1. ~~Introduction:~~ hate and hate crimes in society

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Headlines in the United States during the early part of the 2020s were tremendously worrisome. Thousands of citizens were dying each day from the COVID-19 virus, the United States Capitol had been attacked by a mob calling for the hanging of the vice president, the president was being impeached for the second time, protests against police brutality and racial injustice were being held in hundreds of cities across the nation, and disruptions to the global supply chain were leading to shortages of essential items. While the nation was in the throes of these troubling events, the headlines also reported that hate crimes were on the rise. Headlines such as the following were reported in every form of media:

- "Hate crimes in US rise to highest level in 12 years, says FBI report" (*The Guardian*, 2021);
- "2020 saw highest number of reported hate crimes in two decades, updated FBI data shows" (Sganga, 2021);
- "Anti-Asian hate crimes increased 339 percent nationwide last year" (NBC News, 2022).

Based on official statistics, the headlines were accurately reporting a disturbing trend. Reported hate crimes in the United States increased from 7,314 incidents in 2019 to 8,263 in 2020, an increase of approximately 12.9 percent. This increase in the number of hate crime incidents was recorded despite 452 fewer agencies actually reporting to the FBI (US Department of Justice, 2020). The trend then continued in 2021 and 2022. In 2021, 14,859 law enforcement agencies reported 10,840 hate crime incidents involving over 12,400 separate offenses (US Department of Justice, 2021), and the number of reported hate crimes rose to over 13,000 reported incidents in 2022 (US Department of Justice, 2023).

Unfortunately, the increase in hate crimes was not only observed in the US. Based on data from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), recorded hate crimes increased in most of the 40 nations that reported to the agency. For example, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Romania all reported increases in the number of reported hate crimes (ODIHR, 2023). While decreases were reported in a few nations, overall reported hate crimes increased among the 44 participating European states from 6,391 incidents in 2021 to 8,106 incidents in 2022 (ODIHR, 2023). Although most nations do not report hate crime statistics, the United Nations has noted an alarming trend of growing xenophobia, racism, misogyny, and anti-Semitism as well as anti-Muslim and anti-Christian hatred around the world. Indeed, it seems as if hate crimes are increasing in many—if not most—countries, and the expressions of hate are no longer whispered or couched in coded language as happened in the not-so-distant past. As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres (Guterres, 2019, p. 1) said when discussing the global groundswell of hate:

> This is not an isolated phenomenon or the loud voices of a few people on the fringe of society. Hate is moving into the mainstream—in liberal democracies and authoritarian systems alike. And with each broken norm, the pillars of our common humanity are weakened.

Thus, reading newspaper headlines, scouring the data, and listening to experts and governmental officials all lead to a disturbing conclusion: the major trend in hate crimes is that they appear to be increasing, and this increase is especially pronounced in liberal democracies. How did we get here? After years of dominating the world system and unprecedented periods of prosperity, why are Western democracies dealing with increasing levels of hatred toward historically marginalized groups? The answers to such questions are undoubtedly complex and the causes of these trends are many; however, we have gathered 40 scholars to help provide insights to issues surrounding hate and hate crimes in society. Our major objective was to place the study of hate and hate crimes into historic and cross-national perspective. To do so, we offer chapters that address a variety of types of hate—from race-based hate to anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ+ hate. In addition, we offer chapters that consider hate and hate crimes in a variety of nations—from France and Finland to Pakistan. We also tackle the complexities of studying and combating hate that emerge from definitional issues as well as issues that hinder intervention strategies. Finally, we include chapters that confront the complex relationship between the state and hate crimes in terms of how these are defined, how they differ from terrorism, and how they differ from harms committed by privileged actors such as corporations and the state itself.

The chapters in this book address these issues, but before we turn to these we need to step back and view the current situation with a wider lens. When we take a historic and cross-national view, we notice four features: (1) the hate and extremism of today is predominantly from the right; (2) there are similarities across nations in the types of hate and the groups it targets; (3) hate is reaching vast audiences and doing so faster than ever before; and (4) authorities struggle to combat it. Let us briefly consider each of these features of modern hate.

