

U.S. Arctic National Interests and Arctic Engagement

Julian R. Meade

Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Planning, Governance, and Globalization

Joel Peters

Ariel I. Ahram

Giselle Datz

Timothy W. Luke

September 12, 2022

Arlington, VA

Keywords: Arctic, polar, U.S. national interests,
national security, engagement

U.S. Arctic National Interests and Arctic Engagement © 2022 by Julian R. Meade is licensed
under Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International. To view a copy of this
license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

U.S. Arctic National Interests and Arctic Engagement

Julian R. Meade

ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the emergence and evolution of United States' national interests in the Arctic region, as well as examines the factors that influence how the U.S. engages in cooperative endeavors in the region with other Arctic states. Though geographically located on the periphery of broader global politics, the region nevertheless is geopolitically situated at the convergence of three continents—North America, Asia, and Europe—in an area historically significant to, but often underappreciated by, the U.S. Government. Two research questions frame this study. The primary research question asks: *How have U.S. national interests in the Arctic region evolved over time, and what factors help explain the evolution of U.S. engagement in the region?* U.S. perceptions of the region's geopolitical significance gives rise to a subsidiary question: *To what degree has the U.S viewed the Arctic region as a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation?*

Drawing on a range of archival sources, academic literature, historical and contemporary U.S. Government documents—including several declassified documents, as well as personal interviews of key Arctic experts, this study analyzes the development of U.S. interests in the Arctic over four distinct time periods, collectively spanning over a hundred years. These time periods are pre-World War I to the end of World War II (1906-1945); the first half of the four-decade-long Cold War (1945-1967); the second half of the Cold War (1968-1989); and the post-Cold War period (1990-2017).

The study produces three major findings. First, U.S. overall interest in the Arctic region increased and decreased in conjunction with how the U.S. perceived the region's overall geopolitical significance. This waxing and waning of U.S. involvement in the polar north generally aligned with the U.S. viewing the Arctic as either a zone of insignificance, competition, or cooperation at different phases over the study's time period. The study's second major finding is that U.S. security interests in the Arctic singularly dominated and shaped America's overall set of national interests that emerged in the region, particularly since World War II. While constituting a number of issues, the most important U.S. security interest in the Arctic has been ensuring freedom of navigation in and through the Arctic. The region's overwhelming maritime composition, along with freedom of navigation's centrality to America's broader global power and interests, ensures the security-driven focus of America's overall Arctic national interests.

The final key finding reveals that U.S. Arctic cooperative engagement is conditional. Geopolitical perceptions of the Arctic as either a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation conditions America's willingness to engage with other Arctic states in the region. Since the end of the Cold War and the ensuing period of circumpolar cooperation, U.S. participation in Arctic cooperative arrangements has been conditioned on how much it perceives such arrangements intrude on U.S. autonomy and freedom to act in and through the region.

U.S. Arctic National Interests and Arctic Engagement

Julian R. Meade

GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

The Arctic is a vast and sparsely populated region that historically has been viewed geographically and geopolitically peripheral to the rest of the world. The United States has not always considered the region important, even though it has territory there. This study asks two questions. First: *How have U.S. national interests in the Arctic region evolved over time, and what factors help explain the evolution of U.S. engagement in the region?* Second: *To what degree has the U.S. viewed the Arctic region as a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation?*

Three major findings emerge from this study, which covers the early 20th century to the second decade of the 21st century—more than a hundred years. First, the evolution of U.S. interests in the Arctic region have waxed and waned in concert with how important the U.S. perceives the region. Second, America's security interests in the Arctic region dominate and drive its overall approach to the region. Finally, U.S.'s willingness to cooperatively engage with other Arctic states in the region depends on how the U.S. believes such engagements effect its ability to act in and through the Arctic region.

The Arctic region is becoming more geopolitically important than at any time since at least the Cold War. Rapid global warming could potentially make the region's historically inaccessible shipping routes and vast natural resources accessible by 2050. With Russia already the largest Arctic presence, and China's increased focus on the Arctic, the region could become a space for strategic competition that could threaten U.S. national interests. This study provides the policy community the background and context to navigate the geopolitical challenges and opportunities being unleashed in the Arctic region.

Dedication

I dedicate this effort to my wife Connie, our children Jonathan and Jeremiah, and God. Connie, I love you and thank you for sacrificing our time together and taking on added household and family responsibilities these past six years. To Jonathan and Jeremiah, I love you and thank you for charting your own respective pathways into adulthood with maturity and a sense of purpose. Finally, I thank God for blessing me with the opportunity to pursue and successfully complete my doctoral studies—all while keeping me under His grace, mercy, and protection.

Acknowledgments

I want to express my sincere gratitude to my dissertation committee chair Professor Joel Peters and my committee members: Professors Ariel Ahram, Giselle Datz, and Tim Luke. Professor Peters' guidance, encouragement, and constructive feedback made this journey worthwhile and possible. His calm demeanor yet straightforward advice help me navigate and course correct, as needed, along the path to a successful completion—even in the midst of the COVID-19 global pandemic. Professors Ahram and Datz, both of whom I had as classroom instructors, thank you for equipping me with substantive and theoretical insights that helped me develop my topic and situate my research. Professor Luke, thank you for your deep expertise and historical perspective I was able to draw on.

To my fellow faculty colleagues and supervisors at the National Intelligence University (NIU), thank you for your support, encouragement, and advice. To my NIU colleagues who are or were pursuing their own doctoral degree programs during my doctoral journey, thank you for the mutual encouragement. Thank you to Dr. David Belt, who recently departed NIU, for encouraging me to apply to the Virginia Tech doctoral program which I am currently completing. David earned his Ph.D. as a member of the program's first cohort in 2014.

Thank you to my NIU supervisors during my doctoral journey: Drs. Jim Marchio, Kevin Riehle, and Mike May. Acknowledgements to NIU's Ann Caracristi Institute for Intelligence Research, where I completed a one-year Research Fellowship in 2019-20 to further pursue my Arctic research interests. Finally, my sincere gratitude to those who facilitated my access to online archival and other materials essential to my research, but inaccessible in-person for over two years due to COVID-19 restrictions. The trove of digitized U.S. Government documents, particularly declassified documents, provided invaluable insight and texture into my topic.

Table of Contents

List of Figures	ix
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Research Questions	4
Key Terms	4
Dissertation Overview	8
Note on Sources	11
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework	13
International Relations Theory	13
International Relations Theoretical Approaches to Cooperation	24
Security Governance	27
Summary of Theoretical Frameworks	30
Chapter Conclusions	32
Chapter Three: U.S. Arctic Interests (1906-World War II)	34
The Spitsbergen Archipelago and U.S. Arctic Interests	34
U.S. Arctic Interests in the Interwar Period	56
U.S. Arctic Interests During World War II	65
Chapter Conclusions	71
Chapter Four: U.S. Arctic Interests (Cold War, Part I: 1945-1967)	75
The Truman Proclamation and U.S. Arctic Interests	76
U.S. Arctic Interests and Cold War Imperatives	85
U.S.-Canadian Continental Defense	90
U.S. Arctic Interests and Greenland	94
Greenland, the Monroe Doctrine, and Security Governance	100
U.S. Arctic Interests and Arctic International Cooperation	103
Chapter Conclusions	112
Chapter Five: U.S. Arctic Interests (Cold War, Part II: 1968-1989)	116
Momentum Toward Articulating U.S. Arctic Interests	117
Alaskan Oil and U.S. Arctic Interests	124
Identifying U.S. Arctic Interests and Policy	128
Nixon's NSDM 144: Articulating America's Arctic Interests	135
Converting Arctic Interests into Policy	142
Globalizing the Pursuit of U.S. Arctic Interests	149
U.S. Arctic Interests During the Ford and Carter Years	154
NSDD 90: Reagan Reaffirms Nixon's U.S. Arctic Interests	157
Congress and U.S. Arctic Interests and Policy	160
U.S. Arctic Interests and the End of the Cold War	162
Chapter Conclusions	165

Chapter Six: U.S. Arctic Interests (Post-Cold War, 1990-2017)	172
Post-Cold War Arctic Geopolitical Environment	173
Clinton’s 1994 Arctic Policy and U.S. Post-Cold War Arctic Interests	178
Arctic Cooperation and the Emergence of the Arctic Council	190
Bush’s 2009 Arctic Policy and U.S. Arctic Interests	199
Obama’s U.S. Arctic Region National Strategy	211
Chapter Conclusions	219
Chapter Seven: Conclusion	224
Key Findings	230
The Waxing and Waning of U.S. Interest in the Arctic Region	231
Security Interests Shaped U.S. National Interests in the Arctic	236
The Conditional Nature of U.S. Arctic International Engagement	239
Closing Observations	242
Areas for Future Work	244
References	246
Appendices	265
Appendix A: Interview Questions	266
Appendix B: Profile of Interviewees	268

List of Figures

1.1	Arctic Region Boundary	7
2.1	Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Archipelago	35
2.2	Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Archipelago Locator Map	36

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In 2019, President Donald Trump suggested the U.S. Government should purchase Greenland, the massive, Danish-controlled Arctic island located just off the North American continent in Arctic waters separating North America from Russia and Northern Europe. Although Trump viewed the possible purchase of Greenland primarily as “a large real estate deal” (Neuman 2019), he also acknowledged the island could be strategically valuable to the U.S. in terms of national security and natural resources. Trump quickly lost interest in the idea amid widespread ridicule. Critics included both the Greenlandic and Danish governments, which countered that Greenland was not for sale. However, American proposals to purchase Greenland are neither new nor without merit. This 2019 episode is but the most recent example of how the U.S. Government has periodically considered Greenland’s governance status a key U.S. interest in the Arctic region. On at least four occasions dating back to when the U.S. Government purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, U.S. officials proposed purchasing Greenland on the grounds that it would enhance U.S. national security by ensuring the strategically-located landmass does not fall into adversarial hands that could threaten North America from across the Arctic Ocean. This vignette illustrates how the U.S. has historical and enduring national interests in the Arctic region, even if it has not always been apparent to the U.S. Government.

The Arctic region is a vast and sparsely inhabited area of the world. Located in the northernmost part of the world, the region historically has often been considered remote and on the periphery of global politics. However, the region is an important strategic corridor where three continents—Europe, Asia, and North America—converge and lies within the territory of

several states. *Arctic states* are those states that possess land territory within the Arctic Circle. They consist of the eight member states of the Arctic Council: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States (Arctic Council). Geopolitically, all of the Arctic states—except for Russia—are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states that have traditionally been geopolitically arrayed in opposition to Russia. This is important because the region has often been a territory both for geopolitical competition between its NATO members states and Russia, as well as exceptional cooperation among all Arctic states.

The region's strategic significance revolves around two major potentialities driven by rapid global warming in the Arctic. First, the Arctic Ocean along with its two primary Arctic waterways—the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's vast northern coastline and the Northwest Passage (NWP) running through Canada's Arctic archipelago—could become important international shipping routes, shortening transit times and costs between Europe and Asia, as well as Asia and North America. Second, the Arctic Ocean seabed is believed to contain enormous sums of hydrocarbon and other important natural resources worth trillions of dollars. The rapid increase in global warming in the region and related sea ice melting in the Arctic Ocean area is transforming the region's physical environment to such an extent that it is also making the region's historically inaccessible shipping routes and vast natural resources a potential reality by the mid-21st century. Furthermore, China's rise as a great power and its stated interest in inserting itself into Arctic affairs adds a new and significant factor that did not previously exist in considerations of the Arctic region's importance.

Taken together, these factors are making the Arctic arguably more geopolitically important than at any time since at least the Cold War. They could also exacerbate the relatively

benign territorial disputes that exist among several Arctic states. Such a geopolitical turn could complicate the general spirit of circumpolar cooperation that largely characterized the region from the late 1980s and early 1990s to the mid-2010s. These developments, combined with geopolitical factors external to the Arctic, could result in the region reverting to a space for strategic competition, a situation that could threaten U.S. national interests in the polar north.

The U.S. Government first consolidated its disparate Arctic interests in economic development, scientific research, environmental concerns, and national security into “a single coherent national policy” (U.S. State Department 1991) in 1971. Several presidential administrations subsequently revised U.S. Arctic policy as needed, based on that 1971 conceptualization. The U.S. released its first-ever national *strategy* for the Arctic region in 2013, a strategy document that spurred the release of subsequent, supporting strategy and assessment documents by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Intelligence Community. Although the current U.S. national security strategy, the 2017 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, does not explicitly identify U.S. Arctic national security interests, the 2019 DoD Arctic Strategy derives three such national security interests from the broader national security strategy: the Arctic as 1) U.S. homeland; 2) a shared region; and 3) “a potential corridor for strategic competition” (DoD Arctic Strategy 2019:5).¹ Nevertheless, these contemporary developments do not, by themselves, provide a full, contextualized understanding of America’s national interests in the region.

¹ This study draws on Congressional Research Service specialists Kathleen McInnis and Martin Weiss to define *strategic competition* as peacetime competition between great powers (or a collection of states arrayed against another state or states). “Strategic Competition and Foreign Policy: What is ‘Political Warfare?’” *Congressional Research Service*, IN FOCUS, March 8, 2019, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11127>.

Research Questions

Historically, the U.S. has had an ambivalent view of the Arctic, its symbolic place in the American foreign policy narrative, and the region's overall importance relative to other regions of the world. This has affected the country's appreciation of the polar north from a national interest perspective. Ranging from very little substantive knowledge or interest in the Arctic, to benign neglect, to recognizing the region's geostrategic significance in the broader Cold War superpower standoff that dominated much of the U.S. Government's view of the region, the U.S. still has often not fully realized the Arctic region's enduring significance as a national interest.

As a result, this study will investigate the emergence and evolution of U.S. national interests in the Arctic region, as well as examine the factors that influence the extent to which the U.S. cooperatively engages with other Arctic states in the region. Therefore, this study poses the following primary research question: *How have U.S. national interests in the Arctic region evolved over time, and what factors help explain the evolution of U.S. engagement in the region?* In addition, this study will address a related, subsidiary research question that assesses the degree to which U.S. perceptions of the Arctic region's geopolitical status affect America's cooperative engagement in the region: *To what degree has the U.S. viewed the Arctic region as a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation?*

Key Terms

This section defines key terminology necessary for comprehending the study. Defining exactly what constitutes the *Arctic region* is integral to examining it. However, no consensus definition exists. While many works use different definitions, some do not even attempt to define the Arctic at all. Tamnes and Offerdal (2014) define the Arctic geographically, functionally, and

narratively. The Arctic, *geographically* defined, “is an ocean surrounded by continents” (Tamnes and Offerdal 2014:3) and lies entirely north of the Arctic Circle. Defining the Arctic *functionally* emphasizes how the region is used. “Areas located south of the Arctic Circle but with Arctic-like operating conditions are sometimes included in a functional definition of the region” (Tamnes and Offerdal 2014:3). The *narrative* definition draws on four key narratives of the Arctic: “The Arctic as homeland of indigenous peoples; the European Arctic, the North American Arctic; and the Circumpolar Arctic” (Tamnes and Offerdal 2014:5).

The Arctic, according to the Arctic Governance Project (2010), is “a circumpolar region encompassing both marine and terrestrial systems extending southward from the North Pole, covering about 8% of the Earth’s surface, [and includes] areas located within the jurisdiction of eight [s]tates” (3). This definition fails to define the Arctic’s geographical boundaries more precisely. However, it does explicitly include the Arctic’s marine and terrestrial components. Any definition of the Arctic must explicitly include these two components, especially when discussing Arctic governance. Arctic governance discourse and arrangements are often organized around whether one is talking about governing the Arctic maritime domain or the Arctic territorial domain.

The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), an Arctic Council working group, settled for a compromise definition that “essentially includes the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66 [degrees] 32’N), and north of 62 [degrees] N in Asia and 60[degrees] N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean including the Labrador Sea” (AMAP 1998:10). Durfree and Johnstone (2019) insightfully observe that “[t]here is no single definition of the Arctic; rather, the boundaries depend on what is being studied” (23).

This study acknowledges important elements from each of the above sources to define the Arctic. It adopts the definition of the Arctic formulated in the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 and codified in U.S. law. ARPA defines the Arctic as “all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain” (Public Law 98-373 1984). (see Figure 1.1 below) This definition best aligns with this study’s focus on the evolution of U.S. national interests in the Arctic. Although ARPA defined the Arctic specifically in relation to establishing U.S. *research* efforts in the polar north, the definition also focuses on broader U.S. Arctic interests and policies. Subsequent U.S. presidents and lawmakers use ARPA’s Arctic definition in Arctic policy formulation and development.

Arctic Boundary as defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA)

All United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.¹



Acknowledgement: Funding for this map was provided by the National Science Foundation through the Arctic Research Mapping Application (armap.org) and Contract #0520837 to CH2M HILL for the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC).

Map author: Allison Gaylord, Nuna Technologies. May 27, 2009.

1. The Aleutian chain boundary is demarcated by the 'Contiguous zone' limit of 24-nautical miles.

Figure 1.1. Arctic Region Boundary. Map depicting the Arctic region boundary as defined by Public Law 98-373, the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984.

Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission. 2022. "Maps."

https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/ARPA_Polar_300dpi.jpg. Accessed August 23, 2022.

This study draws predominantly on the U.S. Government's executive branch to define the concept of *policy* because that branch articulates most U.S. Arctic policy. This study adopts the current, official U.S. description of its Arctic policy, adopted in 2009. It defines U.S. Arctic policy as meeting relevant national security and homeland security needs in the Arctic; conserving and protecting the Arctic's environment; sustaining the region's natural resource management and economic development; strengthening regional institutional cooperation;

engaging the region's indigenous communities in relevant decision making; and improving scientific research into relevant environmental issues (Bush NSPD-66).

Dissertation Overview

This study's time frame covers the decade preceding World War I through the end of President Barack Obama's administration in 2017, roughly a period of a hundred years. It begins in Chapter Two by presenting the study's theoretical framework. It situates the study within the existing scholarship that explains how states view territory and resources. By conceptualizing the Arctic region as either a *zone of competition* or a *zone of cooperation*, the chapter then summarizes and evaluates key International Relations theory literature relevant to U.S. Arctic interests and cooperation. The chapter then explains how these IR perspectives view the respective concepts of *cooperation* and *security governance*. It will show through these perspectives and concepts how the U.S. identified and pursued its Arctic national interests, as well as approached Arctic international cooperation over time.

Chapter Three is the first of four chapters that explain how U.S. national interests in the Arctic region evolved across different time periods. It covers the decade preceding the First World War through the end of the Second World War, and contends the U.S. Government, first at the behest of private commercial investors and later, prominent non-government individuals, had to be repeatedly spurred into recognizing it possessed legitimate interests in the region. The chapter shows how U.S. interests emerged in the European Arctic around the issue of the Spitsbergen Archipelago's unique territorial status in the early 20th century years preceding the First World War. The chapter devotes particular attention to analyzing how information provided by private commercial interests, along with the Secretary of State's personal determination to

resolve the so-called Spitsbergen Question, were instrumental in subsequently creating the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920. The chapter then examines the U.S. Government's evolving interests in the broader Arctic region from the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s through World War II.

Chapter Four explains how the U.S. Government began to identify and articulate its national interests in the Arctic from the postwar transition to the Cold War through the late 1960s. It argues that the U.S., during and after World War II, finally came to appreciate the Arctic region's enduring significance, especially from a national security perspective. The chapter shows how America's *security* interests in the Arctic that came to the fore during World War II would become the enduring feature of its broader array of national interests that begin to emerge and coalesce during the Cold War. Security interests provided a basis for conveying other political, economic, and maritime sovereignty interests in the Arctic. The chapter goes on to examine how the U.S. Government introduced the concept of security governance into its Arctic involvement as a way to pursue security-focused international cooperation in the region. The chapter then explains how the U.S. Government pursued limited, issue-specific international cooperation in the Arctic in the midst of the overarching Cold War security dynamics that still shaped U.S. Arctic interests in the 1960s.

This study's fifth chapter analyzes how the U.S. formulated, articulated, and pursued an official set of Arctic national interests during the second half of the Cold War from the late 1960s through the end of the 1980s. The chapter will contend that the evolution of U.S. Arctic interests reached a watershed moment when the U.S. Government articulated its first official set of Arctic national interests in 1971. It examines how the U.S. Government not only formally developed its national interests in the Arctic region, but subsequently tied these interests—

particularly its vital security interest in preserving the principle of freedom of the seas through freedom of navigation access in and through Arctic waters—to America’s broader, more global interests. The chapter then proceeds to explain how U.S. Arctic interests evolved over several U.S. presidential administrations, and how these set of interests informed the American government’s approach to the Cold War’s dramatic and sudden end in the late 1980s.

Chapter Six covers the post-Cold War period from 1990 through the end of the Obama presidency in 2017. It argues that both substantial change and enduring constancy marked America’s Arctic national interests during the roughly quarter-century-long period that followed the end of the Cold War. The chapter examines how U.S. Arctic interests first formally articulated in the early 1970s during the Cold War, underwent substantial changes to reflect the Arctic’s dramatically changed post-Cold War geopolitical environment, while retaining the U.S. Government’s primary security interests in the region. The chapter then analyzes President Bill Clinton’s 1994 Arctic policy that articulated a new set of U.S. Arctic national interests, as well as how the Clinton administration came to embrace—with conditions—the concept of institutionalized Arctic international cooperation and the establishment of the Arctic Council. The chapter also explains President George W. Bush’s revised set of U.S. Arctic interests in 2009 that considers how climate change in the Arctic region, as well as circumpolar international cooperation, affect the U.S. Government’s Arctic national interests. It closes by explaining how President Obama issued America’s first-ever national *strategy* toward to Arctic region.

Chapter Seven concludes this dissertation. It begins by summarizing the substantive chapters that investigated the evolution of U.S. Arctic interests over approximately a one hundred year period. The chapter then answers the study’s research questions through three key findings that surfaced during this research project. It highlights the study’s significance, policy

contributions, and recommended areas for future research. This dissertation's expected value lies in the extensive background and context it aims to contribute to understanding how the U.S. Government went from ignoring and underestimating the Arctic region from a national interest perspective to recognizing it as vital territorial space in which the U.S. possessed significant national interests. The contextualized understanding this study intends to offer on the Arctic region provides the policy community a roadmap going forward on how to identify and navigate the unfolding challenges—and opportunities—that will shape America's Arctic national interests well into the future.

Note on Sources

This study engaged existing archival sources, historical and contemporary government documents—including declassified U.S. Government policy statements, National Security Council studies, presidential memoranda—as well as academic literature, and think tank reports to examine U.S. interests pertaining to the Arctic and U.S. engagement in Arctic cooperation. The study drew heavily on an unpublished, declassified draft U.S. State Department historical study that extensively described events relevant to shaping U.S. foreign policy developments in the Arctic region dating back to the department's establishment in 1789. Although the study was never published, it provided great insight into official U.S. thinking about the region from 1960 to approximately 1990.

Most of the information gleaned was available in various government documents, repositories, academic literature, think-tank reports, and other pertinent locations. This included accessing the online archival holdings from the following U.S. presidents' libraries and museums: Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton. The study's research

also included an in-person visit to the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. This study's sources also included personal interviews of several individuals: the U.S. State Department's former lead negotiator on polar issues; the State Department's former lead U.S. negotiator for establishing the Arctic Council and subsequently head of the U.S. representation on the Arctic Council; and a former U.S. Defense Department senior trade advisor with extensive expertise on maritime sovereignty issues.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

How do we understand the Arctic region as a territorial space? How do we understand the United States' view of the Arctic? One can conceptualize the Arctic in two ways: as a *zone of competition* characterized by individual states' primary focus on their own state interests, power, and sovereignty, or as a *zone of cooperation* in which states in the region prioritize cooperation in pursuit of mutual interests in given issue areas. This chapter lays out this study's theoretical framework. It situates the study within the existing scholarship by examining the theoretical frameworks that explain how states view territory and resources. This chapter begins by explaining the realist and liberal institutionalist International Relations (IR) theoretical perspectives that are relevant to U.S. Arctic interests and governance engagement. It examines how these IR perspectives approach the concept of cooperation, then explores the concept and relevance of security governance as the U.S. has applied it in the Arctic region. Finally, the chapter concludes by assessing which theoretical framework best explains the evolution of U.S. Arctic national interests and governance engagement, and how which framework informs the U.S.'s vision of the Arctic as either a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

This study draws on IR theory to help explain how states view territory and resources in the Arctic region. This theory will not only help understand how states view and contextualize the Arctic region as a geopolitical issue, it will also help explain how states engage in

cooperation and governance in the Arctic through various fora, including the Arctic Council. The two most relevant IR theories for this study are realism and liberal institutionalism.

Realism

The realist IR perspective holds that conflict is inherent to the international system. In this conception of international relations, the international system is anarchic and comprised of states that must seek power to achieve their own self-interests in order to survive. According to John Mearsheimer (1995), realism rests upon five assumptions about the international system: anarchy characterizes the international system; all great powers have some inherent offensive capability; states are always uncertain about other states' intentions; great powers' ultimate goal is survival; and that states think strategically about how to survive.

Several threads of realism are relevant to understanding how states approach the international system, and specifically relevant to explaining state behavior and interests toward the Arctic region. This chapter examines classical realism and structural realism.

Classical Realism

Classical realism posits that competition is human nature and establishes the basis for how states view and interact with other actors in the international system. This strand of realism views the international system as *anarchic* in that it lacks an overarching central authority to which states can appeal to peacefully address inherent disagreements that arise between states. Anarchy produces systems of self-help that both limit states' ability to achieve their goals, and intensify the pursuit of self-interests (Wohlforth 2008). Classical realists such as Carr and

Morgenthau attribute the anarchic international system to human nature. It is human nature to seek power and to want to dominate others. There are three concepts from the realist IR tradition that are particularly relevant to this study: *sovereignty*, *interests*, and *power politics*.

Carr, who wrote a seminal text in 1939 critiquing the liberalist theory of international relations that predominated during the interwar years, argued that in the modern, Westphalian state system, *sovereignty* is fundamental to state power.² Sovereignty is where states recognize and respect each other's authority over territory. Realists emphasize sovereignty because states often wage conflict over territorial sovereignty disputes. Although sovereignty is a fundamental part of the modern, Westphalian state system's power, it is ill-defined and, as a result, changes over time as the international environment changes. Calling sovereignty merely a "convenient label," Carr and Cox (2016:212) argued the concept ceased being functional "when distinctions began to be made between political, legal, and economic sovereignty or between internal and external sovereignty" (212).

Carr and Cox contend the concept of sovereignty, originally used to define the post-medieval "independent character of the authority claimed and exercised by states which no longer recognized even the formal overlordship of the Empire" (2016:212), had subsequently been applied to matters far beyond its admittedly imprecise original use. For example, questions of whether subunits of the state—such as the British Dominions or other, similar territories—were sovereign actors, are not sovereignty issues as presented, but rather legal matters regarding powers and authorities. Over time, sovereignty became a catch-all for political, legal, and

² E.H. Carr's 1939 seminal text, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, was reissued with a new preface from Michael Cox in 2016. The reissued text is cited as Carr, Edward Hallett, and Michael Cox. 2016. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

economic matters that had a tenuous connection with a state's authority in an international context (Carr and Cox).

Sovereignty is an important concept relevant to understanding how states view territory and resources in the Arctic region. Carr's warning about sovereignty's disaggregation is exemplified in Arctic interstate relations. In examining Arctic sovereignty and security through various IR perspectives, Murray and Dey Nuttall explain how the constantly evolving Arctic environment is becoming an important area for examining "the shifting views on the concept of sovereignty in [IR] and international law" (2014:2). Arctic sovereignty issues are being determined not only by Arctic state actors, but also by non-state actors such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—also known as the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). Furthermore, substate Arctic regional governments (the state of Alaska, for example), along with Indigenous peoples' organizations also assert sovereignty rights from state actors.

Morgenthau (1985), like Carr, believed the international system is inherently conflictual because it derives from the human desire for power and domination. He further emphasized that state interests and power politics are essential to surviving in a conflictual world. States must concern themselves with their own *interests defined in terms of power* in interstate relations (Morgenthau). Such power-defined state interests constitute one of six fundamental principles that underlie political realism and are "[t]he main signpost[s] that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics" (Morgenthau 1985:5).³ These interests are

³ Morgenthau's five other principles of political realism are that: 1) politics, like the broader society, "is governed by objective laws" rooted in human nature; 2) "Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid;" 3) "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action;" 4) "Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe;" and 5) "The difference...between political realism and the other schools of thought is real, and...profound." (1985:4-13).

based on rational considerations of what is best for the state, and should not be pursued in terms of moral considerations.

National interests constitute those priorities a state identifies as important to its survival or well-being. This conception of interest includes traditional realist concerns about threats to the state in an anarchic international system. It also incorporates “the external constraints on the freedom of [maneuver] of the state from treaties, the interests and power of other states, and other factors beyond the control of the [state] such as geographical location” (Byrd 2018). This is why states express their geopolitical priorities in terms of national interests.

National interest and sovereignty issues played out in the Arctic region in several ways, with maritime disputes among the most important. Historically, the U.S.’s seeming disinterest in the Arctic, coupled with its perceived reluctance to fully embrace its status as an Arctic nation, sometimes gave the impression the U.S. did not have any vested national interest in the Arctic beyond the mere fact of Alaska’s physical location within the Arctic Circle. However, America’s Arctic national interests are reflective of the more expansive, global nature of U.S. interests (Steinberg). As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this is especially pertinent in the Arctic to the principle of preserving freedom of the seas. Two important Arctic maritime disputes involve the status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian archipelago and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) that runs along Russia’s vast northern coastline. Both disputes center around whether these respective waters constitute *internal waters* under the respective sovereign control of Canada and Russia, or whether they are *international waters* not under any state’s sovereign control. The U.S. has long considered both waterways international waters, while Canada and Russia, respectively, consider them internal waters.

Power politics is another important realist concept central to this study. It is one of “four central propositions” (Wohlforth 2008:132)—along with groupism, egoism, and anarchy—that comprise realism.⁴ There is no consensus definition of power politics. Nonetheless, powerful states use or threaten to use military and/or economic power as a coercive means to achieve their own self-interests in the international system, a system that places a premium on power and security.

Power politics is deeply rooted in U.S. foreign policy in practice if not in proclamation. As Morgenthau (1985) contends, early American foreign policy devalued power politics but eventually came to practice it. U.S. power politics traces its roots to three elements in the American experience in the 19th century: the uniqueness of the American experiment; the American continent’s geographical separation from centers of world conflict; and the humanitarian pacificism and anti-imperialism of American political ideology (Morgenthau 1985).

The U.S. engaged in power politics in the Arctic throughout the Cold War. The U.S.’s primary concern of a Soviet military attack originating from directly across the circumpolar north led it to place a premium on projecting military power and establishing a complex defense early-warning network within or near the Arctic region.

Structural Realism

⁴ As Wohlforth (2008) explains, *groupism* asserts that politics occurs “within and between groups” (132) and that states are not only a form of human groups, but they are indeed “the most important human groups” (133). *Egoism*, on the other hand, asserts that political actors, whether individuals or groups, “are driven principally by narrow self-interest” (Wohlforth 2008:133). *Anarchy* shows how anarchic self-help political systems not only constrain international actors in achieving their respective purposes but also “exacerbate group egoism” (133).

Structural realists incorporate classical realists understandings of conflict and cooperation, but add that it is the structure of the international system—not human nature—that makes it anarchic. The structure of the international system, such as the bipolar East-West construct during the Cold War, is inherently competitive and conflictual. Therefore, security in an otherwise anarchic international system characterized by power struggles, is the overriding goal of every state.

Both Waltz (2011) and Mearsheimer (2014) posit that because the international system is anarchic and revolves around self-interested, power-seeking states, states must adhere to the concept of *self-help*. States cannot rely on others to help them in a potential conflict with other states. They must prepare for conflict and look out for their own interests and survival. States cannot hope for or rely on cooperation and they cannot count on other states because of shifting interests. Today's friend could be tomorrow's foe, and vice versa.

As will be argued in Chapter Six, the concept of *self-help* that is foundational to realist IR theory is evident in how the U.S. engages in Arctic cooperation and governance. States are on their own to provide their own security and resolve potential conflict with other states, even when they are part of international organizations. For example, the U.S. insisted in the negotiations that led to the creation of the Arctic Council that the Council be prohibited from addressing military security issues. Proponents of the Arctic Council proposed allowing it to take up relevant military security matters. However, the U.S., even after the Cold War ended, continued to view the Arctic region primarily through a national security lens. Furthermore, the U.S. did not want to subject its vital security interests, particularly those with worldwide applicability such as ensuring access to the world's oceans, to the deliberations of a regionally-focused international organization. This is consistent with the self-help concept and exemplifies

Mearsheimer's contention that "[s]tates operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community" (2014:33).

Defensive and Offensive Realism

Structural realism diverges into two theoretical strands that explain state behavior in an anarchic international system: *Defensive realism* and *offensive realism*. Defensive realism offers that states are most interested in maximizing their security in order to secure their respective position in the international system (Waltz 1979). As *security* maximizers, defensive realism explains that states pursue a *balance of power* as the best way to ensure their security against other powerful states.

One of defensive realism's essential elements is the *balance of power* theory. This theory suggests that the best way to ensure a status quo international system and preserve states' security in that system is to maintain relative equilibrium among states or coalitions of states so that no one state becomes too powerful. Accordingly, in the balance of power, "states will check dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own capabilities...or aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliance" (Wohlforth 2008:141).

Defensive realists contend the balance of power helps preserve the status quo—and states' security in an anarchic international system—by preventing any single state from becoming too powerful, thus endangering the security of weaker states and provoking a counterbalancing alliance of states. As Waltz (1979) explains, "[f]ear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power" (118). The balancing coalition that emerges against the more powerful states will, in

turn, pose a challenge to that more powerful states' own security. This could subsequently increase the potential for conflict in an already anarchic system.

Offensive realism, on the other hand, posits that the best way for a state to ensure its survival in an anarchic, power-centric international system is to maximize its power relative to other states. Therefore, states are *power* maximizers that seek security through expanding their own power, and should seek to become a hegemon in the international system to ensure their security. Offensive realists focus on so-called *great power*⁵ states and as such contend that “[p]ower is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations” (Mearsheimer 2014:12).

Offensive realists articulate a vastly different conception of the balance of power than defensive realists. According to offensive realism, since the goal for states in the international system is to maximize their power relative to other states, maintaining a balance of power actually undermines the international system. Creating and maintaining a coalition of states to counterbalance a powerful state “is often slow and inefficient” (Mearsheimer 2014:156) and goes against offensive realists' proposition that states should prioritize their power relative to other states.

Liberal Institutionalism

The liberal institutionalist IR perspective helps illuminate the conditions under which states use institutions to engage in cooperation and governance arrangements. International

⁵ This study adopts Mearsheimer's (2014) description of a great power. Three things constitute a *great power*: primarily relative military power; sufficient military power to conventionally confront the most powerful state; and, in the nuclear age, a survivable nuclear deterrent to complement formidable conventional military capabilities.

institutions are widespread in the international system and address a host of issue areas, ranging from defense and security issues to trade and the environment. They enhance cooperation among state and non-state actors in a number of ways. International institutions, among other things, “provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity” (Keohane and Martin 1995:42). This study illustrates how one such tenet—providing information—exemplifies liberal institutionalism’s relevance to explaining state behavior toward territory and state interests.

Providing information is one of the most important tenets of liberal institutionalism and is central to the contention between realists and liberal institutionalists over whether institutions are conducive to security issues. Realism’s emphasis on the importance of discerning another state’s intentions in order to ensure one’s own survival places a premium on acquiring and accurately assessing information. According to Keohane and Martin (1995) institutionalist theory “should be highly applicable to security issues because its argument revolves around the role of institutions in providing *information* [original emphasis]” (43).

Liberal institutionalists accuse realists of downplaying the role of international institutions in international relations. For example, Stein accuses realists of downplaying international institutions’ role in IR for two broad reasons. First, realists, most prominently, Mearsheimer (1995), argue that institutions operate in the “‘low politics’ domains of lesser importance such as transportation, communication, health, and the like, and not in the ‘high’ politics’ domains of national security and defense” (Stein 2008:206). Second, realist critics also say international institutions are not independent, “that they merely reflect power and interest” (Stein 2008:206) of states, and therefore, are of questionable value.

Ironically, liberal institutionalism presents itself as a viable theoretical framework for explaining state behavior not by going head-to-head with its main IR theoretical antagonist—realism—but rather by acknowledging important realist tenets and explaining the situations under which these realist tenets might be better addressed through cooperative mechanisms such as international institutions. Liberal institutionalists accept realist claims that the international system is anarchic and revolves around self-interested states who seek power. However, they contend that conflict among states is not inevitable and that states ultimately seek to cooperate as much as possible. Such cooperation is best attainable through international institutions.

Liberal institutionalists such as Stein (2008) and Keohane (1984) argue that states can cooperate and pursue their mutual interests in a given area or issue. They claim that international institutions are best positioned to help states pursue those mutual interests, while also mitigating the potential for conflict and solidifying deeper cooperation. Liberal institutional theory explains not only why states create institutions, but the effects flowing from such institutions. States create institutions “*because of* [original emphasis] their anticipated effects on patterns of behavior” (Keohane and Martin 1995:46).

Liberal institutionalists point to examples such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union that states can and do cooperate, even after periods of conflict or contention. The UN was established in the aftermath of a devastating global war as a measure to ensure cooperation and prevent the recurrence of such conflicts. NATO was created to defend Western Europe from potential aggression from the Soviet-led Eastern European bloc and succeeded in preventing conflict. The EU evolved to foster cooperation through political, economic, and social interconnectivity among disparate European states with a long history of conflict. Liberal institutionalists readily point out such prominent entities as examples of effective international

institutions. They also, as Stein (2008) points out, readily “[accept] the realist view of states as the central actors of international politics, and...that state behavior is rooted in power and interest” (203).

The liberal institutionalist IR perspective helps explain U.S. Arctic cooperation and governance engagement during most of the post-Cold War period from the early 1990s to 2017—when this study’s time period under consideration ends. Chapter Six will argue that liberal institutionalism reached its apex in U.S. Arctic policy and within broader circumpolar north relations when the Arctic states established the Arctic Council—the region’s premier international institution for fostering cooperation and engagement. However, U.S. behavior revealed that such institutions were tolerable to the extent they were relatively weak entities that did not impede on the U.S.’s primary interest in maintaining freedom of navigation through Arctic waters as well as unimpeded access to the region’s natural resources. During this time, the U.S. became increasingly engaged in post-Cold War Arctic cooperative and engagement arrangements. This occurred at a time when many Arctic observers considered the region *exceptional* in the sense that it remained relatively immune from extra-regional geopolitical tensions that increasingly characterized relations between Russia and NATO, of which most of the rest of the Arctic Council’s member states are also members (Dodds 2020).

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO COOPERATION

An important question this study seeks to address is: How do IR theories view cooperation among states? The feasibility of, and extent to which, cooperation occurs in international relations is an important distinction between realism and liberal institutionalism.

According to Keohane, *cooperation* “occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others through a process of policy coordination” (1984:51). More precisely, cooperation between governments “*takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives* [original emphasis]” (Keohane 1984:52). Liberal institutionalists contend that cooperation in pursuit of mutual self-interests is a desirable and achievable goal of most states. Since states are independent actors with their own preexisting interests and priorities, intergovernmental cooperation requires coordination and adjustment. Coordination is an ongoing process and is possible only if the actors involved attempt to align their respective policies so that they complement each actors’ overall objectives. Cooperation is at the heart of international institutions. Therefore, it is essential to understand cooperation in the context of international institutions, as well as how such institutions affect international relations.

Keohane contends “that cooperation can under some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that institutions, broadly defined, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge” (1984:9). Nevertheless, he also accepts the premise that cooperation frequently fails to occur even among mutually-interested states.

Keohane’s premise that cooperation often fails even among states with common interests does not align, for the most part, with Arctic states’ general behavior toward one another in the quarter century following the end of the Cold War. Arctic states’ mutual interests in the major areas of environmental protection and sustainable development established a basis for real

cooperation in the region. Furthermore, Keohane contends that cooperation, to the extent it does occur, frequently occurs to serve the interests of powerful states. This is certainly relevant to explaining the U.S.'s conditional acceptance of the concept that eventually became the Arctic Council in the mid-1990s. Cooperation, therefore, is at best a relative and temporary departure from the conflict-prone, anarchical condition that realists contend is at the heart of the international system. By acknowledging realism's imprint on cooperation and international institutions, Keohane's calibrated argument is applicable for explaining states' behavior in the Arctic region.

Realists minimize the importance of cooperation as a central concept in international relations. In realism's conception of the behavior of states in an anarchic system, the perpetual and self-interested pursuit of power and security to ensure survival is the natural interaction between states. Cooperation among states—except perhaps as a tool of powerful states to extend their own power and security—is an anathema to most realist perspectives. To the extent that cooperation occurs at all, it is temporary, fleeting, and an unnatural aspect of international relations.

Waltz (2011) provides a particularly useful realist understanding of conflict and cooperation in his examination of the role of international institutions. He argues that *international institutions are tools of powerful states*. Such institutions are created or preserved in order to extend a state's power. They are not independent actors that exist primarily to foster cooperation. Using NATO's post-Cold War continuation as his example, he argues against liberal institutionalist claims that NATO is a prime example that cooperation-focused international institutions can exist after an actual or potential conflictual international order, such as the

bipolar Cold War system, has passed. Waltz contends that NATO continues to exist because it serves as a platform to preserve U.S. dominance in European security affairs.

In addition to examining realist and liberal institutionalist IR theoretical frameworks to explain states' behavior toward territory and resources, this study also examines the concept and relevance of security governance.

SECURITY GOVERNANCE

IR theory defines the concept of *security governance* differently depending on the IR perspective. This study adopts a definition of security governance theoretically conceived by Constructivist scholars but drawn from, and exemplified in large part, in realist IR practices. Constructivist scholars Adler and Greve (2009) define security governance as “a system of rule conceived by individual and corporate actors aiming at coordinating, managing, and regulating their collective existence in response to threats to their physical and ontological security” (64). However, in conceptualizing its attributes and practices, they accept that security governance is framed around the realist concept of the *balance of power* as one of security governance's two overlapping mechanisms—the other being a *security community*.⁶ As such, they note realists conceptualize security governance “to be a very thin system of international security governance by means of power, hegemony, empire, or some combination thereof” (Adler and Greve 2009:64).

⁶ Drawing on Adler and Barnett (1998), a *security community* is, Adler and Greve (2009) explain, “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’—where peaceful change means ‘neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes’” (69).

Comprehending security governance first requires one to both understand and distinguish *security* and *governance*. Security is a broadly used, widely contested, and ill-defined concept. Central to the debate about security “have been attempts to deepen and widen the concept of security from the level of the state to societies and individuals, and from military to non-military issues” (Krahmann 2003:9). Although security is a fundamental concept of international relations, efforts to increase its breadth and depth beyond its traditional state-centric moorings have greatly increased since the end of the Cold War. Despite identifying a number of examples where a broader concept of security has been employed, Krahmann fails to offer her own definition of security.

The concept of governance, on the other hand, is much more refined than security. Separating governance from *government*, Krahmann offers a restrictive, yet useful definition of governance. This concept “denotes the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their independent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority” (Krahmann 2003:11). Governance differs from government in several important ways. Krahmann identifies seven differentiating dimensions between the concepts: geographical and functional scopes, distribution of resources, interests, norms, decision making, and policy implementation.

Each of the seven dimensions situated along the government-governance spectrum “can take a variety of forms along a scale between the ideal notion of government, i.e. centralization and integration, and governance, i.e. fragmentation and differentiation” (Krahmann 2003:12). Two dimensions, *functional scope* and *interests*, are particularly relevant to this study’s examination of U.S. Arctic interests and governance engagement.

Governance and policymaking within a functionally scoped dimension “takes a centralized form if different sectors or issue areas are integrated through a comprehensive system that is coordinated by a single authority” (Krahmann 2003:12). On the other hand, regulating different issue areas through “multiple and separate authorities, including public or private authorities” (Krahmann 2003:12), characterizes fragmented governance. The Law of the Sea Convention is a functionally scoped governance structure—a fact Krahmann explicitly points out. As Chapter Five will show, the U.S. recognized the LOSC as the centerpiece through which it perceives and approaches Arctic governance since at least the first formal articulation of U.S. Arctic national interests in the early 1970s. Chapter Six further explains how the U.S., despite never formally acceding to the LOSC, increasingly incorporated it into evolving U.S. Arctic policy and strategy, particularly as a legal framework under which to pursue and preserve America’s national security and energy interests in the region.

As for the *interests* dimension, distinguishing government centralization from governance differentiation is not always easily discernible. As Krahmann (2003) explains, central governments are not monolithic in thought or priorities because they “have to accommodate a range of diverse interests from societal and state actors” (12). However, central governments do function on the notion that “the common interest” (Krahmann 2003:13) is superior to individual interests and preferences. Governance, on the other hand, “accepts the heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting nature of interests and seeks to ensure that each actor can pursue them uninhibited by external regulation” (Krahmann 2003:13). Governance arrangements tend to encourage and achieve consensus more than government arrangement. As such, governance arrangements are “more likely to bring together like-minded actors than arrangements which centralize decision-making from different regions and sectors” (Krahmann 2003:13). America’s

Arctic interests—even before the U.S. Government officially recognized that it had *any* interests in the region—have always included some element of governance. Chapter Three, for example, will show how the U.S. Government—more specifically, then Secretary of State Robert Lansing—was instrumental in bringing about the Spitsbergen Treaty, the Arctic region’s first governance scheme which established a model for future international cooperation and governance the region.

SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Sovereignty is an important concept relevant to understanding how states view territory and resources in the Arctic region. Carr’s prescient prediction that sovereignty would change and disaggregate so much over time that it would lose its fundamental association with state authority is insightful for understanding evolving Arctic sovereignty. Murray and Dey Nuttall (2014) explain how Carr’s warning about sovereignty’s disaggregation actually plays out in Arctic interstate relations. Arctic sovereignty exemplifies the elastic nature of sovereignty that concerned Carr. The emergence and general acceptance of the LOSC—a non-state actor—in delineating sovereignty issues in the Arctic region, further illustrates how the concept of sovereignty is no longer the exclusive right of states to determine.

U.S. national interest and sovereignty concerns were explicitly evident in examining U.S. Arctic national interests and regional engagement. However, what appears on the surface to be an American reluctance—if not outright historical disinterest—in the polar north does not mean the U.S. considers the region unimportant. It instead reflects the broader, more globalized context in which the U.S. approaches national interests and sovereignty in the Arctic. U.S.

national interests and sovereignty concerns in the Arctic revolve directly or indirectly around ensuring freedom of navigation rights in and through two important Arctic waterways—the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route. Likewise, concern over national interests and sovereignty matters both within and external to the Arctic region has led the U.S. at times to pursue power politics, particularly during the Cold War.

Cooperation in the Arctic region is not new. Efforts toward more formalized cooperation since the end of the Cold War show that Keohane’s contention that cooperation often ends in failure even among states with mutual interests does not necessarily apply to the Arctic. Keohane’s further contention that cooperation that does exist is often designed to serve powerful states’ interests, is sometimes merited. This study will show that the U.S.’s conditional engagement in institutionalized Arctic cooperative endeavors after the Cold War reflected in large measure, the U.S. Government’s insistence that such arrangements do not undermine America’s national interests and freedom of action.

The concept of security governance is extremely helpful for explaining the U.S. Government’s particular interest in Greenland’s security and governance arrangement during World War II and continuing throughout the duration of the Cold War. Chapter Three will explain how the 1941 U.S.-Greenland defense agreement that ensured the massive, geostrategically-significant Arctic island’s protection from Nazi Germany during World War II reflected the U.S.’s vital interest in protecting North Atlantic sea lines of communication, along with defense of the North American continent, through security governance. Furthermore, Chapter Four will show how the Cold War-era 1951 U.S.-Greenland Defense Agreement represented another instance of the U.S. engaging in security governance—this time reflecting the balance of power mechanism that comprises one of two pillars of security governance.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This study concludes the realist IR perspective best explains the evolution of U.S. Arctic national interests and governance engagement from the second decade of the 20th century through 2016. The U.S. did adopt liberal institutionalist and security governance concepts at times to engage in cooperation and governance engagement efforts in the Arctic. However, it leveraged such efforts primarily in the service of furthering America's national security and territorial interests in the region.

Realism, in short, argues that states seek power because they prioritize their own survival and *national interests* in an anarchic global system. Simply put, the U.S. Government's view of, and approach to, the Arctic region is mostly driven by the set of national interests toward the region the U.S. articulates from time to time. These set of interests comprise the framework for official U.S. Arctic policy. Even prior to the articulation of an official U.S. Arctic policy in the early 1970s, prevailing U.S. national security interests predominated its approach to the polar north.

The Arctic as a Zone of Competition

Competition is what drives the U.S.'s approach to the Arctic. Consequently, the U.S. has primarily viewed the region's territorial spaces and resources through the lens of a *zone of competition* in which realist concepts of national interests, power politics, and sovereignty issues both fuel interstate competition and predominate U.S. Arctic policy. The concept of a zone of competition, therefore, is an inevitable outgrowth of realist explanations of interstate behavior.

Competition is a contested concept with no consensus definition despite its widespread use in IR scholarship. However, this study adopts the definition offered by Mazarr et al. because it best exemplifies the competition that has occurred in the Arctic region during the time period under study.

As Mazarr et al. (2018) explain, competition among states consists of antagonistic relations below the level of conflict between actors whose respective national interests are at odds with the other and who pursue those interests in competition with each other. Each state seeks an outcome that advantages it over the other, and the object being pursued is often scarce or significant for a given state to obtain. These three factors (contention, contestation, and scarcity/significance) form the core elements of competition. It is important to point out that these characteristics of competition are elastic and situation-dependent. For example, competition implies “some degree of perceived or measurable contention” (Mazarr 2018:3) between the competing states. Such contention is inherently antagonistic, although often in varying degrees over time.

