


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INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the second issue of the Virginia Tech Undergraduate Historical Review. Since its creation in 2011, the Review continues to publish innovative scholarship from undergraduates at Virginia Tech. As a staff, our fundamental mission remains the same – to provide a creative outlet to students for developing their historical research skills outside the classroom. History, as a discipline, is about ongoing, scholarly conversations and interpretations of the past. As the Editorial Board, we take seriously our responsibility as facilitators of this interchange of ideas. The Review and its staff are excited about this opportunity for Virginia Tech undergraduates to showcase their research.

Although the primary aim of the Review is to publish exceptional undergraduate research, it also offers a supportive learning environment for students through its collaborative review process. The Review advances and promotes historical research at Virginia Tech by advising students through the publication process, developing editorial and project management skills, conducting developmental writing and research workshops, and corralling public interest through media outlets, such as our new blog. Along with these endeavors, we look forward to nourishing our partnership with the Virginia Tech History Department, Phi Alpha Theta, and students throughout the university.

Maintaining the traditions of its inaugural issue, the VTUHR continues to seek out original and well-developed research from talented and motivated undergraduate students. Our Board of Editors, consisting of six exceptional undergraduate history majors, vetted all Review submissions. Two undergraduate editors reviewed each paper, and the entire Editorial Board selected the articles for publication. Throughout these student reviews, we followed a traditional blind review process. Editors based their comments and critiques on various criteria, including clarity, structure, organization, grammar, sources, historiography, and originality.

The five articles selected for publication are representative of the Review's high standards and expectations. The first article, by Grace Cardwell, is a historiography about the Solidarity Movement in Poland at the end of the Cold War. She argues that while historians generally accept Solidarity as a foundational social movement, scholars' assertions regarding the movement's sustained success have changed significantly over time. Ultimately, Cardwell highlights how writers shifted from a focus on economic issues to a more complex explanation based on the collaborative work of social groups, workers, professionals, and clergy who worked together to promote a robust social movement. In the second article, Carmen Bolt examines the role of women workers and volunteers in the United Service Organization (USO). Her research questions how women's roles within the USO promoted women's position in society during the war and after. Bolt utilizes a host of first hand accounts of women involved with the USO in order to analyze the historical significance of the organization and women's involvement within it.

For the third article, Emily Bolton investigates the motivations of groups

supporting the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) during the Mozambican civil war. Bolton traces the origins of the movement following decolonization, and the political and religious motives that led others to support RENAMO. By combining State Department records, newspaper accounts, as well as synthesizing the secondary scholarship, Bolton develops a powerful narrative of post-colonial Mozambique's political struggles. On the other side of the Atlantic, Luke Burton explores the intrinsic and intertwined relationship between the Vietnam War and President Richard Nixon's administrative policies from his inauguration in January 1969, to his resignation in early August 1974. Burton analyzes Nixon's public and private images to reveal the impetus behind the President's foreign policy in Vietnam. Lastly, Kelly Drews dissects the complex history of quarantine as a medical technology. Studying examples of this blunt technology from early biblical times through the cholera outbreaks in the United States, Drews draws attention to the increased use of quarantine in the Western world following the Black Death. Following its initial success against the plague, Drews shows how quarantine became a standard procedure in bringing an end to other plagues and pandemics.

As we present this issue of the Virginia Tech Undergraduate Historical Review, we look forward to supporting and motivating the work of promising young historians. In the coming years, we plan to continue publishing the Review annually, and we anticipate reaching out to authors on a regional and national level. Presently, we thank you for your continued support and hope you enjoy this second issue of the Virginia Tech Undergraduate Historical Review.

HEATHER LENNON AND ERICA AIKEN
MARCH 9, 2013
BLACKSBURG, VIRGINIA



SOLIDARITY

A LOOK AT THE LITERATURE OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT, 1980-1989

Grace Cardwell

“The defense of our rights and our dignity, as well as efforts never to let ourselves to be overcome by the feeling of hatred - this is the road we have chosen.”

-Lech Walesa, 1983

After the end of the Second World War, the two largest superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, plunged into the Cold War, an ideological battle that would last for the better part of the next four decades. The clash of these nations would not be contained for long, however, eventually manifesting itself in all corners of the globe. One particular example of Cold War stress was in the Eastern bloc, the so-called Soviet “sphere of influence.” In the years following the war, economic conditions worsened throughout the world, which, in turn, shed a particularly influential light on Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union’s hold on the Eastern bloc began to fade as citizens (most notably in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) rose to action against governments they felt no longer effectively represented them. In Poland, citizens saw how the

economic policies of the Communist Party, which had once promised them a better life, had begun to fail. This united them behind a movement that would bring foundational, lasting change; it would be called *Solidarity*, a word that meant consensus, agreement, and harmony. The Solidarity Movement in Poland focused on creating change through a strong and meaningful unity. It involved a collective struggle for, as Lech Wałęsa, the movement’s leader, called it, “the repair of the republic.”

Solidarity emerged due to the gradual decline of living standards in an increasingly stagnating economy. When examining the history of the Cold War, the Eastern bloc, Poland, or social change in general, scholars around the world cite it as one of the

most foundational, successful social movements. As American historian Lawrence Weschler stated, “it is the latest proof that the aspirations and needs of working people cannot be permanently repressed even by the most authoritarian system.”¹ While there is a general consensus of this throughout Cold War historiography, opinions of the reasons for Solidarity’s success changed significantly over the course of its existence. During the early years of the movement, the objective of Solidarity was written almost exclusively in the context of workers’ rights. Much of the historical narrative focused solely on how Communism had affected the daily lives of the working class, and how their strength and determination evolved into the Solidarity Movement. It chronicled how Poland’s workers, unhappy with the present economic conditions, demanded reform from a government that was failing them.

Less than a decade after Solidarity was founded, however, the historiography of the movement began to touch on a different component, perhaps the key to its lasting success. Historiography from the later years seemed to concur that the real triumphs of Solidarity were due to the *combination* of workers, intellectuals, professionals, and the Catholic Church. Indeed, Poland’s workers were strongly united and faithfully committed to bringing economic reform, but what made Solidarity so revolutionary was the collective effort of several different social groups. This is what would bring about the kind of repair that

Lech Wałęsa envisioned. After 1983, scholar’s opinions on the success of Solidarity took a noticeable shift: they argue that what was so revolutionary about the movement was that it blurred the line between Poland’s social groups. This provided for a powerful combination that the Communist Party could only ignore for so long.

The historiography of the Solidary movement remains today an ongoing and vibrant enterprise. When we look back on the early years, however, it becomes clear that during the years before the end of communism in Poland, commentators shifted from an explanation of the movement solidly rooted in Solidarity as an economic struggle to one, in the later years, that stressed the social nature of the movement as a collaboration between workers, the intelligentsia, and the Church.

CONDITIONS IN POLAND

One of the most interesting facets of the Cold War was how it managed to apply a relatively simple concept – the competition between two differing ideologies – to the global stage. Nations around the world watched as the political battle spread to their economic, social, and cultural spheres. After World War II, much of Eastern Europe had been integrated into the Soviet sphere of influence through a network of treaties and agreements, including the Warsaw Treaty Organization.² These links were made to tie Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. After all, the importance of ideological allies during this time could not be overemphasized. But in time,

1. Lawrence Weschler, *Solidarity, Poland in the Season of its Passion* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), xiii.

2. R. J. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1994), 240.

citizens grew frustrated with the Communist system. This eventually brought the Soviet sphere to global prominence as the Soviet Union's hold on their Eastern bloc countries began to slip away.³ As the Cold War continued, the challenges that Communism faced there only increased, making Eastern Europe one of the most influential arenas for the Cold War "battles" to unfold.

The resistance that began to stir in Poland would eventually evolve into one of the most powerful social movements of the age, but conditions there were not always so complex. In fact, during the 1960s and into the 1970s, circumstances were relatively functional. In the years leading up to Solidarity, Edward Gierek, the First Secretary of the Communist Party, led Poland. Through his initial economic reform strategies, Gierek asked the people of Poland to believe that the Communist Party had turned over a new leaf. The Party even adopted a new slogan: "moral-political unity of the nation," hoping to reflect these changes.⁴ The Communist Party also instituted a number of social reforms, including a relaxation of censorship, an attempted reconciliation with the Catholic Church and the Polish intelligentsia, and a foreswearing of the use of violence against Polish citizens.⁵ Gierek, the son of a coal-miner, was classified as a "common man." His familiar speech and respectful manner were a breath of fresh air to Poles,

who were all too familiar with the unfriendly and detached Wladyslaw Gomulka, Gierek's predecessor.⁶

In the economic arena, Gierek introduced what he called the "New Development Strategy," which he said would achieve success "by taking advantage of Poland's new position in the international arena."⁷ The keys to the New Development Strategy included obtaining Western imports of investment goods, which would modernize Polish industry and agriculture, and increasing the availability of consumer goods, which would improve living standards and work incentives.⁸ When Gierek's New Development Strategy was introduced, not only did the national economy see increased production of consumer goods and new technologies, citizens saw both their wages and opportunities as Polish citizens increase.⁹ Edward Gierek's rule thus began with a feeling of optimism, as he genuinely sought not only to improve the Polish economy, but also to create a thriving Soviet-type society.¹⁰

The beginning of Poland's economic decline, however, resulted from the gradual mishandling and miscommunication of policies by the Gierek administration. Gierek sought to make Poland into the ideal Soviet society, and he was initially successful with reforms that seemed

6. Keith John Lepak, *Prelude to Solidarity: Poland and the Politics of the Gierek Regime* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 52.

7. Slay, *The Polish Economy*, 37.

8. Slay, *The Polish Economy*, 37.

9. Michael D. Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet-type Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 38.

10. Anita Prazmowska, *A History of Poland*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 203.

3. Crampton, *Eastern Europe*, 241.

4. Keith John Lepak, *Prelude to Solidarity: Poland and the Politics of the Gierek Regime* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 47.

5. Ben Slay, *The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform, and Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 36.

to center on the people themselves.¹¹ But before long, Poland erupted into precisely the type of chaos that Gierek had desperately tried to avoid. His popularity with the people plummeted as the New Development Strategy began falter, and the situation only worsened in the years to come.

THE EMERGENCE OF SOLIDARITY

This gradual, decade-long collapse of the Polish economy in the 1970s laid the groundwork for the beginnings of the Solidarity Movement in Poland. It began with a strain on the worldwide economy, as the 1973 Oil Crisis hit the majority of the world's countries hard. This clinch significantly undermined the West's willingness and capacity to buy goods and invest stock in Poland, a key facet of Gierek's strategy for reform.¹² Additionally, Poland's efforts to match the technological innovations of the West (and convince them that Poland was a viable investment) had accumulated a huge amount of national debt with no feasible solution for paying it off.

Furthermore, bad harvests in the early 1970s halted agricultural production, creating a food shortage that would only deepen Poland's downward spiral.¹³ Inflation, on the rise, reached triple digits by 1979, as investment capital became permanently frozen in unfinished projects.¹⁴ The Polish government sought to solve foreign indebtedness via price hikes, but these, especially in meat, a staple of the Polish diet, further

angered citizens. This increased their frustrations and led them to strike.¹⁵

To be a citizen in Poland in the late 1970s meant a constant struggle against unfavorable economic odds. Food shortages were prevalent, accompanied by a sharp decrease in national production, which affected income. There was also an increasing presence of "hidden inflation," or the repackaging of existing products as new ones.¹⁶ Even worse, this was all in the aftermath of the promise of a society that would prosper. These economic tensions and rising frustrations of the people meant the return of political problems. Instead of initiating radical reforms, as conditions took a turn for the worse, Gierek and the Communist Party moved to recentralize economic authority after 1976.¹⁷ Poland had reached the tipping point.

Workers, a central component of any nation's economy, grew frustrated as the situation worsened. They found themselves unable to purchase the food on the shelves, if there was food there at all. Many realized that what Poland really needed was not more Communist reforms, nor help from the West, but action from within. With growing numbers and increased confidence, strikes began to pop up at many coastal (and eventually inland) locations. The people rallied behind Lech Wałęsa, a common citizen recently fired from his factory job as an electrician. Solidarity saw rapidly increasing success and participation over the next few months. Five hundred days following the founding, it had 10 million

11. Kennedy, *Professionals, Power*, 39.

12. Prazmowska, *A History*, 204.

13. Slay, *The Polish Economy*, 44.

14. Slay, *The Polish Economy*, 49.

15. Prazmowska, *A History*, 204.

16. Slay, *The Polish Economy*, 45.

17. Slay, *The Polish Economy*, 46.

members, a quarter of the country's population.¹⁸ The accomplishments they enjoyed in the first few months contributed to the movement's future strength and success. It became the first independent trade union in the Soviet bloc, and it would eventually transform into a full on revolutionary movement.¹⁹

LITERATURE FROM SOLIDARITY'S EARLY YEARS (1980-1983)

Solidarity was a movement unlike anything Poland or its people had ever experienced. Some of the older participants remembered the "Polish October" of 1956, an early example in which young, educated Poles rose up and sought reforms to the Stalinist model of socialism.²⁰ While many more remembered the Hungarian Uprising and the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the reform movements had similar goals. These earlier incidents from around the Eastern bloc would come to define their experiences in the pre-Solidarity years.²¹ With Solidarity attracting such widespread participation and experiencing such a large degree of initial success, many contemporary scholars began recording this social revolution in writing. They recognized it as the movement that would transform

Poland and define their generation.

Scholars writing about Solidarity in its early years tended to describe it as a surge of the working class, whose members sought reforms to the system of government that had been failing them over the past decade or so. When writing their accounts, many Polish and Western scholars alike approached the situation using personal accounts of the participating men and women. They discussed both the grievances that had brought them to Solidarity and what they hoped would come of it. These early sources contain two main components: the economic nature of the Solidarity campaign and the valiant, courageous nature of the *workers*. Even once the fight turned political, these early sources concur that Solidarity had its roots in the basic desire of the workers for fair prices, adequate living conditions, and a stable work environment.

Historians of Solidarity's early years often included conversations with members of the Polish working class, and they clearly argue for an understanding of the movement as a workers' revolution. Jean-Yves Potel, a French writer and revolutionary traveling in Poland at the time, composed his book, *The Summer Before the Frost*, based on conversations with these working-class individuals. It is clear through his accounts that workers did not have as much concern (if any at all) for the political implications of the movement as they did for whether or not their paycheck would allow them enough money to buy food. "We didn't understand why," Potel recounted from his conversation with a working class woman. "Since they were increasing

18. "Solidarity, Gdansk, Poland," Gdansk Life Poland Travel Guide, accessed October 24, 2011, <http://www.gdansk-life.com/poland/solidarity>.

19. "Solidarity, Gdansk, Poland," Gdansk Life Poland Travel Guide, accessed October 24, 2011, <http://www.gdansk-life.com/poland/solidarity>.

20. Bartosz Kaliski, "Solidarity, 1980-1: The Second Vistula Miracle?" in *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*, ed. Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 120.

21. Kaliski, "Solidarity, 1980-1," 121.

prices, they should have increased wages as well.”²² The Solidarity Movement, for the struggling workers, was a reaction to how the current system of government in Poland had been the cause for their economic strife. Very few workers sought any sort of ideological gains.²³ From what Potel gathered through talking with the workers who started it all, the desire was for control of the fruits of their labor. “That is what every Solidarity traded unionist wanted,” Potel opined. “That was what they were hoping for.”²⁴

While for Potel and other early scholars the strength and unity of the working class force was the main factor in the success of the Solidarity Movement, Lawrence Weschler, an American writer and political scientist, cited Solidarity’s influence on similar American labor movements. He began with a sympathetic poem, glorifying the power of workers in Poland at the time:

When the union’s inspiration
through the workers’ blood shall run,
There can be no power greater
anywhere beneath the sun.
In our hands is placed a power
greater than their hoarded gold,
greater than the might of armies,
magnified a thousand fold.²⁵

The poem suggests that workers in Poland recognized an important component of their fight: that by banding together they would not only be effective, but a mighty and unavoidable force. Weschler, like

Potel, also wrote about the economic roots of the campaign, asserting that: “[Poland’s] deterioration stems in part from the economic effects of all the recent political turbulence...but it is more generally a result of the cumulative damage to the economy of the thirty-five years of mismanagement.”²⁶ From conversations with many members of the working class, Weschler asserted that it is clear that the workers were the ones with the most to gain from an upheaval. In one particular instance, he spoke with a farmer, who told Weschler that he “must wait for up to three weeks to rent a grass cutter or a harvester from the government. ‘By then,’ he says, ‘the harvest is over.’”²⁷ For Weschler, it was the workers and farmers of Poland, increasingly unhappy with the current system, who banded together and were able to achieve reform. The changes they sought were not necessarily political, but due to the fact that they could no longer make a living, receive a promotion, or, in many cases, even eat under the current conditions.