HATE MOVES TO THE RIGHT

First, the hate and extremism of the early 2020s is dominated by rightwing, hyper-nationalistic rhetoric more than in the past (Hawdon, 2017). This is not to imply the hate of the past was not deeply racist, nativist, misogynistic, anti-Semitic, and anti-LGBTQ, because it was (see, for example, Perry, 2000). There is no doubt that rightwing groups have been a problem throughout much of the nation's history, and this has not changed. However, what has changed is the relative *decline* of leftwing, anti-systemic extremism in the United States and throughout western Europe (see Miller, 2014; Hawdon, 2017). Looking at data since the early 1990s, Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington (2020) note that the majority of all attacks and plots in the US since 1994 have been from rightwing groups and these attacks and plots have grown substantially in number since 2016 (Jones et al., 2020; Anti-Defamation League, 2023).

Much of the recent increase in hate crimes in the United States was due to a dramatic spike in anti-Asian hate (Gover, Harper, & Langton, 2020); however, other forms of rightwing hate that target victims because of their religion, national origin, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, or sex are also common. For example, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hate

crimes have increased dramatically since the outbreak of the war in October 2023 between Israel and Hamas (Pinales, 2023). And, again, the rise of rightwing groups and the growth of rightwing hate has not been limited to the United States. In countries such as Greece, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and France, openly anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, racist, and anti-LGBTQ far-right political parties have gained strength in local and national elections (Anti-Defamation League, 2014). Hate, it seems, has become mainstream.

This normalization of hate can be linked to hyper-nationalistic groups focused on issues related to immigration (see, for example, Garsd, 2023; Anti-Defamation League, 2016), and it is unquestionable that the United States and Europe have faced recent immigration crises. For example, the US set record levels of migrant crossings in 2023, and the European Union (EU) received more asylum seekers in 2023 than it had since the Syrian civil war led to mass immigration in 2015 and 2016 (Maass, 2023). These crises are largely a result of ongoing wars and civil conflicts, food insecurities due to climate crises, and high rates of violent crime fueled by international drug cartels, gang violence, and political turmoil (Maass, 2023; The United Nations Refugee Agency, 2023). Many of these problems are a result of a growing crisis of neo-liberal globalization and the massive global inequalities that system created (see Rodrik (2021) and Baier (2016) for a discussion of the link between rightwing populism and neo-liberalism and globalization). As was the case when similar systemic crises were being felt in the 1930s, the current crisis is fueling the rise of far-right groups that contribute to waves of xenophobic violence (Berlet & Lyons, 2021; Klapsis, 2014). Hate is a function of fear, and the insecurities of the system are creating a lot of fear.

HATE MOVES TOWARD CROSS-NATIONAL SIMILARITIES

A second observation about the current state of hate is that the rhetoric of hate, despite being hyper-nationalistic, is similar across nations. That is, *there has been an internationalization of nationalism*. As such, the rhetoric of neo-Nazi groups in the United States is very similar to that espoused by British, German, Italian, and French groups (Hawdon, 2023). Anti-immigrant groups such as the Finnish Soldiers of Odin have affiliates and an organized presence in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, and possibly elsewhere (see, for example, Anti-Defamation League, 2016; Laizans & Dagenborg, 2016; Makuch, 2017). There has been a globalization of movements advocating white supremacy and promoting “white identity” (Perry & Scrivens, 2016). Similarly, Sweden’s Nordic Resistance Movement has taken its extreme anti-Semitism internationally, establishing chapters in Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland (Anti-Defamation League, 2022).

While the rhetoric of rightwing hate takes slightly different forms depending on the nation-specific factors, there are striking cross-national similarities. Generally, the central narrative is that the corrupt global system run by Marxists-Jewish-globalists-elites threatens the economic and cultural position of “the common people.” Their culture (e.g. American, British, French, fill in the nation) is under attack and being erased by “politically correct” elitists promoting a “woke” ideology. Moreover, these elites favor some other group over “the common people,” and the elites are actively promoting policies that advantage the “others,” who are often minorities or immigrants. In short, the rightwing group is trying to protect the traditional values, way of life, and economic vitality of the “common man” from the global

elites who want to impose their anti-Christian values on them and the “others” who want to take their jobs and reject their traditions.

