). Two

organizations can have the same charter but assume different socialization tactics. For example, one police department may be open to a proactive newcomer (e.g., listening to a newcomer's feedback). Yet, a neighboring police department may have a closer resemblance to the unidirectional model (e.g., an overwhelming degree of top-down influence).

The OS literature makes mention of the pre-existing values and beliefs that newcomers might bring to an organization (Jones, 1983; Louis, 1980; Perry, 1997) and the likelihood of the newcomer influencing organizational culture (Moyson et al., 2017). Moyson et al. (2017) define OS as "the process of mutual adaptation between an organization and its new members." Feldman (1976) states that mutual influence is centered on "the receptiveness of supervisors to their [newcomers] suggestions" (p. 446). When there is mutual influence, the newcomer has agency in the OS process. Several scholars have explored this dynamic from the interactionist perspective (Griffin, Colella, & Goparaju, 2000; Jones, 1983; Reichers, 1987). Jones' explanation of the newcomer's psychological orientation adds depth to the overall discussion about the interaction that might take place between the individual and the organizational environment. He proposes a model that explains the attitudes, norms, and values of a newcomer and how these factors might influence an organization's culture (Jones, 1983). In his model, a newcomer could have one of three orientations, naïve, competent, or dominant. The naïve newcomer is more likely to be influenced by OS, and he/she will "adopt strategies to reduce anxiety" (Jones, 1983, p. 8). The competent newcomer would assume a middle-of-the road response to OS in which their response to OS could be a mix of innovative and deviant action strategies. The dominant newcomer would be less likely to be influenced by OS, and he/she might try to control the environment and/or manipulate the organization's values or rationality (Jones, 1983).

Unique Features of Police Socialization

Police socialization is a unique form of OS, which encompasses extensive training that occurs prior to the official commencement of the job. For police officers, OS starts at the police academy (Conti, 2011). In an ethnographic study of a police cadet cohort, Conti (2011) describes accounts of socialization that left no room for diversity in moral code, demeanor, or physical strength. If a recruit did not display the ideal image of a police officer, the program authorities asked the recruit to resign. The environment perpetuated an occupational culture that stigmatized/othered those who did not fit the ideal type (Conti, 2011; Conti & Doreian, 2014). These findings suggest that negative attitudes towards difference can formulate in the initial stages of a police officer's career.

Police socialization involves formal tactics that portray a well-ordered environment, however, the environment could be vulnerable to informal tactics. Due to formal socialization processes like the police academy, police organizations tend to have a higher level of OS when compared to other types of organizations (Oberfield, 2012; Van Maanen, 1975; Wilkins & Williams, 2008). After a cadet joins a police department, the formal dimensions of OS may take the form of mentorship, task-oriented training, and/or supervision (Saks & Gruman, 2012; Wilkins & Williams, 2008). Organizational socialization remains a continual process throughout a police officer's career, and officers are the most impressionable during the earlier periods with the department (Moyson et al., 2017; Van Maanen, 1975; Wilkins & Williams, 2008). In addition, the first few years of a police officer's tenure can serve as a sign of their potential success or failure (Wanberg, 2012). Van Maanen (1975) found that newcomers who held on to their initial high expectations of the job were more likely to be perceived as poor performers. In short, if a newcomer did not shift their attitude to match that of the status quo, a supervisor was

more likely to view the individual as someone who might *rock the boat* (Van Maanen, 1975). These factors describe an environment that is keen on assimilation. The challenge to this well-ordered environment is that of informal socialization. Informal socialization typically occurs during peer-to-peer interactions (Oberfield, 2012; Saks & Gruman, 2012; Wilkins & Williams, 2008). If informal socialization dominates over formal tactics, well-intended police departments can bring about great harm. While there could be inherent biases built into the formal aspects of police socialization, interactive colorism is more likely to occur by way of the informal form(s) of OS.

The Conceptual Models - Models 1 and 2

Model Assumptions. The models are based on the most relevant assumptions about how colorism might spread within an organization. The first assumption is that skin color bias plays an active role in the expressed behaviors of public servants (Eberthardt et al., 2006; Harris, 2008). The second assumption is that colorism ideology can spread from the affected to the unaffected individual; colorism is infectious (Colman, 2015; Kravetz, 2017; Wilder, 2008). The third assumption is two-fold--colorism can or cannot be moderated by counter-behaviors like fair policing (Oberfield, 2012; Van Maanen, 1975; Van Maanen, 1978). The fourth assumption is that a police officer's race is not germane to their susceptibility to taking an active role in the perpetuation of colorism (Herring, 2004). In short, interactive colorism has both in-group and out-group proclivities (Herring, 2004).

Description of Models. In Model 1—unidirectional influence, the organization utilizes OS tactics that are formal, informal, sequential, serial, and divestitive in nature. In this model, the influence of OS flows in one direction; socialization is unidirectional. The relationship between the newcomer and the superior (e.g., trainer/partner) is based on the newcomer learning

from the superior. In Model 1, the newcomer's behavior does not influence the superior. Interactive colorism transpires by way of OS. When a newcomer observes biased behavior, she/he will mirror the behaviors. The model assumes that the newcomer is naïve or competent (Jones, 1983), has a desire to fit in or is not motivated to issue a challenge, and therefore offers no counter to the superior's biased behavior. Use of the word "influence" is the simplification of two major functions: 1) organizational socialization; and 2) the socialization of biased ideology—interactive colorism. Over time, these collective behaviors become shared conventions within the organization, and result in biased outcomes. See Figure 3.1a for a depiction of Model 1.

In Model 2—bidirectional influence, the organization utilizes OS tactics that are formal, informal, sequential, serial, and investive in nature. In this model, the influence of OS flows in both direction. Socialization is bidirectional; the relationship between the newcomer and the superior is based on mutual influence. The two entities learn from each other. Interactive colorism transpires by way of OS but is moderated by counter-behavior (e.g., fair policing). When a newcomer observes biased behavior, he/she will decide to mirror the superior's behavior, maintain their prior constitution, or actively try to change the superior's behavior. The newcomer is either competent or dominant, and motivated to issue a challenge (Jones, 1983). The model assumes that the newcomer entered the organization with a decision-making model that runs counter to the biased organizational environment. Use of the word "influence" is the simplification of three major functions: 1) organizational socialization; 2) a superior demonstrating biased behaviors; and 3) a newcomer offering a varied response (mimicking, no response/change, counter-response) to the superior's biased behavior. Over time, these

collective behaviors become shared conventions, and result in moderated bias. See Figure 3.1b for a depiction of Model 2.

Figure 3.1a Model 1: A Conceptual Model of Interactive Colorism with Unidirectional Influence



Note. The figure depicts a conceptual model of interactive colorism and its relationship to individual and institutional colorism. In Model 1, the affected police officer can influence the unaffected police officer. However, the influence is unidirectional. This is the version of Model 1 that was shown to the respondents.

Figure 3.1b Model 2: A Conceptual Model of Interactive Colorism with Bidirectional Influence



Note. The figure depicts a conceptual model of interactive colorism and its relationship to individual and institutional colorism. In Model 2, the affected police officer can influence the unaffected police officer and vice versa. This is the version of Model 2 that was shown to the respondents.