The next chapter is the first of four substantive chapters dedicated to examining the evolution of U.S. Arctic national interests across several time periods. Chapter Three investigates the emergence of U.S. Arctic interests in the roughly decade leading up to World War I and continuing through World War II. It reveals how the U.S. Government did not instinctively view the Arctic region as important and had to be spurred several times by external actors and events into considering the region of national significance.

CHAPTER 3

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS (1906-WORLD WAR II)

This chapter investigates the emergence of U.S. national interests in the Arctic region between 1906 and the end of World War II. The chapter's central argument is that the U.S. Government repeatedly had to be spurred into recognizing it possessed national interests in the Arctic region at several key points during the first four decades of the 20th century, despite the U.S.'s inclination to treat the polar north mostly as a remote, un-"interested" region. The resulting U.S. engagement in Arctic cooperation and governance engagement schemes reflected America's limited, issue-specific approach to Arctic cooperation.

This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section devotes considerable attention to explaining the driving factors that led the U.S. Government to first express an interest in the Spitsbergen Archipelago and then eventually to help formulate and ratify the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty. The second section examines driving factors underlying U.S. Arctic interests during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. The final section explores key factors that shaped U.S. Arctic interests leading up to and through World War II. These sections reveal how the U.S. Government assigned relative insignificance to the Arctic region across vast swaths of this chapter's time period until the outbreak of a second world war.

THE SPITSBERGEN ARCHIPELAGO AND U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS

Spitsbergen is a remote set of islands located north of the European continent, about halfway between Norway and the North Pole in the Arctic Ocean. (See figures 2.1 and 2.2 below) It is important to note that Norway renamed Spitsbergen to "Svalbard" in 1925 when the

Spitsbergen Treaty (now called the Svalbard Treaty) entered into force and the archipelago officially fell under Norwegian sovereignty. Therefore, the names “Spitsbergen” and “Svalbard” are used throughout the literature but refer to the same thing. Although occasionally visited by explorers and whalers, Spitsbergen had no indigenous population and no state claimed sovereignty over the archipelago. Thus, Spitsbergen was considered a *terra nullius*—no man’s land (Ulfstein). Spitsbergen’s unique status emerged from the fact that “no nation has ever considered it worth its while to occupy...[Spitsbergen’s islands]...or to assert sovereignty over them” (Lansing 1917:764).



Figure 2.1. Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Archipelago. Map depicting major population centers and islands of this Norwegian territory in the Arctic Ocean.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 2022. “Svalbard Country Map.” *The World Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/svalbard/map>. Accessed May 21, 2022.



Figure 2.2. Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Archipelago Locator Map. This map depicts Svalbard’s location in proximity to Northern Europe and the Eurasian Arctic region.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 2022. “Svalbard Locator Map.” *The World Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/svalbard/locator-map>. Accessed May 21, 2022.

The discovery of coal deposits on Spitsbergen in 1899, however, along with the ensuing mining populace that soon began to occupy the islands, made the prospect of a permanently populated Spitsbergen a reality. This, in turn, raised important questions of what political authority would govern Spitsbergen’s mostly foreign population “and to what authority could they appeal to settle their conflicting claims and to protect them in the enjoyment of their rights”

(Lansing 1917:764)? The Spitsbergen Question, simply put, asks: who exercises sovereignty over the Spitsbergen Archipelago? This question was significant not because it was about resolving an issue that could serve as a potential flashpoint for interstate conflict. Instead, as Singh (1980) argues, Spitsbergen's sovereignty status "reflected facets of larger issues in international politics" (5), such as claiming and occupying territory, postwar diplomacy, managing natural resources, and accessing, utilizing, and administering "non-contiguous territory having no indigenous population" (5).

Private Mining Interests

The U.S. Government became aware of Spitsbergen Archipelago when two well-connected American businessmen, Frederick Ayer and John M. Longyear, sought to exploit the archipelago's vast coal deposits but needed clarification on what political authority governed the territory. Longyear, a mining investor, became interested in exploiting Spitsbergen's vast coal deposits early in the 20th century. He co-founded the Boston, Massachusetts-based Arctic Coal Company in 1906 and began recruiting miners from Norway and Sweden to work the Spitsbergen mines. However, the brutal climate and difficult working conditions on Spitsbergen often spurred the miners at Arctic Coal and other mining companies to go on strike, disrupting operations. Longyear sought legal, and ultimately, political order over Spitsbergen in order to force miners to return to work. As a result, "[t]he obstacle to commercial exploitation posed by the lack of legal order was the fundamental reason why the Spitsbergen question became political—both in Kristiana [renamed Oslo in 1925] and Washington" (Berg 2017:29).

Longyear's lobbying efforts raised Spitsbergen's profile in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. This occurred at the same time Norway had tried unsuccessfully for several

decades to convince Europe's great powers to support Norway's effort to gain sovereignty over Spitsbergen. Longyear's relentless lobbying efforts paid off. He and his investment partners "managed to induce Congress, the State Department, and even the White House to forge an American policy for the European Arctic ... and to form this policy in accordance with the company's wishes" (Berg 2017:29). In other words, American private commercial interests drove what became U.S. national interests toward Spitsbergen. Arguably, Longyear singlehandedly placed the Spitsbergen question on the U.S. foreign policy agenda between 1905 and the end of World War I. Longyear, as Berg contends, "decided the United States [sic] position and American political manoeuvres over this Arctic [sic] question" (2017:24).

Ayer and Longyear, along with the American-based Arctic Coal Company they established to operate mines on West Spitsbergen, frequently were the only sources information to the State Department about the archipelago's coal mining activities. This made these private American entities "the unique recipients of whatever position the State Department took" regarding Spitsbergen (Singh 1980:4), an assumption Singh claims is partly evident in the documents she examined. At the same time, however, that tension was inherent between Americans' private interests and the U.S. Government's long-standing position of avoiding becoming entangled in European affairs. As Singh (1980) notes, "[t]he tension between support of American business interests abroad and the pronounced disinclination to become involved in European political questions was evident in the development of State Department policy as long as American nationals maintained business interests in the Archipelago" (5).

Shared Interest in Conflict Resolution and International Law

The State Department's interest in Spitsbergen began to increase dramatically when international law attorney Robert Lansing became the department's legal counsel in 1914, then secretary of state in 1915 under President Woodrow Wilson. Lansing brought extensive knowledge of Europe generally and Norway specifically to State from previous legal work on matters of international law. As Berg (2017) contends, Lansing developed a reputation as both "a strong and faithful believer in international law" (30), and as one who was more knowledgeable about Europe prior to 1914 "than any other living American" (30). While serving as a consultant for the State Department in 1911, Lansing argued for ending what he called "the lawless situation" (Berg 2017:30) on Spitsbergen, and proposed what would eventually become the archipelago's "split sovereignty" (Berg 2017:31) under the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty.

Private Commercial Interests vs. U.S. National Interests in Spitsbergen

It is essential to understand Ayer and Longyear and their company in order to understand how U.S. interests developed regarding the Spitsbergen Question. Longyear gathered and analyzed coal samples from Spitsbergen in 1903 to determine its usefulness. After determining Spitsbergen coal was suitable for powering trains and ships, Longyear wanted to acquire land to prospect for more coal but was unsure which country owned Spitsbergen. He lobbied his home state U.S. senator, Michigan's Russell Alger, to ask Secretary of State John Hay. Hay mistakenly thought Tsarist Russia claimed Spitsbergen, apparently unaware that Russia, Sweden, and Norway agreed to a consensus that no one power claimed the archipelago.

In the absence of a sovereign authority over Spitsbergen and following the Arctic Coal Company's chartering in 1906, Ayer and Longyear notified then Secretary of State Elihu Root of their activities and plans. They requested the State Department file the company's documents as

proof of the company's existence and legitimacy. Ayer and Longyear believed their actions would protect them as American citizens so "they might 'invoke and obtain the intervention and protection of the Government of the United States in respect to their rights and interests' in case the lands claimed should become a matter of dispute" (Singh 1980:12).

These events and the emergent the question of who "owns" the Spitsbergen archipelago created the underlying conditions for Ayer and Longyear to begin lobbying the State Department to address the Spitsbergen Question in a way that both settled the sovereignty question and also directly benefitted their private commercial interests. Beyond simply satisfying an American commercial enterprises interests, though, the State Department would also have to determine whether the U.S. Government had a national interest in Spitsbergen.

Private Commercial Interests Shaping U.S. National Interests in Spitsbergen

Ayer and Longyear became the State Department's major source of information on Spitsbergen's commercial activities in the decade from 1906 to 1916. This time frame spanned three U.S. presidential administrations: Republicans Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, and Democrat Woodrow Wilson. The two businessmen submitted annual reports of their activities as well as those of the Arctic Coal Company to the State Department. The reports often included "a request for protection of rights to land duly purchased and claimed" (Singh 1980:14), as Ayer and Longyear sought political protection in case another state—notably Norway—also claimed the same land. These reports collectively served as the State Department's eyes and ears into commercial activities on Spitsbergen.

While Ayer and Longyear almost certainly wanted to provide their native country, the U.S., with the best information on Spitsbergen, their motives were clearly business oriented.

Ayer and Longyear “were capitalists of the first magnitude who used their corporate existence to the fullest advantage as the unique excuse for State Department consideration and policy, advising the Department regarding moves it should take” (Singh 1980:15). They sought to use their access and information to influence the U.S. Government to develop an official position toward Spitsbergen that was also favorable to their private interests. Campopiano (2019) illuminates the lopsided advantage Ayer and Longyear exercised when he points out that “[a]s seemingly the only American actor that was interested in Svalbard, the Arctic Coal Company exerted significant control over American policy” (46).

The U.S. Government’s Increasing “Interest” in Spitsbergen

U.S. policy toward Spitsbergen developed against a “common assumption” (Singh 1980:19) that U.S. foreign policy in general emerges from a set of broad “‘national’ interests” (Singh 1980:19). A combination of politically-connected American businessmen, coupled with Spitsbergen’s unique status as a *terra nullius*, convinced the State Department generally, and Secretary of State Lansing specifically, to make Spitsbergen a *national* interest.

U.S. interest in Spitsbergen emerged in two sequential phases in the early 20th century. During the first phase (1907-1916), the U.S. Government had no explicit interest in far-away Spitsbergen. The government had no reliable knowledge of—let alone interest in—the Spitsbergen archipelago in the first decade of the 20th century. Spitsbergen was not only remotely located off the European continent in the desolate and inhospitable reaches of the Arctic region, it was far outside the purview of American foreign policy, which primarily limited itself to the Western Hemisphere, in adherence with the Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine, as articulated by President James Monroe in 1823, set out to dislodge European powers from their long history of

influencing the affairs of North America and South America by ending Europe's foreign influence in the Western Hemisphere. However, the doctrine also provided that, in exchange for European powers staying out of the Western Hemisphere, "the United States pledged to avoid involvement in the political affairs of Europe" (State 1823). The resulting disinclination toward European affairs meant the U.S. Government only really became aware of Spitsbergen because of *private* Americans' commercial interests in the archipelago's vast coal mines. Private investors Ayer and Longyear successfully lobbied the State Department, requesting, essentially, the U.S. government formally recognize their coal mining interests (including land claims) on territory not under the sovereign authority of any state.

U.S. interest evolved into a second, more formal phase in 1916. The selling of Ayer and Longyear's coal interests not only formally ended American presence on Spitsbergen, it also reshaped the State Department's attitude toward Spitsbergen by essentially removing the economic justification on which to base a potential American policy. This action turned the State Department's attention away from private commercial mining interests to the question of Spitsbergen's status as a terra nullius. Furthermore, Lansing's position in the State Department and personal interest in tackling the Spitsbergen Question further formalized the U.S. Government's interest in Spitsbergen. Lansing used his positions first as State Department Counselor then Secretary of State to raise the issue's profile during the post-World War I peace negotiations by proposing to conditionally grant formal sovereignty over Spitsbergen to Norway. This led to what became the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920.

The U.S., Spitsbergen, and Europe's "Interested" Powers

Singh (1980) poses two important questions that are very useful in illuminating the U.S.'s view of the Spitsbergen Question as a foreign policy issue: How important was Spitsbergen's terra nullius status "for discussions on the future status of the Islands and schemes of administration? Which powers were 'interested'" (23)? The label *interested power* applied to those states "whose nationals either historically or actually frequented the [Spitsbergen] islands for resource exploitation" (Singh and Saguirian 1993:60). There were six interested powers: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States.

In 1907, Norway launched a diplomatic initiative toward the interested powers to address the lack of appropriate sovereignty over Spitsbergen. This initiative, however, did not seek to change Spitsbergen's terra nullius designation, but strived to protect and legitimize those powers' stated interests in the archipelago—a legal authority to establish governing rules over property ownership and other rights and activities essential to realizing a vested power's interests (Singh). The interested powers' responses to the initiative launched by Norway were positive.

As far as Norway was concerned, the U.S. had no formal position on the Spitsbergen Question because, in Norway's view, the U.S. was not an interested power because Spitsbergen was outside of the U.S.'s foreign policy domain. Norway regarded Spitsbergen strictly as a European matter, and it assumed that, just as the U.S. closed off the Western Hemisphere to Europe through the Monroe Doctrine, Europe could close off America from European affairs. However, in 1907, when Norwegian Foreign Minister Jorgen Lovland informed the U.S. ambassador to Norway of Norway's plans to secure an agreement among European powers over Spitsbergen, U.S. Ambassador Herbert H.D. Peirce responded that the U.S. would only agree to a formal treaty requiring U.S. Senate ratification. He also stated the U.S. would notify the European powers "of 'American rights' in the Islands" (Singh 1980:27). Despite the diplomatic

interaction between Norway and the U.S. in 1907, the question of whether the U.S. was an interested power went unresolved until the following year.

By the time the U.S. formally responded to European plans to address the Spitsbergen Question, Ayer and Longyear had been lobbying the State Department to protect their commercial enterprise, the Arctic Coal Company, from potential Norwegian jurisdiction over Spitsbergen. The two American businessmen feared that tax and labor laws potentially emanating from Norwegian jurisdiction could pose an existential threat to their company (Singh). The U.S. ambassador, despite the pleas of Ayer and Longyear, did not appear receptive to their argument warning against Norwegian sovereignty. Peirce noted the coal activities on Spitsbergen “[were] of little practical value” (Singh 1980:28). Ambassador Peirce’s position shows that the U.S. initially had no national interest in Spitsbergen, despite Ayer and Longyear’s lobbying efforts.

In 1908, Norway put forward a second diplomatic initiative and still continued to exclude the U.S. as an interested power. Ayer and Longyear’s Arctic Coal Company not only wanted the U.S. Government to allow it to express its views on how Spitsbergen should be governed, it also sought the government’s imprimatur on the company’s commercial interests. The coal company asked that “a duly accredited representative of the United States” (Singh 1980:28) represent its interests.

It certainly appears that American coal interest lobbying influenced Secretary of State Root to justify U.S. involvement in the Norwegian initiatives to address Spitsbergen’s condition. Root’s instruction to U.S. Ambassador Peirce to convey U.S. plans on this issue “serve as the point of departure for the beginning of official correspondence with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry” (Singh 1980:29) on the Spitsbergen Question. One explicit piece of evidence that

American private interests drove the U.S. Government to involve itself in the Spitsbergen Question was Acting Secretary of State Robert Bacon's view that it is "natural" (Singh 1980:30) for the government to be part of a conference on Spitsbergen "in order to safeguard the rights and interests of its citizens" (Singh 1980:30).

Nonetheless, U.S. Ambassador Peirce was not convinced the U.S. Government participation in the conference would be fruitful. He was concerned that "unless American claims to land were recognized as valid ... American participation in the conference would be useless" (Singh 1980:33). However, Peirce's stated view was inconsistent with his report, which concedes that, absent American involvement in the diplomatic initiative, "other governments would indeed have authority over 'interests' of American nationals" (Singh 1980:33).

The U.S. and the 1914 Spitsbergen Conference

Prior to the outbreak of World War I in 1914, three European states—Norway, Sweden, and Tsarist Russia—sought to address the Spitsbergen Question. Although the U.S. expressed interest in the question, the three powers successfully kept the U.S. out of the initial talks held in July and August 1910. The U.S. was grouped into "the *other* [emphasis added] interested powers" (Singh and Saguirian 1993:59) camp. The European states produced an extensive document, the 1910 *Projet de Convention* (draft convention), that divided administration of Spitsbergen between Norway, Sweden, and Russia, while retaining the archipelago's status as a *terra nullius*. These three *most interested* powers disseminated the document to the other interested powers, including the U.S.

The U.S. Government adamantly opposed the 1910 *Projet de Convention*. The State Department raised three objections. First, the U.S. could not agree to any accord that did not

recognize “the indisputable validity of the claims of American citizens *as recorded in the State Department* [original emphasis]” (Singh and Saguirian 1993:61). Second, the draft convention was not only expensive and complex, but it also insufficiently addressed “the interests of American nationals mining coal in the archipelago” (Singh and Saguirian 1993:61). Finally, the U.S. Government’s consent was contingent on the U.S. participating in drafting a formal agreement on Spitsbergen.

The U.S. raised the first two objections because they constituted the private commercial interests of Ayer, Longyear, and the Arctic Coal Company. The State Department makes clear in a January 1911 diplomatic note (or note verbale) to Norway that it has two objectives in Spitsbergen: “the protection of the rights and interests of its citizens [in Spitsbergen] and the maintenance of the principle of terra nullius in the archipelago” (Singh 1980:155).

It is obvious that Ayer and Longyear’s persistent lobbying of the State Department paid huge political dividends, as two of the three U.S. objections explicitly referred to the *Projet de Convention*’s failure to protect private Americans’ interests in the archipelago. Furthermore, the documentation Ayer and Longyear had been submitting annually to the State Department since 1907 on their claims and activities on Spitsbergen served as the State Department’s basis of knowledge on the archipelago.

Pressure from coal mining interests prompted the U.S. and other interested powers to continue seeking a solution to the Spitsbergen Question despite the lack of consensus on a potential resolution. For example, in addition to seeking U.S. Government recognition and support for existing coal mining claims, Ayer and Longyear, working individually and through their company, the Arctic Coal Company, “lobbied the [State Department] to prevent creation of [an international] regime that would be costly to the company, that is, one under which taxes

would be levied” (Singh and Saguirian 1993:62). In other words, American private interests sought to influence the U.S. Government to develop a policy position toward the Spitsbergen Question that balanced Ayer and Longyear’s desire for a political sovereignty strong enough to establish a corporate-friendly environment, but weak enough to be unable to levy an “expected burden of taxation” (Singh and Saguirian 1993:62) on their coal mining properties. Lansing began reflecting American coal mining interests in the archipelago. He supported, for example, “fees for land registration rather than taxes to be levied by the proposed international commission” (Singh and Saguirian 1993:63).

American commercial interests lobbied the U.S. Government “for an official policy on Spitsbergen that would enhance their enterprises” (Singh and Saguirian 1993:63). There was nothing particularly unique or questionable about such efforts. Commercial interests in Great Britain and Norway, for example, made similar overtures about their interests to their respective national capitals. Despite years long attempts by American coal interests and Lansing’s sympathetic views toward those interests, Singh and Saguirian (1993) contend “[t]he State Department was reluctant ... to take part officially in an agreement that might prove costly in the future” (63).

As the State Department’s unpublished draft Historical Research Project on the Arctic and U.S. Foreign Policy⁷ contends, Spitsbergen was “a minor foreign policy issue for the United

⁷ U.S. State Department, “The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy: Part I [The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy 1789-1960] (UNCLASSIFIED); Part II [The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy 1960-1990] ([UNCLASSIFIED]); Part III (Footnotes [The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy 1960-1990] (UNCLASSIFIED).” *Historical Research Project No. xxx*. The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian produced this undated draft study in the early 1990s to describe events relevant to shaping U.S. foreign policy development in the northern polar region since the department was established in 1789. Although the State Department has no record indicating the draft study was ever finalized or published, the study provides great insight into official U.S. thinking about the Arctic region from 1960 to approximately 1990. Led by State Department Foreign Service diplomat Samuel E. Fry, Jr., the study is divided into three parts. In a June 24, 2019, e-mail replying to this author, a State Department Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs program analyst noted “that Part II [which covers the Arctic and U.S. foreign policy between 1960-1990] was originally classified, but went through a formal

States” (State, Part I, circa 1990:21) from 1909 up through the first Spitsbergen conference that convened in mid-June 1914. However, the issue was important enough to warrant a paragraph in President William Howard Taft’s foreign relations annual message to Congress in 1912. Taft stated

The great preponderance of American material interests in the subarctic island of Spitzbergen, which has always been regarded politically as “no man’s land,” impels this Government to a continued and lively interest in the international dispositions to be made for the political governance and administration of that region. The conflict of certain claims of American citizens and others is in a fair way to adjustment, while the settlement of matters of administration, whether by international conference of the interested powers or otherwise, continues to be the subject of exchange of views between the Governments concerned (State 1919 Annual Message of the President).

Including the Spitsbergen Question in the President’s annual foreign relations message to Congress certainly implies the issue was far more than a minor U.S. foreign policy issue.

However, this is more attributable to Ayer and Longyear’s effective lobbying campaign to keep the issue relevant than on identifiable U.S. Government interest in the islands. While Taft did indeed outline the Spitsbergen matter in his annual message, he “gave no definitive statement on [State] Department policy” (Singh 1980:204 en29).

Taft’s statement notwithstanding, the U.S. did not articulate a compelling national interest in Spitsbergen at the 1914 conference. Outside of insisting on maintaining Spitsbergen’s terra nullius designation, “[t]he State Department instructed the U.S. delegation that it was U.S. policy to ‘refrain from interfering in European affairs,’ and to avoid any commitment in any way at variance with this course” (State, Part I, circa 1990:21). The 1914 conference failed to achieve

declassification process in 1994 and is marked as such.” Included with Part II is an undated memo (Case Control # 9402533) from Frank M. Machak, the State Department’s Director of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review. Mr. Machak is responding to a June 23, 1994, letter from another State Department official who, according to the memo, requested “mandatory review and release of one State Department document under Executive Order 12356.” Machak states the document in question was reviewed and “may be released.”

a solution to Spitsbergen's governing arrangement. This, plus the outbreak of World War I soon after, derailed any plans to address the Spitsbergen Question until the postwar Paris Peace Conference began four years later.

Transformation from Private Commercial Interests to U.S. National Interest

The State Department's posture toward Spitsbergen, generally, and the Arctic Coal Company, specifically, began to change after the coal company—along with Ayer and Longyear—sold all of its mining interests on Spitsbergen to a Norwegian conglomerate in 1916. One example of this changed view occurred soon after the sale. When Arctic Coal Company legal counsel Nathaniel Wilson sought copies of the 1914 Spitsbergen Conference proceedings from the State Department, the department did not respond to the request with the same sense of urgency and interest as it had with previous requests for information from the company.

Lansing's elevation the following year from State Department counselor to secretary of the state signaled the start of a dramatic reframing in the State Department's—and therefore the U.S. Government's—interest in Spitsbergen. It is important to place this shift in a larger, more immediate geopolitical context. The First World War began in 1914 and quickly confined the 1914 Spitsbergen Conference to the back burner of international politics. The U.S. did not formally enter the war until April 1917.

Soon after the U.S. entered the war, Lansing met with Norway's ambassador to the U.S. Helmer Halvorsen Bryn and expressed his belief that Norway should govern Spitsbergen. What prevented Lansing from previously advocating for Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen? The private commercial interests of Ayer, Longyear, and their Arctic Coal Company.

Once Ayer and Longyear sold their coal mining interests to a Norwegian conglomerate in 1916, American nationals no longer possessed any direct interests in Spitsbergen's coal mines. The U.S. Government, therefore, was freed from being "called upon to defend or represent actual American ventures in the Islands" (Singh 1980:92). Those American ventures, previously comprised of the Arctic Coal Company and Ayer and Longyear, collectively opposed granting sovereignty over Spitsbergen to Norway or any other country for fear that such political authority would inhibit their own corporate interests regarding taxes and labor laws.

The sale of direct American private interests on Spitsbergen, along with the geopolitical upheaval created by World War I, cleared the way for the U.S. and other states to focus on resolving the archipelago's unique status. The approach, although not inevitable in previous years, recognized that Norway, as Singh (1980) points out, "was in fact a logical source of sovereignty for the Islands" (89). This new environment allowed Lansing to pursue his preferred solution to the Spitsbergen Question of granting Norway sovereignty over Spitsbergen.

Lansing, U.S. Interests, and Spitsbergen's Unique Sovereignty Status

America's national interest in Spitsbergen was ultimately about the governance of the archipelago. In other words, what and who should exercise sovereignty over Spitsbergen? Lansing considered this sovereignty dilemma at the heart of whether and how states should approach Spitsbergen. He laid out three premises that undergird an understanding of the concept of *sovereignty* and that are particularly applicable to Spitsbergen's terra nullius status. Lansing (1917) posits first that sovereignty generally is "the power to do all things without accountability. Second ... it finds expression in the direction and limitation of human action in

its relation to persons and things” (765). Finally, “[g]overnment is an exercise of sovereignty and is, therefore, dependent for its existence upon the existence of sovereignty” (Lansing 1917:765).

Lansing derives two forms of sovereignty from these premises: *territorial* sovereignty and *political* sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty emerges from “the exercise of direction and limitation of human action within a defined area without regard to the persons affected ... [while political sovereignty is] the exercise of direction and control of the actions of particular persons without regard to the place of exercise” (Lansing 1917:766). Spitsbergen seemingly required governmental sovereignty over three broad areas: order and safety, legal contracts between parties, and land use (Lansing 1917). The first two require political sovereignty, while the third requires territorial sovereignty. The third area, land use, is the most important one for addressing Spitsbergen’s unique sovereignty dilemma. Lansing (1917) observes that “[i]n the present state of affairs the use of land in Spitzbergen seems to be the most prominent of the three, as it has been the cause of the negotiations which have taken place, and the chief subject of discussion” (768).

Spitsbergen required a unique application of sovereignty, agreed to by Northern European powers and the U.S., that forms “a common government” (1917:770) with the appropriate authority delegated to it. Only an international treaty will be able to put in place the proper scope of political and territorial sovereignty over Spitsbergen. Lansing (1917) speculated whether the political environment that eventually emerges after the ongoing “Great War” would allow the Spitsbergen Question to be resolved through an “international government” (770) or whether Northern European states “will prefer to abandon the principle of *terra nullius* [original emphasis] and permit a neutral Scandinavian Power to assume territorial sovereignty over the archipelago” (770).

Lansing recognized that Spitsbergen's sovereignty status—particularly *territorial* sovereignty—must be established to prevent potential future conflicts between states over the archipelago's coal deposits and other resources. His *split sovereignty* concept would eventually be enshrined into the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty that granted Norway political sovereignty over Spitsbergen while granting access to the archipelago's economic resources to any state that ratified the treaty. Lansing's pro-Norwegian sovereignty stance on Spitsbergen drove American views on the Spitsbergen Question during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Although Spitsbergen was a relatively minor postwar issue, it was, nonetheless, one that the U.S. could no longer afford to ignore. The postwar negotiations meant “[t]he period of dormancy for American policy was over” (Singh 1980:90) as it relates to Spitsbergen.

U.S. Interests and the Post-World War I Spitsbergen Commission

Lansing's view toward Spitsbergen became the U.S. Government's formal position during the 1919 Spitsbergen Commission. Fred Nielsen (1920), the American representative to the 1919 Commission, stated that although the U.S. had “no political interest in the archipelago” (233), it was interested in resolving the status of Spitsbergen's sovereignty while also protecting private American mining interests there.

Even though the U.S. had not yet determined what, if any, national interest it had in Spitsbergen, Lansing (2012) contends that resolving the Spitsbergen Question was one of over two dozen territorial and water issues in Europe during post-World War I peace negotiations that was part of “the essentials for a stable peace” (193) in Europe. With victory in the First World War in sight, Lansing drafted a memorandum on September 21, 1918, outlining his views on “territorial settlements” (2012:192) designed to help American commissioners to the postwar

Paris Peace Conference draft instructions for President Woodrow Wilson's approval and use during peace negotiations. The memorandum emerged out of Lansing's disillusionment over what he perceived as Wilson's failure to outline a definitive American postwar plan for Europe. Lansing included within the memorandum a list of 29 territorial and marine issues that should be resolved to help prevent a defeated Germany from trying to dominate Europe again. Lansing's (2012) push for marine territorial settlements was driven by, among other things, "the imperative need of rendering Germany impotent as a military power" (197), as well as to enhance "the economic interdependence of adjoining areas and the mutual industrial benefit to their inhabitants by close political affiliation" (197). His proposal to grant Norway sovereignty over Spitsbergen was the next to the last item.

The Spitsbergen Question, regardless of whatever potential future dilemma and paradoxical international problem it presented, was not a particularly important issue among the postwar European powers during the 1919 Spitsbergen Commission. The commission's creation after World War I merely served to tie up Spitsbergen's loose ends that continued to exist after the war. Despite its growing importance, the Spitsbergen Question "was not a high-priority matter" (Singh and Saguirian 1993:79) for either the U.S. or the other members of the 1919 Spitsbergen Commission. Although Lansing collectively characterized the more than two dozen territorial and water issues as essential for European peace, Spitsbergen's location next to the bottom of the list suggests it was a relatively low-priority issue. This shows how the Spitsbergen Question's relevance and overall importance even at the conference convened to address it was not a high priority. Lansing's years-long efforts notwithstanding, Spitsbergen's status "had become an interesting legal and philosophical issue, instead of a concern for American interests" (Campopiano 2019:47).

U.S. Interests and the Spitsbergen Treaty

The Spitsbergen Treaty contains three major provisions: it granted Norway full sovereignty over the Spitsbergen archipelago; the treaty “simultaneously preserves the previous *terra nullius* [original emphasis] status by according commercial rights to other contracting states” (Koivurova and Holiencin 2017:132); and it demilitarized the archipelago.

Despite Secretary of State Lansing’s personal interest in resolving the Spitsbergen Question, the State Department’s subsequently disinterested and unenthusiastic support for ratifying the Spitsbergen Treaty following Lansing’s departure from the State Department was consistent with the U.S. Government’s ambiguous interest in Spitsbergen itself. After Lansing resigned as secretary of state in 1920, no one apparently cared to remember the treaty even existed as it languished unnoticed in the State Department’s bureaucracy. The department did not even assess the U.S.’s position on the treaty until 1923, three years after the U.S. signed it. When State did an assessment, it realized the treaty was not yet in force, and only one of the nine original signatories had ratified the treaty by 1923 (Singh).

Nielsen drafted a memorandum in 1923 in response to State Department Solicitor Charles Hyde’s request for Nielsen’s observations of the Spitsbergen Treaty. This further exemplifies how the U.S. believed it had a questionable national interest in Spitsbergen. Drawing on his personal recollection because a formal report of the 1919 Spitsbergen Commission’s proceedings was never made, Nielsen contends that U.S. national interests in Spitsbergen, to the extent they existed at all, “largely disappeared” (Singh 1980:174) by the time of the commission.

Nielsen believed the U.S. was really only interested in the Spitsbergen Treaty’s annex that addressed “the so-called private rights” (Singh 1980:174) on the archipelago because it was

the same issue the American representatives focused on at the 1914 Spitsbergen Conference. He further showed that there were no clear advantages to ratifying the treaty when he acknowledged that even the treaty's provisions for commercial interests "are probably not of any great consequence" (Singh 1980:175) if the U.S. did not ratify the treaty. Finally, Nielsen reveals that the U.S. and the other interested powers took up the Spitsbergen Question during the Paris Peace Conference not because it was a significant postwar issue but because the peace conference merely "afforded an opportune occasion for dealing with the question" (Nielsen 1920:232).

The Spitsbergen Treaty is both unusual and monumental from an American perspective. First, it is one of the few aspects of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that is still intact (Berg). Second, and more importantly, the treaty's main element, transferring Spitsbergen's legal status from that as an international no man's land to Norway's sovereign territory, occurred because *private* American interests managed to convince the U.S. Government "to act in an area ... clearly outside the heretofore limits of American foreign policy as set out in the Monroe Doctrine" (Berg 2017:21). It is important to note, however, the Monroe Doctrine applied to the interests and actions of the U.S. Government. It did not apply to the actions of private U.S. citizens or companies. The persistence of Longyear and his Arctic Coal Company, catalyzed by Lansing's personal interest in Spitsbergen's unique status, combined to not only to resolve a purely business interest, but essentially create a U.S. national interest in the European Arctic. This U.S. Government involvement in what became the Spitsbergen Treaty represented a historic expansion of U.S. foreign policy outside the bounds of the Western Hemisphere; an expansion driven by private commercial interests.

The contention that Spitsbergen was minimally important to the U.S. in the immediate post-World War I is well-founded. As Young and Osherenko (1993), who examined the creation

of the Spitsbergen Treaty as well as other regime formations in the Arctic and Antarctic, explain, the 1919 negotiations and subsequent 1920 treaty succeeded because the Spitsbergen Question was *not* a high priority among the states that comprised the 1919 Spitsbergen Commission. They concluded that “[a]lthough the Spitsbergen Commission in Paris articulated the solution to the question in 1919, the case was not a high-priority matter for France, Great Britain, Italy, or the United States, whose representatives sat on the commission” (Young and Osherenko 1993:79). In other words, the postwar negotiations and the Spitsbergen Treaty that followed did not have to address any involved state’s compelling national interests—a situation that likely would have prolonged, if not totally undermined, the negotiated outcome that did occur.

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

The United States has often been accused of being the least interested historically, of the eight Arctic states, in the polar north. This accusation was certainly merited in the years prior to World War II. During this time, the U.S. Government paid scant attention to the Arctic, even as advances in aviation and polar exploration illuminated the region’s growing importance from a domestic as well as international context. This is largely attributable to the U.S.’s historical tendency to think of the Arctic the same way it thinks of Alaska—not much and only then when it pertains to valuable natural resources.

The U.S. has too often viewed Alaska in close relation to the territory’s proximity to the contiguous United States—remote and detached. Historically, the U.S. Government and arguably, most Americans, have treated the far northwestern corner of North America with geographic and psychological remoteness—and therefore, irrelevance. This perception of Alaska, what Haycox (2020) calls “the psychology of non-contiguity” (234), has also fed into a

collective reality that has made the Arctic “rather out of sight and out of mind for American policymakers” (233). Even the State Department’s historical study on the Arctic and U.S. foreign policy development makes the same accusation. The State Department study contends “the Arctic faded even further from [American] national view as an area of either politico/military or economic policy concern” (State, Part I, circa 1990:23) during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s.

Alaskan Oil Deposits and U.S. National Security Interests

The U.S. Government’s Arctic interests during much of the 1920s were domestically focused on Alaska and the then territory’s vast oil deposits. The U.S. recognized during World War I that oil was fast becoming a vital natural resource for military operations and Alaska was a natural focal point to search for more of this resource. After the war, the U.S. and many other states began converting their militaries from coal use to oil use, particularly their navies. This prompted the U.S. Government into action to secure domestic oil deposits under federal control.

In March 1921, President Warren Harding signed Executive Order 3474 (E.O. 3474), transferring tens of millions of acres of lands, identified as naval petroleum reserves, from several American states and territories to the U.S. Department of the Interior. These lands, which the U.S. estimated contained significant amounts of oil deposits, included 23 million acres of Alaskan Arctic territory that were converted into the Naval Petroleum Reserve 4 (NPR-4) (Haycox 2020). Harding issued another executive order, E.O. 3797-A, in February 1923, placing NPR-4 under the U.S. Navy’s control instead of under the Interior Department (Historical Records Survey 1944:319).⁸ Together, these executive orders constituted the U.S. Government’s

⁸ Historical Records Survey. 1944. *Presidential Executive Orders: Numbered 1-8030, 1862-1938, Volume 1*. “Executive Order 3797-A, February 27, 1923: Certain described petroleum seepage lands along the Arctic coast

national interest in ensuring an emergency supply of oil for the U.S. Navy for years to come. The establishment of NPR-4, since renamed the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (NPR-A), also marked “the beginning of Alaska’s Arctic oil and gas regime” (Haycox 2020:237). This petroleum regime would become a key U.S. Arctic interest over subsequent decades.

Identifying U.S. Arctic Interests During the Interwar Period

Outside the role of Alaska’s oil deposits in supplying the U.S. military, in the roughly 20-year period between World War I and World War II, the U.S. Government consistently undervalued the Arctic’s emerging geopolitical importance. Driven largely by advances in civilian and military aviation, the polar north’s strategic relevance would dramatically change from a relatively minor role in World War I to a key region in the years leading up and during World War II. The U.S., outside of its Alaska-focused interests, continued to pay little attention to the region and, as a result, did not consider what national interests it might have in a remote and sparsely populated—but increasingly geostrategically significant—region of the world..

The Arctic region presented many important and potentially important political and legal issues that could help the U.S. formulate “a more definite national policy” (Boggs 1933:1) toward the region during the interwar period. Boggs attempted to organize and present these issues for the State Department’s consideration when he developed a comprehensive study in 1933 called “The Polar Regions: Geographical and Historical Data for Consideration in a Study of the Claims to Sovereignty and in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions” (State, Part I, circa 1990:25), hereafter referred to as the Boggs study. This dissertation examines that study’s Arctic component.

of Alaska reserved as a naval petroleum reserve.” New York: Archives Publishing Company. Google Play e-book. <https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=OsE-AAAAIAAJ&rdid=book-OsE-AAAAIAAJ&rdot=1>.

Within its broad focus on sovereignty claims, the Boggs study “foresaw the gathering impact of potential Arctic great circle air routes on territorial sovereignty, issues dealing with rights of passage for international straits, which would figure so prominently in U.S.-Canadian relations and the Law of the Sea Conference in the years ahead” (State, Part I, circa 1990:25). The study also illuminated the concept of scientifically-derived economic advancement in the Arctic region. This idea would later serve as “the driving force in the development of a national Arctic policy during the 1960s” (State, Part I, circa 1990:25). This dissertation addresses scientifically-driven U.S Arctic economic progress in Chapter Four.

It is worth noting the State Department rejected Boggs’s initial proposed study in 1930—a study that would have focused “on all aspects of U.S. interests in Polar regions to help in the formulation for policy for those areas” (State, Part I, circa 1990:24). State rejected the initial proposal because it did not believe the U.S. had any Arctic interests at stake, and such interests would focus on territorial claims. Therefore, the State Department “did not perceive an immediate operational need” (State, Part I, circa 1990:24) that would justify articulating broader Arctic national interests.

Boggs framed his 1933 study around five key questions.⁹ These questions focused on the polar regions’ value, their collective differences compared to the rest of the world, their legal and political peculiarities, sovereignty claims relating to both regions, and the facts underlying such claims by different states. This dissertation examines the question of the polar regions’—specifically, the Arctic’s—*value* because it is most insightful for helping explain what drove U.S. Arctic interests during the interwar period.

⁹ The five questions are: “1. Of what value are the polar regions? 2. In what significant ways do they differ from the rest of the world? 3. What legal and political problems arise from these peculiar characteristics of the polar regions? 4. What claims to sovereignty have already been made relating to these areas? 5. What are the facts upon which claims to sovereignty (including counter-claims) may be made by various countries?” (Boggs 1933:3).

Boggs (1933) categorizes the polar regions' "economic and other practical values" (4) into four key areas: whaling, fishing, and hunting; mineral resources; international air routes; and scientific data conducted in both regions. This dissertation focuses on and intercontinental air routes because aviation advancements—particularly in developing military air power—would play a major role in identifying U.S. national interests toward the Arctic.

Air Power Advancements and U.S. Arctic Interests During the Interwar Period

Great circle flight routes across the north polar region began emerging as an increasingly significant interest for northern hemispheric states in the 1920s. These air routes would eventually enable the creation of regular flight service between North America and Europe. As Boggs (1933) argues, "[a]ny dispute as to the sovereignty of land in the north polar area may be of greater importance from the viewpoint of potential flying services than from any other" (14). Despite the emerging promise and prominence of polar flight routes, the U.S. still did not consider the Arctic of any significant national importance throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. The polar north became even less important in America after World War I and efforts to raise the region's geopolitical profile usually fell on deaf ears.

U.S. thinking about the Arctic's geopolitical importance reflected Sir Halford Mackinder's view of the Arctic. Heralded as "one of the fathers of geopolitics," (Emmerson 2010:105), Mackinder did not consider the Arctic geostrategically important, given its remote location and extremely difficult to navigate, ice-covered geography. For example, Mackinder (1904), arguing that motherland Russia was geographically situated for world domination, states "[s]he can strike on all sides and be struck on all sides, save the north" (436). In other words, the Arctic presented too many difficulties for any hostile power to threaten Russia from the north.

However, during the interwar period, critics began to question Mackinder's thinking about the Arctic. As Emmerson (2010) contends, "[w]hereas Mackinder had viewed the Arctic as a strategic barrier, enthusiasts of air power conceptualized the Arctic as a *strategic corridor* [emphasis added]" (105).

The advent of powered flight earlier in the 20th century greatly advanced into civilian passenger flight and, more importantly, military flight, in the 1920s and 1930s. This meant that harsh, remote far north geography that once prevented large-scale civilian and military air activity increasingly became a pathway to vastly reduced global travel. The U.S. Government was slow to recognize that the emergence of military air power would eventually make the Arctic a national security interest. The U.S.'s disinterest in the Arctic in light of emerging signs of its increasing importance are exemplified by the experiences of three prominent Americans who recognized and criticized America's strategic shortsightedness regarding the Arctic: polar explorer Admiral Robert Peary, air power advocate General William "Billy" Mitchell, and polar explorer and ethnologist Vilhjalmur Stefansson.

In 1916, Peary opposed President Wilson's plan to give up what Peary viewed as legitimate American rights over Danish-controlled Greenland in exchange for the U.S. purchasing the Danish Virgin Islands from Denmark. "[C]iting Greenland's potentially valuable strategic location" (State, Part I, circa 1990:22), Peary launched a public relations campaign urging the U.S. to consider purchasing Greenland instead of negotiating it away. He stated, presciently, that the large Arctic landmass "'might furnish an important North Atlantic naval and aeronautical base'" (Emmerson 2010:105). Interestingly though, Peary did not directly lobby the U.S. Government (State, Part I, circa 1990) to press his view.

Greenland would become strategically important to the U.S. during World War II. Along the way, however, there were several occasions where the U.S. consistently undervalued Greenland and the North Atlantic's pre-World War II role in U.S. national security (Fogelson). Providing additional insight into Wilson's decision not to purchase Greenland from Denmark in 1916, Fogelson provides evidence showing how the U.S. continued to resist calls well into the 1920s to purchase the massive Arctic island.

General Billy Mitchell, testifying before a Senate committee in 1920, expressed his support for "retaining American interests in Greenland" (Fogelson 1989:53). Like Peary, Mitchell opposed the U.S. Government's decision not to claim sovereignty over Greenland. The State Department, explains Fogelson (1989), "considered and rejected suggestions for incorporating Greenland as a possession, a position consistent with the government's policy to focus on the Caribbean rather than the North Atlantic" (53). Fogelson contends, however, that even though the State Department would not change its position, it did recognize Greenland's "strategic value" (1989:53). This suggests the U.S. Government viewed the Arctic as *valuable* in the general sense, but not worthy of articulating any explicit *national interest* toward it. The U.S. Government's lack of identified interest in the Arctic extended beyond the diplomacy-focused State Department to the U.S. armed forces.

The post-World War I U.S. military resisted conceptualizing whether and how the Arctic region could be integrated into its overall national defense planning (State, Part 1, circa 1990). However, airpower advocate Mitchell recognized the Arctic's increasing military importance and encouraged the U.S. to develop a strategic military policy for the region. Foreseeing the emergence of trans-polar air routes connecting Alaska and the Soviet Union to Europe and Asia, Mitchell argued in the early 1920s "that a comprehensive strategic policy for the north called for

air defense of the Aleutian Islands before Japan attempted to use them as steppingstones for an assault on Alaska” (State, Part I, circa 1990:23). Testifying before the U.S. Congress in 1935, Mitchell proclaimed that ““whoever holds Alaska will hold the world...[and that] it is the most strategic place in the world”” (Le Miere and Mazo 2013:81).¹⁰ Mitchell’s words would prove prescient to U.S. interests in the Arctic during World War II.

One can also trace the recognition of the Arctic’s strategic importance in the 1920s to Stefansson who “foresaw widespread use of transpolar air routes and predicted that submarine freighters would become economical in the Arctic” (Osherenko and Young 1989:4). Casting his vision wider than Mitchell, Stefansson envisioned “a broad masterplan for civilian development of Arctic natural and renewable resources, civilian air routes, transportation and communication centers, and international cooperation” (State, Part I, circa 1990:23). Stefansson, like Mitchell, raised awareness of the Arctic’s emerging importance and the U.S. Government’s inability to comprehend how important the Arctic was quickly becoming. Mitchell and Stefansson clearly understood that, as the State Department’s study on the Arctic in U.S. foreign policy development deftly put it, “what passed for an inter-war U.S. policy dealing with Arctic and sub-Arctic affairs was, in reality, no policy at all” (State, Part I, circa 1990:24). Collectively, Mitchell and Stefansson “personified the counterpoint to the [U.S. Government’s] glacial Arctic policy indifference” (State, Part I, circa 1990:23).

Mitchell and Stefansson’s warnings notwithstanding, the U.S. continued to express little interest in the Arctic the rest of the decade. This inaction occurred despite several high-profile aviation achievements involving Americans, such as the first flight to the North Pole in 1926 and

¹⁰ Billy Mitchell’s quote is referenced in the Congressional Record, (74th Congress) vol. 154, part 18, p. 24292. He reportedly made his comments on February 11, 1935, in support of a bill introduced by U.S. Representative James Wilcox (D-FL) to build airfields in Alaska and other places. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the bill into law in August 1935.

the first transpolar flight in 1928. Moreover, scientific expeditions continued to create new knowledge about the Arctic's natural environment. These collective achievements, however, "produced no reorientation of national policy regarding the Arctic" (Haycox 2020:237).

Boggs referenced select State Department diplomatic correspondence as a basis for both facilitating his study of U.S. polar regions' policy, and to prompt further development of such a policy. The State Department expressed far more interest in Antarctica than the Arctic throughout the 1920s because several states, including the U.S., had or were considering far more sovereignty claims in the south polar region than in the north polar region. Nonetheless, U.S. officials did acknowledge, at least implicitly, that the U.S. did have *some* interest in what *other* states were doing in the Arctic region.

In one diplomatic exchange in 1924, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes did express apprehension over Norway's intention to claim sovereignty over any lands discovered during a Norwegian explorer's planned trans-Arctic flight. Replying to Norwegian Foreign Minister Christian Fredrik Michelet, Hughes countered that the U.S. "cannot admit that such taking of possession as a discoverer by [Norwegian explorer Roald] Amundsen of areas explored by him would establish the basis of rights of sovereignty in the Polar regions" (Boggs 1933:106). This was a rare example of U.S. officials even implying any U.S. interest in the Arctic outside of the Spitsbergen Treaty during the 1920s or early 1930s.

In 1930, the U.S. Senate considered a Senate resolution that, in the absence of a defined U.S. *Antarctic* policy, would have authorized and directed "the President to lay claim to all areas in the Antarctic which have been discovered or explored by American citizens" (Boggs 1933:109).¹¹ Although the Senate never acted on the resolution, the attempt showed how

¹¹ The Senate resolution Boggs references was Senate Resolution 310 (S. Res. 310, 71st Congress, 2nd Session) introduced by Senator Millard Tydings (D-Maryland) on June 30, 1930. It called for "[a]uthorizing the

important U.S. policymakers considered Antarctica. There was no similar effort made, however, to articulate American interests and policy toward the Arctic.

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS DURING WORLD WAR II

The Arctic's importance to U.S. interests underwent a dramatic, two-decade transformation that began with the run-up to the Second World War. As the State Department (Part I, circa 1990) observed in its historical study of the Arctic and U.S. foreign policy, "[i]n no other world region did the pendulum of U.S. national security concerns swing so far as so fast as in the Arctic between the 1930s and the 1950s" (25). World War II raised the Arctic's profile to the U.S. primarily from a military perspective. Yet, the United States still did not clearly articulate its broad national interests toward the Arctic. Haycox's (2020) assertion that, "none of the World War II activities in Alaska motivated the United States to develop a comprehensive Arctic policy or strategy for applying it" (238) is correct but too narrow. This assessment applied far beyond Alaska to include the European Arctic.

Months after attacking Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Imperial Japan also attacked Alaska's Aleutian Islands in the spring of 1942, forcing the U.S. to fortify the Aleutians throughout the rest of the war. Furthermore, the U.S. resupplied its World War II ally, the Soviet Union, by Arctic and Alaskan air and sea routes, through Congress's Lend-Lease plan. Thus, a two-pronged military threat drove the U.S. Government's newfound national security interest in the Arctic. Nazi Germany's potential occupation of Danish-owned Greenland as well as Iceland

President to claim all areas in the Antarctic discovered or explored by Americans." The resolution was subsequently tabled and never acted upon. *72 Cong. Rec. (Bound) - History of Bills and Resolutions - Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 72 (1930)*. "History of Bills and Resolutions: Senate Bills." <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1930-pt12-v72/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1930-pt12-v72-2.pdf>.

in the European Arctic presented the first military threat, while Japan's assault on Alaska's Aleutian Islands in 1942 represented another military threat on the other side of the polar north.

U.S. National Security Interests in the European Arctic – World War II

As Nazi aggression spread across Europe in the late 1930s, the status of remote and sparsely populated Greenland rose as a national security concern to the U.S. Situated in the North Atlantic Ocean between the North American and European continents, Greenland's strategic location provided a potential invasion route for adversaries against North America. The U.S. Senate in June 1939 debated a Senate joint resolution allowing the U.S. president to negotiate the purchase of Greenland from Denmark.¹² Although the Senate ultimately did not pass the resolution, the debate itself illuminated how important Greenland was to defending North America as well as the North Atlantic Ocean (State, Part I, circa 1990). It highlighted "the clear threat to Hemispheric defense that occupation of Greenland and Iceland by a hostile power would pose" (State, Part I, circa 1990:25). This was not the first time—nor would it be the last time—the U.S. Government was prompted to consider purchasing Greenland from Denmark.