These are the common arguments made by rightwing populists in general, and, to be fair, not all populists are extremists espousing hate (Greven, 2016; also see Berlet & Sunshine, 2019). However, as Greven (2016) argues, the more ethno-centric the conception of “the people,” the more xenophobic the positioning against “the other.” Looking at rightwing hate cross-nationally, that which is now being espoused is increasingly xenophobic and targets people because of their race, nationality, and/or immigrant status regardless of the nation in which the hate originated (Hawdon, 2023; Costello, Restifo, & Hawdon, 2021). For example, in a six-nation study, Reichelmann and her associates (2021) found that among those who saw hate espoused online, the overwhelming majority of them saw hate targeting groups based on race or immigrant status. This was especially pronounced in Finland, the United States, Poland, and the United Kingdom (Reichelmann et al., 2021). Thus, the rhetoric being used, the arguments being made, and the targets of the hate are increasingly similar across nations. Ironically, while these groups are anti-globalization, their message has gone global.

HATE MOVES ONLINE

A third observation is that hate is increasingly moving online. While expressing hate is not a crime in the United States and some other nations, the spread of hateful ideologies and the recruitment of individuals into hate groups is increasingly done online. This is certainly not a new phenomenon as hate groups began using the Internet shortly after it was invented (Daniels, 2009). Cyber or online hate first appeared in 1984 as a series of articles expressed disparaging remarks about Jews and African Americans on a bulletin board system (Berlet, 2012). Shortly thereafter, the Ku Klux Klan established Stormfront as a racist bulletin board, and then Stormfront.org became the first website expressly devoted to white supremacy. By 2009 Stormfront was among the most visited hate sites on the Internet (Brown, 2009; Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Costello & Hawdon, 2020), and it had over 300,000 registered online members at its peak in 2017 (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017). Following Stormfront’s early lead, approximately 150 hate groups were operating online by 1996, over 11,500 by 2011 (Brown, 2009; Potok, 2015), and over 1,225 by 2022 (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2023). It is important to remember that these estimates are undoubtedly low and are limited to those groups that are active in the United States. In other words, there are certainly far more online hate groups than what these disturbing numbers suggest.

Not only are there a staggering number of online hate groups but social media has also exacerbated the online presence of hate. Social media, ranging from social networking sites to discussion forums and blogs, offers a variety of outlets for anyone to easily spread hate. Indeed, most online hate is disseminated by individuals rather than formal hate groups (Costello & Hawdon, 2020). Thus, the Internet and social media allow for this rhetoric of hate to be spread far more quickly and widely than ever before, and the numbers of people being exposed to these ideas are frighteningly high in many nations. For example, over 70 percent of young people report seeing online hate in Finland, Poland, Spain, and the United States (e.g., Reichelmann et al., 2021).

It should be noted that the tone of hate differs depending on whether the materials are posted by a formal hate group or an individual. Formal hate groups are often far less likely

to openly advocate violence. In fact, the main objectives of formal hate groups are to recruit and connect like-minded people in support of their cause, inform others about their group, encourage participation in their cause, and denounce others for defaming their group (see Douglas, 2007; McNamee et al., 2010). Comparatively, individuals are more likely to advocate violence against the group or outright hatred of the group, with nearly a quarter and a third of viewed materials doing so in cross-national samples, respectively (Reichelmann et al., 2021). The difference in content of hate materials posted by formal group compared to individuals is undoubtedly a function of anonymity. While formal hate groups are easy to track and potentially held accountable, individuals can easily post anonymously and avoid any direct accountability for their attacks. Regardless of who posts and the explicit content of the post, exposure to online hate can have serious consequences for individuals and society (see Hawdon, Bernatzky, & Costello, 2019). Most disturbingly, those involved in hate crimes and acts of bias-motivated mass violence are often radicalized online. A growing body of research finds that hate crimes are geographically and temporarily connected. That is, hate crimes are more likely to occur in areas with higher amounts of online hate (e.g. Williams et al., 2020), and hate crimes increase after online hate speech increases (e.g. Awan & Zempi, 2016). Consequently, the increasing presence of hate online is concerning because it is harmful in and of itself, it is a hate crime in some countries, and it has been linked to the commission of hate crimes even in countries where hate speech is not criminalized.