Another consistent theme from early accounts of Solidarity is the portrayal of the workers as valiant pursuers of freedom and liberty – as underdogs in a noble fight against years of injustice. Timothy Garton Ash, a British historian studying in Poland at the time, wrote his account of the Solidarity Movement in 1982. Much can be said about Ash’s account of Solidarity before even flipping through the body of the work. Its title, *Revolution in Poland*, denotes insurrection and insurgency. Through his descriptions

22. Jean Yves Potel, *The Summer before the Frost: Solidarity in Poland* (London: Pluto, 1982), 16.

23. Potel, *Summer*, 80.

24. Potel, *Summer*, 84.

25. Weschler, *Poland in the Season*, xii.

26. Weschler, *Poland in the Season*, 9.

27. Weschler, *Poland in the Season*, 13.

of Solidarity, he offered the reader a thorough portrayal of not only what the workers sought from the government, but also who they were and why their character was the essential component that led to Solidarity's success. In his visit to the Lenin shipyard where Solidarity first emerged, he noted:

What I remember most vividly from the Lenin Shipyard is not the leaders, Lech Wałęsa or Andrez Gwiazda, but the figure of one ordinary striker. He was in his mid-twenties, lithe, with short-cropped hair and piercing eyes. It was young men like him who would come into their own in Solidarity, and give the moment its extraordinary youthful energy and fearlessness.²⁸

For Ash it was the workers, seemingly with no political aims, who were the noble ones. They deserved credit for Solidarity's triumphs.

As Ash chronicled Solidarity's progression, he described advances like the Gdansk Agreement, which increased civil liberties in Poland, as "a tremendous victory for the workers."²⁹ In his accounts of negotiations with the Communist Party, he consistently noted that the workers, persistent and unrelenting, refused to accept smaller reforms as concessions in place of the larger, sweeping reforms they wanted.³⁰ The workers that made up Solidarity, Ash asserted, had to wait patiently for what they wanted, and did so nobly. Through their efforts, they were the ones to

enact the lasting change that came to Poland. He demanded that the story of the workers be heard: "In the face of economic recession and the threat of nuclear war, young Polish workers, who had lived their whole lives under Communism, were daubing on a crane in the Lenin Shipyard the words 'Man is born and lives free.'"³¹

But these workers were not only courageous and determined; they were organized, smart, and disciplined. Alex Pravda, a British historian specializing in the international dimension of Eastern European politics, wrote an essay, also in 1982, called "Poland 1980: From 'Premature Consumerism' to Labour Solidarity." Here, he argued that for the first time in a communist state, "workers' self assertiveness went beyond violent, fragmented and short-lived protest to emerge as a well-organized solitary labor movement. It was a self-mobilized workers' protest and a rare instance of authentic working-class spontaneity."³² Pravda, like many of his fellow historians writing at the time, attributed Solidarity to workers' intuition and willpower after years of persistent injustice. Pravda depicted the workers' journey to Solidarity as a forever deepening spiral, beginning with a gradual decline, but quickly heightening to its climax in 1980.³³ For Pravda, the success was indeed about the workers, but there is another level added by Pravda to Ash's portrayal of them – one that was not only about a relentless fight, but also an organized and purposeful unity.

Pravda shares this viewpoint

28. Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution, Solidarity 1980-2* (London: Cape, 1983), 37.

29. Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 68.

30. Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 135.

31. Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 338.

32. Alex Pravda, "Poland 1980: From 'Premature Consumerism' to Labour Solidarity," *Soviet Studies* 34, no. 2 (April 1, 1982): 167.

33. Pravda, "Poland 1980," 168.

with fellow Polish scholar Wojciech Modzelewski, who argued that an invaluable contribution of the workers was the non-violent nature of their campaign. Modzelewski, with a similar, but perhaps less assertive tone as Ash, portrayed the workforce who led Solidarity as the underdog, fighting against the odds for an honest cause. The main assertion of his article was that in order to pull off such a massively successful protest, but still maintain its non-violent nature, it required "a great deal of discipline, organization, preparation, supervision, and leadership," all of which can be attributed to the Solidarity Movement.³⁴ The non-violent way in which the workers chose to act not only avoided disturbances and violence, but also resulted in a constructive attempt at reforming the system.³⁵ Modzelewski and his contemporary authors saw these workers as Solidarity personified. They were the ones that fought against the economic injustice that was plaguing Poland, and had fought with valor. Solidarity, for these early writers, had emerged from the hearts of the people.

LITERATURE FROM SOLIDARITY'S LATER YEARS (1984-1989)

As the Cold War continued, so did Solidarity. The patient Polish citizens watched as the democratic reforms they desired became reality. The movement required sustained effort and determination from the workers, this much is certain. But, as the literature about Solidarity expanded

into the later half of the 1980s, a different examination of it emerged. The workers were determined and their effort was valiant, but they also had the help of numerous other groups in their struggle for reform. As scholars continued to write about Solidarity, they began to shed new light on other groups that had a large and influential role to play in the movement's success. They include the intellectuals, professionals, and the Catholic Church.

The intellectual class in Poland, often referred to as the *intelligentsia*, had been involved in reform politics in Poland since the early 1950s. Up until around 1970, the Polish Intellectuals Revisionist Group had attempted to reform the political system by appealing directly to the Party, advocating for a relaxation of censorship and greater intellectual freedom. After decades of frustration and precious few results, they threw their support behind the workers. Kazimierz Poznanski, a professor born in Germany but raised in Poland, commented on this in his article, "Economic Adjustment and Political Forces: Poland since 1970." He argued that the *intelligentsia* initially supported the workers through financial and legal assistance, but eventually became further involved with the workers' cause, encouraging political activism among them.³⁶ According to Poznanski, the intellectual class in Poland also had much to gain from reform to the system, although their agenda was more political than economic in scope.

The *intelligentsia* in Poland had

34. Wojciech Modzelewski, "Non-Violence and the Strike Movements in Poland." *Journal of Peace Research* 19, no. 2 (January 1, 1982): 110.

35. Modzelewski, "Non-Violence," 112.

36. Kazimierz Poznanski, "Economic Adjustment and Political Forces: Poland since 1970," *International Organization* 40, no. 2 (April 1, 1986): 471.

always been an adversary of the Communist party, but in contrast to their previous efforts, their involvement with the workers of 1980, broadened Solidarity's foundation and increased its influence. "In previous protests," claimed Adam Bromke, a Polish political scientist, "the students and the *intelligentsia* received no support from the workers and barely even worked behind the scenes, essentially playing no role."³⁷ But Solidarity brought about the successful joining of these groups, largely because Solidarity's workers had been well educated under the Gierek administration. The workers themselves felt better informed, increasing their confidence and effectively closing the gap between the working and intellectual classes.³⁸ This combination of the two groups—more specifically the blending of their economic and political motives—led to a higher degree of cooperation, setting Poland apart from other Eastern bloc reform efforts. With the influence of the intellectuals, Bromke argued, the working class realized that in addition to their economic desires, they could gain from political reform.³⁹ This blending of ideas only strengthened their cause.

The Polish intelligentsia was just one of the well-organized social groups that was increasingly outside party control.⁴⁰ In the later 1980s, scholars from a variety of fields began to write about the Solidarity Movement. Michael D. Kennedy, a sociologist, published an article arguing for the

vital participation of professionals in the Solidarity Movement, specifically with regard to the involvement of engineers. Engineers and other professional workers in Poland, who previously enjoyed relatively elevated status, threw their support behind the workers after the economy in Poland began spiraling downward.⁴¹ Because of the decline, citizens were no longer able to reap the benefits of technological advancement, and thus engineers began to lose their importance. Thus, engineers decided that aligning with the working class, which was gaining strength and significance, would supplement production and their livelihood. For Kennedy, the cooperation between professionals and workers, though unlikely in a Soviet style society, was one of the reasons Solidarity became such a successful social transformation.⁴²

Not only was maintaining contact with workers essential to production for professionals, but as the movement gained strength, Polish engineers realized how much there was to gain from economic and political reform of the system. Kennedy explained why the participation of professionals in this social movement was such a key element to its success:

In Soviet-type societies, engineers and other professionals constitute the pivotal class for societal reproduction and transformation. They are between the political elites who control the allocation of economic surplus and the working class which creates the

37. Adam Bromke, *Eastern Europe in the aftermath of Solidarity* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985), 53.

38. Bromke, *Eastern Europe*, 53.

39. Bromke, *Eastern Europe*, 112.

40. Poznanski, "Economic Adjustment," 456.

41. Michael D. Kennedy, "Polish Engineers' Participation in the Solidarity Movement," *Social Forces* 65, no. 3 (March 1, 1987): 556.

42. Kennedy, "Polish Engineers," 641.

surplus but has little to say in its allocation...A professional alliance with a militant working class poses a serious threat to the reproduction of the status quo.⁴³

The role of the professionals cannot be overlooked, as they added materially to the critique of the corrupt system, the goal of the workers from the start.

Historiography from the later years of Solidarity also mentioned the influential role that the Catholic Church had to play. Throughout the movement's existence, it retained a close identification with the Catholic Church and the current pope, a Pole himself, John Paul II. American historian and professor of international affairs, David S. Mason, explained, in depth, the importance of this alliance: "Some people joined Solidarity precisely because of its cooperation with the Church, and some 43 percent of the members listed this as one of their reasons for joining Solidarity."⁴⁴ The Catholic Church, like the Polish workers, saw their ways of life to be increasingly inconsistent with the Communist Party. They supported the workers as the vehicle for the change they desired, an alliance not typically seen, but all the more powerful.

Since the 1960s, a growing tension existed between the Catholic Church and the Communist Party in Poland, largely due to the gradual reduction of intellectual freedom, which was also a problem for the *intelligentsia*.⁴⁵

When Solidarity emerged, explained Poznanski, "the clergy deeply sympathized with workers, particularly because free unions strongly pressed for more religious freedom."⁴⁶ The involvement of the Church led Solidarity to become what Mason called, "a new social movement."⁴⁷ The working class saw their economic claims deepened and empowered by the causes of other groups, and thus the movement could be called "social," as opposed to singularly "economic," "political," "intellectual," or "religious." The Church's involvement added this significant component to the 'workers' rights uprising' rhetoric of earlier scholars. Solidarity could bring increased feelings of freedom and liberty, in addition to economic stability. The Catholic Church became involved with Solidarity primarily because they were concerned not only with politics and economics, but with issues of the quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, and human rights.⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

At the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Celebration of Solidarity in Poland, Lech Wałęsa, the once ordinary working man that became the leader of Solidarity and Poland's first president, addressed the Parliament: "We hold our heads high, despite the price we have paid, because freedom is priceless."⁴⁹ The Polish Solidarity

(Oxford: Berg, 2006), 120.

46. Poznanski, "Economic Adjustment," 479.

47. Mason, "Solidarity," 50.

48. Mason, "Solidarity," 51.

49. Matthew Day, "Freedom is Priceless, Wałęsa tells Poland," *The Telegraph*, August 30, 2005, accessed November 3, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/1497259/Freedom-is-priceless-Wałęsa>

43. Kennedy, "Polish Engineers," 642.

44. David S. Mason, "Solidarity as a New Social Movement," *Political Science Quarterly*, 104, no. 1 (Spring, 1989): 54.

45. Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe*,

Movement was arguably one of the largest and most effective non-violent protests against Communism to occur during the Cold War. A response to the gradual decay of the Polish economy, it emerged and developed into one of the largest social movements in history. This unity of Poland's people would lead to the evolution of a "Soviet sphere" country into a semi-democratic society.

When examining the historiography of this movement, one can see similarities and differences of the story from beginning to end. In Solidarity's initial years, an overwhelming number of analyses about this movement emerged. Though they examined different aspects, they exhibit a consistent theme: Solidarity was first and foremost a workers' struggle. The movement was primarily due to the economic hardships felt by the majority of the Polish population at the end of the 1970s. The workers, heroic, determined, and frustrated with economic injustice, were able to band together and achieve the change in Poland.

When examining historiography from the later years, the initial message is much the same: Polish people wanted change, and through their strength and determination they were able to achieve it. But here it can be seen that this success was due to the culmination of many groups, which set Solidarity apart from other reform movements. The additional support of the workers from the *intelligentsia*, the professionals, and the Catholic Church pushed the Solidarity's foundations beyond the material desires of the workers. In later

historiographical accounts, Solidarity was described in its most literal form: Unity. The unity of peoples for the achievement of lasting change.

The Election of 1989 made Poland the first Eastern bloc country in which democratically elected representatives were able to gain power, winning the majority of the Polish parliament. Solidarity's Cold War ramifications cannot be ignored; its political influence to the rest of the Eastern bloc proved crucial in the years to come as the Cold War came to a close.



HELP ON THE HOMEFRONT THE WOMEN OF THE USO

Carmen Bolt

“The people at home occupy a strategic place in a nation at war...This cooperative, voluntary undertaking has been in line with our democratic way of life, and contributed greatly to victory.”

-General Dwight D. Eisenhower¹

When General Eisenhower described the “cooperative, voluntary undertaking” on the home front, he was referring specifically to the role and actions of the United Service Organization(s) (USO) during World War II. Established in 1941, the USO—a voluntary organization made up of an original six independent agencies—provided aid, both on the home front and overseas. Eisenhower put special emphasis on “the people at home” because of the constant aid and support generated by women remaining on the home front.¹ Over the course of the Second World War, women experienced a shift in their gender roles as they stepped forward to maintain the American “War Machine” while many men were overseas. Women

provided the necessary labor in mechanical jobs and volunteer organizations, such as the USO.

This paper will examine one important form of labor that women workers and volunteers of the United Service Organization(s) provided during World War II. I am particularly interested in explaining how women’s roles in the USO during World War II advance their position in society following the war. I contend that the participation of women in the USO during World War II advanced women’s position in American society by creating a permanent change that lasted long after the war because women demonstrated by succeeding in professional jobs that they were just as capable as men.

My research examines the improvement of social status for women during the American

1. Carson, viii.

experience of the Second World War, 1941-1945. During this time, women exited their homes and entered the war effort both on a voluntary or employment basis. By focusing on these efforts through the establishment and operations of the USO, this research provides a case study of a much larger women's movement, which sought to achieve social equality. The war years were crucial in establishing a professional place for women outside of the household. Historian William Chafe, in *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic and Political Roles, 1920-1970*, suggests that, "within five years, World War II had radically transformed the economic outlook of women," and he argues that the 1940s were a pivotal period in American history for issues of social equality.² However, these conclusions are not unanimously held. Lois R. Helmbold and Ann Schofield argue in *Women's Labor History, 1790-1945* that, "wars as well as other historical watersheds [have been] superimposed on an underlying dynamic of women's increasing involvement in wage labor and their persistently marginal relationship to the labor market"³ Similarly, economist Claudia Goldin's *The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women's Employment* cites several key surveys, including the Palmer Survey, as she comes to pessimistic conclusions about the

impact of the Second World War on women's employment. Goldin suggests that an increase in women's employment following the war was not so much a result of the war itself, but rather of the simultaneous rise in women's education and clerical work. Goldin concludes that, "the Palmer Survey data have reinforced the conclusions of a growing literature that wartime work did not by itself greatly increase women's employment."⁴ Though the importance of World War II to women's social equality and employment remains a matter of debate, the consensus is that an undercurrent of discontent existed among women. Along with other scholars in the field, such as William Chafe, I argue that events of World War II served as significant stepping-stones toward gender equality.

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, sparking the Second World War. Two years later, provoked by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States finally entered the war. Acting swiftly, the United States assembled all of its army and naval military personnel and prepared for their deployment overseas. Husbands, fathers, and brothers departed from their homes for the war. Yet women, as described by Susan B. Anthony in 1943, remained in their traditional setting: "When Mars turned his Red Glare on the United States of America in December of 1941, woman was at her historic post—

2. William Chafe, *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic and Political Roles, 1920-1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 135.

3. Lois Rita Helmbold and Ann Schofield, "Women's Labor History, 1790-1945," *Reviews in American History* 17 (1989): 501-518.

4. Goldin Claudia, "The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women's Employment," *The American Economic Review*, 81, no. 4. (1991): 741-756.

the same post at which she stood during the First World War and the Civil War and all the other wars. The Kitchen.”⁵ However, the typical environment that the female presided over was about to expand into traditionally male territory. The “call of duty” required men to travel overseas, but it required women to travel out of the household and into the workplace.

As the United States found its footing in Europe during World War II, the women at home were finding their place in areas outside of the household. This included both white women and African American women, the latter on a “last hired, first fired” basis. For the purpose of the paper, I focus on the former, as the USO served a predominantly white audience, and the organization did not promote the racial integration of its clubs or efforts.⁶

Many women were called into the mechanical line of duty, literally taking over the industrial blue-collar positions that soldiers had left behind. “Simple necessity propelled more than six million women into America’s workforce during the war years, opening job opportunities for women in many previously male bastions such as factories, shipyards, and steel mills.”⁷ This shift in societal

and professional roles of women was radically different than anything that had occurred before in history.⁸ Never before in the history of the United States had women been relatively equal to men in the workforce. Due to the desperate need for industrial, as well as voluntary labor on the home front, World War II provided one of the first legitimate opportunities for women to breach the confines of the “women’s sphere” and enter the male dominated world of “breadwinning.” Prior to the Second World War, women’s participation in the labor force was marginal compared to men, constituting only 21 percent of occupied persons in 1920, according to records from the Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor.⁹ However, given this new opportunity, larger percentages rushed to pick up the slack of the deploying male labor force. Modeled after the character “Rosie the Riveter,” these women were expected to be the ideal woman worker: loyal, pretty, efficient, and ready to serve their country and men overseas.¹⁰ The opportunities were both challenging and exciting for women, and most stepped up with a smile and a newfound pride in the application of their abilities.¹¹

War II (New York: Free Press, 2004), 39.