America's Arctic Interests and Greenland During World War II

Greenland's geostrategic importance to North America's defense was at once obvious and grossly underappreciated. Greenland's security was essential to protecting the uppermost portion of the Western Hemisphere from transpolar aggression in the years leading up to and during World War II. However, what was not so obvious was whether America's defense establishment clearly understood how much Greenland's security status constituted a vital U.S.

¹² Senate Joint Resolution 119, 76th Congress, 1st session, April 19, 1939.

national security interest. As a U.S. Army military history study pointed out decades later, three factors drove U.S., along with Canadian, interests in Greenland in the lead-up to the Second World War. First, protect Greenland's cryolite mines. Not only was Greenland "the only important natural source of cryolite" (Dziuban 1959:149), this rare mineral was essential to producing aluminum. Second, use the massive Arctic island to build and operate air bases as well as weather and communication stations that could support aircraft transiting the North Atlantic between North America and Europe. Finally, deny Greenland's use by Germany (Dziuban).

In response to the June 1939 U.S. Senate joint resolution debate on purchasing Greenland so the U.S. could both keep the island out of hostile hands and establish military installations there, the departments of War and Navy issued separate reports in the spring of 1939 on the matter and reached opposite conclusions. Secretary of War Harry Woodring believed "the strategic advantage to be gained from operating on Greenland would be negligible and therefore unnecessary...[and that its] possession by a hostile power would not be a threat" (Fogelson 1989:61). On the other hand, the Navy Department concluded that "if war were to break out in the North Atlantic, possession of Greenland could be important because of its position on air and water routes to Europe...[and that Greenland under a hostile power could pose] a serious threat to the security of the U.S." (Fogelson 1989:61). These conflicting reports from the U.S. defense establishment symbolized the U.S. Government's ambiguous and often contradictory view of America's Arctic national interests during the interwar years.

In response to Nazi Germany's April 1940 invasion of Denmark, the U.S., along with Canada and Great Britain, quickly sought to develop a coordinated plan to defend Greenland and Iceland. The problem, observed the State Department, included "the absence of a framework for politico-military coordination, coupled with the lack of a definitive U.S. military plan for the

northern areas” (Part I, circa 1990:26). The lack of explicitly articulated U.S. national interests toward the Arctic exacerbated these problems. The U.S. Government needed, but did not possess, a set of expressed priorities and objectives on how the Arctic region affected U.S. national survival or well-being. The U.S. eventually assumed primary responsibility for defending Greenland and Iceland after high-level U.S. Government officials turned their attention to the Arctic.

The 1941 Denmark-United States Agreement for the Defense of Greenland¹³ “signaled a major shift in American foreign policy related to the island” (Berry 2016:103) by formally bringing it under the protective umbrella of the Monroe Doctrine. Signed on the one year anniversary of Nazi Germany’s April 9, 1940, invasion and occupation of Denmark, the agreement captured the stark situation facing U.S. and North American security. Germany’s occupation of Denmark and other European powers with territorial possessions in the Western Hemisphere presented the dire possibility that Berlin could, through continued domination of the European continent, convert those territorial possessions “into strategic centers of aggression against nations of the American continent” (Denmark-US 1941:129).

The 1941 defense agreement gave the U.S. the right to build and operate military and other facilities and installations necessary to defend and maintain Greenland’s territorial integrity. The U.S. was not limited to using those facilities and installations exclusively on behalf of Greenland’s defense, but could also use them “for purposes connected with the common defense of the Western Hemisphere” (Denmark-US 1941:130). This expansive use was

¹³ “Denmark-United States: Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland.” 1941. *The American Journal of International Law* 35 (3). Supplement: Official Documents (July 1941):129-134. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2213493>. See also “Defense of Greenland.” 1941. United States Treaties and International Agreements: 1776-1949. *Law Library of Congress*: 107-113. <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/b-dk-ust000007-0107.pdf>.

consistent with the U.S Government's view that Greenland was an integral component of the Monroe Doctrine and western hemispheric security. The 1941 agreement also gave the U.S. leasing rights to land and water areas needed to build and maintain defense facilities on Greenland for as long as the agreement was in force. While Denmark retained sovereign authority over Greenland's defense areas, the U.S. exercised "exclusive jurisdiction over any such defense area" (Denmark-US 1941:131) on the island.

The 1941 Danish-American defense agreement for Greenland was a logical extension of the U.S.'s recognition that Greenland was geographically vital to protecting North America and the entire Western Hemisphere from threats originating from Europe. Defining the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere, both geographically as well as in the context of the Monroe Doctrine, had been "a matter of engrossing interest" (Martin 1940:525) to the U.S. for at least a year. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who signed the 1941 defense agreement for the U.S., reiterated Greenland's vital position within the Monroe Doctrine when he conveyed to the Danish government that Greenland's defense "is plainly essential to the preservation of the peace and security of the American continent" (Denmark-US 1941:133). Even the 1941 defense agreement's duration suggested it might very well become a long-term addition to the Monroe Doctrine. The agreement would remain in place until such time that the U.S. and Denmark collectively agreed that "the present dangers to the peace and security of the *American continent* [emphasis added] have passed" (Denmark-US 1941:132).

U.S. Arctic Interests Beyond Greenland

In August 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Canadian counterpart, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, declared an agreement "concerning the mutual defense problems of

the United States and Canada and the defense of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere” (State, Part I, circa 1990:26). The August 1940 meeting also produced the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense. This board, which coordinated the two states’ joint defense planning, “became the cornerstone of all U.S.-Canadian military operations” (State, Part I, circa 1990:26) both during and after World War II. The U.S.-Canadian joint defense agreement established to defend North America from Nazi German aggression against Greenland and Iceland, also played a crucial role in defending the other end of North America from Japanese aggression in the Pacific Arctic.

In the months following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Japanese forces set their sights on Alaska’s Aleutian Islands, and occupied Attu and Kiska islands (State, Part I, circa 1990). This presented a direct threat against Alaska and the far northwest portion of the North American continent, and called for the U.S. to defend its homeland in the Aleutian Islands. A joint U.S.-Canadian operation in 1943 that defeated and forced Japanese forces from Alaska, “changed permanently the concept of circumpolar politico/military policy” (State, Part I, circa 1990:27). President Franklin Roosevelt, for example, “underscored the strategic importance of Alaska and the need to prevent ‘for all time to come’ an attack upon the United States from the area of the Great Circle air routes” (State, Part I, circa 1990:27).

Strategically, the Arctic “came into its own” (Le Miere and Mazo 2013:81) in World War II when the Allies battled Germany for control of the European Arctic because the area was a vital supply artery between the western Allies (notably the U.S. and Great Britain) and their eastern ally, the Soviet Union. The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap was vitally important to the U.S. and its allies. German naval vessels were able to transit it despite Allied attempts to mine the shallower portions of the gap. Iceland’s location and basing was also

strategically important. As Winston Churchill recalled, “[i]t has been said ‘Whoever possesses Iceland holds a pistol firmly pointed at England, America, and Canada’” (Lindsey 1977:3).

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter illustrates how the United States developed its national interests in the Arctic—specifically, the European Arctic—often despite its habitual disinterest in the polar north region at several key points beginning in the second decade of the 20th century. This frequent disinterest, however, did not emerge solely because the U.S. Government did not consider the Arctic important. For example, the U.S. Government initially had no national interest in Spitsbergen because, among other things, the remote and sparsely populated Arctic archipelago lay outside the geographic scope of the Monroe Doctrine and therefore, outside the domain of the early 20th century U.S foreign policy. Over time, however, America’s interest expanded and deepened beyond narrow, private commercial interests to eventually encompass broad, national considerations consistent with America’s rise as a global power.

The U.S. Government’s interests in the first decade (1906-1916) toward Spitsbergen were essentially the private interests of the Arctic Coal Company and Ayer and Longyear. Ayer and Longyear exploited their collective position as the primary providers of information and knowledge on Spitsbergen to the U.S. Government to benefit more directly from the State Department’s position toward remote Arctic island than any other single entity in the U.S. Although America’s foreign policy development toward Spitsbergen was spawned by private commercial interests, this was not unusual. What was extraordinary is that the State Department’s (or more precisely, Secretary of State Lansing’s) support occurred in an area of the

Arctic not only far outside the scope of the Monroe Doctrine, but one designated a “no man’s land.”

Ayer and Longyear’s efforts show the extent to which a determined and politically connected set of individuals not only informed but drove the U.S. Government to take a position on a foreign policy issue to which it had no previous national interest, and very little knowledge. Thus, private American citizens’ corporate interests certainly placed Spitsbergen on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It was this agenda placement, plus the secretary of state’s personal interest in it, that drove the U.S. to develop an explicit national interest in Spitsbergen in the aftermath of World War I. Having established a national interest in the archipelago, the U.S. helped formulate the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1920.

One could have expected the U.S. Government’s interest toward Spitsbergen to lessen after Ayer and Longyear sold the Arctic Coal Company and all American coal mining claims on Spitsbergen in 1916. Instead, the State Department’s growing policy interest toward the Spitsbergen Question transformed from a departmental issue to Lansing’s personal determination to resolve the archipelago’s terra nullius designation, which he deemed unworkable. Additionally, the outbreak and outcome of the First World War dramatically altered the global geopolitical environment and the U.S.’s perception of its role in the world. U.S. involvement in World War I greatly expanded U.S. foreign policy objectives beyond the confines of the Western Hemisphere, thereby, providing added justification for America to be party to resolving the Spitsbergen Question.

The Spitsbergen Treaty is significant in several important ways. It marked the first true experiment in Arctic governance. The treaty provided an architecture for order and governance within the region. It is important to emphasize that the U.S., despite its often well-deserved

reputation as an Arctic state in name only, in this instance was a driving force behind the diplomatic effort that resulted in the region's first formal governance scheme. Beyond the specific question of Spitsbergen's status, the U.S. Government formally entered the geopolitics of the Arctic when it spearheaded, signed and ratified the treaty. This marked the U.S.'s slow, uneven, but steady recognition of the Arctic's geopolitical significance.

Although the U.S. ratified the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1924, it gave relatively little attention to the treaty and its provisions for another half century. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. would express its interest in preventing the Soviet Union from intruding into the Spitsbergen/Svalbard region—a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area by virtue of Norway's NATO membership. The U.S. Government was concerned the Soviet Union, which had a boundary dispute with Norway in the Barents Sea—including waters within Spitsbergen's continental shelf—might attempt to negotiate a settlement that infringed on Norway's sovereignty over Spitsbergen. As a result, the U.S. Government leveraged its “commercial and scientific rights in the Spitsbergen area accruing to the United States as a signatory to the 1920 Treaty” (Scowcroft NSDM 325 1976) to articulate its Cold War position toward Spitsbergen to protect U.S. strategic and economic interests in the region.

The U.S. lacked an explicit Arctic policy in the 1920s and early 1930s because it had yet to clearly define its Arctic national interests. Boggs's study not only focused on sovereignty claims in both polar regions, it implied the U.S. lacked a coherent Arctic policy, particularly when compared to what sovereignty claims other states, such as Great Britain, Canada, the Soviet Union, and Norway, were making in the polar north. American interests toward Antarctica, on the other hand, overwhelmingly drove efforts to “make it more desirable to develop a more definite American policy relating to the polar regions” (Boggs 1933:121). Any

explicit articulation of U.S. Arctic interests and policy during the 1920s and early 1930s would only have occurred in the context of defining the U.S. Government's obviously greater interest in the Antarctic.

Wartime national security imperatives drove U.S. involvement in the Arctic during World War II. These same imperatives would subsequently drive postwar U.S. involvement in the Arctic on a range of issues. As the State Department's (Part I, circa 1990) Arctic historical study contends, the requirement to defend the polar north region during World War II "had a wide and continuing impact" (27) on the U.S. and laid the foundation for "U.S. Arctic research, the development of an Arctic transportation and communication infrastructure, [and] the creation of planning for the exploitation of natural resources, and international efforts to protect environmentally the northern circumpolar world" (27).

One could best characterize the view of the Arctic from a national interest perspective for most of the period between 1906 and the end of World War II as "interested if forced". Traces of this apt description of U.S. involvement in the Arctic would be present at times throughout subsequent periods well into the 21st century. As the next chapter explains, the dramatic deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations after World War II would help drive the next phase of U.S. Arctic interests. The wartime allies' emerging, postwar hostility toward each other "resulted in a new importance to Arctic regions as a natural frontier between the two countries" (Fogelson 1989:63). As noted earlier, the discovery and exploitation of energy resources in the Alaskan Arctic would also shape America's Arctic interests in the next phase of this study. These drivers would ultimately lead the U.S. Government on a slow but steady path toward formally articulating its Arctic national interests.

CHAPTER FOUR

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS (COLD WAR 1945-1967)

This chapter investigates the articulation of U.S. Arctic national interests from the post-World War II transition to the Cold War through the late 1960s. Its central argument is that the U.S. emerged from World War II with a greater appreciation of the Arctic region as an enduring postwar national security space, a potentially significant maritime storehouse of vital natural resources requiring clearly delineated maritime sovereignty areas, as well as a region conducive to limited circumpolar cooperation even in the midst of Cold War security considerations. Furthermore, the realities associated with pursuing its most important Arctic national interest—protecting the North American continent from Soviet aggression originating from across the north polar region—led the U.S. Government to explore security-driven governance in the Arctic region.

This chapter is organized into five sections. The first section examines the Truman Proclamation and its effect on U.S. Arctic interests. The next section examines how the emerging Cold War imperatives broadly shaped America's policy approach to its Arctic interests. This is followed by a section investigating how U.S.-Canadian continental defense arrangements influenced America's Arctic interests. The chapter then takes an expansive look at U.S. Arctic interests in Greenland, including the application of the Monroe Doctrine and the emergence of security governance as part of the U.S.'s Arctic interests. The chapter concludes by examining how U.S. Arctic interests began to broaden from national security considerations to encompass international scientific cooperation. In their totality, these sections illustrate how the Arctic region's profile as a national interest concern rose greatly during World War II, and how the U.S.

Government carried forward this realization of the Arctic's increased significance the emerging Cold War, security-driven global geopolitical dynamic that began to take shape.

The U.S. emerged from World War II not only victorious, but also as the most powerful state on the earth. Despite the huge role the Second World War played in shaping the U.S.'s postwar global standing and perspective, and how important the Arctic region was in ensuring Allied victory, the U.S. still had not formally articulated its national interests in the region. This lack of focus on the Arctic in many ways reflected America's long tradition of general policy neglect toward the region. This did not mean, however, that the U.S. did not begin paying attention to the polar north in the immediate postwar period.

THE TRUMAN PROCLAMATION AND U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS

Maritime sovereignty emerged as an important issue in September 1945, less than a month after World War II ended. President Harry Truman issued a presidential proclamation asserting U.S. jurisdiction over the United States' enormous maritime continental shelf and the natural resources contained within the boundaries of the shelf. This proclamation would have important implications for U.S. Arctic interests as the proclamation applied to the Alaskan territory's Arctic Ocean and Bering Strait coastal areas, in addition to America's respective Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico coastal areas in the contiguous United States.

Truman's proclamation 2667, issued on September 28, 1945, announced the U.S. Government "regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States, subject to jurisdiction and control" (Truman Proclamation 2667 1945). Truman then issued Executive Order 9633 on the

same day, placing such natural resources under the control of the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, pending congressional legislation to enact the proclamation's actions into law (Truman E.O. 9633 1945).¹⁴

E.O. 9633 explicitly stated that neither it nor Truman's proclamation should be interpreted in any way as expanding America's offshore jurisdictional boundaries "outside of the three-mile limit" (Truman E.O. 9633) that marked a state's sovereign territory beyond its coastline. However, Truman's proclamation and executive order in effect did just that. In claiming exclusive U.S. jurisdiction over the natural resources within its continental shelf, Truman's actions reconceptualized "the concept of high seas sovereignty" (Haycox 2020:238) and the three-nautical mile distance from shoreline that customarily marked a state's sovereign territory. Given that coastal states' continental shelf usually extends well beyond three nautical miles from their respective shoreline, Truman was effectively extending the U.S. Government's sovereign jurisdiction far into the high seas. Truman's desire to secure America's own sources of hydrocarbons and other vital mineral resources located offshore drove his decision to issue the proclamation and subsequent executive order.

In addition to the actual or potential existence of oil, gas, and vital mineral resources in the continental shelf, technological advances also factored in Truman's decision to issue the natural resources proclamation and related executive order. Advances in modern technology coming out of the Second World War enabled the practical exploitation and utilization of natural resources located in maritime areas. Truman, in fact, acknowledged in his proclamation that the

¹⁴ Truman issued E.O. 9633 reserving and placing pertinent areas of the continental shelf under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Interior. Truman subsequently revoked E.O. 9633 and replaced it with E.O. 10426 on January 16, 1953. However, Truman's Presidential Proclamation 2667, *Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf*, covers the original E.O. 9633, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2667-policy-the-united-states-with-respect-the-natural-resources-the-subsoil>. E.O. 9633 is filed in the Federal Register, 10 FR 12305, October 2, 1945, <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1945-truman.html>.

U.S. is fully “aware of the long-range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals” as well as the enabling power that “modern technological progress” (Truman Proclamation 2667) provides in exploiting such resources. The deep sea bed along, along with—for the Arctic region, harsh climatic conditions—previously made it extremely difficult to locate and extract natural resources. However, technological advancements developed during World War II made it feasible to exploit resources believed to lie beyond the internationally-recognized three-mile limit of a state’s maritime territory (State Bulletin 1945).

Truman’s decision to issue Proclamation 2667 and the attendant E.O. 9633 were informed by estimates that offshore areas within the continental shelf contained vast deposits of oil, petroleum, and important mineral resources. America’s continental shelf drew the attention of U.S. policy officials at the end of the Second World War. The State Department noted “[p]etroleum geologists believe that portions of the continental shelf beyond the three-mile limit contain valuable oil deposits” (State Bulletin 1945:484) as well as valuable mineral resources. The global demand for hydrocarbons and mineral resources, constrained by wartime needs, exploded after the war and made the ability to locate, extract, and use such resources extremely important to the United States.

Truman issued Proclamation 2667 in concert with another proclamation—this one establishing conservation zones to protect fisheries located in the high seas but contiguous to the U.S. Although these two proclamations covered vastly different issues, in both cases the U.S. asserted jurisdiction over areas of its continental shelf beyond traditionally recognized sovereign boundaries. Dean Acheson, who personally worked on both proclamations in 1945 as Acting Secretary of State, collectively called them “matters of considerable importance” (Acheson 1969:128). In fact, President Truman considered offshore natural resources so important that he

devoted an entire chapter from his memoirs to the issue, explaining his motivations for pursuing U.S. government control over the continental shelf and the domestic political factors he faced in implementing his policies.

Domestic Factors and Sovereign Rights Over Offshore Natural Resources

Claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf and the natural resources within it was not exclusively a foreign policy or national security matter to the United States. It was also a controversial one involving important domestic factors. The question of whether the U.S. government or respective coastal U.S. states exercised jurisdiction over offshore submerged oil deposits long preceded, but came to the fore during, the Truman administration (Truman 1956). Truman's Proclamation 2667 and the accompanying E.O. 9633 attempted to resolve this question in the U.S. government's favor. Powerful domestic interests opposed the U.S. government exercising sovereign jurisdiction over offshore natural resources despite Truman's contention that such "supervision and control of the continental shelf...are essential to the national security" (Truman 1956:481).

Coastal American states including California, Texas, and Louisiana—as well as private oil interests—argued the U.S. government did not have the right to claim jurisdiction over offshore areas. Not surprisingly, these U.S. states and private oil interests hoped to control such offshore territory themselves to exploit the oil resources and reap the tremendous wealth that would be generated from such resources. Truman wanted the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the dispute once and for all and instructed the U.S. government to sue a California-based oil company in order to put the question of who can rightfully exercise sovereign control over offshore natural resources as well as any resulting profits before the Supreme Court (Truman

1956). Truman’s gamble paid off as the Supreme Court ruled in 1947 “the Federal Government rather than the states has paramount rights in and ... full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil” (322 U.S. 19 1947:38).¹⁵ The Court upheld its ruling in two subsequent cases against Texas and Louisiana, respectively.

Private oil interests lobbied the U.S. Congress to enact legislation overruling the Supreme Court’s multiple rulings that favored federal jurisdiction over the resources contained within the continental shelf. Both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives passed resolutions that would give respective coastal American states legal jurisdiction over submerged offshore lands. Truman adamantly opposed these efforts and repeatedly stated that such actions would be detrimental to U.S. national security interests. After vetoing a Congressional joint resolution in May 1952,¹⁶ Truman stated once again that he did not believe giving coastal U.S. states jurisdiction over offshore oil and mineral resources now under U.S. government control “would be in the national interest” (1956:483).

Truman continued to oppose efforts to surrender U.S. government sovereignty over offshore oil and other natural resources until the very end of his presidency. After the 1952 U.S. presidential election, the incoming Eisenhower administration expressed its support for allowing coastal American states to claim jurisdiction over offshore natural resources—a view totally at odds with the Truman administration. However, Truman sought through executive power to further solidify the U.S government’s jurisdiction on national security grounds. Just days before leaving office in January 1953, Truman issued Executive Order 10426 that further recognized

¹⁵ Black, Hugo Lafayette, and Supreme Court of the United States. 1946. *U.S. Reports: United States v. California*, 322 U.S. 19. Periodical. <https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep332019/>. [Hereafter U.S. vs. California 1947]

¹⁶ Senate Joint Resolution 20 proposed “[t]o confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and waters, and to provide for the use and control of said lands and resources” (Truman Library, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/146/veto-bill-concerning-title-offshore-lands>).

how increasingly significant hydrocarbons located off America's extensive continental shelves were becoming to U.S. national security interests.

Truman's E.O. 10426 revoked his 1945 E.O. 9633 which had placed submerged continental shelf lands assessed to contain hydrocarbon and mineral resources under the Secretary of the Interior's authority. E.O. 10426 now set aside continental shelf lands of the U.S., including "Alaska lying seaward...as a naval petroleum reserve [that] shall be administered by the Secretary of the Navy" (Truman E.O. 10426). It is worth remembering that Alaska at this time was still a U.S. territory and not yet a state. The clear objective of this order, as Truman himself would later recall, "was to conserve and utilize the great oil and gas deposits in these lands in order to promote the national security" (Truman 1956:486). The U.S. for the first time securitized its continental shelf and the resources contained within it.

The Truman Proclamation and Arctic Sovereignty

The U.S. State Department justified Truman's reconceptualization of sovereignty on national security grounds, "asserting that to protect the country and conduct foreign relations, the United States had paramount rights in and power over the [continental] shelf, including full dominion over the natural resources, including oil" (Haycox 2020:238). Truman's proclamation 2667 was a clear recognition that it was in the U.S.'s national interest to explicitly claim and exercise sovereignty over the country's vast continental shelves emanating from U.S. coastlines, including the Arctic Ocean coastline in the Alaskan territory. The proclamation and related executive order was consistent with the Truman administration's political realist tendencies that generally guided early Cold War U.S. foreign policy (Stupak and Leitner). It was certainly in the U.S.'s overall national interest to secure for itself exclusive rights to potentially vast deposits of

energy and mineral resources located off its coast. Otherwise, as Stupak and Leitner contend, it risked the possibility that “any [nation-] state could set up an oil platform in the high seas three miles off an American shore and begin drilling” (2001:n.p.).

Although Truman’s order did not explicitly mention the Arctic region, it did have important implications for U.S. Arctic interests, generally, and U.S.-Canadian Arctic relations specifically. The proclamation created the conditions for a potential dispute between the U.S. and Canada over sovereignty in the Arctic. The Truman Proclamation “set up a potential conflict with Canada which...require[d] all foreign scientists and explorers in the Arctic to obtain government permits, an expression of Canadian sovereignty” (Haycox 2010:238). This was referring to Canada’s claim that adhering to the so-called *sector principle* allowed Canada to claim Arctic sovereignty all the way up to the North Pole. The sector principle is “[t]he use of meridians to demarcate boundaries or claims on land and in the oceans. This is the principle on which claims to territory in the Arctic and Antarctic are made” (Mayhew 2009). In 1925, Canada amended its Northwest Territories Act of 1906 to extend the maritime boundaries of its vast Northwest Territories to the North Pole. Schönfeldt observes that “[a]ccording to the amendment, scientists and explorers, who wish to enter the territories, are required to obtain permits or licenses from the proper Canadian government agency” (2017:cv).

Contrary to Haycox’s assertion that the Truman Proclamation raised the prospect of *negatively* affecting U.S.-Arctic Canadian relations over the issue of sovereignty, the proclamation did not negatively affect U.S.-Canadian relations over Canada’s Arctic sovereignty under its self-proclaimed sector principles. Instead, the proclamation actually aligned respective U.S. and Canadian Arctic interests over the issue of who exercises sovereignty over the outer continental shelf and its related natural resources. As Peter M. Leitner, who served as senior

strategic trade advisor for the U.S. Department of Defense, contends in a personal interview, the Truman Proclamation brought the U.S. and Canada together over the jurisdiction of the outer continental shelf (Leitner 2021).¹⁷ Both states have extensive continental shelves, including along their respective Arctic coastlines. Nonetheless, “Canada’s position is identical to the U.S. position” (Leitner 2021) in the Truman Proclamation in that the outer continental shelf and the natural resources that lie upon and underneath it falls under the sovereignty of the relevant coastal state’s national government. The U.S. and Canada clearly understood it was in their respective Arctic national interests to exercise jurisdiction over the continental shelf in order to claim for the national government whatever natural resources known or potentially discovered with the boundaries of the shelf. This shared U.S.-Canadian view becomes evident in oil and gas development in the Arctic, and, more broadly in eventual negotiations over the law of the sea treaty in the late 1950s.

Truman’s 1945 proclamation had global implications well beyond its stated purpose. As Leitner (1996) aptly characterizes it, Truman’s proclamation marked “the initial salvo in the explosion of claims made by coastal states around the world to extend territorial seas and fisheries and economic zones in the years since” (9). It sparked a process that eventually culminated in 1958 in the adoption of the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf and the UN *Conference on the Law of the Sea* (also known as UNCLOS I). Truman’s actions, in effect, arguably provided the foundation for the 1982 UNCLOS agreement (UNCLOS II), the legal regime that subsequently came to be broadly recognized as the quasi-legal framework for the Arctic region.

¹⁷ Peter M. Leitner, interview, March 11, 2021. Dr. Leitner is a professor in the School of Science and Technology at the National Intelligence University. He has over 30 years of federal government service, 21 of them in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as senior strategic trade advisor. He has written on territorial sovereignty, the continental shelf, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and U.S. Arctic Interests

Congress codified Truman's 1947 proclamation into law when it enacted the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)¹⁸ less than a year after Eisenhower succeeded Truman to the presidency. This law defined the U.S.'s outer continental shelf (OCS) as "all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters ... and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control" (OCSLA 1953). OCSLA established that the U.S.' outer continental shelf begins *beyond* the three-mile territorial sea limit and that the U.S. federal government—not individual American states—exercised jurisdiction over these submerged lands lying further out into the sea. Congress enacted this legislation to protect the OCS as a significant reserve from which the U.S. could explore, develop, and produce oil, petroleum, and minerals stored offshore but under U.S. jurisdiction.

The OCSLA does not explicitly mention either the Alaskan Arctic or U.S. national interests in the Arctic region. However, it helped establish the policy and administrative architecture for exploiting the Alaskan Arctic's *offshore* natural resources, particularly the oil and natural gas deposits that would become a central U.S. Arctic priority in subsequent years and decades (Dugger). Asserting U.S. Government jurisdiction over the Alaskan territory's enormous continental shelf greatly expanded the geographic area thought to contain vast quantities of untapped hydrocarbons and other natural resources.

¹⁸ This law, officially known as Public Law 83-212, *An Act to amend the Submerged Lands Act*, is informally called the 1953 "Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act."

Furthermore, the 1953 OCSLA, by defining the U.S.'s outer continental shelf and strengthening the Truman Proclamation's authority, gave rise to a legal, regulatory, and leasing environment that incentivized the search for hydrocarbons within the U.S.'s Alaskan outer continental shelf (Leitner 2021). As this dissertation explained in an earlier chapter, President Warren Harding in the early 1920s converted tens of millions of acres of Alaskan Arctic territory to a U.S. Government-controlled Naval Petroleum Reserve. The 1953 OCSLA, in conjunction with Truman's proclamation, increased the Arctic region's security and economic significance by positioning the U.S. Government to be able to exploit whatever natural resources the region contained.

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS AND COLD WAR IMPERATIVES

U.S. Early Cold War Arctic Policy Statements

While the Truman Proclamation's focus on the much broader issue of U.S. sovereignty over the submerged lands and resources of America's vast continental shelves did not directly illuminate the Arctic region, this does not mean the administration did not explicitly consider the region an emerging U.S. national interest. In fact, the State Department published a Polar regions policy statement in 1947 that provided an overview of U.S. general political, territorial, as well as economic interests in the Arctic (State 1947 Polar Regions Policy Statement).¹⁹ This constituted the first formal U.S. policy *statement* on the Arctic region.

¹⁹ The U.S. State Department produced a series of Policy and Information Statements beginning in 1946 that summarized U.S. policy and related problems and issues concerning particular countries or regions of the world. The State Department produced two policy statements on the Polar regions in 1947 and 1951, respectively, before discontinuing the series in the mid-1950s.

The 1947 policy statement conveyed that the U.S., since purchasing Alaska in 1867, continues its long-standing interest in the Arctic's territorial and political situation. Coming on the heels of World War II, the policy statement explicitly identifies the U.S.'s immediate postwar Arctic interests as *security* interests. The policy statement notes that America's Arctic security interest, "particularly in the zone Alaska-Canada-Greenland-Iceland, has been indicated in a concrete manner by military measures taken by the [U.S.] during [World War II] on its own territory in Alaska and in conjunction with the local governments in Canada, Greenland and Iceland" (State 1947 Polar Regions Policy Statement). In other words, America's ability to preserve the favorable political and territorial conditions it fostered during the war is fundamentally necessary to achieve its postwar Arctic security interests. Those security interests, in turn, depended on the U.S. maintaining a military presence throughout the Arctic region. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered these military measures to be in the U.S.'s "long-range interest" (State 1947 Polar Regions Policy Statement).

Even as the wartime clouds of World War II receded, U.S. officials were concerned America could potentially leave itself exposed to future hostile acts if it abandoned the military presence and agreements the U.S. government built up during the war. Senior military leaders were especially adamant the U.S. maintain at some level the military footprint and series of wartime defense arrangements the U.S. established spanning across the Arctic region and including Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed in the mid-1940s, basic U.S. security must include protecting North America from attack. Senior military officials were especially concerned with defending the northern Western Hemisphere from attacks from "the Arctic air approaches as well as well as the sea and air approaches to the continent from both oceans" (Schnabel 1996:176).

U.S. Arctic *economic* interests, on the other hand, rest on regional development such as building aviation infrastructure as well as weather stations throughout the region. Importantly, the 1947 policy statement implicitly acknowledges the significance and relevance of the Truman Proclamation to the Arctic. The policy statement contends that America's Arctic economic interest "is also manifest in connection with mineral resources, particularly rare minerals...known to exist or which may be discovered in [the Arctic] area" (1947 Polar Regions Policy Statement). Nonetheless, analyzing the 1947 policy statement specifically and in the broader context of U.S. geopolitics shows that the U.S.'s economic interests in the Arctic are clearly secondary to its security interests.

In July 1951, the U.S. State Department issued a revised "Polar Regions" policy statement. The 1951 policy statement, unlike its 1947 counterpart, is much more explicit about the Soviet military threat emerging from across the Arctic Circle. Whereas the 1947 statement does not even mention the postwar Soviet Union, the 1951 policy statement, clearly informed by four years of intensifying U.S.-Soviet geopolitical tensions, places the Soviet threat at the center of U.S. Arctic interests. Furthermore, the 1951 policy statement explicitly linked the Arctic to the broader Euro-Atlantic security alliance—the newly-created North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—and its mission to deter Soviet aggression.

As evidenced by the existence of its 1947 predecessor, this 1951 revision did not constitute, as Schönfeldt (2017) contends, the U.S.'s "first Arctic policy document" (xli). The 1951 statement was formulated in the early stages of the Cold War and following NATO's creation in 1949. It clearly reflects the U.S.'s recognition that the Arctic was geopolitically central to the emergent Cold War.

U.S. Arctic interests in the early Cold War years were primarily *security* interests. The U.S. outlined three Arctic policy aims in the 1951 policy statement. They are “(1) to safeguard our strategic interests in the area, (2) to facilitate the establishment and maintenance in the area of installations required for commercial transportation, communications and weather services, and (3) to avoid, so far as possible, any action tending to support the so-called ‘sector principle’ in the Arctic” (State 1951 Polar Regions Policy Statement). The first and third policy objectives provide important insight into the U.S. Government’s Arctic geopolitical considerations.

The U.S., the policy statement contends, “is deeply concerned with the strategic significance of the lands surrounding the Arctic basin, in part at least because of the proximity of Canada, Greenland, and Iceland along Arctic or sub-Arctic invasion routes from the Soviet Union” (State 1951 Polar Regions Policy Statement). The policy statement further contends that “[i]t is vital to the safety of the United States and the Western Hemisphere that international planning for Arctic defense continue. Planning for Arctic defense as part of the defense of the U.S., and in accordance with existing treaty obligations, should therefore be pursued in conjunction with other interested nations and through international organizations as appropriate” (State 1951 Polar Regions Policy Statement).

Here the U.S. is acknowledging that despite its immense overall military power in the early years of the Cold War, it cannot defend the Arctic region by itself but must do so through international agreements. In fact, the 1951 policy statement observes that “[i]n many cases, the NATO affords an excellent framework within which to deal with [Arctic] defense requirements” (State 1951 Polar Regions Policy Statement). Therefore, the U.S. would rely in large measure on the NATO security framework to achieve its Arctic security interests.

Defending against a potential Soviet invasion across the polar north was not the U.S.'s only strategic interest in the Arctic. The north polar region was also an important area for such issues as transportation, communications, weather, and navigation. For example, as the 1951 policy statement notes, “[e]ven in normal times, the areas where the great circle routes cross the Arctic and sub-Arctic between the great Northern Hemisphere population centers are important to air and sea travel and radio communications” (State 1951 Polar Regions Policy Statement). The U.S. military’s senior military officers concluded, as they had in the 1947 policy statement, that the Arctic remained “a long-range interest” (State 1951 Polar Regions Policy Statement).

The U.S.’s Arctic interests in the late 1940s and early 1950s were driven and shaped by the imperatives flowing from the emergent Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. For example, in 1950, the U.S. State Department published a then highly classified memorandum, National Security Council Paper NSC-68, entitled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” (U.S. State Department NSC-68 1950). This policy memorandum outlined recommendations for a comprehensive national strategy approach to the Soviet Union. Arguably “among the most influential documents composed by the U.S. Government during the Cold War” (U.S. State Department Milestone Documents 1950), NSC-68 foresaw the Arctic would play an important military role in a potential nuclear war between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

NSC-68 assessed that, should the Soviet Union initiate a war against the West, Moscow had the military capacity “[t]o attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United States” (U.S. State Department NSC-68 1950). The recommendations that flowed from NSC-68 became the basis of a massive and sustained U.S. military build-up against the Soviet-led Eastern bloc over the subsequent 40 years. This national policy assessment not only anticipated the Arctic region

becoming a vitally important geographic location in a potential great power nuclear conflict, but it also positioned the region squarely in the middle of the most important and comprehensive global geopolitical competition of the second half of the 20th century. U.S. Arctic interests, placed in the context of the Cold War, clearly became essential to U.S. national survival.

The Arctic slowly assumed vast importance in the reconfigured world order that emerged from the ashes of World War II (Emmerson). Faced with a growing Soviet threat developing across the ice-covered Arctic Ocean, the U.S. sought to convert its *wartime* alliances with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and other Arctic states into an integrated network of *peacetime* agreements that would secure America's Arctic national interests. While the emerging Soviet threat was directed primarily at the U.S., America's wartime Arctic allies depended on the U.S. to ensure their own national security. For example, Canada, the U.S.'s geographically closest Arctic neighbor and integral wartime ally, was the landmass separating the U.S. from its nuclear-armed Cold War superpower rival. As a result, Canada's "transition from unconditional wartime alliance with the United States to conditional peacetime alliance was almost inevitable" (Emmerson 2010:109).

U.S.-CANADIAN CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

As during World War II, Canada proved essential to defending the North American continent from external aggression emanating from or through the polar north. Furthermore, Canada would clearly be the junior partner in most aspects of U.S.-Canadian continental defense. However, during the emergent Cold War, "Canadian political and military officials curbed U.S.

pressure and protected the Canadian government's sovereign interests" (Herd 2011:5) when it came to developing continental air defense plans.

U.S. Arctic interests early in the Cold War were generally a low priority even though they included continental defense arrangements with Canada. U.S.-Canadian relations in the Arctic did not automatically complement each other in the early phase of the Cold War despite the two countries' close relationship during World War II. Contrary to Tynan's characterization that World War II created a postwar "habit of mutual cooperation in matters of continental defense" (1979:411) between the U.S. and Canada, the reality was much more complicated.

The U.S. initially did not seek Canada's input into post-World War II/early Cold War continental defense and assumed its vast northern neighbor would accept whatever approach the U.S. wanted to take on Arctic-continental defense. Canada was "'invisible and inaudible' to policymakers in Washington, DC" (Herd 2011:5). This seems strange given Canada's physical proximity to the U.S. and the key role it played in North American defense during World War II. More importantly, Canada is strategically situated between the U.S. and Soviet Union across the Arctic Ocean. Canada, in other words, continued to be a large geographic buffer separating the U.S. from yet another existential threat emanating from across the polar north.

However, when the Soviet Union tested a thermonuclear device in August 1953, suddenly, the Arctic's strategic importance increased dramatically. Moscow's ability to develop and test a thermonuclear device faster than the U.S. anticipated, combined with advances in Soviet long-range bomber capabilities, put U.S. military and government leaders on notice. The U.S. was now concerned North America was vulnerable to a nuclear attack from Soviet bombers launched across the Arctic Circle (Watson 1986).²⁰ The Soviet nuclear test drove the U.S. to

²⁰ The Office of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff published a multi-volume history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1998. In 1986, Robert J. Watson wrote the fifth volume, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953-1954*,

reconsider its relationship with Canada as a matter of national survival. The U.S. Government subsequently became more eager to develop, in cooperation with Canada, “a ‘more hermetic system of continental defense’ ...[that would]...strengthen North America's Arctic defenses” (Herd 2011:7).

Moscow’s thermonuclear test led the Eisenhower administration’s National Security Council (NSC) to quickly establish the Continental Defense Committee within the NSC system to examine the U.S.’s continental defense arrangement. This committee—informally called the Bull Committee after its chairman, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Harold R. Bull—was charged to study and make recommendations “needed to insure ... action in the field of continental defense, and...preparation of periodic evaluation of Soviet net capabilities to injure the United States” (Watson 1986:121). The Bull Committee noted the U.S. emphasized other elements of national security—such as defending the periphery of the country, extensively fielding offensive capabilities, and developing mobilization capabilities—often at the expense of defending the North American continent. The committee also found that even though continental defense is essential to U.S. national survival, it was “clearly inadequate” (State FRUS 1954). An inadequate continental defense against a possible Soviet nuclear-equipped attack against North America presented “an unacceptable risk to [the] nation’s survival” (State FRUS 1954).

The Bull Committee recommended a number of objectives and courses of action for mitigating the U.S.’s weak continental defense system. One such recommended course of action clearly exemplified the crucial role Canada played in ensuring U.S. national security. The committee called for the U.S. Government to establish agreements with its northern neighbor because

which describes the JCS’s roles and activities in helping formulate basic national security policies early in the Eisenhower administration.

Canadian agreement and participation on an adequate scale is essential to any effective continental defense system. Although machinery for reaching and implementing agreements exists, the Canadian government should at once be approached at the highest levels in order to establish a common appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to U.S.-Canadian security and the measures required to meet it. Exploration should be made of the extent to which Canada may wish to take leadership in developing parts of the system and in contributing to its expense (State FRUS 1954).

The NSC approved the Bull Committee's recommendations in the form of an official NSC statement of policy—NSC 159/4—on North American continental defense (State FRUS 1954). In short, U.S. officials ultimately—if belatedly—realized that ignoring its vast northern neighbor was not tenable in the emergent superpower geopolitical struggle. The U.S.'s very survival was inextricably linked to the defense of Canada.

U.S. domestic political considerations also played a role in pushing U.S. officials to engage their Canadian counterparts on mitigating the threat to continental defense the Soviet thermonuclear test presented. A series of American newspaper articles appeared, “expressing public concern over the Soviet threat and North American defense” (Herd 2011:8). Many Canadian officials generally opposed the concept of a combined continental defense program with the U.S. because they feared the U.S. would dominate it and infringe on Canadian sovereignty. These Canadians considered the newspaper articles as a deceptive or “‘sly campaign’ by the U.S. government to quell domestic opposition to its continental defense programs.” (Herd 2011:8).

American efforts to influence domestic opinion over North American continental defense struck at a long-held Canadian concern about U.S.-Canadian relations. Since the early 1940s, Canadian officials expressed concern that Canada's Arctic relations with its powerful southern neighbor had the potential to undermine Canadian sovereignty. Tynan makes this same point when discussing growing U.S.-Canadian military relations. As Tynan (1979) observes, “[i]f there

was a predominant theme [related to Canadian sovereignty as joint U.S.-Canadian defense activities increased during the Cold War], it was Canadian uneasiness over the large-scale American operations in her northland and the effect these operations might have upon Canada's de facto sovereignty" (408).

Canadian officials were most interested in an article by U.S. Army General Omar Bradley, published just as he was retiring and leaving his post as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bradley proposed developing a robust continental air defense system with the Canadians, reviewing "the current Canadian-U.S. defense relationship and its inherent problems" (Herd 2011:8), and perhaps most consequential, creating a combined U.S.-Canadian continental defense command.

As the Canadian government understood it, creating a North American continental air defense system served not only Canada's own Arctic interests, but also reinforced Canada's commitment to NATO (Herd). The Canadians wanted the U.S. to explicitly acknowledge and link North America's continental defense not merely in the context of a U.S.-Canadian joint defense arrangement, but within the broader context of Canada's (and presumably, the U.S.'s) NATO obligations. Although the two countries initially approached North American continental defense from different perspectives, they both eventually agreed that it served their overlapping Arctic and NATO interests.

U.S.-Canadian joint defense requirements for the Arctic were not the only U.S. Arctic interests to benefit by overlapping with NATO requirements. The U.S. was also able to leverage its NATO membership to pursue its Arctic interests in Greenland.

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS AND GREENLAND

As was the case during World War II, the U.S.'s continental security during the Cold War's early phase was inextricably tied to whoever controlled Greenland. This greatly influenced America's general conception of the Arctic as well as its Arctic national interests. It also marked a significant milestone in U.S. involvement in Arctic governance engagement. While the 1941 Denmark-United States Agreement for the Defense of Greenland provided the framework to secure U.S. Arctic interests toward Greenland during World War II, the realities of the emergent Cold War required the U.S. Government to forge a new framework to continue securing its interests in the massive, Danish-controlled Arctic island.

U.S. Arctic Interests and the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement

Like U.S.-Canadian relations, the 1951 U.S.-Danish agreement for the U.S. to provide for Greenland's security exemplified how U.S. Arctic interests were interwoven with the newly created NATO alliance. Greenland was a linchpin in both the U.S.'s Arctic security interests as well as the North Atlantic alliance that would serve as the cornerstone of the Cold War's Euro-Atlantic component.

At the conclusion of World War II, the Danish government expected the 1941 agreement with the U.S. that protected Greenland against German aggression would terminate once the war ended. However, U.S. military officials considered Greenland just as important in the emerging postwar geopolitical environment as it had been during the Second World War. The U.S. utilized a stipulation from the 1941 agreement to maintain a military presence in Greenland far beyond the duration of World War II, to the consternation of the Danish government. The 1941 Danish-American agreement to defend Greenland stipulated "this agreement shall remain in force until it

is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American continent have passed” (Denmark-US 1941:132). This, in essence, gave the U.S. an open-ended guarantee to maintain an Arctic military footprint in Greenland to help protect U.S. continental security.

From a U.S. military perspective, Greenland, far from being relegated to its prewar position “as a strategic and international backwater far from the great power scene” (Petersen 1998:2), remained strategically important—if yet undefined—terrain in the unfolding Cold War against the Soviet Union. This marked a significant reversal of the U.S. military’s pre-World War II view of Greenland. Before the war, U.S. military leaders assigned relatively little importance to the massive Arctic island. Now, in the emerging Cold War environment, the Soviet Union replaced Nazi Germany as the primary existential threat to Greenland—and by extension—North America and the U.S.

From a policy perspective, the U.S. made clear that its primary interest in Denmark was Greenland. The U.S. State Department in its 1949 Denmark policy statement outlined five U.S. policy objectives toward Denmark: maintain Danish independence; strengthen Danish resolve and ability to resist external aggression; foster Denmark’s international political and economic cooperation; build and maintain a viable Danish economy; and strengthen Danish relations with other like-minded states (Denmark Policy Statement 1949). However, the U.S.’s overriding objective was to replace the 1941 U.S.-Greenland wartime defense agreement with a permanent one satisfactory to both Denmark and the U.S. The U.S. considered Greenland “of primary strategic importance in the defense of the US and the North Atlantic” (Denmark Policy Statement 1949) and sought to maintain a permanent military presence on the island while respecting Danish sovereignty.

The U.S. and Denmark had vastly different conceptions about the scope and purpose of the 1951 Greenland defense agreement. Contrary to Denmark's view that it—not the U.S.—had the primary responsibility for defending Greenland, the U.S. knew that only it could ensure Greenland's security because the massive Arctic island played a key military role within the Cold War's geopolitical context. The U.S.'s overriding interest in providing for Greenland's defense was not simply for the sake of defending an ally's territory. Instead, the U.S. viewed Greenland as essential to enabling “the strategic deterrence of the Soviet Union and the possibility of conducting nuclear warfare from or via Greenland” (Petersen 1998:9).

The U.S. military's conception of Greenland as an area from which to deploy nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, if necessary, explicitly brought the Arctic region into the U.S.'s Cold War nuclear strategy. This drove the U.S. to, among other things, build Thule Air Base (AB) in Greenland in 1950, even as the Danes and Americans were still negotiating Greenland's new defense agreement. The U.S.'s decision to build Thule violated one of Denmark's three conditions on becoming a founding NATO member in 1949: no NATO bases, no nuclear weapons, and no military exercises on Danish territory—including in Greenland (Denmark and NATO). However, Denmark eventually accepted U.S. military installations and personnel in Greenland.

America's decision to build Thule AB introduced “a *polar* [emphasis added] strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union” (Petersen 1998:9) to supplant America's *perimeter* strategy against Moscow. The perimeter strategy consisted of basing strategic bombers in the United Kingdom, North Africa, the Middle East, and in the Pacific Ocean area (Petersen 2011). This transition from a perimeter strategy to a polar strategy illuminated the essentiality of U.S. strategic military interests in the Arctic. Thule AB greatly increased the Arctic's role in America's emerging Cold

War nuclear deterrence strategy against the Soviet Union by placing U.S. nuclear-armed bomber aircraft much closer to potential Soviet targets than was previously feasible. The U.S. decided literally at the last minute to build Thule AB once it became apparent that Moscow's successful atomic bomb test in 1949 made the U.S.'s existing perimeter strategy vulnerable.

Besides its vulnerability from a military standpoint, the perimeter strategy also presented a complex political challenge. The U.S. was concerned that some countries hosting American air bases central to the perimeter strategy might oppose its efforts to launch nuclear strikes from their territory if such an occasion arose. Denmark as well as Canada, for example, "were apparently deemed less likely than Britain to obstruct the wartime use of bases" (Petersen 2011:93). These dual realities made a polar strategy increasingly attractive and necessary. Greenland provided a location from which the U.S. could launch nuclear-armed bombers relatively close to the Soviet Union. This proximity across the polar north was designed to give Moscow further pause if it ever contemplated attacking the U.S. and other NATO states.

Thule AB would play a vital and dual role in U.S. Arctic interests contributing to securing U.S. national security interests in the Arctic, as well as providing "a strong, unified Cold War defence strategy for NATO" (Denmark and NATO). The U.S. used its obviously more powerful position in its bilateral relationship with Denmark to secure its Arctic as well as NATO interests in Greenland. This further ensured that U.S. Arctic interests would be inextricably and necessarily linked to the Cold War—the U.S.'s most vital national security interests for the next 40 years.

The 1951 Greenland defense agreement that emerged arguably had as much to do with the new North Atlantic alliance established two years earlier as it had with the Arctic region, generally, or even Greenland, specifically. The defense agreement obligated the U.S. and

Denmark, both charter members of NATO, “to negotiate arrangements under which armed forces of the parties of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may make use of facilities in Greenland in defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area” (Greenland Defense Agreement 1951). The 1951 defense agreement not only enhanced Greenland’s strategic relevance to America’s Arctic interests, it also increased the Arctic island’s significance to NATO by bulking up the defensive alliance’s northernmost flank.

NATO’s first official strategic guidance acknowledged that defending Greenland was an essential element in the alliance’s overall offensive and defensive postures. Not only was Greenland’s territorial defense important to protecting the North Atlantic Ocean’s sea lines of communication linking North America and Europe, the island was also a strategically important location from which to conduct offensive military operations against the Soviet Union (NATO Strategic Concept 1952). No longer exclusively a U.S. national security concern, Greenland’s defense was integral to NATO’s overall defense component for the North Atlantic Ocean area, European and North American continental security, respectively, as well as the Arctic region.

The 1951 U.S.-Greenland defense agreement included a much more expansive defense domain than the 1941 agreement it replaced. Now operating, in effect, as an extension of NATO’s defense umbrella, the 1951 agreement’s defense area of responsibility encompassed not only Greenland’s and North America’s respective territorial integrity. It also extended the area of responsibility to the entirety of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The U.S., as the primary guarantor of Greenland’s security, was expected to use its Greenland-based defense capabilities to support NATO’s broader defense plans (Greenland Defense Agreement 1951).