Methods

Participants

The participants for the study participated as either a SME or a non-SME. The SMEs included police officers, and college professors from the fields of psychology, sociology, and law. The SMEs were recruited through an email campaign. Individuals were qualified as a SME based on their body of scholarship or an extensive tenure as a police officer. The SMEs were asked to perform three tasks, to recommend which of the two conceptual models should be used in future studies, to provide feedback on the overall feasibility of Models 1 and 2, and to provide feedback

on the components of the models related to their areas of expertise. The non-SMEs were PhD students. The non-SMEs were recruited via a listserv that caters to graduate students. To participate, the non-SMEs had to be a graduate student of at least 25 years of age and willing to discuss topics related to race and racism. The non-SMEs were asked to perform two tasks, to recommend which of the two conceptual models should be used in future studies, and to provide feedback on the overall feasibility of Models 1 and 2. In total, there were 10 participants, four (4) non-SMEs and six (6) SMEs. Three of the SMEs were categorized as theorists (i.e., college professors), and the other three SMEs were categorized as practitioners (i.e., police officers). Other than professional titles, no other demographic information was collected for the study. There were no promises for compensation, and none of the participants received compensation.

Research Design

In the following, I will discuss the overall research design, which will include the methods that were used for the data collection and the rationale for selecting the methods. In addition, I will discuss the procedures I took and a contingency strategy that was employed to complete the data collection. The discussion of the research design will conclude with a step-by-step description of the data collection process.

Online Focus Groups. Online Focus groups were the primary method for the data collection. Focus groups can be used to gather feedback on topics in a non-threatening environment (Krueger, 1994; Litosseliti, 2003). They were first used as a tool for market research in the 1940s, and now the method is used in academic research to explore meaning, group norms, and processes (Gill, Stewart, Treasure & Chadwick, 2008). Some social scientists have used focus groups to generate data for mixed methods research (Heinrich, 2010; Kennedy,

2013), and others have used focus groups to capture the perspectives of police officers on topics pertaining to race and OS (Wilkins & Williams, 2008).

Interaction between the participants is an essential element of focus groups (Gill et al., 2008; Litosseliti, 2003), and the anticipated interaction between the subject-matter experts is one of the major reasons for adopting this method of data collection. The proposed models were designed based on disparate knowledge from disciplines outside of public administration, such as psychology and law. The focus group format presents an opportunity for experts from these fields to make comment on the overall model, but to also provide additional feedback on the components of the model that derived from their area of expertise. In addition, a scholarly debate between the experts could reveal variables or themes that are not accounted for in the current version of the models. At minimum, the exchange would offer insights on how to advance research in this area.

Advancements in technology have made it possible to conduct focus groups via online platforms. Online focus groups can be helpful when preferred participants are not conveniently located (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2017), which was the case for this project. Therefore, online focus groups were used to gather feedback from SMEs and non-SMEs to validate a conceptual model of interactive colorism. There are certain limitations to online focus groups, such as the inability to read non-verbal cues (Litosseliti, 2003). However, the ability to gain simultaneous access to the SMEs outweighed the limitations.

Procedures. The research design for the focus groups set out to recruit participants that were familiar with the topics of policing, race, colorism and organizational socialization. This would consist of four SME groups: 1) Group 1 – theorists who have studied colorism and race theories; 2) Group 2 – theorists who have studied the intersection of colorism and human

cognition; 3) Group 3 - theorists who have studied the topic of organizational socialization; and 4) Group 4 – senior police officers. Some of the identified parties had interests that spanned across two groups, which made these individuals ideal informants. A fifth group (Group 5), which would consist of non-SME participants, would be used to control for any professional bias that might originated from the SME groups. Having the ability to compare the data collected from the SME groups with the non-SMEs input might offer additional insights. In total, five focus groups would be involved in the data collection. The target size for each of the focus groups was set at three (3) to five (5) participants.

The list of potential participants for Groups 1 - 3 was compiled from a literature review. For Group 1, nine potential participants were identified and asked to participate in the study. Two people agreed to participate. However, due to scheduling conflicts, only one of the respondents was able to participate in the focus group. For Group 2, I identified and contacted for four potential participants. Two people agreed to participate in the study. However, due to scheduling conflicts, neither of the two were able to participate in the focus group. For Group 3, I contacted ten potential participants. Two agreed to participate in the study, but only one followed through with their commitment. For Group 4 (police officers), I made a list of two types of cities, cities with large communities of color and cities with minimal racial diversity. These cities varied in population size and the size of their police organization. Through an email campaign, I contacted members of the leadership team for the identified police organizations. See Appendix A for a copy of the email templates that were used for the campaign. I anticipated an even higher level of resistance from Group 4, so I increased the number of contacts. For Group 4, 51 potential participants were identified and contacted. Only one person agreed to participate at that time. I followed up the initial email with a second round of emails, and phone

calls to about 1/3 of the potential participants. I had difficulty getting an actual person on the phone.

A different recruitment strategy was used for the non-SME group (#5). I used a university's email listservs that sends weekly communications to a varied group of graduate students. The criteria listed in the recruitment announcement stated that the participant(s) must be at least 25 years of age, be willing to discuss topics like race and racism, and be a PhD student at Virginia Tech. The criteria were intended to increase the likelihood of attracting participants who had the skill level to thoroughly analyze conceptual models and the emotional maturity to discuss difficult topics. From this campaign, I recruited four respondents. Once again, scheduling conflicts prevented me from conducting a session that would include all four of the respondents.

Contingency Strategy. I advanced the project by collapsing the available candidates into teams of two. For the non-SMEs, two groups of two were formed. For the SMEs, the respondents from Groups 1 & 3 were combined into a team of two. Since Groups 2 and 4 did not materialized into a session or yield the availability needed to participate in a focus group, the respondents were moved to a list of potential participants for one-on-one interviews. In short, Team 1 consisted of two non-SMEs. Team 2 consisted of two non-SMEs, and Team 3 consisted of two theorists—an expert on colorism and an expert on organizational socialization.
The team discussions focused on the process of organizational socialization and what this process might mean to the function of interactive colorism. In addition, the focus groups were used to solicit ideas for future research on this topic.

Data Collection. All the focus teams/groups were conducted online via WebEx. A copy of the consent form (see Appendix B) was emailed to the participants prior to the start of the

session. Unless the participants voluntarily shared their identity, the participants' identity was withheld from the other participant. Once all parties were online, I read the details of the consent form to the participants and obtained their verbal consent. The verbal explanation of the consent form was accompanied by projected slides that reiterated the same information.[1] I then shared the objective of the conversation which was to select one of two models that could best explain *how skin color bias (colorism) might spread throughout an organization (e.g., police department)*. I then explained the concept of colorism and its three levels (individual, interactive, and institutional), with special emphasis on interactive colorism. Then, participants were provided with an explanation of organizational socialization. Next, participants were shown Model 1 along with an explanation of how organizational socialization might serve as a conduit for interactive colorism. After showing the first model, the participants were asked three questions: 1) *What did we get right*; 2) *Are there any key elements missing from the model*; and 3) *On a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most convincing, how convincing is the model*? Participants were then shown Model 2 along with an explanation of the difference between the two models. I then asked an additional structured question--*If you had to recommend advancing one of the two models, would you select Model 1 or 2*? —and offered the participants an opportunity to share any additional feedback. I then told the participants how I plan to use the data, entertained additional questions and comments, and concluded the session. All the focus teams/groups sessions were accomplished in less than 40 minutes.

As a second contingency to the challenges faced with the focus groups, I contacted respondents that were unable to participate in the focus groups due to time constraints to see if they would be willing to participate in a phone interview. Four of the individuals agreed to participate in a phone interview, which included a theorist and three police officers. The data

from the interviews were used to add dimension to the data collected during the focus groups (Gill et al., 2008). The interviews consisted of the same structured questions that were used in the team sessions, along with impromptu questions used to solicit additional information from the respondents. A few minutes prior to the phone interview, I emailed a copy of the consent form and a copy of the slides that were used to guide the conversation. With some alteration to the wording, these were the same slides used during the team sessions. During the interviews, I followed the exact sequence used for the teams/focus groups, but I afforded more space for unscripted dialogue. Each interview took approximately 30 minutes.