Yet, there is also encouraging news with respect to cyberhate. The increasing online presence of hate is not only in terms of those promoting it; attempts to counter hate and hate crimes are also moving online and increasing in number. Many of these efforts take the form of anti-hate speech campaigns designed to teach people to recognize online hate, embrace diversity, and confront bias when it is encountered (Windisch et al., 2022). Other interventions encourage individuals or groups to establish community standards on online platforms and to conform to those established social norms. Still other strategies include the automated detection of online hate to target interventions and attempts to empower users to produce counternarratives (see Blaya, 2019). In some countries, especially those of western Europe, heightened legal regulations of online content have been proposed and implemented (Blaya, 2019). Cutting-edge efforts to use AI-generated counternarratives aimed at specific individuals who have been flagged as posting hateful materials are also being tried (Ping, Hawdon, & Rho, n.d.). Unfortunately, systematic reviews and meta-analyses of these efforts report insufficient evidence to determine their effectiveness (e.g. Blaya, 2019; Windisch et al., 2022). Nevertheless, there are increasing numbers of attempts to counter the documented growth and adverse consequences of the hate that has moved online and is now widely available to view.

UNDERSTANDING AND COMBATING HATE CONTINUES TO BE ELUSIVE

Fourth and finally, attempts to understand and combat the spread of hate, mitigate the adverse effects of hate crimes suffered by those victimized by it, and enforce laws that can punish those who commit hate crimes are stymied by legal complexities, definitional debates, jurisdictional disputes, and, in some cases, indifference toward the victims or outright support for the perpetrators. One issue that complicates the study, regulation, and prosecution of hate crimes is that we continue to inadequately measure them. While many issues contribute to this, one funda-

mental problem plaguing our estimates of how much hate crime is out there is the fact that in nations such as the United States, the number of agencies reporting their data to the Federal Bureau of Investigations fluctuates widely from year to year. Thus, the totals for reported hate crimes regularly change at least partly due to differences in the number of agencies reporting. This makes accurately tracking hate crimes over time difficult, if not impossible. The reasons law enforcement agencies fail to report hate crime statistics vary, but include organizational factors (e.g. resources, policies, organizational culture), environmental factors such as political climate and local laws, and individual factors and convictions (see Nolan & Akiyama, 1999; Perry & Samuels-Wortley, 2021).

Another problem with measuring hate crime comes from definitional inconsistencies across jurisdictions. As Joseph H. Michalski documents in this volume (see Chapter 2), differences in how various countries define and record hate crimes make it impossible to compare hate crimes cross-nationally. While some scholars suggest alternative sources can be used to measure hate crimes, these methods also face complexities and difficulties (see Vergani et al., 2021). The impact of jurisdictional differences in defining hate crimes is perhaps most obvious when it comes to online hate and/or hate speech. Many nations, such as France, Germany, and Pakistan, criminalize at least some forms of hate speech, while others, such as the United States, do not. Given the frequency with which hate is spoken, it is clearly impossible to make meaningful comparisons between nations that consider some forms of speech as criminal and those that do not. An inability to accurately measure hate and hate crimes over time and space makes understanding its causes and consequences difficult, and this lack of understanding can only adversely affect our attempts to mitigate it.

Yet another issue that haunts scholars of hate and those attempting to regulate it is the fact that many victims do not report hate crimes to the authorities. Looking at victimization data and comparing it to what is officially reported reveals that hate crime is dramatically underreported (e.g. Kena & Thompson, 2021; Pezzella, Fetzer, & Keller, 2019; Sandholtz, Langton, & Planty, 2013). There are a host of reasons why people do not report hate crimes to the authorities, including that they prefer to handle the issue through alternative means or believe the authorities would not or could not do anything about the crime. In the US, it is estimated that approximately 44 percent of hate crimes go unreported to the authorities (Kena & Thompson, 2021). Ultimately, the under-reporting of hate crimes reflects a reluctance on the part of the public to report these crimes, which then obviously compromises law enforcement's ability to enforce hate crime laws.