America's Arctic interests in Greenland extended beyond traditional defense and military security issues. The U.S. was also concerned with Greenland's governance and the implications it might have for America's short-term as well as long-term Arctic interests.

GREENLAND, THE MONROE DOCTRINE, AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE

The special consideration the U.S. assigned to Greenland during World War II as essentially an American quasi-protectorate under the Monroe Doctrine continued into the Cold War. Greenland's geographic location between North America and Europe, along with its physical proximity to North America, led the U.S. to appreciate the importance of Arctic governance, particularly the concept of *security governance*, as an Arctic national interest.

The Monroe Doctrine and Greenland

America's interest in Greenland's governance status exemplifies the U.S.'s long held, if largely dormant, foreign policy tenet expressed in the Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine sought to cease further European colonization of the Americas and put European powers on notice against any future intervention in the Americas. In 1823, President James Monroe "forewarned the imperial European powers against interfering in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states or potential United States territories" (State 1823). The doctrine stated that any European states that attempt to export their influence "to any portion of [the Western] hemisphere [would be considered] dangerous to our peace and safety" (Annals of Congress 1823:22).

Greenland fell within the geographical boundaries of the Monroe Doctrine from America's perspective. As explained in Chapter Three of this study, Greenland has always been implicitly associated with the Monroe Doctrine even though the U.S. never explicitly articulated it as such until after Germany invaded Denmark and threatened to occupy Greenland in 1940. Theoretically, the Monroe Doctrine previously covered all of the Western Hemisphere. However, "in practice it has almost exclusively been applied to the Caribbean" (Berry 2016:107). Therefore, extending the doctrine deep into the vast, cold polar north represented a fundamentally important practical expansion of the doctrine.

It is not at all surprising the U.S. extended the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland when considered in the doctrine's historical context. When Monroe articulated his doctrine in 1823, the U.S. was a young and relatively weak power compared to major European powers such as Great Britain, France, Spain, and Russia, and therefore, could not enforce the doctrine even if it tried. However, emerging from World War II as the most powerful country in the world, the U.S. now possessed the strength to actually enforce the Monroe Doctrine. As Berry contends, "[t]he formulation of the Monroe Doctrine's jurisdiction was based largely on security considerations, where American national interests overruled any sensitivity to legal technicalities" (2016:107). The U.S. extended the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland as a manifestation of the U.S.'s rise as a global power and acknowledgment of the Arctic island's importance to U.S. national security. It therefore made fundamental sense for the U.S. to act on Greenland's significance to hemispheric security and U.S. Arctic interests.

U.S. Arctic Security Governance and Greenland

Greenland's strategic location as a potential vector for European aggressors to threaten North America has always made the U.S. view Greenlandic governance as a continental security concern. Applying the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland transformed the Arctic island into arguably the U.S. Government's most important foray into the issue of Arctic security governance. The U.S.'s extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland "had a lasting impact on the governance of the island's security" (Berry 2016:104) and incorporated Greenland within America's expanding military footprint and network of global defense alliances. This Monroe "Doctrinization" of Greenland represented the U.S.'s policy embrace of "the security governance of the North American Arctic" (Berry 2016:104). Thus, security governance provided a narrowly scoped, but significant, form of sovereignty that correlated well with the U.S.'s primary and broader national security interests in the Arctic region.

The U.S.'s general approach toward Arctic governance engagement during the Cold War's early years was first and foremost about security, and nowhere was this more important to U.S. Arctic interests than Greenland. U.S. policy objectives toward Denmark included strengthening existing relations between the two states. As noted earlier, however, the U.S. also explicitly stated it had "a special interest in Denmark because of Danish sovereignty over Greenland" (Denmark Policy Statement 1949:621). The U.S. sought to ensure a governance arrangement that gave it primary responsibility for the island's security while respecting Danish sovereignty over the Arctic territory (Denmark Policy Statement 1949).

The 1951 U.S.-Greenland defense agreement marked a significant milestone in U.S. engagement in Arctic governance. The agreement gave the U.S. "the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over those defense areas in Greenland for which it is responsible" (Greenland

Defense Agreement 1951). This effectively meant the U.S. applied security governance as part of its Arctic interests.

U.S. Arctic interests during the roughly first two decades of the Cold War primarily and necessarily focused on national security and military imperatives emanating from the East-West military and ideological standoff. However, America's Arctic interests extended beyond the straitjacket power politics of the Cold War and into areas involving international scientific cooperation. As part of this evolution in America's Arctic interests, U.S. officials, influenced by events transpiring at the South Pole, began considering the concept of an Arctic treaty and a less formal international compact designed to both broaden and advance U.S. Arctic interests while advancing a new form of Arctic governance engagement.

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS AND ARCTIC INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

This study drew heavily on the State Department's extensive draft study, the *Historical Research Project on the Arctic and U.S. Foreign Policy*,²¹ to investigate the evolution of U.S. Arctic interests in the 1960s, particularly efforts to forge greater international cooperation in the Arctic around scientific research matters. Although never finalized or published, the draft study

²¹ The U.S. State Department's Office of the Historian produced this undated draft study in the early 1990s to describe events relevant to shaping U.S. foreign policy development in the northern polar region since the department was established in 1789. Although the State Department has no record indicating the draft study was ever finalized or published, the study provides great insight into official U.S. thinking about the Arctic region from 1960 to approximately 1990. Led by State Department Foreign Service diplomat Samuel E. Fry, Jr., the study is divided into three parts. In a June 24, 2019, e-mail replying to this author, a State Department Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs program analyst noted "that Part II [which covers the Arctic and U.S. foreign policy between 1960-1990] was originally classified, but went through a formal declassification process in 1994 and is marked as such." Included with Part II is an undated memo (Case Control # 9402533) from Frank M. Machak, the State Department's Director of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review. Mr. Machak is responding to a June 23, 1994, letter from another State Department official who, according to the memo, requested "mandatory review and release of one State Department document under Executive Order 12356." Machak states the document in question was reviewed and "may be released."

nevertheless provided great insight into official U.S. thinking about the Arctic region in the absence of official U.S. Government policy pronouncements about its Arctic interests throughout the 1960s.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, U.S. Arctic interests expanded beyond the national security and military concerns that dominated the U.S.'s attention to the polar north in the emerging years of the Cold War. Events unfolding at the polar end of the globe involving international cooperation helped shape America's broadening Arctic interests. The international community, with the U.S. at the forefront, formulated the Antarctic Treaty in 1958 and entered it into force three years later. As the State Department's historical study points out, this treaty is noteworthy because it was created in the midst of the bipolar Cold War "with the participation of a diverse group of nations whose policies were often mutually hostile in other world areas" (State, Part II, circa 1990:1). While the U.S. allowed its *Antarctic* national interests to be encapsulated within a treaty governing activities in the polar south, it did not take this same approach toward its interests in the more geopolitically significant polar north.

Despite the international scientific cooperation that resulted in the Antarctic Treaty, the Arctic was arguably the second most important geopolitical battlespace in the Cold War superpower stand-off, yielding only to Europe. By the start of the 1960s, the U.S. still had not clearly envisioned "or define[d] in the context of national goals what the overall policy of the [U.S.] for the Arctic should be" (State, Part II, circa 1990:1). Zero-sum Cold War "strategic national security considerations" (State, Part II, circa 1990:1) concerned primarily with deterring the Soviet ballistic missile and bomber threat to North America—not outright policy neglect—drove this lack of policy articulation.

The U.S. Government recognized it had a vested interest in international scientific research in the Arctic, just as it had in the Antarctic, and attempted to rectify this absence. In 1964, the State Department's Office of International Scientific Affairs (SCI) concluded in an internal departmental memo "that the United States was ill-prepared to participate with other Arctic nations in peacefully shaping the future of the Arctic region" (State, Part II, circa 1990:2). Scientific research is inherently cooperative and this meant cooperating with the Soviet Union—America's superpower rival, but also the largest Arctic state and the one with arguably the most advanced Arctic scientific program in the world. Despite the fact "that other Arctic nations, including U.S. military allies" (State, Part II, circa 1990:2), were interested in collaborating with the Soviets in Arctic scientific research, the U.S. was unwilling to go that far. This is not surprising. From a geopolitical perspective, the Arctic was diametrically opposite of the Antarctic. Given the Cold War's security-driven imperatives present in the Arctic, why would the State Department's international scientific affairs office expect the U.S. Government to cooperate with the Soviet Union in a geopolitical space over which a potential nuclear war might play out?

In 1964, SCI proposed that the Arctic states create a treaty "for the technological advancement of the Arctic" (State, Part II, circa 1990:3). SCI was attempting to replicate the international cooperation that took hold in Antarctica in the Arctic. Cognizant of the different geopolitical calculations at play in the Arctic, treaty proponents sought to address the security-driven counter-pressures existing in the Arctic. SCI implied that an Arctic treaty "could reduce cold war tensions by introducing a measure of amicable cooperation in a region then dominated by military considerations" (State, Part II, circa 1990:3). As the State Department's Arctic historical study (circa 1990) suggests, a proposed Arctic treaty focused on scientific cooperation

would likely, among other things, incentivize America's NATO allies by providing a treaty that could also serve as a counterweight to the existing Cold War geopolitical dynamics. However, the Soviet Union rebuffed SCI's outreach efforts on Arctic research cooperation.

SCI's efforts to convince the State Department's bureaucracy of the merits as well as the geopolitical implications of an Arctic treaty met with almost reflexive resistance. SCI drafted and circulated an action memorandum outlining its primary argument for an Arctic treaty. The international scientific affairs office argued "it would be mutually advantageous to the United States and other Arctic governments, including the Soviet Union, to cooperate in the scientific investigation and technological development of the Arctic region, under the aegis of a treaty similar in some respects to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959" (State, Part II, circa 1990:4).

Furthermore, the draft action memorandum pointed out the glaring omission of an overarching Arctic policy within U.S. foreign policy, in spite of the region's centrality to overall U.S. Cold War foreign policy. As the State Department's historical study (circa 1990) points out, the memo emphasized the department lacked "a focal point...for international affairs in the Arctic" (4) that was necessary for not only shepherding through a proposed Arctic treaty in the short-term, but also ensuring the Arctic region "receive[s] adequate consideration" (4) as a long-term U.S. foreign policy concern.

Despite SCI's claim that a proposed Arctic treaty's scientific cooperation core would mutually benefit all Arctic states, the State Department's internal bureaucracy rejected the proposal out of hand. The department's Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) was arguably the most important recipient of SCI's draft memo since it was responsible for covering the entire Arctic region as well as most of the Arctic states. EUR opposed the very idea of an Arctic treaty, considering such an endeavor "a major mistake" (State, Part II, circa 1990:4) given the U.S.'s

“strategic interests and defense activities in the Arctic” (State, Part II, circa 1990:4). EUR’s response shows how U.S. national security considerations in the Arctic clearly outweighed support for a scientifically-focused Arctic *treaty*.

However, EUR did not completely oppose the concept of Arctic international scientific cooperation. It offered “to review any ‘concrete proposals’” (State, Part II, circa 1990:5) for regional scientific cooperation with other Arctic states, including the Soviet Union. SCI continued outreach efforts to bring the Arctic states together for international scientific cooperation, including exchanging visits and information between U.S. and allied states. SCI even proposed facilitating U.S.-Soviet “reciprocal visits to Arctic sites” (State, Part II, circa 1990:5). While EUR was open to cooperative research efforts with allies such as Canada, it expressed skepticism toward joint efforts with the Soviet Union for fear that Moscow would exploit such access to the detriment of U.S. defense considerations.

As this section shows, efforts to develop a U.S. Arctic policy centered around scientific cooperation and a possible Arctic treaty failed to gain traction. It is apparent that U.S. national security considerations were the major reason. Quite simply, the Arctic region, even in the immediate aftermath of the spirit of international cooperation that led to the formulation of the Antarctic Treaty, was not geopolitically ripe for similar international cooperation between the East and West, even in common research areas. The U.S. was concerned, in part, that cooperative scientific efforts involving the Soviet Union might compromise sensitive U.S. scientific efforts in the Arctic at a time when Cold War tensions, while arguably less tense than in the 1950s, still drove U.S.-Soviet relations.

U.S. Arctic Interests and the “Northlands Compact”

Opposition to the concept of an Arctic treaty did not stop the forward momentum toward formalizing international cooperation in the Arctic, as well as to develop a formal U.S. Arctic policy. At the urging of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, SCI, along with the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, drafted a proposed "Northlands Compact" designed to foster Arctic international cooperation between the U.S., Canada, and the Soviet Union—a narrower set of Arctic actors than would a comprehensive circumpolar treaty (State, Part II, circa 1990). Prevailing Cold War national security concerns notwithstanding, the U.S.'s increasing awareness throughout the decade of the growing importance of circumpolar cooperation as an Arctic national interest culminated in this effort to formalize international cooperation in the polar north. Before examining the "Northlands Compact," it is important to point out that the concept of an Arctic compact was not new.

In the early 1940s, as the U.S. was entering World War II, the highest levels of the U.S. Government recognized that an Arctic treaty could serve long-term U.S. national interests. In 1941, then Vice President Henry Wallace "theorized about the utility of some kind of an Arctic Compact" (State, Part II, circa 1990:7) even as a global war significantly involving the polar north was unfolding. He was one of the first prominent U.S. officials to provide "[s]trong political support for Arctic cooperation" (Rothwell 1996:224). Wallace argued to the State Department as well as the U.S. Congress that the U.S. should take the lead in advocating for an Arctic international treaty, "one which would provide for cooperative efforts to promote transportation, communication and Arctic exploration" (Rothwell 1996:224). President Franklin Roosevelt was open to the idea of formalized international cooperation in the Arctic. In 1944, Roosevelt, "sensing the growing strategic importance of the Arctic" (Rothwell 1996:224),

articulated that the historically ignored polar north (including Alaska) was quickly emerging as both a short-term and long-term U.S. national interest.

Wallace's vision of an Arctic treaty did not come to fruition because it was subordinated to the postwar strategic needs of the emerging Cold War. However, it is insightful that the U.S. recognized and tried to accommodate the reality that it had two seemingly contradictory national interests in the Arctic region—strategic military interests as well as international cooperation. The U.S. never totally abandoned Wallace's vision for circumpolar cooperation vision, even during the early phase of the Cold War when national security imperatives dominated U.S. Arctic interests. The U.S. Government continued to push for cooperative measures in the Arctic in the 1950s, including President Dwight Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal which sought to encourage arms control between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Arctic component of Eisenhower's broad proposal was significant, "since [the Arctic's] northern transpolar routes were the most likely for a surprise attack" (Rothwell 1996:224). The proposal ultimately went nowhere because the Soviet Union never bought into the idea. Nonetheless, it showed that the U.S., despite its obvious and necessary primary interest in national security, appreciated how important international cooperation was as a Cold War Arctic national interest.

The threat of nuclear annihilation posed by U.S. and Soviet bombers and subsequently ballistic missiles attacking from across the Arctic Circle drove the U.S. to continue to seriously pursue cooperative measures in the region. The U.S., which long exhibited very little interest in the Arctic outside of immediate national security concerns, began to appreciate that it must broaden its Arctic interests in order to help provide long-term stability to the region. Hayton, writing in 1958 about an American proposal at the time to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to create an international weapons inspection regime in the Arctic "to preclude surprise

attack over that region” (1958:750), argued that increased great power interest in the Arctic presented several international legal complexities for the Arctic region.

The U.S.’s draft resolution to the UNSC, unlike Eisenhower’s earlier and much broader “open skies” proposal at the 1955 Geneva summit, focused exclusively on the Arctic. The draft UNSC resolution called for establishing a “Northern zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle with certain exceptions and additions” (UN S/3995).²² The Soviet Union, a permanent member of the UNSC, subsequently vetoed the resolution because Moscow was unwilling to allow UN inspections on its territory.

International tensions and the explicit threat of nuclear conflict would persist “[a]s long as the Arctic remains an economic, legal, and military wilderness” (Hayton 1958:752). Juxtaposed against the global international cooperation emerging over Antarctica, culminating in the Antarctic Treaty, the Arctic region remained literally and figuratively, on the polar opposite of the geopolitical spectrum. Notwithstanding its failure to secure an international inspection regime in the Arctic notwithstanding, the U.S. continued to pursue regional cooperation as an important national interest.

The U.S. arguably exerted more effort in trying to develop Arctic international cooperation throughout the Cold War era than any other Arctic state. The U.S. encouraged other Arctic states, most notably its Canadian ally and its Soviet adversary, through proposals like the “Northlands Compact.” The compact proposed to jumpstart international cooperation in two areas of expressed common interest between the U.S., its close ally Canada, and its Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union: regional development and basic scientific research.

²² United Nations Security Council draft resolution 3995, S/RES/3995, April 28, 1958, available from <https://undocs.org/en/S/3995>, accessed December 2020. The U.S. proposed to create a Northern zone of international inspection in the Arctic Circle against surprise attack. This draft resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, on May 2, 1958.

In the area of regional development, the compact “proposed a new experimental framework for international Arctic cooperation” (State, Part II, circa 1990:7) between the three Arctic states. Fully cognizant of existing Arctic Cold War tensions, State Department advocates sought to thread the needle by tailoring the proposed compact around areas of mutual interest to the U.S., Canada, and the Soviet Union without antagonizing each capital’s national security concerns. As the State Department’s historical study points out, the proposed compact “did not seek to duplicate the Svalbard Treaty, much less the Antarctic Treaty given the fundamentally different circumstances obtaining in the two regions, most importantly the national security considerations” (State, Part II, circa 1990:7). The proposed compact identified nearly a dozen areas of cooperation, including communications, transportation, health, and the environment—all of which could benefit Arctic populaces regardless of whether they resided in Alaska, northern Canada, or the Russian Arctic (State, Part II, circa 1990).

The “Northlands Compact’s” second approach sought to advance basic scientific research between the three Arctic states. Picking up on earlier efforts in the 1960s to foster international scientific cooperation in the region, the compact focused on “climate, glaciation, and biology” (State, Part II, circa 1990:8). Major aspects of such cooperation would involve scientists coordinating research, conducting joint explorations, exchanging visits and information, and participating in joint conferences. The compact did not intend that it would be the sole vehicle for trilateral Arctic cooperation. However, it did envision it would be the mechanism that the respective American, Canadian, and Soviet governments could use to encourage nongovernmental organizations to participate.

To ensure all three states maintained their respective autonomy, the compact proposed that each one “would designate a national organization to assist in program coordination, thus

avoiding creation of an international bureaucracy” (State, Part II, circa 1990:8). This form of engagement and cooperation through issue or program coordination, rather than creating an autonomous international organization, would come to characterize Arctic governance in the decades to come.

The proposed “Northlands Compact” was one of several ongoing initiatives designed to help the U.S. explicitly identify and coalesce its Arctic interests around a comprehensive and unified Arctic policy. Drafted near the end of Democrat Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, the proposed compact did survive the change of presidential administrations and political party from Johnson to Republican Richard Nixon. Attesting to the compact’s conceptual importance within the growing consensus that the U.S. Government needed to formally articulate its national interests in the Arctic, the new Nixon administration would consider the “Northlands Compact” as part of its effort to develop a comprehensive formal U.S. Arctic policy.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter demonstrates how significant the Arctic region became as an enduring Cold War space where vital U.S. national interests were at stake—particularly from a national security perspective. Although the U.S. Government understood by the end of World War II that the security of the U.S. and the entire North American continent increasingly depended on securing and defending the Arctic region, the emergence of an existential threat from across the North Pole brought the situation into sharp relief. The identification, if not consolidation, of various threads of U.S. national interests in the Arctic began to come into focus in the first two decades of the Cold War. While national security imperatives were clearly the primary and most

important driver of U.S. Arctic interests, they were not the only interests the U.S. had in the polar north. Each of the other Arctic national interests—from maritime sovereignty to hydrocarbon development in the Alaskan Arctic to international scientific cooperation among the Arctic states—all explicitly related to U.S. national security and/or military interests in the Arctic.

U.S. Arctic interests during the first half of the Cold War were characterized primarily by the national security imperatives of the East-West geopolitical competition. However, U.S. maritime sovereignty, economic interests, and international scientific cooperation also rose to the fore as key U.S. interests in the polar north. Individually and collectively, these interests at various levels supplemented the U.S.'s predominant Arctic interest in defending the U.S. and its allies against the Soviet threat.

The Truman Proclamation illustrates how the U.S. had to balance its national interests that support its status as both a coastal state and a maritime state. The proclamation initiated “the cavalcade of coastal State expansion” (McDorman 2009:83) further into the high seas. At the same time, however, Truman made clear that proclaiming coastal state sovereignty over the natural resources within the continental shelf did not, in fact, affect America's concurrent interest as a maritime state in maintaining freedom of the seas. He cautioned that extending America's coastal state sovereign claims further into the high seas in no way affected “free and unimpeded navigation” (Truman Proclamation 1945) of those same high seas.

The mutual defense cooperation that underpinned U.S. Arctic security interests during World War II was extended to Canada and other Arctic wartime allies through bilateral as well as multilateral agreements (Emmerson). This international cooperation aspect of U.S. Cold War Arctic security interests formed one of the foundational pillars for establishing NATO in 1949. Nearly half of NATO's 12 founding member states were also Arctic states: Canada, Denmark,

Iceland, Norway, and the U.S. Within a year of NATO's creation, "the entire coastline of the Arctic Ocean was controlled either by the Soviet Union or by the United States and its allies" (Emmerson 2010:110). The Arctic region and America's national interests that emerged from it could no longer be ignored as remote, detached, and secondary. The reality is that U.S. Arctic interests were clearly interconnected with, and essential to, America's most important and enduring Cold War international alliance. NATO's formation became integral to U.S. Arctic interests.

Despite its overwhelming military and economic power in the first half of the Cold War, the U.S. could not secure its Arctic security interests unilaterally. The issue of Arctic governance began to emerge as well—albeit it in very limited and discrete ways such as the U.S.'s interest in security governance as a Cold War-era Arctic national security measure. The nature of the Cold War's geopolitical arrangement forced the U.S. to engage in limited Arctic governance in order to pursue its security interests in the polar north. The U.S. engaged in security governance of Greenland through military and diplomatic means. America pursued this through "the continued physical presence of the US military – in combination with the diplomatic power of the United States in organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (Berry 2016:105).

National security considerations continued to dominate U.S. Arctic interests into the 1960s. However, international scientific cooperation became a prominent factor as well in shaping U.S. Arctic interests and accelerating the push toward formalizing these interests. Inspired in large measure by the successful international cooperation that led to the Antarctic Treaty on the polar opposite end of the earth, State Department officials attempted to import a similar international cooperative effort to the polar north. While efforts to create an Arctic treaty failed, the U.S. did achieve limited success in fostering international cooperation on scientific

research initiatives in the Arctic region. This created an atmosphere of limited cooperation in a region increasingly important to the Cold War's security-driven geostrategic calculations.

Despite the U.S.'s mostly well-deserved reputation for ignoring or assigning a relatively low priority to the Arctic, the U.S. was indeed moving toward formally articulating its Arctic national interests in an official policy statement. The U.S. did in fact identify its Arctic interests beginning in the early years of the Cold War. This, in some ways, dilutes conventional arguments that the U.S. did not develop a formal, coherent Arctic policy until 1971. While technically true, individually, the disparate Arctic-relevant policy statements drafted in the late 1940s to early 1950s did contain the major threads that guided U.S. Arctic policy throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s.

Although the U.S. Government clearly recognized and appreciated the Arctic region's significance as a Cold War geostrategic space, it still had not articulated an official set of national interests in the region approaching the end of the 1960s. Nonetheless, driven by the prospect of vast hydrocarbon deposits in the Alaskan Arctic, outlines of America's first formal set of Arctic national interests would begin to take shape. The next chapter examines how the U.S. reached a milestone in its Arctic national interests. The increasing prominence of the Arctic, both within the context of the ongoing Cold War as well as the increasing importance of developments within the Alaskan Arctic, reached its apex as the 1960s ended. This culminated in the U.S. Government finally formulating and articulating official Arctic national interests.

CHAPTER FIVE

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS (COLD WAR, PART II: 1968-1989)

Chapter Five investigates the formulation and articulation of U.S. Arctic interests during the roughly last two decades of the Cold War from the late 1960s through the end of the 1980s. This chapter's central argument is that U.S. national interests in the Arctic region reached a milestone with the first-ever articulation of official U.S. Arctic policy in the early 1970s that reflected the maturation of the U.S. Government's deliberate path toward becoming an Arctic nation. The subsequent official U.S. Arctic policy directives that followed for nearly two decades reflected the regional as well as global focus of America's national interests in the polar north.

The chapter is organized into ten sections. The first section examines the momentum in the late 1960s toward formally articulating U.S. Arctic national interests. The next section explains how the discovery of oil in Alaska illuminated the Arctic region's importance and the national interests emerging in the region. The section that follows examines how the U.S. Government determined its Arctic national interests and the policy process it developed to pursue those interests.

This chapter then delves into the U.S.'s first official Arctic national policy statement under President Richard Nixon and the respective national interests contained within the statement. Two sections respectively explain how the U.S. Government converted its Arctic national *interests* into *policy*, as well as pursued many of those interests outside the established Arctic policy process. The chapter then discusses the state of U.S. Arctic interests from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. Two sections unpack President Ronald Reagan's U.S. Arctic policy statement as well as the U.S. Congress's Arctic research and policy legislation. This chapter

concludes by examining how America's Arctic interests positioned the U.S. to help peacefully bring about the end of the Cold War and move into the post-Cold War era. Collectively, these sections illustrate the extent to which the U.S. Government formally acknowledged the Arctic region's importance from a national interest perspective.

MOMENTUM TOWARD ARTICULATING U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS

Although the U.S. did not have a formal Arctic national policy in the 1960s, there were slow, if uneven, efforts promoting the need to articulate such a policy. Articulating an Arctic national policy could not realistically happen, however, without first understanding the wide array of U.S. government research activities occurring in the Arctic region. Understanding such research efforts were important for helping U.S. policymakers discern the country's actual interests in the region.

The U.S. Government had a number of research-related initiatives under way in the Arctic region in the 1960s that highlighted the region's rapidly increasing national importance. Many of the research areas focused on U.S. national interests that were *implied*, but never explicitly articulated in any comprehensive way—interests related to military and national security, mineral resource development, and international scientific cooperation in the polar north. Even though executive branch agencies managed these government research activities, it was not until the legislative branch pressed for a comprehensive examination of U.S. Arctic research efforts that real progress began toward a formal articulation of overall U.S. Arctic interests.

The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee commissioned a comprehensive study of the U.S. government's Arctic research activities in 1967, with a view toward prompting the federal government to finally develop "an initial broad statement of U.S. Arctic policy" (Nilsson 2018:3). Alaska U.S. Senator and Senate Appropriations Committee member E.L. "Bob" Bartlett conceived the idea of a comprehensive Arctic research study to address what he believed was a disparity in U.S. attention and resources between the Arctic and Antarctica. Coming less than a decade after the U.S. played an instrumental role in formulating the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, Bartlett argued the U.S. Government was underfunding and underappreciating Arctic research efforts. Bartlett "reasoned that U.S. arctic interests, involving potential natural resource developments and the lives and conditions of the region's peoples, deserved at the very least the same national attention as those in Antarctica, albeit the national interests in the two polar regions were based on different rationales" (Hickok 1983:6). Whereas U.S. Antarctic scientific research activities basically flowed from U.S. foreign policy objectives inherent in the Antarctic Treaty, U.S. Arctic research efforts did not flow from any similarly articulated Arctic policy framework (Hickok).

The research study (hereafter the Doumani report) commissioned by the Senate Appropriations Committee shows that the U.S. Government in the mid-1960s was involved in a broad, yet largely uncoordinated array of Arctic research activities spanning more than 20 government agencies (Doumani). This dissertation focuses on those departments and agencies primarily associated with prevailing, if not formally articulated, U.S. Arctic national interests in the 1960s. These interests were military and national security, hydrocarbon resource development, and international scientific cooperation. The respective lead government departments and agencies pursuing such interests were the departments of Defense, Interior, and

State. The Doumani report compiled considerable, yet incomplete information across federal agencies, covering U.S. government fiscal years 1966 and 1967.

Some departments, such as the Department of Defense (DoD), did not divulge all of their Arctic research efforts—many of which were understandably classified. Nonetheless, the Doumani report indicates the federal government spent approximately \$40 million on Arctic research activities, with the departments of Defense and Interior comprising over half these expenditures (Doumani 1968:viii).

Defense Department Arctic Research

The DoD conducted a series of Arctic research-related activities, mostly by its respective military services as well as the department’s advanced research agency. The U.S. Army continued its two-decades long research and development initiatives examining how cold weather affects the Army’s operational capabilities. This included operating in cold regions as well as determining how such climatic conditions affect materiel. The Army began conducting cold regions research during World War II and continued, as of the mid-1960s, to address many unknown operational factors regarding Arctic-like climatic conditions.

The U.S. Navy maintained an important research presence in the Arctic, as its research bore on ongoing U.S. military interest in the region, as well as on the increasing possibility of discovering hydrocarbon deposits in the Alaskan Arctic. The Navy’s involvement in managing oil and gas exploration within Alaska’s Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 4, which began in 1944, continued two decades later. The Office of Naval Research’s Arctic program was responsible for conducting basic and applied research that contributes to the Navy’s mission success in the Arctic region. For example, such naval research focused on “the acquisition of

data leading to improved acoustic and electromagnetic communications, diverse under-ice and over-ice operations, applications of detection and surveillance systems, [and] use of ice for platforms for any Navy or other Government use” (Doumani 1968:86). The knowledge and utility derived from such research were of obvious military importance in subsequent years.

The U.S. Air Force’s Arctic research efforts in the mid-1960s were organized around four areas. Two areas focused on identifying how Arctic-like weather conditions adversely affect Air Force personnel. Another explored launching, tracking, and acquiring data on rockets operating at high latitudes. Finally, the Air Force studied seismic events occurring on Greenland’s ice sheet through a U.S.-Danish bilateral agreement (Doumani). Another DoD entity, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, was involved “in a few unclassified Arctic-related projects” (Doumani 1968:105), including the Air Force’s seismic studies project on Greenland.

It is not surprising the DoD had such an extensive research presence in the Alaskan Arctic, given both the department’s size and mission, as well as the Arctic region’s prominence in U.S. national security considerations dating back to the late 1930s. The region, and therefore the need to acquire and apply knowledge about it, became even more important militarily during the Cold War. What is surprising, however, is Doumani’s assessment of overall U.S. military research in the Arctic. He argued that overall, “military interest in the Arctic is waning and ... most of the unclassified projects discussed in this report appear to be somewhat indirectly relevant to military applications and objectives” (Doumani 1968:vii). Doumani never actually justified his contention that the U.S. military’s research interests were declining. It is important to note, however, that Doumani acknowledges his report is based only on unclassified projects. Therefore, one could reasonably assume the DoD likely engaged in classified research activities for which he would not have had knowledge.

Interior Department Arctic Research

In addition to DoD Arctic research activities, the Department of the Interior was also deeply engaged in important Arctic research in the mid-1960s, particularly given the department's role in managing U.S. natural resources. More precisely, the Interior Department's Bureau of Mines is responsible for "the conduct of programs designed to conserve and develop mineral resources" (Doumani 1968:189). The bureau's Alaska operations were engaged in a host of research activities. The most important ones focused on hydrocarbon resource development, even though relatively little actual development had occurred by the mid-1960s, as the Doumani report suggests.

The potential existed that the Alaskan Arctic contained significant amounts of hydrocarbon resources. The Bureau of Mines was primarily interested in developing Alaska's mineral resources, of which it had little real knowledge. Therefore, the bureau focused on closing this significant knowledge gap by "obtaining information leading to the full utilization of this resource" (Doumani 1968:191). The Bureau of Mines engaged in several preliminary studies and surveys on hydrocarbon development in Alaska. These research activities were consistent with "a growing emphasis on offshore drilling" (Doumani 1968:192) in the Arctic Ocean area and elsewhere along the U.S.'s extensive continental shelf. It is clear the U.S. Government was laying the groundwork to oversee any hydrocarbon discoveries in the Alaskan Arctic.

State Department Arctic Research

The State Department did not have an active research role in Arctic research efforts. Instead, it managed the Interagency Arctic Working Group (IAWG), an informal coordinating

body designed to bring together a dozen U.S. government agencies actively engaged in basic or applied research in the Alaskan Arctic. Ironically, at the time Doumani was studying U.S. Arctic research activities, the IAWG, the body “formed to explore the possibilities of interagency cooperation and coordination in Arctic research” (1968:233), had been idle for approximately two years. This dichotomy characterized the state of U.S. Arctic research even as the federal government engaged in substantive and wide-ranging research in the region. The executive branch carried out a whole range of scientific research activities in the Arctic even as one of its main entities for coordinating such activities was effectively inactive.

Despite the IAWG’s inactivity, the State Department issued a report, albeit obviously somewhat outdated, on the status of U.S. Arctic research programs. The report summarized U.S. Arctic research programs, described the relevant work of individual agencies, discussed interagency coordination efforts, and described U.S. government relations with other states engaged in similar Arctic research (Doumani). The State Department readily acknowledged that its report contained several limiting factors which, collectively, meant the report did not present a complete picture of U.S. Arctic research activities. For example, the report made no effort to separate basic research from applied research. Furthermore, it included neither classified information “nor any activities of those U.S. agencies whose work is largely classified” (Doumani 1968:234). Finally, the report approximated funding information and raised the real possibility that it may have inadvertently omitted information.

The U.S. Government carried out a rather extensive research agenda in the Arctic in the 1960s. These initiatives were directly or indirectly carried out with the objective of contributing to a growing U.S. focus on the Arctic region and its effect on U.S. national defense and natural resource development concerns. While the Doumani study revealed the U.S. Government did

indeed possess a robust, research-driven Arctic interest in the Arctic, it also illuminated the shortcomings in this U.S. Arctic research presence. Arguably, the most important finding was that “[t]here is no central coordination of Arctic research plans and activities among ... U.S. agencies concerned” (Doumani 1968:238). This made the absence of an overarching U.S. articulation of its Arctic interests and policy all the more evident.

Alaska Senator Bartlett's push to have Congress produce a comprehensive study on federal Arctic research helped focus attention on the lack of an explicit federal policy statement on the Arctic. His collaboration with Joseph Fitzgerald, head of the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, to initiate and coordinate Arctic policy discussions among federal agencies, was invaluable. The committee Fitzgerald chaired was created in the aftermath of a deadly 1964 earthquake in Alaska to oversee federal recovery efforts and solicit ideas on federal policies to help ensure long-term economic development in Alaska. The committee recognized that, among other things, the U.S. Government needed “to set forth a policy position on national interests in the entire circumpolar Arctic” (Hickok 1983:55 en18) if it hoped to achieve lasting economic success in Alaska.

The Federal Field Committee drafted and circulated a broad Arctic policy statement designed to address a variety of issue areas requiring federal involvement. As Hickok (1983) explains, the proposed policy statement “dealt strongly with the need for the conduct of coherent Arctic scientific programs in all disciplines prerequisite to exploration for natural resources...and environmental understanding of the arctic region generally” (6). The Federal Field Committee’s actual draft Arctic policy statement could not be located. However, the various federal agencies involved in Arctic policy discussions did subsequently agree on a proposed Arctic policy statement.

Late in 1968, the relevant federal agencies, organized as the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee (IARCC) under the guidance of the National Science Foundation, drafted a proposed Arctic policy statement (State Part II, circa 1990). The proposed policy, which approached U.S. Arctic policy primarily from a marine science perspective and highlighted the Arctic region's "great economic potential and strategic importance" (Marine Resources and Engineering Development Annual Report 1968),²³ articulated eight U.S. Arctic policy objectives. These objectives, among other things, tied Alaska's economic development to its natural resource availability; promoted mutually beneficial international cooperation with Arctic and non-Arctic states in exploring, exploiting and scientifically studying the Arctic region; and ensured the capability of the U.S. to successfully perform national defense operations in the region (Marine Resources and Engineering Development Annual Report 1968).

President Lyndon Johnson ultimately did not sign the proposed Arctic policy statement, most likely because the report was not submitted to Johnson's NSC until a few weeks before he left office in January 1969 (State Part II, circa 1990). Nonetheless, the effort not only kept alive the dialogue for a national Arctic policy statement, it also served as an important bridge to the incoming Nixon administration as several Arctic-relevant policy issues continued to gain prominence. As the next section explains, the discovery of oil in Alaska clearly raised the region's national interest profile.

ALASKAN OIL AND U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS

²³ The proposed Arctic policy statement was published in the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development's annual report for 1968. The report officially titled *The Third [Annual] Report of the President to the Congress on Marine Resources and Engineering Development*, is hereafter referred to as the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Annual Report 1968.

The discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in 1968 immediately and profoundly changed U.S. Arctic interests. The oil and petroleum architecture that followed the discovery brought the prospects of energy exploration and economic development to the fore in Alaska. More broadly, the oil discovery “fundamentally changed US interests in the Arctic, making the Arctic relevant at the national level beyond interest related to military operations” (Nilsson 2018:5). The oil find, along with the U.S.’s increasing scientific research interest in the polar north, illustrated the Arctic’s prominence as a region in need of a policy in ways the region’s Cold War national security relevance did not. Despite the region’s obvious national security importance, this fact never prompted the U.S. Government to formally articulate its Arctic national interests or consolidate them into a comprehensive policy framework. Oil discovery, on the other hand, brought with it immediate and significant economic and domestic implications for Alaska and the entire country.

The oil discovery created a potentially significant political dilemma that probably could not be adequately addressed without the U.S. Government first explicitly identifying and articulating its national interests in the Arctic region. As Nilsson (2018) explains, such various U.S. Arctic interests can be characterized as *frames*. The East-West Cold War stand-off, for example, constituted a *conflict and strategy* frame—one that clearly dominated U.S. interest in the Arctic for two decades. This frame co-existed in the Arctic with another one—*science and technology*—that arose nearly in concert with the conflict and strategy frame. Although different, these frames complemented each other since advances in science and technology comprised an essential element of the U.S.’s national security approach to the Soviet threat across the polar north. In addition to the conflict and strategy, and science and technology frames, the Arctic

region during the 1960s witnessed “the seeds of the *environment/environmental change* frame [in] ... the Arctic” (Nilsson 2018:3).

These frames collectively mirrored the most important U.S. Arctic interests through most of the 1960s. While they characterized and embodied America’s Arctic interests, these outward-facing interests largely ignored one emerging, inward-facing (or domestic) issue: Alaska’s indigenous peoples were organizing and asserting territorial rights the U.S. Government heretofore generally ignored. However, the discovery of oil, as Nilsson contends, not only placed premium importance on the *economic development and competitiveness* frame, it put this frame in direct contact with Alaska’s indigenous peoples’ quest to claim lands they argued belonged to them. This created a domestic component to U.S. Arctic interests that greatly increased the Alaskan Arctic region’s salience as a U.S. Government policy concern. These issue areas, individually important in and of themselves, converged in the mid- to late-1960s to force the U.S. Government to seriously confront for the first time the need to formally articulate its national interests toward the Arctic region.

The oil discovery at Prudhoe Bay placed U.S. interests in the Arctic region squarely onto the U.S. national political agenda. Follow-up geological surveys in the subsequent months confirmed that Prudhoe Bay contained large, offshore oil deposits. The Atlantic Richfield oil company petitioned the U.S. Interior Department in June 1969 to construct an oil pipeline to transport oil from Alaska’s Arctic Ocean coastal areas south to a seaport at Valdez, Alaska. This would enable oil tankers to ship the oil to markets in the continental United States and elsewhere. While oil companies, the state of Alaska, and Alaska’s indigenous population reacted to the oil find and considered the logistical challenges that lay ahead, the U.S. Government lacked an

explicit articulation of its Arctic national interests as well as a comprehensive policy framework from which to address the Arctic region's fast-emerging national significance.

Following the discovery of oil in Alaska, Humble Oil Company, a member of an oil consortium, "organized a test of a seaborne route through the Northwest Passage" (Haycox 2020:241) to determine the best way to transport oil to market. The company contracted the *SS Manhattan* oil tanker and reinforced the massive tanker with ice-breaking capability to make a roundtrip voyage between the U.S. mainland east coast and Prudhoe Bay via the Northwest Passage located in Canada's Arctic archipelago. The voyage, which occurred in 1969 and ultimately proved more expensive than transporting oil via a land pipeline, raised "issues of territoriality" (Haycox 2020:241) between the U.S. and its close ally Canada.

The *SS Manhattan* voyage sparked controversy over territoriality between the U.S. and Canada because the Canadian government viewed the Northwest Passage (NWP) as its historic *internal* waters and claimed the U.S. did not seek or receive Canadian permission to transit the passage, over which Ottawa "asserts full sovereignty...including the right to deny transit to any ship" (Haycox 2020:241). The U.S. Government considered the NWP *international* waters in accordance with the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and concluded, therefore, it did not need Canada's permission.

It is important to note the controversy over the NWP's status did not begin with one state setting out to test its claimed right to transit territory against another state. The *Manhattan* voyage was a *private sector* initiative, not a U.S. government one. Nevertheless, soon after the controversy ensued, the U.S. "began development of a coherent, wide-ranging set of policies toward the Arctic within the context of its position of an Arctic nation" (Haycox 2020:242). In

other words, the U.S. soon began an earnest push toward finally articulating its formal Arctic interests.

The discovery and subsequent economic impact of oil in Alaska was no surprise. The potential for discovering, exploiting, and reaping the economic benefits from valuable natural resources has always been central to U.S. interest in Alaska going back to the 19th century. As Nilsson (2018) reminds us, “[w]ith control of resources and trade as prominent political drivers, the most important frame when the United States entered Arctic politics with the purchase of Alaska was that of *economic development and competitiveness* [original emphasis]” (3). Therefore, what happened at Prudhoe Bay in 1968 did not *create* a key U.S. national interest in the Arctic region. Rather, it *realized* a long-sought American interest in the region.

By the late 1960s, a series of Arctic-related issues such as ongoing scientific research in the region, a possible Arctic international conference, a proposed Arctic treaty, and oil discovery in Alaska, all converged to spur the new Nixon administration to order a review of U.S. Arctic policy. These factors helped drive the U.S. toward formally articulating its Arctic national interests.

IDENTIFYING U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS AND POLICY

The Nixon administration undertook a series of actions to identify the United States’ national interests in the Arctic and convey those interests into a formal policy statement. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, acting to assuage Nixon’s “expressed concern” (Kissinger memo 1970) over the lack of a coordinated national policy on Arctic and related affairs, issued a then classified April 15, 1970, memorandum to the NSC’s Under Secretaries

Committee directing it to conduct an Arctic policy review.²⁴ Although the main purpose of the policy review was to develop a coordinated overall Arctic policy framework, Kissinger's memo also made it clear that environmental preservation must be at the heart of a U.S. national Arctic policy. Kissinger stated there exists a "critical need for an overall policy framework to preserve the environment of the North, to provide guidelines for decision-making on several issues of international concern, and to focus United States activities, longer-range interests and objectives in the Arctic" (Kissinger memo 1970). Preserving the Arctic's unique environment was the necessary condition upon which the U.S. could pursue other interests and issues in the Arctic.

The composition of the group within the NSC Under Secretaries Committee tasked to review U.S. Arctic policy is revealing and provides further evidence that environmental preservation was the Nixon administration's priority issue area in the Arctic. Kissinger instructed the Under Secretaries Committee to "include the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality" (1970) in the policy review, as well as representatives from other federal entities such as the departments of Interior and Health, Education and Welfare, the Office of Science and Technology, and the National Science Foundation (Kissinger memo 1970).

Subsequent to Kissinger's guidance, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee designated the head of the State Department's Office of International Scientific Affairs (SCI) to chair a NSC interagency ad hoc committee to take the lead on the policy review and to draft the response (State Part II, circa 1990). Interestingly, Kissinger did not include either the Defense Department or the Intelligence Community among the participants in the review. These two developments are instructive, individually and collectively. The decision to put the State Department's

²⁴ The 1970 Kissinger memo, dated April 15, 1970, from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, is one of several Arctic policy-related NSC papers archived in National Security Council, Subject Files box 308, folder [05] Arctic: US Policy on March 1970-April 12, 1971. This author received the folder contents from the Nixon Presidential Library Archivist via e-mail on June 25, 2021.

international scientific research office in the lead role reinforces the idea that scientific research associated with the environment drove the U.S. Government toward finally developing a national Arctic policy. Likewise, Kissinger's initial guidance omitting arguably the two most important national security entities in the U.S. Government from a major policy review of the Arctic is surprising, given the region's Cold War geostrategic relevance. It suggests, at best, U.S. national security interests in the Arctic were secondary considerations in the Nixon administration's view of the Arctic.

The Nixon administration's Arctic policy review represented a key moment in America's Arctic national interests. However, it was just one of many initiatives the U.S. Government pursued in the early 1970s that affected what the U.S. considered its emerging national interests in the polar north. Nixon's 1970 U.S. oceans policy statement is one example.

1970 U.S. Oceans Policy

The U.S. has a long-standing global national interest in ensuring freedom of the seas and used both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard to defend this principle. Canada's proposed jurisdictional claim over the NWP for pollution control purposes threatened U.S. freedom of the seas interests in the Arctic. In April 1971, during the administration's ongoing Arctic policy formulation, Nixon directed his NSC staff to also develop a policy outlining U.S. interests and objectives regarding the world's oceans. He recognized the existing law of the sea regime that governed the world's oceans was inadequate to address contemporary issues such as exploitation of vast minerals located in the world's seabed. While mineral resource exploitation was a potentially lucrative undertaking, it also had the potential to pose ecological hazards as well as spark international conflict (Nixon 1970).

Nixon's U.S. oceans policy statement is relevant to his unfolding Arctic policy since the Arctic region is comprised mostly of the Arctic Ocean. However, Nixon's statement on the need to ensure freedom of the seas is both the heart of why the U.S. advocated for a new law of the sea treaty, as well as the part most relevant to U.S. Arctic interests. The primary reason the U.S. was a leader in the global effort to develop a new law of the sea was to preserve the principle of freedom of the seas. Nixon acknowledged the U.S.'s primary interest in a new law of the sea treaty was to "assure unfettered and harmonious use of the oceans as an avenue of commerce and transportation, and as a source of food" (Nixon U.S. Oceans Policy Statement 1970). To satisfy U.S. interests, Nixon called for a new law of the sea treaty to increase a state's territorial seas limit from three nautical miles to 12 nautical miles "and provide for free transit through international straits" (Nixon U.S. Oceans Policy Statement 1970). Applying the freedom of navigation criteria to the world's oceans would ensure the U.S. unfettered access to Arctic waters—most importantly, the NWP in Canada's Arctic archipelago.

The U.S. identified three policy objectives in its emerging oceans policy. The objectives, outlined in National Security Study Memorandum 125's (NSSM 125's) declassified, partially redacted, and undated analytical summary, were: to insure U.S. military forces maintained "sufficient tactical and strategic mobility" [original emphases] to present a credible deterrent to adversaries; to protect America's respective investment, labor, and consumer equities associated with broader U.S. economic and environmental interests; and finally, "[t]o avoid political and armed conflict [original emphases] over rights to use ocean space" (State NSSM 125 Analytical Summary n.d.:2). Although the declassified analytical summary was undated, language in NSSM 125's cover memo suggests the summary was completed between late April and mid-June 1971.

The Nixon administration was particularly interested in actual or possible jurisdictional claims of coastal or archipelago states, including Canada, presented. Such claims, including “claims of jurisdiction to prevent pollution” (Kissinger NSSM 125) could limit the U.S.’s freedom to navigate relevant international waters. Canada’s claim that it had jurisdictional rights over the NWP alarmed U.S. officials. As a State Department-chaired interagency task force charged with conducting a study of U.S. oceans interests concluded, Canada’s position represented an especially problematic unilateral claim. The U.S. considered Canada’s proposed claim over the NWP among “the most potentially dangerous limited jurisdiction claims” (State NSSM 125 Analytical Summary n.d.:9) because of its potential to affect Arctic navigation rights.

While Canada’s proposal emerged in response to the controversy surrounding the oil tanker *Manhattan*’s transit of the NWP in 1969 following the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, the proposal’s implications extended beyond oil tanker transits. Canada’s position, if left unchallenged, could be applied to cover U.S. military and other sensitive navigation operations in the NWP. In a worst-case outcome, for example, coastal states along Arctic or other waters could turn such jurisdiction into “the equivalent of a consent requirement” (State NSSM 125 Analytical Summary n.d.:9). Such a scenario would almost certainly undermine the U.S.’s power projection capability which, in turn, could endanger American interests worldwide.

Although the U.S. ocean policy initiative was separate from, and much broader than, the ongoing Arctic policy work, the policy objectives that emerged were certainly relevant and applicable to the Arctic region. It is worth remembering the Arctic region mostly consists of the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent waters. The concurrent formulation of a U.S. ocean policy illustrates how important it was for the U.S. Government to formally articulate its Arctic national interests.

At the same time, however, the U.S. sought Canada's support to encourage international cooperation on circumpolar issues. Such cooperation would be extremely difficult without Canadian participation. In fact, the U.S. Government solicited Canadian cooperation at the same time it was objecting to Canada's proposed legislation on the NWP. On April 15, 1970—the same day Kissinger instructed the NSC to initiate an Arctic policy review—the U.S. State Department disseminated a telegram proposing a multilateral Arctic conference “to establish an international regime for Arctic areas beyond national jurisdiction and...[urges] Canada to participate in such a conference” (State telegram April 15, 1970). The U.S. proposed this conference in order to develop rules affecting high seas navigation through international agreement and not, as Canada proposed, through unilateral state action.

The executive branch within the U.S. Government was not the only federal branch calling for the U.S. to articulate its Arctic national interests. The state of Alaska's congressional delegation voiced particular interest in developing a formal Arctic national policy statement. Alaska U.S. Senator Mike Gravel, argued in a letter to Nixon in March 1971 that if the U.S. had an existing Arctic policy statement in place, “a number of issues currently facing Alaska and the nation would likely be surrounded with less confusion and be more susceptible of solution” (Gravel 1971). Gravel was referring to the request to issue a permit for an Alaska oil pipeline, settling the Alaska Native Land Claims, and responsibilities for protecting the environment along the Northwest Passage.