*Data Analysi*s

The two quantitative questions had the most bearing on the determination about the basic feasibility of both models and the decision regarding which model to advance. Apart from one modification—bidirectional influence—Model 2 contains all the elements of Model 1. With that in mind, participants were asked this question of Model 1--*On a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most convincing, how convincing is the model*? The responses to this question for both the team discussions and the interviews were combined into a composite score. The second quantitative question asked--*If you had to recommend advancing one of the two models, would you select Model 1 or #2*? For this question, I calculated a raw score for both models based on the feedback from the team sessions and the interviews. The respondents' comments about future research were summarized, and some comments were verbatim notations. I analyzed the comments for emergent themes and grouped them by theme. The noteworthy comments and the associated themes will be summarized in the results section.

Results

Quantitative Results

On average, respondents ranked the convincingness of Model 1 with a score of eight (8) out 10. The highest score (10) came from two of the theorists from the disciplines of law and sociology. The three practitioners (police officers) and one of the non-SMEs gave a score of nine (9). The lowest scores (6) came from a non-SME and a theorist from the discipline of psychology. Seven (70%) of the respondents recommended that Model 2 be advanced for future studies. This total included three (3) of the four (4) non-SMEs, two (2) of the theorists (i.e., sociology and psychology), and two (2) police officers. Three (30%) of the respondents opted for Model 1, which included one (1) non-SME, one (1) theorist (i.e., law), and one (1) police officer. See Table 3.1 for a summary of these results.

Qualitative Results

Majority of the qualitative comments were categorized as *empirical considerations*—factors to consider for future research and *war stories*—personal stories about policing, and the nature of colorism, race and racism. The comments categorized as empirical considerations are listed in Table 3.2. The empirical considerations touched on three major topics: 1) the feasibility of the models; 2) potential enhancements of the models; and 3) future approaches to conducting research on interactive colorism. Majority of the war stories were related to the nature of colorism and local policing. The comments categorized as war stories are listed in Table 3.3.

Table 3.1 *Results from the Quantitative Questions*

Group/Type	Role/Discipline	How Convincing is Model 1	Model 1	Model 2
Non-SME	Graduate Student	8		X
Non-SME	Graduate Student	7		X
Non-SME	Graduate Student	9	X	
Non-SME	Graduate Student	6		X
Theorist	Law	10	X	
Theorist	Sociology	10		X
Theorist	Psychology	6		X
Practitioner	Police Officer	9		X
Practitioner	Police Officer	9	X	
Practitioner	Police Officer	N/A		X
Average		8		
Totals			3	7

Note. The table depicts responses to the two quantitative questions that were posed to the respondents. Respondents were asked to rate the convincingness of Model 1, with 10 being the most convincing. After Models 1 & 2 were explained, respondents were asked which model should be used in future studies.

Empirical Considerations. The major themes that emerged from the respondents' comments were related to the validation of the models, the clarity of the models, the factors that should be considered for future research, and the function of OS. Majority of the validation comments provided support for the logic behind the models, and most of these comments were expressed by non-SMEs:

"The depiction of how we get to institutional colorism seems logical." (non-SME)

"The model seems fairly believable." (non-SME)

"There is merit to the model." (police officer)

Out of the six comments related to clarity, two of the comments relayed an understanding of the general premise of the models:

"Very simple and concise." (theorist-law)

"I understood the model. It's fine." (police officer)

Other comments alluded to the respondents' difficulty with understanding the models. One SME informant stated that without the verbal explanation that accompanied the models, the models were not very clear. One of the non-SMEs also suggested that the boxes for biased outcomes and shared conventions "be further qualified". There were five recommendations on what factors to consider for future research, which include societal influences, tenure in the job role, the length of the relationship between the two actors, the race of the two actors, and racial identity awareness as a moderator for bias transfer. All these additional factors were provided by two SMEs, the psychologist and one of the police officers. In terms of how OS would function in a police department, three of the five comments alluded to the purchase of the unidirectional argument (Model 1):

> "With most police departments, it's going to be very rare that a junior officer is going to be able to influence a senior officer in that manner. Unless the senior officer is a weak officer. A junior officer would not come in with the mindset of let me influence you. They are there to learn because they don't know anything. If he [junior officer] influences the senior officer, more than the likely the senior already had those type of thoughts." (police officer)

> "If the bias is reinforced by the organizational environment, the bi-directional flow seems less important." (non-SME)

> "The established power structure may not allow resistance to bias behavior." (non-SME)

One of the goals for soliciting qualitative feedback was to gather suggestions for future research. However, I thought it was necessary to address the comments related to clarity or lack thereof. In response to this set of comments, both models were redesigned to place the focus solely on interactive colorism. The inclusion of the additional two levels of colorism—individual and institutional—might have served as a distraction for some of the respondents. To review the modified models, see Figures 3.2a and 3.2b.

Tables 3.2 *Empirical Considerations: Comments Regarding Feasibility, Enhancement and Future Approaches for Models 1 & 2*

Theme	Comment/Feedback
Additional Factors	"Societal influences should be accounted for in the model."
Additional Factors/dynamics of racial identity	"The race of the two actors might also play a role."
Additional Factors/dynamics of racial identity	Individuals who have a higher sense of racial identity may be more aware of colorism.
Additional Factors/experience & relationship	"...also take into account additional demographics like tenure in the role, how long the two actors have known each other."
Clarity/General	Without the verbal explanation, the models are not all that clear.
Clarity/General	The models are reductive.
Clarity/General	Re: Model 1: "I understood the model. It's fine."
Clarity/Model 1	"Very simple and concise."
Clarity/Model 2	"The biased outcomes box for Model 2 needs to be further qualified."
Clarity/Model 2	"The shared conventions box for Model 2 needs to be further qualified."
Focus of the Model	"You are not trying to demonstrate how fair policing spreads throughout a department. Sure, it's bidirectional, but so what?"
Focus of the Model	"The focus should be on the contamination of discrimination."
OS w/bidirectional influence	"Knowledge and awareness (on the part of the junior member) of colorism may counter the influence of interactive colorism."
OS w/bidirectional influence	"The tactics used in my socialization…there are broader permissions in our organization." We give permission to question the judgement, tactics and individual conventions so that we become a more progressive organization."
OS w/unidirectional influence	"With most police departments, it's going to be very rare that a junior officer is going to be able to influence a senior officer in that manner. Unless the senior officer is a weak officer. A junior officer would not come in with the mindset of *let me influence you*. They are there to learn because they don't know anything. If he [junior officer] influences the senior officer, more than the likely the senior already had those type of thoughts."
OS w/unidirectional influence/additional factors	"If the bias is reinforced by the organizational environment, the bi-directional flow seems less important."
OS w/unidirectional influence/power dynamic	"The established power structure may not allow resistance to bias behavior."
Potential research methods	"Obviously, there is a lot from social network analysis that you are going to consider here."
Validation/Bidirectional	"I think it's fair to say that influence works both ways. An individual who polices in a fair way may have some effect on the actions of others"
Validation/General	"There is merit to the model."
Validation/Import	"If the bias is reinforced by the organizational environment, the bi-directional flow seems less important."
Validation/OS explanation	"Organizational socialization is a good representation of how skin color bias might function."
Validation/Rationale	"The depiction of how we get to institutional colorism seems logical."
Validation/Unidirectional	"The model seems fairly believable"

Note. These comments were provided by the non-SMEs and the SMEs during the online team/focus groups and the phone interviews. The comments are presented here based on the central theme that emerged from each statement.