Even when hate crimes are reported, there is then tremendous variation across jurisdictions with respect to how they are handled. While some jurisdictions pursue these cases with diligence, others do not. In many jurisdictions, there is a woeful lack of training for law enforcement in how to recognize and handle hate crimes. Even when training is provided to officers, many receive inadequate amounts of it because there are organizational, operational, and individual factors that can undermine the training's delivery and effectiveness (see Hardy, Chakraborti, & Cuko, 2020). As with the host of problems that lead to poor data quality and the under-reporting of hate crimes to authorities, variations in how hate crimes are handled by the authorities hamper our abilities to regulate them effectively.

In short, while scholars continue to refine their concepts and search for solutions to the "data problem," we still lack the robust data we need to truly comprehend the scope of the problem, as well as its causes, the consequences of experiencing it directly or vicariously, strategies for disrupting it, and the effectiveness of a variety of interventions meant to prevent it. Similarly,

while there are increased efforts on the part of many governments to clearly define hate crimes, pass hate crime legislation, and enforce such legislation in an attempt to combat hate, we are still confronted with several challenges.

It is in this climate that we offer the *Research Handbook on Hate and Hate Crimes in Society*, and our book includes chapters that address these topics. While numerous scholars have documented and discussed these trends, we solicited chapters from a variety of scholars to highlight the ongoing empirical and conceptual challenges scholars and practitioners confront when studying or trying to combat hate and hate crimes. Our goal in including these chapters was to provide insights that can offer guidance for addressing these challenges. We also wanted chapters that could help put recent events and trends into context, both historically and cross-nationally. We included chapters that address a wide variety of types of hate, ranging from race-based hate to hate that targets religion or sexual orientation, to underscore the multifaceted nature of hate. It was with these goals in mind that we collected the following 17 chapters, all of which underwent a double-blind peer review process.

ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT OF THE BOOK

The 17 chapters are organized into four broad parts that reflect our goals: Measuring Hate Crimes and Their Effects; Variation in Types of Hate Crimes; Hate Crimes in Countries around the Globe; and Hate Crime and Its Complex Relationship with State Actors.

The first part offers three chapters that address some of the empirical and conceptual challenges involved in studying hate. It also details some of the unique consequences hate crimes have on those victimized by them. In Chapter 2, Joseph H. Michalski outlines definitional issues associated with documenting and studying hate crimes. He argues the lack of definitional consistency hinders our abilities to reliably evaluate the scope, incidence, and prevalence of hate crimes. Michalski also highlights methodological issues by comparing official statistics on hate crimes with evidence from both victimization and self-report studies. The differences in these data sources reflect fundamentally different types of social behavior with different social determinants. The chapter concludes with a series of recommendations with respect to future directions in hate crime research.

In Chapter 3, Andre Kehn, Mariah L. Sorby, Madison Adrian, and Lauren Stornelli discuss the theoretical origins of hate-motivated behavior from a social psychological lens. Taking a multidisciplinary perspective, the authors discuss how hate-motivated behavior is currently assessed, the tools used to measure it, and the areas where these tools and our current measurements of hate-motivated behavior are lacking. They also discuss how hate-motivated behavior affects those targeted by it, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of future directions for the studies and assessments of hate-motivated behavior.

The part concludes with Chapter 4 where Brendan Lantz, Marin R. Wenger, and Jack M. Mills document the unique consequences of hate crime victimization in comparison to other types of victimization. The authors consider the distinct physical, emotional, psychological, and social effects of being victimized by or witnessing a hate crime. Offering a model for understanding the unique and combined impacts of these harms, the chapter highlights the challenges vulnerable populations face when experiencing victimization or vicarious victimization. Taken together, the chapter articulates the various challenges victims confront when seeking assistance with and responding to their victimization.

The book's second part includes seven chapters that cover various types of hate crimes, ranging from anti-Asian hate crimes to hate crimes where no individual victims are identified. The part begins with Chapter 5, authored by Michael L. Dolezal, Heather Littleton, Stephanie Lim, and Katie Edwards. In this chapter, the authors review the literature documenting how often LGBTQ+ individuals experience acts of bias-related violence, differences in risk across various LGBTQ+ identities, and the characteristics of perpetrators of anti-LGBTQ+ violence. They consider the psychosocial consequences for both individuals victimized by this violence and the broader LGBTQ+ community. They discuss the need for interventions addressing anti-LGBTQ+ bias-related violence and conclude with recommendations for future research, practice, policy, and advocacy.