Gravel made three observations he contends underlie the case for such a policy statement. First, he argued it was well past time to develop a comprehensive national policy articulating America's Arctic interests. Second, such a policy statement would “knit together national concerns” (Gravel 1971) in the Arctic region. Finally, Alaska's proximity to the Arctic region

affords the U.S. an excellent “opportunity to capitalize on fresh international initiatives with other members of the circumpolar community in a region as yet relatively free from strife but ripe for cooperative ventures.” (Gravel 1971). Gravel was unaware the Nixon administration was actively drafting an Arctic policy statement at the time he penned his letter to Nixon. Nevertheless, Gravel’s keen observations provided another example that the Arctic’s increasing national-level interest warranted the U.S. Government to formally identify its Arctic national interests in a national policy statement.

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee examined U.S. Arctic policy for more than a year and submitted a report to Kissinger on August 9, 1971. The report, crafted by the committee’s ad hoc Interagency Committee on U.S. Arctic Policy, represented at long last, the U.S. Government’s attempt to finally articulate its national interests toward the Arctic and the requisite policy framework to pursue such interests. The then classified NSC report found several shortcomings in the U.S. Government’s disjointed and uncoordinated set of activities toward the Arctic region, and recommended a formal expression and execution of those disparate activities under a formal policy statement.²⁵

Not surprisingly, the theme of an uncoordinated Arctic policy coursed through much of the report’s examination of the U.S. Government’s policy approach toward the Arctic. For example, the NSC report found “there is not now nor has there ever been a coordinated U.S. Policy on the Arctic” (State Part II, circa 1990:13). The existing policy apparatus lacked a lead agency as well as a coordinating mechanism to examine and consider the implications of various Arctic policies and programs. The assortment of U.S. Arctic interests lacked unity and cohesion.

²⁵ The August 9, 1971, report written by the ad hoc Interagency Committee on U.S. Arctic Policy is archived at the Nixon Library in National Security Council Institutional Files, box H-229, folder [06] NSDM-144. However, the Nixon Library’s archival research room was still closed due to the global COVID-19 pandemic when this author visited the library in California in mid-June 2021.

According to the report, “U.S. Arctic interests, including developmental and environmental concerns, research, and national security interests, should no longer be pursued separately without real coordination, but rather should be addressed within the framework of a single coherent national policy” (State Part II, circa 1990:13).

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee recognized U.S. interests in the region depended in large measure on cooperation with other Arctic states, including with its superpower rival, the Soviet Union. The State Department had been leading efforts to forge a circumpolar environmental agreement, including one designed to address pollution in the Arctic region. As such, the committee suggested an Arctic policy statement that reflected a level of international cooperation necessary for the U.S. to achieve its national interests in the region. It should be U.S. Arctic policy to, the committee suggested,

insure that Arctic development is orderly and consistent with U.S. policy on conservation and protection of the environment; to maintain a posture sufficient to protect our national security interests and preserve the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace; to develop and implement programs and activities, within a framework of international cooperation wherever appropriate and feasible (State Part II, circa 1990:13).

The NSC committee recommended that five policy objectives should comprise U.S. Arctic policy, including two directly tied to implementing a coordinated national policy.

NIXON’S NSDM 144: ARTICULATING AMERICA’S ARCTIC INTERESTS

On December 22, 1971, President Nixon issued National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 144, “United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group.” Issued as a then classified NSC directive, NSDM 144 represented arguably the most consequential occasion in the U.S. Government’s relationship with the Arctic region since the U.S. purchased Alaska

from Russia just over a century prior. NSDM 144 marked the first time the U.S. formally articulated its overall national interests in the Arctic region. The directive identified three national interests in region. The United States, Nixon (1971) determined, “will support the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace” (NSDM 144). This dissertation examines NSDM 144’s three objectives to explore the key factors that determined the composition of the U.S.’s first formal articulation of its Arctic national interests, as well as examines the extent to which these collective interests drove U.S. Arctic cooperation efforts.

U.S. Arctic Interests and Arctic Development

Alaska’s native population had long called for economic development dating back to Alaska achieving statehood in 1959. However, the U.S. Government paid relatively little attention to such calls, despite its own long-held interest in Alaska’s economic potential. The U.S.’s rising interest in Arctic economic development emerged slowly at first but then expedited after the 1968 Prudhoe Bay oil discovery, nearly a decade after Alaska gained statehood. The discovery and subsequent economic impact of oil in Alaska was no surprise. The potential for discovering, exploiting, and reaping the economic benefits from valuable natural resources has always been central to U.S. interest in Alaska going back to the 19th century.

Despite the economic relevance of oil and its potential effect on Arctic economic development, the U.S. Government could not focus singularly on oil as a resource development

issue in Alaska because it was intertwined with other important issue areas. The issue of natural resource development, newly important in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was both controversial from a political perspective and complicated from a policy formulation perspective. Oil and other natural resource development issues constituted part of “a final complicating factor...[one] occurring in tandem with intense U.S. domestic debate on exploitation of the Alaskan North Slope and related environmental questions, building a pipeline to southern Alaska, and agreement for a land claims settlement championed by Native Alaskan peoples” (State Part II, circa 1990:13). These domestic political factors further complicated the already complex challenge of determining an overall U.S. Arctic policy in the midst of trying to construct an international regime to address pollution affecting the polar north. Settling Native Alaskan land claims was a significantly important factor in Arctic economic and resource development because it would determine the nature and extent of the U.S. Government’s interest and effort in developing the Alaskan Arctic.

Before the U.S. Government could finalize a set of Arctic national interests within an official Arctic policy, it first had to address a number of long-held land claims Native Alaskans made against territory throughout Alaska—some of which lie in areas important to transport oil to market. Exploring and extracting oil from Prudhoe Bay meant very little if the oil subsequently could not be transported to market. Given Prudhoe Bay’s relative isolation in Alaska’s far north on the largely ice-covered Arctic Ocean, petroleum companies concluded that building a nearly 800-mile-long aboveground pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to the southern, ice-free port at Valdez, Alaska, was the only viable way to transport the extracted oil to where it could be shipped to the contiguous U.S. The U.S. Government, which had an obvious interest in encouraging and supporting oil development in Alaska, first had to resolve Native claims over

millions of acres of land, including, importantly, the lands in which a proposed oil pipeline would have to traverse. Relatedly, the U.S. Government had to overcome its own ban on land transfers it had in place.

In 1966, U.S. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall ordered a freeze on all land transfers in Alaska until the U.S. Government decided on a policy to settle existing Alaska Native land claims. The Prudhoe Bay oil discovery two years later suddenly became a domestic political issue because the land claims freeze prevented oil companies from building a pipeline on contested land to transport extracted oil to Valdez. This created a dilemma as several entities besides the oil companies stood to benefit economically from the enormous wealth expected to be generated from oil development. The expected economic windfall “provided the main impetus for settling native claims through an unusual alliance of natives, oil companies, and the State of Alaska” (Morehouse 1987:n.p.). The U.S. Government also had a vested interest. Geological surveys suggested Prudhoe Bay contained the largest source of proven oil reserves ever discovered in North America (Thomas 1986). If true, this could enhance America’s energy security by reducing the U.S.’s dependence on foreign oil. However, the U.S. Government, as well as the other relevant private and public entities, recognized that uncertainty hung over whether an oil pipeline would ever be built as long as the land claims remained unresolved (Thomas 1986).

Despite the change in the U.S. presidency that occurred in early 1969 from Democrat Lyndon Johnson to Republican Richard Nixon, the existing land freeze order remained in place and became an important domestical political consideration in and of itself. Coincidentally, Nixon nominated then Alaska Governor Walter Hickel to succeed Stewart Udall as U.S. Interior Secretary. The Democratic-controlled U.S. Senate, however, confirmed Hickel on the condition

that he “promis[ed] to extend the land freeze through December of 1970” (Thomas 1986:29). The combination of newly discovered oil, the potential wealth to be generated from such discovery, plus the uncertainty created by the long-unsettled land claims, all coalesced to produce a domestic political issue that ultimately prompted the U.S. Government to finally address the land claims head-on.

The U.S. Congress passed legislation to settle Alaska’s Native lands claims on December 18, 1971. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971), which recognized “an immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska” (Public Law 92-203), extinguished all land claims in Alaska by aboriginal natives. Congress, in return, provided for a cash settlement totaling \$962.5 million as well as a land settlement comprising nearly 18 million hectares (Public Law 92-203).

Settling the Alaska Native land claims was both a necessary and sufficient condition for issuing the first-ever U.S. Arctic policy statement. Nixon signed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act into law the very same day Congress passed it. He then issued NSDM 144 a mere four days later on December 22, 1971. Resolving the Alaskan Native lands claims issue cleared a major hurdle in articulating a U.S. Arctic policy statement. By issuing NSDM 144, Nixon “fully opened the way for massive resource development in the US Arctic, including Prudhoe Bay oil field” (Fry 1991:243).

U.S. Arctic Interests and Arctic International Cooperation

Nixon considered Arctic international cooperation a pillar on which to create a comprehensive U.S. Arctic policy. He instructed his NSC to develop plans and programs “for increasing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries” (Nixon NSDM 144

1970) across a range of issue areas, including exploration, resource development, and scientific and technical research. Initially, Nixon was particularly interested in bringing to fruition the Northlands Compact and using it as the centerpiece for Arctic international cooperation. Any such international compact was only feasible if it involved Canada and the Soviet Union because these states were major players in the Arctic region. However, convincing these two states to agree to an interstate compact raised a number of security-related concerns for each. Additionally, the U.S. also had to ensure its pursuit of international cooperation did not undermine its own Arctic security interests.

The IAPG, charged with developing actual policy reflective of the U.S.'s stated Arctic national interests in NSDM 144, found itself trying to navigate the intersection of Arctic international cooperation and respective states' security interests. The policy group faced the challenge of drafting a comprehensive policy that both pursued international cooperation and addressed national security concerns that did or otherwise might emerge from such cooperation. To assuage concerns emanating from within the U.S. Government, as well as from Canada and the Soviet Union, IAPG officials explicitly stated that any proposed Northlands Compact "was designed not to prejudice the position of any party as to rights under international law in the Compact area. Specifically, it would not affect rights regarding the high seas and superjacent airspace, nor recognize, dispute or establish any territorial or jurisdictional claims in the Arctic area" (State Part II, circa 1990:15). This shows that Arctic international cooperation efforts were clearly intertwined with broader U.S. national security interests.

U.S. Arctic Interests and National Security

While the U.S. Government developed explicit, if incomplete, policy ideas on two stated Arctic national interests—Arctic development and mutual international cooperation in the polar north—the same cannot be said for the emergence of the U.S.’s third articulated Arctic national interest: protecting “essential security interests in the Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace” (Nixon NSDM 144). As a maritime state, the U.S. has considered preserving freedom of the seas a global U.S. interest since the nation’s founding. This national interest made its way into America’s first formal articulation of its Arctic national interests because of the Arctic Ocean’s strategic location separating the U.S. from its Cold War rival, the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government did not explicitly discuss the Cold War in its Arctic-related policy formulation documents; however, it is inevitable that Cold War considerations factored into the need to protect vital American security interests in the region. Documents clearly indicate U.S. Arctic security interests also include extending America’s broader global interest in maintaining freedom of the seas to the Arctic region.

While the U.S. was developing its Arctic national policy, it was also trying to craft a response to Canadian legislation that could effectively restrict U.S. maritime access to Canada’s Northwest Passage. The U.S. Government was at odds with its close ally Canada over the legal status of the NWP. Canada, still smarting from the U.S. Government-sanctioned transit of the *SS Manhattan* oil tanker through the NWP in 1969, considered the NWP to be its *internal* waters, subject to Canadian laws and regulations.

The Canadian government, responding to the domestic uproar in Canada that the oil tanker *SS Manhattan*’s voyage triggered, enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Protection Act (AWPPA) in 1970 purportedly to protect its Arctic waters—such as the NWP—from pollution generated from foreign vessels transiting the NWP (Canada AWPPA 1970). Canada’s real

reason for enacting AWPPA was to restrict the regime of navigation for foreign vessels transiting the NWP to rules established by the Canadian government. Although Canada did not outright declare the NWP its *internal* waters in the AWPPA, it did interpret the legislation in a way designed to achieve Canada's most important objective in enacting the AWPPA: "preventing the NWP from 'internationalization'" (Solski 2021:4).

The U.S., on the other hand, considered the NWP *international* waters, not subject to a state's laws or regulations. The legal status of the NWP could affect the U.S.'s position that the NWP is open to freedom of navigation in support of the principle of freedom of the seas. The Nixon administration, believing the Canadian government was overreacting to the Canadian public's "nationalistic claims to the waters in the [Arctic]" (Johnson memo 1970), considered several possible responses if Canada formally considered internalizing the NWP.²⁶ The responses ranged from continued consultation with the Canadian government to the U.S. publicly announcing it intended to continue transiting submerged American submarines through the NWP without notifying Canada in advance (Sonnenfeldt memo 1970).²⁷ The dispute over the NWP was important to formulating a formal U.S. Arctic policy and reflected key U.S. interests in the Arctic. The U.S. could not afford to allow another state, even a close ally like Canada, to dictate America's global position to preserve the principle of freedom of the seas in applicable waters.

CONVERTING ARCTIC INTERESTS INTO POLICY

²⁶ The Johnson memo, dated March 21, 1970, from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, is one of several Arctic policy-related NSC papers archived in National Security Council, Subject Files box 308, folder [05] Arctic: US Policy on March 1970-April 12, 1971. This author received the folder contents from the Nixon Presidential Library Archivist via e-mail on June 25, 2021.

²⁷ The Sonnenfeldt memo, dated April 9, 1970, from NSC senior staffer Helmut Sonnenfeldt, is one of several Arctic policy-related NSC papers archived in National Security Council, Subject Files box 308, folder [05] Arctic: US Policy on March 1970-April 12, 1971. This author received the folder contents from the Nixon Presidential Library Archivist via e-mail on June 25, 2021.

Nixon's 1971 decision memorandum formally articulating U.S. Arctic national interests was monumental in the evolution of the U.S.'s recognition of the Arctic. The U.S. Government acknowledged the Arctic's collective national significance in several issue areas: national security and defense, environmental protection, natural resource development, and international cooperation. Nevertheless, for all the deserved attention it received in the years since it was declassified in 1977, NSDM 144 was *foundational* but not *comprehensive*. Nixon's memorandum and the policy review that preceded it certainly provided a necessary foundation upon which to develop a full-fledged Arctic policy, yet it "did not establish comprehensive Arctic policy" (Westermeyer and Shusterich 1984:14). Westermeyer and Shusterich are correct in their general point regarding NSDM 144's importance in the overall scheme of articulating and formulating U.S. Arctic national interests. However, they overstate their argument that the U.S. reverted to a default position of general disinterest in Arctic affairs after Nixon issued America's first formal Arctic policy statement in 1971. The Nixon administration continued to build on NSDM 144's foundational objectives and also develop a policy apparatus to oversee and manage America's burgeoning Arctic national interests.

The Interagency Arctic Policy Group

In addition to formally articulating U.S. national interests in the Arctic, Nixon's NSDM 144 created a body within the National Security Council to oversee the establishment of U.S. Arctic policy to achieve the stated national interests. The Interagency Arctic Policy Group (IAPG), chaired by the State Department, was charged with "overseeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic,

with the exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to Alaska” (Nixon NSDM 144). In addition to the State Department, the IAPG’s membership consisted of the departments of Defense, Interior, Commerce, and Transportation, along with the National Science Foundation and the Council on Environmental Quality (State Part II, circa 1990).

The long-awaited formal articulation of U.S. Arctic *national interests* along with an accompanying order to create a mechanism for formulating and coordinating Arctic *national policy* constituted a level of presidential attention on the Arctic arguably unprecedented in American history.

The IAPG, in response to Nixon’s instructions in NSDM 144 to study ways to increase mutually beneficial Arctic international cooperation through, among other things, developing a cooperative framework modeled on the proposed Northlands Compact, issued its very first report to the president in 1972. The IAPG drafted the “Northlands and Arctic Cooperation Compact” report (State Part II, circa 1990:14) and made four recommendations. The IAPG recommended President Nixon: 1) accept the Northlands Compact proposal as the foundational framework for developing Arctic international cooperation; 2) authorize the State Department to explore with prospective states the feasibility of convening an Arctic international conference; 3) explore future bilateral and multilateral Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union during an upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit; and 4) invite the Soviets to participate in developing a multilateral Arctic compact if the Soviets were favorable to the concept (NSC IAPG Draft Memorandum).²⁸

²⁸ The Nixon Presidential Library and Museum archival staff was unable to locate in its holdings the IAPG’s full report, “U.S. Arctic Programs: Review and Recommendations,” issued on July 21, 1972. However, the archival staff did locate and e-mail this author a four-page NSC draft memorandum that is a compilation of four related memos: 1) a May 15, 1972 Memo for the President from NSC Under Secretaries Committee Chairman John N. Irwin, II, that collectively summarize the IAPG’s recommendations; 2) a January 10, 1973 Memo for National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger from NSC staffer Michael A. Guhin through NSC staffer David D. Elliott commenting on the IAPG’s recommendations; 3) a January 17, 1973 Memo for the President from National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger discussing the pros and cons of the IAPG’s recommendations; and 4) an early draft of President Nixon’s January 22, 1973 National Security Decision Memorandum 202.

The IAPG contended that an Arctic compact modeled on the Northlands Compact would enhance Arctic cooperation by enabling Arctic states to pursue areas of mutual interest such as environmental protection, scientific research, and resource development. While such a compact could theoretically increase circumpolar cooperation, the IAPG readily acknowledges that its proposed compact might have trouble attracting Soviet and Canadian support. The Soviet Union heretofore “ha[d] shown little interest” (NSC IAPG Draft Memorandum) in cooperating with other Arctic states in any type of formal arrangement. Canada’s concern with its Arctic jurisdictional claims might prompt it to reject any regional compact that might jeopardize or otherwise undermine those claims.

Nixon’s subsequent decision to not pursue the idea of a multinational Arctic compact was informed by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s memo laying out the pros and cons of the IAPG’s recommendation. The compact concept did have “some merit in principle” (NSC IAPG Draft Memorandum) pertaining to issues like pursuing Arctic environmental protection as well as slowing the trend toward states proclaiming unilateral extensions of their jurisdiction. However, the idea of pursuing a formal structure for institutionalizing Arctic international cooperation was premature. It was too early to formalize Arctic international cooperation, given Soviet and Canadian concerns over preserving their respective “jurisdictional prerogatives” (NSC IAPG Draft Memorandum) in the Arctic.

The U.S. could not reasonably expect the Soviet Union and Canada, two states whose participation would be absolutely necessary for any type of formal Arctic cooperation to occur, to agree to an American initiative when it was the U.S. that was the biggest impediment to their respective Arctic jurisdictional claims. Kissinger argued convincingly that attempting to institutionalize Arctic cooperation at that time “could be counterproductive as our bilat[eral]

programs are getting off the ground” (NSC IAPG Draft Memorandum). It is important to point out that Nixon did not reject out of hand the idea of a formal Arctic compact. He chose instead to continue prioritizing Arctic cooperation through bilateral and multilateral efforts as necessary steps toward perhaps considering a formal Arctic compact later.

NSDM 202: U.S. Arctic Program Review and Recommendations

The Nixon administration followed up its 1971 Arctic directive with another NSDM barely a year later in January 1973. NSDM 202 acknowledged the IAPG’s progress in overseeing U.S. Arctic policy development. However, the briefly worded decision memorandum focused on ongoing U.S. efforts to pursue international cooperation in the Arctic region, “particularly in the areas of scientific research, resource development, and environmental protection” (NSDM 202). Despite Nixon’s continued support for Arctic international cooperation generally, he explicitly put an end to one long-sought U.S. initiative dating back to his predecessor Lyndon Johnson’s State Department to foster international cooperation in the Arctic region. Nixon concluded he did not want the U.S. to continue promoting an international conference designed to convince other Arctic coastal states, particularly the Soviet Union and Canada, to establish and join “a multinational Northlands and Arctic Cooperation Compact” (Nixon NSDM 202). The U.S.’s serious concern with Canada’s efforts to legislate control over access to the Northwest Passage, as well as the Soviet Union’s disinterest in a formal Arctic international cooperative regime, made it highly unlikely the U.S. could achieve anything on the scale of a Northlands-type compact in the Arctic region.

NSDM 202 halted steps the U.S. Government had been taking toward establishing an Arctic international cooperative regime, through a Northlands Compact or even an international

conference to address Arctic environmental issues. Nixon, in other words, reversed U.S efforts to internationalize Arctic cooperation and marked a pullback from the U.S. Government's attempt to formalize U.S. engagement in Arctic cooperation and governance.

Arctic policy observers have made much of Nixon's decision in January 1973 that the U.S. would cease efforts to pursue Arctic international cooperation. For example, the State Department's (circa 1990) then classified draft Arctic policy study concluded that Nixon's NSDM 202 "effectively ended for many years U.S. Government consideration of an international structure for Arctic cooperation" (15). Furthermore, NSDM 202 appears to mark the end of the heyday of the U.S. Government's articulation of its Arctic interests and subsequent policy formulation. The relative lack of explicit presidential-level attention to Arctic matters that followed gives the impression the U.S. essentially lost interest in pursuing its Arctic interests. Westermeyer (1990), for example, believes that general policy expressions notwithstanding, "little has been done since 1973 to articulate more fully United States interests in the Arctic or to implement the stated policy" (14). However, an examination of U.S. Government archival documents reveals Nixon did not totally abandon Arctic cooperation specifically or America's broader Arctic interests generally. Instead, the Nixon administration recognized the timing was not right for pursuing a formal structure for Arctic cooperation, and the U.S. could only achieve most of its Arctic interests through a broader policy framework.

Three developments drove Nixon to significantly redirect—not pare down—its pursuit of U.S. Arctic interests after the initially flurry of Arctic policy activity in the early 1970s. First, the U.S. could not realistically achieve two of its three stated Arctic national interests—promoting Arctic international cooperation and ensuring freedom of the seas in order to protect U.S. national security interests—solely within the confines of a regional (Arctic) policy framework.

Despite American efforts dating back to at least the mid-1960s to foster mutual areas of Arctic cooperation with its Cold War adversary, the USSR, Moscow's military-driven Arctic policy and general disinterest in cooperating with the West in the Arctic made such cooperation all but impossible. The Nixon administration ultimately concluded during the brief 13-month period between issuing the first formal U.S. Arctic policy statement through NSDM 144 in December 1971 and issuing NSDM 202 in January 1973, "that the military domination of Soviet Arctic policy would preclude participation by the USSR in anything like an Arctic Treaty or Arctic/Northlands Cooperation Compact" (State Part II, circa 1990:16).

Second, Canada's threat to unilaterally legislate sovereign jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage presented a two-fold problem for U.S. Arctic interests. The U.S. was concerned that Canada could use an American-proposed Arctic treaty "to provide 'a kind of legal umbrella over' its unilateral Arctic legislation" (State Part II, circa 1990:16). This concern, coupled with the Soviet Union's approach to Arctic engagement, further undermined America's effort to institute a multilateral treaty for the circumpolar north. Canada's position presented a second problem for U.S. Arctic interests and policy development. Any Canadian attempt to declare the NWP internal waters subject to Canadian jurisdiction could threaten the principle of freedom of the seas—an explicitly stated U.S. Arctic security interest—both in the Arctic region and more broadly around the world.

Third, arguably, the most important development that convinced the Nixon administration to pursue U.S. Arctic interests above and beyond an Arctic region-specific policy track was the start of upcoming negotiations for a new law of the sea (LOS) treaty. The LOS is particularly relevant to the Arctic region since the region primarily consists of the Arctic Ocean area. This made it incumbent on the U.S. to ensure its interest in formalizing Arctic international

cooperation aligned with its bigger interest in updating the existing LOS treaty. Additionally, ensuring freedom of the seas and protecting freedom of navigation was not merely an *Arctic region* U.S. interest—it was a *global* U.S. interest. With preparations underway in 1973 to begin negotiating a new Law of the Sea, the subsequently established Third United Nations *Conference on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS III) “appeared [to promote] a more favorable venue for the United States to pursue its broader interests while working on those LOS aspects, particularly applicable to Arctic conditions” (State Part II, circa 1990:17). In other words, the U.S. Government expanded its Arctic national interest and policy development and implementation framework beyond the narrowly-focused Arctic region to a broader global perspective.

GLOBALIZING THE PURSUIT OF U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS

The start of UNCLOS III negotiations signaled a major shift in how the U.S. pursued its Arctic national interests. UNCLOS III gave the U.S. Government a fresh opportunity to achieve most of its stated Arctic interests through a second, and arguably more important, policy route. Shifting the playing field in which to achieve the majority of its Arctic national interests greatly reduced the visibility and relevance of the Arctic policy apparatus the Nixon administration established. To be sure, the Nixon administration did not transfer the entirety of U.S. Arctic policy interests to the LOS conference negotiations. As the State Department acknowledges, “[t]he Arctic-related issues which had driven U.S. Arctic policy formulation and planning in the late 60s and early 70s, had been either subsumed in the LOS proceedings, addressed by domestic legislation or were awaiting resolution when the machinery for developing a comprehensive national Arctic policy could again be activated” (Part II, circa 1990:17). Nevertheless, the U.S.

Government subsequently embarked on a second policy pathway to achieve its Arctic national interests.

The IAPG effectively ceased functioning in 1973 as U.S. Arctic policy formulation turned primarily to LOS negotiations. In fact, the IAPG did not officially convene again for six years—in 1979 during the Carter administration. This reality, coupled with the relative dearth of explicit presidential-level public pronouncements on the Arctic, contributed to Arctic policy observers concluding in subsequent decades that the U.S. Government reverted to its natural, historical tendency to ignore the Arctic region. However, this interpretation is incorrect. Although the U.S.'s Arctic *policy* apparatus certainly changed and was deemphasized after Nixon's 1973 directive, the U.S. did continue to pursue most of its Arctic *interests* through the UNCLOS III negotiations that began in 1973 and continued into the early 1980s.

Although the UNCLOS III negotiations that began in 1973 covered worldwide maritime issues far above and beyond the relatively narrow scope of the Arctic Ocean region, these negotiations provided the international venue for the U.S. Government to pursue and presumably achieve significant aspects of its Arctic national interests. The Law of the Sea negotiations set out to address, for example, maritime boundary and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the outer continental shelf. This was extremely important to U.S. Arctic interests because the rules governing the outer continental shelf would establish a baseline upon which to determine the feasibility and nature of any Arctic international cooperation scheme since such cooperation would include recognizing mutually agreeable boundary and jurisdictional lines and authorities. Furthermore, the U.S.'s ability to preserve the principle of freedom of the seas and exercise freedom of navigation in the Arctic's unique operating environment depended on recognizing and respecting this principle and right on a global scale.

Ensuring the application of the principle of freedom of the seas to Arctic waters was arguably the most important U.S. Arctic national interest at stake during the law of the sea negotiations. Protecting freedom of the seas was not only a key element of America's global power, it would also enable the U.S. to pursue Arctic international cooperation with Canada and the Soviet Union, the most important Arctic states to the U.S. As R. Tucker Scully, former chief U.S. negotiator on polar issues, observed, the U.S. disagreed with both states' "more proprietary view" of the respective Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route (2021). These disagreements were over contested interpretations of navigation rights through Arctic sea routes. The U.S. wanted to ensure unimpeded commercial and military vessel passage through both waterways (Scully). The Arctic's frequently ice-covered waters presented unique jurisdictional questions and operational challenges that could hamper the U.S.'s ability to ensure the principle of freedom of the seas. Given these factors, along with Canada's and the Soviet Union's respective jurisdictional claims over the NWP and NSR, all three states used the LOS negotiations to pursue a mutually acceptable agreement on Arctic maritime navigation rights.

Negotiating Arctic navigation rights was a sensitive issue for the U.S., Canada, and the Soviet Union. The Canadians sought two seemingly contradictory outcomes: prevent the NWP from being recognized as international waters, while also gaining international recognition of Canada's 1970 AWPPA law. The U.S. and Soviet Union, although Cold War superpower rivals, were also both maritime states with large, globe-spanning navies. As a result, both superpowers had a shared interest in restricting coastal states' maritime jurisdiction in order to preserve their respective global maritime mobility (Solski). As a result, "most negotiations occurred off the record in informal negotiating fora, without full official records reflecting the exchange of positions" (Solski 2021:3). Nevertheless, a small number of declassified U.S. correspondence,

combined with existing literature on UNCLOS III negotiations, provide valuable insight into American thinking on upholding the principle of freedom of the seas in Arctic waters.

In April 1976, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee drafted a then secret memorandum for President Gerald Ford, seeking approval for an agreement the U.S. delegation to the UNCLOS III talks reached with their Canadian and Soviet counterparts that would enable coastal states to control vessel pollution in their respective Arctic waters (NSC Under Secretaries Memorandum April 1976).²⁹ Importantly, the agreement also included several conditions to ensure states' Arctic navigation rights. Key elements of the memorandum focused directly or indirectly on explaining how the trilateral agreement would, on balance, protect U.S. freedom of navigation rights in the Arctic, thereby ensuring the U.S. could extend the principle of freedom of the seas to relevant waters in the Arctic region.

The U.S. sought an agreement that would uphold the principle of freedom of the seas and protect its Arctic navigation rights in several ways. From the U.S.'s perspective, such an agreement should: delineate where the agreement applied; outline coastal states' authority to regulate "vessel-source pollution" (NSC Under Secretaries Memorandum April 1976:3); and explain how the agreement would affect existing rights for transiting Arctic straits, including an exemption for military vessels as well as providing safeguards ensuring "due regard to navigation" (NSC Under Secretaries Memorandum April 1976:4). The 1976 memorandum, which traces the origins of the negotiations back to Canada's 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, clearly shows U.S. negotiators were primarily interested in maintaining freedom

²⁹ National Security Council. 1976. "Subject: Law of the Sea – Request for Instructions on an Article on Vessel Pollution Control in the Arctic." Memorandum for the President. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee. U.S. Department of State. April 28, 1976. Hereafter referred to as NSC Under Secretaries Memorandum. This NSC memorandum, formerly classified Secret, was approved for public release on February 27, 2003 (CIA-RDP82S00697R0004026-0) and is publicly available in the CIA's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82s00697r000400170026-0>.

of navigation rights in Arctic waters through whatever special provisions would be required to account for the Arctic's unique maritime conditions. The U.S. insisted that any agreement with Canada and the Soviet Union was possible as long as it did “not have the practical effect of impeding freedom of navigation” (Solski 2021:16).

The U.S.'s stance on the special Arctic provision within UNCLOS III negotiations reflected its determination to advance the one Arctic national interest—protecting America's essential national security interests in the Arctic through preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas—necessary to enable its two other Arctic national interests. The U.S. pursued an acceptable agreement with Canada and the Soviet Union to preserve the principle of freedom of the seas in a forum much broader in scope and importance than a smaller scale, Arctic-specific treaty the U.S. previously advocated. That the private negotiations took place within the larger law of the sea negotiations framework recognized the Arctic region's special circumstances within the context of a broader international setting. As Solski (2021) correctly contends, “the geopolitical context surrounding the issue of internationalization of the Arctic” (18) made possible an agreement over what would become a very important law of the sea article to U.S. Arctic interests.

Pursuing major elements of its Arctic national interests through the broad LOS negotiations process illustrates how America's Arctic national interests were not confined solely to the polar north. The U.S. Government ultimately agreed to the “Arctic Article” (NSC Memorandum 1976:5) drafted during UNCLOS III negotiations, viewing it “as an effective compromise measure to address the special precautions of how Arctic ice conditions affect freedom of the seas and other pertinent maritime navigation issues” (Scully 2021).

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS DURING THE FORD AND CARTER YEARS

While the law of the sea conference negotiations provided the U.S. a useful and necessary path to pursue many of its Arctic interests articulated in NSDM 144, the U.S. Arctic policy process Nixon created languished in limbo for the six years following the IAPG's inactivation in 1973. The Carter administration resuscitated the IAPG to consolidate a number of Arctic-relevant issues that increasingly required national-level policy attention. The reemergence of the IAPG signified the Arctic region's growing policy importance and spotlighted the need to at least consider whether the NSC should refocus on the Arctic by, among other things, producing "a basic catalogue of U.S. interests in the Arctic" (State Part II, circa 1990:18) since the U.S. issued its last formal Arctic policy statement in 1973. Despite a seemingly renewed emphasis on U.S. Arctic national interests and policy formulation, including reactivating the IAPG in November 1979, the Carter administration ultimately declined to issue an Arctic national policy statement before the Carter presidency ended in 1981.

The decision to not issue an updated Arctic policy statement occurred even as the Carter administration NSC acknowledged the Arctic's increasing importance. The State Department's study on the Arctic and U.S. foreign policy reveals that just prior to the 1980 U.S. presidential election, the IAPG summarized U.S. Arctic interests and "stressed that in the seven years since the last statement of U.S. Arctic policy, the north polar region had been increasingly viewed as an important strategic, resource, and research area" (circa 1990:19). The absence of a new formal Arctic statement notwithstanding, the Carter administration's Arctic goals and objectives were to maintain "an adequate security posture," (State Part II, circa 1990:19), ensure Arctic navigation and overflight rights, facilitate scientific research, and rational resource development, all while

promoting conservation efforts and environmental protection in the Arctic. In other words, the Carter administration largely embraced and pursued the Nixon administration's Arctic national interests and policy goals without explicitly saying so. For example, Carter continued long-time U.S. efforts to encourage Arctic international cooperation on mutually agreeable areas of concern in order "to promote the peace and security of the northern circumpolar area" (State Part II, circa 1990:19).

The IAPG recognized, however, that a comprehensive agreement codifying Arctic international cooperation was highly unlikely in the near-term unless and until the Arctic states first collectively resolved a number of regional differences over strategic interests, sovereignty and jurisdiction, and resource development (State Part II, circa 1990). Although many of these issues required international agreement at some level, U.S. domestic influences and factors also played an important role in preventing the U.S. Government from pursuing its Arctic national interests.

Domestic Factors and Influences

One of the most important reasons U.S. Arctic national policy development stalled in from mid-1970s and into the early 1980s is that there was no clear consensus on how best to convert articulated Arctic national interests into actual Arctic national policy. Even the IAPG, long dormant from 1973 through the late 1970s, found it difficult to determine what issues should constitute national Arctic policy. Differing views among federal agencies represented in the IAPG revealed the U.S. Government lacked a consensus not only on WHAT policies to formulate to achieve U.S. Arctic interests, but even WHO should develop such policies. The Department of the Interior, for example, was content with the largely ambiguous and

uncoordinated nature of U.S. Arctic policy that existed. Interior, which had a prominent role in Arctic affairs by managing the Alaskan Arctic's federal natural resource development activities, did not believe the U.S. Government needed to clarify or update its Arctic policy (Westermeyer and Shusterich).

The Interior Department argued that U.S. Arctic policy should be less—not more—federally centralized and coordinated. Interior implicitly raised questions about how the national Arctic policy development framework established by Nixon within the National Security Council (NSC) system too narrowly viewed U.S. Arctic national interests and policy through a national security lens, when in fact U.S. Arctic interests were much broader (Westermeyer and Shusterich). This raised questions specifically about the IAPG's lead role in reviewing and implementing U.S. Arctic policy. The Interior Department argued that the IAPG is a NSC entity whose authority therefore “should be limited to consideration of the international and national security aspects of activities in the Arctic” (Westermeyer and Shusterich 1984:16). Likewise, Interior viewed other Arctic issues like natural resource development as “a purely domestic matter ... that should be coordinated by the appropriate federal agency, not the IAPG” (Westermeyer and Shusterich 1984:16).

U.S. officials clearly wrestled with how best to develop U.S. Arctic policy even after Nixon's 1971 articulation of U.S. Arctic interests. The traditional tendency to view the Arctic as a unique collection of interests arguably makes it even more difficult to characterize the region in policy terms (Westermeyer and Shusterich). This did not mean, however, that the Arctic did not present a particularly challenging set of interests in need of a comprehensive policy framework.

The U.S. Government's inability (or disinclination) to develop a comprehensive Arctic policy in the roughly dozen years following Nixon's 1971 reflects, in part, how complicated the

Arctic was in and of itself to define in policy terms. The challenge in formulating policies to achieve stated U.S Arctic interests reflects the recognition in the years after Nixon’s 1971 memorandum that although the Arctic region may not in fact be all that unique from a national interest perspective, it “is distinctive, and the environmental, political, and cultural context within which conflicting issues must be resolved is without parallel in the United States experience” (Westermeyer and Shusterich 1984:18). The Arctic region was, from a national interest and policy formulation perspective, a challenge to articulate because of its overlapping and often conflictual international, regional, and domestic components.

NSDD 90: REAGAN REAFFIRMS NIXON’S U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS

U.S. Arctic interests became enmeshed in U.S. domestic policy considerations early in Ronald Reagan’s presidency due in part to Reagan’s philosophy favoring a smaller federal government role in American society. The IAPG, in light of the Reagan administration’s budget and policy priorities, “undertook an Arctic policy evaluation to assess the proper Federal government role in the Arctic” (State Part II, circa 1990:19). However, as the policy evaluation would ultimately conclude, the Arctic region’s burgeoning and multifaceted importance meant that it required policy and governmental expansion—not retrenchment.

Contrary to Reagan’s general desire for less government involvement in private sector initiatives, the IAPG recommended that Arctic policy should be an exception because so many existing federal laws applied to the Arctic region. As the State Department’s Arctic study notes, “the [IAPG] foresaw the need to provide a range of Federal services related to Arctic energy and transportation because of statutory responsibilities for promoting commerce, and for protection

of life, property, resources and the environment” (circa 1990:19). It is neither surprising nor totally unwarranted for a new presidential administration, particularly one of a different political party and ideology of the one it replaced, to pursue a different policy approach and emphasis. Nonetheless, the Reagan administration’s desire to reduce the federal government’s size and scope during a time when the U.S. Government had not comprehensively reexamined its Arctic national interests in nearly a decade suggests the U.S. Arctic national policy reached an inflection point.

In addition to its broader approach to governing, the Reagan administration expressed particular reservations over the general emphasis and direction of the IAPG’s policy recommendations. In 1982, the U.S. Interior Department, which had a large role in overseeing resource development, wanted the IAPG’s Arctic study to primarily focus on “the domestic implications for the United States of foreign energy developments in the Arctic, rather than discussing the possible effects of domestic operations on U.S. foreign policy” (State Part II, circa 1990:20). Interior wanted the IAPG to cease its Arctic policy study until the administration had time to weigh in on overall U.S. Arctic policy. Ultimately, the IAPG reaffirmed the validity of existing U.S. Arctic policy as articulated in Nixon’s 1971 directive and recommended that Reagan issue a new Arctic policy statement affirming and continuing Nixon’s policy statement (State Part II, circa 1990). The IAPG recommended President Reagan issue a new Arctic policy statement not because U.S. Arctic interests fundamentally changed since 1971—which they had not—but to reemphasize the Arctic’s growing importance, and to show that the U.S. Government indeed had clearly articulated national interests at stake in the region.

Reagan issued a new U.S. Arctic national policy statement through National Security Decision Directive 90 (NSDD 90) on April 14, 1983. Despite the administration’s previous

skepticism of the IAPG's role in Arctic policy development, Reagan accepted the IAPG's primary recommendation to reaffirm Nixon's initial Arctic policy statement. NSDD 90 acknowledged the U.S.'s "unique and critical interests in the Arctic region related directly to national defense, resource and energy development, scientific inquiry, and environmental protection" (Reagan NSDD 90 1983). It is noteworthy that Reagan elevated scientific research to the level of an explicit, stand-alone U.S. Arctic national interest. When Nixon issued the first formal U.S. Arctic policy statement in 1971, he approved developing a coordinated scientific research plan for the Arctic, anticipating its increasing importance to America's interests in the polar north.

While Reagan retained Nixon's stated objective to promote mutually beneficial Arctic international cooperation, he omitted any reference to pursuing a Northlands Compact or any other formal regional framework for structuring international cooperation. Reagan, nonetheless, remained committed to pursuing ways to foster Arctic international cooperation. In fact, the president instructed the IAPG to study how the U.S. could coordinate its Arctic activities with other Arctic coastal states in order "to serve best U.S. Arctic interests" (NSDD 90 1983).

The IAPG subsequently found that U.S. Arctic international cooperation affecting U.S. Arctic interests fell into several categories. These categories included interactions constituting "a broader international pattern" (State Part II, circa 1990:22), similar to how NATO member states converge their respective national defense interests within that alliance's framework. Another category concerned pursuing U.S. interests and policies in ways that "create specific problems for resolution" (State Part II, circa 1990:22) like ensuring freedom of navigation; while conversely, pushing back against other states' actions that negatively affect America's own interests and policies. Finally, the IAPG identified and categorized interactions that require the

U.S. to cooperate with other circumpolar north states in order to achieve its Arctic interests and policies (State Part II, circa 1990).

The above sections clearly show how the executive branch drove the formal formulation and development of U.S. Arctic national interests in a range of issue areas over successive presidencies from Nixon to Reagan. However, in the early 1980s and in conjunction with the Reagan administration, the legislative branch of the U.S. Government reestablished its interest in the Arctic, particularly in the area of research-related priorities and activities.

CONGRESS AND U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS AND POLICY

The flurry of activity relating to U.S. Arctic interests and policy during the Reagan administration was not limited to the executive branch. The U.S. Congress, which had generally deferred to the executive branch in shaping U.S. Arctic policy, renewed its expressed interest in the vast array of research-related activities in the Arctic region dating back to the 1960s. Recognizing the need to codify and consolidate Arctic policy in the broad area of research beyond presidential articulations of U.S. Arctic interests going back to at least Nixon, Congress enacted the *Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984* (Public Law 98-373).

Not surprisingly, the Arctic Research and Policy Act was sponsored by a member of Alaska's congressional delegation—Alaska U.S. Senator Frank Murkowski. The legislation went on to garner near-unanimous support in both houses of Congress, with the Senate overwhelmingly voting by voice vote, while the House voted 253-1 in favor of it (Congress.gov 1984). The law was designed “[t]o provide for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and objectives in the Arctic” (Public Law 98-373:1242). This legislative

effort to consolidate and raise the profile of America’s diverse Arctic research interests marked a significant milestone in the pursuit of U.S. Arctic national interests. The Arctic Research and Policy Act helped fill a major gap in U.S. Arctic policy. It not only established a consolidated national approach to Arctic research policy, it “completed the statutory framework for...[developing and implementing] ... U.S. Arctic policy in its totality” (State Part II, circa 1990:21).

As this study explained earlier, U.S. Government’s interest in Arctic scientific research goes back to at least World War II and was a driving force leading the U.S. to issue its first formal Arctic policy statement in 1971. Like U.S. Arctic policy in general, America’s Arctic scientific research initiatives were broad but not necessarily consolidated in pursuit of a common set of national interests. U.S. Arctic policy statements explicitly considered scientific research not only a pillar of the nation’s Arctic national interests, but even a central enabling issue at the heart of other Arctic interests such as promoting international cooperation in the region. Despite the overlapping centrality of Arctic scientific research to America’s focus on the polar north, this broad issue area lacked the necessary “management and coordination” (State Part II, circa 1990:21) to enhance overall U.S. Arctic interests effectively and efficiently.

The Arctic Research and Policy Act entered the U.S. Arctic policy domain a year after President Reagan issued NSDD 90, which not only reaffirmed existing U.S. Arctic policy, but also made the promotion of scientific research an explicit Arctic national interest. Although scientific research constituted just one of four U.S. Arctic interests, the knowledge generated from it was essential to enabling other Arctic interests. For example, the U.S.’s long-standing desire to promote international cooperation across the Arctic region depended in large measure to engaging in scientific research that would mutually benefit all states involved.

The 1984 legislation created the Arctic Research Commission, charging it to promote Arctic research and make policy recommendations on Arctic research policy. It made the National Science Foundation “responsible for implementing Arctic research policy” (Public Law 98-373:1243), and created the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, responsible for developing and implementing “a national Arctic research policy” (Public Law 98-373:1243).

Arctic research was one of the leading shapers of U.S. Arctic interests in the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in the 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act. In light of earlier suggestions that Arctic scientific research, particularly those activities undertaken in an international cooperative framework, was not conducive to the U.S.’s vital national security interests in the polar north, Arctic research was actually a vital component to ensuring the U.S.’s Arctic security interests. The following section illustrates how the potential for Arctic international scientific research cooperation helped mitigate the uncertainty surrounding the region’s evolving and much more pressing security situation.

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The Reagan administration continued to pursue Arctic international cooperation throughout the 1980s, even when U.S.-Soviet Cold War relations deteriorated. Despite Reagan’s generally hawkish foreign policy and his pessimistic view of the Soviet Union, he took a more pragmatic approach toward Arctic international cooperation—consistent with U.S. Arctic interests initially outlined in 1971—by separating America’s non-security Arctic interests from its security interests.

In 1987, the IAPG presented a study exploring near-term challenges and opportunities for U.S. Arctic policy. The study divided U.S. Arctic policy into two broad areas: “international political and security-related issues...and resource development, and scientific research issues” (State Part II, circa 1990:23). The Arctic Research Commission likewise resurrected the U.S.’s effort to establish an international cooperative body to facilitate scientific research in the Arctic region. These developments show that the U.S. Government continuously promoted the concept of formal Arctic international cooperation on scientific matters even during some of the most intense periods of U.S.-Soviet relations. The U.S. Government actively sought ways to engage in Arctic cooperative efforts through non-security arrangements.

The U.S. Government nonetheless understood it could not completely separate its Arctic-related security interests from its non-security interests since they inherently overlapped in many ways. For example, during the height of the Reagan administration’s defense build-up in the early to mid-1980s, the congressionally-created Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) explicitly linked U.S. Arctic research efforts to broader U.S. Arctic security interests. In the inaugural publication of its journal, *Arctic Research of the United States*, the IARPC stated “[i]t is in the national interest of the United States to support scientific and engineering research to implement its national policy of protecting essential security interests” (1987:2) along with other U.S. Arctic national interests. Although scientific research was fundamentally important to protecting U.S. national security interests, the U.S. had long taken the position that scientific research in the Arctic was feasible only if it mutually benefitted other Arctic states.

Promoting Arctic engagement and cooperation through scientific research drove the Reagan administration’s response to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s surprising call for Arctic cooperation in a 1987 speech in Murmansk, Russia. Gorbachev, seeking to

redefine Cold War relations in the Arctic, called for “a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region” (Gorbachev 1987) and transforming the Arctic into “a zone of peace” (Gorbachev 1987). The Reagan administration, as well as the U.S.’s NATO allies, reacted negatively to Gorbachev’s call to demilitarize the Arctic region since the region contained important U.S. and allied military facilities crucial to detecting and reacting to possible Soviet aggression directed toward the North American continent.

Given the U.S.’s reaction to Gorbachev’s Arctic security proposals, the U.S. could have easily rejected his proposals out of hand. However, notwithstanding the security aspects of Gorbachev’s speech, “the non-security aspects were another matter for U.S. policymakers” (State Part II, circa 1990:24). These proposals called for, among other things, cooperating in Arctic scientific research and exploration. Gorbachev’s Murmansk initiative prompted the Reagan administration to reemphasize the U.S.’s long-time interest in engaging the Soviet Union on Arctic scientific research matters. In other words, the U.S.’s non-security Arctic interests somewhat converged with Gorbachev’s proposals just as the Cold War was beginning to wind down. As East-West Cold War tensions began to ease in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Government’s long-sought interest in promoting mutual cooperation in the polar north began to bear fruit. As the State Department’s Arctic historical study concludes, the Cold War’s unfolding geopolitical transformation “offered the potential for a strengthened multilateral approach to addressing and cooperating on a wide range of issues affecting the Arctic” (circa 1990:25).

The initial formal statement of U.S. Arctic national interests that Nixon issued in 1971 and the subsequent Arctic policy development that followed positioned the U.S. Government to identify and begin pursuing its polar north national interests. Reagan’s 1983 Arctic policy statement appears at first glance to simply be a restatement of Nixon’s directive issued a dozen

years prior. However, Reagan's statement was more than that. It both reaffirmed and calibrated U.S. Arctic policy to the realities of the Arctic in the 1980s. Collectively, Reagan's Arctic policy statement, combined with Congress's 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act, "resulted in a workable, practical, flexible framework" (State Part II, circa 1990:25) for the U.S. Government to develop and implement an Arctic policy.

The high-level policy attention the U.S. Government paid to its Arctic national interests generally, and to Arctic scientific research and the foundation it provided for Arctic international cooperation specifically, has been neither well understood nor appreciated. This is especially true as it pertains to the U.S.'s interest in promoting mutually beneficial scientific research in the region. The geopolitical transformation that began to unfold in the mid-to-late 1980s opened the door to increased U.S. engagement in Arctic affairs through the cooperation-enhancing appeal of scientific research and environmental protection.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

U.S. Arctic national interests in the second half of the four decade long Cold War were characterized by a concerted effort to develop, articulate, and pursue an integrated official U.S. Arctic national policy. Although Cold War security considerations still greatly influenced the U.S. Government's perception of the Arctic region, a series of other important issues converged with existing security interests to propel the U.S. to finally articulate its national interests in the polar north. Ongoing scientific research, fueled by U.S. efforts to promote circumpolar international cooperation, slowly moved the U.S. Government toward issuing a formal Arctic

policy statement. However, it was the discovery of oil in the Alaskan Arctic that triggered the U.S. to finally articulate its Arctic national interests.

The oil discovery in Alaska in the late 1960s drastically transformed not only Alaska but U.S. interests toward the Arctic region. It marked “the beginning of an economic revolution” (Emmerson 2010:178) in the Alaskan Arctic. The subsequent voyage of oil tankers connecting Alaska to the U.S. east coast propelled to the forefront the regional significance of America’s long-standing global interest in ensuring freedom of the seas and freedom of navigation. The U.S.’s determination to ensure freedom of the seas put it at odds with Canada, its northern neighbor and arguably closest ally. These factors would form key elements of an emerging set of formal U.S. Arctic interests.