Tables 3.3 *War Stories: Comments Regarding the Nature of Colorism and Local Policing*

Theme	Comment/Feedback
Diversity/in thought	“We are all in the same uniform, but that doesn’t mean we all have the same mindset.”
Future research question	"Are people of color more or less likely to be susceptible to interactive colorism?"
Language as a tool	"We have moved to [teaching] cultural intelligence."
Language as a tool	"The whole [concept] of colorism softens the discussion…how their mind sets them up to be successful with interactions at the street-level."
Normative/what should be	"Since policing is about individual interactions, individual police officers have to practice *anti-colorism*."
Normative/what should be	"We have to break a part our OS and the shared conventions within our organization."
Root cause/fear	"Organizational pressures (fear of losing your job). Someone might adopt biased decision-making models begrudgingly."
Root cause/no exposure	"People come from different parts of the country. They are unaware, and don’t know about cultural differences. They just don’t know.”
Root cause/predisposition	Informant: “Are you afraid of black people.” Trainee: "Yes…I have never been around Black people."
Root cause/predisposition	"Some people may come with their own biases before they join the organization."
The Nature of Colorism	"Also, a lot of this is going to be transmitted in a much less direct [way] and maybe even less verbally than basic police racism."
Us vs. Them	Informant's Senior Colleague (after watching the informant speak to a citizen): "How can you talk to that piece of crab.” Informant: “It’s my job. If information is needed...he will come to me before he will talk to you.”

Note. These comments were provided by the non-SMEs and the SMEs during the online team/focus groups and the phone interviews. The general nature of colorism and local policing were not the central focus of the project; however, the comments carry enough import to mention. The comments are presented here based on the central theme(s) that emerged from each statement. Some of the comments are direct quotes and others are paraphrased statements.

Figure 3.2a Model 1: A Modified Conceptual Model of Interactive Colorism with Unidirectional Influence



Note. The figure depicts how interactive colorism might occur between a police officer with a decision-making model that is affected by colorism and a police officer with a decision-making model that is unaffected by colorism. The model is based on Van Maanen's (1975) description of organizational socialization (OS), in which a junior (new) police officer is subject to being influenced by more seasoned officers. In this frame, biased behaviors of a senior officer would have influence on the decision-making model of a junior officer. This version of Model 1 takes into consideration the feedback received from the respondents.

Figure 3.2b Model 2: A Modified Conceptual Model of Interactive Colorism with Bidirectional Influence



Note. The figure depicts how interactive colorism might occur between a police officer with a decision-making model that is affected by colorism and a police officer with a decision making-model that is unaffected by colorism. As organizational socialization takes place, both entities can influence each other's policing behavior. Biased policing is countered by fair policing, and fair policing is countered by biased policing. This version of Model 2 takes into consideration the feedback received from the respondents.

War Stories. As one might expect, the police officers provided a few war stories. However, other respondents shared stories about the nature of local policing and colorism. The three predominate themes for the war stories category include the *root cause of colorism ideology*, *language as a tool* and *normative/what should be*. One respondent described fear as a potential root cause of interactive colorism:

> "Organizational pressures…fear of losing your job. Someone might adopt biased decision-making models begrudgingly." (non-SME).

Other respondents attributed the root cause of interactive colorism to a predisposition for colorism ideology prior to joining the police force. One respondent stated that biased thoughts may have always been held by an officer, but the officer could receive license to act on these thoughts when they observe behavior that validates their private thoughts.

> "Some people may come with their own biases before they join the organization." (police officer)

> Police Informant: “Are you afraid of black people.”
> Trainee: "Yes…I have never been around Black people."

In the above passage, a respondent (police officer) recalled when a trainee was assigned to them due to the trainee’s “fear of Black people". Prior to them meeting for the first time, the police informant was made aware of the trainee’s fear. The quoted dialogue occurred within the first few minutes of their introduction to each other. The informant made a concerted effort to immerse the trainee in residential areas where people of color were the predominant inhabitants. He also placed the trainee in direct contact with Black people and instructed the trainee to “engage". The trainee engaged with the citizens while the supervisor looked over the trainee’s shoulder to offer reassuring nods to citizens. The police informant stated that this was an exercise about building trust on both sides—the citizens’ trust of the officer and the officer’s trust of the citizens. He ended this war story by stating “People come from different parts of the

country. They are unaware, and don't know about cultural differences. They just don't know." The theme of having a predisposition for colorism ideology emerged in the critique of the models (empirical considerations) and in the war stories.

Although it is not depicted in Table 3.3, the theme of progress was shared by two of the police informants. One police officer said that diversity, three decades ago, was sufficed by hiring someone from the "safe" minority group. This comment was clarified by qualifying the safe group as Asians. The second informant reflected on a 30-year history with the department. Compared to 30 years ago, the department has made progress in terms of diversity and race. When asked what may have caused the shift in culture, the informant stated "…realizing we are a profession, not a trade.". The informant added to this comment three additional factors:

- A culture shift came from within the organization and it came from "those entering the policing profession having higher degrees of education. "[We] started talking about co-policing with the community."
- "Breaking barriers was important." (e.g., gender, race)
- There was a shift in the social exchange between police officers.

It is also important to note that both informants opted for Model 2—bi-directional influence.

Discussion

Discussion of the Results

Quantitative Results. To some degree, the quantitative findings ran counter to the study's expectations. I expected that the police officers would endorse Model 1. This expected outcome was based on the paramilitary structure of police departments, which is complemented by a highly formalized socialization process. However, only one of the three officers selected Model 1. This finding suggests that police culture might be more diverse that the original assumption. If this is true, neither of the two models would be appropriate without further detail. A blend of

the two models might be the best approach to studying interactive colorism within local police departments. However, I recommend using Model 2 as a starting point for future studies.

Some departments may not waiver from a traditional rigid structure, while others may encourage mutual influence. One of the officers that voted for Model 2 stated that junior officers have opportunities to impact the organization's culture. The police informant who voted for Model 1 painted a starkly different picture that relayed minimal to no chance of a junior officer having influence over a senior officer. Given the conflicting results from the police informants, we may need a larger data capture to further explain the variation in police culture across departments. At this time, this is not something either model can do.

In general, the quantitative responses from the other SMEs and the non-SMEs met the expected outcome. It was expected that respondents who were more distant—loose ties to the policing profession--from police departments would assume a more optimistic perspective, which would be Model 2. The other three SMEs, from the disciplines of law, sociology, and psychology, had different reactions to the models. The law-SME selected Model 1, and the other two SMEs selected Model 2. Without additional knowledge about the respondents, it is safe to assume that the law-SME is closer in proximity to police departments than the sociology-SME and the psychology-SME. For the non-SMEs, only one selected Model 1. If we were to look at police as one group, the other SMEs as a second group, and the non-SMEs as a third group, only one member from each of these three groups voted for Model 1. Apart from one non-SME, those with loose ties to policing selected Model 2. Conversely, of the three respondents with close ties to policing, only two selected Model 1. The best interpretation of these findings is that there is not a one-size-fits-all model that can capture the full dynamics of interactive colorism in police departments, but Model 2 might be closer to achieving this aim.

Qualitative Results. The qualitative responses provide several opportunities for enhancing Model 2. The even balance of positive and critical comments about the *clarity* of the models encouraged revisions to both models. Half of the clarity comments found the models to be "clear and simple" and the other half of the comments found issues with the models. The goal here was to provide a basic explanation of interactive colorism within local police departments. The visual depiction of the model should be constructed in a way that tells a clear story. Instead of waiting for the next iteration of this work, I decided to redesign the models as a deliverable of the project. Any future work that refers to this article should utilize Figures 3.2a and 3.2b as a starting point.