8. Yellin, 39.

9. Data gathered from the Department of Labor, Women’s Bureau, *Women Workers in Ten War Production Areas and Their Postwar Employment Plans*, Bulletin 209 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), in *America’s Working Women*, ed. Rosalyn Baxandall, Linda Gordon, and Susan Reverby (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), 310–12.

10. Yellin, *Our Mother’s War*, 167.

11. Nancy Baker Wise and Christy Wise, *A*

5. Susan B. Anthony II, *Out of the Kitchen-Into the War* (New York: Stephen Daye Inc., 1943), 1.

6. Meghan K. Winchell discussing the inclusion of African American women in the USO, in an interview with The University of North Carolina Press, discussing her dissertation, “Good Food, Good Fun, and Good Girls: USO Hostesses and World War Two” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 2008).

7. Emily Yellin, *Our Mother’s War: American Women at Home and at the Front During World*

Though women were needed primarily as a source of labor in the industrial field during World War II, other options were available too. Many women chose the less evident, but equally vital path of volunteering. Through organizations such as the Red Cross, the USO, and the Office of Civilian Defense, women aided the war effort and developed the means of raising support and funds at home for the war effort.¹² One specific form of aid that became especially important was raising morale. Women were particularly good at improving the morale and outlook of soldiers, especially in the most dire of situations, providing empathy and a willingness to listen and comfort. One specific voluntary group recognized the effects and significance of this effort, and adopted the idea as its primary purpose—the USO.

The United Service Organization(s) utilized social culture as a means of relief during World War II. The Departments of War and Navy noted in 1946 that the USO “brought to a focus the resources of the amusement industry for the maintenance of the moral of American men and women on every fighting front.”¹³ The USO had a specific “fundamental basis,”¹⁴ a belief structure that they built upon,

laying the foundation for the purpose of the aid it provided; the USO believed “in a supernatural power that exists beyond any that is upon this earth; faith in the brotherhood of man; belief in the individual dignity of man; belief in the existence of positive ethical standards of right and wrong that exist apart from the will of any man.”¹⁵ This strong affinity and compassion for humankind was translated through the aid the USO provided, which combined social events and funding.¹⁶

The USO hosted various social events, including concerts and dances, primarily at the clubs that the organization maintained. There were approximately 3,000 of these clubs in the United States alone. Women volunteered by serving as “hostesses, dancing partners, played cards and Ping-Pong, or just socializ[ing] with soldiers.”¹⁷ One-on-one time between the women volunteers and servicemen proved to be especially effective as it often lifted the spirits of the soldiers. Nancy Potter, a young volunteer at a “Buddie Club,” recalled that, “servicemen were very lonely, very homesick, and they simply liked to sit and talk with someone.”¹⁸ The USO stood for the idea that good morale amongst servicemen was imperative to the outcome of the war, and they continued to host social events throughout the remainder of the war.

Though the USO was composed and run by men as well

Mouthful of Rivets: Women at Work in World War II (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994), 3.

12. Yellin, *Our Mother's War*, 167

13. Carson, *Home Away From Home*, ii; Letter from the War and Navy Departments expressing their appreciation to the efforts of the USO.

14. Carson, *Home Away From Home*, xii.

15. Carson, *Home Away From Home*, xii.

16. Carson, *Home Away From Home*, ii.

17. Yellin, *Our Mother's War*, 169.

18. Yellin, *Our Mother's War*, 170.

as women, women's labor served as the pivotal tool that kept the clubs running over the course of the war.¹⁹ The motherly or compassionate attributes commonly associated with women manifested themselves in the volunteers of the USO. Women workers, most of whom came from traditional households, were used to the everyday "women's work" that they provided during their volunteer hours. Cooking, cleaning, nurturing – customary, culturally acceptable female duties – were utilized within the USO, whether at specific functions or during everyday activities. Thus, this provided servicemen with a soothing atmosphere, similar to that of the homes and families they were missing. Also, the USO made available a key missing aspect of the soldier's usual life when at war: the presence of strong females. In her dissertation, *Good Food, Good Fun, and Good Girls*, Meghan Kate Winchell quotes former USO president Harper Sibley on the role and benefits of women volunteers within the USO: "The men of the United States believe in the USO, but it is the women of the USO that are the heart and soul of the USO...the people who make these clubs so attractive to the men are the women."²⁰ Not only did the activism of women in the USO prove useful in attracting a male crowd, but it also presented the opportunity for men to see women, though performing their

historically traditional tasks, in a new light. No longer were these women working from inside a household, benefiting only their own families. Now, on a much larger scale, they were impacting the lives of thousands and influencing the outcome of a war.

From within the USO, women fought against the restraints of social conformity and the caste within which they had always resided. The establishment of organizations, such as the USO, served as catalysts to the growing undercurrent of female discontent concerning traditional gender roles. Though sexuality was an essential weapon of choice, it was the actual occupational shift that stood out most prominently. Prior to the Second World War, women presided over the household, but were rarely equal to the paternal figure. Though the Nineteenth Amendment had been ratified in 1920 and the women's suffrage movement had been in existence for decades, social equality remained a seemingly unattainable dream. However, once the need for women's labor overruled the "importance" of social constraint and control, women were in a vital position to affect change. Between 1940 and 1945, the employment of women increased from a little over 14 million to 19 million, approximately 36 percent, much of which was on a voluntary basis.²¹ Organizations such as the USO rarely discriminated against women when assigning jobs. This

19. Meghan Kate Winchell, "Good Food, Good Fun, and Good Girls: USO Hostesses and World War Two" (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2003), 13.

20. Winchell, "Good Food, Good Fun, Good Girls," 13.

21. Women's Bureau, *Women Workers in Ten War Production Areas and Their Postwar Employment Plans*, Bulletin 209; Baxandall, Gordon, and Reverby, *America's Working Women*, 310–12.

opportunity placed women in the USO in a position of power: their talents and abilities were necessary to maintain morale among servicemen, and the aid they provided was necessary to assist with war needs. Women, for once, were at the apex of the sociological pyramid. Servicemen, as well as the United States itself, were now partially reliant on women to sustain the country and war effort.

In one of its most effective efforts both overseas and on the home front, the USO incorporated popular culture into the relief effort. In order to attract large numbers of servicemen to the USO, stimulating entertainment had to be offered, which often included exploiting women's sexuality. Certain implied criteria began to be placed on volunteers in order to determine model hostesses. These hostesses not only served food, but also provided companionship on and off the dance floor. Though the USO offered numerous activities at their many different locations, none proved quite as appealing as the shows and dances. The hostesses served as partners as they joined servicemen in both formal and square dancing.²² Through dancing, women and servicemen could join in fellowship in a more intimate atmosphere; this allowed volunteers to get to know men on a more personal basis. One volunteer recalled, "When I volunteered to be a dance partner at the USO, I found that the boy who's going there really wants companionship, a feeling that he's

being accepted as a human being."²³ Companionship was provided at these social events along with entertainment, such as live performers and speakers, intended as rewards to commend soldiers on their services. The shows hosted bands, entertainers, and speakers, including Bob Hope, comedian Joe E. Brown, Roy Rogers, and more.²⁴ Female entertainers, such as Marilyn Monroe, also wielded their sexuality to engage servicemen, unintentionally challenging social norms and emphasizing the female capability to support a country at war. However, female sexuality was viewed more often less as a form of exploitation, but rather as a tool to provide for emotional needs, such as "love, attention and excitement rather than for sexual gratification, and as a manifestation of emotional maladjustment."²⁵

The clubs, dances, and concerts provided by the USO were immensely popular. A survey conducted by the Research Branch of The Special Services Division of The War Department showed that a combined 81% of those who attended the USO clubs during wartimes deemed the programs of great importance or absolutely necessary.²⁶ Perhaps one of the

23. Yellin, *Our Mother's War*, 169.

24. "Timeline", last modified, 2011, <http://www.uso.org/uso-entertainment-history.aspx>. The Official Website of the USO, "Timeline" noting important shows and entertainers that the USO hosted in chronological order.

25. Karen Anderson, *Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations, and the Status of Women during World War II* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), 110.

26. *Operation USO: Report of the President* (New York, NY: United Service Organizations Inc., 1948), 31

22. Carson, *Home Away From Home*, photograph insert.

most obvious reasons for the extreme popularity of the clubs was the availability of warm, friendly hostesses. The junior hostesses spent the most intimate time with the servicemen, engaging in personal discussions and accompanying them on the dance floor. These younger hostesses possessed a sexuality that the men in action had been separated from. Oftentimes this intimacy led to actual relationships, even marriage. Ruth Vogler Fritz, a senior in high school during 1942, recalls the USO social scene: "... at night we'd go to the USO and dance. The servicemen all used to come there. That's how I met my husband."²⁷ The proximity and availability of young women to the servicemen often sparked such a connection, leading to a long-term relationship. There were, however, instances where the relations between the younger hostesses and the men were slightly more explicit, primarily sexual. It was in these instances that the older, more mature, senior hostesses would step in as chaperones.²⁸ Still, this sexuality proved powerful, not only in alluring men, but also from a social standpoint.

The roots of female empowerment were shallow and young, barely given enough time to latch onto American culture by the end of World War II. The war ended abruptly with the United States dropping two atomic

bombs on the Japanese towns of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Along with the end to the war came the end of the need for women within the workplace as well as the necessity for volunteer support. The USO ceased its operations on December 31, 1947, having "fulfilled its commitment and discharged its wartime responsibility completely and with signal distinction."²⁹ Although its active role was no longer necessary, the USO still existed to assist in times of need. Likewise, though the necessity for women in the workplace vanished following the war, their newfound talents and abilities remained, awaiting the next "call to duty." As men returned home to previous occupations, many women grudgingly returned back to the household. Yet when responding to a survey held by the U.S. Department of Labor, on average about 75 percent of the wartime-employed women expected to be part of the post-World War II labor force.³⁰ Therefore, the transition back to "women's work" was a negative change for many women that withdrew the responsibilities and respect that they had fought so diligently to earn. Dr. Susan B. Anthony II argued that, "the conditions of war are definitely pulling women out of the house into the world. The peace must not push them back into the

27. Nancy Baker Wise and Christy Wise, *A Mouthful of Rivets: Women at Work in World War II* (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass, 1994), 15.

28. Winchell, "Good Food, Good Fun, and Good Girls," 58.

29. *Operation USO*, 43-44; Quoted in a letter the President of the USO, Lindsley F. Kinball, from United States President Harry S. Truman, 1947.

30. Sylvia Rosenberg Weisbrott, *Women Workers in Ten War Production Areas and Their Postwar Employment Plans* (U.S Govt. Printing Office, 1946), 4.

house..."³¹ And yet, this was exactly the case. The gender roles slowly but surely shifted back to the accepted norm, though now, more than ever before, there was a resistance – and it was growing.

The social changes of World War II stirred the sense of oppression that long had been dormant in the minds of women. World War II provided an opportunity to experience life outside of the kitchen, a life with different responsibilities and co-reliance within society and the workplace. The respect that women gained through their excellent and surprisingly sufficient performance in mechanical and voluntary fields was now suppressed once again. However, these women did not and could not forget. While the following two decades saw the return of women to their traditional household positions, the discontent in the hearts of women soon reignite a fight as never before for social equilibrium, respect, and gender integration within the workplace, like the generation of World War II experienced.³² Betty Crocker, noted homemaker, commented on the capabilities of women, saying,

Hail to the women of America! You have taken up the heritage from the brave women of the past. Just as did the women of other wars, you have taken your positions as soldiers of the Home Front... the efforts and accomplishments of women today are boundless!³³

These "soldiers of the

Home Front" engaged in a new battle following World War II and the return to the homes, a battle that continues, even to the present day, against gender inequality and for women's rights.

Voluntary organizations are vital component to success in war; however, they are often not recognized for their efforts – the USO offers a prime example. Though widely appreciated during and following World War II, the USO's successes have been forgotten by subsequent generations. For those who were not around to witness the aid provided, the USO is practically unheard of, much less shown in its grandeur of the 1940s. But there was perhaps a greater importance of the USO and its role during World War II. The role of women in the USO did in fact lead to their elevated social status, though it was a slow process and not an immediate metamorphosis.

The decades following World War II saw a notable increase in women's participation in the labor force. Based on studies by Howard N Fullerton, Jr., senior demographic statistician in the Office of Employment Projections at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the increasing percentages of women entering the work force reflected "the significant change in women's role in the world of work"³⁴ Similarly, in a study published by the University of Akron regarding the impact of World War II on the women's labor market, researchers

31. Anthony, *Out of the Kitchen*, 244.

32. Wise and Wise, *A Mouthful of Rivets*, 4.

33. Yellin, *Our Mother's War*, 3.

34. Fullerton, Howard N Jr., "Labor force participation: 75 years of change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025," *Monthly Labor Review*, December 1999, 3-12.

maintained that, "Between 1948 and 1985, women's share of the labor force grew from 29 to 45 percent as women's labor force participation rate jumped from 33 to 55 percent."³⁵ Both studies conclude that the efforts of women during World War II were part of a trend towards greater gender equality. The roles that women occupied during the war proved that they were capable of maintaining a profession. Further, their actions commanded men's respect, as women stepped departed from the status quo in the hopes of aiding and eventually reforming societal roles. Dr. Susan B. Anthony, particularly taken by the idea of female equality in society, argued during the war that, "Women today are *earning* the right to rule, as well as the right to work. Why should they not be given that right?"³⁶

Women were never simply be "given" the right to work, or vote, or stand side-by-side with men socially. It would be a long, hard-fought war, a war where they once more would have to break the norm, step out of the households, and confront their typical reality with the hope and determination to achieve something more for themselves. Organizations, such as the USO, provided a vital stepping-stone to propel women toward greater gender equality. By allowing women to labor alongside men within the workplace, the USO got women out of the household, out of the kitchens, and into a more equal society.

35. David E. Bloom, "Women and work." *American Demography* 15 (1986): 25-30.

36. Susan B. Anthony II, *Out of the Kitchen*, 243.



A PROPELLING PURPOSE

A LOOK AT THE MOTIVES BEHIND GROUP SUPPLYING AID TO RENAMO

Emily Bolton

After the decolonization of Africa, many countries tackled problems they had never before faced. While freedom felt liberating, it also brought hardships that differed in nature from previous trials. Citizens sought to rebuild nations on their own, often with many differing beliefs, and they fought for leadership. Internal conflicts did not come as a shock. In one such case, civil war broke out for nearly sixteen years in Mozambique because two different parties fought for control of the government.¹ The Mozambican people rid their country of the Portuguese in 1975, only to be wrecked internally by the nationalist groups FRELIMO, the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, and RENAMO, the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*. After Mozambique gained freedom, both RENAMO and FRELIMO began to establish a following. Ken Flower,

founder of RENAMO, served as Chief of the Rhodesian Intelligence Service and constructed his group out of soldiers from Portugal, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. While still an active political party today, in 1975 the primary purpose of this organization was to gather information on the whereabouts of members of the Zimbabwe African National Union, or ZANU, as well as to protect the Rhodesian-Mozambique border from guerilla warriors, such as FRELIMO members.² FRELIMO, while not the main topic of this analysis, was crucial to the country of Mozambique and RENAMO itself. FRELIMO, the nationalist organization that liberated Mozambique from Portuguese rule, began to establish the first foundations of a government. While both parties sought a free Mozambique, strong ideological differences separated FRELIMO and RENAMO.

1. Bjorn Enge Bertelsen, "War, Peace and Development in Mozambique: A critical assessment," (paper presented to a 'peace building and post-war aid' workshop CMI, University of Bergen, Norway, June 2005).

2. ZANU was a nationalist group led by Robert Mugabe. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. "Resistência Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO)."

Ideologically, RENAMO was a firmly anti-communist group, while FRELIMO was fiercely communist.³ Given this vast difference in political principles, it is not surprising that they espoused quite different opinions of how they believed their country should be governed. Ideological differences, along with FRELIMO cutting off communication and closing its borders to its neighboring white ruled countries, marked the beginning of the civil war in Mozambique.⁴ Because of FRELIMO's communist roots and the concomitant threats presented to their own governments, neighboring countries, such as Rhodesia, began to take precautionary measures and provided material support to RENAMO. By 1977, RENAMO focused on overthrowing FRELIMO and ZANLA, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army.⁵ During the civil war, a majority of RENAMO's support came from Protestant religious institutions.⁶ While it is intriguing that RENAMO had relations with religious institutions, one must ask why religious organizations were in alliance with the group at all?