The U.S. Government’s wide-ranging Arctic-related research activities were a testament to the region’s potential. The congressionally commissioned Doumani study assessing U.S. research activities in the Arctic found that despite the U.S. Government’s extensive Arctic research presence, the U.S. lacked a coordinated research agenda as well as an overarching set of national interests in which to pursue. Furthermore, the oil find at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, immediately raised the region’s profile and the potential for it to become an important component of overall U.S. economic interests. However, the potential for an oil-driven economic bonanza had important domestic implications for Alaska, its native indigenous population, and the Arctic’s fragile environment. The convergence of these issues, combined with the region’s prevailing national security importance, prompted the Nixon administration to focus on reviewing America’s existing—or more accurately, non-existent—Arctic national interests. President Nixon’s 1971 Arctic policy statement that emerged from an extensive policy review

process was historic and represented arguably the most consequential U.S. Government action toward the Arctic since the U.S. purchased Alaska in 1867.

National Security Decision Memorandum 144 provided an effective foundation for the U.S. to identify its Arctic national interests and develop the requisite policies to achieve such interests. A host of important issues collectively drove Nixon's first stated interest in supporting "sound and rational" (NSDM 144) Arctic development. Although the Prudhoe Bay oil find was fundamentally significant in and of itself, the U.S.'s ability to transport the oil and reap the economic benefits depended on first addressing environmental concerns as well as long-unresolved Native Alaskan land claims against the U.S.

The U.S. Government's continuous efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s to encourage mutual cooperation with other Arctic states on scientific research matters drove Nixon's second expressed national interest in promoting mutually beneficial Arctic international cooperation (NSDM 144). Pursuing mutual cooperation was essential to realizing a comprehensive U.S. Arctic policy because a cooperative regional environment might enable the U.S. to pursue other issues such as scientific research and resource development. Nixon's initial support for pursuing a formal Arctic compact with other Arctic states, including the Soviet Union, exemplifies how important the U.S. considered Arctic international cooperation.

Although the Nixon administration did not explicitly state this, the demands of the Cold War and the Arctic region's strategic location in the Cold War battlespace factored into Nixon's stated interest to protect America's vital national security interests in the Arctic. Relatedly, applying America's global commitment to preserve the principle of freedom of the seas to the Arctic was apparent—if not heretofore ever explicitly stated. The U.S.'s willingness to confront close ally and neighbor Canada to ensure U.S. military and commercial vessel navigation rights

to the Northwest Passage exemplified how America's Arctic security interests are vital to overall U.S. Arctic interests.

Nixon's 1971 Arctic policy statement did not merely convey the U.S.'s official Arctic national interests for the first time, it established a policy mechanism to ensure—at least in theory—the regular, coordinated, and permanent review of those national interests. The Interagency Arctic Policy Group, and the flurry of deliberations, policy studies, and implementation measures were a vast improvement over the unfocused, uncoordinated, and effectively non-existent Arctic policy apparatus that preceded it. Arguably, for the first time in American history, U.S. Arctic national interests received sustained presidential-level attention.

Nixon's decision to first support, then ultimately, oppose having the U.S. Government seek a Northlands Compact type of formal cooperative regime to achieve Arctic international cooperation did not indicate U.S. backsliding on pursuing mutually beneficial Arctic cooperation. It merely reflected the reality that such cooperation could not exist until more urgent jurisdictional issues were resolved. U.S. efforts promoting formal circumpolar north cooperation were not wrongheaded or naïve, but premature in the larger scheme of Arctic interstate relations.

Nixon's decision to effectively halt IAPG's activities in concert with issuing NSDM 202 in 1973 and the resulting half-decade long dearth in U.S. Arctic policy action that followed gave the impression in hindsight that the U.S. reverted to historical norm and lost interest in the Arctic. In reality, the U.S. Government recognized that it probably could not achieve many of its Arctic national interests—namely promoting Arctic international cooperation and ensuring freedom of the seas in Arctic waters within the confines of the Arctic region. Furthermore, the nature of Canadian and Russian opposition to a U.S.-promoted formal Arctic compact made the

subsequent Law of the Sea conference a more appropriate venue for securing America's Arctic national interests.

The Arctic policy *process* Nixon established to oversee U.S. Arctic policy development did stagnate in the six years between 1973 and 1979, however, the U.S. continued to actively pursue most elements of its Arctic *interests* during that time through the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. The U.S.-Soviet-Canadian secret negotiations over Arctic maritime navigation rights during the law of the sea negotiations led to the inclusion of a special Arctic provision in the subsequently revised Law of the Sea Convention.

The Carter administration's decision to resuscitate the formal Arctic working group in the late 1970s to review U.S. Arctic interests represents that administration's recognition that the Arctic not only remained important but was becoming even more important to the U.S. One should not characterize the Carter administration's decision to review, but eventually not issue, a new Arctic policy statement as an example of the U.S. neglecting or de-prioritizing the polar north. This decision to acknowledge the region's growing importance without issuing a new policy statement effectively represented an *unofficial* continuation of Nixon's original statement of U.S. Arctic national interests.

The Reagan administration, given its initial misgivings over the extent of the U.S. Government's role in Arctic affairs, plus its disagreement with the general thrust of the IAPG's policy recommendations, appeared at first disinclined to formally issue the first new Arctic policy statement in a decade. However, the Reagan administration assented to the IAPG's recommendations and issued a new policy statement—not to articulate fundamentally new Arctic national interests—but to generally reaffirm the Nixon era policy statement and signal the Arctic region's growing importance.

Like Nixon, Reagan's 1983 Arctic policy statement conveyed the U.S. had respective national interests in protecting its essential national security interests in the Arctic, to include ensuring freedom of the seas; encouraging development of the Arctic region, with minimal environmental effect; and pursuing mutually beneficial Arctic international cooperation that serves to facilitate the other Arctic national interests. Significantly, however, Reagan's decision to raise scientific research from one of several issue areas under Nixon's policy statement to a stand-alone U.S. Arctic national interest was an unmistakable, if not obvious, signal that the U.S. remained committed to using international scientific research to foster greater circumpolar cooperation.

The U.S. Congress further illustrated America's commitment to Arctic policy, generally, and Arctic *research* policy, specifically, when it enacted the *Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984* on the heels of Reagan's 1983 Arctic policy statement. These dual policy actions positioned the U.S., obviously unknowingly at the time, for the rapid geopolitical transformation set to unfold before the end of the 1980s. Although the dramatic easing in U.S.-Soviet Cold War tensions that began in the mid-to-late 1980s affected the Arctic region's geopolitical context arguably more than any other factor, it was in many ways the U.S. Government's persistent, but understated, pursuit of mutually beneficial Arctic cooperation centered around scientific research that positioned the U.S. to find common ground with Soviet leader Gorbachev and open the door for increased U.S. engagement in Arctic affairs.

The enormous maturation in U.S. Arctic national interests that occurred in the second half of the Cold War—the roughly 20-year period between the late 1960s and the late 1980s—occurred as the Arctic region arguably reached its apex as a geostrategically significant region. The series of executive branch actions, undergirded by the legislative branch's consolidation and

codification of the vast array of U.S. Arctic research efforts performed from the national, state, and local levels, positioned the U.S. Government to emerge from the Cold War with a much greater appreciation of the Arctic region's national significance as a geopolitical space beyond the confines of the security dominant Cold War. Well-formulated and articulated U.S. Arctic interests provided a baseline for the U.S. to confront both the dramatic geostrategic changes within the Arctic region brought on by the sudden end of the Cold War, as well as the constancy of those national interests within and through the polar north in the post-Cold War Arctic.

CHAPTER SIX

U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS (POST-COLD WAR, 1990-2017)

This chapter investigates the articulation and formulation of U.S. Arctic interests from the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s through the end of President Barack Obama's second term in 2017. Its central argument is that noteworthy *change* as well as striking *constancy* characterized U.S. national interests in the Arctic during the roughly quarter-century following the end of the Cold War. The three major U.S. Arctic policy and strategy declarations that anchored those Arctic interests reflected how America more fully recognized, secured, and embraced its status as an Arctic nation. This chapter introduces the concept of institutionalized circumpolar cooperation, which begins to emerge in sharp relief during this time period.

The chapter is organized into five sections. The first section examines the post-Cold War geopolitical environment that contextualized Arctic affairs. The next section unpacks President Bill Clinton's 1994 U.S. Arctic policy directive and its post-Cold War Arctic interests. This is followed by examining institutionalized circumpolar cooperation in the context of the emergence of the Arctic Council. The chapter then focuses on President George W. Bush's articulation of a new U.S. Arctic policy a decade into the 21st century. Chapter Six concludes by examining the U.S.'s first-ever national strategy for the Arctic region, issued by President Barack Obama. These sections collectively illustrate how U.S. Arctic national interests that emerged following the end of the Cold War consisted of enduring national interests complemented by new ones which reflected the region's geopolitical transformation to a largely cooperative domain, as well as America accepting its status as a true Arctic nation.

POST-COLD WAR ARCTIC GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

U.S. Arctic national interests that existed at the beginning of the 1990s reflected the Cold War superpower dynamics that had long shaped America's approach to the Arctic region. The dramatic geopolitical transformation that marked the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the potential for great power conflict in and through the polar north and began to refocus the region away from competition and conflict and toward long-sought regional cooperation. While this transformation itself did not explicitly result in a new U.S. Arctic policy, it did enable the U.S. to broaden its emphasis beyond primarily security interests in the region to include mutual cooperation in a range of issue areas.

President George H.W. Bush saw no need to review or articulate a new official Arctic policy throughout his four-year administration that ended in 1993. Therefore, this study does not extensively examine U.S. Arctic national interests during his presidency. This in no way implies that relevant actions that occurred during this time had no bearing on America's Arctic national interests. In fact, this study examines two such actions that subsequently influenced U.S. Arctic national interests: the 1990 U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement that formally established the maritime boundary separating the two superpowers in the Bering Strait, and the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy that led to a circumpolar consensus on protecting the Arctic region's environment.

The 1990 U.S. – USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement

In 1990, the U.S. and Soviet Union signed the Maritime Boundary Agreement which *formally* established the maritime boundary separating the two states along the Bering Strait area

in the Arctic region. The boundary, which both sides informally recognized for more than a century, had never been formally established when the U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. The 1990 treaty was one of the first U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreements in the Arctic in the post-Cold War period and reflected how U.S. Arctic interests helped drive increased American participation in Arctic cooperative engagement endeavors.

The treaty covers an area—the Bering Strait Region—that not only contains a vital international maritime chokepoint, but is also an important area for hydrocarbon exploration, mining, development, production, and fisheries (McNeill). In fact, overlapping U.S. and Soviet fisheries management zones in the Bering Sea area produced “the immediate problem” (McNeill 1991:47) in the late 1970s that led to negotiations that eventually culminated in the 1990 boundary agreement. The rapidly thawing Cold War relations between the two superpower rivals enabled the U.S. Government to resolve this matter, protect a key U.S. Arctic interest, and subsequently increase U.S. engagement in post-Cold War Arctic affairs.

The agreement was representative of cooperative relations that emerged between the U.S. and Soviet Union in the mid-to-late 1980s. While it did not fundamentally alter U.S.-Soviet relations in the way major nuclear arms control agreements did in the 1970s and 1980s, it did reaffirm an existing U.S. Arctic national interest in one important respect.

The U.S. Government sought to protect its primary Arctic national interest when it negotiated the 1990 maritime boundary agreement. The U.S., through the agreement, successfully maintained “uneroded access to the Bering Straits [sic] and preserv[ed] its freedoms to operate in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, as well as the North Pacific and Arctic Oceans” (McNeill 1991:53). The boundary agreement ensured that a key U.S. Arctic interest—protecting America’s essential security interests, which includes preserving the principle of freedom of the

seas—remained intact. The agreement’s fourth article stipulated that the agreed upon maritime boundary “shall not affect or prejudice in any manner either Party’s position with respect to the rules of international law relating to the law of the sea” (Maritime Boundary Agreement 1990:4). The mutual agreement ensured the principle of freedom of the seas by not interfering with either states’ freedom to navigate the Bering Strait.

Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union challenged each other’s right to exercise freedom of navigation through the relatively narrow straits even during the most intense periods of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the thawing of superpower relations allowed each side to address an important issue of mutual interest that had gone unresolved due to overarching Cold War tensions. By formally agreeing to the maritime boundary, both sides effectively “enhance[ed] strategic stability” (McNeill 1991:52) in a critical part of the Arctic region. President George H.W. Bush underscored the agreement’s significance not only for the Arctic region, but its broader importance to U.S. national security. In his letter accompanying the agreement to the U.S. Senate for ratification, Bush articulated his belief that the mutual boundary agreement was not only “fully in the United States interest” (Maritime Boundary Agreement 1990: III), but it also eliminated “a significant potential source of dispute between the United States and Soviet Union” (Maritime Boundary Agreement 1990: III) in the Arctic region. Even as U.S.-Soviet Cold War tensions dramatically eased more broadly, the U.S. continued to ensure it protected its essential Arctic security interests.

Receding Cold War tensions opened the door to long-sought U.S. efforts to promote Arctic international cooperation. The 1990 agreement exemplified how superpower adversaries could cooperate in the Arctic region and put the region on a path toward mutual cooperation and

shared governance. Any realistic Arctic governance schemes largely depended on the ability and willingness of the two most influential Arctic powers to cooperate.

The 1990 agreement signified an important advance in U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the Arctic as well as more broadly in the emerging post-Cold War geopolitical environment. Fully aware that “bilateral cooperation between the two countries is critical to the governance of [the Arctic] region” (Berkman 2016:186), the U.S. Government, nonetheless, did not alter its U.S. Arctic interests as a result of the Maritime Boundary Agreement or in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union the following year.

The sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 represented arguably the most significant geopolitical event since the end of the World War II and potentially threatened nascent superpower cooperation in the Arctic. The U.S.’s most immediate concern in the Arctic in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the security of Moscow’s vast strategic nuclear arsenal deployed throughout the former Soviet empire as well as in and near the Arctic region. The Russian Federation, led by President Boris Yeltsin, succeeded the Soviet Union and assumed positive control of the country’s enormous nuclear arsenal.

The 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

In 1989, Finland, taking advantage of the Arctic region’s emerging geopolitical transformation resulting from the end of the Cold War, initiated collective action among the eight Arctic states to protect the region’s fragile environment. The Arctic states recognized and acknowledged “a growing national and international appreciation of the importance of the Arctic ecosystems” (AEPS 1991:6) and committed themselves to cooperatively protect the Arctic

environment. This was important because no single Arctic state had neither the responsibility nor the capacity to effectively mitigate the clear and present danger to the region's environment.

Exploring and extracting the Arctic region's vast natural resources was key to any realistic long-term and sustainable economic development among the individual Arctic states. These states therefore sought to create a circumpolar environmental protection agreement that provided a balanced approach of enabling economic development without imposing "unacceptable ecological or cultural impacts" (AEPS 1991:7) on the region.

The Arctic states established the AEPS as a non-binding agreement in 1991. The environmental strategy identified six pollution-generating issues—persistent organic contaminants, oil, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity, and acidification—that threatened the region's ecosystem and required collective action. This study focuses on oil pollution since oil exploration and extraction has long constituted a key U.S. Arctic national interest, as encapsulated in the first official U.S. Arctic policy directive in 1971. That policy statement, in rather generic language, called for "the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment" (Nixon NSDM 144). The U.S. and the other Arctic states acknowledged that the region's physical environment made it highly vulnerable to the risks posed by oil pollution and collectively voiced this in the AEPS's founding strategic document.

The AEPS warned that "[t]he highest risk of oil spill is connected with transportation activities and production of oil as well as to a lesser degree, exploration activities" (1991:15). To cooperatively address the issues associated with oil pollution, the Arctic states agreed to, among other things, closely monitor and document hydrocarbon activity within their respective Arctic boundaries. This action was part of a broader, regionwide monitoring and assessment effort to

anticipate and mitigate adverse Arctic environmental effects. Furthermore, the AEPS presented a conceptual model for how increased circumpolar cooperation and governance engagement might proceed in the future.

CLINTON'S 1994 ARCTIC POLICY AND U.S. POST-COLD WAR ARCTIC INTERESTS

In 1994, President Bill Clinton issued a new official U.S. Arctic policy that replaced Reagan's 1983 Arctic policy and laid the foundation for how the U.S. identified and would pursue its interests in a region that had undergone a dramatic geopolitical transformation with the end of the Cold War. Despite this transformation, U.S. Arctic interests did not materially change in some important areas. America's security interests still predominated, followed by the legacy issues of environmental protection, resource management and economic development, and scientific research. However, Clinton's inclusion of circumpolar international institution-building, along with including Arctic indigenous peoples in pertinent decision making, represented a significant expansion in overall U.S. Arctic interests.

Clinton articulated six U.S. Arctic interests when he issued Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council-26 (PDD/NSC-26) in June 1994. He determined the U.S. was intent on

(1) meeting post-Cold War national security and defense needs, (2) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources, (3) assuring that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable, (4) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations, (5) involving the Arctic's indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them, and (6) enhancing scientific monitoring and research into local, regional and global environmental issues" (Clinton PDD/NSC-26 1994:2).

Interestingly, Clinton combined U.S. Arctic and Antarctic policy into a single policy directive when he issued PDD/NSC-26. While he noted that both polar regions required international cooperation and stood to benefit from environmentally-related scientific research, Clinton recognized that the Arctic differed substantially from its polar counterpart in that “the Arctic is an inhabited area in which development must be carried out in an environmentally sustainable manner” (Clinton PDD/NSC-26 1994:2).

U.S. Arctic Post-Cold War National Security and Defense Interests

Clinton’s first articulated U.S. Arctic interest—meeting national security and defense requirements—explicitly used the legacy of the Cold War as a basis from which to move forward. PDD/NSC-26 acknowledges that “[a]lthough Cold War tensions have dramatically decreased, the United States continues to have basic national security and defense interests in the Arctic region” (1994:2). Even though the Cold War was over, the U.S. retained a significant interest in maintaining a military presence in the Arctic, both to safeguard U.S. national security and to preserve regional stability. For example, Clinton’s statement that the U.S. “must maintain the ability to protect against attack across the Arctic” (PDD/NSC-26:2) clearly recognized that, the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, Russia still maintained the means to attack the U.S. from across the polar north.

Unlike the two U.S. Arctic policy statements that preceded it, Clinton’s Arctic policy did not explicitly include preserving the principle of freedom of the seas within the realm of a security interest. However, he implied such when he stated the U.S. must retain the ability “to move ships and aircraft freely under the principles of customary law reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention [LOSC], to ... [among other things] ... carry out military operations in the

region” (PDD/NSC-26 1994:2). This does not mean Clinton devalued the principle of freedom of the seas generally or specifically as it pertained to U.S. Arctic national interests. In fact, the Clinton administration was simultaneously reviewing existing U.S. freedom of navigation policy, as well as finalizing negotiations to amend the 1982 LOSC (formally called the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS) that was set to enter into force in 1994, all while issuing a revised U.S. Arctic policy.

As stated in previous chapters, the U.S. has long considered preserving the principle of freedom of the seas a fundamental U.S. global interest. Ensuring freedom of the seas has been an integral component of U.S. national security for as long as the U.S. has been a maritime power. For example, the U.S. and Great Britain explicitly acknowledged in the 1941 Atlantic Charter just before the outbreak of World War II how global stability rested, in large measure, on the ability to “enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance” (Roach 2020:224). Maintaining freedom of the seas is particularly important to the Arctic region given that the region overwhelmingly consists of marine territory. The 1982 LOSC, which updated and defined this principle, was close to entering into force when Clinton issued his Arctic policy in June 1994. When it did enter into force several months later in November 1994, the LOSC formally codified the principle of freedom of the seas. This principle

gives “all States, whether coastal or land-locked,” the right to freely travel the high seas under international law. Freedom of the seas comprises, among other things, the freedoms to navigate, overfly, “lay submarine cables,” and build “artificial islands and other installations” (UNCLOS 1982). These freedoms “shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas” (UNCLOS 1982 Article 87).

It is reasonable to assume Clinton’s Arctic policy was intentionally vague regarding freedom of the seas until the LOSC entered into force. It is also possible Clinton sought to

encourage Arctic cooperation by deemphasizing inherently contentious aspects of security interests that often characterized the region's Cold War dynamics. Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy helped push along the proposed Arctic Council by laying the foundation for greater international cooperation and U.S. involvement in the Arctic region. The policy statement did so by, among other things, "distinctly downgrading national security and defence considerations" (Scrivener 1996:22) while elevating environmental protection and biological resources conservation. Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy emerged from a cooperation-driven Arctic geopolitical context that radically differed from the more militarized geopolitical environment that informed the previous U.S. Arctic policy issued in 1983.

Nevertheless, two months after the LOSC went into effect, Clinton issued a stand-alone directive on *freedom of navigation*, an important element to ensuring freedom of the seas. In January 1995, Clinton revised the U.S.'s freedom of navigation policy through PDD/NSC-32. This directive superseded President George W. Bush's 1990 freedom of navigation policy and "provide[d] current guidance for protecting U.S. navigation, overflight rights and freedoms, and related interests on, under, and over the seas against excessive maritime claims" (Clinton PDD/NSC-32 1995:1). While Clinton's directive is much broader than—and does not even explicitly mention—the Arctic Ocean region, it is certainly relevant to pursuing U.S. Arctic *security* interests by providing guidance for exercising and asserting the navigational rights and freedoms fundamental to ensuring freedom of the seas in Arctic waters.

The lessening of superpower tensions that had characterized the region's geopolitical status for more than 40 years certainly called for the U.S. to reexamine its Arctic national security interests. This did not mean, however, the U.S. was in any way prepared to consider the Arctic as some sort of demilitarized "zone of peace" then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev

famously aspired to in his 1987 Arctic speech in Murmansk, Russia (Gorbachev 1987). Nonetheless, Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy represented a bridge from the Cold War to the new geopolitical environment that followed. Clinton noted this reality when he observed with respect to America's Arctic national security interests, the emergent post-Cold War environment "allows a significant shift of emphasis in U.S. Arctic policy. The new atmosphere of openness and cooperation with Russia" (Clinton PDD/NSC-26:2) opened the door to real circumpolar collaboration in non-security domains in ways that were pursued, yet largely constrained, by the Cold War's security realities.

Arctic Environmental Protection and Biological Resource Conservation

Environmental protection and biological resource conservation constituted the second of Clinton's six U.S. Arctic national interests. Clinton (1994), clearly signifying how important circumpolar cooperation had become by the early 1990s, articulated that "U.S. environmental and conservation interests in the Arctic are shared by the eight Arctic rim nations and are reflected in the [AEPS]" (PDD/NSC-26:2) the Arctic states adopted in 1991.

Protecting the Arctic region's environment had long been a staple U.S. interest dating back to the first formal U.S. Arctic policy in 1971. Inspired generally by the worldwide environmental movement in the 1960s and early 1970s, and more specifically by concerns that oil exploration in the Arctic could damage the region's fragile ecosystem, environmental protection and resource conservation emerged as *stated* U.S. Arctic interests. However, little to no tangible efforts were made to bring these issue areas to fruition. These issues transcended national boundaries and therefore could only be addressed through international cooperation. The Cold War geopolitical dynamics that shaped Arctic international relations inhibited cooperative

efforts between the largest and most important Arctic state actors—the U.S. and Canada on one side of the geopolitical divide, and the Soviet Union on the other side. Nonetheless, the gradual easing of Cold War tensions that began in the mid-1980s, exemplified by Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk speech calling on the Arctic states to reconceptualize the Arctic as a zone of cooperation and peace, presented the geopolitical conditions for the U.S. and other Arctic states to seriously discuss cooperative efforts to protect the region’s environment. The post-Cold War thaw in East-West relations provided the geopolitical context for the Clinton administration to pursue environmental protection and biological resource conservation as key U.S. Arctic national interests.

The desire for international cooperation clearly drove the Clinton administration’s national interest in Arctic environmental protection and biological resource conservation. The 1994 Arctic policy directive on numerous occasions directs U.S. executive branch departments and agencies to cooperate with other Arctic states in order to pursue this national interest.

PDD/NSC-26 (1994) called on the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee to coordinate efforts throughout the U.S. Government “to produce an integrated national program of research monitoring, assessments and priority-setting that most effectively uses available resources” (3) in support of the AEPS’s effort to manage the “coordinated monitoring of radioactive and chemical pollutants (both direct discharges into the Arctic region and long-distance transport by oceanic and atmospheric circulation) and assessment of the health and ecological risks” (2). As for conserving the Arctic’s biological resources, the Clinton Arctic policy sought to “promote a cooperative review by the Arctic nations of the adequacy of their existing Arctic wildlife reserves, including relevant U.S. reserves in Alaska” (PDD/NSC-26 1994:3). The 1991 AEPS played an important role in informing the Clinton administration’s

Arctic policy, the first post-Cold War official U.S. Arctic policy statement. Implementing key elements of the circumpolar environmental protection strategy reflected the high priority the Clinton administration afforded environmental protection and resource conservation as an Arctic national interest.

Environmentally-Sustainable Arctic Region Natural Resource Management and Economic Development

Clinton's Arctic directive illuminated the reality that Arctic resource management and economic development had to consider environmental considerations, but could only be achieved by cooperative measures at multiple levels. PDD/NSC-26 called on the U.S. Government to "work with other Arctic nations to ensure that resource management and economic development in the region are economically and environmentally sustainable" (1994:3). Clinton provided purpose and clarity to existing and vaguely-worded U.S. Arctic policy on developing the region's resources and building up its economy.

For more than 20 years, the U.S articulated in rather vague terms, its national interest in "sound and rational [Arctic] development" (Nixon NSDD-144; Reagan NSDD-90), or, more precisely, managing the region's natural resources and developing its economy. Not only did Clinton's Arctic policy directive provide much-needed clarity to these interrelated issues, it acknowledged that the U.S. Government could not hope to achieve its interests in these areas without effective cooperation with domestic regional entities, as well as with other Arctic states. The 1994 U.S. Arctic policy called for cooperation with the State of Alaska, and to consider "the social impacts on indigenous peoples" (Clinton PDD/NSC-26 1994:3) when pursuing environmentally-friendly resource management and economic development in the region. The

U.S.'s status as an Arctic nation rested solely on, and by virtue of, Alaska's location in and near the Arctic region. This meant that cooperation with the State of Alaska was essential to achieve America's natural resource and economic development national interests in the region.

Furthermore, Clinton's Arctic policy provided substance to guidance Reagan issued in his 1983 U.S. Arctic policy directive calling on the U.S. Government's Arctic interagency process to study ways to coordinate with other Arctic states on issues that enhance U.S. Arctic interests.

Strengthening Institutionalized Arctic International Cooperation

Clinton's Arctic national policy called on the State Department to lead a federal effort to "seek to create a more formal policy forum through which the Arctic nations can oversee implementation of the AEPS and discuss other appropriate issues" (Clinton PDD/NSC-26 1994:4). This objective represented an important development in the U.S.'s approach to Arctic international cooperation. The geopolitical transformation that followed the Cold War enabled real progress toward institutionalized cooperation among the Arctic states.

Clinton's Arctic policy recognized how the post-Cold War geopolitical dynamics shaped Arctic relations when it highlighted that the U.S.'s emergent relationship with the former Soviet Union's successor state, Russia, provided a window to "offer further opportunities to protect the Arctic environment" (Clinton PDD/NSC-26 1994:4). The cooperative U.S.-Russia relationship that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s further enabled the U.S. to pursue Arctic environmental protection—an issue that had long found common cause among the five Arctic coastal states—beyond the constraints of the heretofore dominant and Cold War-driven U.S. Arctic *security* interests. For example, Clinton encouraged relevant federal agencies with a broad international scope, such as the State Department and the Agency for International Development,

to “consider Arctic issues when formulating energy and environmental initiatives” designed to assist Russia (Clinton PDD/NSC-26 1994:4). The Clinton administration, therefore, sought to use the U.S.’s first post-Cold War Arctic policy to both institutionalize broader Arctic cooperation, and enhance U.S. bilateral relations with Russia through mutual interest in Arctic environmental protection.

Involve Arctic Indigenous Peoples in Decisions that Affect Them

One of the most distinguishing objectives of Clinton’s Arctic policy is that it explicitly called for inviting Alaskan state, local, and indigenous peoples’ entities into U.S. decisions relevant to the Alaskan Arctic. The U.S. Government had a vested national interest in “involv[ing] the State of Alaska and Alaskan indigenous peoples, our direct link with the Arctic, in policymaking regarding this region” (PDD/NSC-26 1994:4). Clinton devoted a relatively brief paragraph explaining why State of Alaska, local, and indigenous peoples’ governing entities’ involvement in U.S. Arctic policy and decision making warranted a stand-alone U.S. Arctic policy objective.

PDD/NSC-26 called for U.S. Government agencies to include, as appropriate, recognized governmental authorities in Alaska on American delegations involved in international meetings on Arctic issues. Specifically, U.S. delegations should carefully consider “indigenous peoples’ unique health, cultural and environmental concerns when developing Arctic policies” (PDD/NSC-26 1994:4). Clinton’s Arctic policy directive fully recognized that the U.S. had little chance of achieving all of its Arctic interests without formally bringing in and empowering all levels of governance pertinent to the Alaskan Arctic.

Involving indigenous peoples in U.S. Arctic decision making was not limited to what was explicitly outlined in the stand-alone U.S. Arctic policy objective. Such involvement permeated other stated interest objectives as well. This was particularly true regarding environmental protection, resource development and management, international institution-building within the Arctic, as well as cooperative scientific research efforts toward environmental issues. Each of these issue areas directly or indirectly affected local inhabitants in significant ways. Explicitly acknowledging indigenous peoples' involvement in relevant Arctic decisions represented an important step in the evolution of U.S. Arctic interests and was consistent with other Arctic states that increasingly recognized that Arctic indigenous peoples were indispensable to such states realizing their respective Arctic national interests.

Enhance Scientific Monitoring and Research into Local, Regional, and Global Environmental Issues

The Clinton Arctic policy directive's sixth and final national interest called for "enhancing scientific monitoring and research into local, regional and global environmental issues" (PDD/NSC-26 1994:2). Unlike with the other stated national interests, PDD/NSC-26 did not dedicate a stand-alone section explaining what factors comprised this interest. At first glance, this gives the impression the issue area was a throw-away line, unworthy of even a few lines of explanation. However, a closer examination of Clinton's Arctic policy in its entirety reveals this national interest is integrated throughout the policy statement.

Recalling that the Clinton administration articulated its respective U.S. interests for both the Arctic and Antarctic within the same policy directive, PDD/NSC-26 (1994) opens by acknowledging how important environmental protection is to both regions and highlights "their

potential for scientific research on regional and global issues” (1). Although U.S. national security and defense interests in the Arctic remained essentially unchanged after the Cold War, the transformative shift away from Cold War tensions enabled the eight Arctic states to, among other things, collaborate on environmental protection through cooperative research that included considering the effects of environmental issues on the region’s indigenous populations (Clinton PDD/NSC-26). The AEPS, which greatly informed and featured prominently in the Clinton Arctic policy’s interest in environmental protection and biological resource conservation, contains several provisions for scientifically monitoring and mitigating environmental issues that negatively affect the region, regardless of whether such issues emerged from within or external to the Arctic region.

The U.S.’s interest in strengthening Arctic international institutions was largely based on the desire to institutionalize cooperative scientific monitoring and research into environmental issues. A key aspect of this national interest was tied to cooperative oversight and implementation of the AEPS. Relatedly, and specific to U.S.-Russian relations in the Arctic, PDD/NSC-26 directed the U.S. Government to “seek ways to encourage the growth of Russian institutions for environmental monitoring, assessment and management of that country’s Arctic resources” (1994:4).

The Clinton administration integrated its interest in improving environmental research in the Arctic region throughout its entire Arctic policy, as well as in one of six explicit national interests. Including this issue area so pervasively throughout PDD/NSC-26 was consistent with the administration’s general embrace of scientifically-informed environmental protection efforts. It was also in line with the U.S.’s long-time interest in protecting the Arctic’s environment, as

well as the consensus among Arctic states of the need to address environmental protection throughout the region.

Clinton issued a new U.S. Arctic policy in 1994 to align America's Arctic interests to the realities emergent in the post-Cold War polar north. The existing U.S. Arctic policy, issued just over a decade earlier in 1983 by President Reagan, was an artifact of the Cold War. An emerging consensus in several issue areas required the U.S. to revisit and, where necessary, revise its national interests in the Arctic region. The Clinton administration made Arctic environmental protection, institutionalized circumpolar cooperation, and indigenous peoples' rights fundamental U.S. Arctic interests. Nevertheless, America's security interests still predominated in the region, although to a lesser extent than during the Cold War.

Although the U.S., as well as other Arctic states, had long sought to protect the environment in the Arctic going back to the early 1970s, the issue gained outsized prominence as Cold War tensions receded. It was the one issue area that all Arctic states—including the former Soviet Union—recognized was vitally important to the region, and it was the issue that could advance circumpolar international cooperation and institution building. The creation of the non-binding AEPS in the early 1990s represented a tangible success that brought together the Arctic states in consensus on a significant issue. The Clinton administration clearly supported such efforts and drew on the AEPS to inform its Arctic policy review.

Clinton's 1994 U.S. Arctic policy represented a significant step toward greater U.S. engagement in the Arctic cooperation. The policy directive looked to the AEPS and the emerging consensus surrounding that entity's environmental focus and non-binding nature to support, in principle, greater institutionalized circumpolar cooperation and engagement. Although favorably-disposed toward some form of institutionalized Arctic framework, Clinton was careful

not to endorse any scheme that could hinder America's national interests in the region. It is noteworthy that PDD/NSC-26 makes only a single reference to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention—when discussing U.S. security and defense interests in the Arctic and the need to ensure freedom of movement in and through the region. PDD/NSC-26 did not associate the 1982 LOSC—or any similarly formalized governance framework—with its call for institutionalized Arctic cooperation at all. PDD/NSC-26 instead called for the U.S. Government to cooperate with other Arctic states “to create a more formal policy forum to oversee implementation of the AEPS and discuss other appropriate issues” (1994:4). Nevertheless, the fact that the policy directive frequently advocates for increased cooperation in a host of issue areas represented a substantial step toward more formalized U.S. engagement in Arctic affairs.

After issuing a new U.S. Arctic policy, the Clinton administration's subsequent position on Canada's proposed Arctic Council gives further credence to the contention that Clinton supported Arctic internationalized institution-building as long as it aligned with U.S. interests in the region. As the next section reveals, the emergence of the Arctic Council immediately put America's long-stated interest in circumpolar cooperation to the test.

ARCTIC COOPERATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

Canada took the initiative in the late 1980s and early 1990s to formalize circumpolar cooperation and governance. Inspired in part by Gorbachev's call in 1987 to transform the heavily militarized Arctic region into a zone of cooperation and peace, as well as mutual concern among the Arctic states to protect the region's fragile environment, Canadian Arctic observers proposed the establishment of an Arctic Council. Even Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney

supported the concept when, during a 1989 visit to the Soviet Union, he suggested creating “a council of Arctic Countries...to coordinate and promote cooperation among them” (Keskitalo 2003:67). The idea of such an entity was not entirely new, but was made more viable by a general consensus among the Arctic states to explore cooperative efforts in the emerging post-Cold War Arctic.

The Arctic Council Panel, a group comprised of Canadian Arctic advocates representing, among other things, Arctic resources issues, indigenous concerns, and Canadian arms control, was established to explore the concept of an Arctic Council (Keskitalo 2003). The panel aimed to develop an Arctic cooperative body modeled, in part, on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE was a multilateral regional security forum created in the 1970s to ease East-West Cold War tensions. Advocates of an Arctic Council suggested “an Arctic Council should share certain attributes of the [CSCE], centralize international discussion of regional issues and the identification of projects for joint action, decentralize implementation, and be an ‘instrument for consensual learning, public diplomacy, and mutual suasion among parties with much business to transact’” (Keskitalo 2003:69). Modeling a proposed Arctic international governance forum after the CSCE, which brought together adversaries without the formality and power of a treaty, seemed well-suited to the Arctic’s emerging geopolitical status.

The Arctic Council Panel’s proposed Arctic Council would serve as the institutional centerpiece of circumpolar cooperation and governance in the polar north. The proposed entity included an expansive concept of representation that included not only traditional states, but northern indigenous peoples and nongovernmental organizations as well. This is significant in that it would essentially put indigenous peoples’ organizations and NGOs on par with nation-states over pan-Arctic affairs. Furthermore, the proposed council’s mandate would not only

address a range of issues areas such as economic, environmental, and military matters. Its agenda could also be expanded to address any other issues agreed to by consensus. In addition to proposing the Arctic Council's membership and mandate, Canadian governmental and nongovernmental advocates proposed four goals for an Arctic Council (Nord 2006). Three of the goals—expanding human contacts throughout the region, improving regional environmental protection, and recognizing the region's indigenous peoples' rights—seemed fairly non-controversial and likely to attract support among the other Arctic states. However, a fourth goal called for “[r]educing the overall military presence in the region” (Nord 2006:259). This last goal seemed likely to arouse opposition from other Arctic states because, among other things, it presumed to be able to give an international forum a say in arguably a state's most important and sensitive issue area—hard security.

The emerging concept for Arctic formalized cooperation appeared in broad terms to align with the U.S.'s long-desired interest in enhancing mutual cooperation in the Arctic. However, the U.S. opposed several aspects of the proposed Arctic Council that emerged in the early 1990s. Emerging victorious from the Cold War superpower competition as the undisputed global power, the U.S. Government in the early 1990s was not very interested in subjecting its national interests in the Arctic to a multilateral forum. The U.S. was also reluctant to cede policymaking authority to non-state actors, as proposed by the Arctic Council Panel. Furthermore, the U.S. expressed concern that a proposed Arctic Council duplicated existing mechanisms in place to address issues in the region. However, military security issues drew the most attention and resistance against inclusion in a proposed Arctic Council.

The U.S. was particularly concerned that Canada's proposed Arctic Council “might interfere with Washington's established security and defense-oriented approach to the region”

(Nord 2006:260) which had long-dominated U.S. Arctic policy. Two such sensitive issues were America's strategic nuclear deterrence and preserving the principle of freedom of the seas. The dramatic easing of Cold War nuclear tensions and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union did not eliminate the need for the U.S. to maintain a nuclear deterrent and the Arctic region played an essential role in preserving that capability. Ballistic missile-equipped U.S. nuclear-powered submarines operated in the Arctic Ocean area, and the polar north remained the shortest flight path for both submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as long-range strategic bombers. Furthermore, as stated earlier in this and earlier chapters, the U.S. resolved to ensure freedom of the seas and maintain freedom of navigation around the world. This posture, which undergirded America's global military and economic power, was particularly important in the Arctic, given the presence of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. Most significantly, the U.S., along with other Arctic states, objected to allowing an Arctic forum to address hard security issues.

The main argument against subjecting hard security issues to an Arctic forum was that such matters "were more appropriately addressed in fora such like NATO or the Helsinki Process (CSCE)" (Scrivener 1996:21). Clearly, cooperation even in a cooperation-friendly environment like the Arctic had its limits. The Arctic Council Panel's proposal to address security issues touched a sensitive nerve in the perceptions of many Arctic states. This is especially the case for the U.S. The U.S. long-considered its Arctic security interests an essential element of its broader global national security interests and did not want to subject those sensitive interests to review by other states.

It is worth noting the irony of what drove initial U.S. opposition to the proposed Arctic Council. American opposition to subsuming its post-Cold War Arctic *security* interests to a new

circumpolar cooperation/governance arrangement did not arise out of concern over the actions or intentions of its Cold War rival and fellow Arctic power, the former Soviet Union. Given the long shadow of the Cold War in the Arctic, one could reasonably assume that efforts to pursue and achieve pan-Arctic international cooperation that necessarily involved the two former superpower rivals would inevitably confront lingering post-Cold War security realities, such as the need for each state to maintain its respective nuclear posture in the Arctic region at some level. Furthermore, fostering circumpolar cooperation in the aftermath of the high-stakes Cold War period meant bringing together all five Arctic coastal states in which four of these states (the U.S., Canada, Greenland (Denmark), and Norway) were members of a major military alliance—NATO—that continued to exist after the Cold War ended and remained arrayed against the fifth Arctic coastal state—Russia. This reality “rendered cooperation sensitive and tenuous” (Keskitalo 2012:157) from the outset. Determining how to address military security issues in such a context was bound to complicate post-Cold War Arctic cooperative efforts.

What was unexpected, however, is that the U.S. was primarily concerned its Arctic *security* interests would be challenged, if not threatened, not by its formal rival Russia, but by its vast northern neighbor, mutual defense ally, and arguably closest political ally—Canada. The U.S. considered the matter of security issues sufficiently important that it “refused to participate” (Huebert 1998:54) in discussions of a proposed Arctic Council if Canada persisted in including such matters in its proposal. Whether and how to address security issues was related to another point of U.S. opposition to the concept of an Arctic Council. The U.S. and Canada disagreed over indigenous peoples’ issues in broader Arctic matters. The U.S. objected to Canada’s proposal to emphasize indigenous participation and membership in a proposed Arctic Council

because such a focus could threaten U.S. environmental and maritime navigation interests in the Arctic.

Scrivener, writing just as the Arctic Council was on the verge of being established in 1996, contends the Arctic Council recommendation panel's reference to security issues was not really focused on discussing *hard* security issues. Instead, the panel focused "primarily [on] the 'ecological security' of Arctic indigenous peoples whose habitat had long been an unintended victim of military activities in the region, rather than more traditional measures of East-West arms control" (Scrivener 1996:21). The Arctic Council Panel's attempt to authorize a proposed Arctic Council to discuss security matters was more reflective of Canadian domestic political considerations rather than Arctic interstate security concerns. Nevertheless, the U.S. was unwilling to permit a proposed region-focused cooperative entity to address security matters even in the broadest sense of the concept of security.

The effort to establish a post-Cold War Arctic consultative body was largely driven by Canadian domestic political considerations. As Scrivener (1996) points out, "Arctic issues were less prominent in the domestic politics of the other Arctic states, compared with the Canadian case. In some ways, the whole Arctic Council idea could be seen as an external projection of the internal political processes related to the indigenous peoples of the Canadian North" (21). On the other hand, there were no prominent U.S. domestic political considerations at play in the development of the Arctic Council. In fact, the U.S. largely ignored the planning meetings that subsequently proposed what became the Arctic Council.

The Clinton administration's general view of multilateralism opened the door to greater U.S. involvement of pan-Arctic international cooperation and eventual acceptance of an Arctic Council, albeit one based largely on U.S. terms. The Clinton administration was much more

favorable to the concept of a proposed Arctic Council than the preceding George H.W. Bush administration. As evidenced in his 1994 U.S. Arctic policy statement, Clinton prioritized environmental protection in the region and sought to foster greater international cooperation to achieve its objectives on this issue.

U.S. support for greater pan-Arctic cooperation on environmental protection notwithstanding, the U.S. Government remained reluctant to the need for an Arctic Council because of lingering concerns over the proposed entity's structure, function, and goals. Clinton announced during a February 1995 visit to Canada that the U.S. accepted and would join Canada's proposed Arctic Council in 1996. However, this announcement came with several conditions that highlighted U.S. concerns. The U.S. would only join the Arctic Council if the new Council did not have a permanent secretariat; the AEPS was subsumed within the new entity to prevent duplication; the Council was created without a treaty; and the Council was explicitly prevented from discussing national security and defense issues (English 2016).

Based on the concerns expressed above, U.S. negotiators drafted their own plan for a proposed Arctic Council. The U.S. proposal eliminated "most of the 'objectionable' features of the Canadian plan and further diluted the authority of the Council" (Nord 2006:264). Under the U.S. proposal, the Arctic Council's functions would be limited to that of a consultative body with a small, temporary staff and no decision-making authority. The Council's mandate would be confined primarily to environmental protection issues. Furthermore, not only would the U.S. proposal limit the Arctic Council's mandate, it called for language in the Council's charter explicitly prohibiting it from discussing hard security matters. Lastly, despite accepting the Canadian Arctic Council Panel's inclusion of indigenous peoples' and NGOs among the organization's membership along with state actors, the U.S. plan clearly indicated the Council

“was primarily an interstate entity” (Nord 2006:264). Canadian officials, fully cognizant that they needed the U.S. onboard to give the proposed Arctic Council any realistic chance of establishing and sustaining viability, acquiesced to U.S. conditions for the Council. Canada’s subsequent acceptance of the American terms and conditions led the U.S. to support the Arctic Council’s formal establishment in September 1996.

Establishing the Arctic Council

The eight Arctic states—Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States—established the Arctic Council through a joint declaration in Ottawa, Canada, on September 19, 1996.³⁰ The Ottawa Declaration formed the Arctic Council as a high level intergovernmental forum designed to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among and between Arctic states, indigenous communities, and even non-Arctic states and organizations as observers, “on common Arctic issues” (Arctic Council 1996). These common issues primarily revolved around environmental protection and sustainable development in the region.

The Arctic Council that emerged differed markedly from the broader Canadian conception and instead adhered much more closely to the limited conception the U.S. demanded in exchange for supporting the Council’s creation. For example, the Council was not established as an international organization with binding legal authority, but was instead created as a forum with no “legal personality” (Bloom 1999:721) in which to develop or enforce its own policies. The Council’s limited scope, authority, and structure reflected the U.S.’s desire to minimize the

³⁰ The declaration is officially titled the “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council. Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.” It is also referred to simply as the Ottawa Declaration.

Arctic Council's footprint in regional governance, while allowing it to foster engagement and cooperation. Unquestionably, the most significant aspect of the Ottawa Declaration was that it explicitly prohibited the Arctic Council from "deal[ing] with matters related to military security" (Arctic Council 1996). That this was the only issue area the founding declaration expressly forbid is a testament to how the U.S. Government sought to ensure the Council would exact minimal hinderance on America's most important national interest in the Arctic region.

Despite initial skepticism to the idea of an Arctic Council, the U.S. Government successfully tailored the proposed entity to better suit U.S. conceptions of institutionalized circumpolar cooperation after the Cold War. Evan Bloom led the U.S. effort in negotiating the Council's initial rules and documents in the mid-1990s, and then subsequently oversaw America's representation on the Council from 2006 to 2020. In an interview for this study, Bloom states the U.S. did not want the proposed Council to become some sort of "UN of the North" or an "operational" organization (May 1, 2021). The U.S. was content to join the Arctic Council on the condition that the Council exist as a discussion forum and not be established as an international organization with regulatory authority or dues by member states (Bloom 2021).

The Arctic Council that came into being in 1996 was a net positive for U.S. Arctic interests. As the U.S. Government's leading Arctic research journal observed at the time, the Arctic Council "is entirely consistent with [U.S. Arctic interests articulated in Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy] and offers an important vehicle for pursuing them" (Arctic Research of the United States 1996:2). The Council's primary focus on environmental protection and sustainable development—two issue areas that are both research-intensive and inherently cooperative undertakings—fit neatly into long-sought U.S. efforts to enhance international cooperation in the Arctic region. Furthermore, limiting the Arctic Council's stature and outright preventing it from

taking on sensitive hard security issues meant the U.S. succeeded in establishing post-Cold War Arctic cooperation and governance in ways that fostered international cooperation without impeding on its national interests in the Arctic region.

BUSH'S 2009 ARCTIC POLICY AND U.S. ARCTIC INTERESTS

U.S. Arctic interests remained essentially unchanged from the mid-1990s well into the first decade of the 21st century. By the turn of the century, however, the international scientific community began expressing increasing concern over the effects of global climate change, particularly in the polar north. Furthermore, the existing U.S. Arctic policy did not account for the major changes that had taken place in Arctic cooperation and governance since Clinton last updated America's Arctic policy in 1994. These two issues drove President George W. Bush to order an Arctic policy review late in his presidency.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirmed in 2007 that dramatic warming was occurring in the Arctic region, greatly reducing Arctic Ocean sea ice and permafrost throughout the region (IPCC 2007). The panel also predicted that further dramatic change would occur even more rapidly in the coming decades. The U.S. and other polar states recognized that climate change could have a transformative effect on the Arctic region's geopolitical importance by, among other things, unlocking the region's vast quantities of vital mineral resources and potentially opening up maritime shipping lanes. Such "clear, and in some cases astonishing, changes in the Arctic environment" (Bloom 2009:370), drove the George W. Bush administration to launch an Arctic policy review in 2008

A secondary factor that influenced the decision to review U.S. Arctic policy was the need to address the major changes in Arctic cooperation and governance that took place after the U.S. updated its Arctic policy in 1994. It is important to recall that the Arctic Council was created in 1996, two years after Clinton issued PDD/NSC-26. The Council, at the U.S.'s insistence, was not empowered to govern the Arctic region but merely to foster cooperation within the region. This, in effect, left the region with a governance gap at a time when climate change slowly but steadily increased the region's geopolitical significance by the mid-2000s. A confluence of events provided added impetus both to climate change and, more broadly, Arctic governance itself.

As a result of climate change's increasing impact on the Arctic region, the 1982 LOSC gained increased importance in the region as states sought to legitimize their rights to any resources on their continental and extended continental shelves that might become more accessible as Arctic sea ice continued to melt. A Russian research expedition ignited worldwide media attention on the Arctic by planting a Russian flag at the North Pole in 2007, symbolically claiming it as part of Russia's extended continental shelf under the LOSC. A year later, the Danish government, responding to calls in some quarters for the Arctic states to create a formal, treaty-like regime similar to the Antarctic Treaty to govern the Arctic, invited representatives from the five Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.—to a conference in Ilulissat, Greenland discuss the “possibilities and challenges” (Ilulissat Declaration 2009:382) climate change might present to each states' sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean area. In the resulting declaration, the Arctic coastal states affirmed the existing law of the sea was adequate and saw “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” (Ilulissat Declaration 2009:382).