Joseph H. Michalski considers several key issues surrounding anti-Muslim hate crimes, with a special focus on the United States and Canada, in Chapter 6. He begins by reviewing the historical context for the growth of Islam in these two countries, and then presents official statistics on anti-Muslim hate crimes, victimization data reported by Muslims, and the recent experiences of those who have suffered directly or indirectly from the effects of various forms of Islamophobia. He then examines the concept of "minority-group threat" and the main factors that contribute to practices associated with identifying and scapegoating Muslims.

In Chapter 7, co-editor Matthew Costello and Holly Verity Williams place the proliferation of anti-Asian hate in the wake of the outbreak of COVID-19 into historical context by discussing the long history of anti-Asian sentiments in America. The authors outline that history and highlight the ways in which Asians have been systematically *othered* in America. They also explore the history of linking Asians to the outbreaks of novel diseases, with an emphasis on the COVID-19 pandemic. Using recently collected data from X (previously Twitter), they examine how rhetoric on X regarding Asians and China devolved as the pandemic worsened.

Salvatore J. Restifo and Amie Bostic consider anti-immigrant sentiment and hate in Chapter 8. They document how immigrants have repeatedly been painted as cultural, economic, political, and criminal threats. Drawing on a threat perspective, they examine the sociocultural, economic, and political-legal dynamics surrounding three periods of anti-immigrant conflict: (1) 1880–1924, (2) 1965–1985, and (3) 2000–2023. They also explore parallels across periods, consider how they unfold across major institutions, and examine dynamic intersections of race, nativity, and group relations. They conclude by discussing how anti-immigrant hate continues to lead to marginalization, discrimination, and violence against the foreign born.

In Chapter 9, Janice Iwama, Jazmine Talley, and Jack McDevitt discuss the patterns and trends of hate incidents reported in US schools. They begin by examining reports on school-based hate crimes and other hate incidents, and then discuss the limitations of these statistics. They then review studies on the effects these incidents have on students in schools. The authors offer recommendations for strategies on prevention and reporting, and they conclude by discussing available resources to support victims of hate incidents in US schools.

In Chapter 10, Jonathan LLoyd and Ashley V. Reichelmann assess racial threat by observing anti-Black hate crime offenses over the course of President Barack Obama's initial candidacy announcement, presumptive nomination, confirmed nomination, electoral victory, and inauguration. The findings indicate that racial threat theory carries implications for political elections and that the temporal analytic unit can drastically affect findings. Empirically, Obama's initial announcement, rather than his election or inauguration, constituted the most threatening event to his detractors. More generally, it appears hate crimes may increase sharply at the realistic prospect of a threatening future event rather than when the event actually occurs.

The part concludes with a change of focus in Chapter 11. In this chapter, Lisa M. Jones, Kimberly J. Mitchell, Heather A. Turner, Gina Zwerling Kahn, and Leanne Gast present data from a national survey of law enforcement agencies across the US about hate crime investigations where no individual victims are identified. Their findings indicate that cases with no identified victims were disproportionately property crimes and motivated by religious bias and less likely to include identified suspects. For these cases, witness statements predicted a greater likelihood of identifying suspects. The chapter recommends that law enforcement training programs emphasize the importance of identifying victims, improving documentation, and vocally supporting communities.

Unlike much of the book that focuses on hate crimes in the United States, the third part includes chapters that discuss hate crimes in different cultural contexts, including Pakistan, France, Finland, and the United Kingdom. Chapter 12, authored by Nizar Ahmad, Jun Sung Hong, and Paghunda Bibi, discusses hate crimes in Pakistan. The authors trace the evolution of existing Pakistani laws related to hate crimes before reporting empirical evidence from a survey of Pakistani students about hate crimes and youth exposure to hate crimes online. The results reveal that more than 50 percent of youth are exposed to hate online. Finally, the chapter discusses the implications of the findings and directions for future research.

In Chapter 13, Catherine Blaya and Liliia Korol provide an overview of the legal framework and existing knowledge on cyberhate among young people in France. Specifically, the authors present a synthesis of research concerning the prevalence of online hate experiences among children and adolescents, including cyberhate exposure, victimization, and perpetration. They identify predictors of youth's involvement in cyberhate, the consequences of cyberhate experiences for wellbeing, and the potential links between cyberhate and offline hate. The authors conclude by discussing the practical implications for decision-makers and intervention efforts designed to prevent and combat online hate to create a safer and more inclusive online environment.