One pastor, who was located in the Angonia district of Mozambique during the time of the civil war,

captivatingly testified that, "there is always fighting [in Mozambique,] and we do not know the difference between the sides. They all wear the same uniform and carry the same weapons. They all demand food even though we have none ourselves, and they all punish us if we feed the 'enemy' only difference is that at least RENAMO does not stop us worshipping God and teaching the Gospel."⁷ His claims about RENAMO comes from a report titled, "Eyewitness Testimonies of Persecution and Atrocities," published in September of 1986. While the pastors' name is not given, this statement infers the notion that the nationalist organization RENAMO was in some way linked with and sympathetic to the organized Christianity. Throughout the history of this group, various religious organizations, such as Frontline Fellowship and religious leaders, such as Peter Hammond, came into contact with RENAMO and provided support for their operations in Mozambique. While Western countries considered RENAMO a terrorist organization because of their actions committed against the Mozambican population during the civil war, in reality, both RENAMO and FRELIMO committed atrocities for their own personal gain.⁸ Although the United States sided with the FRELIMO and portrayed RENAMO as terrorists, other conservative groups in the United States saw RENAMO as a group fighting for a democracy. Ultimately, each side used

3. Some members of the FRELIMO party came over to RENAMO because of FRELIMO's communist views. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. "Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO)."

4. Bertelsen, "War, Peace and Development."

5. ZANLA is a military branch of ZANU. Alex Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique* (York, England: Centre for Southern African Studies, 1991), 16.

6. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 106.

7. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 102.

8. Bertelsen, "War, Peace and Development."

horrendous tactics, and one group cannot be called terrorist any more than the other. Since the majority of Western countries labeled RENAMO as a terrorist group, it appears odd that RENAMO received these Christian resources at all, and the question still remains: why were Christian organizations involved?

The idea of Christian organizations backing RENAMO marks an important contradiction within the Mozambican Civil War because, according to Prexy Nesbitt, it displays an example of Western involvement in Mozambique after decolonization.⁹ Western or “Western-like” nations such as, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal wanted to rid Mozambique of the communist FRELIMO leaders and place into power a Mozambican government that would submit to a Western agenda.¹⁰ Thus, a significant amount of support flowed into RENAMO from these countries and Christian organizations within these nations. Steve Askin expands on the idea that Westerners used religion as a way to exercise control over nations, such as Mozambique. He describes how Christian groups such as Frontline Fellowship from South Africa, employed the church as a means for “white domination.”¹¹ Thus, some scholars believe that western nations used religion as a way to manipulate RENAMO

and extend the Western power. RENAMO, being sympathetic to Christians and fighting against communism, managed to establish a great foundation for support that came flowing into their organization from Western nations.

Although the secondary literature focusing on RENAMO is thin, most works recognize the religious connections of the movement and conclude Christianity was used by RENAMO in their workings as an organization. In comparison, FRELIMO failed to adhere to a certain religion and even attacked religious customs and practices.¹² Ogbu Kalu argues that RENAMO had Christian support in their fight against FRELIMO.¹³ Glenda Morgan adds to Kalu’s argument, highlighting that RENAMO actually utilized FRELIMO’s resistance to religion by “exploiting” the support that came from religious institutions for their own benefit.¹⁴ Christianity was, she argues, a way that RENAMO, as a group, could gain “legitimacy and support” from external organizations.¹⁵

From the available sources, one can see that the help given to RENAMO stemmed from a variety of places with differing

9. Prexy Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators: Western (Private & Public) Support for RENAMO & Unita,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 43 (1988): 111-124.

10. Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators: Western (Private & Public) Support for RENAMO & Unita,” 119.

11. Steve Askin, “Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 18, no. 2 (1990): 29-38.

12. Glenda Morgan, “Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of RENAMO,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 4 (1990): 603-619.

13. Ogbu Kalu, “Decolonization of Nigerian Churches: The Nigerian Experience, 1955-1975,” *Nigerian Heritage: Journal of the National Commission for Museums and Monuments* 10 (2001): 35-59.

14. Morgan, “Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of RENAMO,” 603-619.

15. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 109.

views and beliefs. Throughout this study, readers will see that internal problems and motives ultimately formed the backbone of support coming into RENAMO. Consequently, through assorted newspaper articles, memoirs, and the public propaganda of international organizations involved with RENAMO, this article argues that the external organizations contributing to RENAMO had an agenda of their own. Outside benefactors supported RENAMO because they knew they were gaining support for their own respective causes and gaining something from their contribution. Analysis of Western donor motivations for supporting RENAMO illustrates the symbiotic relationship between RENAMO and its supporters. Without sponsors from other countries, RENAMO would not have been able to operate within the confines of Mozambique and would have dissolved. Yet, as this article demonstrates, RENAMO's continued existence was intimately linked to the rhetorical purposes of its respective donor organizations. As a result, this analysis presents a move away from examining RENAMO's key beliefs into a more detailed examination of the core ideologies of the groups actually supporting RENAMO. Throughout this paper, I examine three different supporters of RENAMO, focusing on their motives and goals they wished to achieve. In the end, the overall assistance given to RENAMO stemmed from a diverse collection of benefactors that believed helping RENAMO would change its nationalist ideology and

that RENAMO could and would help them spread their own ideas to what Westerners considered a "corrupted" African Nation. All the supporters of RENAMO can be seen as fighting for their own needs, and the key question assessed in each section is what did each group have to gain from their support of RENAMO?

THE CREATION OF RENAMO

When Ken Flower initially created RENAMO in 1975, he sought to establish a fighting force to counter a hostile nation whose internal stability was in turmoil. Thus, when RENAMO was first developed for the Rhodesian Special Branch of the army, the gains the founders sought to receive were quite obvious: security and inside information. In his memoir, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981*, Flower discusses the creation of RENAMO and how it was to benefit Rhodesia. In a diary entry from March 26, 1974, Flower describes how he "managed to get agreement from the DGS (*Direcção Geral de Segurança*) [Portuguese Intelligence], to form 'Flechas' for trans-border operations in Mozambique where the security situation continues to deteriorate."¹⁶ The *Flechas* were "airborne commando-trained units established in 1973, by the Portuguese secret police on the Rhodesian frontier to combat national insurgency" and to

16. Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981* (London: John Murray, 1987), 140. In Flower's memoir, the note states, "Top Secret Note on 'Flechas and the formation of the Mozambique National Resistance,' April 1974."

monitor FRELIMO activities within Mozambique.¹⁷ Embedded within the establishment of the *Flechas* was the origins of the RENAMO nationalist group. Flower formed RENAMO to construct a security buffer against a violent Mozambique. Thus, in his formation of RENAMO, Flower demonstrated that his reason for supporting the group was the protection of his own country and the government within Mozambique.

After the original groundwork for the group was laid in 1973, through the *Flechas*, RENAMO began to grow and flourish. In 1974, middle-ranking officers displaced the Portuguese government in Lisbon in a military coup.¹⁸ Yet while the Portuguese presence in Mozambique waned, Rhodesia's hold on the Mozambique border was also weakening. With the threat of the guerrilla war in Mozambique growing, Flower once again utilized RENAMO as a medium of protection.¹⁹ Flower had a duty to his people and their safety within Rhodesia. RENAMO was a precaution Flower used against a country that he believed could not control its own state affairs and its incipient guerrilla war.

The rebel fighters in Mozambique were having an effect on the economic situation in Rhodesia. Samora Machel, the President of Mozambique, had closed the border of Mozambique to Rhodesia, causing Rhodesia to rely entirely on South Africa for

their economic survival.²⁰ After the closure of this 800-mile border, Rhodesia and Mozambique were "on a war footing."²¹ As a result of the closure, between 25 and 40 percent of Rhodesia's trade had been cut off from Mozambique.²² As a result, a war broke out between Rhodesia and Mozambique. As Machel stationed "3,000 black nationalist guerillas...on the western border for attacks inside Rhodesia," Ian Smith, the President of Rhodesia, and Flower fought back.²³ After the border closing, the Rhodesian government continued to supply RENAMO with "logistical, military, and financial assistance."²⁴ To an extent, RENAMO was Rhodesia's way of protecting themselves from Mozambican warriors, as well as gaining inside information into the internal affairs for Mozambique.

The main goal of RENAMO was to "gather information on FRELIMO and Zanla operations."²⁵ Flower expanded on this idea in his memoir as he describes how the "CIO (Central Intelligence Organization) was in a position to offer invaluable help through elements of the MNR (or RENAMO) who had been our 'eyes and ears' in these areas for

20. Flower, *Serving Secretly*, 163.

21. "Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia," *The Spokesman Review*, March 4, 1976, 38, accessed April 17, 2012, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1314&dat=19760304&id=gc4RAAAIIBAJ&sjid=deoDAAAIBAJ&pg=6861,1256649>.

22. "Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia," 38.

23. "Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia," 38.

24. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. "Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO)."

25. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 15.

17. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. "Flecha(s)."

18. Flower, *Serving Secretly*, xvi.

19. Flower, *Serving Secretly*, xvi.

more than five years and could assist the officers of Special Branch and Military Intelligence employed on those operations.”²⁶ This operation, called “Operation Dingo,” was to be Rhodesia’s largest raid yet into Mozambique. To help maintain the element of surprise, Rhodesia used RENAMO as their group behind enemy lines. RENAMO had not only been fighting against FRELIMO, but also had been able to spy on them. They also were assisting with raids and seriously affecting Machel, “whose country was now suffering from extreme problems caused by damaged communications and food shortages” from RENAMO.²⁷ While RENAMO was acting as a spy for Rhodesia and bringing harm to the Mozambican government, support continued to flow in from the Rhodesian government because they proved to be a vital asset in advancing Rhodesia’s goals. Without them, the inner workings of FRELIMO, as well as ZANLA within Mozambique, would be a mystery. Thus, through the creation and placement of RENAMO into Mozambique, one can see how the motives behind Rhodesia were of their own accord and political plan, and ultimately served their own neocolonial goals. Behind Rhodesia’s motives, one can see cultural, political, and economic reasons for wanting to extend an arm of power over Mozambique. However, the army in Rhodesia was not the only support RENAMO was receiving from within Africa.

²⁶. Flower, *Serving Secretly*, 192.

²⁷. Flower, *Serving Secretly*, 248.

FRONTLINE FELLOWSHIP

In South Africa, Frontline Fellowship is a missionary group dedicated to serving persecuted churches in Africa and evangelizing in war zones. In their report, “Eyewitness Testimonies of Persecution and Atrocities,” Frontline shows its support for RENAMO in the way they describe the group and its members, as well as how they characterize FRELIMO. In 1986, Peter Hammond, the Founder and Director of Frontline Fellowship published an article describing the outrageous acts of violence committed against the organization by FRELIMO. One statement from the report describes the brutality committed against the ministry by FRELIMO:

FRELIMO persecuted the Church in our district very severely: ‘Anyone we find worshipping God is an enemy of the People.’ They would arrest or kill anyone who they found praying and preaching. ‘In this country there is no God except Samora Machel,’ they told us. During all these 8 years we had to meet secretly at night to worship. Then, in 1982, RENAMO chased FRELIMO away and for the first time we had freedom to preach the Gospel and gather for worship.²⁸

Frontline Fellowship’s relationship to RENAMO was clearly based on religion. RENAMO

²⁸. Peter Hammond, “Eyewitness Testimonies of Persecution and Atrocities,” Frontline Fellowship, accessed March 20, 2012, <http://www.frontline.org.za/news/September1986/EyeWitnessTestimoniesPersecutionAtrocities.htm>.

extended their sympathies to them, letting them preach and gather for worship in the areas they controlled.

Frontline Fellowship was a Christian ministry that had access to support and resources to give RENAMO. David Robinson argues in his dissertation that while official support to RENAMO from South Africa was cut off by the N'komati Accord in 1984, a few of RENAMO's supporters within South Africa's Reconnaissance Commandos, a special forces unit of the South African National Defense Force, joined Frontline Fellowship.²⁹ He describes how the "former Special Forces [of South Africa,] provided RENAMO with what assistance they could independently of the Apartheid state, and even personally advised Dhlakama at his Gorongosa headquarters on a number of occasions."³⁰ Further, Steve Askin articulates how the main form of aid from Frontline "involved sending 'missionaries' to work alongside... Renamo...and internationally disseminating quasi-religious propaganda against governments and movements that had been targeted for attack and destabilization by the South African military."³¹ With RENAMO receiving help, however, Frontline got something in return.

For Frontline, the reason for supporting a movement within

Mozambique was that they were portrayed as fully contributing to an organization that believed in the same ideas they did. RENAMO was seen as an anti-Marxist, Christian organization. Consequently, Frontline was able to portray their organization as backing a group that stood for what many white, Christian, South Africans believed in. Frontline thought they were providing "spiritual warfare" against "communism," in the nations they went out to.³² Bearing in mind that many white Africans viewed communism as "irreconcilable with Christian beliefs," their support for RENAMO should not be surprising.³³

Peter Hammond of Frontline Fellowship also described the account of missionaries going into Mozambique: "we preached to the [RENAMO] commander and saw him and his friend take off their hats and kneel in the dust accepting Jesus.' This leader, they said, declared, 'we need God' and granted Shekinah 'freedom to preach in any area they control.'"³⁴ Hammond's tales of his interaction with the RENAMO leader likely caused the white Christians of South Africa to see Hammond as making a difference, fighting for the faith.

By describing the actions of

29. David Alexander Robinson, "Curse on the Land: A History of the Mozambique Civil War," (PhD diss., University of Western Australia, 2006): 222.

30. This quote comes from "a conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal," quoted from Robinson, "Curse on the Land," 222.

31. Askin, "Mission of RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right," 35.

32. Askin, "Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right," 29.

33. Wessel Visser, "Afrikaner Anti-Communist History Production in South African Historiography," *History Making and Present Day Politics, The Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa*, (2007): 308.

34. Peter Hammond, "We Are at War," Frontline Fellowship Newsletter 1(1989) quoted in Steve Askin, "Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 18, no. 2 (Summer, 1990): 29-38.

FRELIMO in the “Eyewitness Testimonies” as ferocious acts committed against Christianity and democracy, Hammond, in turn, garnered more support for their organization as well as RENAMO. Christians in South Africa reading this article were likely appalled by the atrocities. Thus, they would turn against FRELIMO, and support RENAMO, which would lead to their support for Frontline Fellowship.

Steve Askin addresses Frontline’s involvement, emphasizing that Hammond viewed the “Pretoria’s apartheid regime as a Christian bulwark against communism and atheism.”³⁵ Since Hammond had a desire to fight communism and atheism, RENAMO proved to be the perfect group to support. Once again, by Frontline supporting RENAMO, they were not only prosthelytizing, but they were also gaining support from Christians within the country and around the world who shared their goals. Apartheid was a potent force in South Africa, and as Saul Dubow conveys, Christian-nationalism provided “intellectually coherent justification for apartheid.”³⁶ Thus, the Christians of Frontline that agreed with Apartheid saw it as a fight against communism and atheism.

Throughout the history of Apartheid, the threat of communism against the Apartheid principles is evident. Apartheid was a “system of racial discrimination and white political domination adopted by the

National Party,” from 1948 to 1994.³⁷ The Apartheid regime wanted to position themselves alongside the Western nations and prevent black nationalist uprisings within the country. While black nationalists began to align themselves with the Communist party, the government decided to pass the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950, which outlawed the Communist Party of South Africa. As a result, C. R. Swart, the Minister of Justice in 1948, held a dictatorial power over communism and those associated with it.³⁸ Considering that the South African government “defined nearly all opposition to their cause as communism,” many blacks and anti-apartheid advocates found themselves persecuted.³⁹ Swart had sweeping powers. As a result, he kept dissidents from publishing documents, making speeches, attending meetings or “exist[ing] in any meaningful way.”⁴⁰ Thus, anyone who spoke out against apartheid and the South African government could be branded a communist and become a pariah in society. Swart’s power was used to not only define communism as a Marxist-Leninist ideology, but any “doctrine [which brought about]...political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbances or disorder.”⁴¹

According to Wessel Visser, a

37. Roger B. Beck, *The History Of South Africa* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000), 125.

38. Rodney Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 2000), 384.

39. Beck, *The History Of South Africa*, 129.

40. Beck, *The History Of South Africa*, 129.

41. Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 385.

35. Askin, “Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,” 29.

36. Saul Dubow, “Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of Race,” *Journal of African History* 33 (1992): 209.

history professor at Stellenbosch University, "in South Africa the communists...aimed at destroying religion, confiscating private property, overthrowing the state and creating a black republic where blacks and Coloureds 'would be boss and govern'."⁴² He goes on to explain how, "Christian-nationalist alternatives to 'communist' trade unions" began to spring up because of the prejudice "against the 'threat' of non-racialism propagated by the communists."⁴³ Frontline Fellowship can be seen as an example of a Christian-nationalist union that rose up to fight the concepts of communism, and RENAMO was just one front in a larger war. Frontline battled against the spread of communism through their support of RENAMO because the teachings of Christianity during Apartheid threatened that communism and atheism would lead to an upending of the current racial and political order.

While often people try to separate the idea of religion and politics, the two cannot be separated in South Africa.⁴⁴ The idea of atheism was associated with the idea of communism, and the idea of Christianity was attached to democracy. Visser describes how, "the avowed atheism of international communism understandably touched a raw nerve in the Christian-nationalist ethos of the traditional

Afrikaner churches...[thus,] the church would act as a vanguard to shield the Afrikaner people from the 'Red Peril' [of communism] and its offshoots."⁴⁵ RENAMO can be seen as a fight against communism and atheism and for the notions of democracy and Christianity in Mozambique. While most likely not all Christians within South Africa believed that Apartheid, atheism, and communism overlapped, sources show that white South African Christians of this time supported Apartheid and RENAMO because they believed it was keeping out communism and atheism.