The comments regarding *root cause* and the *nature of colorism* are in alignment with the predominate literature pertaining to colorism. Those interested in conducting research on either of these two themes should first refer to the comprehensive work of Russell-Cole et al. (2013), *The color complex (revised): The politics of skin color in a new millennium*. The text discusses colorism at the individual and institutional level. As you may learn from a cursory review of the literature on colorism, minimal inquiry has been conducted from the interactive perspective. Nonetheless, the Russell-Cole et al. provide thorough coverage of the dynamics of colorism and one might find morsels of guidance that could inform the study of interactive colorism. However, I would caution researchers not to place too much focus on the origins of the phenomenon and accept the assumption that interactive colorism is occurring in every organization. Studies that focus on root cause are highly appropriate for the study of individual colorism, and even institutional colorism, but this might be a less productive venture for the study of interactive colorism.

Some of the comments from the police informants highlighted the progress their department has made, in terms of race relations, and they also stressed the importance of treating culture as a unique characteristic for each police department. The article that motivated much of the logic in Model 1 was written in 1975. Van Maanen (1975) described police departments as highly structured organizations with a clear path towards achieving the status of an ideal police officer, often through pressurized learning. While this may still be the case in 2018, the police informants had a mixed reaction to Van Maanen's description of police culture. The police informants agreed that police departments during that era (mid 70s) were problematic and had poor relationships with communities of color. However, two of the police informants stated that their departments have made considerable progress since 1975. The major takeaway here is that, overtime, collective police culture may have morphed into varied levels of rigidity and malleability.

Significance of the Research

Interactive colorism provides us with a different approach for addressing racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and this concept is especially relevant to street-level bureaucracy. We could benefit from a deeper understanding as to how biased administrative behaviors contribute to the racial inequities in the criminal justice system. More importantly, we could benefit from a deeper understanding about how biased behaviors spread throughout public organizations, especially the organizations that routinely interface with the public. As far back as the 1960s, we have data that depict a biased criminal justice system, especially in the case of African Americans (Alexander, 2012; Myers, 2018; Travis, Western & National Research Council, 2014). We have studied these racially biased outcomes in a myriad of ways, to include length of prison sentences (Viglione, Hannon & DeFina, 2011) and traffic stops (Epp, Maynard-

Moody & Haider-Markel, 2014). However, our empirical studies have predominately remained affixed on outcomes, and minimal attention has been placed on the behaviors that might help to perpetuate biases.

This work helps to highlight challenges and shortcomings in the conduct of PA research regarding police departments. First, there is the issue of the blue-wall—an unofficial code to protect police officers from public scrutiny (Kleinig, 2001; Nolan, 2009). The leadership of police departments must be concerned about the overall safety of their police officers, which should include the preservation of their careers. Kleinig (2001) and Nolan (2009) make the case for the factors that support the notion of the blue wall, but the most relevant factor for the scholarly community is how the blue wall prevents empirical inquiry. I can also imagine that using any variant of the word race to describe proposed research will reduce the possibility of collaboration with police departments.

Second, the study of local police organizations has been led by other disciplines like sociology. Given the charge of police departments, having sociology at the helm of police studies makes sense. However, police departments are a major component of street-level bureaucracy, which falls within the purview of public administration. In addition to the study of the intersection of local policing and race, public administration theorists have not provided administrators, in various fields (e.g., public safety, education), with the language to deal with the complexities associated with race, skin color, bias and discrimination.

The field of public administration is in the most appropriate position to provide the language and the tools to address the perpetuation of skin color bias within public organizations. For example, the development of concepts like interactive colorism may get us closer to what is actually transpiring at the street-level. Bureaucrats may be responding to what is physically in

front of them, which goes beyond racial categories. If bureaucrats are reacting to citizens based on physicality, then there are embedded stories about sameness and acceptance, and difference and othering that can impact social and criminal justice outcomes. If we can address the spread of biased behaviors, especially at the street-level, we can begin to address one of the most egregious administrative failures in modern times--mass incarceration. While this current effort is exploratory, it could help to shift the collective discussion towards a more introspective approach to the study of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system.

Implications for Research and Practice

A better understanding of how colorism intersects with public administration should help to move us closer to equitable outcomes. In particular, outcomes that impact an individual's quality of life will warrant our immediate attention. Public safety is an area of service that can impact every facet of the things that we value most, such as access to education, housing, and employment. If an individual receives unfair treatment from agents of the criminal justice system, the entire trajectory of their life can experience a detrimental shift. That is why it is paramount that we call things what they really are versus using categories. A more comprehensive approach to race studies, racial disparities and administrative thought and behavior will add depth to how we address some of the aforementioned racial disparities.

Authors—from disciplines other than public administration--have provided excellent work on the topic of colorism (Norwood, 2015), however, we have not reached a threshold where the body of evidence can be used to formulate practical responses to colorism. This is especially true for the discipline of public administration. Public administration interfaces with citizens on a routine basis, and if administrators are not equipped with the adequate language, they will inevitably contribute to the perpetuation of racial and skin color bias. Mention of

colorism is close to nonexistent in public administration journals. Therefore, we should continue to conduct studies that utilize existing datasets and do so using interdisciplinary methods. In tandem, we should conduct studies from within organizations that attempt to collect current data on its members and compare those data with the organization's outcomes. In fact, public administration should take the lead on the latter type of inquiry. In doing this work, we must acknowledge that some public organizations are apprehensive about working on sensitive topics like race and/or skin color. In fact, many of the challenges I experienced in developing the focus groups is demonstrative of the apprehension. However, this apprehension gives more reason for work in this area. We must get to a place where complex dialogues are no longer "a nervous area of government" (Gooden, 2014). In the following, I will offer specific steps to help guide future research on interactive colorism.

Potential Research Questions. The next phase of inquiry should try to explore questions that seek to unearth "embedded" nuance. Since colorism serves as a challenge to the categorical approach to studying race, we should start with a basic question like—*Are there varied outcomes when we search for signs of colorism versus racism*? We should also look to similar projects that have taken this approach (Devaraj et al., 2018). To answer this question, the research should consist of two models. In the first model, data would be compared across racial categories. In the second model, data would be compared across a skin color spectrum. Comparing these two models should help to determine two things, if race is a contributing factor to the outcomes, and secondly, is skin color a contributing factor. If the discriminatory treatment is most suffered by dark-skinned citizens, any corrective response should try to address racial and skin color discrimination. For questions that seek specificity about racial discrimination, we might find

patterns that resemble gradations of discriminatory treatment based on skin color. The following example might help to illustrate the importance of these type of questions.

> *A research team wants to know if there is racial discrimination involved with the determinations for participation in the TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) program. The researchers find that social workers were more likely to deny TANF if the recipient was Black. When the research team conducted the same study using a colorism frame, they found that dark-skinned citizens comprised majority of the TANF denials.*

As stewards of the public, we should be concerned about the inconsistent justice outcomes that occur within a protected class. Furthermore, categorical protections should not serve as an excuse to forgo nuanced factors that might be related to skin color. Research designs that consider the variability of race will relay a more accurate picture of the collective behaviors that influence organizational outcomes, and the resultant knowledge can be used to make appropriate corrections to programs. Here are two other types of questions to consider: 1) *What role does skin color play in the traffic stops*; and 2) *Are dark-skinned citizens more likely to be arrested than their counterparts*? As I stated before, colorism studies have been conducted at the advanced levels of the criminal justice system (i.e., sentencing), however, little is known about how colorism might operate at the base level/entry point of the criminal justice system. These questions, or similar ones, could help to advance our knowledge in this area. Studies that attempt to address these questions might involve mixed methods, such as observational research, secondary data analysis, and/or interviews. To explore these questions within the context of interactive colorism, I would suggest conducting interviews with junior and senior police officers and observing their daily interactions with each other and with the public. Then, compare the qualitative findings with outcome data (e.g., traffic stops, arrests).