Markus Kaakinen, Teemu Vauhkonen, Janne Vepsäläinen, and Pekka Räsänen explore the links between online hate speech and offline hate crime in Chapter 14. Using data collected from Finnish adolescents, they find that the production of online hate speech and exposure to peer-produced online hate speech are positively correlated with the perpetration of offline hate crimes. The findings suggest that young individuals who commit offline hate crimes tend to also produce online hate speech and associate with peers who also produce hate speech. However, peer-produced hate speech appears to be a significant risk factor only for those adolescents who already possess intolerant attitudes.

The next chapter, Chapter 15 authored by William Allchorn, investigates the effectiveness of counternarratives as a means of combating extremist ideologies. Used mainly at the "upstream" phase of radicalization, the use of counternarratives in communications campaigns is a key intervention strategy within the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) professions. Despite this renewed challenge and imperative from far-right extremist organizations, there is a dearth of empirical data on what works and what does not in counter-narrative campaigns specific to the far-right. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, Allchorn describes an iterative attempt to affect attitudinal changes among far-right sympathizers. After describing the intervention and the methodology used, he presents the evaluative results of the initiative.

The fourth part returns to the discussion of the conceptual difficulties when studying hate and hate crimes. The part includes three chapters that consider the complex relationship

between the state and definitions of hate crimes, terrorism, and hate speech. In Chapter 16, Robert Todd Perdue examines "eco-terrorism" in the United States to articulate the distinctions between domestic terrorism and hate crimes and highlight how political ideology influences the resources given to combating these. He demonstrates how governmental and corporate actors created a moral panic by grossly inflating the threat posed by radical environmentalists to justify repressing the movement for their anti-capitalist and anarchist views. He contrasts these efforts with those aimed at combating hate crimes, which often promote and protect underlying cultural ideologies and do not challenge the dominant structures of society. He concludes by arguing that efforts to combat the serious threats posed by hate crimes and hate groups are stymied because state and corporate actors are consumed with protecting the status quo, not people.

In Chapter 17, Matteo Vergani and Jade Hutchinson review the multidisciplinary research concerning the relationships between terrorism, hate crime, and hate speech. By doing so, they uncover the empirical and theoretical knowledge gaps and propose a new theoretical framework: Ecosystems of Hate. The framework provides the intellectual parameters for a new research agenda that accumulates knowledge about the shared causes, effects, and correlates between different hate behaviors. The chapter closes with a discussion of the advantages and limitations of adopting an ecological framework focused on the interrelations among terrorism, hate crime, and hate speech.

Finally, in Chapter 18, the complex relationship between the state and hate is discussed. Looking throughout history, the United States government has frequently engaged in behaviors that targeted marginalized groups and could easily be classified as hate crimes; however, this same state passed laws that define hate crimes as offenses whose perpetrators deserve additional punishments. Recognizing this, co-editor Hawdon argues that states can adopt four different roles vis-à-vis hate: participate, tolerate, castigate, or regulate. Historical examples of when the US federal government and various states have adopted each role are provided, and the chapter concludes with theoretical and practical considerations.

CONCLUSION

We believe these chapters will significantly advance our understanding of hate and hate crimes in society. We are confident that these works convey the complexity of the issues we confront, provide context to recent and historical trends in hate and hate crimes, give a sense of the wide variety of hate crimes that occur, and highlight cross-cultural similarities and differences in types of and responses to hate. We also believe these chapters offer new insights into how to deal with the complexities of hate and understand its variability across both time and space. We are hopeful that they stimulate interest in the study of hate and hate crimes in society. The scholars who contributed to this work are among the many who dedicate their efforts to understanding and combating hate and hate crimes, but it will take many more scholars and practitioners conducting many more studies and interventions to fully understand and successfully combat hate. There appears to be a rising tide of hate that threatens the safety, wellbeing, and lives of many of our fellow citizens. It will take a monumental effort by those who are concerned by these trends to reverse that wave and shelter those that it threatens.

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