THREAT OF COMMUNISM

Western nations also supported RENAMO. For reasons similar to Frontline, Western governments portrayed RENAMO as an organization of fellow Christians fighting communism. In his article, Prexy Nesbitt quotes Michael Howard the President of Shekinah Ministries, from a letter he wrote in 1985 stating, "Mozambique is under control of an anti-Christian government...the RENAMO are fighting communism [and...] we believe that it won't be long before RENAMO is one in full control of Mozambique."⁴⁶

Prexy Nesbitt states that his main goal is to demonstrate the "preoccupation of Western governments, especially the USA, with finding ways to terminate or, at the very least, to manage national liberation movements

42. Visser, "Afrikaner Anti-Communist History," 309.

43. Visser, "Afrikaner Anti-Communist History," 308.

44. Tristan Anne Borer, *Challenging the State: Churches as Political Actors in South Africa 1980-1994* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 16.

45. Visser, "Afrikaner Anti-Communist History," 308.

46. Nesbitt, "Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators," 119.

or the crises they create.”⁴⁷ This was certainly the case within Mozambique as America through its support behind RENAMO. In the December 2, 1988, issue of *Africa Confidential*, Nesbitt describes America’s support to RENAMO:

The United States government appears to be sponsoring not one but two covert operations in support of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO or MNR). Of the two US networks operating in support of RENAMO today, one seems to be sponsored by elements in the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), US military intelligence – working through civilian contacts. The second operation bears the CIA hallmark. Serving US officials say that the DIA and CIA have differing views on Mozambique.”⁴⁸

During the Cold War, the United States led a global campaign to rid the world of communism. And Africa proved to be just another part of a worldwide struggle. As FRELIMO established a communist government in Mozambique, American support for its rival RENAMO was symbiotic. Money flowed, covertly and then overtly, to RENAMO as long as there were willing to fight communism.

At first, the United States stayed out of providing support for Mozambique because of the FRELIMO party and Samora Machel’s relations with the Soviet

Union. However, as time went on, Mozambique became more non-aligned, and from 1983 onwards the State department’s relations with Mozambique’s FRELIMO government improved. However, major support for RENAMO began when Samora Machel planned his visit to Washington in 1985.⁴⁹ Upon the announcement that he was coming to the U.S., right-wing conservatives began lobbying against his visit. Right-wing Americans saw him as a “ruthless pro-Soviet, anti-American, Marxist dictator,” and found his visit to America offensive.⁵⁰ As a result, a campaign called “Conservative Caucus,” organized to try and stop his visit. When they failed to stop his visit, they instead initiated “a series of anti-Machel meetings.”⁵¹ In attendance was RENAMO’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who portrayed the organization as a victim of Samora’s communist reign, thus gathering commiseration from right-wing American organizations, Senators and Congressmen, as well as putting RENAMO on Americans’ radar.⁵² Machel sparked American

49. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 43.

50. See the Heritage Foundation, “National Security Record. A Report on the Congress and National Security Affairs,” 92 (June 1986), quoted in Vines, *RENAMO Terrorism in Mozambique*, 43.

51. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 43.

52. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*,

43. Quoted in Vines Notes, “Organizations that have in the past shown sympathy for RENAMO in the USA not named in the text include: About My Father’s business, Inc, KY; American Enterprise Institute, DC; Americans Freedom International, DC;

47. Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators,” III.

48. Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators,” 119.

conservatives' international aid to RENAMO, because Americans saw communism coming too close to home. RENAMO was the institution fighting against communism in Machel's own country, thus Americans saw RENAMO as an outlet to fight communism on a global level and make a statement to Machel.

Another aspect of Machel's visit that sparked conservative protests was the relationship between Samora Machel and President Reagan. Doyle McManus argued, in an article in the *LA Times* that:

Conservative Republicans complain that aid for Mozambique is inconsistent with Reagan's policies in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, where the Administration has been aiding rebels against leftist regimes. They called on the President to aid the rightist Mozambican National Resistance, known as Renamo, which has been fighting to overthrow Machel's regime.⁵³

Americans for Tax Reform, DC; Bashore International, DC; Citizens for America, DC; Coalitions for America, DC; Cuban American National Foundation, FL; Free Congress and Educational Foundation, DC; Fund for Africa's Future, DC; Good News Communications, GA; High Frontier, DC; Open Doors Mission, Restore A More Benevolent Order Coalition (RAMBOC), CA; RUFFPAC, DC; Selous Foundation, DC; The Believers Church, CA; The Freedom League, DC; United States Global Strategy Foundation, DC; Vigeris Association, DC; World Missionary Assistance Plan (World MAP), CA. Senators Malcolm Wallop, Gordon Humphrey, Paul Tribble, and Congressmen Dan Burton, Robert Dornan participated in pro-RENAMO rally."

53. Doyle McManus, "Mozambican's U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives." *LA Times*, September 18, 1985.

Throughout his time in office, Reagan supported governments that aligned with the democratic policies preferred by the United States. However, support for Samora Machel and his relations to the FRELIMO party were not typical of American policy. McManus pointed out that in relation to Mozambique, "the United States is supporting a Soviet-backed Marxist dictatorship against a pro-Western rebellion."⁵⁴ Reagan's reasoning for this support was because he believed Mozambique was veering away from the influence of the Soviet government and towards a more neutral stance. However, Howard Phillips, chairman of the Conservative Caucus argued that, "The President is engaging in what seems an ultimate act of hypocrisy by extending official honors to Samora Machel... The only evidence that Mozambique is tilting toward the West is that they are willing to take our money... We hope the President comes to his senses on this."⁵⁵ The article goes on to explain how the United States was "supplying Machel's regime with \$40 million in economic aid this year."⁵⁶ Senator Jesse Helms claimed that, "the Mozambique government... would inevitably collapse without Western sustenance...[and] we question whether it is in America's strategic interest to prevent the inevitable toppling of a pro-Soviet, dedicated Marxist government which has ruthlessly suppressed its people

54. McManus, "Mozambican's U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives."

55. McManus, "Mozambican's U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives."

56. McManus, "Mozambican's U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives."

and bankrupted its economy.”⁵⁷ Conservatives believed the funds Reagan bestowed upon the FRELIMO government were the main reasons as to why Machel was claiming to change his governing policies. Without help from the United States, Machel’s government would fail and therefore, right-wing Americans believed that Machel was playing with America to receive their support. Because of Reagan’s unusual stance, senators, businessmen, and many others took it into their own hands to portray democratic American values using RENAMO as an outlet.

In the minds of conservatives, RENAMO was an example of a “pro-Western rebellion.” Therefore, they began funding support for their actions. As Reagan was propping up a communist regime by uniting with Machel, conservatives such as Howard Phillips, Senator Jesse Helms, and many others began supplying aid to RENAMO to show their opposition to the spread of communism and supporting communists. Right-wing Americans believed that the President was being foolish in his sympathies to Machel and that he should not negotiate with such a government.

The Heritage Foundation also endorsed RENAMO because of their anti-communist views. The Heritage Foundation is a “right-wing, think-tank [who was] influential with the Reagan Administration that actively lobbied for closer ties between the United States and RENAMO.”⁵⁸ Its

“mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.” William Pascoe, a policy analyst, describes RENAMO in his article for the Heritage Foundation as “pro-western Freedom Fighters” who by 1987 “controlled 80% of the countryside” in Mozambique.⁵⁹ The Heritage Foundation also stated that RENAMO was a “popularly supported resistance” that was “establishing a provisional government in the large area of Mozambique in which the resistance movement operates freely.”⁶⁰ The Heritage Foundation, as a supporter of limited government, saw a chance to promote their views in the US and Mozambique through their support of RENAMO.

Pascoe also believed that the Reagan administration should consider supporting RENAMO because of their democratic values. Pascoe wrote, “if the Chissano regime refuses to negotiate with RENAMO, the U.S. should signal strongly its break with the communists and place itself squarely on the side of the democratic resistance forces. Such action, in the context of U.S. assistance to the UNITA freedom fighters in Angola, would restore consistency to U.S. policy in southern Africa.”⁶¹ The Heritage

57. McManus, “Mozambican’s U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives.”

58. Karl Maier, *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), 187.

59. William Pascoe, “Mozambique Merits the Reagan Doctrine,” *Backgrounders*, no. 572, The Heritage Foundation, March 31, 1987.

60. “The Resistance can Win In Mozambique,” *National Security Record*, no. 92, The Heritage Foundation, June, 1986, quoted by Maier, *Conspicuous Destruction*, 187.

61. William Pascoe, “Mozambique Merits the

Foundation wanted to provide RENAMO with resources because they firmly believed in fighting against communism. Supporting RENAMO was a public statement of their beliefs and another example of how American supporters tried to promote anti-communist views in America and around the world.

CONCLUSION

Today, RENAMO is no longer a guerilla movement within Mozambique. Instead, they act as a conservative political party to try and bring about their notions of change. Funding for their rebel movements began to die down in different areas for a variety of reasons. Rhodesia's transition into Zimbabwe caused Ken Flower to turn over power of RENAMO from Rhodesia into the hands of South Africa. After a few years of South African control, the N'komati Accord on "Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness" was signed in 1984, halting South African resources.⁶² In America, horrific accounts of RENAMO's atrocities against civilians, such as William Minters "Inside RENAMO as Described by Ex-participants" and Robert Gersony's "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique," caused funding to stop because RENAMO had "extraordinary high [levels of violence]" against civilians.⁶³

Reagan Doctrine."

62. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 21.

63. U.S. State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs, "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique," by Robert

However, throughout RENAMO's rebel reign, the international support RENAMO received had little to do with the state of affairs in Mozambique and more to do with the domestic situations in the countries from which the aid was coming. Through its Rhodesian roots, its connections to the Frontline Fellowship, and the anti-communist image conservatives in America sought to portray, RENAMO provides a great example of the influence that other nations can have on others internal affairs. RENAMO, after all, was not just a group of "armed bandits" acting of their own accord, but a legitimate "military-based organization" that had a significant impact of the economy and society of Mozambique thanks to its supporters.⁶⁴ While RENAMO had similar views to the countries and organizations that gave it support, the aid that was given to them was directly linked to how RENAMO's ideologies supported the domestic agendas of the governments and organizations that were giving it support. In a way, RENAMO's relationship to its supporters can be seen as an aspect of neocolonialism within Mozambique in the sense that donors extended their economic resources and exerted their influence primarily for their own gain. As a whole, we can see how outside alliances had an effect on RENAMO's efforts within Mozambique and how crucial the outsiders were to RENAMO's operations.

Gersony, (April, 1988).

64. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 3.



EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION

RICHARD NIXON, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Luke Burton

“We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and in Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds . . . To say that we are mired in a stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion . . . It seems increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out will be to negotiate.”

-Walter Cronkite, 1968

On February 27, 1968, veteran CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite—and the “most trusted man in America”—addressed the nation just days after the now infamous Tet Offensive. Uncharacteristically, in this broadcast he integrated his own opinion regarding the North Vietnamese’s demoralizing surprise attack on the South’s capital of Saigon during Tet, the Vietnamese New Year. The substantial American presence in Vietnam with an initial influx of military advisors began under John F. Kennedy and continued to grow through Lyndon Johnson’s extensive expansion of the war following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964. By the Tet

Offensive, the American military presence, contradicting claims of seeking “no wider war,” peaked with 536,000 U.S. soldiers active in 1968.¹ To this point, American leaders had consistently assured the public of progress, with victory close at hand. But now, Vietnam had grown into a fully-fledged war to prevent the spread of communism into Southeast Asia and to defend the liberties of American democracy abroad – the instrumentalization of Domino Theory diplomacy. According to many scholars, after

1. “Learn About the Vietnam War,” Digital History, accessed November 5, 2011, <http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/modules/vietnam/index.cfm>.

Tet the nation's optimistic outlook suffered a crushing blow, sending public support spiraling down towards dissent and marking a definitive turning point in the Vietnam conflict.² These claims seemed to be supported by responses from December 1967 to March 1968 to Gallup Poll's survey question: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" Answers of 'yes' rose from 45 – 49%, while 'no' responses fell from 46 – 41%, marking the largest drop in support prior to Tet.³ However, this turning point did not lead to a swift end to American involvement. Instead, the war would be revamped once again with the inauguration of President Richard Nixon in January of 1969. It continued until Congress finally cut war funding indefinitely in July 1973.

This essay seeks to explain how and why American involvement in the Vietnam conflict persisted for so long, even after the events of the Tet Offensive. The actions of Nixon's executive administration from his first term election until the war's conclusion suggest that the end of American intervention in Vietnam was neither solely due to inadequate military strategy and execution nor faltering public support, as scholars have previously argued.⁴ Instead,

I argue that the Vietnam War was simply one of many pawns in the complex political game that was Nixon's administration. It was a tool of domestic politics used to shore up Nixon's legitimacy and to insure the stability of his presidency. With the correlation between the rise and tragic fall of the Executive branch during this period and America's slow exit from Vietnam, the symbiotic relationship between the two emerges and depicts a true abuse of power.

The 1968 Presidential election was a watershed in American politics. It marked the end of the New Deal Coalition. Republican candidate Richard Nixon successfully challenged this Democratic Party dynasty and assumed control of managing the numerous crises, domestic and international, including the struggle for American civil rights and the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Part of his campaign's strength was his willingness to make often vague promises to end the war in Vietnam. This was something his Democratic opponents could not do, despite Johnson's celebrated "bombing halt" that October. The Paris Peace talks, undertaken shortly before the election, demonstrated promise; however, they were partially sabotaged by Nixon's campaign because the Republicans promised the South Vietnamese government an offer superior to Democrats' plans for negotiations.⁵ Before he resigned, Lyndon Johnson's Secretary of Defense

2. Steven Hayward, *The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Liberal Order, 1964-1980*, (Roseville: Prima, 2007), 188.

3. Alec M. Gallup, Jr., *The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index: Public Opinion, 1937-1997: Volume 3* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 2109.

4. Ben Kiernan, "Review: The Vietnam War: Alternative Endings," *American Historical Review* 97 (1992): 1118-1137.

5. Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 2001).

Robert McNamara characterized the Democratic view of the war effort as: "We're in Vietnam 10% to help the South Vietnamese, 20% to hold back the Chinese, and 70% to save American face."⁶ By contrast, Nixon sought to reach a different end, one of victory not surrender, in order to preserve American honor and reputation, as well as his own. Allowing peace talks to conclude would not only have prevented him from rescuing America from international embarrassment, it would also have greatly threatened his entire election campaign. However, peace negotiations soon disintegrated, as the South Vietnamese government proved unsatisfied with the Democrats' terms. The Republicans solidified their control of the Vietnam conflict with a dominating victory in the 1968 Presidential election. Nixon was now the United States' Supreme Commander in Chief, and he would wield this power with a strong hand throughout his time in office.

From the infancy of his presidency, Richard Nixon yearned for individual greatness as well as national triumph, to be remembered and respected. America was the vessel that would grant him his place in history, and he believed that the prosperity and reputation of the nation were directly linked to his own. The Vietnam War offered a unique opportunity: it gave him the chance to change the war's trajectory from a growing mistake to an honorable effort by the world's

leading democratic nation to defend Southeast Asia for the greater good. This aspect of his agenda (which would continue throughout his presidency) was exemplified by his first Presidential inaugural address, in which he claimed: "The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker...If we succeed, generations to come will say of us now living that we mastered our moment, that we helped make the world safe for mankind."⁷ Alexander Butterfield, aide to Nixon's Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman, also described this bittersweet hubris, stating that: "The president is very history-oriented and history-conscious about the role he is going to play, and is not at all subtle about it."⁸ The President's colossal need for commendation would grow to be fueled by his depraved ventures, from selfishly manipulating the Vietnam conflict to his involvement in the Watergate Scandal. By assuring the legitimacy of his quest for remembrance with an "ends justify the means" mentality, Nixon would gradually lose sight of the boundaries between personal gain, national prosperity, and moral rationale.

THE WAR

Outwardly, Nixon sought peace. Behind the scenes, he retrenched further into war. He began his first term in office with the slogan: "Peace with Honor." Yet Nixon immediately initiated

6. Judith Ehrlich and Rick Goldsmith, *The most dangerous man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers*, (Kovno Communications and InSight Productions, 2009), DVD.

7. Richard Nixon: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1969, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941>.