A Key Consideration for Future Research--Varied Police Culture. For future research, we should consider the variability of police culture, which was a factor that was stressed by two of the police informants. Moyson et al. (2017) state that an organization's socialization processes enable the transmission of its culture to newcomers. The authors also state that socialization tactics may vary across organizations of the same type (Moyson et al., 2017). If socialization is how organizations ensure the sustainment of culture and the employed tactics vary across police departments, we should expect cultural variation to be a key factor in the explanation of how interactive colorism might function within a local police department. Future projects that seek to explore interactive colorism, within a local policing context, should first conduct a cultural inventory of the police department(s) under study.

In addition, we should not assume that all police departments will resemble Model 1 or 2. Some departments may resemble a blend of the two models. For example, the broader culture of an organization may resemble Model 2, an environment that is open to innovation that originates from junior officers. However, that same environment could encompass factions that run counter to the aspired cultural identity of the organization. These factions might be guided by unofficial rules and norms that run counter to the established laws that govern the police department (Downs, 1967; Jones, 1983; Perry, 1997). These norms could play a key role in shaping police behavior for the entire department (Skolnick, 1966). If these factions are the predominate force within a police department, the unofficial culture of the organization might resemble Model 1. The recommendation here is that we conduct future studies that use Model 2 as a starting point. After a cultural inventory has been conducted, adjust the model according to the cultural makeup of the organization.

Limitations of the Study

Small N. A major limitation to this study was the number of respondents. Scheduling conflicts and the project timeline did not permit space to capture the proposed number of respondents. While the data are rich and important themes did emerge from the comments, increasing the number of focus group participants might have enhanced the dynamics of the discussions. In addition, since police officers have firsthand knowledge of police socialization, a higher number of phone interviews with officers would have been ideal. This is also the case with the other SMEs. Having more than one SME from the various disciplines would add validity to the conclusions drawn here. Without a larger *N*, it is difficult to generalize the results.

Online focus groups. While online focus groups are convenient (Litosseliti, 2003), they encompass missed opportunities to read body language and/or pose impromptu questions in response to body language. Participants also could multi-task while participating in an online focus group. This is something that I do believe occurred during one of the sessions. Noise from the participant's background disrupted the flow of the discussion. In addition, the inability to secure more participants hampered the opportunity to capitalize on the use of the focus group method. What was expected was rigorous debates, but that is highly unlikely when the focus groups are reduced to team conversations.

Low Response Rate for Police. Given the recent news stories of police officers alleged use of excessive force when dealing with Black men, the odds were unlikely that the police response rate would be high. Future projects should consider the necessary lead time to build an adequate amount of trust between the research team and police officers. Most of the officers I contacted did not know who I was, and majority of them made no attempt to respond to the request for participation. If any of the police officers that I reached out to were to conduct an

online search using my name, they would have discovered that I am African American. In some cases, my race may have hindered the response rate. Nonetheless, the collected data are useful, and they served the intended purpose of the study.

Conclusion

The purpose of this project was to validate one of two conceptual models of interactive colorism, and to gather input for future research on this topic. Online focus groups and SME interviews were used to collect the data. The responses to two quantitative questions were tallied, and central themes were extracted from the qualitative feedback. Majority of the respondents selected Model 2, which posits that interactive colorism is a bidirectional process. Majority of the respondents purchased the notion that a newcomer has enough agency to counter skin color bias expressed by a superior officer. However, the qualitative comments provide partial support for both models. Future research that seeks to examine police socialization and the socialization of skin color bias should consider the variance in culture across police departments, the dynamics of racial identity and how this might impact socialization processes, and the influence of relationship dynamics between junior and senior police officers. In addition, future research should take into account the study's limitations, such as the number of respondents. One way to address low response is to incorporate methods that are designed for large data collection (e.g., surveys). However, to increase buy-in, researchers should set aside enough lead time to build rapport with police and other SMEs.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation project connected the disparate research on colorism to demonstrate how the concept of colorism could help public administration address the racial disparities that stem from social institutions. In the following, each article will be summarized in terms of what was argued or questioned, the major observations and findings, and the intellectual merits and broader impacts. The dissertation will conclude with guidance for future research.

Article I - *An Introduction: Colorism and Its Relevance to Public Administration*

In Article I, I presented a three-part argument. The first part of the argument was that the racial inequities that stem from our social institutions are not just about categorical race. The second part of the argument was that some of these racial inequities can be explained as skin color discrimination. In particular, and in addition to categorical race, I argued that these inequities involve a street-level bureaucrat's varied reaction to skin color—the third part of the argument. In terms of the execution of the article, the main objective was to introduce the concept of colorism to the field of public administration (PA). The second objective was to bridge contributions from other disciplines to create descriptions of colorism that would be most relevant to PA. The third objective was to demonstrate colorism's current and potential impact on public administration, especially street-level bureaucracy. The main objective was achieved by outlining the different types of colorism and explaining how the phenomenon might operate at the individual-, interactive- and institutional level. For the second objective, I used scenarios to illustrate how colorism might operate at the three distinct levels. For the third objective, psychology's description of automatic and rational cognition was used to describe how street-level bureaucrats might contribute to the perpetuation of skin color bias.

Intellectual Merit and Broader Impact. This article contributes to scholarship in few ways. Previous studies have discussed individual colorism and institutional colorism in detail, however, there is limited discussion about interactive colorism and how the three levels might be connected. This article provided the foundation for bridging that gap, which will be beneficial to the broader literature on colorism. Furthermore, the article provides a perspective that is understated in the PA literature, which is a detailed explanation for how colorism might function within a public organization. The article also discussed subtle features of colorism that have received limited or no attention, such as *colorism as selective racism* and *the stealth nature of interactive colorism*. It was argued that the stealth nature of interactive colorism could occur by way of social contagion, a concept that is discussed in the psychology literature. I discussed the notion of social contagion coupled with colorism ideology, and this conceptual fusion was unpacked within the context of public administration.

Article II – *Operationalizing a Conceptual Model of Colorism within the Context of Local Policing*

Article II was motivated by the notion that colorism could serve as an alternative explanation for racial disparities in the criminal justice system. I use simulated scenarios to explore the plausibility of this notion in the form of two questions: 1) RQ_1: *How might colorism function within an organizational context?* and 2) RQ_2: *What might occur when managers apply the typical dilemmatic responses to address detected colorism?* The first question is theoretical in that it seeks to describe aspects of colorism. To explore RQ_1, I designed a conceptual model that would address the literature gap outlined in Article I--the disparate literatures that provide description of the three levels of colorism (i.e., individual, interactive, and institutional). I then used the findings from the literature to establish plausible connections between the three levels of

colorism. In addition to colorism, the conceptual model incorporated predominant descriptions of organizational socialization (OS) and organizational norms/conventions.

Then, the conceptual model was used to build an agent-based model (ABM) that would allow me to test the tenets of colorism and organizational socialization. ABM enabled me to describe how colorism might function in an organization while challenging the underlying assumptions of the model's components. For the second research question (RQ_2), I was able to manipulate the ABM simulations to mirror typical responses to dilemmas like skin color bias. In short, the use of ABM allowed me to breathe life into a conceptual model of colorism to explore theoretical and practical questions.