The George W. Bush administration supported the Ilulissat Declaration because the declaration clarified that the LOSC and existing international law provided an adequate legal framework for governing the Arctic Ocean region. The declaration further reiterated the existing legal framework “enshrines navigational rights and freedoms for military and commercial vessels” (Bellinger 2008). This observation, articulated by the State Department’s Legal Advisor at the time of the Ilulissat Declaration, is significant because ensuring freedom of navigation has always been the centerpiece of America’s *security* interests in the Arctic region. Furthermore, by signing onto the Ilulissat Declaration, the U.S. not only reinforced its support for the LOSC and international law to frame Arctic governance, it signaled the U.S.’s view of the Arctic Council’s proper role. The U.S. had long believed that the Arctic Council’s role should remain limited to fostering Arctic cooperation and engagement—not governing the activities of states.

The same year the U.S. lent its support to the Ilulissat Declaration, the U.S. Geological Survey released a report in 2008 estimating the Arctic was home to vast stores of hydrocarbon and other vitally important natural resources. The USGS estimated the Arctic region contains approximately one-quarter of the world’s undiscovered petroleum, including “90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids” (Bird). Since most of these resources are estimated to lie offshore, they are expected to become increasingly accessible as projected warmer Arctic temperatures leads to more ice melting throughout the Arctic Ocean in the future. This astonishing scientific estimate raised the prospect that the region’s long sought-after vital natural resources could become accessible, and therefore, greatly increasing the region’s geopolitical significance.

In the context of this new Arctic reality, the George W. Bush administration undertook an Arctic policy review, resulting in a new U.S. Arctic policy—*National Security Presidential*

Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25)—issued in the waning days of Bush’s presidency in January 2009. Unlike Clinton’s 1994 directive, which updated both U.S. Arctic and Antarctic policy under a single policy directive, Bush only updated America’s Arctic policy while leaving in place its Antarctic policy.

Bush characterized the U.S. as “an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region” (NSPD-66 2009:2). This is significant in and of itself as it marked the first time the U.S. explicitly acknowledged in an official Arctic policy statement that it is indeed an Arctic nation. Within this contextual characterization, Bush articulated six U.S. Arctic national interests in NSPD-66. He established that it is U.S. policy to

1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them;
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues (Bush NSPD-66/HSPD-25 2009:2).

U.S. Arctic National Security and Homeland Security Interests

Under Bush’s revised Arctic policy and consistent with previous Arctic policy, the U.S.’s first and arguably most important priority in the Arctic remained its substantial security interests. These involved matters including missile defense and early warning, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and preserving freedom of navigation and overflight (NSPD-66). Bush expanded the security policy domain beyond traditional *national* security to include *homeland* security. As such, NSPD-66 recognized the U.S. “also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region” (3). This is the only

substantive difference in any of the six Arctic policy areas since the last U.S. Arctic policy update in 1994 and clearly reflects the post-9/11 security environment from which the 2009 Arctic policy emerged.

NSPD-66 (2009) states the Arctic region “is primarily a maritime domain” (3), one in which the U.S. must “assert a more active and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power throughout the region” (3). This reinforces the fact that not only was the U.S. finally embracing its historical status as an Arctic nation, but that its Arctic security interests are fundamentally tied to its broader national interest in ensuring freedom of the seas. Reviving language used in official U.S. Arctic policy prior to Clinton’s 1994 policy, Bush’s 2009 policy illuminates America’s central security interest in the Arctic. NSPD-66 explicitly refers to *freedom of the seas*, calling it “a top national priority” (2009:3). Bush’s Arctic policy not only reinserted the term in official U.S. Arctic policy, but explicitly referred to the Northwest Passage that passes through Canada’s Arctic archipelago, as well as portions of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s vast Arctic coastline, as international straits open to freedom of navigation, a position essential to preserving freedom of the seas.

International Governance

In addition to the climate change’s amplifying effects in the Arctic, the region’s substantial progress in international institutional structures also drove Bush to issue a new Arctic policy. Since Clinton’s 1994 Arctic policy, Arctic international cooperation and engagement had matured significantly, primarily with the creation of the Arctic Council. As a result, “U.S. agencies needed to review how the Arctic Council and other international institutions were meeting U.S. needs in the Arctic” (Bloom 2009:370).

The U.S. Government participated in a host of international cooperation and governance mechanisms to pursue its Arctic national interests in the roughly dozen years between the Clinton and Bush Arctic policy statements. Despite general political and ideological differences between the two administrations over the extent and nature of U.S. involvement in international affairs, the U.S. maintained relative consistency in Arctic governance engagement. In fact, Bush, recognizing that the Arctic's changing physical landscape and increased human activity inevitably leads to a more accessible region, called on the U.S. and other Arctic states to "consider, as appropriate, new international arrangements or enhancements to existing arrangements" (NSPD-66 2009:4). The U.S. increasingly viewed the Arctic Council as a central mechanism of Arctic international cooperation, but not actual governance.

Despite initial misgivings it had in the mid-1990s about the necessity for and purpose of the Arctic Council, the U.S. played an instrumental role in establishing the Council's credibility and usefulness in the intervening years. The U.S. held the Council's second, two-year rotating chairmanship from 1998 to 2000. During its chairmanship, the U.S. prioritized sustainable development, environmental protection, as well as education, outreach and coordination among Arctic Council member states and indigenous communities (Memo on U.S. Chairmanship Priorities 1998). At the conclusion of its chairmanship, the U.S.'s senior Arctic representative succeeded in issuing a declaration—representing the consensus view of the eight Arctic member states—endorsing efforts to, among other things, ensure sustainable development, protect the region's environment and eliminate pollution, and conduct an Arctic climate impact assessment (Barrow Declaration 2000). The Arctic Council certainly helped the U.S. pursue many of its Arctic national interests after the turn of the century, particularly in the areas of international cooperation and engagement and environmental protection—including monitoring the growing

effects of climate change. For example, the U.S.-drafted 2000 Barrow Declaration resulted in the Arctic Council co-producing the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, the first “comprehensive, multidisciplinary account of climate change in the Arctic” (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme ACIA 2005).

The Arctic Council, as NSPD-66 concluded, “has produced positive results for the United States by working within its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development” (2009:5). While Bush was open to structural updates to the Arctic Council to improve its effectiveness, he opposed substantive changes to the organization’s charter and overall authority. As such, Bush concluded “[i]t is the position of the United States that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization” (2009:5). This U.S. position on the Arctic Council remained unchanged since the Clinton administration and reflected the U.S.’s continued ambivalence toward expanding the Council’s role or authority into anything beyond high-level consultation and cooperation enhancement. This U.S. ambivalence predated the organization’s establishment.

Bush’s Arctic policy position on international governance did not mean, however, the U.S. devalued Arctic international engagement. In fact, the opposite is true. Bush’s 2009 policy statement was the first official U.S. articulation of its Arctic policy since the Arctic Council was created in 1996. The Bush administration gave its endorsement to the Council as then constituted. By expressing its satisfaction with the Arctic Council, an assessment levied more than a dozen years into the Council’s existence, NSPD-66 clearly sought to strengthen and expand U.S. cooperation in the region in the years ahead. The U.S. finally began to embrace its status as an Arctic nation. The U.S. has long believed its national interests in the Arctic region

are extensions of, and intertwined with, its broader global national interests. Therefore, the best international governance mechanism for pursuing and protecting its Arctic interests is through the LOSC. As Bloom (2009) observes “[t]he law of the sea speaks to essential questions relevant to all countries and the Arctic, including maritime transit rules, marine environmental protection, treatment of areas beyond national jurisdiction and continental shelf rights” (371). NSPD-66 recognized the Arctic Council, on the other hand, serves as useful purpose in providing a forum to facilitate circumpolar cooperation and engagement.

NSPD-66 encouraged the U.S. Senate to ratify the LOSC, which the Senate refused to do dating back to limited objections first raised in 1982 by the Reagan administration when the LOSC was signed by the international community and eventually entered into force in 1994 during the Clinton administration. George W. Bush, like his predecessor Clinton, supported U.S. accession to the LOSC, which Bush saw as central “to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the Arctic” (NSPD-66 2009:5). Joining the LOSC is essential to ensuring freedom of the seas and freedom of navigation within and beyond the Arctic region. Furthermore, as Bush’s Arctic directive pointed out, acceding to the LOSC “will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted” (NSPD-66:2009:5).

Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues

Bush’s Arctic directive added a new policy area, one the Clinton administration did not explicitly address in its 1994 Arctic policy statement: Arctic extended continental shelf and

boundary issues. Given the potential stakes associated with exercising sovereign rights over maritime areas that may contain an abundance of natural resources, including oil and gas deposits, Bush's Arctic policy emphatically calls on the U.S. to follow the procedures set forth in the LOSC for defining a state's extended continental shelf and resolving maritime boundary disputes.

The U.S. refused to sign the LOSC in 1982, initially citing concerns over the agreement's deep sea mining provisions. Despite not acceding to the Convention, the U.S. over the years has generally abided by its other provisions, including those related to the extended continental shelf and maritime boundaries. It is worth recalling that although the LOSC was signed in 1982, it did not enter into force until late in 1994, several months *after* Clinton issued the last official U.S. Arctic policy statement. Accordingly, 15 years later, Bush's 2009 Arctic directive concluded that determining the U.S.'s extended continental shelf in accordance with the LOSC "is critical to our national interests in energy security, resource management, and environmental protection" (Bush NSPD-66 2009:6).

NSPD-66 also called on the U.S. Government to continue pursuing efforts to resolve the U.S.-Canadian boundary dispute in the Beaufort Sea. This dispute, which centers around determining the maritime international boundary that extends into the Beaufort Sea between the two countries, is more like a disagreement rather than a dispute as it is highly unlikely to ever lead to conflict between the two close allies. However, because the disputed area covers the extended continental shelf, determining who exercises sovereign rights over the area is important since the area could contain hydrocarbon and other vital natural resources. Although the U.S. was (and still is) one of the few states that had not ratified the LOSC at the time, the Bush Arctic

policy understood the U.S. could best protect its claim over the delineation of the Beaufort Sea boundary over the long-term by acceding to the LOSC.

Bush also called on the U.S. and Russia to continue to abide by the terms of the 1990 maritime boundary treaty between the U.S. and the then Soviet Union even though Russia still has not ratified that agreement. Similar to the U.S.'s position toward the LOSC, both Russia and the U.S. adhere to the 1990 treaty's provisions even though Russia's lower house of parliament—the Duma—has yet to ratify the agreement.

Promoting International Scientific Cooperation

Bush's Arctic policy continued a long line of official U.S. Arctic policy statements advocating for more international cooperation through scientific research collaboration. The U.S. Government, even predating the first official U.S. Arctic policy in 1971, had long advocated the idea that the Arctic states, including then Cold War rival the Soviet Union, should cooperate on mutually beneficial scientific research in the polar north. While the U.S. had always called for circumpolar cooperation, such cooperative measures, as NSPD-66 (2009) points out, are also “vital for the promotion of [U.S.] interests in the Arctic region” (7).

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Bush also recognized that successful Arctic international scientific cooperation was not feasible without Russia's cooperation, which NSPD-66 deemed “particularly important” (2009:7). As the largest Arctic state with arguably the most experience in Arctic scientific research, Russian cooperation was vital to understand and address environmental protection and climate change issues—two science-centric issue areas. This is a testament to how the U.S. and Russia had been able to find common ground on many important Arctic-related issues despite their sometimes frosty relations outside the Arctic region.

Economic and Energy Issues

The Bush Arctic policy's focus on economic and energy issues recognized how much more insight the U.S. had gained about the region's economic and energy importance since the last U.S. Arctic policy was articulated in 1994. During the 15 years that separated the two policy pronouncements, the U.S. Government came to appreciate just how important the Arctic region's energy-driven economic potential had become to broader U.S. national interests. Examining NSPD-66 closely reveals Bush relied more on international cooperation to address economic and energy issues in the Arctic than one might expect.

First, NSPD-66 (2009) acknowledges that sustainable development “poses particular challenges” (10) in the Arctic region. This acknowledgment implies the Arctic Council's essential role in long-term Arctic development since sustainable development is one of the Council's two foundational issue areas—along with environmental protection. Second, NSPD-66 is replete with examples recognizing the need or desire for international cooperation to achieve U.S. economic and energy interests in the Arctic. For example, in order to implement U.S. Arctic policy on economic and energy issues, the Bush Arctic policy calls on the U.S. Government to pursue international consultation and cooperation on a range of issues to enhance economic development in the Arctic, including climate change's effects on realizing economic opportunities in the region. Furthermore, even when it comes to energy development—an issue of great importance to the Bush administration—NSPD-66 called for the U.S. to engage with other Arctic states “to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in the Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted best practices and internationally recognized standards” (2009:11) and principles. Although Bush's 2009 Arctic policy directive does not explicitly

reference it by name, its view of the Arctic's economic and energy potential was clearly informed by the 2008 USGS appraisal estimating the Arctic region's undiscovered hydrocarbon deposits and potential value.

Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources

The 2009 Arctic policy directive acknowledges how climate change disproportionately affected the Arctic region and U.S. Arctic interests. NSPD-66 accepts that “changing climate conditions” (2009:11) will not only affect the region's economic and energy potential, it will also affect U.S. interests involving environmental protection and natural resources conservation. Advances in both the knowledge and effects of climate change in the region magnified its relevance to U.S. Arctic interests.

U.S. Arctic policy had long recognized the Arctic as a “unique and fragile [environment]” (Clinton PDD-26:1) where it must minimize adverse environmental effects to successfully pursue vital American interests first formally articulated in Nixon's 1971 Arctic policy. Bush took the next step by explicitly identifying the significance of climate change in the region and the uncertainties that remained about its effects. As Bush cautiously noted, “[d]espite a growing body of research, the Arctic environment remains poorly understood” (NSPD-66 2009:13). Furthermore, notwithstanding the physical changes taking place within the Arctic due to rising temperatures, the region remains highly uncertain “concerning the effects of climate change and increased human security” (Bush NSPD-66;12).

Like its approach to achieving U.S. economic and energy interests in the Arctic, NSPD-66 explicitly recognized the U.S. must seek international cooperation to address the region's unique environmental protection and natural resource conservation challenges. Bush's Arctic

policy sought to implement a combination of existing enforcement mechanisms and forward leaning initiatives within the context of greater international cooperation to pursue U.S. objectives. For example, NSPD-66 (2009) directed the U.S. Government to not only effectively and responsibly “manage Arctic species and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safeguard living marine resources” (13), but also to engage “with other governments” (13) in order to effectively conserve and manage such living resources whose activities transcend international boundaries in the region. The Bush Arctic policy’s approach to Arctic protecting the region’s environment and conserving its natural resources effectively recognized that the inherent transitory nature of environmental issues such as pollution and climate change, as well as the migratory character of living resources—such as fish stocks—required both national action and international cooperation.

U.S. Arctic national interests remained remarkably stable in the 15 years between Clinton’s 1994 policy and Bush’s new Arctic policy. Nevertheless, the 2009 U.S. Arctic policy acknowledged the increasing effects of climate change and greater human activity on the region. Furthermore, Bush’s Arctic policy also took into consideration the changed, post-9/11 security landscape, the Arctic Council’s maturation, as well as an increased awareness of the region’s double-edged resource sword of both fragility and richness. Collectively, this shows that the U.S., despite the continued occasional criticism that it “lacked clear Arctic identity” (Nilsson 2018:7), was rapidly evolving toward becoming an “Arctic Nation” in more than name only.

OBAMA’S U.S. ARCTIC REGION NATIONAL STRATEGY

In 2013, President Barack Obama, retaining Bush's 2009 Arctic policy as official U.S. policy, issued the first-ever U.S. *national strategy* devoted exclusively to the Arctic region. Like Nixon's 1971 Arctic policy directive—the first formal expression of U.S. interests in the Arctic region—Obama's Arctic national strategy represented another milestone in the evolution of U.S. Arctic interests. The U.S. Government truly began to consider the Arctic region as a national strategic issue. Far from the lingering perceptions that the U.S. still considered the Arctic region largely out of sight and out of mind, the U.S. Government by the second decade of the 21st century developed a strategy to think and act comprehensively about the Arctic's regional and national significance. In fact, Obama hammered home this very point at the outset of his Arctic national strategy.

The *National Strategy for the Arctic Region* (NSAR) begins by recalling the U.S. is “an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region” (Obama NSAR 2013:2). While it is certainly laudable to make explicit the obvious fact that the U.S. is indeed an Arctic nation, George W. Bush first made this point in his 2009 Arctic directive. What is significant about Obama reiterating this fact is not that he stated it in the first-ever U.S. *Arctic* national strategy. However, it is significant that Obama articulated this in the more expansive 2010 United States *National Security Strategy* (NSS). This broader national strategy document stated

The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues (U.S. *National Security Strategy* 2010:50)

This marked the first time the U.S. Government explicitly discussed the Arctic region in its highest level public articulation of America's national security priorities. The NSS (2010)

identified U.S. Arctic interests as one of a handful of “key challenges requiring broad global cooperation” (47). In other words, the U.S. was acknowledging that it is fundamentally important for the U.S. to help preserve and strengthen international cooperation in the Arctic region in order to successfully advance its national interests there.

The 2013 Arctic national strategy further illustrates the link between America’s Arctic interests and its broader, global interests. As Obama explains, protecting the U.S.’s “central interests in the Arctic region” (Obama NSAR 2013:4) requires America to draw on, among other things, its long-standing global interest in maintaining all aspects of freedom of the seas. The “central interests” the strategy refers to are the existing U.S. Arctic national interests Obama’s predecessor Bush articulated just prior to leaving office in January 2009. This is notable in that it shows continuity and maturation in U.S. Arctic interests even during a change of political parties in the presidency.

The Arctic national strategy establishes the nation’s “strategic priorities for the Arctic region” (Obama NSAR 2013:2) under the Obama administration and develops an action plan to implement U.S. Arctic policy principles. It does so by outlining lines of effort that collectively identify and incorporate common issues together in order to meet established strategic priorities. Four guiding principles both inform the strategy’s lines of effort and “serve as the foundation for U.S. Arctic engagement and activities” (Obama NSAR 2013:10). These principles call for safeguarding Arctic region peace and stability, basing decisions on the best available information, pursuing innovative arrangements to address needs in the Arctic region, and consulting and coordinating with Alaskan Native peoples. The Arctic national strategy’s three major lines of effort focus on security, stewardship, and cooperation.

Advance U.S. Security Interests

Not surprisingly, the Arctic national strategy's first line of effort is to advance America's security interests. These wide-ranging interests include protecting the American people, U.S. sovereign territory and rights, access to natural resources, and other U.S. interests in the Arctic (Obama NSAR). Collectively, these security interests comprise the nation's "highest priority" (Obama NSAR 2013:6) throughout the region, and require fully developed capacities and capabilities to realize and sustain them. Importantly, the Arctic national strategy acknowledges the U.S. cannot achieve its security interests in the Arctic separate from—or to the exclusion of—explicitly non-security issues.

Protecting U.S. national security interests in the region "must be undertaken with attention to environmental, cultural, and international considerations" (Obama NSAR 2013:6). Security has always dominated U.S. considerations of the Arctic, even before the U.S. Government first formally articulated its Arctic interests in the early 1970s. The Arctic region's unique cultural, geopolitical, and environmental conditions have always required comprehensive thinking about security—something the U.S. has gradually developed in its official Arctic policy statements over time. Obama's Arctic national strategy reinforces the priority that security plays in U.S. thinking about the Arctic even as it recognizes that non-security issues in the region can affect hard security considerations.

The Arctic national strategy calls for the U.S. Government to pursue its security interests by developing the Arctic region's infrastructure as well as its strategic capabilities; improving the government's Arctic domain awareness; preserving freedom of the seas throughout the region; and providing for America's future energy security needs (Obama NSAR). Each of these

are important for advancing U.S. security interests, however, it is worth briefly illuminating the last two issues: preserving freedom of the seas and providing for future energy security.

Preserving freedom of the seas is, as has been pointed out several times, an essential goal of U.S. interests globally as well within the Arctic region. Obama's Arctic strategy explicitly states the U.S. "will enable prosperity and safe transit by developing and maintaining sea, under-sea, and air assets and necessary infrastructure" (Obama NSAR 2013:6) throughout the region. The strategy also implies that ensuring freedom of the seas is beneficial beyond traditional hard security concerns in the region. For example, the strategy shows how freedom of the seas is also essential to enhancing international cooperation on issues beyond the scope or capabilities of any one state. Such issues include ensuring navigation safety, responding to marine environmental issues, and enabling search-and-rescue capabilities throughout the region (Obama NSAR).

Obama's Arctic national strategy is not the first time the U.S. Government associated the Arctic region's hydrocarbon resources with America's energy needs. Nixon's 1971 Arctic policy, as well as subsequent U.S. Arctic policy directives, explicitly refer to the region's potential hydrocarbon abundance. However, Obama clearly identifies energy security as an essential element of broader U.S. national security. Informed by the U.S. Geological Survey's 2008 authoritative estimate that the Arctic region contains vast amounts of undiscovered hydrocarbon resources, the 2013 Arctic national strategy contends "[t]he Arctic region's energy resources factor into a core component of our national security strategy: energy security" (Obama NSAR 2013:7). The strategy commits the U.S. Government to pursue the region's energy sources responsibly and collaboratively in the context of the U.S.'s "economic, environmental, and climate policy objectives" (Obama NSAR 2013:7).

Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship

The 2013 Arctic national strategy's second line of effort calls for pursuing responsible stewardship in the Arctic region. This covers a broad and interrelated set of issues and recognizes that the region requires precautionary actions as environmentally-enabled human activity increases. Responsible stewardship in the Arctic "requires active conservation of resources, balanced management, and the application of scientific and traditional knowledge of physical and living environments" (Obama NSAR 2013:7).

This line of effort subsumes and develops implementation plans for two existing Arctic national interests first articulated in Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy and continued by Bush's 2009 Arctic policy: environmental protection and resource conservation, as well as environmentally sustainable natural resource management and economic development. Obama's (2013) Arctic national strategy calls Arctic environmental protection "a central goal of U.S. policy" (7). It commits the U.S. Government to assessing and monitoring "the status of ecosystems and the risks of climate change and other stressors to prepare for and respond effectively to environmental challenges" (Obama NSAR 2013:7). Furthermore, the strategy recognizes that balancing natural resource management with economic development requires an integrated management plan "based on a comprehensive understanding of environmental and cultural sensitivities in the region" (Obama NSAR 2013:8), all while addressing future needs and trends associated with infrastructure and other development.

Like the Clinton and Bush Arctic policies that preceded it, the 2013 U.S. Arctic national strategy acknowledges climate change is an emergent and prevailing driver of both U.S. and international increased interest in the Arctic region. This had an important effect on changing

perceptions of the U.S.’s approach to the region. Even skeptics acknowledge considerable movement in the American view of the Arctic from one of reluctance to acceptance.

Nilsson (2018), for example, observed that Obama’s Arctic national strategy not only “reaffirmed that the United States was an Arctic nation...[but] ...was explicitly aimed to ‘position the [U.S.] to respond effectively to challenges and emerging opportunities arising from significant increases in Arctic activity due to the diminishment of sea ice and the emergence of a new Arctic environment’” (8). Indeed, the strategy’s frequent references to climate change and the accompanying implications within and beyond this section on responsible Arctic stewardship exemplifies how much climate change has come to shape the U.S.’s view of the polar north. For example, in addition to protecting the environment and conserving natural resources, the 2013 Arctic strategy’s responsible stewardship objectives include things such as charting and mapping the Arctic region’s vast territory, a goal made feasible by the climate-induced rapid reduction in sea ice (Obama NSAR).

Strengthen International Cooperation

The Obama Arctic national strategy’s third line of effort prioritizes another long-time U.S. Arctic interest—strengthening circumpolar international cooperation. Similar to the strategy’s second line of effort, this effort consolidates and pursues several objectives into a unified whole. The strategy contends that “[t]he remote and complex operating conditions in the Arctic environment make the region well-suited for collaborative efforts” (Obama NSAR 2013:8). This is an important acknowledgment that collaboration in the Arctic is both desirable and a linchpin to maintaining and promoting more cooperation with the other Arctic states. It is instructive to briefly examine the Arctic strategy’s objectives for the Arctic Council and U.S.

accession to the LOSC as both are key to understanding how the U.S. approaches Arctic engagement and governance.

The Obama Arctic national strategy committed the U.S. to continue working through the Arctic Council to advance American interests in the region. For example, the Council's "advancement of public safety and environmental protection issues" (Obama NSAR 2013:9) were instrumental in bringing about two significant circumpolar agreements important to U.S. Arctic interests: the 2011 Arctic Search-and-Rescue Agreement along with the 2013 Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement (Obama NSAR). Likewise, the strategy reiterates the U.S.'s long-standing position that the Arctic Council is a useful forum for facilitating Arctic international cooperation on issues "within its current mandate" (Obama NSAR 2013:9). In other words, while the U.S. continues to consider the Arctic Council an important forum, it has no intentions of allowing the Council to broaden its authority over any substantive issue areas such as hard security matters. Dating back to its origins during the Clinton administration, the U.S. has been willing to accept the Arctic Council as long as it was limited to relatively benign issue areas that fostered circumpolar cooperation and engagement.

The 2013 U.S. Arctic national strategy reiterates a long-standing position, supported by Obama's two immediate predecessors—Clinton and George W. Bush—calling for the U.S. Senate to ratify the LOSC. As the Arctic strategy explained, "[o]nly by joining the Convention can we maximize legal certainty and best secure international recognition of our sovereign rights with respect to the U.S. extended continental shelf in the Arctic and elsewhere, which may hold vast oil, gas, and other resources" (2013:9). The 2013 U.S. Arctic national strategy further illustrates how the U.S. approaches Arctic engagement and governance. By amplifying Bush's 2009 Arctic policy, Obama clearly reinforces the U.S. view that the LOSC is the primary and

appropriate governing framework for the Arctic. Likewise, the Arctic Council is instrumental in facilitating circumpolar engagement and cooperation upon which such governance can exist.

The Obama administration formulated the first-ever U.S. national strategy for the Arctic region in order to establish, prioritize, and implement U.S. national objectives for the region. The rapidly changing conditions occurring in the Arctic region as a result of climate change was the driving factor behind producing this strategy. As Obama explains, the “dramatic, abrupt, and unrelenting” (2013:5) pace of Arctic sea ice melt is the most important development and potentially presents incredible opportunities as well as serious challenges in the region. Relatedly, uncoordinated or mismanaged development across a range of activities could negatively affect the Arctic region’s sensitive ecosystems as well as its inhabitants.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

U.S. Arctic national interests in the quarter-century that followed the end of the Cold War were characterized by noticeable *change* as well as remarkable *constancy*. The transformed geopolitical landscape that shaped the region during the 40-year East-West standoff, as well as the subsequent emergence of circumpolar engagement and cooperation among the eight Arctic states, framed the U.S.’s approach to the region. The U.S. revised its official Arctic policy twice since the end of the Cold War and, significantly, developed its first-ever national strategy toward the Arctic region. The removal of Cold War calculations from the polar north opened the door to long-aspired, but heretofore geopolitically infeasible, circumpolar cooperation on a number of issues of mutual interest to Arctic states. Despite this major shift that characterized the region,

security interests still predominated the U.S.'s Arctic national interests, including its view of Arctic cooperation and governance engagement well into the 21st century.

The 1990 U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement exemplified how U.S. interests in the Arctic region remained relatively stable, yet flexible, through the emerging post-Cold War environment. The agreement was an important development in superpower relations in the Arctic because it provided a template for subsequent circumpolar cooperation. However, the U.S.'s primary interest in formalizing the boundary was to protect its security interest in preserving the principle of freedom of the seas through the unimpeded freedom to navigate international waters. These seemingly contradictory goals—facilitating cooperation while preserving predominant security interests—became major characteristics of U.S. Arctic policy after the Cold War.

Free from the exigencies of the Cold War, Clinton's Arctic policy represented the U.S.'s *recognition* of its status as an Arctic nation, intent on helping shape the remote and largely heretofore ignored region. PDD/NSC-26 reflected the change and constancy at work in U.S. Arctic interests and sought to strike a balance between security and cooperation. Clinton's Arctic policy raised environmental protection to a higher, more practical concern. The Clinton administration's favorable disposition toward environmental protection, along with the successful implementation of the AEPS, helped make Arctic environmental protection feasible. In the area of Arctic international cooperation, Clinton's Arctic policy did not introduce the concept of circumpolar cooperation as a U.S. Arctic interest. Yet PDD/NSC-26 raised it to a to a practical reality when it deemed that it was in America's national interest to strengthen international institutions in the region.

While notable progress toward environmental protection and international cooperation in the Arctic constituted *change* in post-Cold War U.S. Arctic interests, traditional hard security

interests in and through the region constituted the enduring *constancy* in America's Arctic interests. The Clinton administration's general support for institutionalized circumpolar cooperation was conditional, as revealed by its response to the Canadian-led proposal to create the Arctic Council. The administration's reluctance and outright opposition to various aspects of the proposed Council's necessity, purpose, and authority ultimately came down to reservations about what institutionalized Arctic cooperation might mean for America's core security interests in the region. The U.S. was just as concerned about *institutional* threats to its security interests as it was about traditional, *state-based* hard security threats. In other words, the U.S. was concerned that a cooperative institutional arrangement proposed by close ally Canada posed a potentially bigger threat to U.S. security interests in the region than the persistent, albeit greatly reduced, threat Russia still presented in polar north. Despite the end of the Cold War, warming U.S.-Russian relations, the realization of Arctic international cooperation, and mutual concern about protecting the Arctic's fragile environment and vulnerable biological resources, none of these developments had the singular or collective significance to compete with, override, or otherwise hinder America's predominant security interests in the region.

The change and constancy that marked U.S. Arctic policy in the 1990s continued to characterize that policy when President George W. Bush's revised it well over a dozen years later. Beyond mere words, symbolism, and even geographic presence in the Arctic region, the U.S. finally *secured* its status as an Arctic nation with Bush's 2009 Arctic policy. While climate change's increasing effects on the Arctic region, as well as the growing maturation and acceptance of institutionalized Arctic cooperation, drove Bush to revisit U.S. Arctic policy, these two issues did not result in fundamental changes in America's Arctic policy. Instead, Bush

articulated a new U.S. Arctic policy to recognize how much more important climate change and Arctic cooperation became since the previous Arctic policy was issued.

Bush, unlike his predecessor Clinton, enjoyed the benefit of issuing a new U.S. Arctic policy informed by years of actual and sustained institutionalized Arctic engagement and cooperation through the Arctic Council. In issuing NSPD-66, however, Bush clearly emphasized the Law of the Sea Convention as the main quasi-legal governing framework for the region. Doing this while simultaneously endorsing the Arctic Council's limited mandate allowed the Bush administration to clearly differentiate the Arctic Council's role as a forum for circumpolar cooperation from that of a legally-empowered governing entity. Consistent with Clinton's Arctic policy, NSPD-66 ensured the U.S. remained free to pursue its Arctic national interests in a broader, more global context, uninhibited by a narrower, regional context.

If devoting the time and resources to develop a national strategy for achieving one's stated interests in a region of the world indicates that region's increased prominence, then the U.S. fully *embraced* its status as an Arctic nation when the Obama administration issued the National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013. Furthermore, the Arctic went from a purely regional policy concern with global implications, to a truly global interest of its own standing when Obama earlier explicitly identified the Arctic region as a broader U.S. national security concern where global cooperation was imperative.

The relative constancy in U.S. Arctic national interests since the 1990s provided stability in U.S. Arctic policy even as the region transformed geopolitically as well as physically during the same period. The U.S.'s expressed interests in the region, calibrated to address the nation's regional as well as global interests inherent in the Arctic no doubt greatly contributed to preserving the region as a so-called "zone of cooperation"—if not the "zone of peace" famously

envisioned by Gorbachev in 1987. During the roughly quarter-century that followed the end of the Cold War, the two official U.S. Arctic policy statements along with the first-ever U.S. Arctic national strategy collectively revealed the U.S. could not realistically pursue its Arctic security interests without also pursuing its other, non-security interests in the region.

The 15-year gap between Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy and George W. Bush's 2009 policy is instructive. Unlike previous U.S. Arctic policy directives which were issued within two years of an administration taking office, Bush felt no urgency to issue a new Arctic policy until the very end of his presidency. Furthermore, Obama's wholesale adoption of Bush's Arctic policy as the policy basis for developing the Arctic region national strategy in 2013 adds further credence to the judgment that the U.S. Government formulated a set of comprehensive and stable, yet flexible national interests in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War that placed the U.S. on firm footing to pursue its interests in the polar north for more than a quarter century. This, as Arnaudo (2013) reminds us, "reflects the constant nature of U.S. fundamental interests and objectives in the North, regardless of which political party is in power" (85). The articulation and pursuit of U.S. Arctic national interests through two updated official U.S. Arctic policy statements, followed closely by a first-ever U.S. Arctic national strategy—all within a geopolitically transformed post-Cold War Arctic environment—shows how the U.S. Government finally placed the United States in the camp of an "Arctic Nation."

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This study set out to investigate the emergence and evolution of U.S. national interests in the Arctic region, along with examining those factors that influence the extent to which the U.S. cooperatively engages with other Arctic states in the polar north. It was framed around the following primary research question: *How have U.S. national interests in the Arctic region evolved over time, and what factors help explain the evolution of U.S. engagement in the region?* The study also addressed a related, subsidiary research question that explored the extent to which U.S. perceptions of the Arctic region's geopolitical status affected America's cooperative engagement in the region: *To what degree has the U.S. viewed the Arctic region as a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation?*

Summarizing this study's substantive chapters reveals the extent to which the U.S. identified and developed a set of national interests toward the polar north and how those interests informed the nature and extent to which the U.S. engaged in international cooperative efforts in the region. This dissertation analyzed the emergence and evolution of U.S. Arctic national interests across four time periods, collectively spanning more than one hundred years. Chapter Three, the first of four chapters that examined U.S. involvement in the Arctic region, showed the emergence of U.S. national interests in the Arctic region from the decade leading up to the First World War through the end of World War II. During this period, the U.S. Government had to be implored on several occasions, first by private investors, then subsequently by well-respected voices outside of the U.S. Government, to recognize that it possessed important national interests in the Arctic region. This reality contrasted sharply with the U.S. Government's tendency

throughout the period in question to mostly ignore the polar north as a relatively insignificant space.

The U.S. Government's involvement in Arctic affairs from a national interest perspective effectively began when it was requested to articulate an official position regarding the Spitsbergen Archipelago's sovereignty designation as a *terra nullius*—or “no man's land” and encapsulated in the Spitsbergen Question. In relatively short order, the U.S. Government went from having virtually no knowledge of—let alone an expressed interest in—the remote and far-away European archipelago to being a driving force behind what became the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 and the unique sovereignty arrangement it applied to the archipelago. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Spitsbergen Treaty is important because it represented arguably the first instance of international cooperation and governance in the Arctic region. This treaty provided a template for order and governance in the region.

As Chapter Three went on to explain, U.S. interest in the Arctic began to decline dramatically even before the ink dried on the Spitsbergen Treaty. During the two-decade long interwar period, the U.S. Government resorted to a disinterest toward the Arctic region. This reality meant that the U.S. considered the polar north a relatively insignificant space during a critical period of technological and military airpower advances that would make the Arctic region an emerging area of vulnerability to America's continental security.

The U.S.'s view of the Arctic's strategic significance abruptly changed only when the exigencies of World War II caused the U.S. to start viewing the Arctic as a vital security interest. Chapter Three showed how the wartime imperatives associated with protecting the U.S. homeland, as well as the North Atlantic commercial and military shipping lanes critical to supplying the Allied European war effort, forced the U.S. Government to start recognizing the

Arctic region as an enduring national interest. Similar to the U.S. Government's entrée into Arctic affairs pre-World War I over the status of the Spitsbergen Archipelago, most of the emergent interest before and during World War II focused on the security status of important Arctic landmass—in this case, Greenland. Although national security considerations obviously drove U.S. interest in the Arctic during World War II, the need to consider the U.S.'s enduring security interests in the region required the U.S. Government to look beyond its security requirements to a more holistic consideration of national interests in the Arctic.

The Arctic region became a significant and enduring—if not always highly publicized—feature of U.S. geopolitical considerations from the mid-1940s transition marking the end of World War II and the near-simultaneous beginning of the Cold War, to the late 1960s. The U.S. emerged from a global hot war with a much greater appreciation of the Arctic's emergent national security significance, among other important considerations. As was covered in Chapter Four, national security considerations quickly came to dominate U.S. Arctic interests during this period. The existential military threat the Soviet Union posed to North America from across the polar north meant the Arctic played a geostrategically significant offensive and defensive military role in deterring potential Soviet aggression. The proximity of the Soviet threat to North America illuminated the importance of cooperation in the Arctic region, as exemplified by the U.S. Government's adoption of the concept of security governance within the region.

The U.S. Government began to identify, in very limited fashion, its key interests in the Arctic region. The State Department's 1947 and 1951 Polar Regions policy statements contained, in effect, the U.S. Government's initial policy *statements* on its Arctic interests. Chapter Four further articulated how these policy documents weaved together political, economic, territorial, and security issues, that collectively conveyed how important the Arctic region had become to

the U.S. These various threads constituted an emerging set of U.S. national interests toward the Arctic.

Although security considerations dominated U.S. Arctic interests during this early period of the Cold War, the U.S. was also able to pursue limited cooperation with other Arctic states—including the Soviet Union—on scientific research matters of mutual interest in the Arctic. Chapter Four explained how the Arctic’s harsh climate and austere operating environment, coupled with the international cooperation that led to the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty in the polar south, created the conditions that fostered a degree of circumpolar cooperation in the polar north in the broad area of international scientific research. This effort, though limited by the realities of Cold War security considerations, provided an early example of how more formalized circumpolar cooperation could materialize.

The evolution of U.S. Arctic interests reached its high point between 1968 and 1989, the period of this study comprising roughly the second half of the Cold War. As explored in Chapter Five, the U.S. Government finally developed and articulated its first-ever official set of national interests toward the Arctic region in the early 1970s. Though the U.S. was on a pathway to developing an overall set of national interests toward the polar north, the discovery of oil off the Arctic Ocean coastline of Alaska in 1968 catalyzed this effort.

A combination of the Alaskan Arctic oil discovery, ongoing efforts within the U.S. Government to develop a comprehensive set of Arctic policies and priorities, along with the region’s existing national security importance, provided the context for the newly inaugurated Nixon administration to conduct a full review of American interests and policies toward the Arctic region. The official U.S. Arctic policy that subsequently emerged organized U.S. national interests in the region around three objectives: developing the Arctic while minimizing adverse

environmental effects, promoting mutually beneficial Arctic international cooperation, and protecting essential U.S. security interests in the region, including preserving the principle of freedom of the seas and airspace. The U.S. Government's first formal Arctic policy reflected the reality that America's Arctic national interests comprised both regional and global characteristics.

As explained in Chapter Five, the U.S. Government pursued its Arctic national interests along two policy pathways that effectively globalized two of America's three stated Arctic national interests. In addition to the formal Arctic policy process, international negotiations that began in the early 1970s to update the law of the sea treaty and culminated the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the early 1980s, enabled the U.S. to pursue two of its Arctic national interests—Arctic international cooperation and ensuring freedom of the seas—beyond the confines of an Arctic-specific policy approach. This ensured that international cooperation and the principle of freedom of the seas, which are inherently linked, were explicitly tied to globally applicable law of the sea treaty. Furthermore, the law of the sea treaty is particularly relevant to the Arctic region since the region primarily consists of the Arctic Ocean area.

The initial set of U.S. Arctic national interests the Nixon administration articulated remained remarkably stable spanning several presidential administrations through the rest of the Cold War period. These well-developed set of Arctic national interests provided a foundation for the U.S. Government to navigate a deterioration in U.S.-Soviet Cold War relations in the early and mid-1980s. As discussed in Chapter Five, the full array of U.S. interests in the Arctic developed a stability and flexibility by the 1980s that enabled the U.S. Government to continue fostering circumpolar international cooperation on non-security issues, while simultaneously

protecting vital U.S. national security interests in the region, including increasing its military footprint in the polar north to mitigate a growing Soviet military threat in and near the Arctic region. The broad array of U.S. Arctic interests further equipped the U.S. Government to help facilitate the dramatic easing of East-West tensions that ultimately resulted in a peaceful conclusion to the more than 40-year-long Cold War. The U.S. Government's long-sought desire to foster limited Arctic international cooperation while protecting its security interests positioned the U.S. to pursue areas of mutual cooperation with the Soviet Union, while rejecting calls by Soviet leader Gorbachev to demilitarize the Arctic and transform it into a "zone of peace."

U.S. involvement in the Arctic entered its final stage of this study in 1990 between the aftermath of the Cold War period and the end of President Obama's presidency in 2017. Substantial *change* as well as enduring *constancy* characterized U.S. Arctic national interests during this roughly quarter-century-long period. As discussed in Chapter Six, these interests reflected the stark geopolitical transformation brought on by the end of the Cold War, as well as the slow, but undeniable geophysical changes taking place in the region due to climate change.

President Clinton's 1994 U.S. Arctic policy directive revised America's Arctic interests to reflect a balanced approach to the region that acknowledged the enduring predominance of U.S. security interests in the region while recognizing new opportunities in circumpolar cooperation necessary to effectively manage the region. The 1994 Arctic directive's expressed support for strengthening institutionalized circumpolar cooperation opened the door to realizing this concept in the form of the Arctic Council. As explained in Chapter Six, the U.S. Government conditionally accepted the Arctic Council to the extent that it did not intrude on America's primary security interests in the region, not otherwise impede U.S. autonomy in the region, nor threaten to undo the emergent post-Cold War regional stability in the polar north.

U.S. Arctic interests did not materially change between Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy and the revised policy President George W. Bush issued in early 2009. However, as Chapter Six went on to explain, Bush's Arctic policy did account for the two major factors that led to issuing a new policy. First, a greater awareness of climate change's effects on the Arctic's physical landscape and the resulting geopolitical implications. Second, the 2009 Arctic policy directive accounted for the significant progress in Arctic international cooperation that followed the Arctic Council's establishment in 1996—two years after Clinton articulated the previous set of U.S. Arctic national interests.

This study wrapped up its examination the evolution of U.S. Arctic national interests by explaining how President Obama adopted Bush's Arctic policy directive as the basis for issuing the U.S.'s first-ever national strategy devoted exclusively to the polar north. As illustrated in Chapter Six, this marked the maturation of U.S. Arctic interests to a new level. The Obama administration, beyond simply identifying its Arctic national interests, elevated the region's strategic relevance by developing a strategy to enable the U.S. Government to think, prioritize, and act comprehensively to achieve its interests in the polar north. The Arctic national strategy Obama put forward consolidated the various strands that comprised America's Arctic interests into three lines of effort focused on advancing U.S. security interests in the region, pursuing responsible stewardship in the region, and strengthening Arctic international cooperation.

KEY FINDINGS

This dissertation revealed three key findings. First, the evolution of U.S. interests in the Arctic region have waxed and waned over time during the period under study. Second,

America's single most important national interest in the Arctic region has been its security interests that exist within and through the region. Finally, U.S. Arctic international cooperation and engagement is conditional.

The Waxing and Waning of U.S. Interest in the Arctic Region

This study's first key finding is that the U.S. Government's level of interest in the Arctic region has increased and decreased over time in concert with how the U.S. perceives the region's overall geopolitical importance. This interest level generally aligns with whether the U.S. views the region as either a "zone of insignificance," a zone of competition, or a zone of cooperation. These three ways of characterizing of the Arctic from the U.S.'s perspective broadly divides the region into the following phases: Pre-World War I to pre-World War II (the Arctic as a zone of insignificance); World War II to the end of the Cold War (the Arctic as a zone of competition); and post-Cold War to 2017 (the Arctic as a zone of cooperation).

As was shown in Chapter Three, the U.S. Government initially not only lacked an explicit national interest in the Arctic in the roughly 10-year period before the U.S. entered the First World War, it also knew very little about the region in general, outside the fact that it owned a large, remote, and largely uninhabited (Alaskan) territory within it. Except for the enterprising lobbying efforts of American private investors Frederick Ayer and John Longyear who, in essence, forced the U.S. Government to realize the Arctic region's—specifically the Spitsbergen Archipelago's—economic and legal importance, the U.S. Government almost certainly would have continued to treat the Arctic region even more as a "zone of insignificance" than it already did. The fact that Ayer and Longyear, along with the Arctic Coal Company they established, effectively served as the U.S. Government's sole source of insight into the

archipelago's economic potential and unique sovereignty status exemplifies how the U.S. believed it had no national interests at stake in the region. Guided in large measure by the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. Government made it its business not to formally have any national interests outside the Western Hemisphere. Despite Ayer and Longyear's efforts to raise Spitsbergen's profile, the U.S. Government's initial non-receptivity to such efforts reflected the inherent tension between private interests' desire to engage in foreign enterprises and the Monroe Doctrine-informed American foreign policy tradition of avoiding such engagements.

Like Ayer and Longyear, it was State Department counselor and Secretary of State Robert Lansing's *personal* interest in the resolving the Spitsbergen Question that had to contend with a U.S. Government bureaucracy and foreign policy tradition that resisted conceptualizing that the U.S. might have a vested national interest outside of the Western Hemisphere and in a far-away and remote area like Spitsbergen. Despite Lansing's ultimate success in resolving Spitsbergen's unique sovereignty status, and establishing a U.S. national interest in the European Arctic as exemplified by the U.S. subsequently ratifying the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty, the U.S. Government still effectively considered the broader Arctic region a zone of insignificance.

Despite the narrow set of Arctic interests that were associated with America's ratification of the Spitsbergen Treaty, as well as the U.S.'s increased standing in the post-World War I global order, the U.S. Government's interest in the broader Arctic region waned during the subsequent interwar period. This was due in large part to the absence of an organizing or motivating driver to sustain or increase the U.S. Government's interest in the region.

The U.S. Government fully came to understand how oil had replaced coal as the essential natural resource required to power militaries (including the U.S. military) after World War I. As a result, the Alaskan territory's vast oil deposits became increasingly important to U.S. national

security. Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to revert to its pre-World War general disinterest toward the entire Arctic region.

As demonstrated earlier in this dissertation, the State Department undertook an extensive study (the Boggs study) to identify what various national interests the U.S. Government may have in the Arctic region that could serve as the basis for developing a comprehensive U.S. Arctic policy. However, the State Department's decision to reject the proposed study in 1930 because it—the State Department—did not believe the U.S. Government had any vested national interests worth exploring in the polar north was consistent with a *strategic disinterest* in the Arctic. When Boggs, at the request of the department, broadened his proposed study to include the other polar region—Antarctica, the State Department subsequently expressed more interest in the Antarctic than it did in the Arctic. This strategic disinterest was all the more puzzling because prominent American voices such as Arctic pioneers Robert Peary and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, along with Billy Mitchell, all urged the U.S. Government to pay more attention to the Arctic. The general insignificance the U.S. Government applied toward the Arctic region was, in some ways, a reflection of the U.S.'s reluctance to engage in international affairs even as it clearly emerged from World War I as a great power.

Although the State Department was the lead U.S. Government entity for assessing America's national interests in the Arctic region, it was not alone in dismissing the region's growing significance during the interwar period. The U.S. military also failed to appreciate the security implications of developments relevant to the region—such as commercial and military aviation advancements. For example, it is worth recalling that the American army and navy reached contradictory conclusions on the strategic importance of keeping Greenland out of Nazi Germany's possession on the eve of World War II. That the U.S. Navy considered Greenland's

status a serious national security concern while the U.S. Army did not, reflected once again the U.S. Government's ambiguous and contradictory view of the Arctic even as war loomed in Europe.

The sudden and remarkable change in the U.S. Government's perception of the Arctic region's importance as World War II began in Europe constituted the region's shift from a zone of insignificance to a zone of competition. Unsurprisingly, this shift reflected the Arctic's significance almost entirely as a national security matter. Not only was the European Arctic's territorial status essential to protecting North Atlantic Ocean sea lanes linking North America to Europe, it was also absolutely essential to protecting the North American continent from potential enemy aggression originating from across the Arctic.

Greenland's governance status and security throughout much of this study's zone of competition period is significant when considering U.S. national interests in the Arctic region over time. The security governance concept the U.S. adopted in Greenland on two separate occasions to protect the North American continent illustrates a unique situation in which the U.S. fused together two seemingly contradictory concepts—security and governance—to form an essential part of its overall Arctic national interests.

Factors and events external to the Arctic region often played an outsized role in determining U.S. priorities toward the region. The onset of East-West tensions immediately after the end of World War II marked a continuous, albeit less intense, phase of geopolitical competition in the Arctic. Despite the dissipation of a hot war in and near polar north, America's Arctic interests, although still formally undefined, retained a security-driven focus that continued to undergird its interests in the Arctic well into the 21st century. The postwar rise of global

maritime sovereignty as a significant issue, in conjunction with emerging Cold War geopolitical dynamics, ensured the Arctic region's long-term prominence as a vital U.S. interest.

The Arctic region itself arguably contained very few assets over much of this study's time period that made it an important security space. However, its composition as primarily a maritime domain both enhanced and ensured its relevance. For example, the Truman Proclamation's assertion of U.S. sovereignty over the country's extensive continental shelf raised the Arctic region's importance to America's broader global standing without explicitly mentioning the region. More important and applicable to the Arctic, the proclamation set in motion a series of actions that led the international community to lay the foundation for a new law of the sea framework that, over time, the U.S. and the rest of the international community eventually came to accept as the appropriate legal regime for governing the Arctic region.

It seems ironic that during approximately half of the period that marked the Arctic region's apex as a U.S. vital interest, the U.S. Government lacked a formally identified and articulated set of national interests in the Arctic region. However, as this study explained in Chapter Four, this did not mean the U.S. Government totally ignored the region from a national interest perspective. The 1947 and 1951 State Department Polar Regions policy statements individually and collectively served as substitutes for a broader and official expression of U.S. Arctic national interests. These two policy statements unambiguously depicted the Arctic region first and foremost as a security-focused interest for the U.S. Government—a view that persisted throughout the duration of the Cold War and the Arctic's characterization as a zone of competition.