8. Stanley Kutler, ed., *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes*, (New York: The Free Press, 1997), xiv.

a series of secretive operations in Vietnam including the bombing of Cambodia beginning in March 1969. With this “Operation Menu” kept hidden from public knowledge, support for Nixon’s handling of the war gradually rose throughout 1969 to 54% in August. This popularity was brief. Nixon’s approval rating dropped sharply to 45% in mid-September after the U.S. Army brought murder charges against Lt. William Calley for the horrific My Lai Massacre over a year before.⁹ This event sparked a massive surge in anti-war protests, including the famous October Moratorium in which millions of people around the nation participated. Still, from late September to mid-November, the President’s war approval rating swelled once again, jumping from 52 – 64%.¹⁰ Nixon’s maneuvers created an unexpected paradox: support for the President’s management of Vietnam grew to unprecedented levels, while open opposition to the war simultaneously grew. For Nixon, this indicated that in contrast to the loud, radical, left-wing anti-war protesters, much of Middle America sat quiet, mutely supporting the war effort in opposition to its condemnation.¹¹ This “Silent Majority” feared communist and anti-American influences and reacted defensively against protests denouncing the war effort. President Nixon mobilized this wariness

with his famous “Vietnamization” speech on November 3, 1969, just a couple weeks after the October Moratorium. His address utilized an animated call to patriotism to criticize rash demands for a swift end to American involvement. Instead, the President advocated a gradual process to transition the war effort from American to South Vietnamese hands. He consistently emphasized how America must not choose “the easy way... [But] the right way” in order to obtain a beneficial outcome in Vietnam. Nixon also subtly blamed Democrats for prolonging the war, all the while presenting himself as the honorable shepherd of victory.¹² With the promise of massive troop reductions and a valiant call to arms of the public, Nixon had solidified his position on Vietnam. The war would continue for “Peace with Honor,” while holding fast to Nixon’s policy of diminishing American involvement. This created a dilemma for the President that would linger throughout his time in office as he would progressively need more bombing campaigns in order to replace the thinning presence and use of ground forces required by his new approach.¹³

By 1970, public support fluctuated erratically in the context of constant protesting, troop withdrawals, and multiple bombing campaigns in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Yet it is clear that the

9. Joseph Carroll, *The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison*, (Graph: ‘Richard Nixon’s Approval Rating handling the Vietnam War, 1969-73’), Gallup.com, 15 June 2004. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/11998/iraqvietnam-comparison.aspx>.

10. Carroll, *The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison*.

11. Matthew Motten, *Between War and Peace* (Free Press: New York, 2011).

12. *President Nixon’s Speech on “Vietnamization,” November 3, 1969*, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, pp. 901-909. <http://vietnam.vassar.edu/overview/doc14.html>.

13. Alan Axelrod, *Political History of America’s Wars* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006).

timing of these troop reductions and military offensives strongly correlated. Nixon carefully tried to balance appeasing the public with maintaining martial pressure on Hanoi. On April 20th, in a televised address, Nixon announced the withdrawal of 150,000 soldiers over the next year; he claimed it as a consequence “based entirely off the progress” in Vietnam.¹⁴ Complementing this effort, the President ten days later publicized the plan to invade Cambodia, legitimizing this move by declaring, “I would rather be a one-term President and do what is right than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this Nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.”¹⁵ Therein lay the dichotomy of Nixon’s intentions; he demonstrated his dedication to the “American Way” and his policy of Vietnamization, while also foreshadowing the war’s importance regarding his developing reelection campaign. Even early in his first term, Nixon realized the significance of conciliating the public while simultaneously maintaining a strong hand in Vietnam to prevent the loss of face, for the nation and for himself. An undesirable end to Vietnam, he believed, would prove disastrous to his political ambitions, so its longevity was ultimately a necessity. This was at the root of

Nixon’s “Decent-Interval Strategy,” which proposed the continuation of military force until negotiation terms were agreed upon that would allow enough delay between an American exit and a North Vietnamese victory. If this period was too small, the United States risked looking weak and cowardly, having simply abandoned their allies after so much bloodshed. This was something Nixon was not willing to tolerate.¹⁶

Protests, troop reductions, and bombings continued into 1971, while Nixon’s Vietnam approval slid from 64% in January 1970 to 41% by February 1971.¹⁷¹⁶ This significant decline occurred in the context of calamitous events: the Kent State protest shootings in May 1970 and the proposal of the Democrats’ McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, providing for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops by 31 Dec 1971 (which was rejected by the Senate). Additionally, Nixon’s plan for an offensive on the Laotian Ho Chi Minh Trail in February of 1971 further catalyzed the dwindling public opinion. It came just one month after Congress succeeded in repealing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, rendering the war’s origins illegitimate. Nixon responded characteristically, ignoring the significance of the resolution and holding fast to his self-authorized and ultimately illicit rights as Commander in Chief.¹⁸ Still, the President *was* adhering to his promises of Vietnamization; the Laos incursion was designed

14. “April 20, 1970: Nixon announces more troop withdrawals.” This Day in History, accessed 11 November 2011, <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nixon-announces-more-troop-withdrawals>.

15. Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” April 30, 1970. <http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/nixon430.htm>.

16. Alan Axelrod, *Political History of America's Wars*, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006).

17. Carroll, *The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison*.

18. Robert Longley, “How Congress Ends Wars,” <http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/uscongress/a/congendswar.htm>.

to be a South Vietnamese ground effort only, the first chance to prove their own capabilities. Although initially a success with the South Vietnam forces capturing important territory, within months the North Vietnamese quickly staged a counter-offensive, reclaiming lost ground. This caused great concern inside the Nixon administration as it threatened their “Decent-Interval” and demanded revamped military efforts to prolong the conflict and coincide with the 1972 elections.

THE PENTAGON PAPERS

June 1971 marked a significant turning point in the mentality of Nixon’s administration, when the *New York Times* released a momentous story regarding the Pentagon Papers. This 7,000-page collection of documents detailed an elaborate internal history of American involvement in Vietnam. Former military analyst and member of the prestigious RAND think-tank Daniel Ellsberg, who had gradually realized the terrible nature of the war, leaked the documents to the *Times*. After hearing of the articles pertaining to the Pentagon Papers, Nixon drastically altered much of his administration’s focus and strategy regarding Vietnam and other issues, trivializing each as mere matters affecting his prospect of reelection. Correspondingly, the Pentagon Papers would bring out paranoia, secrecy, and an illicit atmosphere within Washington as the war itself became less of a prominent issue in the wake of developing internal crises.

The Pentagon Papers’ release described the Vietnam War

within the chronological context of *only* the Kennedy and Johnson administrations but held wider ramifications for Nixon’s presidency as well. During the first few weeks after their publication, the President and his confidants regularly debated the merits of the leak. On the one hand, it depicted the dishonest and dishonorable maneuvers of prior Democratic Presidents; yet, on the other, it represented both “a devastating security breach of the greatest magnitude of anything [Security advisor A. Haig had] ever seen,” and the misconduct of the entire governmental institution.¹⁹ The day after the story broke, Bob Haldeman warned the President of these possibly profound and enduring consequences:

[The Papers] don’t hurt us politically so much. They hurt the others. But what they really hurt, and this is what the intellectuals – and one of the motivations of the *Times* must be – is it hurts the government. What it says is... to the ordinary guy, all this is a bunch of gobbledygook. But out of the gobbledygook comes a very clear thing, which is: You can’t trust the government, you can’t believe what they say and you can’t rely on their judgment. And that the implicit infallibility of presidents, which has been an accepted thing in America, is badly hurt by this, because it shows that people do

19. David Coleman, Ken Hughes, and Erin Mahan, *The Nixon Tapes: Transcripts*, Presidential Recording Program, 2011, Meeting tape, June 13, 1971 - 12:18pm, <http://whitehousetapes.net/transcript/Nixon>.

things the president wants to do even though it's wrong. And the president can be wrong.²⁰

Popular doubts in how the government functioned and upheld "democracy" had been mounting as a result of the Vietnam War and other internal issues. With Nixon furthering the gradual expansion of Executive power, he was forced to fall deeper into concealment to preserve his governing authority at the cost of public liberty. To the President, "success" depended on the effectiveness of his actions alone, not on how strictly he upheld democratic principles.

From the beginning, Nixon had to carefully choose how to handle the Pentagon Paper situation. His guarded personality and aggressive attitude managed to trounce ethical reservations and eventually to publicize exactly what he would try so hard to conceal. Possibly supplementing these growing fears, the story in the *Times* came not even one week after Teddy Kennedy's speech about ending the war in which he stated:

The only possible excuse for continuing the discredited policy of Vietnamizing the war, now and in the months ahead, seems to be the President's intention to play his last great card for peace at a time close to November 1972, when the chances will be greater that the action will benefit the coming presidential election campaign... How many more American

soldiers must die, how many innocent Vietnamese civilians must be killed, so that the final end to the war may be announced in 1972 instead of 1971?²¹

Given the fragile scenario in Washington after June of 1971, Nixon initiated a complex political strategy in order to save his place in history, punish his enemies, and guarantee his reelection in 1972. This multi-faceted procedure involved a mass declassification of documents from prior administrations, legal actions regarding the release of the Pentagon Papers, and investigations into everyone involved. Additionally, Nixon ordered undercover operations to be carried out to not only discredit Ellsberg, but also to destroy or prevent any injurious documents from getting out in the future.

Nixon's plans to handle the security breach began chaotically, because Ellsberg had gone underground, his identity as the culprit still unknown. Nearly immediately, the White House initiated printing halts on the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, and it filed suits against the newspapers for illegally publishing classified documents. The President also desperately searched for those accountable. In his conversation with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Nixon seemingly ruled out civilians completely as suspects for the leaking of the Pentagon Papers; he was sure it was the Democrats and proposed plans to put the suspects under

20. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting tape, June 14, 1971 - 8:49 am.

21. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Telephone tape 005-002.

oath to prosecute them for treason, or for perjury if they lied.²² Nixon had always been party-oriented, yet after the Papers' leak, he seemed to barricade himself within his administration. He became constantly suspicious and talked to Kissinger about "really cleaning house when we have the opportunity" and firing people to insure loyalty and security.²³

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Throughout the week following the story in the *Times*, Nixon and his trusted advisors discussed a strategy to break into the Brookings Institute (another think-tank like RAND) to steal documents detrimental to Lyndon Johnson, along with any damaging to his own presidency. He voiced his concern to Kissinger saying, "they'll have the whole story of the Menu Series," referring to the secret bombings of Cambodia and Laos throughout 1969 and 1970.²⁴ He ordered the break-in to be "implemented on a thievery basis. Goddamn it, get in and get those files. Blow the safe and get it."²⁵ For Nixon, the Pentagon Papers represented a threat to the order of American politics, and he could not afford to overlook the leak if he hoped to maintain control of not only sensitive information but the fate of his administration. His aides agreed, Presidential aide Roger Colson bluntly explained

that, "if you allow something like [the leak] to go unchallenged then you are encouraging it; an unending flow of it...but if you nail it hard it helps to keep people in line and discourage others."²⁶ Nixon was determined to prevent anything of the sort from happening again with the formidable powers of the Executive branch at his disposal.

Eventually Daniel Ellsberg revealed himself as the "leaker" and even held a televised interview with Walter Cronkite. However, the effect of the Pentagon Papers seemed to be waning. Ellsberg described this reality, saying that the American public "hear it, they learn from it, they understand it, and then proceed to ignore it."²⁷ But Nixon could never believe that Ellsberg had carried out such a large-scale security breach alone. Instead, he imagined a massive conspiracy against his administration. The President, Kissinger, and Haldeman discussed polygraphing a massive number of government employees to find who leaked the papers. Nixon demanded that even "if they're on the golf course, on the tennis courts, going to New York or to Boston or someplace or to Nassau, get those fuckers back here and polygraph them. Is that clear? Every goddamn one that had access to it. Now I mean it. Everyone."²⁸ Nixon matched his efforts to prevent leaks regarding *his* administration by

22. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting tape, June 13, 1971 - 3:09pm.

23. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting tape, June 13, 1971 - 3:09pm.

24. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting Tape, June 15, 1971 - 10:39am.

25. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting Tape, June 17, 1971 - 5:15pm.

26. Rmm413c, "NIXON TAPES: "Fight All Out" over Pentagon Papers (Chuck Colson)," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDhsmHGYZi&feature=related>.

27. Ehrlich and Goldsmith.

28. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting Tape, July 24, 1971 - 9:43am. <http://whitehousetapes.net/transcript/nixon>.

continuing discussions of releasing damaging information about his enemies. They discussed linking Ellsberg to communist groups and planned to provide stories of him killing innocent Vietnamese civilians from the back of a Jeep as well, regardless of their validity.²⁹ Ultimately, they also devised plans of breaking into his psychiatrist's office to find documents damaging to his credibility and mental stability. Nixon's dirty tricks would continue to proliferate as he fell further into secrecy.

Nixon's attempts to quiet the media failed. On June 30, 1971, the United States Supreme Court ruled that, in the case of *New York Times Co. vs. the United States*, there was no act of treason and that the media was permitted to resume printing the contents of the Pentagon Papers. In response to this, efforts to discredit the "conspiracy" intensified as Nixon advised Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell to not "worry about [Ellsberg's] trial...try him in the press...we want to destroy him in the press."³⁰ He didn't want Ellsberg "to be brought up until after the election" and wanted to utilize the media to separate himself from the leak, trial, and issues they brought up.³¹ Nixon continued to organize his infamous break-in team, known as the "Plumbers," who would later carry out the plan to break into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, delegating CIA officer Howard

Hunt and FBI official Gordon Liddy as its supervisors. The Plumbers would ultimately grow to be a part of a larger organization identified as CREEP, or the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. On top of this illegal organization, President Nixon continued to push for leaks regarding documents injurious to anyone he viewed as threatening. He described leaking as "a game," legitimizing his actions by saying "We're up against an enemy, a conspiracy, their using any means, we are going to use any means as necessary."³² For the President, the Pentagon Papers threatened the stability of his campaign. Vietnam was supposed to boost his chances; now there was a risk of it destroying him, directly and indirectly. The administration's illicit approach was now in full tilt and would not slow down as ethical judgment increasingly fell to the wayside.

The leak had created a lasting foundation for the Administration's growing misconduct. It began as efforts to prevent future security breaches, but as the story of the leak progressed, the public gradually overlooked its significance. Nixon grew to see the Pentagon Papers as a useful tool instead of a threat to his political position in Washington or Vietnam. The national majority's seemingly apathetic attitude regarding their release was disheartening. He planned to re-release the Papers to the media, along with the accumulated documents damaging to any and all Democrats: "Get the eyes off of Vietnam [leading up to the 1972 election]. It

29. Stanley Kutler, ed., *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes*, (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 6; Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting Tape, July 24, 1971 - 9:43am. <http://whitehousetapes.net/transcript/nixon>

30. Kutler, 6.

31. Kutler, 11.

32. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, 2011, Meeting Tape, July 24, 1971 - 9:43; Kutler, 8.

gets them thinking about the past rather than our present problems.”³³ He reiterated this important agenda explaining how the media was the only option; bringing them to the Senate floor or the Supreme Court would be worthless. “If it goes to Congress...John [Erlichman] feels that we couldn’t control them. In terms of leaking it into the court, it won’t come out until after the election, which is too late to do us any good.”³⁴ Nixon needed the Vietnam War and the fallout from the Pentagon Papers leak to *survive*, as his administration was beginning to dissolve. This quandary became all the more clear as the election drew nearer and the Watergate scandal would grow out of the activities of CREEP and the Plumbers, all with Nixon’s knowledge and even direction.

THE CONCEALED CAMPAIGN

Throughout 1971, domestic issues involving Vietnam dominated discussion within the White House, but the war abroad remained an important issue for the public as bombings and protests continued. Nixon seemed to be making little progress in Vietnam, good or bad, still holding true to promises of troop reductions while continuing to initiate military campaigns. This was exemplified by the bombings of Haiphong beginning in late March and with the mining of many North Vietnamese harbors. Similarly, peace talks with Hanoi continued to begin and end abruptly, something quite important to Nixon in order to maintain the impression of

improvement in Vietnam. As part of Nixon’s “Mad Man Theory,” he intended to use sporadic bombings as a way to keep Hanoi guessing in order to push North Vietnam toward beneficial negotiations. His “Decent-Interval” plan relied on the success of these negotiations, still in the works, because only favorable terms could provide any hopes of saving face in Vietnam.

In 1972, Nixon continued down the path towards his eventual resignation as he arranged a diverse array of actions to promote his campaign while damaging the Democrats. This included influencing Democratic Senator Eugene McCarthy to run as an independent in order to steal votes in the election, leaking documents about the Bay of Pigs, and releasing tax returns from contributors to candidates Hubert Humphrey and Ed Muskie.³⁵ Additionally, Nixon ordered wiretaps on the Democratic nominee for President George McGovern because he was “affecting the peace negotiations.”³⁶ On this note, the administration also sought to release photographs of anti-war protestors supporting McGovern holding signs saying, “Communism must win in Southeast Asia.” Nixon planned to gain support for his handling of the negotiations by portraying the protestors and McGovern as un-patriotic.³⁷ Furthermore and most notoriously, Nixon ordered a break-in at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters. These occurred on two separate occasions

33. Kutler, 8.

34. Kutler, 34.

35. Kutler, 27, 28-89.

36. Kutler, 92.

37. Kutler, 155-56.

in May and June of 1972. Both were failed efforts, but the misconduct of these illegal entries was discovered, and seven of Nixon's "Plumbers" were indicted for the break-in. They remained unassociated with the administration as a whole, and they would not go to court until the next year. Nixon and his aides rejoiced greatly over this as they assumed they were out of harm's way.³⁸ The cover up began as Nixon fell further into secrecy plagued by doubts regarding the loyalty of his personnel. Once again, the election took primary importance as Haldeman optimistically planned ahead for their next term saying, "I would think that we could get some people with guts in the second term, when we don't care about the repercussions."³⁹

Concurrently, the war once again grew in importance. With the Watergate indictments delayed until after the election, Nixon once again focused on utilizing the Vietnam situation to benefit his campaign. His "Mad-Man" tactics were epitomized during a meeting in May of 1972, where he raged about how America must intensify the bombing offensive to draw a favorable scenario for that November's election:

Here's what we're gonna do. We're gonna get through it. We're going to cream them. This is not anger. This is all business. This is not "petulance." That's all bullshit.