Major Observations.

- Predominate definitions of colorism are problematic in that they position privilege and discrimination in a dichotomous relationship, which did not hold true in the simulations.
- We currently do not have an adequate way to describe treatment of those who are in the middle of the skin color spectrum. This would include people who might experience varied degrees of skin color discrimination and privilege.

Intellectual Merit and Broader Impact. The two major findings highlighted two opportunities to improve how we describe the function of colorism within an organizational context. I used the findings to revise the conceptual model of colorism (See Figure 2.9). The revised conceptual model helps to clarify what is meant by colorism, and it is reductive enough to have universal utility. In addition, the work conducted to answer the practical question—*What might occur when managers apply the typical dilemmatic responses to address detected colorism?* --provides a foundation for future research pertaining to the potential dilemmas related

to skin color bias. The variation in the simulated responses to detected colorism were designed based on conditional statements informed by the tenets of colorism. The conditional statements that were explored in Article II can be used to formulate hypotheses for future projects.

Article III - *Interactive Colorism: Directions for Future Research with Specific Focus on Police Departments*

Article III maintained the arguments outlined in Articles I and II. However, the primary focus was on the socialization of skin color bias between street-level bureaucrats (i.e., police officers). The prime objective of Article III was to select one of two conceptual models that could provide the most plausible explanation of interactive colorism within a local policing context. The project focused on socialization acts that involve junior and senior police officers. The research question was --*How might skin color bias (colorism) spread throughout a police department?* The conceptual models were based on two explanations. The first explanation describes interactive colorism as a unidirectional process in which the influence of organizational socialization originates from a superior officer. However, junior officers have no agency to influence the behaviors of their superiors. The second explanation grants agency to junior officers to influence their superiors. In this scenario, interactive colorism would have bidirectional influence. The explanations were represented as conceptual models and shown to subject-matter experts (SME) and non-SMEs. I gathered feedback from the participants about the plausibility of both models and I asked them for ideas on how to move the research forward.

Major Observations.

- Majority of the participants selected the bi-directional model of interactive colorism.
- The informants painted a varied picture of police culture and how interactive colorism might transpire in a police department.

Intellectual Merit and Broader Impact. As a result of this project, we now have a way to explain how interactive colorism might spread throughout a police department. The selected model was validated by individuals with various levels of expertise, which includes theorists who have conducted research on the various aspects of the conceptual models (e.g., colorism, organizational socialization), police officers who have relevant work experience, and laymen. The current literature lacks a thorough explanation of the interactive aspects of colorism, and this is certainly the case for the study of public organizations. This project addressed this gap, which should help to further our understanding of how colorism might spread between police officers but also inform the broader literature on colorism. With consideration for the limitations to the study, Model 2 could serve as a general roadmap for understanding the function of interactive colorism within police organizations and other types of public organizations. In addition, the principles incorporated into the model are basic, so much that there are opportunities to extend the model beyond local police departments and other public organizations.

Guidance for Future Research

At the end of each article, I provided some guidance for future research. Here I will situate some of the key guidance into a broader research agenda. For those interested in conceptual development, here are some approaches that might be of value to public administration. First, we should engage in discussion that explores how colorism is related to some of the more predominant PA theories, such as representative bureaucracy and public service motivation. Colorism presents an opportunity to further complicate how we frame representation and the motives of public servants. There is also an opportunity to further complicate the simulation model from Article II and the proposed conceptual models from Articles II and III. In terms of the simulation model, future projects should try to add more depth to the analysis conducted in

Article II. For example, studies that attempt to explore interactive colorism in different environments (e.g., unidirectional vs. bidirectional) and contexts (e.g., provision of social services) should help to expand our understanding of the phenomenon. In addition, there was a concerted effort to maintain an element of simplicity in the proposed conceptual models of the *concept of colorism*--in Article II, the *conceptual model of the three levels of colorism*--in Article II—and the two models of *interactive colorism*--in Article III. Future projects should try to further specify these models, which might be achieved by using the respondents' feedback from Article III (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3).

Researchers who have interests that are more aligned with direct practice within public organizations should try to conduct studies that will further our understanding of interactive colorism. What is currently lacking from the field of practice are mechanisms to detect interactive colorism within public organizations, adequate language to address colorism complaints, and a general awareness of the phenomenon. Research that can contribute to any of these concerns would help to advance scholarship and practice. To that end, future research designs for field experiments are encouraged to use the conditional statements from Article II as a starting point.

Appendix A – *Recruitment Emails*

Script for Email Recruitment of Subject-Matter Experts

Subject: The Colorism Project: Local Policing and Skin Color Bias (Colorism)

Hello _____:

My name is _____. I am a member of a research team at Virginia Tech, and the other member of my team is _____. We are conducting an online focus group to explore the concept of colorism within a local policing context. I am aware that you are a subject-matter expert on (**colorism/local policing/implicit bias**), and we would like to have your expert opinion regarding two conceptual models that we have designed. If you agree to be a participant in this research study, you would participate in a group discussion with two (2) or three (3) other professionals in your field.

Participation in the focus group would take about 45 minutes to an hour of your time. If you agree to participate, the format of the session would follow this sequence: 1) a brief discussion about our consent process; 2) an explanation of how colorism is being operationalized for this project; and 3) feedback from you regarding the two conceptual models that we have designed. Participation is voluntary, and we will not use any of your personal information for our research or in publications. The findings from this study will inform my dissertation, and they may be used in future publications. We cannot offer compensation for your participation; however, you would be helping to further the development of colorism and local policing studies.

If online participation poses a challenge, we can make arrangements for you to participate at no cost. Would you be willing to lend your expertise to this project? I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Henry Smart
Virginia Tech
colorism@vt.edu
571-XXX-XXXX

Script for Email Recruitment of Non-SME

Subject: The Colorism Project: Local Policing and Skin Color Bias (Colorism)

Hello _____:

My name is _____. I am a member of a research team at Virginia Tech, and the other member of my team is _____. We are conducting an online focus group to explore the concept of colorism within a local policing context. We are reaching out to you because we are seeking an unbiased opinion about the conceptual models that we have designed related to these two topic areas (i.e., colorism and local policing).

Participation in the focus group would take about 45 minutes to an hour of your time. If you agree to participate, the format of the session would follow this sequence: 1) a brief discussion about our consent process; 2) an explanation of how colorism is being operationalized for this project; and 3) feedback from you regarding our conceptual models. Participation is voluntary, and we will not use any of your personal information for our research or in publications. We cannot offer compensation for your participation, however, you would be helping to further the development of studies related to colorism and local policing.

If online participation poses a challenge, we can make arrangements for you to participate at no cost. Would you be willing to lend your time to this project? I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Henry Smart
Virginia Tech
colorism@vt.edu
571-XXX-XXXX

Appendix B – *Consent Form*

Participant Consent Form

Project Title: The Colorism Project

Purpose of this Project
The purpose of this research study/project is to explore the concept of colorism within an organizational context—local policing. We are conducting a series of online focus groups with individuals who are familiar with local policing, colorism and/or psychology. In addition, we will collect some input from individuals who are not familiar with colorism or the policing profession. If scheduling conflicts arise, we will attempt to conduct one-on-one interviews as well. The input gathered from the focus groups, and the potential interviews, will be used to validate/enhance a conceptual model of colorism. The findings will be available for public consumption; the public will be allowed to read any reports that may derive from this work. In addition, the findings will be used for the completion of a dissertation and possibly for future publications.