The policy objectives that comprised the U.S. Government's first formal articulation of its Arctic national interests—Nixon's 1971 Arctic policy directive—consolidated various issue

areas that existed in America's interests toward the polar north since the end of World War II and further exemplified the security-first view of the Arctic as a zone of competition. Nixon's 1971 Arctic policy directive represented the zenith in the evolution of America's Arctic national interests. Equally important, this occurred during the Cold War—the most significant period for the Arctic region from a U.S. national interest perspective. Nixon's U.S. Arctic policy is significant not only because it was the first-ever official U.S. Arctic policy, but also because it established a fundamental set of national interests that successfully identified and balanced U.S. national interests existing both within and through the polar north. The fact that subsequent revisions to U.S. Arctic policy since Nixon's half a century ago have built on—but not fundamentally changed—the three objectives (development, international cooperation, and national security) that underlie the 1971 Arctic policy directive.

Security Interests Shaped U.S. National Interests in the Arctic

This dissertation's second key finding is that America's vast array of national security interests within and through the Arctic region have driven America's overall approach to the region since long before the U.S. formally articulated its Arctic national interests in the early 1970s. While many aspects of the U.S.'s vital security interests in the polar north likely remain classified and out of the public domain, the combination of scholarly literature and declassified U.S. Government documents clearly demonstrates that security considerations have dominated America's Arctic interests from World War II through the end of the Obama presidency.

The centerpiece of the U.S.'s Arctic national security interests has been ensuring freedom of navigation rights and access in and through Arctic waters. Freedom of navigation, undergirded by the principle of freedom of the seas, is an essential element of America's global power.

Ensuring freedom of navigation through the overwhelmingly maritime Arctic region not only protects the U.S.'s security interests in the region, it is what enables the U.S. to pursue its other Arctic national interests.

The enduring predominance of *security* interests may at first seem strange, given the general insignificance and inattention the U.S. Government exhibited toward the Arctic region in the more than 30-year period that comprised the first phase of this study. However, the U.S. subsequently assigned greater importance to the region in conjunction with the onset of geopolitical conflict and increased competition—World War II and the Cold War. Relatedly, America's rapid rise to become the world preeminent military and economic power required it to pay more attention to the polar north. The U.S.'s global standing rested, more than anything else, on the country's military and economic power. These elements of national power, in turn, depended in large measure, on ensuring freedom of navigation to enable the movement of global commerce as well as U.S. military power projection around the world.

The ascendance of America's security interests in the Arctic also played out along several different strands within the region itself. As this study explained, the reality of having to defend the North American continent during both World War II and the Cold War guaranteed the prioritization of security over other U.S. Arctic national interests early on. The U.S. Government's decisions to extend and formalize the respective World War II-era joint defense agreements with Canada and Greenland into the Cold War period illustrates how continental defense requirements drove broader security considerations in the Arctic region. Collectively, these joint defense agreements provided an important strand in America's broader Arctic security interests. A robust continental defense apparatus not only helped protect the North American continent from transpolar aggression, it also directly linked America's Arctic security interests to

the newly formed NATO defense alliance. Through respective joint defense agreements that predated NATO's creation, Canada and Denmark (Greenland), both NATO charter members themselves, buttressed U.S. security interests in the Arctic region, and effectively also served as the northern flank of the transatlantic defense alliance.

The other important strand in which the U.S. elevated its security interests above its other Arctic interests was evident when the U.S. challenged its vast northern neighbor and closest ally Canada over the legal status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) beginning in the late 1960s. This was part of one of the most revealing insights of this entire study because it illustrated one of three instances in the evolution of U.S. Arctic interests when Canada—the closest of America's allies—took a position on a matter the U.S. perceived as problematic to its security interests in the Arctic. Canada's earlier, initial reluctance in the late 1940s to formalize a continental defense arrangement with the U.S. over legitimate concerns that its much more powerful southern ally would dominate the arrangement and potentially undermine Canadian sovereignty, exemplified one such instance. Another instance, addressed later in this chapter was the U.S.'s concerns over Canada's proposed Arctic Council and how it might impede U.S. security considerations in the Arctic. In the case of the NWP, the U.S. Government was determined to preserve freedom of navigation rights and uphold the principle of freedom of the seas, even though this determination put the U.S. directly at odds with Canada's position toward the NWP.

The U.S. Government, though sensitive to Canadian concerns about sovereign rights over Arctic waters, clearly subordinated such concerns to America's own security interests inherent in freedom of navigation, not only specifically in the NWP, but more generally around the world. The controversial sailing of the oil tanker Manhattan through the NWP in 1969 and the Canadian government's legislative response trying to curtail future unannounced and uncoordinated U.S.

transits in Canada's Arctic archipelago made the U.S. more determined not to allow regional and/or allied considerations to infringe on the more global nature of its Arctic security interests. The U.S. Government's experience over the NWP further cemented its view that it could best protect its Arctic security interests—particularly preserving freedom of the seas—by tying them to the subsequent international negotiations to update the law of the sea treaty.

The Conditional Nature of U.S. Arctic International Engagement

The final key finding that emerged from this study is that U.S. international cooperation and engagement in the Arctic region has been conditioned on the extent to which the U.S. perceives the region as either a zone of competition or cooperation, the relative strength and authority of circumpolar cooperative entities, as well as the extent to which the U.S. perceived such arrangements affected U.S. autonomy both within and external to the Arctic region. Since the outbreak of World War II, the U.S. Government has viewed the Arctic region primarily through a security lens—certainly when perceiving the region as a zone of competition—and even when perceiving it as a zone of cooperation. This conclusion did not apply to the roughly three-decade period before the Second World War because the U.S. treated the Arctic as a zone of relative insignificance and largely ignored it from an overall national interest perspective.

The U.S. generally has been less inclined to support formal international cooperation and engagement efforts in the Arctic when it both views the region as a zone of competition and if it perceives such arrangements might negatively affect its vital security interests in and beyond the region. However, this has not always been a zero-sum proposition in which formal cooperation and engagement inherently acts against America's security interests in the Arctic. The fact that the U.S. applied the concept of security governance in Greenland throughout World War II and

the Cold War exemplifies where formal cooperation with another state greatly enhanced U.S. national security in the Arctic region.

That the U.S. Government (primarily, the State Department) led efforts to build greater circumpolar cooperation on international scientific research matters in the midst of the Cold War in the 1960s further shows how the U.S. occasionally viewed narrowly scoped cooperative efforts favorably. However, it is worth recalling that other elements within the U.S. Government—primarily, the Defense Department—viewed such efforts skeptically because of potential risks to America’s vast security interests throughout the Arctic. The U.S. Government sought to strike a proper balance in which international cooperation on issues of mutual interest between, for example, the U.S. and former Soviet Union, was limited.

For all the limited and narrowly scoped cooperative efforts the U.S. Government participated in during the Arctic region’s half century as a zone of competition, one cannot truly appreciate the conditional nature of U.S. Arctic international cooperation and engagement during this period. After all, the U.S. fully recognized the region as an active zone of competition and potential conflict during most of the period in which the U.S. identified, articulated, and pursued its national interests in the Arctic.

The period that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s following the end of the Cold War more explicitly and accurately conveys the conditional nature of U.S. Arctic international cooperation and engagement. The dissipation of Cold War geopolitical dynamics that characterized, framed, and scoped circumpolar cooperation for more over 40 years—while significant in and of itself—did not fundamentally alter the predominant role that security considerations played in America’s overall Arctic national interests. The region’s dramatic geopolitical transformation from a zone of competition to one of cooperation in a relatively short

time allowed Arctic states to pursue cooperation on several issues of mutual interest. However, the pursuit of institutionalized Arctic cooperation, of which the Arctic Council became the centerpiece, illustrated both the promise and limitations of how far the U.S. Government was willing to go.

U.S. support for Arctic cooperation and engagement since the end of the Cold War has also been conditioned on the extent to which institutionalized cooperation manifested itself in weak institutionalized arrangements. This study pointed out how the U.S. was concerned not only over the need for a proposed Arctic Council, but more importantly, how such an entity might affect America's enduring security interests in the region, specifically, as well as U.S. autonomy and freedom of action, more generally. The U.S. Government was particularly sensitive to how some Arctic state and non-state actors sought to both adopt a broader conception of security beyond more narrowly defined traditional military security issues, and to subject such a broadened concept to the Arctic Council's authorities. As stated in Chapter Five, the U.S. Government's explicit reservations over how its close ally Canada—which led the effort to create what became the Arctic Council as well as subsume a broadly-defined conception of security under the Arctic Council's mandate—was particularly revealing. The fact that it took President Bill Clinton to explicitly tie U.S. acceptance of, and participation in, the proposed Arctic Council to Canada dropping all attempts to empower the Council to have a say in a country's traditional hard security matters in the Arctic exemplified how serious the U.S. Government was to not subject its security interests to a regionally-focused international fora.

The U.S. correctly and cautiously viewed the post-Cold War Arctic as an emergent zone of cooperation. This, however, did not fundamentally alter America's security interests in the region, which, in turn, informed the U.S.'s view on circumpolar cooperation and engagement.

The post-Cold War period represented both change and continuity in U.S. Arctic interests. While the prospects for greater cooperation certainly constituted change, U.S. security interests still remained the *essential* U.S. interest in the region—and therefore, the enduring constancy in America’s approach toward the polar north. This reality illustrated why the U.S. leveraged its considerable power and influence to ensure that whatever institutionalized circumpolar cooperative entity arose did not infringe—or be perceived as infringing—on America’s security interests in the Arctic region.

U.S. thinking about the Arctic Council evolved toward a more favorable view of the Council since its inception in the mid-1990s. After initial skepticism, U.S. officials came to understand that the Arctic Council makes an important contribution to U.S. interests. This study contends, in agreement with Bloom (2021), that the Council’s ban on addressing military security issues—the essential issue the U.S. demanded as the price for its endorsement of the intergovernmental forum—has spared the Council from getting involved in such potentially contentious matters that would almost certainly have hindered overall cooperation. This has enabled the U.S. to achieve many of its Arctic interests on the environment and sustainable development, vis-à-vis Russia for example, in a cooperative, multilateral forum.

Closing Observations

For all its relevance and significance over the past century, it is important to place the Arctic region in its proper context. It is but one of many regions where the U.S. has vested national interests at stake. The U.S., as a global power with global interests, has conditioned its support for Arctic international cooperation and engagement efforts on the insistence that Arctic affairs cannot interfere with America’s broader global interests and standing.

The U.S. views the Arctic primarily in a global context instead of merely in a regional one. In agreement with Steinberg, this study contends the U.S. is most interested in maintaining *regional stability in the Arctic and global access through it*. Therefore, any regionally-focused cooperation and engagement efforts must align with those two considerations. This explains why, for example, three successive U.S. presidential administrations—Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama—each emphasized that the U.S. considered the globally applicable Law of the Sea Convention the appropriate governing regime for the Arctic instead of the regionally-focused Arctic Council.

This dissertation wraps up by illuminating its overall significance, its contribution to the body of knowledge on U.S. national interests in the Arctic region, and recommending areas for future research. This study extensively explained how U.S. interest in the Arctic over the course of more than a century steadily increased—if not always in a linear fashion. It showed how the region’s true significance to the U.S. lies far beyond the geographic boundaries of the Arctic region and is inextricably linked to America’s broader, global considerations. The predominant position that America’s *security* interests—particularly relating to preserving the principle of freedom of the seas by ensuring unimpeded freedom of navigation in and through Arctic waters—have held in the constellation of U.S. national objectives in the region since World War II, exemplify this linkage.

This study also showed that far from the conventional wisdom that often portrays the U.S. as traditionally ignoring or downplaying the Arctic region’s importance, the U.S. Government has been actively—if not always consistently—engaged in the polar north once it began to appreciate that it had important national interests in the region beyond the mere presence of Alaska in the region. While the U.S. may not be as engaged in the Arctic as many

observers would like, it is important to recall that the U.S. is a global power with interests in many regions around the world. The Arctic, for all of its significance, is only one of many regions where the U.S. has expressly identified national interests.

This dissertation's true value lies in the background and context it provides in understanding the Arctic region's even greater potential significance to U.S. interests going forward. It is a roadmap for the policy community to follow as it grapples with how to navigate the geopolitical challenges and opportunities that climate change is unleashing in the Arctic region. The Arctic as a zone of cooperation that characterized the last phase of this study is potentially giving way to a return to the region as a zone of competition. Therefore, this study closes by recommending relevant areas that warrant further research.

Areas for Future Work

First, the potential return of strategic competition/Great Power Competition in the Arctic region will undoubtedly affect existing U.S. Arctic national interests. These interests are based in large measure on the international cooperation that has largely characterized the region since the end of the Cold War. It is worth exploring how U.S. Arctic interests might be affected by such a geopolitical recharacterization of the region. Second, the U.S. still has not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, even though the U.S. promotes and accepts it is recognized as the quasi-legal regime for the Arctic region. This issue would greatly benefit by examining the extent to which continued U.S. non-ratification of the Convention could affect U.S. national interests in the Arctic. Finally, Greenland's governance status has been important to U.S. security interests in the Arctic region over time, especially when the Arctic has been characterized as a zone of competition. This issue, which occasionally raises the question of whether the U.S. should

purchase Greenland from Denmark, would greatly benefit by a detailed exploration of the factors that might lead to complete Greenlandic independence from Denmark and how such a move could affect U.S. Arctic national interests.

REFERENCES

THEORY

- Acheson, Dean. 1969. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* [1st ed.] ed. New York: American library signet Books.
- Adler, Emanuel and Michael N. Barnett. 1998. Editors. *Security Communities*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 62. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Adler, Emanuel and Patricia Greve. 2009. "When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Mechanisms of Security Governance." *Review of International Studies* 35: 59-84. doi:10.1017/S0260210509008432.
- Annals of Congress, 18th Congress. 1st session.* 1823. President James Monroe. Seventh Annual Message to Congress. December 2, 1823. Pages 14, 22-23 (hereafter the Monroe Doctrine). <https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=041/llac041.db&recNum=4>.
- Barnett, Michael and Kathryn Sikkink. 2008. "From International Relations to Global Society." In *The Oxford handbook of international relations*, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 62-81. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Black, Hugo Lafayette, and Supreme Court Of The United States. 1946. *U.S. Reports: United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19*. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. <https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep332019/>.
- Byrd, Peter. 2018. "National interest." In *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International relations*. Edited by Garrett Wallace Brown, Iain McLean, and Alistair McMillan Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199670840.001.0001/acref-9780199670840>. Accessed May 27, 2020.
- Bruun, Johanne M., and Ingrid A. Medby. 2014. "Theorising the thaw: Geopolitics in a changing arctic." *Geography Compass* 8 (12): 915-29.
- Carr, Edward Hallett, and Michael Cox. 2016. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44 (4). Cambridge University Press: 823-30.
- Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, Hendrik Hegemann, and Martin Kahl. 2014. "Putting security governance to the test: conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges." *European Security* 23 (2):119-125. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2013.851676.

- Goertz, Gary. 2006. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan and Beth A. Simmons. 1987. "Theories of International Regimes." *International Organization* 41(3): 491-517.
- Hopkins, Raymond and Benjamin Meiches. 2012. "Regime Theory." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. Oxford: 1-23.
- Hufty, Marc. 2011. "Investigating Policy Processes: The Governance Analytical Framework (GAF)." In U. Wiesmann, H. Hurni, et al. Editors. *Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives*, 403–424. Bern: Geographica Bernensia.
- Hynek, Nik. 2018. "Theorizing international security regimes: a power-analytical approach." *International Politics* 55 (3/4):352.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. "IPCC fourth assessment report: climate change 2007". <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar4/syr/>.
- Jervis, Robert. 1982. "Security Regimes." In *International Regimes*, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 173-194. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kacowicz, Arie Marcelo. 1995. "Explaining Zones of Peace Democracies As Satisfied Powers?" *Journal of Peace Research*. 32(3) August 1995: 265-276.
- Krahmann, Elke. 2003. "Conceptualizing Security Governance." *Cooperation and Conflict* 38 (1):5-26. doi: 10.1177/0010836703038001001.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. Editor. *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables." *International Organization* 36(2): 185-205.
- Mazarr, M. J., J. S. Blake, A. Casey, T. McDonald, S. Pezard and M. Spirtas. 2018. *Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation.
- McInnis, Kathleen J. and Martin A. Weiss. 2019. "Strategic Competition and Foreign Policy: What is 'Political Warfare?'" IN FOCUS. *Congressional Research Service*. March 8, 2019. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11127>.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. *The tragedy of great power politics*. Updated Edition ed. New York: Norton.

- Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49.
- Milner, Helen. 1992. "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses." *World Politics* 44(3): 466-496.
- Milner, Helen and Dustin Tingley. 2015. *Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ebook.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vt/detail.action?docID=2028329>
- Pawluszko, Tomasz. 2012. "Theory of International Relations in Search of the Arctic Situation's Definition. Towards the Perspective of International Regimes." *The Northern Spaces – Contemporary Issues*. Ryszard M. Czarny, Radosław Kubicki, Agnieszka Janowska and Roman S. Czarny. Editors. Warszawa - Kielce. Scandinavium: 117-128.
- Pham, J. Peter. 2015. "What Is in the National Interest? Hans Morgenthau's Realist Vision and American Foreign Policy." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 37 (4):187-193. doi: 10.1080/10803920.2015.1080073.
- Rittberger, Volker, and Peter Mayer. 1993. *Regime theory and international relations*. Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.
- Reus-Smit, Christian, and Duncan Snidal. 2008. Editors. *The Oxford handbook of international relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rueschemeyer, D. 2003. "Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains? *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. D. Rueschemeyer and J. Mahoney. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 305-336.
- Stein, Arthur. 2008. "Neoliberal Institutionalism." In *The Oxford handbook of international relations*, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 201-221. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- U.S. Department of State. 1823. Office of the Historian. Milestones 1801-1829. "Monroe Doctrine." <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe>.
- "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—United States: Joint Statement with Attached Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage." 1989. *International Legal Materials* 28(6): 1444-1447.
- Verbeek, Bertjan. 2011. "Regime Theory in International Relations." In *Encyclopedia of Power*, 559-562. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed. Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill.

Watkins, James D. 1986. "The Maritime Strategy." *Proceedings* 112(995): 2-17.

Wohlforth, William C. 2008. "Realism." In *The Oxford handbook of international relations*, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 131-149. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

SUBSTANCE

15 U.S.C. 4111 [Public Law 98-373] 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act].
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2018-title15/pdf/USCODE-2018-title15-chap67-sec4111.pdf>

Arctic Council. "About the Arctic Council." <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/>. Accessed May 16, 2020.

Arctic Council. 1996. "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council. Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council." Ottawa, Canada. September 19, 1996. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

Arctic Council. 1998. "Memo on U.S. Chairmanship Priorities, 1998-2000." *Arctic Council Secretariat*. November 30, 1998. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1890>.

Arctic Council. 2000. "Barrow Declaration. The Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council." Barrow, Alaska, United States. October 13, 2000. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/87>.

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. 1991. *Arctic Portal Library*. Rovaniemi, Finland. http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf.

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. 1998. *AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues*. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway. xii+859 pp.

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. 2005. *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*. <https://acia.amap.no/>.

Arnaudo, Raymond V. 2013. "United States Policy in the Arctic." In *Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean*. Edited by Paul Arthur and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Berkman. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.

Bellinger, John B. 2008. "Treaty on Ice." Opinion. *New York Times*. June 23, 2008. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/opinion/23bellinger.html?searchResultPosition=1>.

- Berry, Dawn Alexandra. 2016. "The Monroe Doctrine and the Governance of Greenland's Security." In *Governing the North American Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Institutions*, edited by Dawn Alexandra Berry, Nigel Bowles and Halbert Jones, 103-121. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Berry, Mary Clay. 1975. "The Alaska pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims." Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Internet Archive. <https://archive.org/details/alaskapipelinepo00berr>.
- Bird, Kenneth J., Ronald R. Charpentier, Donald L. Gautier, David W. Houseknecht, Timothy R. Klett, Janet K. Pitman, Thomas E. Moore, Christopher J. Schenk, Marilyn E. Tennyson, and Craig J. Wandrey. 2008. *Circum-arctic resource appraisal; estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the arctic circle: 2008-3049*, 4 p. [<http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/>]. U.S. geological survey fact sheet.
- Bloom, Evan T. 1999. "Establishment of the Arctic Council." *American Journal of International Law* 93(3): 712-722.
- Bloom, Evan T. 2009. "Introductory Note to United States Directive on Arctic Policy and the Ilulissat Declaration." *International Legal Materials* 48 (2):370-373.
- Bloom, E. T. 2016. "United States Perspectives on the Arctic." In *Governing the North American Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Institutions*. D. A. Berry, Nigel Bowles, and Halbert Jones. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 233-241.
- Bloom, Evan T. 2021. Personal Zoom interview. May 1, 2021.
- Boggs, Samuel Whittemore. 1933. *The Polar Regions: Geographical and Historical Data for Consideration in a Study of Claims to Sovereignty in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions*. Edited by Department of State. Buffalo, NY: W.S. Hein.
- Borgerson, Scott G. 2008. "Arctic meltdown: The economic and security implications of global warming." *Current*(502): 15.
- Brubaker, R. Douglas and Willy Ostreng. 1999. "The Northern Sea Route Regime: Exquisite Superpower Subterfuge?" *Ocean Development & International Law* 30 (4): 299–331. <https://doi.org/10.1080/009083299276131>.
- Bush, George W. 2009. *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-25: Arctic Region Policy (NSPD-66/HSPD-25)*. Washington, DC: The White House, 2009). <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26082871>.
- Campopiano, Luke. 2019. "Non-State Actors in the Arctic: Lessons from the 1920 Svalbard Treaty Negotiations." *St Andrews Historical Journal* 3(1). Summer 2019: 41-50.

- Carlson, Jon D., Christopher Hubach, Joseph Long, Kellen Minter, and Shane Young. 2013. "Scramble for the Arctic: Layered Sovereignty, UNCLOS, and Competing Maritime Territorial Claims." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33(2): 21-43. <https://muse.jhu.edu/>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2022. "Svalbard Country Map." *The World Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/svalbard/map>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2022. "Svalbard Locator Map." *The World Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/svalbard/locator-map>.
- Churchill, Robin. 2015. "The exploitation and management of marine resources in the Arctic: law, politics and the environmental challenge." In *Handbook on the politics of the Arctic*. Leif Christian Jensen and Geir Hönneland. Editors. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015: 147-184.
- Clinton, William J. 1994. *Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26: United States Policy on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions*. Washington, DC: The White House. June 9, 1994. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12750>.
- Closson, Stacy R. 2017. *Russian foreign policy in the arctic: Balancing cooperation and competition*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no24-russian-foreign-policy-the-arctic-balancing-cooperation-and>.
- Congress.gov. 1984. "Actions - S.373 - 98th Congress (1983-1984): Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984." July 31, 1984. <http://www.congress.gov/>.
- Congress, U.S. 1984. *Arctic Research and Policy Act*. Washington, DC.
- Conley, Heather A. Editor. 2016. *History Lessons for the Arctic: What International Maritime Disputes Tell Us About a New Ocean*. CSIS Reports. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- Conley, Heather A. and Jamie Kraut. 2010. *U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic: An Assessment of Current Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation*. CSIS Reports. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- "Denmark-United States: Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland." 1941. *The American Journal of International Law* 35 (3). Supplement: Official Documents (July 1941):129-134. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2213493>.
- Dittmer, Jason, Sami Moisiö, Alan Ingram, and Klaus Dodds. 2011. "Have You Heard the One about the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics." *Political Geography* 30 (4) (5): 202-14.

- Dodds, Klaus. 2010. "Flag planting and finger pointing: The law of the sea, the arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf." *Political Geography* 29(2): 63-73.
- Dodds, Klaus. 2013. "The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, 'Law of the Sea,' and Arctic Ocean." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33(2): 45-55. <https://muse.jhu.edu/>
- Dodds, Klaus, and Mark Nuttall. 2015. *The Scramble for the Poles: The Geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic*. 1st ed. Chichester: Polity Press. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vand/detail.action?docID=4187202>. Accessed March 28, 2020.
- Dodds, Klaus. 2020. "Geopolitics, Security, and Governance." In *Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security*. Gjørsv, Gunhild Hoogensen, Marc Lanteigne, and Horatio Sam-Aggrey. Editors. Routledge Handbooks. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 258-269. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315265797>.
- Doumani, George A. 1967. "Federal Arctic Research: A Report Prepared Pursuant to the Request of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate." 90th Congress, 2nd Session. Senate Document No. 71, December 1, 1967, 313 pages. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).
- Dugger, John A. 1984. "Arctic Oil and Gas: Policy Perspectives." In Westermeyer, William E. and Kurt M. Shusterich, K.M. Editors. *United States Arctic Interests: The 1980s and 1990s*. Springer: New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5262-7_2
- Durfee, Mary, and Rachael Lorna Johnstone. 2019. *Arctic Governance in a Changing World*. New Millennium Books in International Studies. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Dziuban, Stanley W. 1959. *Military relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945*. United States Army in World War II. Special studies. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army.
- Ebinger, Charles K., and Evie Zambetakis. 2009. "The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 85 (6):1215-1232.
- Emmerson, Charles. 2010. *The Future History of the Arctic*. New York: Public Affairs.
- English, John. 2016. "The Emergence of an Arctic Council." In *Governing the North American Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Institutions*, 217-230. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fry, Samuel. 1991. "Feature: The Arctic and US foreign policy, 1970-90." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 2 (14):5.
- Gómez, J. Alfredo. 2014. "Better Direction and Management of Voluntary Recommendations

- Could Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation.” Report to Congressional Requesters May 2014 GAO-14-435. United States Government Accountability Office. *GAO Reports*:1.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail. 1987. “The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk.” Moscow, Soviet Union, Novosti Press Agency. Barentsinform.org Portal. https://www.barentsinform.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf.
- Government of Canada. 2009. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians. *Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*. <http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf>.
- Government of Canada. 1925. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates. 12 Parliament, 4th Session. Volume 4. Ottawa: FA Acland.
- Government of Canada. 1970. *Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act*. R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12. <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/A-12/FullText.html>.
- Gravel, Mike. 1971. Letter to President Richard Nixon urging a formal U.S. Arctic policy. March 23, 1971.
- Hale, Thomas, David Held, and Kevin Young. 2013. *Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing When We Need It Most*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013.
- Hannigan, John A. 2016. *The Geopolitics of Deep Oceans*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Haycox, Stephen. 2020. “Arctic Policy of the United States: An Historical Survey.” In *The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics*, edited by Ken S. Coates and Carin Holroyd. Palgrave Macmillan: Gewerbestrasse, Switzerland: 233-250.
- Hayton, Robert D. 1958. “Polar Problems and International Law.” *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 52, No. 4 (October 1958): 746-765. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2195596>.
- Herd, Alexander W.G. 2011. “A ‘Common Appreciation:’ Eisenhower, Canada, and Continental Air Defense, 1953-1954.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, No. 3 (Summer 2011): 4-26.
- Headland, R.K. 2010. “Ten Decades of Transits of the Northwest Passage.” *Polar Geography* 33 (1-2): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2010.492105>.
- Hickok, David M., Gunter Weller, T. Neil Davis, Vera Alexander, and Robert Elsner. 1983. “United States Arctic Science Policy.” Division American Association for the Advancement of Science. Alaska Council of Science and Technology.

- Historical Records Survey. 1944. *Presidential Executive Orders: Numbered 1-8030, 1862-1938, Volume 1*. "Executive Order 3797-A, February 27, 1923: Certain described petroleum seepage lands along the Arctic coast of Alaska reserved as a naval petroleum reserve." New York: Archives Publishing Company. Google Play e-book. <https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=OsE-AAAAIAAJ&rdid=book-OsE-AAAAIAAJ&rdot=1>. Accessed August 28, 2020.
- Hough, Peter. 2013. *International Politics of the Arctic: Coming in from the Cold*. London: Routledge.
- Huebert, Rob. 1998. "New Directions in Circumpolar Cooperation: Canada, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and the Arctic Council." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 5 (2): 37–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.1998.9673131>.
- Huebert, Rob. 2009. "United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power." *The School of Public Policy Publications (SPPP) Volume 2. Issue 2. May 2009*. doi:<https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v2i0.42321>.
- Huebert, Rob. 2010. "The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment." *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*. https://d3n8a8pro7vhm.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/41/attachments/original/1413661956/The_Newly_Emerging_Arctic_Security_Environment.pdf?1413661956
- "The Ilulissat Declaration." 2009. *International Legal Materials* 48 (2): 382-383. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25691378>.
- Keskitalo, E. C. H. 2003. *Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region*. Florence: Taylor & Francis Group. Accessed November 13, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- Knecht, Sebastian. 2016. "The politics of Arctic international cooperation: Introducing a dataset on stakeholder participation in Arctic Council meetings, 1998–2015." In *Cooperation and Conflict*: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Koivurova, Timo and Filip Holiencin. 2017. "Demilitarisation and neutralisation of Svalbard: how has the Svalbard regime been able to meet the changing security realities during almost 100 years of existence?" *Polar Record* 53 (2): 131-142. doi:10.1017/S0032247416000838.
- Kraska, James. 2007. "The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage." *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 22 (2): 257-82.
- Kraska, James. 2011. "The New Arctic Geography and U.S. Strategy." In *Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change*. Edited by James Kraska. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Lansing, Robert. 2012. *The Peace Negotiations*. Luton, Bedfordshire: Andrews UK Ltd.. Accessed August 26, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- Lansing, Robert. 1917. "A Unique International Problem." *The American Journal of International Law* 11 (4): 763–71.
- Larson, David L. 1990. "United States interests in the Arctic region." *Ocean Development & International Law* 21 (2): 167-191. doi: 10.1080/00908328909545929.
- Laruelle, Marlene. 2014. "Resource, state reassertion and international recognition: Locating the drivers of Russia's arctic policy." *The Polar Journal* 4 (2): 253.
- Law Library of Congress*. 1941. "Defense of Greenland." United States Treaties and International Agreements: 1776-1949: 107-113. <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/b-dk-ust000007-0107.pdf>.
- Leitner, Peter M. 2021. Personal interview. March 11, 2021.
- Leitner, Peter M. 1996. *Reforming the Law of the Sea Treaty: Opportunities Missed, Precedents Set, and U.S. Sovereignty Threatened*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Lindsey, G. R. 1977. "Strategic Aspects of the Polar Regions." *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*. Behind the Headlines Series. Volume 35 (6): 1-24.
- Lindsey, George. 1989. *Strategic Stability in the Arctic*. Adelphi Papers, 241. London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies. Digitized by the Internet Archive, <https://archive.org/embed/strategicstabili0000lind>.
- Martin, Lawrence. 1940. "The Geography of the Monroe Doctrine and the Limits of the Western Hemisphere." *Geographical Review* 30 (3): 525-528. doi: 10.2307/210268.
- May, Peter J., Bryan D. Jones, Betsi E. Beem, Emily A. Neff-Sharum, and Melissa K. Poague. 2005. "Policy Coherence and Component-Driven Policymaking: Arctic Policy in Canada and the United States." *Policy Studies Journal* 33 (1):37-63.
- Mayhew, Susan. 2009. "Sector principle." *Oxford Dictionary of Geography*. <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199231805.001.0001/acref-9780199231805-e-2740>.
- McCormick, Ty and Joel Kimmel. 2014. "Anthropology of an Idea: Arctic Sovereignty." *Foreign Policy* 206: 20-21. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24577407>.
- McDorman, Ted L. 2009. *Salt Water Neighbors: International Ocean Law Relations Between the United States and Canada*. New York: Oxford University Press. Oxford Scholarship Online. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195383607.001.0001.

- Mendez, Tessa. 2009. "Thin Ice, Shifting Geopolitics: The Legal Implications of Arctic Ice Melt." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* (Issue 3):527.
- Miller, David Hunter. 1925. "Political Rights in the Arctic." *Foreign Affairs* 4(1): 47-60.
- Morehouse, Thomas A. 1987. "Native Claims and Political Development: A Comparative Analysis." 1987 Annual Meeting of Western Regional Science Association. Kona, Hawaii. February 19, 1987.
- Murray, Robert, and Nuttall, Anita Dey. 2014. Editors. *International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance*. Amherst: Cambria Press. Accessed December 6, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- Murray, Robert W. and Anita Dey Nuttall. 2014. "Introduction: Understanding Policy and Governance in the Arctic." In *International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance*, edited by Robert W. Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall, 1-21. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press.
- National Science Foundation. *Arctic Research of the United States*. 1987. Volume 1. Fall 1987.
- National Science Foundation. *Arctic Research of the United States*. 1996. "U.S. Arctic Policy and the Arctic Council." Volume 10. Fall/Winter 1996.
- National Security Council. 1971. Subject Files box 308, folder [05] "Arctic: US Policy on March 1970-April 12, 1971." Received from the Nixon Presidential Library Archivist on June 25, 2021. This folder contains several Arctic policy-related NSC papers, including the 1970 Henry Kissinger, U. Alexis Johnson, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt memos cited in chapter 5 of this dissertation.
- National Security Council. 1973. NSC IAPG Draft Memorandum. The Nixon Presidential Library and Museum archival staff was unable to locate in its holdings the IAPG's full report, "U.S. Arctic Programs: Review and Recommendations," issued on July 21, 1972. However, the archival staff did locate and e-mail a four-page NSC draft memorandum that is a compilation of four related memos: 1) a May 15, 1972 Memo for the President from NSC Under Secretaries Committee Chairman John N. Irwin, II, that collectively summarize the IAPG's recommendations; 2) a January 10, 1973 Memo for National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger from NSC staffer Michael A. Guhin through NSC staffer David D. Elliott commenting on the IAPG's recommendations; 3) a January 17, 1973 Memo for the President from National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger discussing the pros and cons of the IAPG's recommendations; and 4) an early draft of President Nixon's January 22, 1973 National Security Decision Memorandum 202.
- National Security Council. 1976. "Subject: Law of the Sea – Request for Instructions on an Article on Vessel Pollution Control in the Arctic." Memorandum for the President. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee. U.S. Department of State. April

- 28, 1976. This NSC memorandum, formerly classified Secret, was approved for public release on February 27, 2003 (CIA-RDP82S00697R0004026-0) and is publicly available in the CIA's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room.
<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82s00697r000400170026-0>.
- Neuman, Scott. 2019. "No Joke: Trump Really Does Want To Buy Greenland." *National Public Radio*. August 19, 2019.
<https://www.npr.org/2019/08/19/752274659/no-joke-trump-really-does-want-to-buy-greenland>.
- Nielsen, F. K. 1920. "The Solution of the Spitsbergen Question." *The American Journal of International Law* 14(1-2): 232-235.
- Nilsson, Annika E. 2018. "The United States and the making of an Arctic nation." *Polar Record* 54 (2):95-107. doi: 10.1017/S0032247418000219.
- Nixon, Richard. 1970. "Statement About United States Oceans Policy." May 23, 1970. *The American Presidency Project*. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. University of California at Santa Barbara. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/239769>.
- Nord, Douglas C. 2016. *The Arctic Council: Governance within the Far North*. London: Routledge.
- Nord, Douglas C. 2006. Canada as a Northern Nation: Finding a Role for the Arctic Council. In *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O'Reilly. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
- Nord, Douglas C. 2007. "Searching for the North in North American Foreign Policies: Canada and the United States." *American Review of Canadian Studies* 37 (2):207-217. doi: 10.1080/02722010709481855.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. N.d. "Denmark and NATO." NATO Declassified. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_162357.htm. Accessed on January 23, 2021.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1952. "North Atlantic Military Committee Decision on M.C. 14/1[:] A Report By the Standing Group on Strategic Guidance." *Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area*. Appendix. December 9, 1952.
<https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a521209a.pdf>. Accessed on January 23, 2021.
- Obama, Barack. 2013. *National Strategy for the Arctic Region*. Washington, DC: The White House. May 2013.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.
- O'Rourke, Ronald. 2018. "A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential

- Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress.” *Congressional Research Service Report*. Report R43838. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- O’Rourke, Ronald. 2019. “Changes in the Arctic: background and issues for Congress.” *Congressional Research Service Report*. Report R41153. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Osherenko, Gail, and Oran R. Young. 1989. *The Age of the Arctic: hot conflicts and cold realities*, Studies in Polar Research. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Østreng, Willy. 1977. “The Strategic Balance and the Arctic Ocean: Soviet Options.” *Cooperation & Conflict* 12 (1):41.
- Panel of the Law of Ocean Uses. 1990. “U.S. Interests and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” *Ocean Development and International Law* (Issue 4):373.
- Pedersen, Torbjørn. 2008. “The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy.” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19 (2): 236–62.
- Pedersen, Torbjørn. 2011. “International Law and Politics in U.S. Policymaking: The United States and the Svalbard Dispute.” *Ocean Development & International Law* 42 (1/2): 120–35.
- Petersen, Nikolaj. 1998. “Negotiating the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects.” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 21 (1): 1-28.
- People’s Republic of China. 2018. State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (SCIO). China's Arctic Policy (White Paper). Foreign Languages Press. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.
- Pollack, Herman and Peter J. Anderson. 1973. “United States Policy for the Arctic.” In *Arctic Bulletin* 1 (1): 2-3. Summer 1973. Washington: National Science Foundation. HathiTrust Digital Library. <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.31822009382557>.
- Public Law 83-212. 1953. An Act to amend the Submerged Lands Act. Cited as the “Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.” U.S. Statutes at Large 67: 462-471. <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/STATUTE-67/STATUTE-67-Pg462>.
- Public Law 92-203. 1971. An Act to provide for the settlement of certain land claims of Alaska Natives, and for other purposes. Cited as the “Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.” U.S. Statutes at Large 85: 688-716. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-85/pdf/STATUTE-85-Pg688.pdf#page=1>.
- Public Law 98-373. 1984. *Arctic Policy and Research Act of 1984*. <https://www.congress.gov/98/statute/STATUTE-98/STATUTE-98-Pg1242.pdf>.

- Rainwater Shiloh. 2013. "Race to the North: China's Arctic Strategy and Its Implications." *Naval War College Review* 66 (2): 62.
<http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.vt.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.26397372&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Reagan, Ronald. 1983. "Statement on United States Oceans Policy." *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum*. March 10, 1983.
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-united-states-oceans-policy>.
- Reed, John C. 1958. "History of the Story of the Exploration of Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 and Adjacent Areas Northern Alaska, 1944-53: Part 1, History of the Exploration." Edited by Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of the Interior. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Ries, Thomas. 1980. "Svalbard: Flashpoint of the Far North?" *International Defense Review* (3): 335-339.
- Roach, J. Ashley. 2020. "Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic Region." In Spohr, Kristina, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Jason C. Moyer. *The Arctic and World Order*. La Vergne: Brookings Institution Press, 2021.
<https://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=6451546>.
- Rosamond, Annika Bergman. 2011. *Perspectives on Security in the Arctic Area*. Report. Danish Institute for International Studies: 14-36.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep15639.5>.
- Rossi, Christopher R. 2016. "A Unique International Problem: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History." *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* (Issue 1):93.
- Rothwell, Donald. 2008. "The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a New Regime." *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, no. Issue 1: 241.
- Schnabel, James F. 1996. "History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume I: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945-1947." Office of Joint History. *Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington, DC.
- Schönfeldt, Kristina. Editor. 2017. *The Arctic in International Law and Policy*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Scowcroft, Brent. 1976. *National Security Decision Memorandum 325: United States Policy Toward Svalbard*. Washington, DC: National Security Council. April 20, 1976.
<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm325.pdf>.
- Scrivener, David. 1996. *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council*. Security Policy Library No. 1/1996. Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee.

- Scully, R. Tucker. 2021. Personal Zoom interview. August 6, 2021.
- Sevastyanov, Sergey, and Alexey Kravchuk. 2017. "The Russian approach to national security in the arctic." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29 (1): 131.
- Singh, Elen C. 1980. *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States Foreign Policy, 1907-1935*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Solski, Jan Jakub. 2021. "The Genesis of Article 234 of the UNCLOS." *Ocean Development & International Law* 52 (1): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2020.1835026>.
- Steinberg, Philip E. 2014. "U.S. Arctic Policy: Reproducing Hegemony in a Maritime Region." In *International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance*, edited by Robert W. Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall, 165-190. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press.
- Stupak, Ronald J., and Peter M. Leitner. 2001. "Realism Revisited: Philosophical Assumptions, Power Patterns, and American Foreign Policy." *Journal of Power and Ethics* 2 (1).
- Tamnes, Rolf, and Kristine Offerdal. 2014. *Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional dynamics in a global world*. Florence: Routledge.
- Thomas, Monica E. 1986. "The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Conflict and Controversy." *Polar Record* 23 (142). Cambridge University Press: 27–36. doi:10.1017/S003224740000677X.
- The Third [Annual] Report of the President to the Congress on Marine Resources and Engineering Development*. January 1969. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.
- Truman, Harry. 1945. Executive Order 9633. *Reserving and Placing Certain Resources of the Continental Shelf Under the Control and Jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior*. September 28, 1945. <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/9633/executive-order-9633>.
- Truman, Harry. 1945. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667. "Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf." September 28, 1945. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2667-policy-the-united-states-with-respect-the-natural-resources-the-subsoil>.
- Truman, Harry. 1952. "Veto of Bill Concerning Title to Offshore Lands." May 29, 1952. Truman Public Papers. *Harry S. Truman Library*. <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/146/veto-bill-concerning-title-offshore-lands>.
- Truman, Harry S. 1953. Executive Order 10426. *Setting Aside Submerged Lands of the*

- Continental Shelf as a Naval Petroleum Reserve*. January 16, 1953.
<https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/10426/executive-order-10426>
- Tynan, Thomas M. 1979. "Canadian-American Relations in the Arctic: The Effect of Environmental Influences upon Territorial Claims." *The Review of Politics* 41 (3): 402-427.
- Ulfstein, Geir. 1995. *The Svalbard Treaty: from terra nullius to Norwegian sovereignty*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- United Nations Security Council. 1958. Draft resolution subsequently vetoed by the Soviet Union on May 2, 1958—U.S. proposal to create a Northern zone of international inspection in the Arctic Circle against surprise attack. Eight Hundred and Seventeenth (817th) meeting. S/RES/3995. Available at <https://undocs.org/en/S/3995>. Accessed December 2020.
- U.S. Department of State. *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: 1945-1952*. "NSC 68, 1950." Washington: Government Printing Office. Document 85.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68>.
- U.S. Department of State. 1919. *Foreign Relations of the United States*. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1912." Washington: Government Printing Office.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1912/message-of-the-president>.
- U.S. State Department. 1945. *Department of State Bulletin* 13 (327). September 30, 1945: 453-504.
- U.S. Department of State. 1947. *Foreign Relations of the United States*. National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Department of State Policy Statement: "Polar Regions," January 27, 1947. Washington: Government Printing Office. Document 529. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v01/d529>.
- U.S. Department of State. 1949. *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Western Europe; Volume IV, Policy Statement of the Department of State: "Relations of the United States with Denmark," October 1, 1949. Washington: Government Printing Office. Pages 618-625. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v04/pg_618.
- U.S. Department of State. 1950. *Foreign Relations of the United States*. National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950. Washington: Government Printing Office. Document 85. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85>.
- U.S. Department of State. 1951. *Foreign Relations of the United States*. National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Department of State Policy Statement:

“Polar Regions,” July 1, 1951. Washington: Government Printing Office. Document 765. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v01/d765>.

U.S. Department of State. 1954. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*. National Security Affairs, Volume 2, Part 1, Document 92. “A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay): Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Continental Defense [Regarding NSC 159/4 – Statement of Policy on Continental Defense].” September 25, 1953. Washington: Government Printing Office. S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5408. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d92>.

U.S. Department of State. 1970. “Proposed Arctic Conference.” Telegram. April 15, 1970.

U.S. Department of State. 1990. *The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary. “Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, with Annex, Signed at Washington. June 1, 1990.”* Washington, DC: U.S. Government.

U.S. Department of State. 1992. “United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims.” *Limits in the Seas*, Number 112. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. March 9, 1992. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/LIS-112.pdf>.

U.S. Department of State. Circa 1990. “The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy: Part I [The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy 1789-1960] (UNCLASSIFIED); Part II [The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy 1960-1990] ([UNCLASSIFIED]); Part III (Footnotes [The Arctic and United States Foreign Policy 1960-1990] (UNCLASSIFIED).” *Historical Research Project No. xxxx*. Office of the Historian. Washington, DC: U.S. Government. The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian produced this undated draft study in the early 1990s to describe events relevant to shaping U.S. foreign policy development in the northern polar region since the department was established in 1789. Although the State Department has no record indicating the draft study was ever finalized or published, the study provides great insight into official U.S. thinking about the Arctic region from 1960 to approximately 1990. Led by State Department Foreign Service diplomat Samuel E. Fry, Jr., the study is divided into three parts. In a June 24, 2019, e-mail replying to this author, a State Department Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs program analyst noted “that Part II [which covers the Arctic and U.S. foreign policy between 1960-1990] was originally classified, but went through a formal declassification process in 1994 and is marked as such.” Included with Part II is an undated memo (Case Control # 9402533) from Frank M. Machak, the State Department’s Director of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review. Mr. Machak is responding to a June 23, 1994, letter from another State Department official who, according to the memo, requested “mandatory review and release of one State Department document under Executive Order 12356.” Machak states the document in question was reviewed and “may be released.”

- U.S. Government. 1990. *Arctic research: a focus of international cooperation: report of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission to the President and the Congress of the United States of America for the period 1 October 1988 - 30 September 1989; including a summary of Commission recommendations and government responses*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arctic Research Commission.
- U.S. Government. 2016-17. "The world factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/north_america-political.jpg?1561570875. Accessed July 5, 2019.
- U.S. Government. 2019. Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. Department of Defense. Washington, DC.
- United States. Executive Office of the President. 2010. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington: Executive Office of the President.
- United States v. California*. 332 U.S. 19. 1946. Black, Hugo Lafayette, and Supreme Court of the United States. Periodical. <https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep332019/>.
- "United States Joins in Arctic Declaration, Supports Existing Arctic Legal Regime." 2008. *The American Journal of International Law* 102(4): 872-873. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20456693>.
- University of Oregon. 2018. International Environment Agreements (IEA) Database Project. <https://iae.uoregon.edu/ird>.
- University of the Arctic. "The Circumpolar North." Accessed April 11, 2019. <https://education.uarctic.org/circumpolar-north/>.
- Wang, Muyin, and James E. Overland. 2009. "A sea ice free summer Arctic within 30 years?" *Geophysical Research Letters* 36 (7). doi: 10.1029/2009GL037820.
- Watson, Robert J. 1986. "History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume V: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953-1954." Office of Joint History. *Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington, DC.
- Wegge, Njord. 2014. China in the arctic: Interests, actions, and challenges. *Nordlit* 32: 83, <http://septentrio.uit.no/index.php/nordlit/article/view/3072/2964>.
- Westermeyer, William E., and Kurt Michael Shusterich. 1984. *United States Arctic Interests: The 1980s and 1990s*. Springer-Verlag. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat07058a&AN=vtp.1231756&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Young, Oran R. 1985. "The Age of the Arctic." *Foreign Policy*(61): 160-179.

- Young, Oran R. 1998. *Creating regimes: Arctic accords and international governance*. Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press.
- Young, Oran R. 2005. "Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation." *Global Governance* 11, no. 1 (January-March 2005):9-15. Brill.
- Young, Oran R. 2011. "The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?" *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) 87 (1):185-193.
- Young, Oran R., and Gail Osherenko. 1993. *Polar politics: creating international environmental regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Zimmerman, Michael. 2018. "High North and High Stakes: The Svalbard Archipelago Could be the Epicenter of Rising Tension in the Arctic." *PRISM* 7 (4):106.

Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Questions

Evan Bloom Interview Questions

1. How did the Arctic Council fit into U.S. Arctic national interests and the U.S.'s conception of Arctic governance after the Cold War?
2. What was the nature of the U.S.'s opposition to allow the Arctic Council to address military security matters? Who (individuals or agencies) objected to allowing the Council to discuss such matters? What U.S. national interests were at issue?
3. What entity (a reformed Arctic Council or something else) would be best suited to address military security matters in the Arctic in the future? How might such an entity come about?

Peter M. Leitner Interview Questions

1. To what extent did the Truman Proclamation affect U.S.-Canadian relations in the Arctic over issues such as Arctic sovereignty or North American continental defense?
2. To what extent did the Truman Proclamation and the subsequent 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act affect U.S. Arctic interests in the 1950s and 1960s?
3. What other sources would you recommend to provide a more detailed exploration of the above questions?

R. Tucker Scully Interview Questions

A) U.S. Arctic national interests formulation

1. What factors or considerations were most consequential in helping the U.S. Government formulate its Arctic national interests in the 1970s and 1980s?

2. What role did the U.S.'s broader national interests play in shaping its Arctic national interests in the 1970s and 1980s? For example, how did the U.S.'s global interest in preserving freedom of the seas affect the formulation of its Arctic national interests?

B) U.S. Arctic national interests drivers

1. To what extent did U.S. domestic political considerations drive the formulation of U.S. Arctic interests during the 1970s and 1980s?

2. To what extent did U.S. domestic political considerations drive the formulation of U.S. Arctic interests after the Cold War?

C) U.S. Arctic national interests and Arctic governance engagement

1. How did the Arctic Council fit into U.S. Arctic national interests and the U.S.'s conception of Arctic governance engagement after the Cold War?

2. What was the nature of the U.S.'s opposition to allow the Arctic Council to address military security matters? Who (individuals or government agencies) objected to allowing the Council to discuss such matters? What U.S. national interests were at issue?

Appendix B: Profile of Interviewees

Evan Bloom

Mr. Evan Bloom is a Senior Fellow at the Wilson Center's Polar Institute. He led the U.S. Government's effort in negotiating the Arctic Council's initial rules and documents in the mid-1990s, and then subsequently oversaw America's representation on the Arctic Council from 2006 to 2020.

Peter M. Leitner

Dr. Peter M. Leitner is a professor in the School of Science and Technology Intelligence at the National Intelligence University. He has over 30 years of federal government service, 21 of them in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as senior strategic trade advisor. He has written on territorial sovereignty, the continental shelf, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

R. Tucker Scully

R. Tucker Scully is a retired U.S. State Department senior official with over three decades of experience on oceans and polar regions issues. This includes serving as chief U.S. negotiator on polar issues in the 1980s and 1990s, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries. He had an instrumental role in negotiating the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Treaty, as well as creating the Arctic Council.