38. "7 indictments close US Probe into Watergate Bugging Case," *Kentucky New Era*, September 16, 1972, 144..<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=266&dat=19720901&id=ovArAAAIAIBAJ&sjid=EGkFAAAAIAIBAJ&pg=827,1616375>.

39. Kutler, 114.

I should have done it long ago. I just didn't follow my instincts. I'll see that the United States does not lose. I'm putting it quite bluntly. I'll be quite precise. South Vietnam may lose. But the United States cannot lose . . . For once, we've got to use the maximum power of this country . . . against this shit-ass little country: to win the war.⁴⁰

Nixon's war policy was now completely defined by the Decent-Interval Strategy; all hopes for legitimate military triumph had vanished. Incursions by the South Vietnamese supported by American bombing campaigns would continue throughout the year as peace talks, particularly between Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho, seemed to be progressing. The election approached, and on October 26, 1972, Kissinger announced at a press conference: "We believe peace is at hand."⁴¹ This was exactly the pre-election boost that Nixon had planned on; his Presidential approval ratings reached a height of 62% after Kissinger's declaration.⁴² Nixon won the 1972 election by a landslide, fulfilling his ambition for a second term. For Kissinger, the war in Vietnam was the linchpin of Nixon's campaign against McGovern; Nixon had "made Vietnam your issue and his weakness."⁴³ Still,

40. Daniel Ellsberg, *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and The Pentagon Papers*, (New York: Penguin, 2002), 419.

41. "Transcript: Peace is at Hand, 1968-1973," *American Experience*, 29 March, 2005, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/series/pt.09.html>.

42. Carroll, *The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison*.

43. Rmm413d, "Richard Nixon Tapes: Election Night 1972 (Henry Kissinger)," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBLR8OeqimQ>.

the situation in Vietnam lingered.

INEVITABLE ENDS

Peace talks dissolved. President Nguyen Van Thieu proved unwilling to sign a treaty that allowed Northern troops to remain in South Vietnam. Kissinger then refused to go back to Vietnam after the negotiations failed frustratingly. So Nixon, with renewed plans to push Hanoi toward favorable terms, sent the more assertive National Security advisor Alexander Haig as his new ambassador. Increasingly aggressive policy led to the initiation of Operation Linebacker II, bombing campaigns that devastated North Vietnam and became known as the “Christmas Bombings.” This caused a sharp drop in public opinion as Nixon’s approval rating dropped to 51% at the beginning of 1973.⁴⁴ The President still pushed for acceptable terms, something that seemed increasingly detached from reality. With the Watergate scandal growing, Nixon needed another boost in support and decided to push negotiations. On January 27, 1973, all parties signed the Paris Peace Accords, marking an official end to direct military involvement by the United States. This monumental event for the American people led to an explosion in Nixon’s approval rating to an unprecedented level of 67%.⁴⁵ However, unknown to the public, Nixon *still* had plans to expand the conflict as he undoubtedly expected North Vietnam to violate the treaty agreements allowing for military action to be resumed. But

this would once again be affected by the developing Watergate scandal, which ultimately prevented the administration from carrying out plans to resume the fighting. Henry Kissinger accurately portrayed this concept explaining how the “tragedy was a domestic situation...In April [1973], Watergate blew up, and we were castrated...the second tragedy was that we were not permitted to enforce the agreement [Paris peace treaty]...I think it’s reasonable to assume [Nixon] would have bombed the hell out of them during April.”⁴⁶

Instead, Nixon sat helplessly on April 30th when Watergate was linked to high-ups in his administration, and he was forced to announce the resignations of his beloved and trusted associates Bob Haldeman and Domestic Counsel Chair John Erlichman. With this, along with the unfolding cover up and Nixon’s involvement (supplemented by the release of the “Smoking Gun” Nixon Tapes in July), the executive branch crumbled and became an example of corruption, deceit, and immoral self-interest. In order to permanently dismantle this Executive misconduct, Congress passed the War Powers Act in May, giving the legislature sole authority to order military intervention. Additionally, with the realization of Nixon’s manipulative government, Congress passed House Joint Resolution 636 on July 1, which stated that, “no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by

44. Carroll, *The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison*.

45. Carroll, *The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison*.

46. Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam*, (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 7-8.

United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.”⁴⁷ Finally, Congress reached a lasting conclusion of the Vietnam conflict as it carried out actions to prevent the abuse of the separation of powers; after lengthy trials, Richard Nixon became the first and only American President to resign from office August 9, 1974, the foreseen outcome since the events of mid-1972.

Richard Nixon came into office in 1969 with dreams of victory in Vietnam, politics, and popular history. Instead of the war’s conclusion bringing him admiration and respect, it was actually linked to Nixon’s own destruction. Throughout his presidency, Nixon and his administration continuously overstepped their legitimate power in order to secure longevity in office. Along with many political transgressions, this involved manipulating the situation in Vietnam to provide a needed public support boost leading up to the 1972 election. Vietnamization was a policy introduced in order to delay the conflict by appeasing the American population while also allowing for continued military involvement. The evolution of the “Decent-Interval” and “Mad-Man” strategies were part of Nixon’s plan to utilize Vietnam for political success. However, all of his secrecy and illegal activity backfired and provided an unsatisfactory exit from Vietnam while taking an administration

from honor and praise to shame and disdain. “The Pentagon Papers affair ... led directly to the unraveling and final disintegration of the Nixon presidency,” which would then give Congress unopposed authority to end American involvement in Vietnam.⁴⁸ This would later be tested by Gerald Ford, Nixon’s successor, when he asked Congress for an enormous aid package for South Vietnam during the North’s resumed offensive; however, Congress rejected Ford’s request, setting a precedence of Congressional authority. Without this enduring result, one can only wonder how long America would have remained involved in the military conflict in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the progression of Nixon’s administration and the Vietnam War from 1969–1973 would provide an potent example of some of the issues at the heart of the Cold War. It was not only in Southeast Asia that America battled to fend off communism while preserving its own prosperity and influence around the globe. But to what degree aspirations of democratic safeguarding outweighed selfish geopolitical ambition during this period may forever remain a mystery.

47. “Bill Summary & Status 93rd Congress (1973 - 1974) H.J.RES.636,” Library of Congress, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d093:HJ00636:@@L&summ2=m&>.

48. Michael Belknap, review of *The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case* by David Rudenstine, *American Historical Review* 102 (1997): 1263-1264.



A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUARANTINE

Kelly Drews

Quarantines have been employed for thousands of years as safeguards against the spread of disease. Early in the history of human civilizations, isolation and confinement of ill persons were the predecessors of quarantine. As an understanding of diseases and employment of quarantines evolved, documentation regarding their use increased. This paper focuses most heavily on the latter history of quarantine, as more primary sources exist from those time periods. This article aims to better define quarantine within the parameters of human technology and, therefore, to gain a deeper understanding of its uses in relation to advancements made in science and medicine. Quarantine, as a technology, will be examined only in the context of Europe and the United States up to the year 1850, as scientific advances made following the Industrial Revolution led to rapid and varied medicinal responses to disease outbreaks besides traditional quarantines. In addition, due to the prevalence of


quarantines following the Black Death, only a few case studies after that plague will be discussed.

QUARANTINE AS A TECHNOLOGY

Quarantine differs greatly from isolation; it requires a theoretical knowledge about the causes and methods of disease transmission. However, for the purposes of this article, isolations will be examined as a precursor of true quarantines. Throughout much of early epidemiological history, isolation, not quarantine, was the primary method of halting the spread of pandemics, because people did not understand the concept of an incubation period.¹

The historical significance and impact of quarantine cannot be understood without distinguishing the scientific principles that quarantine employs. The key concept utilized in true quarantine is germ theory, which holds that

1. "Quarantine and Isolation," *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*, last modified October 24, 2011, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/>.



Isolation is established when those people who belong in the red circle are restricted in their movements. Quarantine occurs when those people who belong in the yellow circle have their movement restricted as well.¹

1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Quarantine and Isolation.” Last modified October 24, 2011. Accessed December 5, 2011. <http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/>.

microscopic organisms called bacteria are the cause of disease. Germ theory, first postulated in the mid-nineteenth century, was supported by the work of Louis Pasteur, who published his findings in 1861.² In 1876, German physician Robert Koch “traced the life history of the organism responsible for anthrax, a disease of cattle and sheep.”³ Six years later, in 1882, Koch successfully traced tuberculosis, “first human disease microorganism.”⁴ Though Koch’s discovery was monumental in retrospect, germ theory did not become part of scientific

and medical canon until the early twentieth century.⁵ Koch’s contemporaries were trained to believe that, “most diseases were caused by miasmas, undisciplined lifestyles, and anything other than tiny *living* organisms.”⁶

An important offshoot of germ theory and an idea pivotal to the technology of quarantine is the notion of the incubation period of disease. Anyone who carries a pathogen responsible for a disease is considered infected, though not all carriers may be symptomatic (*figure 2*). Symptoms of a disease are not always caused by the pathogen itself. Sometimes, the symptoms occur due to the response of the immune system in its attempt

2. Charles De Paolo, *Epidemic Disease and Human Understanding* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2006), 154.

3. Jo N. Hays, *The Burdens of Disease: Epidemics and Human Response in Western History* (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 150.

4. Hayes, *The Burdens*, 150.

5. Charles De Paolo, *Epidemic Disease and Human Understanding*, 155.

6. Sheldon Watts, *Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism* (Wiltshire, United Kingdom: Redwood Books, 1997), xii.

to fight off the infection. An excellent example of an immune response symptom is a fever, which is the body's attempt to control the spread of harmful microbes through internal temperature regulation.⁷ Many microorganisms exhibit a small tolerance range for heat; by increasing the temperature of the environment in which they grow (the body), the immune system attempts to kill invading pathogens.⁸ Pathogenic bacteria take time to grow and multiply within their host. Until they do so in sufficient numbers, they are often overlooked by the immune system. The time between when a pathogen enters the body and when it first causes symptoms is the incubation period.⁹

An example of a disease with an incubation period is Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The organism responsible for AIDS is Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), which is transmitted through the exchange of bodily fluids, such as blood, semen, and vaginal fluids.¹⁰ When HIV enters the body, the virus infects cells that belong to the immune system, known as lymphocytes. As the virus replicates, it slowly

destroys the body's ability to protect itself from infection, cell by cell. Eventually, the immune system is overwhelmed and the individual develops AIDS.¹¹ "The median incubation period [for adults] from HIV infection until development of AIDS is estimated at approximately 10 years."¹² At any point during those ten years, an HIV positive individual is considered infectious and able to pass on the disease to others.¹³

Rudi Volti, author of *Society and Technological Change*, defines technology as "a system based on the application of knowledge, manifested in physical objects and organizational forms, for the attainment of specific goals."¹⁴ It is important to note that by such definitions, technologies are employed even when the users have theories regarding how to attain their specific goals based on false information. Therefore, though for thousands of years people had no knowledge of germ theory or the true methods of disease transmission, they employed quarantines as a technology against the spread of epidemics. With the work of Koch and Pasteur, the scientific basis for why quarantines work was finally unveiled, though quarantine as a technology remained unchanged

7. Rudi Volti, *Society and Technological Change* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 6.

8. Robert Benoit, "Honors General Microbiology Lecture" (lecture, Virginia Tech, November 15, 2011).

9. MedicineNet, "Definition of Incubation period," last modified November 6, 2001, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=18956>.

10. "HIV/AIDS," *Mayo Clinic*, last modified October 20, 2011, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/hiv-aids/DS00005>.

11. Michael Madigan, John Martinko, Paul Dunlap, and David Clark, *Biology of Microorganisms* (Glenview, IL: Pearson Education, Inc., 2009), 995-996.

12. Dennis Osmond, "Epidemiology of Disease Progression in HIV," *University of California San Francisco*, last modified May 1998, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite?page=kb-03-01-04>.

13. Madigan et al., *Biology of Microorganisms*, 996.

14. Volti, *Society and Technological Change*, 6.

as a correct understanding for how a technology works is not necessary for the definition of technology.

EARLY USES OF QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION

One of the earliest mentions of isolation is found in the Biblical book of Leviticus, the third book of the Jewish Torah. Though there is no exact date regarding the age of Leviticus, most biblical scholars agree that it was written between the fifth and eighth century BCE.¹⁵ Because Leviticus was added to continuously over the period of several centuries, the relevant chapters could have been written as early as the twenty-first century BCE.¹⁶ Jewish knowledge regarding the usefulness of isolation shows up in the thirteenth chapter, in response to a skin disease (most likely leprosy, caused by *Mycobacterium leprae*).¹⁷ Jewish Rabbis certainly had no knowledge of the bacteria, but they did know the value of isolation:

The priest is to examine the sore on the skin, and if the hair in the sore has turned white and the sore appears to be more than skin deep, it is a defiling skin disease. When the priest examines that person, he shall pronounce them ceremonially unclean. If the shiny spot on the skin is white but does not appear to be more than skin

deep and the hair in it has not turned white, the priest is to isolate the affected person for seven days. On the seventh day the priest is to examine them, and if he sees that the sore is unchanged and has not spread in the skin, he is to isolate them for another seven days.¹⁸

Technology, as previously defined, is a vast field, but it does have restrictions. Supernatural means of attaining specific goals, such as prayer or belief in the divine intervention, do not incorporate technologies. As historian Maurice Richter states, “technology requires that natural means be employed: we shall not allow... for a technology of prayer.”¹⁹ Leviticus offers an excellent example of both the expansiveness and the boundaries of the definition of technology. In the fourteenth chapter, Jewish Rabbis were instructed to:

Bring [the afflicted] for their cleansing to the priest at the entrance to the tent of meeting, before the Lord. The priest is to take the lamb for the guilt offering, together with the log of oil, and wave them before the Lord as a wave offering... In this way the priest will make atonement before the Lord on behalf


15. Mary Douglas, *Leviticus as Literature* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 7.

16. Douglas, *Leviticus*, 8.

17. “Leprosy,” *World Health Organization*, last modified February, 2010, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs101/en/>.

18. “Leviticus 13 (New International Version),” *Bible Gateway*, accessed December 5, 2011, [http://www.btiblegateway.com/passage/?search=Leviticus 13&version=NIV](http://www.btiblegateway.com/passage/?search=Leviticus%2013&version=NIV).

19. Maurice Richter, *Technology and Social Complexity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 10.



“The sequence of events during a simple, directly transmitted disease. The dynamics of the disease are shown in A and the dynamics of infectiousness in B. The victims may cease to be infectious before the end of the symptomatic period.”¹

1. Susan Scott and Christopher Duncan, *Biology of Plagues: Evidence from Historical Populations*, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22.

of the one to be cleansed.²⁰

Rabbis trusted that their God would cure the afflicted and protect the uninfected. Such methods of disease prevention do not fall within the definition of technology, and thus do not qualify as quarantine, or even isolation.

Nearly a thousand years later, in 541 CE, the first recorded outbreak of what came to be known as bubonic plague took place. Originating in Arabia and Pelusium, the plague “inundated Syria, Persia and Palestine with sudden outbreaks of fever followed by collapse, emergence of buboes, delirium, vomiting of blood, and death.”²¹ Known as the Plague of Justinian, the disease reached the Byzantine capital of Constantinople in 542. According

to the historian Procopius of Caesarea (c.490/507-c.560s CE), the disease killed “up to ten thousand daily and wiped out 40 percent of the capital city.”²²

Emperor Justinian I (482-565 CE) contracted the plague, but he survived and became immune to its effects. Realizing the magnitude of the outbreak, he quickly set up procedures for disposing of the many corpses in his capital. Public money was set aside for the payment of gravediggers, and boats contracted to dump bodies at sea.²³ In addition, a series of laws were enacted against those individuals he believed to be most responsible for the epidemic, including Jews, Samaritans, pagans, heretics, Arians, Montanists, and homosexuals.²⁴ These laws created

20. Leviticus 14 (New International Version).

21. Mary Ellen Snodgrass, *World Epidemics: A Cultural Chronology of Disease from Prehistory to the Era of SARS* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 20-21.

22. Snodgrass, *World Epidemics*, 21.

23. Jo N. Hays, *Epidemics and Pandemics: Their Impacts on Human History* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005), 26.

24. Lester Little, *Plague and the End of Antiquity*:

an artificial (and very porous) quarantine around Constantinople.

Justinian's discriminatory laws created a sort of quarantine, though he had no knowledge of what caused the disease to spread. People who were considered different from the Christians of Constantinople were accused of causing the terrible outbreak. As a result, Justinian attempted to halt their movement. These minorities were no guiltier in their role as plague carriers than the Christians who had the disease, but racism and aggression against dissident groups of Justinian's reign played a major role in their branding as the source of the epidemic.²⁵ The quarantine enacted by Justinian proved virtually useless and did nothing to stop the spread of the plague. However, it still qualifies as a quarantine technology, a failed technology, but a technology nonetheless.