Procedures
The following procedures will be the same for the focus groups or the alternative one-on-one interviews. First, the facilitator will read the consent form aloud. Then, the facilitator will answer preliminary questions you might have about the consent form. If you agree to the outlined conditions, you will be asked to provide your verbal consent to participate and you will be asked to state that you understand the conditions of the focus group. Once you have given verbal consent, you will be provided with an electronic copy of the consent form for your records. Next, the facilitator will explain the concept of colorism to you and show a demonstration of the two conceptual models of colorism. After the demonstration, you will provide your feedback via oral and written comments. The entire process will take approximately 30 minutes to an hour. Once the discussion is over, your participation in the project is complete.

Risks
During the focus group, or one-on-one interview, you will be asked questions about the general premise of the conceptual model. In answering these questions, you may run the risk of having your expressed opinions associated with your professional identity. To reduce this risk, the facilitator will not mention your names, professions, titles, and/or affiliations. However, at your discretion, you are free to mention your name, profession, title, and/or affiliation throughout our discussion. This precaution will not be necessary if the format is a one-on-one interview.

Benefits
No promise or guarantees of benefits have been made to encourage you to participate. However, your participation will help to inform scholarship and governance. You will help to advance our understanding of racial disparities in local policing and possibly improve the quality of public safety. If you would like a copy of the final report/findings, please submit your request to colorism@vt.edu.

Extent of Anonymity and Confidentiality
The research team will handle all information collected in a confidential manner. In addition, your identity will not be revealed in any reports, articles, or distributed in any other form. Data collected from each focus group and interview will be referenced using one identifier--the participant's profession (e.g., the psychologist). All data collected for this project will be destroyed once the final transcript is complete. We will not allow audio or video recordings of the focus group.

Compensation
There is no compensation for your participation.

Freedom to Withdraw
Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate at all, or you may refuse to answer certain questions or discontinue your participation at any time without any penalty.

Your Responsibilities
There is no right or wrong answer to the questions. By voluntarily agreeing to participate in this project, we ask you to answer these questions with responses that are true to you.

Cellphone Use
To protect your privacy and that of the others, we ask that you refrain from using your cell phone for the entire time (30 minutes to an hour). If you find that you need to accept or place a call, please step away to an area that will not cause disruption to the focus group. (Note: This request does not apply to the one-on-one interviews.)

Your Verbal Permission
The consent form and the conditions of the study have been read to me. At this time, I give my verbal consent by stating: "I agree".

Joseph Rees, Principal Investigator, Associate Professor, reesj@vt.edu, 540-XXX-XXXX
Henry Smart, Co-Principal Investigator, Ph.D. Candidate, hsmart3@vt.edu, 571-XXX-XXXX

It is possible that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) may review this project's collected data for auditing purposes. If you should have any questions about the protection of human research participants regarding this project, you may contact the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, telephone: (540) 231-3732; email: irb@vt.edu.

Appendix C – *Focus Group Slides*

The Colorism Project:
Local Policing and Skin Color Bias

Facilitator: Henry Smart, III

1

Purpose of the Project

- The purpose of this research study/project is to explore the concept of colorism within an organizational context—local policing.
- We are conducting a series of online focus groups with SMEs who are familiar with local policing, colorism and/or psychology.
- We will also collect some input from individuals who are not familiar with colorism or the policing profession.
- The input gathered from the focus groups will be used to advance a conceptual model of colorism within organizational context.

2

Procedures

- I will answer any preliminary questions about consent.
- Once I have received your verbal consent:
  - I will explain the concepts of colorism and organizational socialization;
  - I will demonstrate the two conceptual models we would like your feedback on; and
  - Panelists will provide their feedback.
- Time: 45 minutes to an hour.

3

Risks, Benefits & Compensation

- You'll be asked questions about the general premise of the conceptual model.
- No promise or guarantees of benefits have been made to encourage you to participate.
- You will help to advance our understanding of racial disparities in local policing and possibly improve the quality of public safety.
- There is no compensation for your participation.

4

Extent of Anonymity and Confidentiality

- Your identity will not be revealed in any reports, articles, or distributed in any other form.
- Data collected from each interview and focus group will be referenced using one identifier--the participants' profession (e.g., the psychologists).
- All data collected for this project will be destroyed once the final transcript is complete.
- We will not allow audio or video recordings of the focus group.

5

Freedom to Withdraw

- Your participation is voluntary.
- You may choose not to participate at all.
- You may refuse to answer certain questions or discontinue your participation at any time without any penalty.

6

Verbal Consent

- At this time, please provide your consent verbally by stating "I consent to this study" or by typing the same words into the chat box.

7

The Focus

How skin color bias (colorism) might spread throughout an organization (e.g., police departments).

8

The Concept of Colorism

9

Colorism

"The allocation of privilege and disadvantage according to the lightness or darkness of one's skin, with favoritism typically granted to those with lighter skin." (Burke et al., 2008)

10

The Concept of Colorism



Skin Color Spectrum

Institutional Colorism
systemic w/artifacts

Interactive Colorism
social contagion

Individual Colorism
internalized, projected

12

Organizational Socialization

"...the process by which an organizational member learns the required behaviors and supportive attitudes necessary to participate as a member of an organization." (Van Maanen, 1975)

13

Model #1

14



What did we get right?

16

Are there any key elements missing from the model?

17

On a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most convincing, how convincing is the model?

18

Model #2

19



If you had to recommend advancing one of the two models, would you select Model #1 or #2?

21

Recap of the Models

22





Appendix D – *IRB Approval Letters*

Office of Research Compliance
Institutional Review Board
North End Center, Suite 4120, Virginia Tech
300 Turner Street NW
Blacksburg,
Virginia 24061
540/231-4606
Fax 540/231-
0959 email
irb@vt.edu
website
http://www.irb.
vt.edu

VirginiaTech

MEMORANDUM

DATE: January 20, 2018

TO: Joseph V Rees, Henry Smart III

FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA00000572, expires January 29, 2021)

PROTOCOL TITLE: The Colorism Project

IRB NUMBER: **17-1126**

Effective January 20, 2018, the Virginia Tech Institution Review Board (IRB) approved the New Application request for the above-mentioned research protocol.

This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents.

Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report within 5 business days to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others.

All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at: http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm

(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:

Approved As:	**Expedited, under 45 CFR 46.110 category(ies) 7**
Protocol Approval Date:	**January 20, 2018**
Protocol Expiration Date:	**January 19, 2019**
Continuing Review Due Date*:	**January 5, 2019**

*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:

Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals/work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee.

The table on the following page indicates whether grant proposals are related to this IRB protocol, and which of the listed proposals, if any, have been compared to this IRB protocol, if required.

Date*	OSP Number	Sponsor	Grant Comparison Conducted?

* Date this proposal number was compared, assessed as not requiring comparison, or comparison information was revised.

If this IRB protocol is to cover any other grant proposals, please contact the IRB office (irbadmin@vt. edu) immediately.

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VirginiaTech

MEMORANDUM

DATE: February 20, 2018

TO: Joseph V Rees, Henry Smart III

FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA00000572, expires January 29, 2021)

PROTOCOL TITLE: The Colorism Project

IRB NUMBER: **17-1126**

Effective February 19, 2018, the Virginia Tech Institution Review Board (IRB) approved the Amendment request for the above-mentioned research protocol.

This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents.

Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report within 5 business days to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others.

All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at: http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm

(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:

Approved As:	**Expedited, under 45 CFR 46.110 category(ies) 7**
Protocol Approval Date:	**January 20, 2018**
Protocol Expiration Date:	**January 19, 2019**
Continuing Review Due Date*:	**January 5, 2019**

*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:

Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals/work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee.

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If this IRB protocol is to cover any other grant proposals, please contact the IRB office (irbadmin@vt. edu) immediately.

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