THE BLACK DEATH

The use of quarantine rapidly expanded during the Black Death of the fourteenth century. Originally appearing in the Far East, the disease that would come to be synonymous with plague first emerged in Europe as nothing more than a rumor in 1346. Over the next five to ten years the plague exploded onto the Western world, killing millions and altering the fabric of every society it touched.²⁶ Italian author Giovanni Boccaccio

(1313-1357) wrote one of the most famous descriptions of the Black Death in his *Decameron*:

For in the early spring of the year we have mentioned, the plague began, in a terrifying and extraordinary manner, to make its disastrous effects apparent. It did not take the form it had assumed in the East, where if anyone bled from the nose it was an obvious portent of certain death. On the contrary, its earliest symptom, in men and women alike, was the appearance of certain swellings in the groin or armpit, some of which were egg-shaped whilst others were roughly the size of the common apple... Against these maladies, it seemed that all the advice of physicians and all the power of medicine were profitless and unavailing... few of those who caught it ever recovered, and in most cases death occurred within three days from the appearance of the symptoms we have described, some people dying more rapidly than others, the majority without any fever or other complications.²⁷

For years medical historians debated the true cause of the Black Death. The most common pathogen proposed by modern researchers is *Yersinia pestis*, which causes bubonic plague.²⁸

The Pandemic of 541-750 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 113.

25. Little, *Plague*, 113.

26. Philip Ziegler, *The Black Death* (Wolfeboro Falls, NH: Alan Sutton Publishing, Inc., 1991), 1-3.

27. Giovanni Boccaccio, *The Decameron*, translated by G. H. McWilliam (London: Penguin, 1972), 50-51.

28. "Plague Fact Sheet," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, last modified March 30, 2005, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/plague/facts.htm>.

While there were many historical accounts, the symptoms described by contemporary writers sometimes conflicted.²⁹ In addition, modern biologists and epidemiologists have had some “difficulties explaining how either bubonic or pneumonic [a similar disease] plague could have moved with such terrible speed and savagery.”³⁰ In 2011, scientists working at McMaster University confirmed the genetic strain of *Y. pestis* found in London plague victims, proving that the bubonic plague was indeed the disease responsible for the Black Death.³¹

The vector of the Black Death has traditionally been attributed to fleas, specifically *Xenopsylla cheopis*, and the rats that carried them. However, a small group of historians, led by Jean-Noel Biraben, believe that a human flea, *Pulex irritans*, was the true vector of the disease. Others, such as Paul Slack, contend that, “though *Pulex irritans* may transmit plague in certain circumstances, modern work suggests that major epidemics require a rodent epizootic as their foundation.”³²

29. Ziegler, *The Black Death*, 9.

30. Hays, *The Burdens of Disease*, 38.

31. Kirsten I. Bos, Verena J. Schuenemann, G. Brian Golding, Hernán A. Burbano, Nicholas Waglechner, Brian K. Coombes, Joseph B. McPhee, Sharon N. DeWitte, Matthias Meyer, Sarah Schmedes, James Wood, David J. D. Earn, D. Ann Herring, Peter Bauer, Hendrik N. Poinar, and Johannes Krause, “A draft genome of *Yersinia pestis* from victims of the Black Death,” *Nature*, 478, no. 7370 (2007): 506-510, <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v478/n7370/full/nature0549.html> (accessed December 5, 2011).

32. Paul Slack, “The Black Death Past and Present. 2. Some Historical Problems,” *Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 83, no. 4

Fleas, as the vector of the Black Death, proved essential to the successful use of quarantines. By halting any movement of people and especially clothing, which was often contaminated with pathogen carrying fleas, from plague areas, quarantines achieved limited success against the spread of the disease.

The Black Death took an enormous toll on Europe’s population (figure 3). Though reliable information is scarce, between 1347 and 1351, the “Black Death was darting about, mortality varied from an eighth to two-thirds of a region’s population.”³³ By the time it subsided, 20 million people had died in Europe alone, reducing the population to 80 million people.³⁴ The epidemic completely halted the rise in human population begun in 5000 BCE; it killed so many people that it would take Europe more than 150 years to return to its former population.³⁵

By the late fourteenth century, the effects of the plague were so bad that Italian city-states resorted to desperate measures in an attempt to preserve public health. Without definite knowledge of what caused the disease, Italian health commissioners fell back

(1989): 461-463, <http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.vt.edu:8080/science?ob=MiamiImageURL&cid=272971&user=513551&pii=0035920389902472&check=y&origin=&coverDate=31-Aug-1989&view=c&wchp=dGLzVlk-zSkWz&md5=8103080c59ec4d7861450a81e3f1a8bb/1-s2.0-0035920389902472-ma> (accessed December 5, 2011).

33. Watts, *Epidemics and History*, 1.

34. Irwin Sherman, *Twelve Diseases That Changed Our World* (Washington, DC: ASM Press, 2007), 68.

35. Sherman, *Twelve Diseases*, 69.

on a common theory that the air itself was infected. In their view, the only way to stop the epidemic was to somehow clean the air. "In their pursuit of corruption-free air, commissioners inspected wine, fish, meat, and water supplies; they worried about sewage; they regulated burials, and decreed the destruction of the clothing of the deceased."³⁶ These measures may have saved lives by cutting down on secondary sources of infection. But besides burning the clothing of the deceased, they did little to curb the rampant spread of the plague.³⁷ More extreme measures were taken by Viscount Bernabo of Reggio, who ordered, "every person with plague be taken out of the city in to the fields, there to die or recover."³⁸

The doctrines of contagion set up in Italy led to two vitally important "forms of public health control... municipal quarantine and isolation of the victims."³⁹ In 1374, both Genoa and Venice began determining the ports of origin of incoming ships, and "turned away any coming from infected areas."⁴⁰ Three years later, in 1377, the first maritime quarantine was established at Venice's trading colony of Ragusa. All ships that visited the colony were required by law to anchor outside the harbor for a period of

thirty days while port authorities inspected the crew and cargo in order to determine any potential health threat.⁴¹ The quarantine law consisted of four tenets:

- (1) That citizens or visitors from plague-endemic areas would not be admitted into Ragusa until they had first remained in isolation for 1 month;
- (2) that no person from Ragusa was permitted go to the isolation area, under penalty of remaining there for 30 days;
- (3) that persons not assigned by the Great Council to care for those being quarantined were not permitted to bring food to isolated persons, under penalty of remaining with them for 1 month; and
- (4) that whoever did not observe these regulations would be fined and subjected to isolation for 1 month.⁴²

Ultimately, the Italian city-states extended their quarantine time requirement to forty days. Originally termed *trentino*, the adjustment to forty days of quarantine caused the name to be modified to *quarantino*, a "term derived from the Italian word *quaranta*, which means 'forty.'⁴³ Some suggest this was based on the "Hippocratic belief that the 40th day distinguished

36. Hays, *The Burdens of Disease*, 54.

37. Hays, *The Burdens of Disease*, 54.

38. Paul Sehdev, "The Origin of Quarantine," *Clinical Infectious Diseases*, 35, no. 9 (2002): 1071-1072, <http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/9/1071.full>.

39. Hays, *The Burdens of Disease*, 54.

40. Joseph Byrne, *Encyclopedia of Pestilence, Pandemics, and Plagues*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 483.

41. Byrne, *Encyclopedia*, 483.

42. Paul Sehdev, "The Origin of Quarantine," *Clinical Infectious Diseases*, 35, no. 9 (2002): 1071-1072, <http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/9/1071.full>.

43. Paul Sehdev, "The Origin of Quarantine," *Clinical Infectious Diseases*, 35, no. 9 (2002): 1071-1072, <http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/9/1071.full>.



Unknown Artist, "Great Plague of London-1665," *Wikipedia Commons*

acute diseases from chronic."⁴⁴ Other authors contend that it was changed due to Christian practices, such as the observation of Lent, the length of the great flood of Noah, or the length of Jesus' stay in the wilderness. Regardless of the reason, the increased quarantine time offered an improvement; it better insured that the ships in question did not pose a health risk to the city.

In addition to establishing a maritime quarantine for incoming ships, Italian health officials instituted a "reactive quarantine – the restriction of infected persons and their families (and often anyone they had been in contact with) to their homes as a

means of preventing further spread of disease."⁴⁵ Often the authorities would assign individuals to guard the homes of the quarantined in order to insure they did not escape. In Milan, "where cases of the plague were first discovered, all the occupants of the three houses concerned, dead or alive, sick or well, were walled up inside and left to perish."⁴⁶ This extreme action appeared to have worked, as out of all the large Italian city-states, Milan was the least afflicted with the Black Death.⁴⁷

In 2007, archeologists working in Italy's Venetian Lagoon discovered a mass grave of more than 1,500 victims of the bubonic plague (see Figure 4). In Venice, those who caught the plague were immediately sent to the small island of Lazzaretto Vecchio. Once there, any physicians brave or foolish enough to tend to the infected treated them until they either survived or perished. Lazzaretto Vecchio may have been the world's first lazaret, or quarantine colony.⁴⁸

The forty-day quarantine was strictly adhered to and maintained for the next 300 years throughout Europe. In northern Italy, the quarantine continued in order to avoid the importation of diseases to their busy commercial ports. In 1652, the city of Genoa quarantined people "who had been in close and

45. Byrne, *Encyclopedia of Pestilence, Pandemics, and Plagues*, 483.

46. Ziegler, *The Black Death*, 38.

47. Ziegler, *The Black Death*, 38.

48. Maria Valsecchi, National Geographic, "Mass Plague Graves Found on Venice "Quarantine" Island." last modified August 29, 2007, accessed December 5, 2011. <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/08/070829-venice-plague.html>.

44. Byrne, *Encyclopedia of Pestilence, Pandemics, and Plagues*, 483.

direct contact with infected people or merchandise” for the standard period of forty days.⁴⁹ In addition, maritime vessels had to follow strict procedures: Vessels from England, if they come directly without touching at infected or suspected paces, and with clean bills, are allowed entry after a few days; first, however, goods and merchandise are sent to the pesthouse where they are purified for 20 days, and if they touch any of the above [infected] places they must observe complete quarantine.

Vessels coming from ports uninfected, but under suspicion, are subject to quarantine for 30 or 35 days according to the suspicion held, but nevertheless the goods are sent immediately to the pesthouse.

If perchance any deaths occur or if anyone falls sick during the voyage or during the time the quarantine is being observed, the quarantine is to be extended for 50 or 60 days according to the danger and circumstances; the people and the goods are to be sent to the pesthouse.

Vessels from the Levant are quarantined for 30, 35, 40 days according to information received and if they come with a clean bill; the goods at the pesthouse are purified for the same length of time.⁵⁰

The forty-day quarantine proved to be an effective formula for handling outbreaks of the plague. According to current estimates, the bubonic plague had a 37-day period from infection to death; therefore, the European quarantines would have been

highly successful in determining the health of crews from potential trading and supply ships.⁵¹ The prevalence of a forty-day quarantine throughout the continent suggests one causative agent of the Black Death, further reinforcing the notion that *Yersinia pestis* was the pathogen responsible.⁵²

In England, as in the rest of Europe, the Black Death lingered and tormented people for several hundred years. England’s major cities were particularly vulnerable; poor sanitary conditions and massive overcrowding facilitated outbreaks.⁵³ The last in a long series of pandemics, the Great Plague of London in 1665, killed between 75,000 and 100,000 of the capital city’s citizens.⁵⁴ During the summer months the death rates rose, peaking in September “when 7,165 Londoners died in one week.”⁵⁵

In the English countryside, the small village of Eyam instituted a self-imposed quarantine in 1666, after its citizens began dying of disease. While the cause of the pandemic was traditionally attributed to the Black Death, the rate at which people were killed was far too fast to insure the proper incubation time of *Yersinia pestis*. In addition, the location of Eyam (161 miles north of London) and the type of dwellings produced

51. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 361.

52. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 383.

53. Ziegler, *The Black Death*, 119-126.

54. “The Great Plague of London, 1665,” *Contagion: Historical Views of Diseases and Epidemics*, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/contagion/plague.html>.

55. “The Great Plague of 1665-6,” *The National Archives*, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/lesson49.htm>.

49. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 382.

50. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*.

in the village impeded the spread of the rats necessary to establish an epizootic base for the bubonic plague. Finally, some symptoms of the Eyam disease did not fit traditional plague descriptions, such as “a sickly, sweet cloying sensation in the nostrils.”⁵⁶ One explanation of such symptoms could be the necrosis of the internal organs, which does not fit the profile of the bubonic plague. What no one realized at the time was that if the disease was indeed the bubonic plague as they suspected, the heroic quarantine would “have no effect on a hypothetical rat population which would be free to move to adjacent villages and so continue the spread of the epidemic.”⁵⁷ However, the successful quarantine further reinforced the theory that bubonic plague did not cause the outbreak.⁵⁸

Regardless of the true cause of the Eyam epidemic, at the urging of William Mompesson, the Rector of Eyam, quarantine was imposed in late May or early June of 1666. By mutual agreement, the citizens of the village agreed to confine themselves to “within a circle of about half a mile around the village.”⁵⁹ Nearby towns and various lords left food and other supplies at several pre-arranged points on the boundary of the village. These quarantine methods prevented the disease from spreading outside the parish.⁶⁰ According to the Eyam parish register, within the

village, 260 people died due to the disease. Estimates of the overall population of the community have been anywhere from 350 to 800 people. A comprehensive study of the Eyam outbreak concluded that the total population of the village was between 688 and 800 citizens, meaning the outbreak killed anywhere from 33 to 38 percent of the populace.⁶¹

QUARANTINE IN THE UNITED STATES

As the Black Death slowly receded, public health concerns turned to other diseases, such as tuberculosis, smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever. In the United States, an epidemic of yellow fever struck the capital of Philadelphia in August 1793. The outbreak lasted until November and killed as many as 5,000 citizens and forced about forty percent (20,000 people) of the population to flee the city.⁶² In response to the epidemic, the Commonwealth of Philadelphia established the Lazaretto Station on the Delaware River in 1799.⁶³ “The 10-acre Lazaretto, built with a hospital, offices and residences on the banks of the Delaware River in Tinicum Township, processed ships, cargo and passengers sailing for the port of Philadelphia for nearly a century.”⁶⁴

Nearly forty years later, in 1832, New York City experienced

56. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 282.

57. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 280-281.

58. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 281.

59. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 281.

60. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 280.

61. Scott et al., *Biology of Plagues*, 382, 279.

62. Hays, *Epidemics and Pandemics*, 185-195.

63. “Lazaretto,” *Lazaretto Quarantine Station*, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.ushistory.org/laz/>.

64. “History,” *Lazaretto Quarantine Station*, accessed December 5, 2011, <http://www.ushistory.org/laz/history/index.htm>.

a cholera outbreak. Beginning in Asia, in 1824, the disease spread across the world to England and eventually Canada during the next eight years.⁶⁵ On June 15, 1832, a steamboat from Albany arrived in New York City and “brought word that cholera had broken out in Quebec and Montreal.”⁶⁶ That same week, Mayor Walter Bowne instituted a strict quarantine in an effort to protect his city. According to Brown’s proclamation, later certified by the New York Board of Health, no ship could approach “closer than three hundred yards to the city; no vehicle closer than a mile and a half.”⁶⁷

The New York quarantine was a sound idea, but doomed from the beginning. Many English immigrants arriving in Canada held the United States as their final destination and quickly made their way across the border. As individual towns and cities in New England set up their own quarantines, the immigrants simply “leaped from halted canal boats and passed the locks on foot, despite efforts by contingents of armed militia to stop them.”⁶⁸ On Monday, June 26, the first case of cholera was reported in New York City, with several more being reported by the end of the week.⁶⁹ Like a dam, once the tiniest cracks began appearing in the quarantine, it collapsed. By the end of the epidemic, over 3,500 people died,

though that number does not fully represent the full impact of the disease.⁷⁰ 70,000 people fled the city, “carrying cholera into the interior [of the country]” and reducing the city’s population by thirty-five percent.⁷¹ Through the New York City refugees, the epidemic spread, carrying as far south as New Orleans and Mexico.⁷²

CONCLUSION

Beginning as early as three thousand years ago, quarantine and isolation were employed as technologies against the proliferation of disease. As human understanding of disease transmission grew, quarantine sophistication and efficacy improved, until it became standard practice in combating epidemics. Though not always successful, quarantines delayed or contained outbreaks by removing all potential pathogen carriers from the populace. At first lightly used against leprosy and plagues of antiquity, quarantine, as a technology, expanded rapidly in the Western world during the Black Death epidemic. Its initial success against the plague established quarantine as a standard procedure to stopping the spread of epidemics and pandemics.

65. Hays, *Epidemics and Pandemics*, 211-212.

66. Charles Rosenberg, *The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 21.

67. Rosenberg, *Cholera Years*, 22.

68. Rosenberg, *Cholera Years*, 24.

69. Rosenberg, *Cholera Years*, 26.

70. John Wilford, “How Epidemics Helped Shape the Modern Metropolis.” *The New York Times*, August 15, 2008.

71. Geoffrey Marks, and William Beatty, *Epidemics*, (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 201.

72. Hays, *Epidemics and Pandemics*, 211-212.

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